# 1NC

## 1

#### Settler Colonialism is a structure not an event that becomes a system of fungibility severing people from land resulting in chattel slavery, indigenous, genocide, and ecocide. Systems of the University are complicit overdetermining how we engage and relate with the world making forefronting Settler Colonialism a prior question.

Paperson 17 la paperson or K. Wayne Yang, June 2017, “A Third University is Possible” (an associate professor of ethnic studies at the University of California, San Diego)//Elmer

Land is the prime concern of settler colonialism, contexts in which the colonizer comes to a “new” place not only to seize and exploit but to stay, making that “new” place his permanent home. Settler colonialism thus complicates the center–periphery model that was classically used to describe colonialism, wherein an imperial center, the “metropole,” dominates distant colonies, the “periphery.” Typically, one thinks of European colonization of Africa, India, the Caribbean, the Pacific Islands, in terms of external colonialism, also called exploitation colonialism, where land and human beings are recast as natural resources for primitive accumulation: coltan, petroleum, diamonds, water, salt, seeds, genetic material, chattel. Theories named as “settler colonial studies” had a resurgence beginning around 2006.[2] However, the analysis of settler colonialism is actually not new, only often ignored within Western critiques of empire.[3] The critical literatures of the colonized have long positioned the violence of settlement as a prime feature in colonial life as well as in global arrangements of power. We can see this in Franz Fanon’s foundational critiques of colonialism. Whereas Fanon’s work is often generalized for its diagnoses of anti/colonial violence and the racialized psychoses of colonization upon colonized and colonizer, Fanon is also talking about settlement as the particular feature of French colonization in Algeria. For Fanon, the violence of French colonization in Algeria arises from settlement as **a spatial immediacy of empire**: the geospatial collapse of metropole and colony into the same time and place. On the “selfsame land” are spatialized white immunity and racialized violation, non-Native desires for freedom, Black life, and Indigenous relations.[4] Settler colonialism is too often thought of as “what happened” to Indigenous people. This kind of thinking confines the experiences of Indigenous people, their critiques of settler colonialism, their decolonial imaginations, to an unwarranted historicizing parochialism, as if settler colonialism were a past event that “happened to” Native peoples and not generalizable to non-Natives. Actually, settler colonialism is something that “happened for” settlers. Indeed, it is happening for them/us right now. Wa Thiong’o’s question of how instead of why directs us to think of land tenancy laws, debt, and the privatization of land as settler colonial technologies that enable the “eventful” history of plunder and disappearance. Property law is a settler colonial technology. The weapons that enforce it, the knowledge institutions that legitimize it, the financial institutions that operationalize it, are also technologies. Like all technologies, they evolve and spread. Recasting land as property means severing Indigenous peoples from land. This separation, what Hortense Spillers describes as “the loss of Indigenous name/land” for Africans-turned-chattel, recasts Black Indigenous people as black bodies for biopolitical disposal: who will be moved where, who will be murdered how, who will be machinery for what, and who will be made property for whom.[5] In the alienation of land from life, alienable rights are produced: the right to own (property), the right to law (protection through legitimated violence), the right to govern (supremacist sovereignty), the right to have rights (humanity). In a word, what is produced is whiteness. Moreover, it is not just human beings who are refigured in the schism. Land and nonhumans become alienable properties, a move that first alienates land from its own sovereign life. Thus we can speak of the various technologies required to create and maintain these separations, these alienations: Black from Indigenous, human from nonhuman, land from life.[6] “How?” is a question you ask if you are concerned with the mechanisms, not just the motives, of colonization. Instead of settler colonialism as an ideology, or as a history, you might consider settler colonialism as a set of technologies —a frame that could help you to forecast colonial next operations and to plot decolonial directions. This chapter proceeds with the following insights. (1) The settler–native– slave triad does not describe identities. The triad—an analytic mainstay of settler colonial studies—digs a pitfall of identity that not only chills collaborations but also implies that the racial will be the solution. (2) Technologies are trafficked. Technologies generate patterns of social relations to land. Technologies mutate, and so do these relationships. Colonial technologies travel. In tracing technologies’ past and future trajectories, we can connect how settler colonial and antiblack technologies circulate in transnational arenas. (3) Land—not just people—is the biopolitical target.[7] The examples are many: fracking, biopiracy, damming of rivers and flooding of valleys, the carcasses of pigs that die from the feed additive ractopamine and are allowable for harvest by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. The subjugation of land and nonhuman life to deathlike states in order to support “human” life is a “biopolitics” well beyond the Foucauldian conception of biopolitical as governmentality or the neoliberal disciplining of modern, bourgeois, “human” subject. (4) (Y)our task is to theorize in the break, that is, to refuse the master narrative that technology is loyal to the master, that (y)our theory has a Eurocentric origin. Black studies, Indigenous studies, and Othered studies have already made their breaks with Foucault (over biopolitics), with Deleuze and Guatarri (over assemblages and machines), and with Marx (over life and primitive accumulation). (5) Even when they are dangerous, understanding technologies provides us some pathways for decolonizing work. We can identify projects of collaboration on decolonial technologies. Colonizing mechanisms are evolving into new forms, and they might be subverted toward decolonizing operations. The Settler–Native–Slave Triad Does Not Describe Identities One of the main interventions of settler colonial studies has been to insist that the patterning of social relations is shaped by colonialism’s thirst for land and thus is shaped to fit modes of empire. Because colonialism is a perverted affair, our relationships are also warped into complicitous arrangements of violation, trespass, and collusion with its mechanisms. For Fanon, the psychosis of colonialism arises from the patterning of violence into the binary relationship between the immune humanity of the white settler and the impugned humanity of the native. For Fanon, the supremacist “right” to create settler space that is immune from violence, and the “right” to abuse the body of the Native to maintain white immunity, this is the spatial and fleshy immediacy of settler colonialism. Furthermore, the “humanity” of the settler is constructed upon his agency over the land and nature. As Maldonado- Torres explains, “I think, therefore I am” is actually an articulation of “I conquer, therefore I am,” a sense of identity posited upon the harnessing of nature and its “natural” people.[8] This creates a host of post+colonial problems that have come to define modernity. Because the humanity of the settler is predicated on his ability to “write the world,” to make history upon and over the natural world, the colonized is instructed to make her claim to humanity by similarly acting on the world or, more precisely, acting in his. Indeed, for Fanon, **it is the perverse ontology of settler becomings**—becoming landowner or becoming property, becoming killable or becoming a killer—and the mutual implication of tortured and torturer that mark the psychosis of colonialism. This problem of modernity and colonial psychosis is echoed in Jack Forbes’s writings: Columbus was a wétiko. He was mentally ill or insane, the carrier of a terribly contagious psychological disease, the wétiko psychosis. . . . The wétiko psychosis, and the problems it creates, have inspired many resistance movements and efforts at reform or revolution. Unfortunately, most of these efforts have failed because they have never diagnosed the wétiko.[9] Under Western modernity, becoming “free” means becoming a colonizer, and because of this, “the central contradiction of modernity is freedom.”[10] Critiques of settler colonialism, therefore, do not offer just another “type” of colonialism to add to the literature but a mode of analysis that has repercussions for any diagnosis of coloniality and for understanding the modern conditions of freedom. By modern conditions of freedom, I mean that Western freedom is a product of colonial modernity, and I mean that such freedom comes with conditions, with strings attached, most manifest as terms of unfreedom for nonhumans. As Cindi Mayweather says, “your freedom’s in a bind.”[11]

#### Debate replicates the actions of academia via the misrecognition of genocide as “settlement” and native thought as “land-centered pedagogy” is mimicked by non-native usurpation of natives in debate as “give back the land” which pushes native debaters to identify themselves at the site of coherent intra-human conflict.

Brough 17 (Taylor, BA from University of Vermont and 2016 CEDA Nationals Champion, Open letter to non-Black Native people in debate, <https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/> //af)

I should start by saying that I think Frank Wilderson is right about the position of Native people in the US racial schema. In Red, White, and Black, he argues compellingly that Native people are situated in a liminal space between life and death—that we are haunted by the dual specters of sovereignty and genocide; that our demands occur simultaneously in a coherent register of land repatriation, land theft, and treaty rights and in an incoherent register of an incomprehensible and ongoing magnitude of massacres, rape, starvation, boarding schools, and smallpox. Wilderson’s work has provided me with some of the tools to describe the gap between coherence and incoherence, a gap which is made especially evident in debate rounds. And particularly clear is that Native debate[[1]](https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/" \l "_ftn1) is inclined towards talking in the grammar of sovereignty rather than genocide.

