# 1AC Haptic Jobs

## 1AC V1

#### The trading of Black flesh marks the birth of modern logistics. The first global movement of commodities required algorithmic regulation and arrangement of bodies and movement so as to secure financialization that we witness today in trade policy. Logistics has never been merely about the movement of goods, but about the control of the flow of movement and touch itself within labor. The nation-state serves here not as an external actor who can check capitalism’s excess, but rather an arrangement of governmentality that ensures the enclosure of the form of radical touch that would threaten logistics. Executive touch is social production – it seeks on all scales to correct the perversions of trade so as to make spaces and peoples of the illicit economy ready for speculation and valuation. Executive touch – regulated intimacies that produce property bearing subjects – makes us all complicit with trade policy – like gentrifiers who move into neighborhoods brimming with brown and Black life only to police and deaden it into another shitty coffee shop – we are constantly training ourselves to correct the perversions in ourselves and others. Only an internal strike from the commons can rearrange logistics

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When J. Kameron Carter takes up the question concerning the “Godterms” that underwrite sovereignty, he shifts it and us so that we really start thinking, also, about the “Man-terms” that underwrite sovereignty as well.61 He works a kind of persistent cosmological inconstancy, with a dark energy that anticipates the unfixing of the stars that it follows, allowing us to have to ask why man became God as if it were before the question of why God became man; now we get to have to ask how it is that becoming God is tantamount to what Gayle Salamon calls, “assuming a body.”62 What is it to assume, to conceptualize, to take up and take onto oneself a body? What is it for the body and the self to take one another up and take one another on in serial preface to each, in the other, being taken out? What remains beyond that address, that incursion, that aggressive vulnerability, that brutally projective and protective settlement, which is sovereignty in the midst of its diffusion? Meanwhile, mutiny, **the general strike**, the remorseless working of no-things and no-bodies, romantic comedy in the commons, its antinomian swerve and quarrel, living’s dissolute spread, its dispersive largesse, its cosubstantial blur, its transubstantial fade, **can’t be faded**, requiring that we speak, maybe appositionally, to some insubstantial pageantry of the anasubstantial. Are substance and sovereignty so bound up with each other (substance being an unreal matter of having mass and occupying space in time, on time’s line) that we have to **imagine** a more improperly surreal physicality? Not anti-matter but ante- and after-matter. Maybe flesh is matter’s Auntie, matter’s play mama, who survives having and occupying. So that what’s at stake is the necessity of a more emphatic analysis of flesh, as something other than withdrawn or withheld or reduced body, as that which is, therefore, apposed to body. One wants to speak (of) (through) (as) flesh in its own terms; but flesh has no terms, though the terms that are imposed upon it become its interminable preoccupation with cœnobitic commotion. When J. Kameron Carter takes up the question concerning the “Godterms” that underwrite sovereignty, he shifts it and us so that we really start thinking, also, about the “Man-terms” that underwrite sovereignty as well.61 He works a kind of persistent cosmological inconstancy, with a dark energy that anticipates the unfixing of the stars that it follows, allowing us to have to ask why man became God as if it were before the question of why God became man; now we get to have to ask how it is that becoming God is tantamount to what Gayle Salamon calls, “*assuming a body*.”62 What is it to assume, to conceptualize, to take up and take onto oneself a body? What is it for the body and the self to take one another up and take one another on in serial preface to each, in the other, being taken out? 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So that what’s at stake is the necessity of a more emphatic analysis of flesh, as something other than withdrawn or withheld or reduced body, as that which is, therefore, apposed to body. One wants to speak (of) (through) (as) flesh in its own terms; but flesh has no terms, though the terms that are imposed upon it become its interminable preoccupation with cœnobitic commotion. Despite the pressure Deming and other American overseers placed on Japanese workers in industry, productivity in Japan, contrary to the received storyline, did not improve at all in those years. But if the experiment was a failure as a productivity tool, this is not to say it failed as a management tool deployed amidst the **intense labor strikes** and worker solidarity that characterized Japan in the 1950s. Meanwhile, the Americans still managing Japan indirectly were already shifting to the tried and true American industrial strategy: government intervention and market distortion. First, they demanded that all their Asian post-War client states, inherited from the British, French, and Dutch, start to give Japanese imports preferential treatment, even at the expense of American products. Then, with the onset of war in Korea, the Americans increasingly put Japanese industry back on a war footing in order to supply their imperial belligerence. As a result, the Japanese economy took off in the direction of its post-War miracle and, with the same distortion later applied by way of the American war on Vietnam, Japan’s economy became legend. Deming and company had nothing demonstrable to do with this miracle. But they were in the right place at the right time, when American business needed its own ‘productivity solution.’ If the increase in Japanese industrial productivity is essentially fictive, so too is the ascendancy of quality. The oil shocks of 1973 and 1978 – part of a complex class struggle in the oil-producing regions, as the Midnight Notes Collective teach us – coincide not with the more reliable, higher quality Japanese durable goods that are supposed to be the products of a management miracle, but with cheaper cars that have better fuel efficiency. These cheaper cars appear amidst another class struggle not unrelated to the one in the oil fields. It is here that we can pick up the thread of operations management, especially ‘quality control,’ and its latent power as a class weapon. For while there is no evidence that total quality management was in any way responsible for the Japanese miracle, it was a useful tool in disciplining a collectivist insurgency in Japanese labor. Moreover, in the 1970s with the final breakdown of productivity deals in the United States, amid wildcat strikes and the rise of organizations like the League of Revolutionary Black Workers in Detroit’s auto industry, American management was looking for a new form of control. It is here that the failed management theory of Deming and company, burnished by the rise, for very different reasons, of competition in the car, electronics, and machine industries with Japan, finally had its day. How can we make a monstrous