# 1NC

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#### Conformity into the university through philosophical deliberations results in platform racism - that generates violent material worlds that are a priori to jaeggi as existence is a reflection of our current position in space time proven by cx research models being defended by the 1AC

**Moten and Harney ‘21** (Fred Moten, Professor of Performance Studies for the Tisch School of the Arts at NYU, PhD in English from UC Berkeley, 2020 MacArthur Genius Fellow, Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management for the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University, PhD in Social and Political Sciences from the University of Cambridge, co-founder of Ground Provisions—a curatorial collective, founder of the School for Study—a nomadic study collective, 2021, *All Incomplete*,)//Joey

Despite of what Heidegger may say it is, the thing does not exist exclusively for the existential thing. Nor does Descartes’ exercise on mental fitness immediately and irrevocability renders a thing *res extensa*. More along the lines of what Kant realized, the thing exceeds whatever can be apprehended as form, as object or data. As such, a thing always mismatches the structure (and do so | All Incomplete because it extends beyond the boundaries of the input because it does not find its proper place within them) and slows the procedure to halt (as what in it is in excess of the input, what in it is not data overflows of the possibilities for what is to come). That which in the thing exceeds the parameters of form and efficacy can never enter in the process, unless it is already deject, reject, or just as well as dead. No-thing is a thing as much as anything is every-thing. What is the thing then? A thing is but this incomprehensible incompleteness, which is also Stefano Harney and Fred Moten generously offer to our attention. Incomprehensible incompleteness is then not so much the name for something or a somewhere from where resistance is attempted. Against scarcity, and the juridical and ethical terms with which it has dressed up the subjects of property, sovereignty, or desire, *res imperfectum* as *res improprium* is just another name for the material capacity (the power of matter) which is perhaps what Stefano Harney and Fred Moten calls jus generativity, the one for which I propose generosity as principle. Locating by finding the current longitude and latitude is to miss the opportunity – and all that could happen but cannot be anticipated when one tries – to find something in the midst/amongst everything else along with/in/ out which it exists. This manner of locating both specifies and generalizes and, as such, it follows the basic map of what exist **Kant’s provide** in his *Critique of Judgment*, under his law of specification of nature. The image is that of distinguishable wholes within which other smaller wholes lie, each (but for the most general, which he calls Nature) both a part of and a participant of the larger one within which it is found. If **Locke invents the derivative**, then Immanuel **Kant’s innovation is high frequency trading**. And when Kant reverses the fortunes of logistics by announcing that it is the ends (of man) and not the means that are important, the human, **the ultimate derivative, is fully logistically installed**. The human is held up, not by **Kant, but by logistics**, a logistics that **gives the illusion of a free-standing subject**. **A human universe appears to Kant**, full of what he posits as human properties. Kant walks the docks, traversing the seven bridges of Königsberg, surveying the logistical world from a point of view he never needs to leave. From there, his ship come in with each new travel log and ethnographic treatise, he is witness to the humanization of the flesh. Logistics now has a subject and it is race. The humanization of the flesh is the racialization of the flesh. It is the catastrophe that befalls the species-being, one not even Marx can reverse. This is why logistics is the science of whiteness in/as the science of loss. It is said that the (anti)social contract and the public sphere it creates is a reaction to feudalism and absolutism. But this is only half the story, and an inaccurate half at that. Perhaps it’s better to think of the (anti)social contract as emerging, as Angela Mitropoulos says, not in opposition to absolutism but as the democratization of sovereignty. Even that might have had an inadvertently anarchic quality, as every man considered himself a king. But the (anti) social contract not only reacts to, while also reflecting, absolutism, making every home/castle/hovel a hall of mirrors, it also emerges as a way to explain and justify the violence of European man. Everyone from Adam Ferguson to Immanuel Kant tries to explain why the Africans, Asians, and indigenous people being exterminated and enslaved are so much less warlike than Europeans. The Crusades misled Europeans into believing their brutality was part of humanity rather than an exception, even as religious war gave them a taste for blood that they could not ignore. So the (anti)social contract emerges less to confront absolutism than to contain the obvious historical exceptionalism of European savagery. Clearly the world could not be ordered around good and evil without some dire consequences for Europe. Those who conceive of the (anti)social contract mistake the wars it instigates: wars of sovereigns against contractors, and of contractors against each other, and of contractors against those whom Bryan Wagner describes as “being subject to exchange without being a party to exchange,” the ones who are not one who are innumerable and un(ac)countable even in having been accumulated, even in having been financialized.12 Perhaps, in this regard, it would be even better to think of the (anti)social contract as emerging against a history of revolt: the peasant revolts that buried European feudalism, and which Robinson understands as “the socialist exchange” comprising Marxism’s anthropological (under)ground, is the revolt of nature, prosecuted by those who are made to stand in for nature, having been philosophically relegated to some essentially paradoxical state of nature by the ones who seek to engineer nature’s subordination to and within the socioecological disaster of improvement. *An Anthropology of Marxism* is instructive here) or of exchange encountered amongst Africans who would rather move elsewhere than enter into conflict to gain improvement (Robinson’s *Black Marxism* is instructive here).13 Ferguson and Kant both say war is about improvement of the European race. And Robinson teaches us that this is carried out as a violent intra-European racialization of difference, a continually barbaric festival in which incursion and the instantiation of improvement as militarily enforced externalities produce Europe, and then the globe, as dead and deadly bodies politic, monsters whose mechanized, drone-like simulations of spirit regulate the social with the kind of latex affability and latent menace commonly associated with police commissioners and university provosts. Antisocial sociability is the basis of the social contract. In the end, improvement is war, which is why the public sphere is war, and why the private – in its anti- and ante-individual impurity, as refuge even under constant pressure – is a porch. Nonsense reinitiates a problem of philosophical translation as well as sufficiency: *Sinn*/sense/meaning is or are brought into play precisely insofar as much of what Booth does when he preserves nonsense – when he reveals it, explains it, valorizes it – is keep open or keep opening referential suspense in its endlessly eccentric fall. This is how *Sinn* and sin, sin and corruption, rub each other the right way. This is also about transubstantiation’s descent into consubstantiality. What is it that a text becomes for us, through ritual, in having been announced, like the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist? It makes you want to run: from the devotions, the trinity, and ternary form to the nonsense of a broken circle. When Donne is coupled with Henry Dumas you get a kind of Trane, whose meditations, and those of Mingus, all touch on the intra-action of nonsense and spiritual sustenance. What is it to be nourished by the insubstantial? Is there a materiality of the insubstantial? Maybe that’s what literature is. But if it is, if it’s the doing of that work, then it is so in and as the gift of corruption. It’s as if when the words, “this is my body, take it and eat it” are uttered, then what’s in dangerous and overwhelming proximity to the promise of resurrection is the problem of insurrection. In Donne’s meditation, this shows up as a world and body problem, a problem of corporeity and institutionality, which Jan Potoçka’s *Body, Community, Language, World* helps to illuminate. There he writes: We arrived at the conclusion that the world in the sense of the antecedent totality which makes comprehending existents possible can be understood in two ways: (a) as that which makes truth possible for us and (b) as that which makes it possible for individual things within the universum, and the universum as a sum of things, to be. Here again the phenomenon of human corporeity might be pivotal since our elevation out of the world, our individuation within the world, is an individuation of our subjective corporeity; we are individuals in carrying out the movements of our living, our corporeal movements. Individuation – that means movements in a world which is not a mere sum of individuals, a world that has a nonindividual aspect, which is prior to the individual. As Kant glimpsed it in his conception of space and time as forms which need to be understood first if it is to become evident that there are particulars which belong to a unified reality. It is as corporeal that we are individual. In their corporeity, humans stand at the boundary between being, indifferent to itself and to all else, and **existence** in the **sense of a pure relation** to the totality of all there is. On the basis of their corporeity **humans are not only the beings of distance** but also the beings of proximity, rooted beings, not only innerworldly beings but also **beings in the world**.82 Now, who is this “we” Patoçka is talking about? The “we” who have arrived at this conclusion? Well, we are the world, in a sense. We are the world insofar as we can arrive at conclusions about the world – more specifically, the conclusion that world is what makes possible for us truth and individuation. The world is our common corporeity, its institution, as it were, within which our individuation is given in and as the body, that individuation rolling back into and on and as itself as the condition of possibility of knowledge of and in the world. We are the we who are the world insofar as we are and have (some) bodies. But this steady state system, in which body and world are given as one another’s condition of possibility and preservative, is burdened by the anti/ biotic dynamism it is meant to contain. The consultant is not here to provide solutions, innovation, or even advice. The consultant exists to demonstrate access in the era of logistical capitalism. The consultant is not an ideologue. Ideology operates here only for the consultant himself. He is demonstrably the only one who believes his bullshit, but fortunately for him this is not the point, not his point. The consultant literalizes access to workplaces, demonstrating their openness by showing up in their midst, like a drone. One day you come to work and there he is sitting next to the boss. Nothing she says or does is as important as this demonstration of access. What the consultant introduces into the imposed, exposed workers’ corps is the algorithm. The consultant bears the algorithm, which violates in the name of completion. When the consultant brings his algorithmic charge, the body of the workers, that undesired and constantly invaded enclosure, is finished. We are rendered complete, made free, by the work, in the work, of the algorithm. We are done, and done in by, the consultant’s forced, aggressive incorporation of an undoing that was of and for itself, of and for ourself, the undoing we keep on making in the face of every sovereign invasion, every violent ascription of words and worth and (the) work. The consultant completes, so that he can access the private loop of a thwarted desire to be intact. It is not the product or even the organization that interests the algorithm of work. It is the production line’s infinite curvature. The algorithm of work is a demonstration within a demonstration. With access comes (the necessity of) improvement, which always takes the form of a demand for more access. As the introduction of the consultant inside the organization demonstrates access, so the introduction of the algorithm demonstrates improvement. The algorithm is the machine of self-improvement; as such, it is the only machine that makes new machines. There is a mirror – marking and instantiating self-envisaging’s shared exclusivity, that scary, silly, Stuart Smalleyish binary solipsism – that stands between it and man, the only other machine that makes new machines and, in so doing, improves itself. The mirror between man, the mirror, and The Man, man’s mirror, is the algorithm. Meanwhile, the inhuman, which is our fleshly inherence and **inhabitation** in the general mechanics of a general disregard **for self-reflection**, makes machines because it does not want to improve. **Before the algorithm**, machines came **from strikes, from resistance**, from sabotage. Machines made from the algorithm do not wait for the class struggle. ***The undercommons*** *is* not*, except* ***incidentally, about the university****; and the undercommons is crucially about a sociality not based on the individual. Nor, again, would we describe it as derivative of the individual – the undercommons is not about the dividual, or the pre-individual, or the supra-individual. The undercommons is an attachment, a sharedness, a diffunity, a partedness.* Reading *All Incomplete*, over the past few months, as I followed the rising rate of infections and the growing numbers of persons being killed by COVID-19, the disease caused by Sars-CoV-2 (the new corona virus), I could not but wonder about how improvement is at work, in Brazil and in the USA, for instance. Improvement, we know, governs the decisions (by policy makers | All Incomplete and algorithms) to let die that are made in view of numbers that show who (the economically dispossessed, “essential workers,” with “underlying conditions,” who happen to be, in the US, a large percentage of the country’s black, Indigenous, Latinx populations). It is the operating element behind what seems to be an accumulation of decisions that led to an increase in the number of infections and deaths. I cannot but wonder about how is that line of reasoning expressed, which words are used which words are avoided. Under other names, invention, progress, civilization, development, improvement is also at work in the previous decisions leading to their economic dispossession, to their underlying conditions, to their finding employment in the economic sectors most exposed during a global pandemic. The instructor submits to the university, grading and degrading on the curve, acceding to its claim of access to what goes on underneath it. The students submit to the firm, desiring their (de)gradation into good value propositions, gaining access to it in unequal exchange for the firm’s access to their newly acquired creativity and criticality, their newly won competence in leadership and subservience. Whatever had been shared in the classroom makes all this possible. And if it was necessarily deformed in this straightening out for access, that doesn’t mean the students – which is all the instructor had found that *they* ever were, and could be – shouldn’t try to take it back.