I am here preoccupied with our enunciative capacities in debate—with what I perceive “Native debate,” and specifically non-Black Native debaters, to be doing in service of Settler/Master (mis)recognition, what the consequences of such doing might be, and what it might mean to push against the disciplining force of recognition in debate. The ontological fact of genocide/sovereignty as a dual positioning for Native people, coupled with academia’s push to identify ourselves at the site of (coherent and recognizable) trauma (what Wilderson terms “intra-human conflicts”), has led Native thought in debate, broadly, to do three related things: 1) prioritize the coherent discussion of sovereign loss over one of genocide and its incoherence, 2) articulate ourselves as always in conversation with (read: traumatized by) the Settler, 3) distance ourselves from a Black/Red conversation or from Black/Red theorizing. These three moves are all antiblack in addition to being an insidious manifestation of the genocide that structures half of our (non?)being.Depressingly, if we were to historicize “Native debate,” we would have to begin with a litany of non-Native debaters reading “Give Back the Land,” offering sovereignty as a solution to a tragic history of genocide that relegates Native people to phobic/phillic objects of the past whose futures are in the hands of those Settlers who bravely dare to talk about them. The terrain in which everyone can become Native—or at least become an advocate for Natives—is a cleared landscape produced by genocide but also, significantly, produced by antiblack slavery.[[2]](https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/" \l "_ftn2) This history of non-Native debaters’ representations of sovereignty, land repatriation, and treaty rights as the only solution to genocide also reaches into the present. What is most disturbing to me about this ongoing history is that we have yet to tie virtually any debate round to actual, material land repatriation, sovereign gains, or the upholding of treaty rights. These material gains involve labor from Native people organizing at the grassroots level, not an academic labor from Settlers. Debate arguments do not facilitate sovereign benefits for Native peoples. Further, the struggle for sovereignty itself does not overcome or solve genocide. The removal of the Hunkpapa Lakota Oyate and their relatives at the Oceti Sakowin camp at Standing Rock should be proof enough of this—sovereignty as a politic is often met with, rather than resolving, genocidal violence. Non-Black Native people in debate have performed a similar land-based politic. **Native debate has become** so **associated with words like “land,” “sovereignty,” “space,”** “place,” “treaty rights,” and others, **that it is** almost **impossible to theorize Native debate absent sovereignty** as a grammar that marks our existence. So **both non-Native** debaters (who claim to advocate for Native peoples’ sovereignty) **and Native debaters** (who claim to advocate for something that usually falls into the grammar of sovereignty) a**re talking in essentially the same register, with incredibly limited slippage towards genocide as a vector of violence.** And, for Native people, like non-Natives, debate arguments do not and cannot facilitate the material elements of decolonization that these land-based arguments frequently rely upon.[[3]](https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/" \l "_ftn3) Sovereign gains don’t happen in debate rounds, but for some reason the (mis)recognition of Native enunciation as sovereignty persists, in that the word “land” harkens to Native debate in almost every instance, that almost every debate involving Native people reading perceptibly “Native” arguments includes a discussion of “treaties” or “sovereignty” or “land-based pedagogy” or “spatiality.” What other reason could this be than a structure of desire around recognition from the Settler/Master? If we really follow the history of how “Nativeness” has been misrepresented in debate by Settlers, it becomes clear that much of contemporary Native debate, strangely (or as I argue, not so strangely), mimics these misrepresentations. Of course, debate is an economy of (mis)recognition. That “Native” becomes coextensive with “land” in debate is no accident. It is an enunciation that has been evoked prior to the involvement of any Native debaters or coaches. And it is reiterated by non-Black Native debaters with increasing certainty about the truthiness of Native relationships to the land. **Systematically absent from this conversation, of course, is a discussion of genocide**. I have gestured above towards the ways that the desire for recognition from the Settler/Master motivates this conceptual move towards the register of sovereignty. As Wilderson writes,“The crowding out, or disavowal, of the genocide modality [by the sovereign modality] allows the Settler/’Savage’ struggle to appear as a conflict rather than as an antagonism. This has therapeutic value for both the ‘Savage’ and the Settler: the mind can grasp the fight, conceptually put it into words. To say, ‘You stole my land and pilfered and appropriated my culture’ and then produce books, articles, and films that travel back and forth along the vectors of those conceptually coherent accusations is less threatening to the integrity of the ego, than to say, ‘You culled me down from 19 million to 250,000.’”[[4]](https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/" \l "_ftn4) This gesture towards conceptual coherence and therapeutic value is why there is a celebrated and ongoing association between “land” and “Native” in both non-Native argumentation and in arguments made by Native people. It is why we cannot theorize about Native debate absent the contingent register of sovereignty. I am hesitant to claim that sovereignty should be completely abandoned as an analytic for obvious reasons—I think Wilderson also gives credit to indigenous conceptions of sovereignty, what it unseats, and how it operates, while still articulating a critique of sovereignty unrivaled by much of Native studies. I am not interested in suggesting that all Native people ignore our peoples’ land relationships or histories of broken treaties as politic throughout the United States or the world. I agree with Qwo-Li Driskill’s suggestion, alongside similar ones from other Native theorists, that sovereignty must be re-theorized significantly rather than echoing the propertied enterprise that confers legibility to state formations. Regardless of my reluctance to disavow the potential for sovereignty as a politic outside debate rounds, I think it is obvious that sovereignty in its terms in debate—as a recognized and fundamentally “Native” utterance—is genocidal and anti-Black. Broadly, my argument is that genocide is an undertheorized arm of an antagonism that halfway positions Native people, and that the basis of such undertheorization is the desire to be (mis)recognized as nearly-Human by the Settler. This claim invites an investigation of the context of (mis)recognition in debate and what is particular about debate itself with regard to Wilderson’s theory of position. Debate is inevitably a space of recognition, coherence, and transparency. It seeks to uncover, make clear, and expand consciousness more than it promises to occlude, hide, or make incoherent. This condition of debate is significant not because that makes it different from the rest of the academy, or the rest of civil society, but because it offers a specific situation from which to apply the critique of recognition. In the age of academic identity politics, the identification of the self as a subject of trauma has emerged as the primary locus of (recognizable) enunciation. Many who are familiar with Eve Tuck’s work have read her critical analysis on the academy’s demand for damage-centered narratives and the kinds of traumatized neoliberal subjectivity they produce—as those who are continually indebted to a parasitic regime of recognition. When this critique is applied in debate, it frequently targets identity-politics models of intervention in academia which posit the traumatized subject as a primary locus of critique. For example, many of the ableism debates I’ve judged contained arguments locked entirely in this register—where the traumatized subject is itself offered as a structural analytic in a manner that is always parasitic on Blackness. Teams who read arguments that they refer to as “disability pessimism” and describe disability as a form of “ontological death” often go on to claim that no change has come from reading critical arguments in debate and that we should be pessimistic about the ability for debate to become more inclusive of disabled people. This is, at best, an appropriation of Afropessimism based on a reductive reading of Black debate. Significantly, the misrecognition of Black debate that is rearticulated through “disability pessimism” also includes the secondary claim that critical argumentation has not produced shifts in the institutional schema of debate. But “disability pessimism” would not exist without Black debate. You can’t bite Afropessimism and then disavow the intellectual labor of Black people as the condition of possibility for your argument. Worse still, “things have never changed in debate for disabled people,” is not an advocacy. It is just a recognized enunciation of the trauma of degraded subjectivity. In this example, the degraded subject masquerades trauma as analysis while occluding structural phenomena. They merely say, “The world is a horrible and traumatizing place for me, therefore listen to me reiterate my trauma.” And more often than not, as Eve Tuck writes, “All we are left with is the damage.”[[5]](https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/" \l "_ftn5) These so-called interventions posited by identity politicians are ineffective in that they fail to provide a solution to a problem that they have misidentified because of their own egoistic (contingent) investments. In other words, in an instance of identity politics, where trauma must be isolable, human, subjectified, and coherent in order to be validated as authenticity by the Settler/Master, sovereignty gets the job done in a way genocide does not. Again, it is the assumption that recognition by the Settler/Master is favorable, or even necessary, that motivates Native people’s investments in arguments about land, space, place, sovereignty, and treaties. It is also this assumption that facilitates the false move to authenticity (false in that it is only given coherence by a genocidal and antiblack apparatus of recognition). Native people have been (mis)recognized by the Settler/Master since Taino peoples were met with Columbus’ genocidal misrecognitions in 1492. Much of this (mis)recognition rests on the incoherence of genocide. “Genocide is not a name for violence in the way that ‘arson’ is; genocide is a linguistic placeholder connoting that violence which out-strips the power of connotation. To represent it we have to dismantle it, pretend that we can identify its component parts, force a name into its hole—macrocytes, spur cells, kidneys at half-throttle, a thoroughly ulcerated stomach, Wounded Knee, Sand Creek—and make it what it is not, the way one fills the tucked sleeve of a one-armed boy. But these fillers, these phantom limbs of connotation, can only be imagined separately, and as such they take on the ruse of items that science, love, aesthetics, or justice—some form of symbolic intervention—can attend to and set right. They become treatable, much like the massacre at Wounded Knee were it not for the fact that to comprehend Wounded Knee, three hundred-plus men, women, and children in a snow-filled ravine, one must comprehend those three hundred synchronically over three thousand miles (the forty-eight contiguous states) and diachronically over five hundred years. Here, madness sets in and the promises of symbolic intervention turn to dust. We are returned to the time and space of no time and space, the ‘terminal.’”[6] The magnitude of this hole—the impossibility of representing or narrativizing how genocide as a modality continues to position not just Native peoples but the extent to which it is a structural principle of modernity itself—is not easy. It is certainly not as easy to articulate in a debate round as sovereign loss is, nor is it as easy for Settlers to hear. In order to no longer occlude the emergence of Red/Black theorizing in debate, non-Black Native people in debate must begin speaking in the register of incoherence, which demands engaging conceptually and argumentatively with Black people in debate. The avoidance of such a conversation (or series of conversations) can only be rooted in antiblackness and will only reproduce antiblackness. While Native people can be recognized by the Settlers we are talking to in the register of sovereignty, structurally, Black people (including people who are Black and Native) have no such register at the level of ontology. “Whereas Humans exist on some plane of being and thus can become existentially present through some struggle for, of, or through recognition, Blacks cannot reach this plane.”[7] The simultaneous coherence and incoherence of the “Savage” position has thus far led non-Black Native people collectively to invest ourselves in antiblack kinship relations in debate that refuse to speak to or with Black people except when using them as a scapegoat to gain recognition from the Settler/Master institution of debate. This is because, more often than not, non-Black Native debaters are only tasked with talking to Settlers. I don’t mean this in terms of whether we have white friends—I mean argumentatively and conceptually, our work is creating a Settler/Native binary that conspicuously erases and systematically under-theorizes Blackness, antiblackness, slavery/prison, and Black people. Too many non-Black Native debaters don’t even have an answer to the question of whether Black people are Settlers. That there are Native debaters who feel ambiguous about this question at all suggests the rootedness of Native debate in antiblackness. It is beyond the scope of this letter to offer specific critiques of the myriad of (inadequate) ways that many non-Black Native scholars claim to “position” “Blackness,” but it is overwhelmingly true that their discussion of antiblackness consistently describes it as a system of racial identification subservient to settler colonialism. In debate, however, this neglects the indebtedness of non-Black Native debaters to the intellectual and argumentative labor of Black debaters, coaches, and judges. In other words, to reduce antiblackness in debate to a system of racial identification subsumed structurally by settler colonialism is ahistorical, given that it has been the work of Black people in debate that has made Native debate possible at all, as tenuous and numerically small as we are. Why, then, are non-Black Native people in debate so invested in describing settler colonialism as the sole matrix of power under which violence operates? Much of this scholarship (Eve Tuck’s work, Jodie Byrd’s, and other similar texts from Native studies) critiques integrationist elements of Black studies as seeking inclusion in the national project—but Afropessimism broadly, and Wilderson’s work specifically, is far from integrationist. To my knowledge (which is extensive but obviously not exhaustive when it comes to Native debate), non-Black Native debaters have been largely unwilling to contend with the thesis of Wilderson’s book, even when reading other scholars who allege disagreement with him, as most of these scholars do, from the vantage point of sovereignty. A coherent conversation with the Settler about sovereignty in debate is unlikely to challenge the (mis)recognition that leads to the high level of politicization around who is really Native and who is not. Similarly, the numeric lack of Native people in debate, as a function of genocide itself, makes it difficult to articulate what Native resistance has been, is going to be, or even what it is doing right now. Rather than an aspirational politic that suggests we should culturally infuse debate with indigeneity (the implicit endpoint of many of these conversations about “decolonization” which are ultimately revivalist and inclusionist attempts related to Native spiritual or cultural practices), there is an (under-theorized) incoherence to our position that I believe should motivate us to enter into the fraught terrain of Red/Black theorizing. Nothing Native is happening in debate—not that there are not Native people in debate, but I do not believe debate is a space that we should aspire to “indigenize,” “decolonize,” or anything in that register.

