## 1

### OFF

#### Interp – the 1AC must defend a contrapuntal reading of the resolution.

Biswas 07 (Shampa Biswas Paul Garrett Professor of Political Science. Education: Ph.D., Political Science, University of Minnesota, 1999, M.A., International Relations “Empire and the Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said As An International Relation Theorist” Millennium Journal Of International Studies, 2007 (Vol 36) pp. 117-133)//JP

The kind of globalism that Said advocates involves a felt and sympathetic awareness of an in- and co-habited world. In an interview with Bruce Robbins, Said is at pains to underscore that the rootlessness and exilic marginality he promotes are not detached, distant positions that exclude ‘sympathetic identification with a people suffering oppression ... [e]specially when that oppression is caused by one’s own community or one’s own polity’.47 The exilic orientation ‘involves the crossing of barriers, the traversing of borders, the accommodation with various cultures, not so much in order to belong to them but at least so as to be able to feel the accents and inflections of their experience’.48 It is a globalism that is very much linked to Said’s unabashed defence of ‘humanism’. At the heart of this defence is a commitment to an aware and felt ethic of ‘humanity’ that emerges from a sense of ‘worldliness’ (i.e. a sense of ‘the real historical world’49) and knowledge of difference. A central defining pole of (Said’s) humanism, says Akeel Bilgrami in the foreword to Said’s posthumously published collection of essays in Humanism and Democratic Criticism, is ‘the yearning to show regard for all that is human, for what is human wherever it may be found and however remote it may be from the more vivid presence of the parochial’.50 Said himself criticises the rampant use of the word ‘human’ in much of the current discourse on ‘humanitarian intervention’, which, as he points out, is conducted largely by visiting violence on distant humans.51 His humanism is an attempt to retrieve the humanity of those distant humans by developing a genuinely globalist ethic. This globalist ethic is not based on a crass abstract universalism, but is very much a concrete, grounded ethic that takes the local seriously. As intellectuals, we all carry, he says, some ‘working understanding or sketch of the global system’, but the ‘direct encounters with it in one or another specific geography, configuration, or problematic’ is absolutely essential to developing the kind of sensibility he articulates.52 In an interview with Jennifer Wicke and Michael Sprinker, Said rejects the indiscriminate use of the word ‘internationalism’, reiterating the deep roots of processes in a local or national situation despite their location in varied and larger contexts.53 But it is not a reification of the local, as has already been indicated in the previous section, that Said is arguing for here. While so much of his work, especially in Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism, has critiqued the imperial particularisms of universalising claims to power and authority, what he offers in their stead are locally sensitive, context- informed and respectful universals. As Mufti points out with respect to Said’s work, while the whole can only be comprehended contingently ‘from one possible location within it or a trajectory through it’,54 ‘(t)he genuine alternative to (the) universalism of contemporary Eurocentric thought is not a retreat into the local, into so many localities, but rather a general account of the play of the particular in the universalizing processes of capitalist-imperial modernity’.55 Indeed, as Mufti also suggests, what Said offers is a rethinking of the local. Recalling his commentary on the exilic orientation as pushing one’s scholarly perspective towards the margins from which a more expansive view of the global is available, one may understand Said’s attempts to rescue the ‘marginalized perspective of the minority as one from which to rethink and remake universalist (ethical, political, cultural) claims, thus displacing its assignation as the site of the local’.56 What Said is offering us here, then, is a felt commitment to the concrete and the situated, especially via the lived experiences of those most marginalised by contemporary global politics. This may yield to IR scholars a reconfigured ‘area studies’ (shorn of its calculating, Cold- War, strategic logics) or perhaps ‘place studies’, providing concrete sites to think the global empirically and carefully.57 What indeed would it mean for IR scholars to ‘represent all those people and issues that are routinely forgotten or swept under the rug’58 – refugees, poor migrants, asylum seekers, sweatshop workers, enemy combatants – to build their understandings of the global less from state-centric institutions of world politics and more from the concrete ‘spaces of exception’ in Georgio Agamben’s words, where the least state-protected bodies reside? The question then is how one understands the global in a way that remains sensitive to context and perspective. What method does Said offer for abandoning the skewed historiography, the parochial universalism and its uniform theory of progress and the Orientalism which has been the legacy of Eurocentric scholarship in the humanities and the social sciences and cultivating a ‘sense of multiple worlds and complex interacting traditions’?59 Contrapuntal readings, Said suggests, are such an ‘attempt at a globalized (not total) description’,60 readings that offer just such a method for crafting an understanding of global politics as inhabited by multiple and overlapping worlds.61 It is a method that responds to ‘Eurocentrism as an epistemological problem’ – ‘the social and cultural force of (the) idea of Europe in intellectual life, as in the phenomenal world of global power relations’.62 To read contrapuntally, Said argues, is to show a historical awareness of the complex interdependence through which the global has been constituted. As he explains more broadly of the massively knotted and complex histories of special but nevertheless overlapping and interconnected experiences – of women, of Westerners, of Blacks, of national states and cultures – there is no particular intellectual reason for granting each and all of them an ideal and essentially separate status ... we must be able to think through and interpret together experiences that are discrepant, each with its particular agenda and pace of development, its own internal formations, its internal coherence and system of external relationships, all of them co-existing and interacting with others.63 Said argues that a ‘post-imperial intellectual attitude’ *requires* looking at different experiences contrapuntally, ‘as making up a set of ... intertwined and overlapping histories’.64 This would mean re-reading the cultural archive ‘with a simultaneous awareness both of the metropolitan history that is narrated and of those other histories against which (and together with which) the dominating discourse acts’.65