#### The lens of cooperation is founded upon a racist conceptualization of anarchy and the white man's burden. The aff is just a means of providing a pretty mask to a racist institution that silences opposing theories and creates epistemological bias while ignoring the functional improvement desire culminating in endless logistical rhythms that can’t escape the façade of labor - Black and Brown bodies are reduced to fetishized objects to offer a feel good ameliorism.

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When J. Kameron Carter takes up the question concerning the “Godterms” that underwrite sovereignty, he shifts it and us so that we really start thinking, also, about the “Man-terms” that underwrite sovereignty as well.61 He works a kind of persistent cosmological inconstancy, with a dark energy that anticipates the unfixing of the stars that it follows, allowing us to have to ask why man became God as if it were before the question of why God became man; now we get to have to ask how it is that becoming God is tantamount to what Gayle Salamon calls, “assuming a body.”62 What is it to assume, to conceptualize, to take up and take onto oneself a body? What is it for the body and the self to take one another up and take one another on in serial preface to each, in the other, being taken out? What remains beyond that address, that incursion, that aggressive vulnerability, that brutally projective and protective settlement, which is sovereignty in the midst of its diffusion? Meanwhile, mutiny, the general strike, the remorseless working of no-things and no-bodies, romantic comedy in the commons, its antinomian swerve and quarrel, living’s dissolute spread, its dispersive largesse, its cosubstantial blur, its transubstantial fade, can’t be faded, requiring that we speak, maybe appositionally, to some insubstantial pageantry of the anasubstantial. Are substance and sovereignty so bound up with each other (substance being an unreal matter of having mass and occupying space in time, on time’s line) that we have to imagine a more improperly surreal physicality? Not anti-matter but ante- and after-matter. Maybe flesh is matter’s Auntie, matter’s play mama, who survives having and occupying. So that what’s at stake is the necessity of a more emphatic analysis of flesh, as something other than withdrawn or withheld or reduced body, as that which is, therefore, apposed to body. One wants to speak (of) (through) (as) flesh in its own terms; but flesh has no terms, though the terms that are imposed upon it become its interminable preoccupation with cœnobitic commotion. When J. Kameron Carter takes up the question concerning the “Godterms” that underwrite sovereignty, he shifts it and us so that we really start thinking, also, about the “Man-terms” that underwrite sovereignty as well.61 He works a kind of persistent cosmological inconstancy, with a dark energy that anticipates the unfixing of the stars that it follows, allowing us to have to ask why man became God as if it were before the question of why God became man; now we get to have to ask how it is that becoming God is tantamount to what Gayle Salamon calls, “*assuming a body*.”62 What is it to assume, to conceptualize, to take up and take onto oneself a body? What is it for the body and the self to take one another up and take one another on in serial preface to each, in the other, being taken out? 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So that what’s at stake is the necessity of a more emphatic analysis of flesh, as something other than withdrawn or withheld or reduced body, as that which is, therefore, apposed to body. One wants to speak (of) (through) (as) flesh in its own terms; but flesh has no terms, though the terms that are imposed upon it become its interminable preoccupation with cœnobitic commotion. Despite the pressure Deming and other American overseers placed on Japanese workers in industry, productivity in Japan, contrary to the received storyline, did not improve at all in those years. But if the experiment was a failure as a productivity tool, this is not to say it failed as a management tool deployed amidst the intense labor strikes and worker solidarity that characterized Japan in the 1950s. Meanwhile, the Americans still managing Japan indirectly were already shifting to the tried and true American industrial strategy: government intervention and market distortion. First, they demanded that all their Asian post-War client states, inherited from the British, French, and Dutch, start to give Japanese imports preferential treatment, even at the expense of American products. Then, with the onset of war in Korea, the Americans increasingly put Japanese industry back on a war footing in order to supply their imperial belligerence. As a result, the Japanese economy took off in the direction of its post-War miracle and, with the same distortion later applied by way of the American war on Vietnam, Japan’s economy became legend. Deming and company had nothing demonstrable to do with this miracle. But they were in the right place at the right time, when American business needed its own ‘productivity solution.’ If the increase in Japanese industrial productivity is essentially fictive, so too is the ascendancy of quality. The oil shocks of 1973 and 1978 – part of a complex class struggle in the oil-producing regions, as the Midnight Notes Collective teach us – coincide not with the more reliable, higher quality Japanese durable goods that are supposed to be the products of a management miracle, but with cheaper cars that have better fuel efficiency. These cheaper cars appear amidst another class struggle not unrelated to the one in the oil fields. It is here that we can pick up the thread of operations management, especially ‘quality control,’ and its latent power as a class weapon. For while there is no evidence that total quality management was in any way responsible for the Japanese miracle, it was a useful tool in disciplining a collectivist insurgency in Japanese labor. Moreover, in the 1970s with the final breakdown of productivity deals in the United States, amid wildcat strikes and the rise of organizations like the League of Revolutionary Black Workers in Detroit’s auto industry, American management was looking for a new form of control. It is here that the failed management theory of Deming and company, burnished by the rise, for very different reasons, of competition in the car, electronics, and machine industries with Japan, finally had its day. How can we make a monstrous distortion, a spreading bullwhip through the flow? How can hapticality step out on criticality, that brutal, Delphicoracular imperative to ‘know thyself’? How can we join and intensify a general strike against calculation, against valuation? Such a strike wouldn’t be an event so much as the emergence of a general condition of exhaustion and radically impure generativity. It would be a crooked blow, with a curved and curling stick picked up on the run in afformative, depositional black repose. How can our study live in the flesh as a refusal (out) of mind, in the break of the flow? Let’s re-route Kafka through a passage in Spillers and see if we can refuse to adapt. This capacity to think and represent the inability to stave off errancy in the human, to regulate and manage black and inhuman flaw, is what makes us want to think Van Peebles and his ante-hero Jeff Gerber as a precursor to the Kafka we propose, who offers us a picture of Gregor’s anti-heroic condition as, in part, an inability to claim a certain monstrosity, an accession rather than a resistance to or refusal of total access. Is there a difference between Gregor and that sassy, all but sapphirically watermelon mannishness – in which one wakes up and realizes that he is not insofar as he is black, which blackness he has been trying to allay in a strenuous regime of constant improvement, so that Gerber is revealed as someone who’s been passing all along? Watermelon Man, whose self-improvement breaks down seemingly under its own weight, as if he literally sweated away his own makeup, his own capacity to keep (self-)making up for something, given in and as a whiteface that practically teases us with its audacious visual failure, doesn’t die alone in the room that is no longer, but has also never been, his own; rather, he enters into black sociality, walking into the blues with a drink in his hand. In *The Metamorphosis* we propose, Gregor will have realized he was a monster all along thereby claiming, which is to say radicalizing, the status of the shipped, the sold, in a general refusal and suspension of, a general strike against, calculation. The brain, in/and its synapses, is just another bad concept, a brutal conceptualization – by way of body, its spatiotemporal constitution, and its attendant metaphysics of the possessive individual self in networked relationality – of held flesh. What is valued is work directed toward the improvement of the flow, and in the social factory the flow of the line can run anywhere, and we must enter its streams. But what is the historical economy by which blackness becomes the black and the black becomes a sign (a monster, a demonstration, a showing) of blackness, where blackness derives its name from its sign, from that by which it is announced? The sign works its terrible magic precisely from within a radical non-isolation. It’s not just that it signifies an unruly sociality; it actually instantiates and materializes that sociality. The ungovernability of Gregor’s limbs, as if he is gifted with the stigmatic charismata of a multi-linear, polyrhythmically funky drummer’s independence, is how flesh demonstrates the body’s non-assumption, its haptic wakefulness in groundedness, even as it also indicates the agitation that attends having been reduced to atmospheric flow’s hub, or nub, in the constant attempt to regulate and vilify affective rub. In the room that is not now nor ever was his own, this interplay of access and ungovernability indicates that Gregor is not in the world. And the way this metoikic staying outside and unhoused at home occurs makes you wonder if he’d ever been in the world and makes you wonder about how it is or what it means to be in the world, to be involved in worldliness as optimization, as this constant necessity of and for improvement. Does Gregor become what improvement forces him to become or does he revert to what improvement was sent to improve? This concerns the relation – between administration and metamorphosis, where improvement is mobilized both to induce and to suppress change – we have to want not to be not able to refuse. Can we embrace such imperfection and keep on imperfecting every old and new logistical collapse? Can we extend and improvise upon the radically generative and degenerative inefficiency of Kafka’s writing? Van Peebles teaches us that such failure, such continual detonation of the capstone, is always worth a try. The pathway to the lived experience of impossible individuation goes through rigid conformity, whose severed, separate performances are strictly accounted for. School is where the social contract is taken out on kids. In good schools, network’s eclipse of contact is enacted with great efficiency; in bad schools, an experiment might happen, either accidentally, where networks and the networked don’t apply, or under the protection of an idea of the alternative. The loss of empathy in the submission of the social to the contractual ought only ever make us want to ask, can there be cybernetic bruise? Cybernetic caress? Cybernetic sensation? This we do in remembrance of the general antagonism and the general strike we keep all but enacting, recognizing that these questions arise not from the fact of new computational hardware but rather from the values that animate old computational software – a spiritless theory of mind/hand coordination manifest most clearly in the reduction of reverent touch to instrumental grasp. **It’s not that touch is nonviolent. It’s that we need lovingly to return such violence from resource improvement back** to its multiple sources. We want to intensify our thoughtful feel of bad complicity in the interest of its brush against the good so that no one can ever say, ‘Watch me make my own way through this bullshit.’ The record shows, no one can take the blows and remain intact in the effort to remain intact, which is only given in the taking of the blows. If we want to fight for the good, we have to overturn the bad rather than navigate it by ourselves in crowded loneliness. It’s all nappy and out of all compass – dread, naught, knotty, naughty, dred as worn cover and rent vessel. The oldness, the oldheadedness of the people, is given in their recognition and refusal of this turbulence we go through. There, they study what also can’t be there. It’s like a band straining against development, trying to make a music that studies it while avoiding it. Is there a point where you can’t go on indefinitely? Is that space limited or unlimited? The broken document of a workshop that breaks out into poetry by breaking from the crafting of poems is a concert film. The record of thoughtful play becomes a play. This production of the subject reaction is the dematerialization and individuation of logisticality, *which logistics effects*. Our critical and creative efforts in the classroom, and our grading, are part of this dematerialization, and submit to its logistical demands, not because they do not begin well, but because they do not end well. *They end with degraded means*. Such a dematerialization has deep roots in the Western tradition of positing a subject and its mind. But today it is at work most frenetically and most (in)visibly in logistical capitalism, powered by the algorithm. Logistics today mobilizes and networks us as never before. It asserts us as means as never before. It opens access everywhere and in everything. And, at the same time, logistics degrades those means and denigrates this access by driving them always toward a single end through valuation. That end is surplus: stolen, accumulated, regulated. By tapping our invaluable means to do this, logistics also confronts what we have called our logisticality, our capacity to be a means for itself, in selfless, unplotted, non-local incompleteness. Indeed, we can read the rise of logistics and the subject reaction that it encourages and instructs as attempts to regulate our logisticality. Logisticality is more than a counter-logistics, a countering of logistics. It is our means of movement, and our movement as means. Logistics seeks to impose a position, direction, and flow on our movement, our pedesis, our random walk, our wandering errancy, to trap us in this oscillation, this neurotic pacing back and forth. Logistics wants to position us, to have us take a position, and fortify, and settle. And yet logistics itself also has to keep moving even in its degraded way. This is where the algorithm gets put to work. Some say it was Alfred Sohn-Rethel who first figured out how the concept was, in this interplay of formation and enforcement, stolen into ownership, abducted and abstracted, weaponized in strategy. He said the abstraction of exchange, and later the abstraction of money, led us to think in the suspension of time and space, the suspension of materiality, and this led to the propriation of the concept. But Sohn-Rethel only picks up the trail of this theft with the thief, the individual, already formed and ready for the strategized and immaterial concept, already formed and readied by it. He wants to convict this thief. We want to take him home. The act of emplotting yourself in time and space is – perhaps paradoxically at first – also the act of being all but nowhere. That spot you mapped is dimensionless. It cannot be found precisely because your act claims that the point you will have occupied is universal, the abstract point every individual can and must make and from which humanity becomes possible, with and through and in which the human finds himself. And because it is nowhere, its relationship to place is, in fact, one of impunity. It is this impunity that founds modern morality and the idea of responsibility or sustainability which this act of impunity then hires as its security detail. Can there be a better description of the human: the being who lives with impunity on the earth and is sorry about it? So, the question of what has happened can be taken with the question of what will happen in a way for which normative ethical questioning makes room. Against this abstract preparation for the victory of reason over its rivals, this tilting of the board toward one point, there is a way to live history and place that is not part of the humanization, that is to say racialization, of our earth and its reduction to world, its degradation of its means to mere logistical ends and its forfeit of sharing to mere ownership, all of which require and are instantiated by emplotment and its rule(r). Amiri Baraka calls this entanglement of history and place “place/meant” and we hear him, now, through M. NourbeSe Philip’s amplification of “dis place,” as if he meant for that errant and supplemental “a” to signify a movement of and in place, a radical and irreducible movement that constitutes our undercommon indigeneity, our shared, native, ante-natal turning out of (re)turn.71 If emplotment is how we give up the undercommons for a common grave, then dis place/meant is how we find and mark the surrealistic spot. Black imagination in the face of fascism is certainly an example of this, living history and place without succumbing fully to this emplotment; but this is not to say living in some form of life that’s more ‘real.’ That’s not the point. It’s not even about the point and it’s not about pointing. Some of the earliest speculative fiction we have is black speculative fiction written in response to American fascism and it’s part of what is now the longest running and perhaps most successful, which is to say unsuccumbed to “success,” of the earth’s anti-colonial movements – the struggle by black people *all over the world* against the fascist colonial order called the United States of America. From Martin Delany to Octavia Butler, from Mary Prince to Frankétienne, emplotment is continuously disrupted in movement’s names. And we could also point to the continuous non-coercive rearrangements of desire, to take a turn again with Spivak, that constitute black music, which is neither metaphor nor allegory, which is nothing but generally ante-generic black social life as it brings around its history and mashes up its place again and again. This is what tells us that the answer to how to act is how we act. It’s C. L. R.’s and Etta’s future in the present, which is this train Sister Rosetta Tharpe is always talking about, that clean one Woody Guthrie sleeps on, as a pillow, with all the unscheduled calypsonians in shared logisticality; it’s Gladys Knight’s midnight train, the O’Jay’s friendship train, Bob Marley and the Wailer’s Zion train, Trane’s sun ship, Sun Ra’s funkadelic spaceship, the general blinds we ride. Time and space emplotment is fundamental to every capitalist production process, to all the circuits and metrics of production, beginning with the production of the human worker. Bending time and space to our offbeat beat and displaced place is bound to fuck that up, ‘cause it already will. Now, if you need some, come on, get some, before it’s too late. As long as you don’t steal, we share. But feel, which is the embrace of incompleteness undetermined by the economy of in/voluntarity, can’t be subdivided into a whole bunch of anesthetized feeling some kinda way about our incompleteness. To say we feel complicit in and as our individuation is to say we feel complicit *through* our individuation. To feel complicit in the work of an organization, a profession, a corporation, is not a form of consciousness (of which the unconscious is not just one among many). It can’t distinguish mental from manual labor or good jobs from bad jobs. To feel complicit all by yourself is to be a good employee. It is also to be a good citizen, to vote strategically, to make policy, to feel bad about loving your city. But to feelcomplicit in all our incompleteness is to be revolutionary – so much so you might even call it otherwise than being. To enter with accomplices, to work with unseen friends, to plan everyday with someone, to be with someone, is so much more than being someone in being less than someone. An individual’s felt complicity with an organization is (un)matched by real complicity in feel, which is unalone. To want to be with past the point of mere being, to feel the refuge of all the rest out of sight, to have accomplices in all you do – this is real complicity, still folded, still nautical, all naught. Feeling complicit and complicit nonbeing in the feel – the two cannot live together even as they live together in our complicity. Accomplices disrupt the individuation of the complicity we feel in the organization. But the organization, too – the museum, the hospital, the school – constantly interrupts and violates the complicity we build. And yet, the more we deepen our complicit, collective, uncorrected friendships, the more the individuation machine and its “strategic career in and out of the institution” malfunction. As Robinson was fond of saying, we “deepen the contradiction.” Mahalia Jackson pre-amplifies that formulation, singing about helping somebody along the way to the abolition of the efficient institution of somebody; Silva dubs it, talking about no-bodies helping no-bodies to dissolve the equations of value. As we hold on tighter to our complicities, the two can’t hold. Neither can you. Neither can I. Something’s gotta give and what gives is what gives. You and I are not complicit. We feel – we share – complicity. What does it mean to stand for improvement? Or worse, to stand for what business calls a ‘commitment to continuous improvement‘? It means to stand for the brutal speciation of all. To take a stand for speciation is the beginning of a diabolical usufruct. Improvement comes to us by way of an innovation in land tenure, where individuated ownership, derived from increasing the land’s productivity, is given in the perpetual, and thus arrested, becoming of exception’s miniature. This is to say that from the outset, the ability to own – and that ability’s first derivative, self-possession – is entwined with the ability to make more productive. In order to be improved, to be rendered more productive, land must be violently reduced to its productivity, which is the regulatory diminishment and management of earthly generativity. Speciation is this general reduction of the earth to productivity and submission of the earth to techniques of domination that isolate and enforce particular increases in and accelerations of productivity. In this regard, (necessarily European) man, in and as the exception, imposes speciation upon himself, in an operation that extracts and excepts himself from the earth in order to confirm his supposed dominion over it. And just as the earth must be forcefully speciated to be possessed, man must forcefully speciate himself in order to enact this kind of possession. This is to say that racialization is present in the very idea of dominion over the earth; in the very idea and enactment of the exception; in the very nuts and bolts of possession-by-improvement. Forms of racialization that both Michel Foucault and, especially and most vividly, Robinson identify in medieval Europe become *usufructed* with modern possession through improvement. Speciated humans are endlessly improved through the endless work they do on their endless way to becoming Man. This is the usufruct of man. In early modern England, establishing title to land by making it more productive meant eliminating biodiversity and isolating and breeding a species – barley or rye or pigs. Localized ecosystems were aggressively transformed so that monocultural productivity smothers anacultural generativity. The emergent relation between speciation and racialization is the very conception and conceptualization of the settler. Maintenance of that relation is his vigil and his eve. For the encloser, possession is established through improvement – this is true for the possession of land and for the possession of self. The Enlightenment is the universalization/globalization of the imperative to possess and its corollary, the imperative to improve. However, this productivity must always confront its contradictory impoverishment: the destruction of its biosphere and its estrangement in, if not from, entanglement, both of which combine to ensure the liquidation of the human differential that is already present in the very idea of man, the exception. To stand for such improvement is to invoke policy, which attributes depletion to the difference, which is to say the wealth, whose simultaneous destruction and accumulation policy is meant to operationalize. This attribution of a supposedly essential lack, an inevitable and supposedly natural diminution, is achieved alongside the imposition of possession-by-improvement. To make policy is to impose speciation upon everybody and everything, to inflict impoverishment in the name of improvement, to invoke the universal law of the usufruct of man. In this context, continuous improvement, as it emerged with decolonization and particularly with the defeat of national capitalism in the 1970s, is the continuous crisis of speciation in the surround of the general antagonism. This is the contradiction Robinson constantly invoked and analyzed with the kind of profound and solemn optimism that comes from being with, and being of service to, your friends. We arrived at the conclusion that the world in the sense of the antecedent totality which makes comprehending existents possible can be understood in two ways: (a) as that which makes truth possible for us and (b) as that which makes it possible for individual things within the universum, and the universum as a sum of things, to be. Here again the phenomenon of human corporeity might be pivotal since our elevation out of the world, our individuation within the world, is an individuation of our subjective corporeity; we are individuals in carrying out the movements of our living, our corporeal movements. Individuation – that means movements in a world which is not a mere sum of individuals, a world that has a nonindividual aspect, which is prior to the individual. As Kant glimpsed it in his conception of space and time as forms which need to be understood first if it is to become evident that there are particulars which belong to a unified reality. It is as corporeal that we are individual. In their corporeity, humans stand at the boundary between being, indifferent to itself and to all else, and existence in the sense of a pure relation to the totality of all there is. On the basis of their corporeity humans are not only the beings of distance but also the beings of proximity, rooted beings, not only innerworldly beings but also beings in the world.82 If the concepts of the body, and the world, are born in and as a kind of mutual embalming, wherein philosophy overlooks that upon which theology must ruminate, then Donne’s rumination is given as a constant, residual freak-out over the fleshliness that neither the body nor its theft, neither the concept of the body nor its juridico-philosophical withholding, can contain. Innerworldly beings’ bear but cannot bear Kafka’s “inmost intensity;” underworldly nonbeings bear questions made of a disembodiment Fanon finds unbearable. If the concept of body, and of world as some kind of collective epistemic body politic, amounts to some kind of mummified institutionality, it does so within the context of a constant speaking of corruption, a constant, self-directed charge of corruption that actually constitutes a kind of embalming. In this regard, anxiety over corruption preserves the body and, the body in, the world. We speak of our corrupt institutions so they can be reformed; to speak of our corrupt institutions is, in fact, to reform them. This is how the interplay of so-called public relations and so-called investigative reporting becomes pseudo-democratic self-congratulation, wherein the institution in question refuses to decay, to disintegrate, to deform. More precisely, what’s at stake is not the reform of institutions but the deformation of the institution as such. How will this have been enacted? Through something like militant preservation. But this is where it gets tricky – in the redoubling of corruption’s innumerable little edges. Corruption is the impairment of purity. Its roots are in a verb that means, to break. The routes of those roots are unmoored, mangrovic and immeasurable. One follows them to the entanglement of generativity and decay, then disappears. What if the very concepts of body and world are each the embalming of the other? What if militant preservation is inseparable from a kind of decay? Then we would have to be concerned not only with what corruption does to the institutionality that kills us, but also what it does for us in the name of preservation. *The paradox of political corruption is that it is the modality through which brutal institutionality is maintained. The paradox of biosocial corruption is that it constitutes the militant preservation of a general, generative capacity to differ and diffuse.* These paradoxes combine to gild the edge of corruption, turn it towards a gift, which was already double-edged, which we might wear, or don, as if it were the very fabric of our skin. Of all on that the juridic and the scientific depend and append, property is perhaps the most obvious and the least straightforward. It is obvious in the sense that it is something that is had but it is not straightforward because this having can take the form of an attribute (a quality) or an article (a target, an object, or a goal). Un-com-prehensible incompleteness misses both, as it signals how all that exists has as missing that part through which each and everything exists with/as/in something else. Propriety, as referring to a rule or a principle, necessarily recalls these two aspects of what is had, and undoing so, it hopelessly brings up that which has the having. Improvement, Harney and Moten offer, is very much contingent on that figure – Man, Subject, Human, or Humanity – whose parts proceed in such a way as to render it not only the embodiment of perfection, but the body/mind that is capable of bringing other existing things to perfection. That thing with property, that is, the juridic-economic figure taking precedence over any alternative description of existence is not, however, self-sufficient. For it has always depended on colonial juridic-economic architectures and the | All Incomplete racial ethic-symbolic arsenal, improvement itself, the quality and capacity said to distinguish has also always being contingent upon our impropriety.