#### Communicative practices work to secure the monopoly of white-manhood. The trick of liberalism is its transmogrification of radicalism into a palliative in order to fuel the counter-insurgency and racial capital. You should vote neg to reject politics of reginiton which only a refusal to commitment can solve

Brough 20 [Brough, Taylor J., the GOAT, May 2020, Counter-Insurgency, Liberalism, & the transmogrification of radical meaning, master’s thesis, Wake Forest University, [https://wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/bitstream/handle/10339/96863/Brough\_wfu\_0248M\_11531.pdf]](https://wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/bitstream/handle/10339/96863/Brough_wfu_0248M_11531.pdf%5d)

The moment that inaugurated privilege, intersectionality, and “the personal is political” as counter-hegemonic terms was also conditioned by the cultural politics of what has routinely been described as the death of the subject. The narrative goes, the subject – conceptualized by these discourses as white and male – and his monopoly, having been successfully challenged by his racialized others, was dethroned, and subsequently the cultural and racial others who undermined the subject’s hegemony were able to lay claim to a properly political voice through cultural representation. As Denise Ferreira da Silva explains, “[S]ocial analysts described these circumstances as the onset of a new site of political struggle —the politics of representation, that is, the struggle for the recognition of cultural difference —that registered the demise of the metanarratives of reason and history that compose modern representation.” 1 Thus a struggle around representation ensued, and the battlefields of that struggle expanded through social media sites, university classrooms, and activist contexts where the question of the representation of modernity’s cultural and racial others remains primary.

Unfortunately, these representational politics remained wedded to the durability of liberal modernity’s subject. As da Silva continues, What was probably less self-evident, perhaps, was that the subject’s passing would not result in its complete annihilation. I am not referring here to how the former private holdings of the subject, Truth and Being, were being invaded by its others, because it was precisely their “fragmentation” that led many observers to announce his death. What has yet to be acknowledged, however, is how this invasion belies the productive powers of the very tools that carved and instituted the place of the subject.2 The counter-hegemonies that felt so ineffably resistive were themselves animated by a melioristic model of subjectivity whose claim on liberatory representation was modeled after the subject of its critique.

Now terms like privilege, intersectionality, and “the personal is political” have come to feel like the closing in of counterinsurgents on revolutionary meaning. A recent Millenial Revolution article, entitled “Why Privilege Makes You Soft” champions the skills learned from growing up in poverty as opportunities to succeed in the financial marketplace, which apparently, along with creating a seven-figure investment portfolio and frugal spending habits, constitutes “a revolution.”3 A blog post from the ACPA argues for “starting a revolution” by asking how to make college campuses more diverse and welcoming to multiply marginalized students, such as offering advising outside business hours and including gender neutral bathrooms.4 A personal blog post from Robin Morgan explains that “the personal is political” is a revolutionary phrase, and one decidedly aligned with “the American spirit,” because it can motivate calls for expansions of healthcare in service of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”5 The “revolution” explained by these think pieces is a far cry from the liberation movements and radical traditions that inspired the coinage of privilege, intersectionality, and “the personal is political.” The above blog posts advocate for expansions of racial capitalism, the university, and the nation-state form through an affirmative relationship to marginality and a welcoming attitude towards racial and cultural difference. This so-called revolution, then, invites a limited reading of history and violence. In other words, the left’s culture of political correctness is limited by that very thing which it understands to be most advantageous to it: its preoccupation with ethicality, goodness, and being on the right side of history. The terms have shifted, or I have shifted, or both.

I began writing this thesis not because I have transcended the need for those terms, or because I think that power must no longer be challenged, but instead because I have come to find the desire to be the right kind of radical itself a kind of enclosure, a delimitation of what can be thought, enunciated, and felt. Even charting the history of my radicalization as beginning when I started to use these terminologies belies a refusal to read my younger experiences, structured by genocide, racial capitalism, antiblackness, the nation-state form, and coercive gender assignation, as radicalizing moments or opportunities for refusal. In other words, I am always re-learning that I do not want to be right – not on the right side of history, the right side of discourse, the right side of the library, the right side of the classroom, or the right side of the most recent Twitter or Facebook fight. I want to be wrong. And I want the revolution – not the expansion of liberalism but instead the destruction of it – to win.

This project, then, emerged from my sense that radical meanings are being transmogrified into political sense-making through the logics of multiculturalism, representative democracy, and a really vile insistence on non-violent consciousness-raising. The politics of representation, a phenomenon which I explore in depth throughout this project, emerged in the last fifty years or so as a counterinsurgent strategy to manage revolutionary uprising. The successes of multiculturalism and the politics of representation have been most apparent in moments where liberal institutions (the university, capital, and the state, among others) have utilized them to route desires for upheaval in the register of raciality back into the community of liberal Humanity. Liberalism’s ability to domesticate the political imaginations carried by radical terminologies has endured through the politics of representation. This politics performs its counterinsurgency through changes to the terrain that do not fundamentally change the battlefield itself, by preserving what the counterinsurgency has always been trying to protect: its own monopoly on the proper use of violence in service of the protection of the ascendancy of white life.