#### Violation – they don’t – they approach the resolution from a stance of IR expertise that fails to account for any site of the social or alternate modalities of experience just like Itachi – any We Meet is proof of our argument that traditional IR will always attempt to obfuscate and shift to avoid any meaningful shift to alternate research models.

**Biswas’ 07** (Shampa Biswas Paul Garrett Professor of Political Science. Education: Ph.D., Political Science, University of Minnesota, 1999, M.A., International Relations “Empire and the Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said As An International Relation Theorist” Millennium Journal Of International Studies, 2007 (Vol 36) pp. 117-133)//JP

One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21 It is not surprising that the ‘cult of expertise’ that is increasingly driving the study of global politics has occurred in conjunction with a larger depoliticisation of many facets of global politics, which since the 1980s has accompanied a more general prosperity-bred complacency about politics in the Anglo-European world, particularly in the US. There are many examples of this. It is evident, for instance, in the understanding of globalisation as TINA market-driven rationality – inevitable, inexorable and ultimately, as Thomas Friedman’s many writings boldly proclaim, apolitical.22 If development was always the ‘anti-politics machine’ that James Ferguson so brilliantly adumbrated more than a decade ago, it is now seen almost entirely as technocratic aid and/or charitable humanitarianism delivered via professionalised bureaucracies, whether they are IGOs or INGOs.23 From the more expansive environmental and feminist-inspired understandings of ‘human security’, understandings of global security are once again increasingly being reduced to (military) strategy and global democratisation to technical recipes for ‘regime change’ and ‘good governance’. There should be little surprise in such a context that the ‘war on terror’ has translated into a depoliticised response to a dehistoricised understanding of the ‘roots of terror’. For IR scholars, reclaiming politics is a task that will involve working against the grain of expertise-oriented professionalism in a world that increasingly understands its own workings in apolitical terms.

#### Standards –

#### 1] Eurocentric Epistemologies – Expert IR crowds out marginalized scholarship ensuring state-centered replicating the extermination of bodies outside the human by regarding alternate research as “too individual” or “irrelevant”, always choosing to “act on” those groups rather than including them within the research process. This resulting in inaccessibility turning Debate into an echo-chamber of white Eurocentric discussions which is a sequencing question to any of their offense.

#### 2] Serial Policy Failure – The sole focus on state-centered expertise ignores the multitude of experiences, perspectives, and cultures that are infused within IR at the level of the local resulting in militaristic violence at the level of pedagogy – their elitist model empowers technocratic policymaking that caused the Iraq War, War on Terror, and endless drone attacks creating a rift between ordinary people and policymaking elites ensuring economic inequality and right-wing traditionalist backlash.

#### Outweighs – 1] Accessibility is a sequencing question to who gets access to Fairness and Education in the first place – can never procedural fairness from unethical structural constraints, 2] Ethical Pedagogy is constitutive to debate – Fairness is only an I/L to more ethical Research practices – there’s no impact to Fairness if it’s actively violent, 3] Scope – Fairness is about this debate – our model is about changing how debate as a model functions and spills-up.