#### **The history of blackness cannot be disentangled from the semiotic flow that humanism uses** to rationalize life – only a move away from this symbolic order accepts structural death and creates the founding logic of reorienting conceptions of being

Murillo’16 [John Murillo III. Quantum Blackanics: Untimely Blackness, and Black Literature out of Nowhere. Diss. Brown University, 2016. Pg 169-172 (B.A., University of California, Irvine, PhD in Philosophy in Departmnet of English at Brown University)//Elmer/rc Raunak

Given that, in Chapter 3, we have considered how Lisa Randall wields her ‘dark matter is like Black people’ analogy in a context in which Physics seems deliberately unconcerned with the marginalization of Black people, especially Black womyn, in its own laboratories, departments and research projects, and also elsewhere in the universe with which the field remains fascinated, I worry about “everyone” and what “should matter” in Krauss’s tagline as much as I worry about “we.” He clarifies further: Every child has wondered at some time where we came from and how we got here. That we can try and answer such questions by building devices like LIGO to peer out into the cosmos stands as a testament to the persistent curiosity and ingenuity of humankind — the qualities that we should most celebrate about being human.217 Gravitational waves “should matter” at the level of the Human in a political-ontological way. Gravitational waves, their implications for the creation of new research opportunities in a new field of astronomy, for how “we” understand the universe, “where we came from and how we got here,” and for how “we” approach the fundamental, physical and philosophical questions that appear to concern ‘us,’ are a Human matter, and “we should celebrate” the fact that “we” are inquisitive enough to recognize this. This is a “we” of a paradigmatically different register than that which concerns “us” here, but the bifurcation is striking, if at all unsurprising. For being, for Humans, for being Human, gravitational waves should matter; what then, for “we” who occupy this untimely position, “we” who are nowhere—double emphasis on “are”—which is to say, for “we” who do not be, who are not Human, and who are, in fact, positioned as the constitutive antithesis to not only the categories, but to the founding logics—the “symbolic order”— that gives them meaning, force, power? How might “we” whose togetherness in this spacetime, in this untimely, labyrinthine, stanky mausoleum, this mass, structural grave, darkly matters—is like, or is dark matter—consider this Human matter, these gravitational waves? What can they tell us about what it is to be nonbeings, be antihuman, to not be, together? More precisely, what insight can the behavior of gravitational waves and the characteristics of the force of gravity, at least at the level of analogue and metaphor, offer this “we” into what it is to congregate as the universe’s dark matter? Better, what can they tell “us” about the nature of the grave—deathly—togetherness at the foundation of this “we” for whom I write this project? “We” must carefully consider the constitutive features and characteristics—the “physics,” or at least the mechanics—of how “we” inhabit and move deeper into this spacetime of contradictions, of how we do the unimaginable wake work of confronting these contradictions as they are, of how this inhabitation and movement both warp the fabric of the arrangements between “us,” and of how that collective inhabitation and movement interact with the overwhelming, crushing, spaghettifying tidal forces of the gravity of our Black (w)hole. Tina Mabry’s autobiographical film, Mississippi Damned, and Taiye Selasi’s novel, Ghana Must Go, not only meditate on and theorize about what it is to make space for direct confrontations and conversations with the contradictory presences of death, the dead, and the variously dying, but also offer devastating insight into the possibilities denied and afforded by those confrontations and conversations in this kind of space. Further, both pieces task us with seriously considering the kinds of violence that propagate intramurally through our nowhere, the iterations of destructive, warping force that play out between Black folk in ways that shatter the possibility of dealing with the structural death that shatters “us” all in both very similar, and very different ways. Both Mabry’s and Selasi’s pieces clarify the stakes, fragility, and necessity of this “we” and of performing this confrontational wake work, and both pieces, themselves, attempt to do this work—rather, both pieces work to make filmic and textual space out of the dark matter(s) of this nowhere for “us” to bear witness to what it might and might not be, to not be, together. So “together,” then, wholly devoted and broken, down the Black rabbit (w)hole we go.

#### Blackness exists in a time crisis that structures how criminality during strikes is ascribed upon the flesh. The 1AC’s investment in linear notions of progress compounds social energy into a collective unconscious rooted in antiblackness. A call for plenitude trades off with the LEAP into the black hole.

Murillo’16 [John Murillo III. Quantum Blackanics: Untimely Blackness, and Black Literature out of Nowhere. Diss. Brown University, 2016.B.A., University of California, Irvine, PhD in Philosophy in Departmnet of English at Brown University]//Raunak Dua

Blackness is a time crisis. A theory of Blackness in time, and also a praxis, u a method for reading time, ethically requires this same, impossible-to-redeem, bearing witness—seeing and hearing included—to death. The deathliness that haunts and works through us, with which we are compelled or forced to work, mutilates, or telegraphs a mutilated, temporality characterized by infinities and impossibilities, arbitrariness and gratuitous violence. It resists naming in its indeterminacy. And yet it manifests in ways that, at least, telegraph its mechanics. Through the everyday murders of Black folk by police force68—Rekia Boyd, Aiyana Stanley-Jones, Oscar Grant, Michael Brown, Yazmin Vash Payne, Anna Brown, Trayvon Martin, Penny Proud, Dionte Green, Tamir Rice, Eric Garner, Renisha McBride, ad infinitum69—variously named, we bear witness to the way, time and time again, Black death repeats, and so telegraphs death’s infiniteness as a series of randomly violent and interruptive repetitions. Through the subjection to the constant disavowals of Black life that create an atmosphere, a miasma, of imminent destruction for merely being Black—sleeping on a sofa in one’s home in Detroit at age 7, playing in a park in Cleveland at age 12, knocking on a door for emergency assistance in Dearborn Heights at age 19, or defending one’s home from forced infiltration in Atlanta at age 9270—a shroud of death’s presence that is always in waiting, we bear witness to the elongation or distention of death’s time across all ages (in all senses of the word). Through the familiarity of each interruptive intrusion into life and thought, through the feeling that these many times rhyme, we bear witness to the sense that death’s time does not appear to move, which telegraphs a deathly time in stasis, frozen, cold. Time, for Blacks, is dead and yet undying, a zombified force and feature of Black being, thinking, and living in an antiblack universe, which, to us, is a dead zone, an underworld, a cosmos of death. [foot note inserted below] 67 Marriott writes, “…the death of blacks, as utter abjection, is a nothingness without history and so indistinguishable from the unhistorical nothingness of a people without time” (240). From my “Black (in) Time” essay published in the Indiana Review: “We hoped, or maybe we did not, but we knew and know the facts of Blackness in relation to the police force, double emphasis on force, as what we mean is not reducible to “police brutality” in a conventional sense because “Blackness is always-already criminalized in the collective unconscious” (Wilderson, 6), and so **subject to orders of policing that include, but cannot be simplified as, gratuitous violence by uniformed officers.** Whites and nonblacks, or Masters and their junior partners, are deputized by civil society to wield police force: the force to violently constrict, monitor, control, and punish, preemptively and without need for “evidence” beyond the supposition of Blackness (a consequence of what Fanon describes as being “overdetermined from without”); the force of being able to submit a Black, and all Blacks, to being “guilty of being a [n\*\*\*\*\*]” (Laymon, 1), a “complete captivity from birth to death” (Wilderson, 7) because “there’s no time period in which Black police and slave domination have ended” (13). This is Black time: dead, undying, and deathly time. This is untime. Time as fatally unethical. Littered with contradictions in which we are forced to wallow. Untime is as the states of water: it is cold and shows no movement, frozen; it is also ceaseless, infinite, and ever shifting via its repetitions, so fluid; and it escapes seeing and hearing, resists the tactility of definition, and obfuscating, so like a mist, a vapor—but all as once. In all, and together, unwieldy, untime becomes another telegraphic name encoding the mechanics and characteristics of Blackness in time, but also inherently incapable of “fixing” time in a double sense: “fixing” time as in binding it to the singularity of definition, securing it; and “fixing” time as in repairing or remedying the deathly and violently indeterminate relations traced here (a distinction from the very impetus for Wright’s engagement). What’s in a name is anything but salvation. What’s in the imposition of new vocabulary is only a clarification of the fullest possible shape of the problem for thought, life, and being, as a problem; there is no solution. Our ethical obligation is to bear witness to the unethicality of this force and feature of the antiblack universe in its undecipherability; this is what it is to heed Ursa’s call, to see what she’s singing, to leap into the abyss, the black hole. Neither as a form of agency or resistance to manageable forces, nor a fatalistic and helpless sacrifice to the unimaginable and omnipotent powers that be, but a bearing witness, and so a listening and a looking, a kind of taking account and surveying of what is as (blue as) it is, and of when and where we “be” in relation to it. To brokenly leap, into the untimely abyss, is to go with the flow of gravity’s tidal forces, is to break (atomize, spaghettify) into the temporal rend, into the dark and crushing opening toward the black (w)hole of the Black position (its where and when).

#### **\*The 1AC’s structural analysis of progressive narratives siphons energy from a reconstruction of time, which flattens the possibility for black revolutionary potential to exist in its complexity and multiplicity.**

