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#### **Genocidal settlement is** a structure, not an event meaning ontological logic of elimination is an everyday manifestation that defines settler identity.

Rifkin 14, Mark. Settler common sense: Queerness and everyday colonialism in the American renaissance. U of Minnesota Press, 2014. (Associate Professor of English & WGS at UNC-Greensboro)//Elmer

If nineteenth-century American literary studies tends to focus on the ways Indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent **attempts to theorize settler colonialism** have sought to **shift attention from its effects** on Indigenous subjects **to** its **implications for nonnative political attachments**, forms of inhabitance, **and modes of being**, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of **settlement as a system**. In Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Patrick Wolfe argues, “Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay—invasion is **a structure not an event**” (2).6 He suggests that a “**logic** **of elimination” drives settler** governance and **sociality**, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). Rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). In Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of Indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 In “Writing Off Indigenous Sover- eignty,” she argues, “As a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “Writ- ing Off Treaties,” she suggests, “**At an ontological level** the **structure of subjective possession** **occurs through** the **imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will,** thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of **the ontological structure of white subjectivity**” (83–84). For Jodi Byrd, the deployment of Indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of U.S. settler colonialism. She observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). She argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as Indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to U.S. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the Indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which U.S. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “**ideas of** Indians and **Indianness** have **served as the ontological ground through which U.S. settler colonialism enacts itself** ” (xix).

#### That results in land exploitation and ecocide – specifically manifests in knowledge institutions making forefronting Settler Colonialism a prior question.

Paperson 17 la paperson or K. Wayne Yang, June 2017, “A Third University is Possible” (an associate professor of ethnic studies at the University of California, San Diego)//Elmer

Land is the prime concern of settler colonialism, contexts in which the colonizer comes to a “new” place not only to seize and exploit but to stay, making that “new” place his permanent home. Settler colonialism thus complicates the center–periphery model that was classically used to describe colonialism, wherein an imperial center, the “metropole,” dominates distant colonies, the “periphery.” Typically, one thinks of European colonization of Africa, India, the Caribbean, the Pacific Islands, in terms of external colonialism, also called exploitation colonialism, where land and human beings are recast as natural resources for primitive accumulation: coltan, petroleum, diamonds, water, salt, seeds, genetic material, chattel. Theories named as “settler colonial studies” had a resurgence beginning around 2006.[2] However, the analysis of settler colonialism is actually not new, only often ignored within Western critiques of empire.[3] The critical literatures of the colonized have long positioned the violence of settlement as a prime feature in colonial life as well as in global arrangements of power. We can see this in Franz Fanon’s foundational critiques of colonialism. Whereas Fanon’s work is often generalized for its diagnoses of anti/colonial violence and the racialized psychoses of colonization upon colonized and colonizer, Fanon is also talking about settlement as the particular feature of French colonization in Algeria. For Fanon, the violence of French colonization in Algeria arises from settlement as **a spatial immediacy of empire**: the geospatial collapse of metropole and colony into the same time and place. On the “selfsame land” are spatialized white immunity and racialized violation, non-Native desires for freedom, Black life, and Indigenous relations.[4] Settler colonialism is too often thought of as “what happened” to Indigenous people. This kind of thinking confines the experiences of Indigenous people, their critiques of settler colonialism, their decolonial imaginations, to an unwarranted historicizing parochialism, as if settler colonialism were a past event that “happened to” Native peoples and not generalizable to non-Natives. Actually, settler colonialism is something that “happened for” settlers. Indeed, it is happening for them/us right now. Wa Thiong’o’s question of how instead of why directs us to think of land tenancy laws, debt, and the privatization of land as settler colonial technologies that enable the “eventful” history of plunder and disappearance. Property law is a settler colonial technology. The weapons that enforce it, the knowledge institutions that legitimize it, the financial institutions that operationalize it, are also technologies. Like all technologies, they evolve and spread. Recasting land as property means severing Indigenous peoples from land. This separation, what Hortense Spillers describes as “the loss of Indigenous name/land” for Africans-turned-chattel, recasts Black Indigenous people as black bodies for biopolitical disposal: who will be moved where, who will be murdered how, who will be machinery for what, and who will be made property for whom.[5] In the alienation of land from life, alienable rights are produced: the right to own (property), the right to law (protection through legitimated violence), the right to govern (supremacist sovereignty), the right to have rights (humanity). In a word, what is produced is whiteness. Moreover, it is not just human beings who are refigured in the schism. Land and nonhumans become alienable properties, a move that first alienates land from its own sovereign life. Thus we can speak of the various technologies required to create and maintain these separations, these alienations: Black from Indigenous, human from nonhuman, land from life.[6] “How?” is a question you ask if you are concerned with the mechanisms, not just the motives, of colonization. Instead of settler colonialism as an ideology, or as a history, you might consider settler colonialism as a set of technologies —a frame that could help you to forecast colonial next operations and to plot decolonial directions. This chapter proceeds with the following insights. (1) The settler–native– slave triad does not describe identities. The triad—an analytic mainstay of settler colonial studies—digs a pitfall of identity that not only chills collaborations but also implies that the racial will be the solution. (2) Technologies are trafficked. Technologies generate patterns of social relations to land. Technologies mutate, and so do these relationships. Colonial technologies travel. In tracing technologies’ past and future trajectories, we can connect how settler colonial and antiblack technologies circulate in transnational arenas. (3) Land—not just people—is the biopolitical target.[7] The examples are many: fracking, biopiracy, damming of rivers and flooding of valleys, the carcasses of pigs that die from the feed additive ractopamine and are allowable for harvest by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. The subjugation of land and nonhuman life to deathlike states in order to support “human” life is a “biopolitics” well beyond the Foucauldian conception of biopolitical as governmentality or the neoliberal disciplining of modern, bourgeois, “human” subject. (4) (Y)our task is to theorize in the break, that is, to refuse the master narrative that technology is loyal to the master, that (y)our theory has a Eurocentric origin. Black studies, Indigenous studies, and Othered studies have already made their breaks with Foucault (over biopolitics), with Deleuze and Guatarri (over assemblages and machines), and with Marx (over life and primitive accumulation). (5) Even when they are dangerous, understanding technologies provides us some pathways for decolonizing work. We can identify projects of collaboration on decolonial technologies. Colonizing mechanisms are evolving into new forms, and they might be subverted toward decolonizing operations. The Settler–Native–Slave Triad Does Not Describe Identities One of the main interventions of settler colonial studies has been to insist that the patterning of social relations is shaped by colonialism’s thirst for land and thus is shaped to fit modes of empire. Because colonialism is a perverted affair, our relationships are also warped into complicitous arrangements of violation, trespass, and collusion with its mechanisms. For Fanon, the psychosis of colonialism arises from the patterning of violence into the binary relationship between the immune humanity of the white settler and the impugned humanity of the native. For Fanon, the supremacist “right” to create settler space that is immune from violence, and the “right” to abuse the body of the Native to maintain white immunity, this is the spatial and fleshy immediacy of settler colonialism. Furthermore, the “humanity” of the settler is constructed upon his agency over the land and nature. As Maldonado- Torres explains, “I think, therefore I am” is actually an articulation of “I conquer, therefore I am,” a sense of identity posited upon the harnessing of nature and its “natural” people.[8] This creates a host of post+colonial problems that have come to define modernity. Because the humanity of the settler is predicated on his ability to “write the world,” to make history upon and over the natural world, the colonized is instructed to make her claim to humanity by similarly acting on the world or, more precisely, acting in his. Indeed, for Fanon, **it is the perverse ontology of settler becomings**—becoming landowner or becoming property, becoming killable or becoming a killer—and the mutual implication of tortured and torturer that mark the psychosis of colonialism. This problem of modernity and colonial psychosis is echoed in Jack Forbes’s writings: Columbus was a wétiko. He was mentally ill or insane, the carrier of a terribly contagious psychological disease, the wétiko psychosis. . . . The wétiko psychosis, and the problems it creates, have inspired many resistance movements and efforts at reform or revolution. Unfortunately, most of these efforts have failed because they have never diagnosed the wétiko.[9] Under Western modernity, becoming “free” means becoming a colonizer, and because of this, “the central contradiction of modernity is freedom.”[10] Critiques of settler colonialism, therefore, do not offer just another “type” of colonialism to add to the literature but a mode of analysis that has repercussions for any diagnosis of coloniality and for understanding the modern conditions of freedom. By modern conditions of freedom, I mean that Western freedom is a product of colonial modernity, and I mean that such freedom comes with conditions, with strings attached, most manifest as terms of unfreedom for nonhumans. As Cindi Mayweather says, “your freedom’s in a bind.”[11]

#### Expansion of medical access is a form of settler colonial biomedical onslaught – humanitarian promotions of health proliferate genocidal assimilation.