#### This genocidal logic naturalizes itself into the unconscious whereby the settler dream becomes extermination.

Young 17 (Bryanne Huston, Doctoral Student at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill “Killing the Indian in the Child: Materialities of Death and Political Formations of Life in the Canadian Indian Residential School System,” pp. 95-100) NIJ

Whiteness, the Child, and the Logics of Futurity Against the politicized topographies and temporalities of indigeneity and race, I now move into a consideration of the contributions of psychoanalytic theory to the questions of politics and time presented thus far. The kinds of questions psychoanalysis is interested in asking, the registers upon which it performs analysis, and its unique emphasis on temporality, language, and difference provide an excellent conceptual apparatus through which we might begin to trouble/problematize stable, taken-for-granted oppositions between psychic and social, personal and political, self and other. Freud’s interest in time is evident in his work on the uncanny, and in his inaugural work on what we might now call trauma studies and conditions we now call post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). For Freud, this theory of hysteria introduces a provocative temporality in which traumatic events reoccur, flashing up in perfect replication of themselves, as though happening again and again. In his diagnosis of so-called shell-shocked soldiers returning from World War I, Freud was keenly aware that time did not always progress along an even plane. Though Freud’s analysis of trauma is captivating and critically rich, it is not within my purview here to take on the full extent of this scholarship. Instead, what is most salient to my analysis are the capacities of psychoanalytic theory to move critique outside and beyond prevailing notions of time and narratives of progress that only mean moving forward. This chapter writes from a stance that views it as imperative that scholarship reaches beyond, and thinks outside, the paradigms that invented it. Psychoanalytic theory, with its idiosyncratic temporal logics—particularly in conjunction with Foucauldian theory—offers a productive and robust way to critique the continuing primacy of normative disciplines whose chronologics have historically warranted a politics that kills in the name of life. Such an approach allows us to hold in productive tension any definition of “the political” as stable and finite, with—as in the case of liberal political philosophy—the legally constructed “person” as its primary epistemological unit. This conceptual capacity of psychoanalysis, in turn, allows us to politicize a form of life and modality of corporeal personhood hitherto constructed as what, in Bataillean parlance, we might call colonialism’s accursed share—colonialism’s pure waste. Additionally, psychoanalytic notions of the death drive, whose proper movement is explicitly circular, allows us to begin to locate the child within logics of futurity, onto which is laminated a kind of indelible whiteness. For the purpose of my analysis I engage Lacanian psychoanalysis, limiting myself to a consideration of the structure of the drives and to a Lacanian conceptualization of language, and its role in the formation of self and the suturing of the psyche to sociality. Freud, as Teresa De Lauretis (2008) emphasizes, elaborated the death drive between the First and Second World Wars, in a Europe living “under the shadow of death and the threat of biological and cultural genocide” (1). Situating her analysis of the death drive in the contemporary moment, De Lauretis points to this contextual, historical darkening, writing: “I wonder whether our epistemologies can sustain the impact of the real … If I return to Freud’s notion of an unconscious death drive, it is because it conveys the sense and the force of something in human reality that resists discursive articulation as well as political diplomacy, an otherness that haunts the dream of a common world” (9). Using psychoanalysis as reading practice, Freud’s suspicion that human life, both individual and social, is compromised from the beginning by something that undermines it, works against it, is (darkly?) generative. The death drive indicates a tension bordering psychic and libidinal relations, which marks Freud’s radical break with Cartesian rationality and points to a negativity that counteracts the optimistic affirmations of human perfectability. This dimension of radical negativity cannot be reduced to an expression of alienated social conditions, nor is it entirely something the body does on its own. Theorized as the destruction drive, the antagonism drive, or sometimes, simply “the drive,” it is impossible to escape. In psychoanalytic theory, therefore, particularly in the clinical setting, the objective is not to overcome the drive, but rather to come to terms with it, in what Slovenian Lacanian psychoanalytic theorist Slavoj Žižek (1989) calls “its terrifying dimension” (4). It is a fundamental axiom of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory that attempts to abolish the drive antagonism are precisely the source of totalitarian temptation. Žižek writes: “The greatest mass murders and holocausts have always been perpetrated in the name of man as harmonious being, of a New Man without antagonistic tension” (5). So it is that one of Canada’s greatest atrocities— the genocide of its First Peoples—took place in the name of Canada itself, that sought progress and unification as a single body politic with claims on a shared futurity. The fulfillment of this destiny relied upon the negation of the other, the bad race, the dangerous race, the race that stood outside the purview of the norm and had no share in its time-zone, the ones called to live in the between space—as nobody. As the relatively more benign civilization policies failed to convert Aboriginal forms of life into separate but civilized, Christian communities on reserves, the federal government intensified its tactics. Policies became more aggressive. As these more aggressive policies (such as enfranchisement) also failed, the federal government intensified its tactics once again, escalating the stakes and the strategies towards the horizon of assimilation. This ‘doubling down’ in the face of failure is a primary trace effect of the death drive, and indeed, it is not unreasonable to argue that the federal government Indian policy has, since confederation, been death driven. Because the aim of fully eradicating the otherness of the other can only fail—in Freudian parlance, it cannot be mastered—the trajectory of the aiming turns in a circularity, orbiting around that which can never be had: perfection. Caught in death drive circularity, the aiming towards the objective (i.e. a unified body politic) authorizes, and indeed recruits, escalating violence in the interest of—finally—closing the open. For Žižek, this compulsive ‘doubling-down’ in the face of failure to arrive at the impossible horizon of perfection tips towards totalitarian temptation, which, he tells us, is implicated in the drive to unify a singular body politic, a new man without antagonistic tension. The drive aims for the return to a moment of unity before the intrusion of language and the entrance of the subject into what Lacan calls the Symbolic—the universe of symbols in which all human subjects share. Because this economy of signifiers operates through a modality of difference by association, on the premise that language does not reflect or carry within it universal a priori meaning, spirit, or Truth, signifiers are always and already sliding along a chain of signification that is never truly fixed. Rather, for Lacan, meaning is constructed through quilting points, durable concepts that affix ideas to their signifiers and which, in their durability, structure entire fields of meaning. For Lacan, subjects are formed by their entrance into this system of sliding difference from a pre-linguistic state retroactively constructed through nostalgic affective associations with unity, perfection, and completion. The loss or lack occurs in the imaginary, the order of presence and absence, and is formalized in the symbolic. This is experienced by the subject as a loss of that to which she/he can never again return, but for which she/he perpetually yearns, and toward which she/he perpetually moves. The circularity of movement toward this impossible horizon is precisely the movement of the drive. It is my argument that the concept of “the Indian” is a quilting point through which the field of politics in Canada is sutured into signification, a durable concept that organizes the meaning of nation, citizen, sovereignty, and subjecthood. Further, the hypoxic vision of national unity and a harmonious white(ned) citizenry is a movement propelled by the drive, a circularity impelled by the belief that what is lacking in the present can be made good in the future—an imaginary that activates/harnesses a kind of libidinal energy that is, by its very nature, inexhaustible. It matters, in the instance of the Canadian Indian Residential Schools and their mandate, that before child subjects enter into the structuration of language/the Symbolic, their bodies are already marked as disprized, abject, inscribed into the signification for, and, I argue, as, loss itself. As I have argued above, reading through psychoanalytic theory facilitates a conceptualization of subject-formation that includes the role of signification in the contouring of subject/ivities. This analytic rubric is importantly brought to bear in my analysis of “the child” the Canadian Indian Residential School System announces into presence: a child fundamentally and constitutively tied to a death whose temporal structure is always deferred, always impartial, always unfolding, and yet always still to be. Indeed, even in circumstances in which her/his mode of being in the world is not a deliberate practice of making- spectral, “the child” remains a notoriously ambivalent, slippery signifier. This plasticity—differently stated, this over-abundant availability of “the child” as concept—takes on an interesting significance within political thought, functioning not as that which is politicized, but as the signifier in whose name the political mobilizes itself. In this way, the child functions as the absolute outside to political thought and the logics of its temporality, functioning instead to condition its possibilities and organize, from beyond its borders, its spatial and temporal limits. An example of this conceptualization of the child as signifier—and certainly one of the more provocative articulations of this phenomena in the contemporary neoliberal moment—is the polemic Lee develops in his monograph No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. For Edelman, the Child—in its conflation with the kind of futurity toward which the teleology of (neo)liberal discourse is mobilized—is not simply important to contemporary politics, but is that which “serves to regulate political discourse [itself]” (ii). Indeed, as Edelman points out, “the figural Child alone embodies the citizen as ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights ‘real’ citizens are allowed. For the social exists to preserve for this universalized subject, this fantasmatic Child, a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). In Edelman’s polemic, it goes without saying that the figural child is a white child and that children of colour, children of mixed heritage, Indian children—within the Ideological State Apparatus of the Indian Residential Schools—far from carrying the over-abundant significance Edelman so adeptly parses, signify on only the most spectral of registers. This child, I argue, as a kind of spectral(ized) partial subject, instantiates a subjectivity simultaneously over-exposed to the political and over-determined by the word of the law, while barely accorded even the status of bare life. This is a subject that is hailed into a circularity of misrecognition in a relationship with death that is virtually inescapable. This relationship with death is the suture that connects this subject to the social. Edelman’s argument does not address racialized formations of self-hood, but is no less relevant to the argument I seek to develop here. Indeed, it is perhaps all the keener in what it omits—which is the child of color. This omission points to the level of signification and the way in which the whitened child is effortlessly lifted from the problematically raced body—the body whose racialized status is found problematic. This fantasy of purification through signification speaks, in ways that are eloquent and disturbing in equal measure, precisely the fantasy of the Canadian Indian Residential School System: that the body of the Indian could be left behind in a transcendent movement away from the vexatious quagmire posed by the Indian body toward the realm of what Kantian philosophy calls pure spirit, the realm of whiteness, purity, and hypoxic visions of what Edelman calls, “a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). This fantasy of corporeal abandonment points to the latent desire of Western philosophical thought that seeks, through the disavowal of bodily finitude and a fetishization of the logos, access to purity of form, a fantasy that relegates, leaves trapped, the sometimes racialized, sometimes feminized other, mired in flesh and finitude from which it is allowed no escape. The Indigenous person, we remember from Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, is imagined as always already outside the teleology of history, already extinct. This way of understanding difference, through the rubric of historical progress, remains central to liberal and neoliberal political thought, economic practices, and policies in the current moment. Prising the child away from the Indian, meanwhile, continues to have important implications in the way we imagine colonial forms, not only of life, but also of death.