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This characterizes Black Studies writ large, “mainstream” and not. Specifically, it characterizes what Wright calls the “Middle Passage Epistemology:” a dominant historical narrative that moves from the violence of the Middle Passage, through the dispersal across the Atlantic, and through the developing and scattered histories of Blacks in the Diaspora this violent dispersal produces; all of the movement is forward, so inherently progressive, and all developments along the continuum are interpreted in relation to the origin point of the timeline (the “beginning” of the Middle Passage itself). While acknowledging the nuance and situational necessity of this epistemology, Wright goes to great length to reveal the limitations of the applicability and inclusivity of systems of knowledge that privilege, if not use exclusively, a Middle Passage timeline to string together the thoughts and experiences giving flesh and form to those systems. Conceptualizing Blackness as a “collective identity” that is as constructed, “implicitly or explicitly defined as a set of physical and behavioral characteristics,” as it is phenomenological, “imagined through individual perceptions in various ways depending on the context,” Wright recognizes that constricting (at least “mainstream”) the narratives of Blackness that inform academic and lay discourse to the finitude of a linear and progressive timeline with a fixed origin point inherently excludes identities that do not fit neatly onto this timeline. Most often, the Western Black heterosexual cisgender male most neatly aligns with the rigid plane of the timeline (and this is evident throughout academic discourse and lay, everyday thought); Blacks who identify any other way, with some other origin point or history, as a member of the LGBTQIA community, as a womyn, are marginalized and cannot s neatly weave their narratives into the dominant thread—they fray. This is prescient: in the most “mainstream” academic, activist, and lay discourse concerning the Black Lives Matter movement, the slip of the tongue makes overt reference to a label for or list of Black (hetero, cis) boys and men, and often fails to pay equal (or sometimes any) attention to the Black girls and womyn, and Black trans folk who suffer at least comparable orders of brutal antiblack violence. As the alternative that forms the answer to her critiques of work and thought that too easily accepts, if not completely reinforces, the singularity of a Middle Passage Epistemology, Wright presents “epiphenomenal time,” a more fluid time of the ever-shifting “now” she draws from philosophy and quantum mechanics. Rather than a straight line or arrow, epiphenomenal time appears more like “a circle with many arrows pointing outward in all directions;” presumably, the center of the circle houses the observer as the circle encircles the “now” the observer occupies, while the arrows move toward the many (possibly infinite) “times,” past and future, inextricably bound to the shifting “now.” As the differences between the two representations of time, in conjunction with the critique of linear progressivity, suggests, what Wright seeks to do is simple in concept, if difficult in execution: depart from the exclusivity of a limiting understanding of the relation between Blackness and time; seek out, or (re)create, and adopt a radically different conception of time that can account for “the greatest number of Blacknesses that are possible and viable”—that is, that can be inclusive of a Blackness that is complex, multidimensional, of different identifications, histories, and origins. This is why, of the thinkers she credits with being emblematic of crafting analyses dependent on a Middle Passage Epistemology (namely Henry Louis Gates, Jr., W.E.B. Du Bois, and Paul Gilroy) she aligns herself most closely with the latter who, unlike Gates and Du Bois, at least frames his understanding of Blackness as transitory, “rhizomorphic,” complex, and fundamentally untethered from the fixedness of a single origin, identification, or destination. At its most radical, epiphenomenal time means to eliminate the foundation for inherently exclusionary and limiting problems spanning the whole of at least “mainstream” Black Studies discourse, academic and not; and, at best, it turns on the desire to include in the center of Black Thought the otherwise marginalized “Blacknesses”—or, rather, it turns on the desire to disperse the notion of “center” altogether, not cramming all the complex “Blacknesses” into a limited space, but scattering a multitude of centers, or temporal nodes, “now” nodes, from which the past and future might be interpreted through differently Black—but unquestionably Black—lenses. In essence, this is a very timely meditation, given the prescient issues of inclusion paralleled in Black Lives Matter organizing and representation, and given the ongoing history of Black Thought’s inability or refusal to question, let alone depart from, its limiting concept of time. But for all its aspirations, Wright’s concept is too neat; or, if it is messy, as this waxing infinity of “Blacknesses,” embodied by countless Black “now” nodes, encircled Black “nows” in constant relation to the innumerable pasts and futures of its own existence and of the many other “now” nodes it inevitably intersects, might imply, it is too neatly and easily messy. And in being so neat, the concept and what Wright believes its implications to be mask the unchecked assumptions about Blackness, time, and their relation that Wright must make in order to make the (quantum) leap to replace linear progressive time with another time, epiphenomenal time, in the first place (or instance). What happens when we do not center “identity” in a way that displaces the structural position, or “political ontology?” Differently, what happens when our analysis shifts its framework to a higher level of abstraction, from an analysis that privileges (to the point of exclusion) intersectional analysis located at the level of “identities,” collective or otherwise, to an analysis that frames those intersections and identities structurally in a way that does not forget the structure? If we understand that structure to be something like the universe, of which time is a force and a fundamental feature, and we understand this structure as it is for Blacks everywhere and always, as violently antiblack, then what happens to time and our capacity to relate to it, let alone in a neat way? Differently, perhaps more sinisterly, what happens to Blackness as a structural position with a phenomenological relation to time’s force, then what happens when that force, that time, helps define the universe’s antiblackness—is, by extension, antiblack, itself? Only time can tell, or inscribe, but what it communicates it encodes. In 1987, Hortense Spillers publishes what might be a fragment of a key, or a cryptovariable, and so a partial means to a small opening into how time’s force acts in relation to Blackness, and how Blacks bear and experience this force. Spillers is “a marked woman” writing about markings. This is a loaded summation: the many names that converge on Black flesh in the name of a collective, global project of ongoing Black subjection, to use Spillers’s word, telegraph a “larger” or more sinister problem that escapes historical, symbolic, and metaphysical singularity. Spillers appears to be in the business of decoding the signal of the marks to better grasp the peculiar and horrifying antiblackness violence of the structures behind the historical, symbolic and the metaphysical: the “historical order,” the “symbolic order,” and the human (as a political ontological construct). By gesturing toward how these names and/as marks gesture toward something “larger,” something structural and perhaps timeless, she begins to “clear the field of static” that has developed, accumulated, “over time.” And “over time” in a number of ways: “over” as in “during” the longue durée of Black subjection to the force of time, and to the force of social death, which is a more superficial reading; “over” as in “governing” or “controlling/defining” as a kind of (over)determining feature of antiblackness, which is a recognition of the structural; and “over” as in “covering over” or “concealing,” which suggests that part of what will be uncovered by clearing away the “static” is time itself.

#### The alternative is the embrace of the black hole.

#### To jump into the black hole is a refusal of the affective moment of 1AC reformism that creates the condition for black revolutionary violence – redemption and coalition-building are only possible in the moment of violence. To wallow within that the black hole is the only ethical role as non-blacks.

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But this leaves Rufus alive, and ultimately must relinquish even the illusion of control to the arbitrariness of his will. Though Dana risks her corporeal life, her sentience, in both instances, especially the second, Rufus lives on, as does her subjection to untime’s force. It is only after a final escalation on Rufus’s part that Dana raises the stakes, and the level of abstraction, of her actions. Rufus attempts to rape Dana. An absolute refusal of consent, and so an absolute disavowal of Dana’s claims to her own flesh, let alone how she names or identifies it, Rufus’s willingness to finalize and hyperbolize his position as Master through rape of his Slave violently raises the stakes.95 Pinned to the bed, but armed with a knife, Dana must choose between submitting to “crushing objecthood,” specifically the pornotropic reduction of her being to sexualized flesh, which might be to continue to “exist,” but only as a sentient “object” that has been unimaginably violated; or, using the knife to kill Rufus and defend herself from the specificity of sexualized antiblack violence, which risks ceasing to exist, or never having existed.96 It is a choice that raises the stakes and the level of abstraction from the corporeal to the political ontological: from physical death, and so a loss of sentience, to a death of being, a negation of existence, itself. The choice is an impossible one, but it must be made. Dana chooses to kill Rufus. She chooses to leap, or tumble, toward the black hole. As he lay dead before her, his hand still clenched around her forearm, a kind of corporeal echo of their struggle, the darkening dizziness burgeons, and Dana “retu rns.” Rufus’s hand never lets go, and Dana’s arm, from the point of his grip and below, remains with him; her arm looks as if it has merged with the wall of the apartment. Attempting loose herself from the wall and his grip, she pulls back a severed limb, and screams in agony; she “frees” herself from his grasp and the crushing objecthood of the wall, losing a bit of herself in the agonizing process. Against the deathliness that characterizes a Black position subject to the arbitrary and gratuitous violence of untime’s force, Fanon appears to believe that violence might “be redeemed…by black revolutionary violence” (Marriott, 231). Fanon might describe this Black revolutionary violence an “explosion” that is, on the one hand, a characterization of the overwhelming and unrestrained nature of that violence, and, on the other, a willingness to embrace violent obliteration in order to produce or make a violent “upheaval” in the face. If Butler’s work maintains a resonance with Fanon’s thoughts here, what Dana chooses to do, and what happens to her as a result seems to be Butler’s speculation on what happens when we choose to run the risk of nonexistence by embracing the factuality of its presence. I read Butler’s inclusion of an epilogue to be the structural expression of a question: “What might happen if/once we embrace untime’s force, and in doing so willingly risk not only corporeal death, but absolute nonexistence?” So to conclude, I turn to it.97 After what’s left of Dana’s arm heals, she and Kevin travel to Maryland searching for confirmation of the reality of all that Dana and the slaves of the Weylin plantation suffered. On the surface, this appears to be a recuperative search on a few levels: on one, it is recuperative in the way that confirmation telegraphs a version of reason in the form of the preservation of sanity; on another, it is decidedly optimistic in its futurity, with Dana and Kevin together, on a shared journey, despite the political ontological rift between their positions, Kevin as White/Master, Dana as Black/Slave, recuperative as a subtle reconciliation of irreconcilable positions via a shared experience; and on another, it is recuperative in that it attempts to fill in the constitutive blanks in the historical archive, the many “what happened?” questions about the whereabouts and wellbeing of the people she encountered, which is an attempt at recuperating continuity and cohesion, which, fundamentally, flies in the face of “untime” and its constitutive features (which are antithetical to continuity and cohesion). But in the final line of the novel, Butler leaves a way to challenge this sort of reading. Kevin remarks, “now that the boy is dead, we have some chance” of recuperation. I understand this kind of recuperation to resonate with what Marriott reads in Fanon to be the redemptive feature of and impetus behind Black revolutionary violence, so what I read Butler to be suggesting is a speculative possibility for redemption grounded in Dana’s recourse to an explosive, Black revolutionary violence at the novel’s culmination. Black revolutionary violence does not promise redemption, but might provide a way to render the impossible and the irredeemable available to the possibility of redemption, without really offering a fixed or clear image of what that redemption could look like. The deathliness that renders time untimely in relation to Blacks, the deathliness that characterizes untime and all its constitutive features and effects, might make legible the possibility of its own redemption via a Black revolutionary violence that has, as its stakes, being, itself. Taking the risk means making the leap or taking the plunge into the black hole, means embracing the inescapability of the tidal forces emanating from its central singularity—the antiblack imposition of the fact of Blackness. As I read him, Fanon describes this unimaginable spacetime as “the zone of nonbeing,” a derelict spatiality and temporality, “an utterly naked declivity where an authentic upheaval might be born.” Only “here” and “now,” or “there” and “then,” along the downward slope(s) of the “zone,” or the inward funnel of the black hole’s gravity well, an “authentic,” which might mean “redemptive,” upheaval might become available to thought. Specifically, this upheaval might be conceived, carried to term, and brought into being (born). The “zone of nonbeing,” the “black hole,” is the only site for the (pro)creation of redemption via an embrace of obliteration; but it is also an “arid and sterile region,” constitutively infertile, or at least, resistant to the kind of redemptive creation that stages or embodies “authentic upheaval” in the form and wake of Black revolutionary violence and its attendant risk of political ontological obliteration. To heed Ursa’s call, to leap into the black hole, to enter into the dereliction of being, is to fall into unimaginable contradiction in the form of an unresolvable paradox. If Black revolutionary violence as a form of untimely, authentic or redemptive (pro)creation is what we might make, and if what we might make is constitutively contradictory to the only spacetime at which this violence and (pro)creation can even ever occur, what might our (pro)creations look like? How might we read or engage this kind of (pro)creation, understanding what is at stake—Black being, itself—when, because of untimely fact—of being Black—we don’t have time to do either? These are the questions that frame our opening, tenuously holding it open; this is when we’ve arrived, and given that (un)time is of the essence, we might do best to (t)read carefully, but quickly, moving to make the leap toward utter destruction. There is no time for anything else

#### The conception of black-hole as a space-time is a good heuristic to evaluate anti-blackness – view the debate through the lense of incoming tidal forces that the aff amplifies in hope of a “better political reality”

Murillo’16 [John Murillo III. Quantum Blackanics: Untimely Blackness, and Black Literature out of Nowhere. Diss. Brown University, 2016. Pg 167-168 (B.A., University of California, Irvine, PhD in Philosophy in Departmnet of English at Brown University)//Elmer/rc Raunak

I ask out of a genuine, critical concern and interest for the aims of this project, renewed by Kiese’s comment. Every deliberate invocation of “black folk,” of “we,” of a kind of singular audience, or of a singular(ly Black) section of an audience—they and “we” lead us to this point and place in the unthought, “unimaginable” (pace Sharpe) terrain of this dismembering exploration. A destruction of wild cats. A crash of rhinoceroses. A murder of crows. Like Spillers, in search of a vocabulary against the symbolic order and the dynamics of naming and valuation it violently releases into the air we breathe to speak and think, what is the name and signification of a collectivity of the dead, the dying, and “we” who remain in proximity to—rather, entangled with death? Differently, as our rememories force before us the interminable silence of Dionne Brand’s grandfather when asked about the matter of origins and names—if those names and our names and this name structurally cease to matter (though they matter to “us”)—how do we describe what it is to collectively occupy this position? How might “we” describe the consequences of reframing black temporality as untimeliness, and black space as nowhere, on the notion of our being “here,” “now,” “together?” Essentially, what is it to be Black in time— untimely—here—nowhere—together? I understand this to be a question of and with gravity, so we might begin here. Leaping into the black hole means negotiating gravity’s tidal forces—inasmuch as a swimmer might ‘negotiate’ a cataclysmic maelstrom—as they play out—inasmuch as ‘playing out’ denotes ‘atomization’ or ‘spaghettificaton’—on our imaginations, at the level of our beings, and, irreducibly, in the flesh. The catastrophic flow and force of gravity as it reveals the dramatic warp of the spacetime beyond the event horizon of the black hole interacts with “we” as “we” spaghettify toward singularity. Worried about the arrangements of this process, “we” concern ourselves with the dark matter of what keeps these distinct, sometimes distant, scrambled clouds of particulate black matter—the political ontological refuse produced by our endless subjection to and countless encounters with unimaginable, gratuitous, and so antiblack, violence—“we” do well to concern ourselves with the mechanics of this force that binds and breaks “we” at once. That gives “we” form, however disarticulated, and meaning, however immaterial or meaningless.