Klausen 13, Jimmy Casas. "Reservations on hospitality: contact and vulnerability in Kant and indigenous action." Hospitality and World Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013. 197-221. (Associate Professor in the Instituto de Relações Internacionais at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro)//Elmer

On the other hand and by contrast, the **governmental reach of public health initiatives** that would effect the improvement of isolated indigenous populations’ health **accords** with Kantian philanthropy – **with all the risks of violated freedom and smothered life** that entails. Public **health advocates** would **repair** the **disadvantaged morbidity profile of** isolated **indigenous groups through** a policy of initiating contact supported by the provision of modern **biomedical** health **care** services to ameliorate the epidemiological effects of contact. State-initiated contact without attendant health care has proved disastrous. Into the 1970s, FUNAI attempted to make friendly contact with isolated Indians. By relying on hired expert indigenous trackers, government contact expeditions located isolated groups and – demonstrating their interest in seeking commerce – enticed the latter with gifts of machetes and blankets. One FUNAI expedition to contact the Matis in 1978 resulted in high morbidity from pneumonia and other infectious diseases and killed one of every two Matis. 60 To correct such devastating policies, anthropologists Magdalena Hurtado, Kim Hill, Hillard Kaplan and Jane Lancaster have elaborated the following argument: Many anthropologists and indigenous-rights activists believe that uncontacted Indians should be left alone. These people are well-meaning, but they are wrong because they base their position on three incorrect assumptions. First, they assume that the Indians have chosen to remain isolated . . . . Those who oppose contact also assume that the Indians will inevitably be decimated by virgin-soil epidemics . . . . Finally, opponents of contact assume that isolated native groups will survive if not contacted. 61 However, even correcting for the fatal infelicities of past policy-driven, state-initiated contacts such as FUNAI’s, the preponderantly disadvantaged morbidity profile of such virgin-soil populations cannot be reduced by greater hospitality in the form of redoubled and more expert interventionary contacts. **Although public health efforts** like those advocated by Hurtado et al. **might reduce mortality**, highly **disease-vulnerable persons will still sicken** and will do so **through means that would pretend to foster life by actively disregarding how the people subject to these external machinations might** determine their own needs and **value their own health**. Isolated **indigenes’** biological **lives** would be **simultaneously fostered and risked**, while their free **personhood would count as nothing** morally–culturally. In short, there are serious political costs to be weighed in such an intervention. Because of – and not in spite of – their philanthropy, public health interventions of the type that Hurtado et al. advocate extend the reach of governmentality much more intrusively than land rights policies. Besides deciding on behalf of peoples in regard to the interpretation of their acts of self-quarantine, the advocated **public health policies surgically insert apparatuses of biomedicine directly into the contacted peoples’ living being**. Such policies thereby **displace** **indigenous norms of health and native cultural strategies** of living on with the norms and overall strategy embedded in the culture of scientific and clinical biomedicine. Though the pretence is that such acts demonstrate the hospitality of the wider national or global society, such health policy interventions cannot simply make a presentation for possible society; rather, qua philanthropy they initiate contact, which, because of the high degree of vulnerability of those contacted, must needs lead to the proliferation of contacts. It is not a hospitable policy of fostering life that Hurtado et al. support, not merely possible commerce but an obsessive philanthropy of biomedical life support and literally **unavoidable onslaught of commerce**, possibly forevermore. Most startlingly, such public health interventions presume as universal a standard of life that could certainly vary while retaining meaning and value. The anthropologist Tess Lea describes this universalising interventionary compulsion in withering words: When you are a helping bureau-professional, the **compulsion to** do something to **fix** the problems of **target populations** – those deemed as suffering from unequal and preventable conditions – exceeds all other impulses . . . . ‘They’ need our greater commitment. The idea that life might be lived differently with value and meaning or that ‘need’ might be conceived differently from the way in which we **calculate** it **through** our **interventionary lens**, becomes impossible to imagine. 62 Hurtado et al. assume that health professionals and policy makers must hospitably confer biomedically acquired immunity on heretofore isolated and now contacted virgin soil populations. Fostering indigenous lives by **imposing** an **alien conception of immunity**, they would inhospitably **destroy alternate strategies of living on**. Seeing through their interventionary lens, Hurtado et al. themselves become arbiters of successful and unsuccessful forms of life: they presume that self-quarantine cannot itself serve as an effective cultural strategy to immunise living bodies. Thus, ironically perhaps, these anthropologists choose biology above culture by seeing each from a standpoint authorised by the culture of biomedicine. From their interventionary lens and against Canguilhem’s admonition above, self-quarantine appears to be a failed strategy for living on because the immunity it would confer is imperfect or incomplete. Likewise, condoning self-isolation is imperfect or incomplete hospitality as against their more perfect interventionary hospitality in the name of life. Authorising themselves to make these judgements, they enact an altogether different collapse of morality into nature than the Kantian collapse I reconstruct above. Whereas Kant’s collapse of minimalism into abstentionism and moral duty into nature’s constraints opens hospitality and therefore strategies for living on, this other collapse binds moralising conceptions of ‘health’ to the biomedically conceived body. Yet if, according to Canguilhem, for humans especially, ‘health is precisely a certain latitude, a certain play in the norms of life and behavior’, 63 then it seems that the ‘**health’ that supposedly hospitable**, though strictly philanthropic, ‘life’-fostering interventionary contact **would impose** on the exuberance of self-quarantining **indigenous peoples** is **a sickness unto** that other perpetual peace Kant mentions: **death**.

#### Biomedicine itself is invested in colonial exploitation through testing done on indigenous communities to biopiracy and stealing indigenous knowledge.

Lift Mode 17 3-10-2017 "Pharmaceutical Colonialism” <https://medium.com/@liftmode/pharmaceutical-colonialism-3-ways-that-western-medicine-takes-from-indigenous-communities-3a9339b4f24f> (We at Liftmode.com are a team of professionals from a variety of backgrounds, dedicated to the mission of providing the highest quality and highest purity nutritional health supplements on the market. We look specifically for the latest and most promising research in the fields of cognition enhancement, neuroscience and alternative health supplements, and develop commercial strategies to bring these technologies to the marketplace.)//Elmer