#### The Aff purpurates informatic colonialism

**Couldry & Mejias ‘18** (Couldry, Nick and Mejias, Ulises (2018) Data colonialism: rethinking big data’s relation to the contemporary subject. Television and New Media. ISSN 1527-4764 (In Press) https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/89511/1/Couldry\_Data-colonialism\_Accepted.pdf. Accessed 9-19-2021)//Joey

Something important is going on with data. That much is common ground, whether in uncritical literature that maps business trends (Davenport 2014; Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier 2013) or much more critical arguments that see in **Big Data processing** the mechanism for a new stage of capitalism (Cohen 2017; Srnicek 2016; Zuboff 2015). This article foregrounds the importance of resisting such developments and so speaks from ‘the South’ within Milan and Treré’s expanded notion as developed in this issue (Milan and Treré 2018). But it does so by refashioning the very term — colonialism — whose historical forms generated the position of the “South” originally. For what is missing in the insightful recent accounts of Big Data is a wider frame to make sense of the whole social process under way. That frame is colonialism, used here not as a mere metaphor,1 nor as an echo or simple continuation of historic forms of territorial colonialism,2 but to refer to a new form of colonialism distinctive of the 21st century: data colonialism. Data colonialism combines the predatory extractive practices of historical colonialism with the abstract **quantification methods** of computing. Understanding Big Data from the Global South means understanding capitalism’s current dependence on this new type of appropriation that works at every point in space where people or things are attached to today’s infrastructures of connection. The scale of this transformation means that it is premature to map the forms of capitalism that will emerge from it on a global scale. Just as historical colonialism over the long-run provided the essential preconditions for the emergence of industrial capitalism, so over time, we can expect that data colonialism will provide the preconditions for a new stage of capitalism that as yet we can barely imagine, but for which the appropriation of human life through data will be central. Right now, the priority is not to speculate about that eventual stage of capitalism, but to resist the data colonialism that is under way. This is how we understand Big Data from the South. Through what we call ‘data relations’ (new types of human relations which enable the extraction of data for commodification), social life all over the globe becomes an ‘open’ resource for extraction that is somehow ‘just there’ for capital. These global flows of data are as expansive as historic colonialism’s appropriation of **land**, **resources**, and **bodies**, although the epicentre has somewhat shifted. Data colonialism involves not one pole of colonial power (‘the West’), but at least two: the USA and China. This complicates our notion of the geography of the Global South, a concept which until now helped situate resistance and disidentification along geographic divisions between former colonizers and colonized. Instead, the new data colonialism works both externally — on a **global scale** — and internally on its own home populations. The **elites** of **data colonialism** (think of Facebook) **benefit** from **colonization** in both dimensions, and North-South, East-West divisions no longer matter in the same way. It is important to acknowledge both the apparent similarities and the significant differences between our argument and the many preceding critical arguments about Big Data. Today’s exposure of daily life to capitalist forces of datafication might seem similar, first, to arguments from four or five decades ago that the capitalist organization of work had extended from the factory to the whole of society: the well-known Autonomist notion of the ‘social factory’ (Gill and Pratt 2008; Terranova 2000; Tronti 1966; more recently, Hardt and Negri 2017; Lazzaratto 2014). Indeed, much important work has been done more recently on the actual exploitation of quasi-labour or playbor, for example, on digital platforms (Fuchs 2017; Scholz 2013), which in turn have their roots often in an alternative strand of Marxist analysis (Smythe 1977). But our argument is not concerned here specifically with the exploitation of labor. Nor are we claiming that everyday life is now governed and managed as if it was labor. The weakness of the latter position has been noted even by those sympathetic to the Autonomist position (Ross 2013, 26) who have stressed the importance of unpaid work not only to today’s capitalism, but to Marx’s original model of capitalism (compare Moore 2013, 71). A factor that has hampered our understanding of the scale of change, and its analogies to earlier forms of colonialism (not just capitalism) is the common suggestion that recent developments of capitalism had already largely been anticipated by Autonomism and its many followers. Certainly, they pointed in the direction of a general intensification of social life’s orientation towards capitalism, but they were rather vague as to the mechanisms, except when they relied on the idea that the structure and norms of work somehow expanded out into social life. As Gill and Pratt (2008, 7, added emphasis) put it, ‘from [the social factory] perspective labour is deterritorialized, dispersed and decentralized so that “the whole society is placed at the disposal of profit” (Negri 1989, 79). Marazzi analogously argues that ‘today the capitalist organization of work aims to . . . fuse work and worker, to put to work the entire lives of workers’ (2008, 50, added emphasis). But that gives us no grip at all on data colonialism, which appropriates life as raw material whether or not it is actually labor, or even labor-like. The legacy of colonialism from the 16th to the 20th century includes the decimation of millions of native lives and the depletion of vast amounts of natural resources, all for the enrichment of a few. In deploying the concept of data colonialism, our goal is not to make loose analogies to the content or form, let alone the physical violence, of historical colonialism. Instead, as indicated earlier, we seek to explore the parallels with historic colonialism’s function within the development of economies on a global scale, its normalization of resource appropriation, and its redefinition of social relations so that dispossession came to seem natural. The **naturalization** of data capture Personal data of many sorts is appropriated for ends which are not themselves ‘personal.’ By personal data we mean data of actual or potential relevance to persons, whether collected from them or from other persons or things. For personal data to be freely available for appropriation, it must first be treated as a natural resource, a resource that is just there. Extractive rationalities need to be naturalized or normalized, and, even more fundamentally, the flow of everyday life must be reconfigured and re-presented in a form that enables its capture as data. Jason Moore (2015) argues that capitalism historically depended on the availability of cheap nature: natural resources that are abundant, easy to appropriate from their rightful owners, and whose depletion is seen as unproblematic, but whose ‘availability to capital’ itself had to be constructed through elaborate means of marketization. So too with what we now call ‘personal data’, but which is the outcome, not the precondition or prior target, of a newly ‘computed sociality’ (Alaimo and Kallinikos 2016). That is the underlying reason why there cannot be raw data (Gitelman 2010): because what is ‘given’ must first be configured for ‘capture’ (Kitchin and Dodge 2011). Natural resources were and are not cheap per se, but legal and philosophical frameworks were established to rationalize them as such, on the basis that they were ‘just there.’ Only later did the costs to humanity of treating natural resources this way come to be appreciated. But, as Julie Cohen (2017) points out, the legal fiction that land inhabited for millennia (such as the territory now known as Australia) was terra nullius or ‘no man’s land’ in English law, and thus available for exploitation without legal interference, has its strong parallels today. The apparent naturalness of data colonialism’s appropriations relies also on a large amount of ideological work, just as did historic colonialism. Consider the business cliché that data is ‘the new oil’, lost to humanity until corporations appropriate it for some purpose. This rests on the construction of data as a ‘raw material’ with natural value, as the World Economic Forum claims: “personal data will be the new ‘oil’ – a valuable resource of the 21st century . . . becoming a new type of raw material that’s on par with capital and labour” (WEF 2011, 5, 7). Through this discursive move, the links of data back to a prior process of data collection (that is, appropriation) are obscured. In this section, we want to discuss some key aspects of the colonization of everyday social life under the aegis of various forms of institutional order, from market capitalism (North America, Europe) to the complex hybrid of commercial and state power that characterizes the People’s Republic of China. Tethered to data judgements Data colonialism means that new social relations (data relations, which generate raw inputs to information processing) become a key means whereby new forms of economic value are created. The value of those extractive processes depends on the comprehensiveness of the data generated. Nothing should be excluded. Before the internet, as Bruce Schneier (2015, 27-28) notes, data sources about social life were limited to company customer records, responses to direct marketing, credit bureau data, and government public records (we might add insurance company data on their insured). Now, as already noted, a vast and varied social quantification sector operating within a complex web of data processing functions extract data from everyday life at a depth far exceeding that found in earlier forms of social organization. The colonized self In the hollowed out social world of data colonialism, data practices invade the space of the self by making tracking a permanent feature of life, expanding and deepening the basis on which human beings can exploit each other. The bare reality of the self as a self6 comes to be at stake. It is the minimal integrity of human life that must be protected. This reality, which each subject can recognise in each other, cannot be traded away without endangering the basic conditions of human autonomy. This is particularly important when we can be sure the costs and consequences of dispossession through data will be distributed unevenly, especially when it comes to surveillance. Even if, under data colonialism, we are all destined to **become data subjects** — that is, parties to regular data relations — what this means for one person may be very different from what it means for another. There are various reasons for this inequality: some relate to how the intensity of surveillance is allocated, and others relate to individuals’ relative ability to repair the costs of surveillance over the long-run. We cannot get into these details here.