#### DTD – It’s a question of the entire form of their research practice.

#### TVA – endorse the Aff through a constructivist reading of IR of how nationalist cultural forces shape the drive for medical dominance

#### Competing Interps – Reasonability collapses into Competing Interps since it’s a question of what should be included into debate

#### No RVI’s – 1] Illogical – Euro Da – Ir interps come as a weighing question of methods

#### A] The 2N gets 6min to brute force the issue and put out way more than I can cover – 3min 2ARs can’t recover

#### B] Illogical – you shouldn’t win just cause you’re fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance

#### C] Topic ed – no RVI means we can go back to substance, but an RVI means the debate has to be resolved on the theory layer

#### D] Chilling effect – new debaters will be scared to read theory because they’re scared of better debaters, which allows experienced debaters to get away with abuse

#### E] Norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms

## 2

### OFF

#### Text – Turtle Island ought to [reduce intellectual property protections for medicines]. Turtle Island should have jurisdictional control over the Plan.

#### The CP solves the Aff - "Everywhere land resists and refuses—whales that destroy ships, bees that refuse to work, bombed islands that reconstitute themselves. The land also resists in the form of people; Indigenous and Black peoples' resistance is the land's resistance. Indigenous and Black people continue to subvert legal and capitalist technologies as part of that resistance."1

1tag sauce from “A Third University Is Possible by La Paperson”, pp. X, slightly edited

Tinker 4 George" Tink" Tinker. "The stones shall cry out: Consciousness, rocks, and Indians." Wicazo Sa Review (2004): 105-125. (Professor of American Indian cultures and religious traditions @ Cliff School of Theology in Denver, member of the Osage nation)//Cut by CL//Re-cut by Elmer

**Did you know that trees talk?** Well they do.They talk to each other, and they’ll talk to you if you listen. Trouble is, **white people don’t listen**. They never learned to listen to the Indians, so I don’t I suppose they’ll listen to other voices in nature. But I have learned a lot from trees; sometimes about the weather, sometimes about animals, sometimes about the Great Spirit.1 When we talk with non-Indians about nature, there is really nothing you can say in universal Western concepts that is going to make a lot of sense. I think that Western people who come into an Indian environment and attempt to preach take along their own set of categories and use it to deal with Indian people they meet. Anthropologists, summarizing what they find in the Indian tradition, always calling us animists, and that view is accepted by a great many people in the field of religion. We are put in a cultural evolutionary framework, and then we are supposed to move from animism to some great abstract conception of one god.2 Science describes things at a level of abstraction, by leaving out of account a whole range of properties that they have (colour, beauty, consciousness . . . ). This is for many purposes a very useful procedure, but it does not follow that the properties with which science concerns itself are more real than those it leaves out.3 Did you know that rocks