Does **modern medicine take from rural communities**? At first, this seems outrageous. However, on closer inspection, we find three main methods of poaching: **stealing indigenous knowledge**, ‘**biopiracy’**, and the sale of pharmaceuticals at exorbitant prices. Another example includes **using** **developing countries** and rural populations **as test subjects in unethical clinical trials** — for example on **AIDS patients in South Africa**.[1] This article examines three methods that Western medicine takes from rural communities. We also examine the emerging new forms of medicine and how many people are beginning to appreciate the medical knowledge of different cultures around the world. Traditional knowledge and culture is threatened by the expansive natural of the pharmaceutical industry 1. Pharmaceutical colonialism: Stealing Indigenous Knowledge First and foremost, what has been taken from indigenous communities for the last roughly 600 years is traditional knowledge about medicinal plants. It is interesting that the **major advancements in Western medicine** **coincide** very closely **to escalating global colonialism** by Western countries. It’s difficult to estimate the exact percentage of **modern drugs** that were **originally based on traditional plant sources**, because of the complex evolution of Western laboratory-made medicine. However, this percentage is known to be very high. In fact, a 2006 paper by Dr. A Gurib-Fakim states: “Natural products and their derivatives represent **more than 50%** of all the drugs in clinical use in the world. Higher plants contribute no less than 25% of the total.”[2] The extent to which traditional knowledge permeates through Western medicine is too broad to explain fully in a small article like this. We’d need to write an entire book to cover the full content! So, we will just take a look at one example below. How the West takes Indigenous knowledge: **Anti-Malaria Drugs** Mosquitoes are, by far, the world’s most dangerous animals, spreading a number of diseases including Dengue fever, Zika virus, and malaria. According to the World Health Organization, nearly half of the world’s population is at risk of malaria. In 2015, over 210 million people became infected with malaria, and a staggering 429 000 people died from the blood parasite.[3] To combat the infectious disease, scientists have developed two major classes of anti-malarial drugs. These are both based on indigenous knowledge of plant medicine: Mosquitos kill more people than any other animal every year 1. Quinine Quinine is extracted from the bark of the cinchona tree, native to South America. Contrary to propaganda by the Spanish inquisitors, which is still used in modern medicine today, Westerners did not ‘discover’ the cinchona tree. Indigenous Peruvian cultures had been using the bark of the cinchona tree for hundreds, possibly thousands, of years before the arrival of the colonial forces from the North. They crushed it up and mixed it with water to ‘relieve shivering’ — a major sign of the feverish symptoms of malaria.[4] Unlike traditional Chinese knowledge, which has survived until modern times, the ancient knowledge of South America cultures was almost completely destroyed by colonial forces. This makes tracing the historical use of the cinchona tree more difficult.[5] After the inquisition of most traditional cultures in South America, the cinchona bark was brought back to Western Europe and was hailed as one of the most exciting discoveries of modern medicine. The success of cinchona bark in Europe created a massive industry, initially run by the Spanish, but which was later overtaken by French and English industrialists.[6] It’s important to know that the ‘traditional’ use of cinchona bark in 18th century Europe was in exactly the same method as its original use in indigenous societies: crushing up the barking and mixing it with water. The chemical compound quinine was first extracted from cinchona bark in 1820 by two Frenchmen: Pierre Joseph Pelletier and Joseph Caventou. This allowed purified quinine to replace traditional cinchona extracts.[7] Interestingly, Western scientists have since discovered that cinchona bark actually contains several active components, which function in a synergistic relationship to kill the malaria parasite.[8] In modern times, a number of quinine-based drugs have been developed, with varying success. The issue becomes complex here because, while these drugs were developed by Western scientists using modern technological laboratories, if it hadn’t been for the original indigenous knowledge, these compounds could not have been developed at all. The quinine derivatives include Chloroquine, Pyrimethamine, and Mefloquine. Chloroquine was used as a spray along with DDT in the WHO’s malaria eradication plan (the efficacy and usefulness of this are still under debate: numerous countries that were sprayed with these chemicals soon developed strains of malaria that were resistant to the drugs).[9] 60411828 - workers are fogging for dengue control. mosquito borne diseases of zika virus. Quinine-based drugs were used in sprays to combat malaria around the world 2. Artemisinin **Artemisinin** is an active compound found in traditional Chinese medicine called Qinghao Su (sweet wormwood). This traditional Chinese medicine has been **used to treat fevers** for over a thousand years. It is currently still extracted from plant sources, the majority of which are grown in China, Vietnam and East Africa. Once the full-grown plants are harvested, the chemical is extracted, leaving the pure artemisinin at a highly variable market price of between $120 — $1200 per kilogram.[10] It’s interesting that the artemisinin-based drug combinations (ACTs) are the most expensive anti-malarial treatments available. This is despite the fact that it is one of the few malarial medications that are still mostly plant-based. However, **Western pharmaceutical** companies are now **developing synthetic** forms of **artemisinin**. The new forms of artemsinin are genetically engineered and have intellectual property rights attached, potentially bringing in big revenues for the companies involved. The proponents of the synthetic form of artemisinin claim that the synthetic form will be able to be sold for cheaper than the natural form. However, the average import price of natural artemsisin to India over the last ten years was around $370 per kilo — a fair amount cheaper than the price that the pharmaceutical companies are pushing for.[11] **Artemisinin farming** **sustains** the **livelihoods of** an estimated **100’000 farmers.** With **synthetic derivatives** being developed this **puts** the **livelihoods** of the farmers and their families **at risk of poverty** (estimated to be around 3–5 times the number of people as the farmers themselves).[12] The ironic and disturbing thing about the whole situation is that the artemisinin farmers themselves are the ones who are most at risk of contracting malaria. In effect, they stand to not only have their incomes stripped by Western pharmaceutical companies but also to become physically dependent on the products of those very companies. [13] 16118463 - portrait of a burmese woman with thanaka powdered face working in farm Farmers livelihoods are threatened by the use of synthetic chemicals 2. ‘**Biopiracy’** — **stealing natural resources and plants** The idea that modern medicine might be a form of colonialism seems at first to be quite outrageous! However, on closer inspection, it’s quite clear that a few nations continue to play the role of ‘missionary’, helping to save people in the ‘developing world’.[14] In some cases, though, the role of the ‘missionary’ becomes a little less clear. The second way that Western medicine takes from indigenous communities is something called ‘Biopiracy’. This is similar to the method we described above, however, in this case, what is taken is not knowledge but the actual plants and resources themselves. In biopiracy actions, plants and natural resources are stolen entirely from indigenous communities and are then used to develop drugs and medicines in the West. The indigenous communities benefit nothing from the theft of their resources. **Medicines** developed from **stolen** materials **are** often **sold back** to the very people from whom the original plant-sources were stolen — **at exorbitant prices**. Examples of medications that face biopiracy charges include: A **drug for diabetes developed** in the UK **from a Libyan plant**, Artemisia judaica A medicine for **immunosuppression** developed by GlaxoSmithKline which is **derived from** a **chemical found in termite hills** in Gambia An HIV treatment taken from bacteria found in central Uganda Antibiotic drugs developed from amoebas found in Mauritius and Venezuela Anti-diarrhea vaccines developed from Egyptian bacteria [15] According to Beth Burrows, president of Washington-based Edmond’s Institute: “Times have changed. It is no longer acceptable for the great white explorer to trawl across Africa or South America taking what they want for their own commercial benefit. It is no more than a new form of colonial pillaging. As there are internationally recognized rights for oil, so there should be for indigenous plants and knowledge.”[16] In an ideal world, knowledge and resources would be shared equitably. Both the indigenous cultures and the modern world would benefit from the sharing of knowledge and medicinal plants, which could leave the world a much better place. However, this is not the case in today’s world. More and more, we see evidence of **pharmaceutical companies using rural communities as customers and guinea-pigs for medicine** that was originally sourced from local knowledge.[17] Traditional medicine is pushed off the market and indigenous knowledge is ‘dumbed down’ through development programs. This forces the majority of the world to have to work through cartel-like pharmaceutical corporations who extract unbelievably large sums of money from people, which we’ll look at below.[18] 21736635 - shanty house in bangkok water canals along the river bank, thailand Those who benefit the least from pharmaceutical colonialism are the ones who need healthcare the most

#### Vote negative to endorse a cartography of refusal

Day 15 Iyko, Associate Professor of English. Chair, Critical Social Thought. “Being or Nothingness: Indigeneity, Antiblackness, and Settler Colonial Critique.” Source: Critical Ethnic Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall 2015), pp. 102-121 //Elmer

And so the potential relations that Wilderson sets up through a critique of sovereignty are at best irrelevant or at worse false in Sexton’s absolute claim that slavery stands alone as the “threshold of the political world.”45 I suggest that this wavering relation/nonrelation of antiblackness and Indigeneity exhibited in Wilderson’s and Sexton’s work reveal the problem in any totalizing approach to the heterogeneous constitution of racial difference in settler colonies. Beyond this inconsistency, the liberal multiculturalist agenda that Wilderson and Sexton project into Indigenous sovereignty willfully evacuates any Indigenous refusal of a colonial politics of recognition. Among other broad strokes, Sexton states, “as a rule, Native Studies reproduces the dominant liberal political narrative of emancipation and enfranchisement.”46 This provides a basis for Wilderson’s assertion that Indigenous sovereignty engages in a liberal politics of state legitimation through recognition because “treaties are forms of articulation” that buttress “the interlocutory life of America as a coherent (albeit genocidal) idea.”47 But such a depoliticized liberal project is frankly incompatible with Indigenous activism and scholarship that emerges from Native studies in North America. The main argument in Glen Sean Coulthard’s book Red Skin, White Masks is to categorically reject “the liberal recognition-based approach to Indigenous selfdetermination.”48 **This is not** a politics of **legitimizing** Indigenous nations **through state recognition** **but** rather **one of refusal**, a refusal to be **recognized and** thus **interpellated by the settler colonial nation-state**. Drawing on Fanon, Coulthard describes the “necessity on the part of the oppressed to ‘turn away’ from their other-oriented master-dependency, and to instead struggle for freedom on their own terms and in accordance with their own values.”49 It is also difficult to reconcile the depoliticized narrative of “resurgence and recovery” that Wilderson and Sexton attribute to Indigenous sovereignty in the face of **Idle No More**, the anticapitalist Indigenous sovereignty movement in Canada whose national railway and **highway** **blockades** have seriously **destabilized** the **expropriation of natural resources** for the global market. These are examples that Coulthard describes as “**direct action**” rather tjhan negotiation—in other words, antagonism, not conflict resolution: The [blockades] are a crucial act of negation insofar as they seek to impede or block the flow of resources currently being transported to international markets from oil and gas fields, refineries, lumber mills, mining operations, and hydroelectric facilities located on the dispossessed lands of Indigenous nations. These modes of direct action . . . seek to have **a negative impact on** the economic **infrastructure** that is **core to** the **colonial accumulation of capital in settler-political economies** like Canada’s.50 **These tactics are** part of what Audra Simpson calls a “**cartography of refusal” that “negates the authority of the other’s gaze**.”51 It is **impossible to frame** the **blockade movement**, which has become the greatest threat to Canada’s resource agenda,52 **as a struggle for “enfranchisement**.” **Idle No More is** not in “conflict” with the Canadian nation-state; it is in **a struggle against the very premise of settler colonial capitalism** that requires the elimination of Indigenous peoples. As Coulthard states unambiguously, “For Indigenous nations to live, capitalism must die.”