#### Moves to eliminate disease to secure health is a tactic of genocidal biopolitics since it attempts to codify Native bodies into the Western body politic

Maxwell 17, Krista. "Settler-humanitarianism: healing the indigenous child-victim." Comparative Studies in Society and History 59.4 (2017): 974-1007. (Professor of Anthropology at the University of Toronto)//Elmer

In her ethnography of how Canadian humanitarianism affects Inuit, Lisa Stevenson (2014) makes a provocative observation. She notes that Inuit do not experience settler-state interventions aimed **at making them live**, such as mid-twentieth-century sanatorium-based tuberculosis treatment, and contemporary suicide-prevention programs, **as forms of care, but rather as erasures** of their identities, cultures, and histories. She analyses this disjuncture as flowing from “the psychic life of biopolitics” in the settler-colonial context: “In the psychic lives of both the colonizer and the colonized, the biopolitical commandment to stay alive at all costs is haunted by the desire on the part of the colonist to murder the colonized, and also by the recurring sense the colonized have that what appear to be the most benign public health programs are, in fact, genocidal” (2014: 44). Stevenson’s account depicts how Indigenous peoples, in their everyday lives, must grapple with the settler-state’s efforts to ameliorate the effects of ongoing dispossession through paternalistic care. The case of Aboriginal healing shows how settler-humanitarianism shapes such settler-state interventions and also how Indigenous people experience the after-effects. In the process of producing Canadian Aboriginal healing policy, a host of Indigenous and non-Indigenous **political actors transmuted “healing” from a collective, social process** with anticolonial underpinnings into an individualized, **marketized set of biopolitical interventions**. We should not be surprised, then, that many residential school survivors, and their families and **communities, have experienced the psychic life of these ostensibly benevolent “healing” interventions as ongoing settler-colonial violence that reinforces the political status quo**. Here I consider the psychic life and troubling social effects of, first, the regime for implementing the Settlement Agreement (IRSSA), and second, the discourse on historical trauma that has become central to Aboriginal healing in Canada. Some close observers of the social effects of the Common Experience Payment (that made to all claimants able to prove attendance at an institution recognized by the state as a residential school), found their assessment complicated by the belief that the payments constituted a form of wealth redistribution, benefitting the most marginalized (see also de Costa 2009). One such observer is Leslie Saunders, long-time coordinator of the Meeting Place, a Toronto drop-in center serving homeless and marginally-housed people, many of whom struggle with addictions. They include many residential school survivors, mostly Cree and Anishinaabeg from northern Ontario, who submitted claims under the Settlement Agreement. Commencing her account to me of how participation in this process had affected many regular users of the Meeting Place, Leslie stated, “I think the Aboriginal school money is a positive thing, generally speaking, because it does give some money to people that previously didn’t have any money at all.” Like many commentators, she applauded the Common Experience Payment as a form of wealth redistribution, and hoped the settlement would redress the racialized socio-economic inequities that characterize contemporary Indigenous-settler relations in Canada. But this was neither the purpose nor the effect of the compensation. Rather, these payments were embedded in a continuing colonial relationship, and they stamped the recipients with an enduring label of “damaged goods.” Leslie made this clear as she elaborated: However, having said that, it has also spiked the addictions and the suicides, because people are drinking themselves to death with this money. Some of them are so re-traumatized by the process that is required to get that money that it’s putting them in a terrible mental state, because they’re forced to dredge up all these horrible memories that they’ve worked so hard to try to numb out.50 And then after they’ve been re-traumatized, they’re handed this cheque, and so, of course, they do the only thing many of them know how to do, and that’s numb out the pain with more drugs and alcohol. So, I really wished that they could have come up with a different process.51 Cree and Anishinaabe residential school survivors using the Meeting Place are arguably among the most socially and economically marginalized of claimants. But research with a broader range of survivors confirms that their experiences were not atypical (Reimer 2010a; 2010b). For many, seeking reparations under the Settlement Agreement has been harmful in itself, entrenching their victim status and exacerbating everyday forms of suffering. Many claimants struggled to obtain the required evidence of attendance due to inconsistent church and government record-keeping. Nearly twenty-five thousand endured the distress of having their Common Experience Payment applications dismissed when their claims of suffering were judged illegitimate, and many of them initiated appeals.52 Those seeking compensation became entangled in state bureaucratic procedures “in which they carry the burden of proof of their … damage while experiencing the risk of being delegitimised in legal, welfare, and medical institutional contexts” (Petryna 2002: 216). Residential school survivors’ responses to the Settlement Agreement underscore the inherently anti-political effects of humanitarian interventions, which work to bolster, rather than transform, the established, settler-colonial political order (see Ticktin 2011). Many beneficiaries rejected the assumption, fundamental to the Settlement Agreement, that cash payments would be healing, and instead equated acceptance of them with capitulation to dominant interests (Reimer 2010a). Some concluded that “to settle for individual monetary compensation was misguided and insufficient” (Reimer 2010a: 93–94). Only about one-quarter of recipients described the payment in terms suggesting the possibility for positive transformation, for example, as a meaningful symbol of public recognition of their suffering and admission of government wrongdoing, or an important step towards reconciliation (ibid.). Infrequent but powerful Indigenous challenges to settler-humanitarianism continued in public events organized by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. While anthropologists have documented how the workings of the TRC generated significant momentum for “historical trauma” discourse, some exceptional contributions deviated from the TRC’s “template” for survivor testimonies, which centered on traumatic experience and suffering counterbalanced by a measure of hope (Niezen 2016; see also Molema 2016). Instead, some former students used this forum to condemn the “retraumatizing and dehumanizing” effects of the Independent Assessment Process (IAP), which those seeking compensation for sexual and physical abuse must undergo (Molema 2016: 141). Speaking at an event in Vancouver, residential school survivor and former chief Jillian Harris reported that “a family member had hung himself the day before his IAP adjudication, and that over the course of the IAP, it was ‘like the spirit of suicide roared through our community’” (ibid.). In his ethnographic account, Arie Molema further documents how some survivors vociferously disrupted presentations to the Commission by Indigenous and settler political leaders. At one event, during a presentation from British Columbia Premier Christy Clark, a group of Indigenous protestors53 brandished a banner proclaiming “We Are Walking Dollars,” and threw bags marked with dollar signs onto the stage where Clark stood (ibid.). The administration of the Settlement Agreement is virtually completed at the time of this writing, but “historical trauma” discourse continues to gain momentum. Canadian health and social work professionals increasingly employ historical trauma as shorthand for Indigenous communities’ psychosocial damage, understood as originating in residential school experiences and transmitted inter-generationally within families. In health and child development literatures, a family history of residential school attendance is now an individual “risk factor” that explains a range of complex social phenomena in Indigenous communities, from lack of parenting skills (Ball 2008) to sexual assault (Patterson et al. 2008), Hepatitis C infection (Craib et al. 2009), and suicide (Elias 2012). These theorized relationships are, of course, impossible to prove empirically and can only be demonstrated as correlations. Invoking “historical trauma” to explain contemporary Indigenous social suffering has problematic, if unintended, corollaries, echoing settlerhumanitarianism. First, historical trauma discourse perpetuates settler-colonial assumptions about the inherent dysfunction of Indigenous families, assumptions that date to the imperial child-rescue movement’s universalization of middle-class British values. The persistence of these assumptions among health and social service professionals contributes to the continuing, disproportionate apprehension of Indigenous children by child welfare authorities (Blackstock 2008; de Leeuw et al. 2010; Richardson and Nelson 2007). Second, privileging past experiences of abuse diverts attention from how contemporary (neo)liberal settler-colonialism over-determines Indigenous social suffering. Finally, historical trauma discourse legitimates the indefinite deferral of Indigenous sovereignty over social reproduction, pending attainment of “capacity” (see also Irlbacher-Fox 2009) that is to be built through a host of behavioral interventions such as early childhood education and parenting programs, which themselves constitute assimilationist projects. CONCLUSION Indigenous healing has been co-opted by the Canadian state and reworked as settler-humanitarianism, partially displacing the **critical, collectivist analyses of earlier Native healing activists**. While some Indigenous leaders and professionals have enabled this process, many Indigenous intellectuals continue to advance alternative frameworks in public discourse. These link contemporary Indigenous experiences of social suffering—including interpersonal violence, substance abuse, and suicide—with collective, historical experiences of dispossession and violence, and ongoing racism, marginalization, and violent assaults on the land. Recent writings by Indigenous feminist environmental and sovereignty scholars and activists, for example, offer analyses comparable to those characterizing earlier understandings of Native healing praxis.54 Time will tell how such analyses may resist co-option; the case of Aboriginal healing as settler-humanitarianism offers trenchant lessons in this regard. Meanwhile, “reconciliation” is supplanting “healing” as the keyword for contemporary Canadian settler-humanitarianism. On 5 December 2015, recently elected Prime Minister Justin Trudeau publicly responded to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report. Having delivered brief remarks promising a “national reconciliation framework,” Trudeau conspicuously wiped his eyes with a tissue. This widely circulated image was later pronounced by the Huffington Post as one of “The 30 Best Canadian Political Photos of 2015.” As I observed in the introduction, the work of the Commission has enabled the Canadian settler-state to redeem itself in humanitarian terms, while failing to reckon with the implications of the residential school system as a settler-humanitarian project that continues to have not only psychosocial effects but also systemic continuities in the present. Trudeau’s compelling performance of settler sympathy (including the latest official apology for residential schools) is consistent with his government’s continuing disregard for Indigenous sovereignty, exemplified by its support for oil-pipeline construction on Indigenous territory and its failure to allocate adequate resources to redress gross inequities in public services funding on First Nations reserves. As I have argued here, settler expressions of sympathy for Indigenous suffering, and the interventions they justify, serve to simultaneously enable and conceal ongoing Indigenous dispossession. As the current Canadian government moves to develop a national reconciliation framework, critical observers should scrutinize the resulting discourses and interventions for settler-humanitarianism.