talk? Well, they do. Yes, I am aware that this is an audacious claim—even for an American Indian—made in the context of late modernity (or even postmodernity, if you insist) and in the context of a world indelibly marked by the accomplishments of modern science. But the argument proposed for this essay is that rocks talk and have what we must call consciousness. And we must extend our discussion of rocks to trees—as Walking Buffalo asserts in the quote above—and to the rest of the created world around us. I want to open an exploration of the particular disjunction between the worldviews of American Indian and Euro-Western cultures with regard to Western scientific, religious, and commonsense knowledges. The Western world, long rooted in the evidential objectivity of science, distinguishes at least popularly between things that are alive and things that are inert, between the animate and the inanimate. Among those things that are alive, in turn, there is a consistent distinguishing between plants and animals and between human consciousness and the rest of existence in the world. To the contrary, American Indian peoples understand that all life forms not only have consciousness, but also have qualities that are either poorly developed or entirely lacking in humans.4 Curiously enough, while Western philosophy asserts universally that human beings have consciousness, there is currently no agreement whatsoever as to what that consciousness is and whether its qualities are to be identified through a process of scientific study (neurology, psychology, and so on) or through philosophical or theological reflection. Yet Western culture, the emergent world culture (in Immanuel Wallerstein’s useful parlance)5 of globalized capital and Western science, is equally sure that rocks certainly do not have consciousness. What, then, is the nature of these contrasting epistemological claims? Is the Indian worldview “merely” religious—with no value in fact?6 Is the Euro-Western scientific worldview a perception of reality that is equally a “mythological” system? Or is it to be understood as a singular truth-value that is incontrovertible? Allow me to begin with a personal reminiscence from the summer of 1986. R O C K S The Kanukamaoli artist was describing how he found the large rock boulders that he sculpted so beautifully into images of Kanukamaoli deity figures. These sculptures, the artist was quick to note, were never for sale and hence were not the source of his sustenance. Speaking to a diverse group of U.S. academics and Pacific Rim artists and scholars gathered at the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii, the man responded to a question by saying, “I don’t find them; they find me! I might be walking along the beach, and one would reach out and bite the heel of my foot.” This explanation resonated deeply with a young American Indian scholar (namely, myself) who was also a conference participant. In my response to the Kanukamaoli brother, I remembered having accompanied an older medicine man on an outing to gather rocks for a special purification ceremony (or sweat lodge, as it is sometimes called in English). “As we walked up an arroyo away from the pick-up,” I reported, “I began to notice some pretty nice rocks right away—just like the ones used regularly in these ceremonies. Why don’t we take these, I asked? The medicine man shook his head, said, ‘No, not those,’ and kept on walking. All the time we were getting further up the arroyo, and I knew who was going to have to carry all those rocks back to the truck. Finally, more than a quarter mile from the truck, the medicine man nodded and pointed to some rocks that looked just like the hundreds we had passed by along the way. ‘These have agreed to go with us,’ he said. ‘They will help us in our prayers.’” The lone British academic present, a professor of American studies at Oxford, immediately jumped in with the severe criticism, “That’s what is wrong with you people. You are so anthropocentric! You think that everything in the world works the way you do.” The critique was emotional rather than rational; it was rooted in nearly a week’s worth of frustrated attempts to communicate across cultural barriers as well as in a lifetime of immersion in a culture that thinks of itself as somehow universal and normative—and thus inherently superior—a position of intellectual fascism, however naïve. As he finished his short tirade, I rose to argue that exactly the opposite is actually the case. “I am sorry Professor W., but that comment cannot go unchallenged. You see, you are the ones who are actually anthropocentric. You believe that everything in the world works differently from yourselves.” Consciousness, Intelligence, and Evolution This claim of consciousness for rocks raises difficult questions for those rooted in the knowledge base of Western science. It raises questions, of course, about the type of consciousness that I intend to identify, given Western science's proclivity for ever more discrete cognitional categorization. But it also raises questions about theories of evolution and the dominance of notions of progress and development in contemporary discourse. [End Page 107] As an American Indian, first of all, I must confess that I am not yet a believer in the "fact" of evolution.7 I do not believe that