#### Notions about modernity are rooted in a grammar of humanity that is determined to regulate the world through difference. Only the quantum leap of the black hole reveals the entanglement of the world, a prerequisite to understanding the formation of the universe and the consequences of the present.

Da Silva ’16 (Denise; Associate professor at the Institute for Research on Gender, Race, Sexuality, and Social Justice, University of British Columbia; 11/16/2016; “On Difference Without Separability"; <https://issuu.com/amilcarpacker/docs/denise_ferreira_da_silva>; *Issuu*; accessed: 10/24/2020; MohulA) \*OCR used so there might be grammatical issues or missing letters

Fear and uncertainty, to be sure, have been the staples of the modern racial grammar. Since the early 20th century, articulations of cultural difference in the modern text added a social scientific signi- fier designed to delimit the reach of the ethical notion of humanity. Precisely because they too are specimens of modern thought, the available critical tools cannot support an ethico-political intervention capable of undermining cultural difference’s capacity to produce an unbridgeable ethical divide. That is, they cannot effectively interrupt deployments of otherwise unacceptable total violence onto those placed on “the Other” (cultural) side of humanity. Why? Because they also rehearse the modern text’s scientific imaging of The World as an ordered whole composed of separate parts relating through the media- tion of constant units of measurement and/or a limiting violent force. When deployed for thinking about the social, this imaging renders sociality as being contingent upon the inhabiting of the same (juridical, spatial, or temporal) parts. An ethico-political program that does not reproduce the violence of modern thought requires re-thinking sociality from without the modern text. Because only the end of the world as we know it, I am convinced, can dissolve cultural differences’ production of human collectives as “strangers” with fixed and irreconcilable moral attributes. This requires that we release thinking from the grip of certainty and embrace the imagination’s power to create with unclear and confused, or uncertain impressions, which Kant (1724-1804) postulated are inferior to what is produced by the formal tools of the Understanding. A figuring of The World nourished by the imagination would inspire us to rethink sociality without the abstract fixities produced by the Understanding and the partial and total violence they authorize - against humanity’s cultural (non-white/non-European) and physical {more-than-human) “Others.” THE THINKING OF THE WORLD After breaking through the glassy, formal fixed walls of the Understanding, released from the grip of certainty, the imagination may wonder about reassembling the fundamental components of everything to refigure the World as a complex whole without order. Let me consider a possibility: What if, instead of The Ordered World, we could image The World as a Plenum, an infinite composition: in which each existant’s singularity is contingent upon its becoming one possible expression of all the other existants, with which it is entangled beyond space and time. For decades now, experiments in particle physics have astonished scientists and laypeople with findings that suggest that the fundamental components of everything, every thing, could be just such, namely the virtual’s (subatomic particles) becoming actual (in space-time), which is also a recomposition of everything else.t For decades now, the counter-intuitive results of experiments in particle physics have been yielding descriptions of the World with features — uncertainty’ and non-locality® — that violate the parameters of certainty. Experiments that, I propose, invite us to image the social without the Understanding’s deadly distinctions and Icthal (re)ordering devices. What is at stake? What will have to be relinquished for us to unleash the imagination’s radical creative capacity and draw from it what is needed for the task of thinking The World otherwise? Nothing short of a radical shift in how we approach matter and form. Early Natural Philosophy (Galileo, 1564-1642 and Descartes, 1596-1650) and Classical Physics (Newton, 1643-1727) have inherited the Ancient view of matter — in the notion of body which comprchends it in abstract notions, such as solidity, extension, weight, gravity, and motion in space, in time, which are said to be present in thought. In any event, the claim that the human mind could know the properties of the bodies with certainty, without the mediation of the divine ruler and author of the Book of Nature, would rely on two departures from Scholastic philosophy: first, the 17 century philosophers who called themselves “modern” devised a knowledge program that was concerned with what they called the “secondary (efficient) causes” of motion, which cause change in the appearance of things in nature, and not with the “primary (final) causes” of things, or the purpose {end) of their existence; second, instead of relying on Aristotle’s (384-322 a.C) logical necessity for the assurance of the correctness of their findings, philosophers such as Galileo relied on the necessity characteristic of mathematics, more precisely, on geometrical demonstration as the basis for certainty. Unquestionably, these philosophers inherited earlier writings of Man’s exceptionality — his soul, free will, capacity for reasoning, etc. What Descartes introduced in the 17th century is a separation of mind and body in which the human mind, due to its formal nature, also acquires the power to determine the truth about the human body as well as anything that shares its formal attributes, like solidity, extension, and weight. This separation is precisely what is consolidated in Kant’s model- ing of his philosophical system after Newton’s program, particularly the idea that knowledge consists in the identification of the limiting forces, or laws that determine what happens to observed things and events (phenomena).’ Kant’s accomplishment, which was the design of a system that relied primarily on the determining powers of reason and not on a divine creator, troubled his contemporaries, who saw the possibility that formal determination would also become a descriptor of human conditions, constituting a deadly threat to the ideal of human freedom. Yet, two interrelated elements of the Kantian program continue to influence contemporary epistemological and ethical projects: (a} separability, that is, the view that all that can be known about the things of the world is what is gathered by the forms (space and time) of the intuition and the categories of the Understanding (quantity, quality, relation, modality) - everything else about them remains inaccessible and irrelevant to knowledge; and consequently (b} determinacy, the view that knowledge results from the Understanding’s ability to produce formal constructs, which it can use to determine {i.c. decide) the true nature of the sense impressions gathered by the forms of intuition. A few decades after the publication of Kant’s major works, Hegel (1777-1831) addresses this threat to freedom with a philosophical system that inverts the Kantian program with a dialectical method that accomplishes two things: (a) a notion of actualization, which presents body and mind, space and time, Nature and Reason, as two manifesta- tions of the same entity, namely Spirit, or Reason as Freedom and (b} the notion of sequentiality, which describes Spirit as movement in time, a process of self-development, and describes History as the trajectory of Spirit. With these moves, he introduces a temporal figuring of cultural difference as the actualization of Spirit’s different moments of development and postulates that post-Enlightenment European social configurations represented the fullest development of Spirit. THE THINKING OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE Ever since the post-Enlightenment consolidation of the Kantian pro- gram, physics has provided models for scientific studies of human conditions - a task facilitated by Hegel’s account of time as the productive force and theater of knowledge and morality. Unfortunately, however, these models have been successful precisely because of how these writings on the human as a social thing rely on the same departures from Medieval philosophy that supported modern philosophers’ claim of knowledge with certainty, namely, efficient causes and mathematical demonstration, which ground the modern text. The racial grammar activated in reactions to the flow of refugees to Europe is but an iteration of the modern text. Not only does it carry over into the claim of certainty, its claims of truth rest on the same pillars - namely separability, determinacy, and sequentiality —- modern philosophers have assembled to support their knowledge program. When one looks closely at the racial grammar, it is possible to identify two discrete moments. First, George Cuvier’s (1769-183 2} initial framing of the science of life, even if modeled after Newton’s Natural Philosophy, still relicd on the descriptive mode of carly Natural History, and introduced Life as both the efficient and final cause of living things. Later, in the 19th century, after Darwin (1809-1882) released his descriptions of living Naturc, in which differentiation emerges as the result of rational principle, an efficient cause, which operates in time through force, namely Natural Selection, or as the result of a struggle for existence, the science of life would guide a program for the knowledge of human existence, namely 19th century anthropology, or the science of man. In addition to external traits, which were used in Natural History’s mapping of Nature, the self-named scientists of man developed their own formal tools, mathematical tools such as the facial index for measuring human bodies, which became the basis for the description and classification of human mental attributes, both moral and intellectual, on a scale said to register their degree of cultural development. Second, in the zoth century, not surprisingly, the physicist-turned anthropologist Franz Boas (1858-1942) performs a major shift in the knowledge of the human condition with the claim that social, rather than biological aspects account for the variation of mental (moral and intellectual) contents. With this he assembles a notion of cultural dif- ference, which has both a temporal and a spatial aspect. According to Boas, the study of mental contents should address the cultural “forms,” or “patterns of thought” which emerged in the early moments of a collective’s existence and were expressed in its members’ beliefs and practices. Emerging and consolidating in time, he argues, cultural, not physical “forms” account for noticeable mental {moral and intel- lectual) differences. The anthropological school his work inaugurated, namely cultural anthropology, marked a methodological shift, that is, a departure from ethnocentric views of human difference, which resonates with a major shift in physics, namely Einstcin’s principle of relativity. For Kroeber, Boas’ student, From that, they commenced to envisage it as a totality, as no historian of one period or of a single people was likely to do, nor any analyst of his own type of civilization alone. They became aware of culture as a “universe,” or vast field in which we of today and our own civilization occupy only one place of many. The result was a widening of a fundamental point of view, a departure from unconscious ethnocentricity toward relativity.‘ In the second half of the century, in the mid-19708, we find particle physics, in the work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault, open- ing new venues for critical thinking. For instance, Foucault establishes a distinction between a mode of operation of juridico-political power that resembles the events involving larger bodies as expressed in Newton’s laws of motion and what he called the microphysics of power, which work primarily through language, or discourse, and institutions.’ This second view describes power/knowledge as productive of its subjects and objects, and operating at the level of desire — much like experiments in quantum mechanics, which inspired Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, show how the apparatus deter- mines the attributes of the particles under observation. For centuries, as these examples indicate, developments in post- classical physics, relativity and quantum mechanics, have been crucial in the development of theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of economic, juridical, ethical and political issues, which both produced and rehearsed human difference.’? Unfortunately, however, they have not yet inspired imagings of difference without separability, whether spatio-temporal, as in Boas’ cultural collectives, or formal, as in Foucault’s discursively produced subject. Not surpris- ingly, they have further reinforced the idea of culture and the mental contents to which it refers as expressing a fundamental separation between human collectives, in terms of nationality, ethnicity and social (gender, sexual, racial} identity. THE ENTANGLED WORLD Following the recent European responses to the “refugee crisis,” we find how cultural difference describes a global present mired in fear and uncertainty: Ethnic identity docs this by means of statements that name the threatening “Other,” that is, those secking refuge in Europe from wars in the Middle East, political unrest in East and North Africa, and conflicts fuclled by the exploitation of natural resources in West Africa. Meanwhile, in Brazil, it manifests itself by those attempting to impeach President Dilma Rousseff by unleashing moral attacks on those who recently had their rights recognized on the basis of their social (gender, sexual, racial, and religious) identity. In both cases, cul- tural difference sustains a moral discourse, which rests on the principle of separability. This principle considers the social as a whole consti- tuted of formally separate parts. Each of these parts constitutes a social form, as well as geographically-historically separate units, and, as such, stands differentially before the ethical notion of humanity, which is identified with the particularities of white European collectives. What if, instead of the Ordered World, we imaged each existant (human and more-than-human) not as separate forms relating through the mediation of forces, but rather as singular expressions of each and every other existant as well as of the entangled whole in/ as which they exist? What if, instead of looking to particle physics for models of devising more scientific or critical analysis of the social we turned to its most disturbing findings — such as nonlocality (as an epistemological principle) and virtuality (as an ontological descriptor) — as poctical descriptors, that is, as indicators of the impossibility of comprehending existence with the thinking tools that cannot but reproduce separability and its aids, namely determinacy and sequentiality? I close this essay with a contemplation of what can become avail- able to the imagination, what sort of ethical opening can be envisioned with the dissolution of the grip of the Understanding and the releasing of The World to the imagination. Towards re-imagining sociality, the principle of nonlocality supports a kind of thinking that does not reproduce the methodological and ontological grounds of the modern subject, namely lincar temporality and spatial separation. Because it violates these framings of time and space, nonlocality allows us to imagine sociality, in such a way that attending to difference does not presuppose separability, determinacy, and sequentiality, the three ontological pillars that sustain modern thought. In the nonlocal universe, neither dislocation {movement in space) nor relation (connection between spatially sepa- rate things} describes what happens because entangled particles {that is, every existing particle) exist with each other, without space-time. Though Kant’s comments on that which in The Thing is irrelevant to knowledge dismiss metaphysical concerns, they also suggest that the reality described in Newton’s (and later Einstcin’s, 1879-1995) physics consists in a limited picture of The World because it refers only to phenomena, in other words, things as they are accessible to the senses, that is, in spacetime. What nonlocality exposes is a more complex reality in which everything has both actual (spacetime) and a virtual (nonlocal) existence. If so, then why not conceive of human existence in the same manner? Why not assume that beyond their physical (bodily and geographic} conditions of existence, in their fundamental constitution, at the subatomic level, humans exist entangled with everything else {animate and in-animatc} in the universe. Why not conceive of human differences — the ones 19" and 20% century anthro- pologists and sociologists sclected as fundamental human descriptors —as effects of both spacetime conditions and a knowledge program modeled after Newtonian (19" century anthropology) and Einstcinian {z0" century social scientific knowledge) physics, in which separability is the privileged ontological principle. Without separability, difference among human groups and between human and nonhuman entities, has very limited explanatory purchase and ethical significance. For, as nonlocality assumes, beyond the surfaces onto which the prevailing notion of difference is inscribed, everything in the universe co-exists in the manner Leibniz (1646-1716) describes, that is, as a singular expression of everything clse in the universe. Without separability, knowing and thinking can no longer be reduced to determinacy in the Cartesian distinction of mind/body (in which the latter has the power of determination) or the Kantian formal reduction of knowing to a kind of efficient causality. Without separability, sequentiality (Hegel's ontocpistemological pillar) can no longer account for the many ways in which humans exist in the world, because self-determination has a very limited region (spacetime) for its operation. When nonlocality guides our imaging of the universe, difference is not a manifestation of an unresolvable estrangement, but the expression of an elementary entanglement. That is, when the social reflects The Entangled World, sociality becomes neither the cause nor the effect of relations involving separate existants, but the uncertain condition under which everything that exists is a singular expression of each and every actual-virtual other existant.