#### Reject Reformism or Plan Focus - Challenging the 1AC’s colonialist framework of interpretation is a prior question to whether or not the Aff is a good idea

Deloria Jr. 99 – Member of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and Professor at University of Colorado Boulder  
(Vine, also Former Executive Director for the National Congress of American Indians and former Professor of Political Science and Law at the University of Arizona, For This Land: Writing on Religion in America, p. 101-7)//Elmer  
If there were any serious concern about liberation, we would see thousands of people simply walk away from the vast economic, political, and intellectual machine we call Western civilization and refuse to be enticed to participate in it any longer. Liberation is not a difficult task when one no longer finds value in a set of institutions or beliefs. We are liberated from the burden of Santa Claus and the moral demand to be "good" when, as maturing adolescents, we reject the concept of Santa Claus. Thereafter we have no sense of guilt in late November that we have not behaved properly during the year, and no fear that a lump of coal rather than a gift will await us Christmas morning. In the same manner, we are freed and liberated once we realize the insanity and fantasy of the present manner of interpreting our experiences in the world. Liberation, in its most fundamental sense, requires a **rejection of everything we have been taught** and its replacement by only those things we have experienced as having values. But this replacement only begins the task of liberation. For the history of Western thinking in the past eight centuries **has been one of replacement of ideas** within a framework that has remained **basically unchanged** for nearly two millenia. Challenging this framework of interpretation means a rearrangement of our **manner of perceiving the world**, and it involves a reexamination of the body of human knowledge and its structural reconstruction into a new format, Such a task appears to be far from the struggles of the present. It seems abstract and meaningless in the face of contemporary suffering. And it suggests that people can be made to change their oppressive activity by intellectual reorientation alone. All these questions arise, however, because of the fundamental orientation of Western peoples toward the world. We assume that we know the structure of reality and must only make certain minor adjustments in the machinery that operates it in order to bring our institutions into line. Immediate suffering is thus placed in juxtaposition with abstract metaphysical conceptions of the world and, because we can see immediate suffering, **we feel impelled to change conditions quickly** to relieve tensions, never coming to **understand how the basic attitude toward life** and its derivative attitudes toward minority groups **continues to dominate** the goals and activities that appear designed to create reforms, Numerous examples can be cited to show that **our efforts to bring justice** into the world **have been short-circuited** by the passage of events, and that those efforts are unsuccessful because we have failed to consider the **basic framework within which we pose questions, analyze alternatives, and suggest solutions**. Consider the examples from our immediate past. In the early sixties college application forms included **a blank line** on which all prospective students were required **to indicate** their **race**. Such information was used to discriminate against those of a minority background, and so **reformers demanded** that the **question be dropped**. By the time all colleges had been forced to eliminate questions concerning the race of applicants, the Civil Rights Movement had so sensitized those involved in higher education that scholarships were made available in great numbers to people of minority races. **There was no way,** however, **to allocate** such **scholarships** **because college officials could no longer determine the racial background** of students on the basis of their applications for admission. Much of the impetus for **low-cost housing** in the cities was based upon the premise that in the twentieth century people should not have to live in hovels but that adequate housing should be constructed for them. Yet in the course of **tearing down** slums and building new housing projects, low-income housing areas were eliminated. The **construction cost** of the new projects **made** it necessary to charge hi**gher rentals**. **Former residents** of the lowincome areas **could not afford to live** in the new housing, so they moved to other parts of the city and created exactly the same conditions that had originally provoked the demand for low-rent housing. Government schools had a very difficult time teaching American Indian children the English language. (One reason was the assumption of teachers that all languages had Latin roots, and their inability to adapt the programs when they discovered that Indian languages were not so derived.) Hence programs in bilingual teaching methods were authorized that would use the native language to teach the children English, an underhanded way of eliminating the native language. Between the time that bilingual programs were conceived and the time that they were finally funded, other programs that concentrated on adequate housing had an unexpected effect on the educational process. Hundreds of new houses were built in agency towns, and Indians moved from remote areas of the different reservations into those towns where they could get good housing. Since they were primarily younger couples with young children, the housing development meant that most Indian children were now growing up in the agency communities and were learning English as a first language. Thus the bilingual programs, which began as a means of teaching English as a second language, became the method designed to preserve the native vernacular by teaching it as a second language to students who had grown up speaking English. Example after example could be cited, each testifying to the devastating effect of a general attitude toward the world that underlies the Western approach to human knowledge. The basis of this attitude is the assumption that the world operates in certain predetermined ways, that it operates continuously under certain natural laws, and that the nature of every species is homogeneous, with few real deviations.

#### The Affrelegates indigenous possibility to reservation, accelerating death-making – only an orientation of refusal as generative can solve. This the ROTB is to reject systems of settler colonialism.

King 17, Tiffany Lethabo. "Humans involved: Lurking in the lines of posthumanist flight." Critical Ethnic Studies 3.1 (2017): 162-185. (Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State)//GZ but re-cut by Elmer

Within Native feminist theorizing, ethnographic refusal can be traced to Audra Simpson’s 2007 article, “On Ethnographic Refusal.” In this seminal work, Simpson reflects on and gains inspiration from the tradition of refusal practiced by the people of Kahnawake.14 Simpson shares that Kahnawake refusals are at the core and spirit of her own ethnographic and ethical practices of refusal. I was interested in the larger picture, in the discursive, material and moral territory that was simultaneously historical and contemporary (this “national” space) and the ways in which *Kahnawakero:non*, the “people of Kahnawake,” had *refused* the authority of the state at almost every turn. The ways in which their formation of the initial membership code (now replaced by a lineage code and board of elders to implement the code and determine cases) was refused; the ways in which their interactions with border guards at the international boundary line were predicated upon a refusal; how refusal worked **in everyday encounters** to enunciate repeatedly to ourselves and to outsiders that “this is who we are, this is who you are, these are my rights.”15 Because Simpson was concerned with applying the political and everyday modes of Kahnawake refusal, she attended to the “collective limit” established by her and her Kahnawake participants.16 The collective limit was relationally and ethically determined by what was shared but more importantly by what was not shared. Simpson’s ability to discern the collective limit could only be achieved through a form of relational knowledge production that regards and cares for the other. Simpson recounts how one of her participants forced her to recognize a collective limit. Approaching and then arriving at the limit, Simpson experiences the following: And although I pushed him, hoping that there might be something explicit said from the space of his exclusion— or more explicit than he gave me— it was enough that he said what he said. “Enough” is certainly enough. “Enough,” I realised, was when I reached the limit of my own return and our collective arrival. Can I do this and still come home; what am I revealing here and why? Where will this get us? Who benefits from this and why? And “enough” was when they shut down (or told me to turn off the recorder), or told me outright funny things like “nobody seems to know”— when everybody *does* know and talks about it *all the time*. Dominion then has to be exercised over these representations, and that was determined when enough was said. The ethnographic limit then, was reached not just when it would cause harm (or extreme discomfort)—the limit was arrived at when the representation would bite all of us and compromise the *representational* territory that we have gained for ourselves in the past 100 years.17 Extending her discussion of ethnographic refusal beyond the bounds of ethnographic concerns, Simpson also ponders whether this enactment of refusal can be applied to theoretical work. Simpson outright poses a question: “What is theoretically generative about these refusals?”18 The question that Simpson asks in 2007 is clarified by Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang in the 2014 essay “R- Words: Refusing Research.” Arguing that modes of refusal extended into the theoretical and methodological terrains of knowledge production are productive and necessary, Tuck and Yang state: For the purposes of our discussion, the most important insight to draw from Simpson’s article is her emphasis that refusals are not subtractive, but are theoretically generative, expansive. Refusal is not just a “no,” but a redirection to ideas otherwise unacknowledged or unquestioned. Unlike a **settler colonial configuration of knowledge that is** petulantly exasperated and **resentful of limits**, a methodology of refusal regards limits on knowledge as productive, as indeed a good thing.19 In line with Simpson’s intervention, Tuck and Yang posit that “refusal itself could be developed into both method and theory.”20 For Tuck and Yang, a generative practice of refusal and a decolonial and abolitionist tradition is making Western thought “turn back upon itself as settler colonial knowledge, as opposed to universal, liberal, or neutral knowledge without horizon.”21 In fact, the coauthors suggest “making the settler colonial metanarrative the object of . . . research.”22 What this move effectively does is question the uninterrogated assumptions and exposes the violent particularities of the metanarrative. Scrutiny as a practice of refusal also slows down or perhaps halts the momentum of the machinery that allows, as Tuck and Yang argue, “knowledge to facilitate interdictions on Indigenous and Black life.”23