#### The Aff relegates indigenous possibility to reservation, accelerating death-making – only an orientation of refusal as generative can solve. This the ROTB is to reject systems of settler colonialism. Group their method cards

King 17, Tiffany Lethabo. "Humans involved: Lurking in the lines of posthumanist flight." Critical Ethnic Studies 3.1 (2017): 162-185. (Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State)//GZ but re-cut by Elmer

Within Native feminist theorizing, ethnographic refusal can be traced to Audra Simpson’s 2007 article, “On Ethnographic Refusal.” In this seminal work, Simpson reflects on and gains inspiration from the tradition of refusal practiced by the people of Kahnawake.14 Simpson shares that Kahnawake refusals are at the core and spirit of her own ethnographic and ethical practices of refusal. I was interested in the larger picture, in the discursive, material and moral territory that was simultaneously historical and contemporary (this “national” space) and the ways in which *Kahnawakero:non*, the “people of Kahnawake,” had *refused* the authority of the state at almost every turn. The ways in which their formation of the initial membership code (now replaced by a lineage code and board of elders to implement the code and determine cases) was refused; the ways in which their interactions with border guards at the international boundary line were predicated upon a refusal; how refusal worked **in everyday encounters** to enunciate repeatedly to ourselves and to outsiders that “this is who we are, this is who you are, these are my rights.”15 Because Simpson was concerned with applying the political and everyday modes of Kahnawake refusal, she attended to the “collective limit” established by her and her Kahnawake participants.16 The collective limit was relationally and ethically determined by what was shared but more importantly by what was not shared. Simpson’s ability to discern the collective limit could only be achieved through a form of relational knowledge production that regards and cares for the other. Simpson recounts how one of her participants forced her to recognize a collective limit. Approaching and then arriving at the limit, Simpson experiences the following: And although I pushed him, hoping that there might be something explicit said from the space of his exclusion— or more explicit than he gave me— it was enough that he said what he said. “Enough” is certainly enough. “Enough,” I realised, was when I reached the limit of my own return and our collective arrival. Can I do this and still come home; what am I revealing here and why? Where will this get us? Who benefits from this and why? And “enough” was when they shut down (or told me to turn off the recorder), or told me outright funny things like “nobody seems to know”— when everybody *does* know and talks about it *all the time*. Dominion then has to be exercised over these representations, and that was determined when enough was said. The ethnographic limit then, was reached not just when it would cause harm (or extreme discomfort)—the limit was arrived at when the representation would bite all of us and compromise the *representational* territory that we have gained for ourselves in the past 100 years.17 Extending her discussion of ethnographic refusal beyond the bounds of ethnographic concerns, Simpson also ponders whether this enactment of refusal can be applied to theoretical work. Simpson outright poses a question: “What is theoretically generative about these refusals?”18 The question that Simpson asks in 2007 is clarified by Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang in the 2014 essay “R- Words: Refusing Research.” Arguing that modes of refusal extended into the theoretical and methodological terrains of knowledge production are productive and necessary, Tuck and Yang state: For the purposes of our discussion, the most important insight to draw from Simpson’s article is her emphasis that refusals are not subtractive, but are theoretically generative, expansive. Refusal is not just a “no,” but a redirection to ideas otherwise unacknowledged or unquestioned. Unlike a **settler colonial configuration of knowledge that is** petulantly exasperated and **resentful of limits**, a methodology of refusal regards limits on knowledge as productive, as indeed a good thing.19 In line with Simpson’s intervention, Tuck and Yang posit that “refusal itself could be developed into both method and theory.”20 For Tuck and Yang, a generative practice of refusal and a decolonial and abolitionist tradition is making Western thought “turn back upon itself as settler colonial knowledge, as opposed to universal, liberal, or neutral knowledge without horizon.”21 In fact, the coauthors suggest “making the settler colonial metanarrative the object of . . . research.”22 What this move effectively does is question the uninterrogated assumptions and exposes the violent particularities of the metanarrative. Scrutiny as a practice of refusal also slows down or perhaps halts the momentum of the machinery that allows, as Tuck and Yang argue, “knowledge to facilitate interdictions on Indigenous and Black life.”23

#### FW Interp: Evaluate the 1AC as a scholarly artifact – this means that the aff has to defend its epistemic and rhetorical investments prior to weighing the hypothetical consequences of the 1AC

#### A.] Smoke Screen DA – Every time the 1AR and 2AR say they get to weigh the fiated impacts against the K is a new link and a settler move to innocence – that allows for them to not be held accountable for violence. If they said the N word – in a model of plan focus they can still win the debate because the aff is a good idea. This OW their offense because it creates a violent and inaccessible model of debate premised on exclusion – try or die for my interp.

#### B.] Resolvability – Voting aff can not magically pass the affirmative – but rather your ballot can have an impact on the type of scholarship circulated within debate. Empirically proven within debate – the success of the Louisville project forced debate to shift away from making args like K’s are cheating, Mcdougnough winning the TOC resulted in a proliferation of alternative approaches to fiat. Competitive incentives flip negative because if a team keeps losing – it forces them to go back to the drawing board and read something different.

#### C.] Survivalism DA

Juárez 15 Nicolas Juárez is a Native American studies scholar with a focus on the political ontology of Amerindians within the Western hemisphere, the settlerist politics of love, and the connections between racialization and psychopathology. My current research is focused on Lacanian psychoanalysis and Indigenous cosmology. [“To Kill an Indian to Save a (Hu)Man:Native Life through the Lens of Genocide”]//Mberhe

I am inclined to agree with Wilderson that the Leninist question of “what is to be done” is in the wrong direction. The question itself fails to grasp the severity of the problem we face. To ask “what is to be done” is to first understand the problem one faces and secondly presumes that the problem one faces can be articulated, that one is deprived of something that can be named rather than deprived of being able to lose. To address this, what is needed is a radical shift in orientation in our scholarship and ethics that focuses on the question of understanding and ending the structures that make our, Red and Black, existence impossible rather than asking what is to be done within the epistemologies and ethics of those structures. When Subcomandante Marcos asks Presidente Salinas why do we need to be pardoned, when he asks what are we to be pardoned for, and when he asks who should ask for pardon, and who can grant it, he is not merely exposing the gratuitous violence of the Settler upon Red bodies, he is revealing the impossibility of an answer. If this paper is forced to offer a solution, however meager, it is for Red bodies to relinquish their desire to be structurally adjusted into the Human fold, a fold which will never solve or relieve our problems because our problems are the condition of possibility for that fold’s existence. In realizing how our desire is structured not only as a fear of Slaveness, but of Savageness, we can better come to form survival strategies for our communities and, as Fanon suggests, set to work.

#### D.] Colonial Worldmaking DA

Byrd 11 (Jodi, (Chickasaw) Associate Professor of English and Gender and Women's Studies at the University of Illinois *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism*, pp. 36-38.

In many ways, one might argue that this transit of Indianness is the condition of possibility that informs even Berlant’s understanding of the “slow death” of obesity that “refers to the physical wearing out of a population and the deterioration of people in that population that is very nearly a defining condition of their experience and historical existence.” ¹²¹ Here, in the interstices of affect and queer theory, between Lauren Berlant and Judith Butler, I want to elaborate on what indigenous critical theory might offer to such understandings of “bare life.” According to Butler and Berlant, the contemporary present is a necessary condition for affect and relation to draw lives into commensurable vulnerability and may, they hope, re- structure governance and help make lives more livable. A core set of questions emerges for me as I read Berlant’s discussions of “cruel optimism” and “slow death,” and they revolve around her delineations of ordinary life. Judith Butler in Precarious Life and Frames of War takes up Berlant’s concerns with the ordinary life in the overwhelmingly present moment and reframes them in the question “When is life grievable?” The concern for me is to consider whether indigenous peoples are understood to be a part of the present within liberal democracy and within the theories Butler and Berlant are articulating to provide possible reframings of relation to reconcile questions of citizenship, sovereignty, recognition, and nationalism. Do Indians live the ordinary life in the contemporary now? Are Indians part of the present tense? And finally, do Indians live grievable lives? I may be begging the question here, given that Butler does not really consider Indians and that Berlant avoids indigeneity even when it is a thematic concern within the text, as her reading of Was indicates. But because their projects work to dismantle the normative state structures that also op- press indigenous peoples whether they actively involve indigenous peoples in their theorizations or not, here we can see how indigenous critical theory transforms queer theory and critical theory more broadly to intervene in the colonialist structures that continue to underwrite racialized and gendered oppressions despite every attempt to disrupt or refuse those structures. To return to Tocqueville and Michelle Obama, we can notice this problem with tenses present—and that Indians are not present at all in the case of the latter. As Tocqueville describes the Choctaw, “their calamities were of ancient date, and they knew them to be irremediable.” Even in the present of their removal, the Choctaws are always already past perfect: they had left, they had stepped, they had been promised. According to Butler, in order for life to be grievable, it needs to be faceable; to exist, it needs to “cast a face, a life, in the tense of the future anterior” in what Barthes has described as the present absolute pastness of the photograph. Butler writes: “The photograph relays less the present moment than the perspective, the pathos, of a time in which ‘this will have been.’” ¹²² Even for Ryman’s Dorothy, who perceives Indians in spite of their invisibility, Indians are “Was.” So the most we can say, given the lack of possibility of an Indian future anteriority in which Indians will have been decolonized, is that Indians are lamentable, but not grievable. The dogs howl and throw themselves to their deaths in the frozen waters of the Mississippi, but the humanity of the scene is still: “No cry, no sob was heard amongst the assembled crowd; all were silent.” The lamentable is pitiable, but not remediable. It is past and regrettable. Grieving, on the other hand, calls people to acknowledge, to see, and to grapple with lived lives and the commensurable suffering, and in Butler’s frame apprehend—in the sense of both its definitions that include to under- stand and to stop—the policies creating unlivable, ungrievable conditions within the state-sponsored economies of slow death and letting die. As the queer makes claims to an affective indigenous generosity that can welcome all arrivants in the hope that those moves, those approximations of traditional kinship sovereignties and tribal affiliations will transform the normative and transgress the dialectics of state sovereignty that conscript, expel, and police whose bodies and lives count as full citizens in the United States, the indigenous must be absent both from the contemporary now and from the spaces and tenses of grief. In order to transcend what many theorists engaged in confronting state-sponsored violence perceive as a retrograde return to nativism, claims of indigeneity are read as conservative neoliberal discourses of normativity rather than a reassertion of the basic fundamental principles of restorative justice in the face of colonization and genocide. Given the push toward kinship, affect, and futurity that queer theory troubles as a way to intervene within and through discourses of sovereignty, nationalism, and citizenship, it seems that indigenous strategies should not be just a return push that demonstrates difference—that move is anticipated and already silenced. Possible sites of intervention depend then on interrogating how the impulse to world is the setting-to-work of the colonizer, even if that work is to reconfigure the world so that it might be kinder and gentler and be a world more possible to live, and grieve, within. The future anterior of such a world that exists outside the cruel optimisms and violences constitutive of liberalism’s very structures must also be a future in which indigenous peoples will have been and will remain decolonized, if there is to be any hope at all.