we Osages evolved from monkeys. However, should it some day be actually proven beyond any doubt that Osages have descended from monkeys, I would be deeply honored to share such a respectable lineage—even though the only monkeys in North America arrived with the colonial occupation and settlement. At the same time, we Indians would continue to have deep concerns for the Euro-Western proclivity for understanding descent as a category of ascendancy leading to the anthropocentric privileging of the human mind. American Indians are deeply aware of our part in another family tree entirely—one predicated on interrelationship rather than on descent or hierarchy of any kind. As Osages, our closest living relatives in this world, for instance, are our brothers and sisters the buffalo and our sister corn, to both of whom I shall return in due course. And, of course, we cannot forget rocks. A principle objection to theories of evolutionary descent on the part of American Indian people, then, stems from this ubiquitous Indian notion of interrelationship and the respect that Indian people maintain for all life forms in our world, including rocks and trees. Rather than elevate human beings to the apex of an evolutionary ascendancy (i.e., Darwin's common descent), the lack of human privileging over these other life forms means that Indians understand that all life shares equal status and that value, personhood, and intelligence must be recognized in all life. If there is a hierarchy of beings in the Indian experience of the world, humans are found at the bottom rather than at the top, being the youngest and least wise of all living things. As Deloria reports: The primary focus of creation stories of many tribes placed human beings as among the last creatures who were created and as the youngest of the living families. We were given the ability to do many things but not specific wisdom about the world. So our job was to learn from other older beings and to pattern ourselves after their behavior. We were to gather knowledge, not dispense it.8 We Osage do seem to come close to agreeing with current cosmological (and, perforce, evolutionary) theories in one regard: we hold that rock is tsage, the oldest living being—for which reason some call the tsage "grandparents" or "beloved old ones." And we know these old ones to be repositories of great wisdom and balance. In this context it should be noted that notions of deep time are not intrinsically foreign to Indian peoples. Unlike that version of the Euro-Western story based on the Hebrew Bible and so highly touted by more conservative Christians, Indian accounts of the beginnings never postulate a temporally ascertainable date.9 But, like some creationists, we do take our stories seriously. [End Page 108] As the oldest and wisest of all life forms, then, rocks are to be deeply respected as a category but especially as persons. They are the source of all life on the planet, and they continue to generously give of themselves for maintaining all life—especially in the ceremony popularly called sweat lodge, or the ceremony of purification.10 And it is a particular kind of rock that has made itself available for use in making the sacred pipe that is foundational to so many Indian prayers and ceremonies. These sacred pipes (nonnionba wakon) are also living beings, constructions of stone (the bowl) and wood (the stem) that possess a life of their own just as the stones used in a purification ceremony are living relatives. Charles Red Corn makes this point abundantly clear in the opening of his novel, A Pipe for February. Faced with the dramatic changes brought about by colonial conquest at the turn of the last century, a group of Osage families decides to put away one of their clan ceremonial pipes, a process requiring a formal burial—a funeral. The wife of the nonhonzhinga (a ceremonial leader/elder/pipe keeper) sits holding the pipe during the ceremony: As his wife her position was to look after the Pipe. She held it cradled in her arms and close to her breasts and in her grief she rocked the Pipe as she would rock an infant and when the woman could no longer restrain herself she began wailing a prayer song for one who has died.11 What are we to think of this description? Are pipes or rocks alive?Do they have consciousness? Deloria again captures the sense of Indian knowledge and experience as he describes the lives of rocks and their relationship to human beings: "We are all relatives" when taken as a methodological tool for obtaining knowledge means that we observe the natural world by looking for relationships between various things in it. That is to say, everything in the natural world has relationships with every other thing and the total set of relationships makes up the natural world as we experience it. This concept is simply the relativity concept as applied to a universe that people experience as alive and not as dead or inert. Thus, Indians knew stones were the perfect beings because they were self-contained entities that had resolved their social relationships and possessed great knowledge about how every other entity, and every species, should live. Stones had mobility but they did not have to use it. Every other being had mobility and needed, in some specific manner, to use it in their relationships.12 [End Page 109]