### OFF

#### The Aff is a fixation on releasing medication creates competing sets of information to build a logistical counterpart– It becomes represented by an assigned data value while these logistical assignments decentralize racialized informatics

**Parisi ‘19** (Luciana Parisi. . “XENO-PATTERNING”. 2-12-2019. Taylor & Francis. [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0969725X.2019.1568735. Accessed 8-1-2021](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0969725X.2019.1568735.%20Accessed%208-1-2021))//RKS Wake Joey

As much as Doro has a plan to **enslave** all latent minds under the program of his master pattern, so too today’s **capital** corporations (from Google to Amazon) are rampantly **competing** to own the Singularity pattern that will finally **subsume** all **thinking** under the One.3 Sadly, the image of our automated future is already packed with the master pattern of **corporate capital**. While the value of human capital approximates zero, the **automated infrastructure** of capital has come to own the universal history of humanity: what has happened and could ever happen to the species, the planet, the solar system, and the galaxy. From the nano scale to the **intergalactic** project of ultimate datification, the growing capacity of the master pattern to engulf at once the past and the future is driven by the computational power of predictive algorithms that constantly learn as they go along, correlating **infinite** varieties of data sets – i.e., annexing and disaggregating increasingly smaller **programs** that fully run on the architecture of neural nets. Swarming patterns of disaggregated machine learning algorithms are held together by a mastering architecture whose growing patterns it rules and divides so as to anticipate – i.e., engulf within itself – the smallest tendency for autonomous programming. The aspiration to become a Patternist, as Octavia Butler calls the species of telepaths that can colonize all forms of thought, coincides with a mode of control predicated upon the obtuse nature of algorithms on the one hand, and the **meta-physical** ascendance of **patterns** to become the pattern of patterns on the other. As automated functions of prediction, whose task is to **optimize recognition**, algorithms remain the enslaved matter-form for the growth of an **automated master infrastructure**. This coming image of the Patternist, however, is at war with an alien form of automation, whereby algorithmic patterning aims to take prediction away from the homeostatic function of recognition to rather embark in a complex logic of productive imagination. By constructing hypotheses about non-observable events, predictive patterning has broken from the logic of deduction and the symmetry between truth and proof. However, the Patternist is not simply an evolving archive of data memories and know-hows. Octavia Butler’s vision of the colonization of thinking is not bound to a specific medium, but to mediation itself: the limits of cognitive representation demarcate the point of departure into travelling through the space of thinking. Instead of a Universal Turing Machine that can move in one direction, forward and backward, and decompose its procedural units into (con)sequential steps, telepathic mediation allows for a **mereo-topological colonization** of parts and wholes intended not simply to gather the content of human thought but to predict what can be thought as part of the expansive boundaries of the Patternist. Butler is referring to how mediation corresponds to the colonization of thought as a predictive pattern that enslaves all thinking into its transcendental schema. A telepath does not just read the minds of others but predicts thinking by controlling the patterns that it owns. The Patternist is not a fortune-teller but a Protean slave trader that transmutes his body whilst it takes over your mind by culling it in his kingdom of instructions. The more thoughts it subsumes to its transcendental schemata, the more the future of thinking only acts as a reminder of what has already been thought. What ensures his colonial mastery is not simply his data architecture that replaces the self-thinking subject with the mediatic form of non-conscious decisionmaking algorithms. Instead of a master algorithm that knows it all, the Patternist needs to evolve its slavery network into increasingly more complex patterns of prediction: the more part-to-whole relations between patterns, the more the Patternist can predict what can be known. This is the sense of capture that today’s **automated neural networks** embody in the aftermath of an accelerated accumulation of voluntary data. Nevertheless, one cannot underestimate that as much as neural nets experiment with predictive learning this new form of telepathic mediation has also evolved new modes of machine percepts and concepts that hardly mirror the categories of the transcendental schema. Instead of optical recognition or the mirroring framing of the world, telepathic mediation is distinctively algorithmic in so far as it relies on predictive patterns of compression not of whole images but of infinitely small sets of information. From the standpoint of information patterning, therefore, artificial intelligence has nothing to do with the optical model of cognitivist representation. If what is seen in the world is the same as what is recognized according to the schema of given categories, then machine thinking would just be an extended automation of the logic of deduction. Patterns would just describe the regular repetition of the same form. Nevertheless, in so far as information patterning coincides with a computational mode of compression, it brings forward an intuitive tendency in predictive learning that runs away from deductive logic. Instead of combining truths with proofs, algorithmic patterns are inclined to learn not only from other patterns but also from **unpatterned data**. This is why if deductive reasoning was held to ensure formal correspondence between what is already known and seen, algorithmic patterning instead brings logical reasoning towards its ultimate conclusion: namely by not knowing in advance what can be **cognized**, and the patterning of image-models can re-configure the horizons of machine thinking. A telepath does not just read the minds of others but predicts thinking by controlling the data. This is why if deductive reasoning was held to ensure formal correspondence between what is already known and seen, algorithmic patterning instead brings logical reasoning towards its ultimate conclusion: namely by not knowing in advance what can be cognized, and the patterning of image-models can re-configure the horizons of machine thinking. Similarly, Butler’s quest of mental slavery also catches upon this undetermined tension between pattern and thought, where the telepathic recognition of discrete and repetitive patterns coincides with the material condition by which a pattern can become demonstrative of a thought, resulting from a **perceptual** and **conceptual** connection with the world. If patterns correspond to the recognition of shapes, sizes, forms, etc. of objects, texts, sounds, images, they can at the same time also be discussed in the terms of what Wilfrid Sellars calls “sheer receptivity” or forms of intuition consisting in non-conceptual representation.4 While this is only one level of intuition, it nevertheless offers a radical shift from the Kantian argument for intuition as an instance of a priori transcendental conceptions. According to Sellars, sheer receptivity as a material form of intuition must, however, be paired up with intuitions resulting from the transcendental synthesis of imagination – or conceptually guided representations involving a transcendental synthesis of imagination. It is only through this coupling of distinctive levels of intuition that one could argue that patterns can take part in a “productive imagination.”5 Instead of a full automated thought that **replaces thinking**, reason, imagination with machine proofs as mere instantiations of conceptual nominal positing (corresponding to an automated unity of appreciation), here patterns rather correspond to image-models constructed by and through learning. If, on the one hand, the relation between receptivity and conceptuality (sheer receptivity and conceptual synthesis) corresponds to a complex form of intuition starting from patterning, on the other predictive patterning adds more acts of perception to the entire space of artificial intelligence (patterning from patterns). Doro, the Patternist – or the **thought colonizer** – is defied by Mary’s predictive patterning because the level of “sheer receptivity” is not simply equivalent to repetitive procedures that represent objects in the world. This level of non-conceptual intuition is also a mode of cognition that brings Mary’s mentality to undergo an alien becoming of the pattern she thinks she owns. The image of thought proposed by the arms race for the monopoly of the **technological explosion** of intelligence (or the Singularity) similarly refuses deductive logic (or the provable explanation of phenomena), but only in the name of **efficient** and robust **networks** of causeless (non-logically caused) patterns of data. The Patternist addresses its own ontological conditions: namely the rivalry between thought colonizers directly engages the question of what and how is a pattern. Both the ontological and the epistemological condition of automated thinking can also be understood here as symptoms of an internal critique of logical thinking: the limit of what a pattern can be is precisely the starting point for the pattern to shift its enslaved condition beyond the image of the network. The latter relies on probability calculation, discrete patterns forming programs that can repeat the same function at incredibly faster rates. Here the Singularity mainly guarantees the efficiency of problem solving at increasingly larger scales. Instead, both the growth and the efficiency of Mary’s Pattern is never given, in so far as its infrastructure **relies** on **predictive patterning** which is conditioned by the indeterminacy of results in constructing what can be known or thought. As opposed to the mindless automation of Singularity, where functions execute concepts derived from the transcendental schema of categories, the Patternist’s empire, as Mary’s plans show, is conditioned by the logic of fallibility, where error becomes part of the pattern’s learning. Here it is hypothesis making and not mindless correlation that drives patterns to construct an image-model from patterns. While hypotheses cannot be directly deduced as proofs of truths, they can nonetheless construct predictive trajectories expanding the act of receptivity beyond the thought of a particular object. Learning and not executing instructions has always been a preoccupation for both the cybernetic and computational development of intelligent systems since the 1940s. The design of artificial systems that could explain how patterns are formed and how machines can learn functions and elaborate concepts beyond their inputted data has accompanied artificial intelligence since Turing’s early thought experiments. What could not be proven and/or computed by an artificial system – and thus through the automated logical procedures into a series of proofs – entered a long phase of experimentation that led to the use of induction as a method of knowing based on the process of gathering data by means of trial and error. In an effort to expand patterns of prediction to encompass incomputable functions,7 unknowns became the new learning ground carried through the hypothetical construction of image-models. As the limits of computation were **manifested** in the proliferation of **error** in the execution of programs, it was also the case that patterning shifted towards the logic of trial and error, or fallibility. From the standpoint of induction, it is possible to suggest that automated learning is not driven simply by the efficient causality of repetitive patterns that reproduce given correlations between truths and proofs. As a consequence of inductive learning, the logic of fallibility in automated systems can importantly contribute to suggest how patterning can coincide with an alien imagination determined neither by given truths (and the unilateral production of proofs) nor by given data (and the unilateral correspondence of data to concepts). Instead, predictive patterning takes the method of trial and error towards the ultimate consequence of constructing model-images that have no direct use, but are as it were “counterfactual” in so far as they concretize the ifclause or the hypothesis making, producing **alien functions** and concepts.8 In other words, starting from a logic of fallibility in machine thinking, hypothesis making involves the construction of model-images about unknown patterns of relations between functions and concepts, precisely for what these can be, do and become. One could therefore pursue a view for which automated learning in terms of hypothetical thinking steps beyond the unity of apperception in the transcendental schema, and thus the deductive programming of the correlation of functions and objects. If the Patternist points out that any form of automated prediction inevitably **carries** within it a logic of **fallibility** and not simply of optimized efficiency, then one could argue that the automation of learning, in the current form of machine learning algorithms, for instance, can be explored as the starting point to rather defy the transcendental schema of neural networks. One way to re-theorize this conceptual correlation between functions and objects (the idea of a cat, the pattern recognition of the cat, and the neural networked image of the cat representing the object cat) may rather start from exploring how sheer receptivity or patterning as a form of intuition (ornon-conceptual representation) concurs and to some extent partakes of the non-monotonic formation of additional premises through a transcendental imagination that can invalidate or add new meaning to them. To put it another way, instead of taking Butler’s view to imply that the Patternist can only ever enslave thinking to the transcendental schema within the limits of deductive reasoning, it is here suggested that patterning already corresponds to a non-conceptual representation that is a proto-theoretical image. In the **neural architecture** of predictive learning, the **algorithmic function** of pattern recognition brings forward this non-conceptual image in a cluster of hypothetical configurations or model-images of counterfactual possibilities.