#### C] Equality – Util is bad and not neutral.

Mignolo 7, Walter D. "The de-colonial option and the meaning of identity in politics." (2007). (Professor at Duke)//Elmer

The rhetoric of modernity (from the Christian mission since the sixteenth century, to the secular Civilizing mission, to development and modernization after WWII) occluded—under its triumphant rhetoric of salvation and the good life for all—**the perpetuation of** the logic of **coloniality**, that is, of massive appropriation of land (and today of natural resources), massive exploitation of labor (from open slavery from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, to disguised slavery, up to the twenty first century), and the **dispensability of human lives** from the massive killing of people in the Inca and Aztec domains to the twenty million plus people from Saint Petersburg to the Ukraine during WWII killed in the so called Eastern Front.4 Unfortunately, not all the massive killings have been recorded with the **same value and the same visibility**. The unspoken criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign (from a de-colonial interpretation) of the hidden imperial identity politics: that is, the value of human lives to which the life of the enunciator belongs becomes the **measuring stick** to evaluate other human lives who do not have the intellectual option and institutional power to tell the story and to classify events according to a ranking of human lives; that is, according to a racist classification.5

#### E] Calculability – Settler Colonialism is unable to be calculated on a utilitarian or a consequentialist metric – it is both a spiritual and cultural genocide that leads to a psychological and emotional genocide that can’t be accounted for by body count.

## 3

### Case

#### Techno-utopic DA : Imaginaries direct funds and structure engineering projects - Causes imperial Warfare

Atanasoski & Vora 19 [Neda, Prof. Feminist Studies & Critical, Race, and Ethnic Studies & Legal Studies @ UC Santa Cruz, and Kalindi, Assoc. Prof Gender, Sexuality and Women’s Studies and Dir., Feminist Research Institute, *Surrogate Humanity: Race, Robots, and the Politics of Technological Futures*, pp. 23-6//ak47]

Dominant techno-utopic imaginaries direct funds and structure engineering research labs around the world, and therefore also impact the distribution of differential conditions of comfort versus misery in the present along vectors of race, gender, class, and other social hierarchies. The surrogate human effect explains how difference continues to inform what subjects become legible as human through technology design imaginaries that respond to market values by focusing on innovating and improving, rather than challenging, social and cultural structures and processes that are predicated by categories of gendered racial hierarchy. To this end, Denise da Silva offers the concept of “knowing (at) the limits of justice,” a practice that “unsettles what has become but offers no guidance for what has yet to become.”59 To insist on “knowing at the limits” of representational categories of difference, we must ask: If the predominant fantasies of systemic social change in mainstream Euro-American public discourse dwell upon the techno-utopics of a world in which all of those who are already human and already subjects ascend into the realm of those whose lives are supported by “human-free” or “unmanned” technological infrastructures of service (whether in factories, in the military, or in the nursing home), then how do we think about the relationship of new technologies to possible fields of political protest or action? The dissident technological imaginaries we include in each chapter take up categories that challenge those of technoliberal capitalism and its projected futures. We read these design imaginaries as exploring the possibilities of technology to break from historically sedimented dynamics of freedom and unfreedom woven into the fabric of technological modernity. In addition to offering critique, each chapter thinks through how such design imaginaries can push at the limits of what is possible, disrupting the confining notions of (technoliberal capitalist) possibility housed in the engineering imaginaries we critique. We explore these questions through juxtaposing engineering imaginaries that embrace the surrogate effect, thereby advancing the infrastructure of technoliberal futures, with imaginaries that do not. Using examples of robotic technologies intended to replace human bodies and functions from the early twentieth century to the present day, the first chapter foregrounds the postlabor and postrace imaginary of present-day “technoliberalism” as a reinvigoration of the historical imbrications of liberalism and fascism—the twin pillars of US economic, social, and geopolitical supremacy. Rather than posit a break between the liberal and fascist logics of automation, we insist on their codependence. We survey the ways in which automation in both the liberal-capitalist and totalitarian-fascist bents depends upon a fantasy of robotics tied to the history of racial slavery and the myth of a worker who cannot rebel. We track this foundational fantasy through Cold War discourses of automation as mediating the distinction between democratic liberalism and totalitarianism as the prehistory of contemporary discourses around robotics and white loss in the era of the Trump presidency. Building on our analysis of how liberalism and fascism have deployed and constructed fantasies of the fully human through and against capitalist logics of automation, the second chapter turns to present-day technoliberalism’s appropriation of socialist imaginaries of the commons, sharing, and collaboration. These three terms have become the buzzwords used to describe the economic transformations marking the so-called fourth industrial revolution and second machine age. While making claims to radical shifts toward an economy where commodities can be shared, and where 3d printers can even lead to the end of capitalism as we know it, as we argue, such technoliberal progress narratives in fact mask the acceleration of exploitation under the conditions of racial capitalism. Critiquing such appropriative moves in collaborative robotics, the sharing economy, and the creative commons, we also read alternate genealogies and visions of collaboration, sharing, and technology in collectivist and decolonial feminisms. In the next chapter, we extend this discussion of the acceleration of exploitation by turning our attention to the ways in which claims that technology is displacing human labor invisibilize the growing workforce of casualized and devalued laborers performing tasks that we are encouraged to imagine as performed for us by robots and ai. Addressing the relationship between service and the promises of technoliberal futurity, we assess how present-day disappearances of human bodies take place through platforms specifically designed to disguise human labor as machine labor. Focusing on the labor politics, design, and infrastructures of service, we argue that platforms like Alfred and Amazon Mechanical Turk enact the surrogate effect for consumers through the erasure of human workers. Consumers therefore consume the assurance of their own humanity along with the services provided. Following from this discussion of the erasure of the potential physical and social encounter between worker and consumer through digital platforms, chapter 4 turns to robots that are designed to take up a different kind of social relation with the human: so- called sociable emotional robots. We argue that machine sociality preserves the effect of human uniqueness, as the social function of the robot is continually reduced to service performed through the correct display of obeyance and eager responsiveness to human needs. Focusing on the robot Kismet, which is considered the first sociable emotional robot, we draw attention to the imperial and racial legacies of a Darwinian emotion-evolution map, which was the model for Kismet’s emotional drives. We analyze how sociable emotional robots are designed as a mirror to prove to us that the apex of human evolution, resulting from these racial legacies, is the ability to perform the existence of an interior psyche to the social world. The next two chapters continue the discussion of service, human–machine relations, and the technoliberal racial engineering of robotics in the automation of warfare. Chapter 6 addresses drones (semiautonomous weapons) and so-called killer robots (autonomous lethal weapons) as technologies that conjure the dangerous specter of machine autonomy in US public debates about the potential threat to humanity posed by ai. This chapter contends with the configuration of autonomy within military technologies that produces killable populations as “targets,” and builds on post-Enlightenment imperial tools of spatial and temporal command to refigure contemporary warfare as “unmanned.” We assert that both autonomous and semiautonomous weapons are in fact not “unmanned,” but cobots, in the sense that they are about human– machine coproduction. The chapter thus problematizes conceptions of autonomy that at once produce myths of unmanned warfare and the racialized objecthood tethered to servitude within technoliberalism. The final chapter elaborates our analysis of how speculation about the future of lethal autonomous weapons engenders present-day fears around machine autonomy in ways that continue to conceive historical agency in relation to the racialized inheritances defining objecthood, property, and self-possession. We argue that the killer robot is a technology that enables a description of what it means to feel human within technoliberal imperialism. To do so, we turn to attempts by human rights organizations and ngos to ban killer robots (autonomous weapons that could make decisions about taking human life without human oversight). These groups argue that killer robots are a human rights violation in the future tense, since fully autonomous lethal weapons are not currently operational in the field of war. Against the specter of the killer robot as an a priori human rights violation, humanity is rendered as the capacity to feel empathy and recognize the right to life of killable others, while reifying the human as the rights-based liberal subject.