#### Framing

#### 1] This flow comes before everything:

#### a.] It questions whether the form of which the 1AC was presented in – weighing the case begs the question of whether deliberating about various philosophical thought is good.

#### 2] Prefer a framing of black value that strays away from normative impact calculus about causation, effectivity, or constraint – the assumption of equal intrinsic value replicates white logistics and colorblind politics that erases cultural difference

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The call for Black Lives (to) Matter hides the question it answers: Why don’t black lives matter? More precisely, it exposes how this question already contains the Kantian program and its equation of the universal and the formal—through articulating determinacy as efficient causation, or effectivity—which guides modern ethical, economic, and juridical formations. For, as a tool of modern knowledge, the category of blackness figures the operation of efficient and formal causes (that is, anatomic forms and organic processes) in the production of a racial subject destined to obliteration. Efficient and formal causes are conjoined in Kant’s account of knowledge and the figuring of reality, which is putatively a philosophical presentation of Newton’s natural philosophy. In it, the world becomes an effect, that is, the result of determination—of judgements or decisions reached by the pure intuitions and the categories of the understanding, that is, the tools available to the mind to access the Truth of the things of the world. This is so because, when he repeats Galileo’s and Bacon’s rejection of final and formal causes—in the famous statement that science is not interested in the Thing-in-itself (essence)—Kant defines the limits of knowledge as that which in things—now objects—is available to the senses (movements and alterations). Furthermore, repeating Descartes’s assertion that the mind can only know with certainty that which is akin to it—that is, the abstract or the formal—Kant consolidates modern thought when he elevates the formal (as the pure or transcendental) to that moment that is before and beyond what is accessible to the senses. Only there, as Descartes had stated about a century before, is the mind comfortable dealing with the sort of objects—numbers and geometrical forms—which it can handle without reference to space-time. For only objects exhibiting such attributes can allow for the kinds of statements Kant considers proper to knowledge, that is, statements that add to what is known about something without drawing from experience. My objective in rehearsing this argument in this context is simply to highlight how, while formalization remains central to modern thought, effectivity constitutes the main descriptor of the worldx, as knowledge becomes interested in what happens (events, movements, and alteration). More importantly, effectivity refers both to the senses’ access to the things of the world (being affected or moved by them) and to the mind’s capacity to resolve the manifold into the basic tools (categories) that the understanding has available for the “higher” moments of cognition—that is, abstraction and reflection—as well as for the task of knowledge—that is, determination. Among other things, in Kant’s account of knowledge Descartes’s formal thing (the cogito) not only knows itself (its existence and essence) without the aid of its body, but also envelops Bacon’s material and efficient causes, and takes the lead in the task of classifying and measuring nature. For instance, in his Lectures on Logic we find Kant employing the categories of the understanding in a description of Bacon’s method for producing his tables; in this description, Kant subsumes Bacon’s method into his own rendering of Descartes’s “formal I” as a transcendental (a priori, pure, or formal) condition for knowledge. Of course, the reference to Bacon’s program is more evident in what is called Kant’s “pre-critical” work. However, determination—that is, the attribution of one, and just one, predicate to a subject—remains central in his rendering of knowledge as a matter of judgement (that is, of decision), as well as in the very definition of the critical task, which privileges the exposure of grounds. In any event, as noted before, determination is crucial to Kant’s notion of synthetic judgements a priori, as it is the term he uses for what Descartes called the “nexus” of consequences that the rational mind follows when attempting to establish something with certainty. There is no question that determination is a task of the mind. In sum, determinacy as deployed in Kant’s knowledge (scientific) program remains the core of modern thought: it is presupposed in accounts of the juridical and ethical field of statements (such as the human-rights framework) which (a) presume a universal that operates as an a priori (formal) determining force (effectivity), and which (b) produce objects for which “Truth” refers to how they relate to something else—relationships mediated by abstract determinants (laws and rules) that can only be captured by the rational things’ (including the human mind/soul) “principles of disposition.” With the consolidation of the Kantian knowledge program starting in the nineteenth century, knowing and all other activities of the mind are reduced to determinacy: namely, the assignation of value that refers to a universal (scale or grid), while the object of knowledge becomes a unity of formal qualities (properties, variables, etc.), that is, an effect of judgements that produce it through measurement (degree) and classification (position). Precisely this notion of effectivity lies at the core of the modern ethical program and accounts for how difference plays into it. For there too the assignation of value results not from direct comparison—the juxtaposition of two or more things—but from the operation of a universal (formal or transcendental) mediator—the universal unit of measurement or the universal basis for classification. That is, the assignation of value results from the operation of something which shares in the attributes that universal reason acquired in the late eighteenth century. Let me briefly elaborate on this by situating blackness in the Kantian design of the modern ethical scene of value. Here, as we know, the guiding ethical entity is humanity, which Kant describes as the sole existing thing possessing dignity, that is, possessing intrinsic value. Among existing things, humanity is highest in the figuring of determinacy because it alone shares in the determining powers of universal reason, since it alone has free will, or self-determination. Though humanity, in Kant’s formulation, already refers only to Europeans, the closing of humanity’s ethical boundaries occurs in the nineteenth century, both in Hegel’s revision of the Kantian program and in the deployment by scientists of man and society of the tools of scientific reason to account for human difference. In Hegel’s version, this happens in an ethical account that transforms World History into a scene of development (the self-actualization of universal reason), which culminates in the mental and social (juridical, economic, symbolic) configurations found in post-Enlightenment Europe. Both the scientific and ethical figurings of determinacy would enter into nineteenth-century scientific accounts of human difference, which produced the notions of racial and cultural difference. Both notions are manufactured in knowledge procedures that produce physical and social configurations as effects and causes of (explanations for) mental (moral and intellectual) differences. Further, these procedures deploy the European/white mind as the universal gauge, since it alone shares a key quality with universal reason (or with Hegel’s “Spirit”), namely, self-determination. In this way, this earlier moment of racial knowledge yielded indexes of human difference—i.e., the naming of racial collectives such as the Negro, the Caucasian, the Oriental, and the Australian—that transformed economic differences resulting from conquest, colonization, settlement, and enslavement into presentations of (Hegel’s self-actualizing) universal reason, identifying spatial and bodily configuration that, in their turn, produced the mental (intellectual and moral) forms that caused the differences in social configurations found in the European continent and its colonies. My point here is that the very arsenal designed to determine and to ascertain the truth of human difference already assumed Europeanness/whiteness as the universal measure, that is, as the bodily, mental, and societal actualization of universality. This has several consequences, the most relevant (to my argument here) being the occlusion of the latter as a term of comparison. More explicitly, economic differences resulting from hundreds of years of expropriating land and labor were attributed to racial and cultural difference. In racial knowledge, they become the effects of particular bodily arrangements, which are established as the causes for particular mental (moral and intellectual) traits, which are themselves expressed in the social configurations found across the globe. Put differently, both the anthropological and sociological versions of racial knowledge transform the consequences of hundreds years of colonial expropriation into the effects of efficient causes (the laws of nature) as they operate through human forms (bodies and societies). In sum, as a category of racial difference, blackness occludes the total violence necessary for this expropriation, a violence that was authorized by modern juridical forms—namely, colonial domination (conquest, displacement, and settlement) and property (enslavement). Nevertheless, blackness—precisely because of how, as an object of knowledge, it occludes these juridical modalities—has the capacity to unsettle the ethical program governed by determinacy, through exposing the violence that the latter refigures.

#### 3] Evaluate ethics through the Equation of Value

Da Silva ’17 (Denise; Associate professor at the Institute for Research on Gender, Race, Sexuality, and Social Justice, University of British Columbia; February 2017; “1 (life) ÷ 0 (blackness) = ∞ − ∞ or ∞ / ∞: On Matter Beyond the Equation of Value”; <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/79/94686/1-life-0-blackness-or-on-matter-beyond-the-equation-of-value/>; *E-Flux*; Journal 79)