#### The attachment to Automatic exchange is traced through violence that results in operational Afro policing cyber war

**Dyer-Witheford & Matviyenko ’19** (Nick Dyer-Witheford, Svitlana MatviyenkoCyberwar and Revolution: Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism. University of Minnesota Press, 2019. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctvcwnzsd. Accessed 2 Aug. 2021](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctvcwnzsd.%20Accessed%202%20Aug.%202021). Strike added for abled language)//RKS Wake Joey

Warfare permeated the entire fabric of everyday life in the “total wars” of the twentieth century, with their mobilization not only of vast armed forces but of the industry, hospitals, bureaucracies, logistic systems, and psychological and propaganda apparatuses that supported the battlefronts (Black 2006; Dreiziger 2006; Chickering, Förster, and Greiner 2005). The persistent power of national security apparatuses in times of Cold War, memorialized in Eisenhower’s reference to the “military–industrial complex” and continuing to the present, has been well documented (Brooks 2016). Yet it might seem that, with **nuclear dangers** supposedly pacified since 1989 by the advent of global capitalism, and the deployment of conscripted armies largely replaced by highly professionalized special-forces operations, an all-encompassing military activation of society is past. The recognition that digital technologies might raise the reach of war to a new scope and intensity has been slowly dawning. **Cyberwar** has therefore emerged as a topic of **global concern** at a moment when the teleological certainties of Marxism seem broken or reduced to cruel caricature. This is not a coincidence. As we will argue, the emergence of cybernetics from the military–industrial complex of the United States at the end of the Second Word War was an important part of that nation’s ascent as a new imperial leader for the capitalist system. Computers and networks, both in their **military** and **economic** applications, played an important role in eventual U.S. victory over the USSR in the Cold War. And their extension into electronic commodities, industrial automation, **supply-chain logistics**, and financial trading was a **crucial** part of the **globalization** in which a reinvigorated capitalism from 1989 on disseminated itself around the planet, under the shelter of the global hegemon’s cruise missiles, smart weapons, and satellite intelligence. This armed pacification of a world market has, however, not had the finality many expected. Rather, it has generated new wars, of two major types, both misnamed and ill defined but each a consequence of capital’s global triumph over its socialist opponents. **Cyberwar**, a neologism that asserts war has left the armored train from which Trotsky directed revolutionary troops far, far behind, is a term that has abruptly risen in prominence in recent years but that possesses more than a quarter century of genealogy (Healey 2013; Rid 2016). As we discuss later, cybernetics originated in the American and British military research of the Second World War, setting a path for the development of computers and networks that continued throughout the Cold War. However, the contemporary use of cyberwar, with specific reference to attacks in and on digital networks, did not emerge until the 1980s. Fred Kaplan (2016) suggests that U.S. military concern about this possibility was sparked by President Reagan’s viewing of the film WarGames (1983), about computer-gaming teenagers breaking into the networks of U.S. Strategic Air Command. This anxiety-inducing event purportedly set in motion the first of what would become a long series of invariably urgent reports about the vulnerabilities of the United States (and its foes) to digital attack, produced by competing defense agencies and departments, only to be shelved, then rediscovered and repeated by successive administrations. The actual conjoining of cyber with war was, however, the work of popular culture, reflecting the rapid uptake of science fiction author William Gibson’s (1984) cyberspace to designate the increasingly widespread experience of internet use. According to Thomas Rid (2016), cyberwar first appeared in the digital avant-garde magazine Omni in a 1987 article about giant military robots. It was taken up more seriously in a 1992 essay by Eric H. Arnett in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that declared, “The leading military concept of the new era might be called cyberwar” and applied it to a range of **computerized** “autonomous weapons,” including crewless tanks, cruise missiles, advanced air-defense missiles, and antimissile satellites. This probably inspired the Chicago Sun-Times news report of the same year, titled “Cyberwar Debate,” about an alleged dispute between “scientists and the military” as to “who should wage war, man or machine,” which the Oxford English Dictionary records as the earliest usage of the phrase. The episode presents a situation in which three major hacker groups, each of which has an alleged association with a nation-state, are implicated in a worldwide network breakdown of significant proportions. While WannaCry was a malware infection of exceptional scope, it is far from unique; other ransomware attacks have affected several regions. As early as **2012**, it was reported that zero-day exploits incorporated into the Stuxnet worm, used in the U.S.–Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear reactors, had been picked up and used widely by cybercriminals, who were also copying sophisticated design elements of weapons, such as forged Microsoft security certificates (Simonite 2012). Other forms of attack, such as the Mirai botnet, which effectively turned the huge amounts of data generated by video surveillance systems into a means for disabling websites, have also **intensified** in scale. As Tim Maurer (2018, 161) observes, distinctions between “crimeware” and “milware,” that is, between criminal malware and military malware, are becoming “less meaningful.” Of special concern to some cybersecurity experts is that some attacks that appear initially to be extortion attempts are in fact “wiper” attacks that destroy their targets with the possibility of ransomed restoration—leading them to believe that, rather than commercial criminal attacks, these may be tests for attacks simply intended to destroy network capacity (Schneier 2016). Cybercrime is an ambiguous issue. Its threat is **frequently** invoked to justify enhancements in the powers and budgets of police and spy agencies and to **encourage** the sale of **cybersecurity** products. However, the realization that security establishments themselves are involved in, and exacerbate, criminal enterprise opens the way to a progressive appropriation of lawand-order issues that would have a precisely contrary direction and argue for the deescalation and decommissioning of cybernetic armaments. Dirty wars. Cyberwar **fosters fake news** and **digital crimes**, but above all, it **fosters war**. Its damage cannot be estimated simply in terms of deceived voters, frustrated internet users, or even canceled **medical operations** (in **hospitals** ~~crippled~~ by malware), freezing homes (amid electrical blackouts), or destroyed centrifuges (in sabotaged nuclear plants). It includes now the dead, maimed, and wounded. We have stressed the difficulty, indeed, the impossibility, of segregating cyberwar as a distinct domain of military activity; on the contrary, we have argued that it is characterized by a tendency, intrinsic to the constantly growing scope of the digitization of all spheres of life, to overspill boundaries. And nowhere is that truer than in the realm of war itself, where, as a recent article in a U.S. defense journal put it, “‘**Cyber War’** Is Quickly Becoming Just ‘War’” (Tucker 2017). Or, as we have put it already, “hybrid wars” that synthesize cybernetic and kinetic elements are today becoming the norm. This means that opposition to cyberwar is inseparable from resistance to other types of war. Here we will look at how this cyberlogic plays out in in the relation to **dirty wars** (Scahill 2013), also known as small wars, irregular wars, shadow wars, or ghost wars. These are the wars without official declarations of hostilities, at and beyond the boundaries of international law, that today proliferate as counterinsurgency operations or proxy conflicts antagonizing different populations