#### Starting points matter – refuse the revitalization of Settler lifeworlds

Smith 18 Gola Smith 2018 “Indigenous Lifeworlds” [https://www.academia.edu/39219089/Indigenous\_Lifeworlds?auto=download](https://www.academia.edu/39219089/Indigenous_Lifeworlds?auto=download%5d//vikas) (Black and Native woman, Northern Virginia Community College, BA in Philosophy)//Vikas//Re-cut by Elmer

I plan to introduce a series of papers concerning the necessary stances Indigenous and Black activists – and their ‘allies’ 1 – must take. This issue forwards the basics of my stance and thoughts – as a Black and Indigenous woman – on Indigenous refusal and resurgence (in line with the concerns of Glen Coulthard with contemporary Indigenous and Settler activism).

"Many **proposals have been made to us to adopt** your laws, your religion, your manners and your customs. We would be better pleased with beholding the good effects of these doctrines in your own practices, than with hearing you talk about them". - Old Tassel, Chief of the Tsalagi (Cherokee) **For centuries we have been told by Settlers that our lives and stories are** merely tools of the Settler, **who insists on fueling his** new **futures with the essence of Indigenous life**. Time and time again, **the same story unfolds**: **one more** - seemingly benign - **policy for the Savage that implicitly affirms** the **Westphalian sovereignty**. **Indigenous life struggles to finds its place in an environment intoxicated** with stories and promises of progress. **Those of us on the Rez increasingly have nothing more to look at than** our **tribal land grants** from the Settler’s institutions as evidence of Indigenous antiquity. As Glen Coulthard reminds us, the **tools to resolve our grievances will never lie in** what he terms “**recognition**,”2 **but a** refusal of Settler sovereignty. Those who ask us to adopt **the tools of colonial institutions**, "**do not provide the tools** required **to protect us against the** unilateral construction of our rights.” **The Indigenous spirit** - or adanvdo - **can only be** vitalized **through** a politics of **resurgence that** refuses negotiation in its entirity. Our solution lies in our own communities through a “politics of authentic self-affirmation.” Coulthard forwards the Idle No More movement as evidence of such resurgence. **The Indigenous spirit is** “**reclaimed and revitalized**” **through** its blockades and refusals of Settler lifeworlds. Indigenous activists – even if in everyday conversation – relate to each other in their hatred of the Settler pipelines being built on Turtle Island. **This cannot be a site of negotiation.** More often than not, Indigenous scholars arguing in favor of incremental reforms that rely on a politics of recognition forget that the site at which our demands align **does** matter. The value in Indigenous activist movements (like Idle No More) lies not in their ability to affect Settler politics, but in the ability to refuse recognition altogether. Even if Indigenous politicians legislatively halted construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline, Indigenous life would not be benefited. This is because **the lifeworlds being built are not Indigenous lifeworlds**. They are Settler lifeworlds. **This is not to say the slew of legislative changes enacted by Indigenous politicians has not benefited communities**, **but to forward an** alternative orientation **for** our **politics**. I will offer a brief discussion of the “SURVIVE Act” to demonstrate my point. Even if funds are set aside for Indigenous tribes through the “SURVIVE Act” to “respond to the emotional, psychological, or physical needs of a victim of crime,” the question of when we can start building our own lifeworlds still remains. **What we need are not** more **Settler** criminal justice **systems because the discussion** of a “criminal justice system” **is** - itself – **mediated by the** destruction of our lifeworlds. Before we were colonized, the Tsalagi had peace towns for wrongdoers, nothing like the prisons now being built on Indigenous lands for wrongdoers. This shit is all wrong. Stop telling me what to do. Let Indigenous activists create solutions from the mobilization of our politics. Don’t make us touch your shit.