To explore this potential of blackness to unsettle ethics, I will now tackle the unquestioned question reiterated by the disregard for lives lost in the streets of the US and in the Mediterranean Sea: Why don’t black lives matter? To do this, I use that which grounds the modern knowledge program—mathematical reasoning—to devise a procedure that unleashes blackness to confront life. Using what I call the Equation of Value, I describe blackness’s capacity to unravel modern thought without reproducing the violence housed in knowledge and in the scene of value. My proof of this equation is designed to sidestep the hegemony of the Kantian subject and to make it possible to expose the disruptive/creative capacity that blackness hosts/holds. In the modern Western imagination, blackness has no value; it is nothing. As such, it marks an opposition that signals a negation, which does not refer to contradiction. For blackness refers to matter—as The Thing; it refers to that without form—it functions as a nullification of the whole signifying order that sustains value in both its economic and ethical scenes. The crux of this exercise is to provide an account of opposition that figures nullification instead of contradiction. This is crucial for distinguishing a radical engagement from a critical one—because the latter cannot but assume the Kantian forms when it seeks to expose their conditions of possibility. Let us first see how the figuring of opposition as contradiction would work in relation to black life. Life is the form; the positive position vis-à-vis life is figured as “1,” and the negative position is figured as “-1”: i. positive life = 1 ii. negative life = -1 If blackness occupies the place of negative life—that is, life that has negative value, that does not matter—then iii. blackness = -1 Let me now figure the relationship between life (1) and blackness (-1) using basic mathematical procedures: addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. Addition in this case becomes subtraction because of blackness’s negative value: a) 1 (life) + -1 (blackness) = 0 When simply combined with life, blackness brings about nullification (0); when added to the positive form of life, blackness obliterates it. As discussed previously, value, because it is both an effect of determinacy (Kant’s account of knowledge) and is equated with determinacy (Kantian and Hegelian ethical scenes), it is (a) determinate, resulting in relations marked by effectivity (efficient causation), that is, relations marked by power differences insofar as one element effectively acts upon another; and it is (b) determinant insofar as it is the effective element—that is, it is the form which is applied to matter (content). To express the relation between blackness (0) and life (1) in terms of effectivity, I use multiplication (×) and division (÷): b) 1 (life) × -1 (blackness) = -1 c) 1 (life) ÷ -1 (blackness) = -1 When blackness multiplies or divides life, it remains in its negative expression, as blackness (-1)—that is, as lack, as a symbol of an absence (of life). My next move is to take blackness’s power to annihilate life (a) and deploy it to multiply (×) life. If iv. life = 1 v. blackness = 0 then we find that d) 1 (life) × -1 (blackness) = -1 e) 1 (life) × 0 (blackness) = 0 The movement in both cases is unmistakably violent; it refigures dialectics. In (d), negativity (blackness) engulfs value, and in (e) it destroys it. Put differently, in (d), life without value—that is, blackness (-1)—disappears with life, and in (e), blackness as a figuring of the absence of form (blackness = 0) disappears with the form (life = 1) and releases matter itself (0). Taking this a step further, it might be possible to move away from dialectics and its deployment of effectivity, which cannot but reproduce violence, by dividing life by blackness: f) 1 (life) ÷ 0 (blackness) = ∞ − ∞ or ∞ / ∞ Instead of the sublation (d) or obliteration (e) of the form, this procedure has no result because it is impossible to divide something by zero. I have chosen ∞ − ∞ (infinity minus infinity) or ∞ / ∞ (infinity divided by infinity) to picture the result because it is undeterminable, it has no form: it is ∞ minus itself or ∞ divided by itself. It is neither life nor nonlife; it is content without form, or materia prima—that which has no value because it exists (as ∞) without form. In equating blackness with ∞ and capturing the rare (“of which something consists”) and the obsolete (“substance without form”) meanings of matter, I claim a radical praxis of refusal to contain blackness in the dialectical form. Though Frantz Fanon’s refusal of dialectics is the most celebrated, I find this refusal also in Cedric Robinson’s tracing of the black radical tradition; in Hortense Spillers’s figuring of the flesh as zero degree of signification; in Saidiya Hartman’s refusal to rehearse racial violence as the moment of black subjectification; and in Fred Moten’s descriptions of blackness in the scene of violence which refuse a simple reconciliation with the categories and premises of modern thought. When blackness’s oppositional power refers to matter—or, in Fanon’s words, in the “night of the absolute”—it is possible to avoid the principle of contradiction and the accounts of self-determination it sustains; it is possible to avoid, that is, a return to Hegel (or Marx) via the shortcut of racial eschatology. What I hope this move against determinacy—the very notion presupposed in the question that Black Lives Matter sets out to challenge—makes possible is an appreciation of the urgency of bringing about its dissolution. For the work of blackness as a category of difference fits the Hegelian movement but has no emancipatory power because it functions as a signifier of violence which, when deployed successfully, justifies the otherwise unacceptable, such as the deaths of black persons due to state violence (in the US and in Europe) and capitalist expropriation (in Africa). That is, the category of blackness serves the ordered universe of determinacy and the violence and violations it authorizes. A guide to thinking, a method for study and unbounded sociality—blackness as matter signals ∞, another world: namely, that which exists without time and out of space, in the plenum.

#### 4] False attachments – pragmatic hope results in cruel optimism naturalizing material violence for debaters in this space

Sullivan ‘17 (Shannon Sullivan, Chair of Philosophy and Professor of Philosophy and Health Psychology at UNC Charlotte, “Setting Aside Hope: A Pragmatist Approach to Racial Justice”, 2017)//Shreyas

IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, significant racial inequalities and anti-black violence continue to be rampant in the United States. Decades, even centuries, of political and legal struggle have deco lisle to change that fact. This chapter will argue that black Americans need new tactics and strategies for responding to the white class privilege and white supremacy that fundamentally structure the country.' They need to increase the number and type of tools in their racial justice toolkit, expanding beyond liberal faith in civil rights and white people's good intentions to cooperate with racial change. The political and legal work that black and other people of color (along with some white people) have done to eliminate antiblack racism isn't working. Pragmatists in particular need to be able to face up to that fact given that we value the practical work that ideas, concepts, and truths can do. Why then, as Calvin Warren pragmatically asks in the epigraph above, would we expect people fighting racism to keep doing the same thing? Why would anyone hope that the same failed actions and strategies would mm out any differentia the future? This kind of hope can function as a cruel optimism that "works" by keeping black people focused on the very thing that undercuts their flourishing (Warren 2015, 221). In line with Warren's concerns, I argue that black America' hope that political struggle can achieve racial justice tends to be a harmed emotion they should avoid. I maim my case in a pragmatist spirit that opposes Comet West's influential argument for black hope In contrast to West, I contend that pragmatists and others concerned about racial injustice would do better to draw on Derrick Bell's racial realism and Warren's blank nihilism to develop alternative strategies for addressing antiblack racism In related ways, Bell and Warren urge their readers to reckon with the permanence of racism and to give op hope that additional political struggle will eliminate it. After exploring their complementary accounts, I augment them with concrete evidence from the health sciences that black hope can be physically harmful to black people, weathering their bodies nod damaging their psychosomatic health such that they are less able to withstand the inequities of anti-black racism. I conclude by arguing for the advantages of reading Bell's and Warren's claims about the permanence of racism pragmatically, that is, by assessing the truth of their claims via their effects. The result m the working hypothesis that black people will have a much greater chance of developing new practices, habits, and strategies of flourishing in an anti-black world if they no longer hope that political struggle will eliminate racism.

[Sullivan Continues Later]

De facto white class privilege in the form of racial microaggressions contributes to people of color's "racial battle fatigue," which entails "the constant use or redirection of energy for coping against mundane racism which depletes psychological and physiological resources needed in other important, creative, and productive area of life" (Smith, Hung, and Franklin 2012, 40). Racial battle fatigue has been linked empirically to depression, tension, and generalized anxiety disorder in African Americans, and the stress associated with all of these psychological problems also contributes to physiological weathering that harms black health, contributing to high rates of hypertension, cardiovascular disease, pre-term birth rates, and infant mortality to name a few (Smith, Hung and Franklin 2012, 37, 40; D. Smith 2012). The effects of white racism literally get inside and help constitute the bodies of black people in harmful ways. They wear down the body's various systems by creating a high allostatic load via stressors that accumulate over time. The results are health problems such as disproportionately high rates of pre-term birth, infant mortality, cardio-vascular disease, diabetes, and accelerated physiological aging (Blitstein 2009). Racism hurts—literally—and it also kills in ways that am subtler but no less deadly than the lyncher's noose or the neighbors Met (Drexler 2007). These effects, moreover, can be transgenerational, physiologically passed onto subsequent generations through various epigenetic changes (Sullivan 2013).

Information paradox and physics takes out other reasoning – Outside information can’t ever explain how we ought to cope with anti-blackness and only gets violently reiterated into the world

Murillo’16 (John Murillo III. Quantum Blackanics: Untimely Blackness, and Black Literature out of Nowhere. Diss. Brown University, 2016. Pg 169-172 (B.A., University of California, Irvine, PhD in Philosophy in Department of English at Brown University)//Joey

80 See Sabine Hossenfelder, “If it Quacks like a Black Hole,” posted on BackRe(Action), a blog devoted to physics that she shares with her husband, Stefan Scherer. Sabine Hossenfelder is a theoretical physicist, and the Assistant Professor for High Energy Physics at Nordita, the Nordic Institute for Theoretical Physics. Stefan Scherer is a physicist in the field of heavy ion physics, working in the field of scientific publishing. 81 I need to clarify that a singularity, as it’s thought in terms of a black hole, marks a site at which hat happens. This is where it is theorized that quantum gravity might come into play, having the explanatory power to remove the singularity. Right now, however, the singularity seems to be a source of a **paradox**, as it suggests that information is lost after a certain point. If the black hole evaporates—since black holes appear to evaporate—what happens to that information? This “information paradox” surrounding what exactly happens to the information that ‘goes into’ a black hole is the subject of an ongoing and unresolved ‘debate’ in physics, having a number of proposed solutions (the cited Stephen Hawking paper stirred the pot a bit, portending a solution of its own, but one which is neither ‘new’ **Black revolutionary violence** does not promise redemption, but might provide a way to **render** the impossible and the irredeemable available to the possibility of redemption, without really offering a fixed or clear image of what that redemption could look like. The deathliness that renders time untimely in relation to Blacks, the **deathliness** that **characterizes** untime and all its constitutive features and effects, might make legible the possibility of its own redemption via a Black revolutionary violence that has, as its stakes, being, itself. Taking the risk means making the leap or taking the plunge **into the black hole**, means embracing the inescapability of the tidal forces emanating from its central singularity—the antiblack imposition of the fact of Blackness. As I read him, Fanon describes this unimaginable spacetime as “the zone of nonbeing,” a derelict spatiality and temporality, “an utterly naked declivity where an authentic upheaval might be born.” Only “here” and “now,” or “there” and “then,” along the downward slope(s) of the “zone,” or the inward funnel of the black hole’s gravity well, an “authentic,” which might mean “redemptive,” upheaval might become available to thought. Specifically, this upheaval might be conceived, carried to term, and brought into being (born). The “zone of nonbeing,” the “black hole,” is the only site for the (pro)creation of redemption via an embrace of obliteration; but it is also an “arid and sterile region,” constitutively infertile, or at least, resistant to the kind of redemptive creation that stages or embodies “authentic upheaval” in the form and wake of Black revolutionary violence and its attendant risk of political ontological obliteration. To heed Ursa’s call, to leap into the black hole, to enter into the dereliction of being, is to fall into unimaginable contradiction in the form of an unresolvable paradox.

## 2

### Case

#### Subconscious identification overdetermines the debate community’s response to their performance and ensures no change—If their arguments are true, it means that A.) Any potential reason to vote Affirmative is soundly rejected by their theory and B.) the Aff is worse than nothing which impact turns there notion of presumption affirming

Wilderson, full professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, 2014

[Frank, Irvine RR Conference - Discussion with Frank B. Wilderson III March 9,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KxMfL35rQsA 1:50-1:53:10 Accessed 3/27/14 JCP]

**I would never say that what I have drawn from my conversations and the limited amount of research that I have done, is the totality of the debate world, but I believe it is the truth of the world**, I believe it is the truth of the world and **I believe that debate is a set of institutional relations in the world that cannot escape that truth**. **So it kind of doesn’t matter to me if there is good will over here and bad will over here** and good intentions over here and bad intentions over here. For two reasons, one because what you are talking about is part - is only one initiative from the schema of subjectivity that comes from preconscious interests and **there are two other registers of subjectivity at least, right, which is unconscious identifications and structural positions and so what I was trying to single the limitations of debate as an institution towards the end of this talk what I was signaling was that the form of the institution is ideologically overdetermined** because it press - it forces discourse or tries to force discourse - this is part of the problem right now - it tries to force discourse into debating discourse in the realm of preconscious interests in other words what one can know and say I am actually talking about a process of identification how aggression, fixation, desire also works to form institutions and I think that's as vital if not more so than the political, sorry, the preconscious aspects of political economy so I actually I can believe that one could have a certain kind of noble intentions although, I wouldn’t say any intentions in civil society are noble, while at the same time being driven by unconscious fixations, attachments, and aggression to what I am calling anti-blackness. And furthermore saying that **it is not something that can be adjudicated or gotten rid of through dialogue**, I am not saying that dialogue is bad we should all stop talking, but I am saying that **the fundamental change which black embodiment portends is so big that most black people don’t even want to be involved with it except in moments when we’ve come together around that antagonism and those moments last for this long [holding his fingers and inch apart]** because violence advance- and I think that one of the debaters the other day, yesterday said was trying to – one of the things I see in the debate blogs and stuff is how violence on the other side of the resistance is theorized as state violence afropessimism theorizes violence as human violence so its not the state, it's the human his or her self.