against each other. Such wars now involve advanced digital systems for intelligence gathering and analysis, coordination, and weapons delivery, functions **fused in weapon platforms** that are also integral parts of cyberwar. Thus among the first, and most representative, victims of cyberwar can be numbered the populations of areas in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen living under visible and audible overflight by CIA Predator and Reaper drones, from which death suddenly and unpredictably descends. Drone warfare has been widely discussed (Turse 2012; Benjamin 2013; Chamayou 2015; Cockburn 2015; Scahill 2016; Shaw 2016), but we want here to put it in the wider context of digitized and networked conflict. As semiautonomous flying vehicles, drones push toward the full robotization that was always a goal of cybernetics. Their remote operations depend on streams of digitized information, flowing from the Nevada bases that house their video game–trained “pilots” to satellite relays in Germany, boosting the signals onward to the aeronautical entities roaming the heavens of the Middle East, entities whose navigation is a matter of computerized geolocation and which are targeted largely on the basis of electronic signals intelligence (SIGINT). In their overflights, U.S. drones are not merely surveilling territory and attacking targets; they are also **sucking up** vast quantities of **wireless data**, primarily cell phone signals, which can be collected through machines like the Gilgamesh device, which can be attached to the base of the drone and operates as a “fake cell phone tower,” forcing targeted SIM cards, purportedly in phones belonging to suspect terrorists, to contact it (Scahill 2016, 66). Information gathered in this way is relayed back to data fusion centers for combination and crossmatching with other intelligence sources. For Cronin, cyberwar is a matter of “mobilization.” Geoffrey WinthropYoung (2011, 134–35), discussing the military writings of Kittler, describes the category of mobilization well and makes the connection to issues of subjectivity: Mobilization erodes the boundaries between war and peace because it takes place in both; it erodes the boundary between the military and civilian population because it affects one as much as the other; and it erodes the distinction between material hardware and psychic software because it deals as much with the optimization of logistics, transport, and technology as with increasing mental preparedness and overall combat readiness. But what kind of human is most equipped (or least under-equipped) to deal with the acceleration and incomprehensibility of modern war? What kind of mind is available to make rapid, on the spot decisions, or even make up new rules when no fiat, no commanding authority, is in sight? What has been programmed to fight with a free will? The modern subject. It could be argued that cyberwar, a form of highly **technocratic warfare**, is in some regards the opposite of the levée en masse, a type of war that, like nuclear weapons, frees states from their politically problematic dependence on mass armies. However, as we suggested in the previous chapter, this idea of cyberwar simply as a series of hacker-team exploits ignores the wider base of technosocial knowledge and practice on which such feats depend. It also ignores the global networked populations that cyberwar hacking traverses, targets, and exploits. There are, therefore, serious limitations to purely tactical, and technical, movement adaptations to the surveillance state. An alternative is political and legal contestation of surveillance. In North America, some of the most important of these challenges come from Afro-Americans, First Nations, and Arab-Muslims, who, on the basis of collective historical experience, point out how profiling systems at once constitute and control specific suspect racialized social groups (Kundnani and Kumar 2015), demonstrating how Virilio’s “endocolonization” is most virulently applied to the already colonized. In many cases, such challenges also point directly to the military aspects of **racialized surveillance**. Thus the digital tracking of Black Lives Matter activists and leaders by both state agencies (Joseph 2015) and private cybersecurity firms (Buncombe 2015) stands as an extension of the paramilitary combination of “stingray” mobile phone signaling interceptions, drone observation, and information “fusion center” cross-checking transferred from Middle Eastern wars to the **policing** of **Afro-American neighborhoods** (Collins et al. 2015), practices that in turn build on a lineage of white vigilance rooted in fear of slave revolt (Browne 2015). At the time of writing, two activist groups, the Color of Change and the Center for Constitutional Rights, are suing the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security on the surveillance of protests in eleven cities, arguing that it undermines free speech while serving to “chill valuable public debate” (Timberg 2017). The **increasing frequency** and intensity of cyberwar reveal that a world dominated by the market is not necessarily peaceful or one from which the prospect of catastrophic conflict has been abolished. While neoliberalism not only acknowledges but enthusiastically celebrates competition and its associated “disruptions” and “creative destruction” as a spur to innovation and wealth creation, its official message is that, ultimately, the invisible hand of the market anneals this into the greater good of optimal resource allocation. What is denied in such discourse is the possibility that the conflicts of an agonistic and increasingly ahuman system might explode into noncreative destruction and that the ultimate “disruption” is to be found in the horror of war. Cyberwar is a secretive but **increasingly irruptive** manifestation of this possibility, a partially contained yet now escalating expression of the world market’s destructive tendencies. Its rise may be a symptom of a new era of capitalist war, a pattern of covert but escalating conflict between great powers, and between these powers and the terrorist movements they have beckoned into existence, in a concatenation of conflicts running from Central Europe to the Middle East and the South China Sea. Yes, we are at war. Or rather, henceforth, we are all in war. We deal blows, and we take blows in turn. We are in mourning, suffering the consequences of these terrible events, in the sad knowledge that others will occur. Each person killed is irreplaceable. But which war are we talking about? It is not an easy war to define because it is formed of various types which have been pushed together over time and which today appear inextricable. Wars between states (even a pseudo state like “ISIS”). National and international civil wars. Wars of “civilization” (or something that sees itself as such). Wars of interest and of imperialist patronage. Wars of religions and sects (or justified as such). This is the great stasis or “split city” of the twenty first century, which we will one day compare to its distant parallels (if indeed we escape intact): the Peloponnesian War; the Thirty Years War; or, more recently, the “European civil war” that raged from 1914 to 1945. And this prospect brings a terrifying ambiguity: that of a deep **destabilization** of the existing order, of the very type that has in the past created openings for new social protagonists and collective experiments, but also for disasters and atrocities whose potential scale today **extends** to nuclear species **extinction**. Any contemporary radical politics should be unsparing about the relation of revolution to war. The preface to the bourgeois revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was written in the ledgers of war debts that bankrupted absolutist monarchies and in the main chapters inscribed in blood spilled on battlefields from Naseby to Valmy. In socialist revolutions, the prelude to successful armed uprising has been a period of sustained capitalist self-destruction: the Paris Commune, the October Revolution, and the Chinese communist revolution all demonstrate this; if there are exceptions, they are relatively minor. One can say that the lesson of the twentieth century for revolutionary politics is that only **capital** can **destroy capital**: nothing other than its own massive apparatus of destruction is adequate to the task of utterly disrupting a dominant, gargantuan, consolidated mode of production.