#### The impact is settler fascism which results in micro-fascist violence – the CP’s grounded normativity solves.

Jokic 19, Dallas. Fascism and Settler Colonialism in Canada. Diss. Queen's University (Canada), 2019. (Graduate Student in the Department of Philosophy @ Queen’s University)//Cut by Shae//Re-cut by Elmer

Conclusion: Indigenous Resurgence as Anti-Fascism While all liberal capitalist states play a role in creating the conditions for fascism, I hope to have explicated the specific ways in which the settler colonial state of Canada does. **Fascism** in settler colonial states must be thought of as a consequence, and perhaps even an extension of**, the logic of colonialism**, even as it may push against the laws and norms of settler colonial states. In a state like Canada in which fascism has not yet taken on a molar form (at least not on a state level), approaches to understanding and opposing fascism must be attentive to molecular microfascisms and the political and social conditions that cultivate them. Understanding fascism not as a unified ideology or political philosophy that is consistent across time and space, but rather as clusters of tendencies and affects, allows us to identify fascism before it takes over a state and to understand the relationship between fascism and the status quo. In the Canadian context, microfascisms are produced in and around institutions of state violence **like police forces, the military, border agencies, and prisons**, as well as in state practices surrounding property and land. Not only do these practices and the use of (white) settlers for territorial fortification create a racialized conception of land, **they implicitly encourage individual acts of settler violence against Indigenous people** that serve to reinforce the white national identity of Canada. This white national identity continues to be reproduced and re-inscribed by everyday practices that can be traced back to the eliminationist and replacement-centered logic of the settler state. These processes serve the function of producing a Canadian nation that is racialized as white. Interestingly, the replacement central to the Canadian nation has been mirrored by fascist claims that articulate a fear that white people in Canada are being replaced. Since fascism in Canada is intimately related to the context of Canadian settler colonialism, anti-fascist strategies in Canada cannot simply be an import of European anti-fascist strategies. Any anti-fascist movements that leave the settler state outside the reach of their criticism leave themselves vulnerable to the fascistic tendencies inherent in the settler state, and in particular, settler nationalism. Anti-fascist movements in Canada must not only contest settler colonialism, they must follow the lead of Indigenous practices of resurgence and resistance.1 Indigenous scholars and activists have articulated different relationships we can have to the land, to each other, and to the non-human world. These approaches, though not always explicitly anti-fascist – that is, not always oriented primarily in opposition to fascism – are non-fascist in the ethical sense Foucault describes, and provide an alternative to practices that cultivate microfascisms.2 Anti-fascism should **not simply be opposed to settler colonialism** in the molar sense or take the form of Manichean opposition to the state. Indigenous resurgence is characterized not as a purely oppositional attitude towards the settler state but as a “turn away” from **settler state** and society **and towards “Indigenous institutions, values and ethics of interdependency**, cycles of change, balance, struggle, and rootedness.”3 Corey Snelgrove, Jeff Corntassel, and Rita Dhamoon write, “Indigenous resurgence is ultimately about reframing the conversation around decolonization in order to re-center and re-invigorate Indigenous nationhood.”4 Indigenous resurgence not only contests the settler state and nation, which as we have seen cultivate microfascisms, they also provide non-fascist ways of living and relating to other human beings, the land, and the rest of the more-than-human world. In stark contrast to the racialized conceptions of land fortified by Lockean notions of cultivation and productivity, many Indigenous nations ~~view~~ [understand] the land as valuable not just as a resource, but as a teacher, and something we find ourselves in meaningful relationship with. Instead of viewing land as a terra nullius that is claimed by a racially pure nation through labour, Leanne Betasamosake Simpson retells the Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg story of a child learning to harvest sap and make maple syrup. The child is not explicitly taught by adults around them, they learn by following the direction of the land itself; the child “learned both from the land and with the land.”5 Land is not just a blank space to be made productive, nor is it an exclusive ground for racial purity. By following the lead of Indigenous peoples and nations as they work to “reclaim and regenerate [their] relational, place-based existence,” we can not only undercut the affective power that racialized and capitalist conceptions of the land suggest, we can contest and turn away from the racist colonial basis of the settler property regime.6 Supporting Indigenous nations in their self-determination is another area in which we can work to undermine the basis of settler colonialism. Indigenous and settler models of nationalism are not just competing claims of nationalism but entirely different conceptions of the nation. While settler nationalism in Canada is implicitly racialized in opposition to Indigenous peoples and other racialized peoples, Indigenous nationhood is not necessarily conceptualized according to race or blood.7 Simpson argues that the senses of nationhood invoked by Indigenous resurgence are entirely different from those invoked by European settlers. She writes, “I am not a nation state…To me, Indigenous nationhood is a radical and complete overturning of the nation-state’s political formation.”8 As opposed to the racially exclusionary models of nationhood characteristic of the (settler) nation-state, Simpson considers her Kina Gchi Nishnaabeg-ogamig to be “based on a series of radiating responsibilities” linking humans and nonhumans together “**in the absence of coercion, hierarchy, or authoritarian power**” and instead forming “relationships based **on deep reciprocity, respect, non-interference, self-determination and freedom.”**9 Instead of simply being aimed at destroying the settler state, practices of Indigenous resurgence and nationhood offer alternatives to colonial and fascist conceptions of people, land, and the more-than-human world. The type of political activism that is required in order to oppose fascism cannot simply be against fascism or even against the structure of the state. The imagining of a future without fascism that does not involve Indigenous resurgence reaffirms the colonial basis of the settler state and engages in what Tuck and Yang call “settler futurity.”10 Instead of acquiescing to visions of a non-fascist future that denounce all kind of conceptions of nations or meaningful connections to land, anti-fascists should pay attention to the political principle that Coulthard and Simpson call “grounded normativity.” Grounded normativity draws on various Indigenous traditions and approaches towards the land and social organizations in order to provide a place-based model of political and ethical action. Coulthard and Simpson write, Grounded normativity houses and reproduces the practices and procedures, based on deep reciprocity, that are inherently informed by an intimate relationship to place. Grounded normativity teaches us how to live our lives in relation to other people and nonhuman life forms in a **profoundly nonauthoritarian, nondominating, nonexploitative manner**….Our relationship to the land itself generates the processes, practices, and knowledges that inform our political systems, and through which we practice solidarity.11 For those of us that are settlers, grounded normativity involves following the lead not just of “Indigenous people” as an imagined monolithic group, but rather the specific Indigenous nations, peoples, and tribes that live and have lived on the lands we find ourselves in.12 We should follow the lead of Indigenous political practices that offer decolonial alternatives to the racialized conceptions of space, love of violence and authoritarianism, and false victimization characteristic of fascism. Not only does this make us accountable to addressing the injustice of settler colonialism itself, it is the only way to attack fascism at its roots, which are deeply intertwined with Canadian settler society. Understanding the connection between fascism and settler colonialism should not be a simply scholarly project, but should motivate and inform place-based and decolonial anti-fascist action.