#### Vote Neg for Counter Riot Logistics - Its mutually exclusive by separating data that controls counter data parts to medication through dialectical insurgency

Dyer-Witheford Et Al ‘20 (Jaime Brenes Reyes and Michelle Liu 20 [Nick Dyer-Witheford, Jaime Brenes Reyes and Michelle Liu. . “Riot Logistics – Into the Black Box”. 6-29-2020. No Publication. http://www.intotheblackbox.com/articoli/riot-logistics/. Accessed 8-2-2021)//RKS Wake Joey

Here, we consider these **riots** in relation to **logistics**. Logistics and riots seem antithetical, at extremes of order and chaos, system and anarchy. The contrast is deceptive. As a burgeoning literature has established, logistics has a military origin, describing activities that bring forces, supplies and equipment to the field of battle. From this genesis the term passed into the **lexicon** of capitalism, and now designates the coordination of globe-spanning supply chains, marshalling and integrating widely varied operations to outdo commercial competitors in the struggle for profit. To prevail, **logistic systems** must **circumvent** all **interruptions** to the connection **between** the extraction of **surplus v**alue at point of production and the realization of that value in the moment of exchange. Such systems thus, as Deborah Cowen insists, operationalize the structural violence of global capitalism. Logistics is, in the words of Jasper Bernes, “capitalism’s art of war”—just as **riots** can be a **countervailing** class war waged by those dispossessed, exploited and insulted in the normal processes of marketization, a “**counter-logistics**.” [5] Logistics **Interrupted** Several authors have pointed to the potential vulnerability of contemporary **logistical networks** to civil disturbances, blockades or strikes.[6] The boldest theorization of this issue is, however, Joshua Clover’s “riot-strike-riot’” thesis, which argues that **riots** are the **paradigmatic** form of resistance in a capitalism that has become increasingly “circulatory.” [7] In classic Marxist thought, production—the making of commodities—is the heart of capital. The workplace, the point of production, is thus the crucial site of workers’ **collective counterpower**, and the strike—pre-eminently, the industrial factory strike—their key weapon. But Clover postulates that at certain phases in the history of capitalism production becomes enveloped or subsumed by the larger apparatus of circulation that connects production to the market. These moments include both capitalism’s preindustrial phase, where mercantile trading is preeminent, and its post-industrial (or perhaps better, super-industrial) moment, when production becomes **dependent** on global **supply chains**. At such moments logistical operations leap into salience both for the managers of capitalism and those who rebel against it. In early mercantile capital, a crucial form of resistance to an emergent market logic is, Clover points out, the food riot. In capital’s later, industrial phase, emphasis shifts to the strike-power of the mass factory worker. But in today’s world market, **production** is itself **distributed across** extended **networks** connecting software studios to assembly plants, and goods circulate to warehouses, supermarkets, stores, homes and computers through **planet-spanning systems** of **transport** and communication. **Revolt gravitates** towards **interruption** of these flows, in new forms of riot. Second, the **battlegrounds** of the protests **were logistical**. Paul Virilio pointed out long ago that mobility has always been definitive of social “movements,” and the street a site of proletarian power before the factory.[10] Events in Paris, Santiago, Hong Kong and elsewhere updated this truth for the vast, intertwined transportation networks of twenty first century capitalism. Occupy **movements** had filled squares charged with **symbolic significance**. In 2019, such moments recurred: “Tahrir Square” enjoyed a second life, not in Cairo but Baghdad. But in this round of struggles, motion, fluidity and viscosity, speed and slowdown, shaped protesters’ tactics. For the Gilets Jaunes, slowdowns of “exurban roundabouts” were the “backbone of . . . revolt” and bases for other actions that included destroying speed cameras, obstructing toll booths, and blocking “highway interchanges, airports, rail tracks, alpine tunnels, and maritime ports.”[11] In Puerto Rico, protest against government corruption found its feet by putting nearly a million people on to the Expreso Las Américas highway. In Iraq, the port of the oil city Basra and that of Um Qasr, the country’s only deep-water exit, were blocked for days. For Catalonian independence activists in Barcelona, and the Hong Kong anti-extradition movement, airport blockades were high-water moments in rebellions which also, however, baffled authorities by their fluidity in running battles through city streets. In Canada indigenous support for Wetʼsuwetʼen chiefs’ resistance to construction of a gas pipeline across their territories generated rail and road blockades that paralyzed east-west traffic. Third, **disrupting** the circulatory **flow** of value **gave** protesters **material power**. The scale of damage inflicted on capital is difficult to assess. Opponents of the movements sometimes exaggerated the economic impacts, emphasizing hardships to “likeable” small businesses and scapegoating protests for capital’s chronic problems (e.g. a falling rate of profit). It is, however, also the case that in several instances blockades and riots hit sectors of capital hard. This take us from **transportation** to another aspect of logistics, communication. For just as capital’s logistical operations have come to increasingly **depend on** digital **networks**, so too have the methods of those who **interrupt** such **operations**. To assert this is, of course, not to suggest that the Internet caused the riots, a foolish proposition; Philip Mirowski is correct to say that focus on social movements’ use of digital networks risks amplifying capital’s inherent technological fetishism.[17] Yet as the streets of putatively “smart” cities filled with tear gas and broken glass, mobile phones and wi-fi networks became, for police and protestors alike, a part of riots, components and conditions of—to adopt a fashionable language— the riot-assemblage. The tools of greatest importance to protest counter-logistics were, however, those that enabled End to End Encrypted (EEE) communication through commercial apps such as WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram. These can be seen as a legacy of the previous “occupy” cycle of struggles, which towards its end included Edward Snowden’s 2013-14 revelations about the cooperation of companies such as Google and Facebook with NSA surveillance. These disclosures deeply embarrassed corporate platforms, raising the specter of user defections, and prompted them to offer enhanced privacy options, commercially disseminating a type of programs previously only championed by dissident libertarian cypher-punks. Facebook’s acquisition of the encrypted message-service WhatsApp in 2014 was symptomatic. So too was the acclaim suddenly bestowed on Moxie Marlinspike, a former head of cybersecurity at Twitter who left in 2013 to create the encryption app Signal, an achievement that also earned him harassment by US security agencies. Other encryption apps came from developers exposed to even more overt authoritarian digital repression: Telegram was launched in 2013 by Nikolai and Pavel Durov, former owners of Russian social network VContakt, but effectively dispossessed of their company by Putin cronies after refusing demands to block by anti-government protest. These apps provided crucial means of coordination for a new generation of protestors, especially in regions outside of North America and Europe where adoption was faster than in the global north-west. In Hong Kong, Telegram had been installed 1.7 million times; it functioned as the **nervous system** of revolt, hosting protest groups with tens of thousands of members.[32] The Hong Kong movement also used Apple’s Airdrop app, which allowed an anonymized “note passing” across mobile phone networks.[33] In Chile, wide everyday use of WhatsApp provided a basis for student organizing of the turnstile-jumping metro fare-avoidance that ignited the uprising.[34] Virtual Private Networks were also sometimes important; in Iran they protected communication between domestic protests and diasporic communities.[35] Widely available, easy to use encryption and anonymization gave a degree of security to online organizing, even if this confidence was periodically shaken by the discovery of vulnerabilities in supposedly safe systems.[36] Digital technologies also supported experiments in rapid, ad hoc collective decision making. Hong Kong protesters “be water” strategy is one of fluidity, involving demos that turn into marches that become blockades that spawn wildcat offshoots. Protesters used online platforms to “open source”[37] responses to changing riot conditions. These include Telegram chat groups and forums such as LIHKG, a Hong Kong version of Reddit where users post anonymously and hold polls. They developed other crowdsourced tools, such as the mobile app HKmap.live, displaying the location of police and protesters in city streets, until it was removed from Apple’s app store after complaint from China. Protesters also circulated information including Tinder, Uber, and Pokémon Go, in a remarkable the “gamification” of political protest.[38] These digital co-ordinations evolve alongside, not in contradiction to, distinctly analog methods; in Hong Kong streets, protesters formed human chains directed by hand-signals to pass supplies, as in the heat of battle revolt fused into urgent cyber-physical ensembles.[39] Every move provokes a counter-move. Security forces struck back against the protests of 2018-19 with blackouts, intimidation, hacks, entrapment, attrition, and cooption. In the 2010-2014 struggles, Internet blackouts, such as that with which the Mubarak regime fought Egypt’s Tahrir Square protest, were a dramatic, but ultimately ineffective response to networked rebellion. Subsequently, regimes threatened by revolt, far from taking networks down, started leaving social media on, the better to monitor, sabotage and arrest protestors: there were suggestions this would become the new normal of protest control.[43] However, in 2019 Ecuador, Iraq, and Iran saw Internet blocking ranging in from gradual throttling to selective outages to near total blackouts, escalating as protests peaked.[44] More specific hacking attacks were aimed at encrypted apps, such as the blackouts of Telegram in Hong Kong, likely launched from mainland China.[45]

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