#### State-based IR reinforces civilizing humanism – all difference is cast as savagely primitive: either tameable for assimilation or wild enough to demand elimination.

King 17, Hayden. "The erasure of Indigenous thought in foreign policy." OpenCanada. org 31 (2017). (Gchi'mnissing Anishinaabe writer and educator based in the Faculty of Arts @ Ryerson University in Toronto)//Cut by Shae//Re-cut by Elmer

Foreign policy, but in whose national interest? For those studying and working in foreign policy, there are certainly debates over what constitutes the definition of the field. In Canada, there are debates about what counts as foreign policy (defence, security, trade, peacekeeping) and also how to approach those subjects (from liberal frameworks, realist, even some critical lenses). In his textbook on foreign policy Kim Nossal notes that the field is inherently divisive, emerging from “the interplay of conflicting interests, divergent objectives, contending perceptions, and different prescriptions about the most appropriate course of action.” Yet despite these divisive debates, there is **near universal acceptance of** two core assumptions: the legitimacy of the Canadian **state** itself as the primary actor in foreign policy and the concept of the national interest, which the field of foreign policy strives to serve. This is no surprise, really, considering these assumptions are underwritten and supported by every domestic institution — from Canada’s constitutional sources, to the cultural organizations that currently promulgate the fantasy of Canada as 150 years of glowing hearts, or decisions of the Supreme Court that reflect on the “assertion of Crown sovereignty” without ever explaining how that sovereignty was obtained. But for critical Indigenous scholars, these assumptions are myths that form not a legitimate state in the community of nations, but rather **a violent settler colony**. Between 1921 and 1923, after many years of resistance to the young countries, Canada and the United States were steadily encroaching into Haudenosaunee territory and governance. Cayuga Chief Deskaheh, also known as Levi General, travelled to London, England, to appeal to King George on the matter. (He wasn’t the first or last to appeal to a King or Queen; Anishinaabe leader Shingwaukonse actively attempted to, post-War of 1812, and Chief Theresa Spence did so in 2013, among many others). But when King George refused him, Deskaheh turned to the Geneva-based League of Nations, seeking a seat for the Haudenosaunee. With his efforts undermined by English officials there too, he returned home but was stopped at the U.S.-Canada border and turned away by Canadian border guards. He spent his final days in Rochester, New York. Before his death he made one last plea to ordinary Canadians and Americans for justice: “Do you believe — really believe — that all peoples are entitled to equal protection of international law now that you are so strong? Do you believe — really believe — that treaty pledges should be kept? Think these questions over and answer them to yourselves…We have little territory left — just enough to live and die on [because] the governments of Washington and Ottawa have a silent partnership of policy. It is aimed to break up every tribe of red men so as to dominate every acre of their territory.” (His plea is documented in Rick Monture’s We Share Our Matters.) The last two sentences of this quote are an apt description of modern settler colonialism, nearly 100 years before scholars identified the process. For anthropologist Patrick Wolfe, there is a distinction between colonialism, which eventually ends when the invaders leave, and settler colonialism, where they don’t. While in the former [colonial] formulation the Indigenous population is **often transformed to labour for colonial extraction**, in the latter, the settler colony attempts to liquidate all remnants of the previous (Indigenous) societies to legitimize its permanent presence. Deskaheh was speaking in the North American context, Wolfe in the Australian, but the phenomenon can be seen elsewhere, from Aotearoa/New Zealand to Palestine/Israel. Common strategies in this liquidation are as follows: physical extermination; oppressive Indian legislation designed to contain; the creation of reserves/reservations/settlements, residential or boarding schools; discrimination aimed specifically at women; and eventually legal absorption into state apparatuses and assimilation. While the genocidal nature of settler colonialism may not appear as physical violence today (though we do still have plenty of that), the underlying motivation to expunge threats to settler sovereignty endures. But where the specific harms of the field of foreign policy come into greater focus are in crafting a common sense around what counts as a legitimate politics of the international. Consider the core concepts of the field, or at least the discipline of IR that foregrounds foreign policy. I think it’s fair to say most traditional perspectives view the international system as an **anarchic environment where self-interested and (mostly) rational states compete against each other for power**. Or, in contrast, they may cooperate. For foundational IR scholar Hedley Bull, this simple formulation is “the supreme normative principal of the political organization of mankind.” I don’t need to elaborate on these concepts for this audience. But, what about political communities that do not resemble a state, that eschew coercive notions of exclusive sovereignty, that are bound by obligations and responsibilities to the land and thus do not recognize an anarchic world, political communities that do not start and end with men? The discipline of IR, as well as practice of foreign policy, effectively casts Indigenous peoples as primitive (or at least inferior), **sanctions the theft of their lands, and then forecloses the possibility of resurgent political communities**. At a fundamental level the perpetuation of this conceptual galaxy denies opportunities for Indigenous expressions of liberation — whether the case is the Six Nations of the Grand River, whose demands for a seat at the League of Nations in 1922 were rejected, or the current Canadian government demands that the articulation of international Indigenous rights not challenge territorial integrity or state sovereignty (this is true generally but seen clearly with the United Nation’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples). Such a denial is also expressed in the unequivocal support of the state of Israel at the expense of Palestinian existence, or the collaboration with a Honduran government that suppresses Indigenous communities and murders activists like Berta Cáceres. I am talking about more than denying liberation. By continuing to enforce the view of humanity as **a set of political states**, with Europe at the centre of the planet – as Chickasaw lawyer James Youngblood Henderson once pointed out in his deconstruction of the familiar Mercator world map – foreign policy actively contributes to the erasure of **Indigenous political difference conceptually as well as Indigenous bodies physicall**y. (Not to mention non-Indigenous but racialized political communities and bodies, too.) Thus, Canadian foreign policy is a foreign policy that normalizes and affirms settler colonialism. This is the primary national interest. And so, foreign policy is itself a manifestation of settler colonialism.