distortion, a spreading bullwhip through the flow? How can hapticality step out on criticality, that brutal, Delphicoracular imperative to ‘know thyself’? How can we join and intensify a general strike against calculation, against valuation? Such a strike wouldn’t be an event so much as the emergence of a general condition of exhaustion and radically impure generativity. It would be a crooked blow, with a curved and curling stick picked up on the run in afformative, depositional black repose. How can our study live in the flesh as a refusal (out) of mind, in the break of the flow? Let’s re-route Kafka through a passage in Spillers and see if we can refuse to adapt. This capacity to think and represent the inability to stave off errancy in the human, to regulate and manage black and inhuman flaw, is what makes us want to think Van Peebles and his ante-hero Jeff Gerber as a precursor to the Kafka we propose, who offers us a picture of Gregor’s anti-heroic condition as, in part, an inability to claim a certain monstrosity, an accession rather than a resistance to or refusal of total access. Is there a difference between Gregor and that sassy, all but sapphirically watermelon mannishness – in which one wakes up and realizes that he is not insofar as he is black, which blackness he has been trying to allay in a strenuous regime of constant improvement, so that Gerber is revealed as someone who’s been passing all along? Watermelon Man, whose self-improvement breaks down seemingly under its own weight, as if he literally sweated away his own makeup, his own capacity to keep (self-)making up for something, given in and as a whiteface that practically teases us with its audacious visual failure, doesn’t die alone in the room that is no longer, but has also never been, his own; rather, he enters into black sociality, walking into the blues with a drink in his hand. In *The Metamorphosis* we propose, Gregor will have realized he was a monster all along thereby claiming, which is to say radicalizing, the status of the shipped, the sold, in a general refusal and suspension of, **a general strike against**, calculation. The brain, in/and its synapses, is just another bad concept, a brutal conceptualization – by way of body, its spatiotemporal constitution, and its attendant metaphysics of the possessive individual self in networked relationality – of held flesh. What is valued is work directed toward the improvement of the flow, and in the social factory the flow of the line can run anywhere, and we must enter its streams. But what is the historical economy by which blackness becomes the black and the black becomes a sign (a monster, a demonstration, a showing) of blackness, where blackness derives its name from its sign, from that by which it is announced? The sign works its terrible magic precisely from within a radical non-isolation. It’s not just that it signifies an unruly sociality; it actually instantiates and materializes that sociality. The ungovernability of Gregor’s limbs, as if he is gifted with the stigmatic charismata of a multi-linear, polyrhythmically funky drummer’s independence, is how flesh demonstrates the body’s non-assumption, its haptic wakefulness in groundedness, even as it also indicates the agitation that attends having been reduced to atmospheric flow’s hub, or nub, in the constant attempt to regulate and vilify affective rub. In the room that is not now nor ever was his own, this interplay of access and ungovernability indicates that Gregor is not in the world. And the way this metoikic staying outside and unhoused at home occurs makes you wonder if he’d ever been in the world and makes you wonder about how it is or what it means to be in the world, to be involved in worldliness as optimization, as this constant necessity of and for improvement. Does Gregor become what improvement forces him to become or does he revert to what improvement was sent to improve? This concerns the relation – between administration and metamorphosis, where improvement is mobilized both to induce and to suppress change – we have to want not to be not able to refuse. Can we embrace such imperfection and keep on imperfecting every old and new logistical collapse? Can we extend and improvise upon the radically generative and degenerative inefficiency of Kafka’s writing? Van Peebles teaches us that such failure, such continual detonation of the capstone, is always worth a try. The pathway to the lived experience of impossible individuation goes through rigid conformity, whose severed, separate performances are strictly accounted for. School is where the social contract is taken out on kids. In good schools, network’s eclipse of contact is enacted with great efficiency; in bad schools, an experiment might happen, either accidentally, where networks and the networked don’t apply, or under the protection of an idea of the alternative. The loss of empathy in the submission of the social to the contractual ought only ever make us want to ask, can there be cybernetic bruise? Cybernetic caress? Cybernetic sensation? This we do in remembrance of the general antagonism and **the general strike we keep all but enacting**, recognizing that these questions arise not from the fact of new computational hardware but rather from the values that animate old computational software – a spiritless theory of mind/hand coordination manifest most clearly in the reduction of reverent touch to instrumental grasp. **It’s not that touch is nonviolent. It’s that we need lovingly to return such violence from resource improvement back** to its multiple sources. We want to intensify our thoughtful feel of bad complicity in the interest of its brush against the good so that no one can ever say, ‘Watch me make my own way through this bullshit.’ The record shows, no one can take the blows and remain intact in the effort to remain intact, which is only given in the taking of the blows. If we want to fight for the good, we have to overturn the bad rather than navigate it by ourselves in crowded loneliness. It’s all nappy and out of all compass – dread, naught, knotty, naughty, dred as worn cover and rent vessel. The oldness, the oldheadedness of the people, is given in their recognition and refusal of this turbulence we go through. There, they study what also can’t be there. It’s like a band straining against development, trying to make a music that studies it while avoiding it. Is there a point where you can’t go on indefinitely? Is that space limited or unlimited? The broken document of a workshop that breaks out into poetry by breaking from the crafting of poems is a concert film. The record of thoughtful play becomes a play. This production of the subject reaction is the dematerialization and individuation of logisticality, *which logistics effects*. Our critical and creative efforts in the classroom, and our grading, are part of this dematerialization, and submit to its logistical demands, not because they do not begin well, but because they do not end well. *They end with degraded means*. Such a dematerialization has deep roots in the Western tradition of positing a subject and its mind. But today it is at work most frenetically and most (in)visibly in logistical capitalism, powered by the algorithm. Logistics today mobilizes and networks us as never before. It asserts us as means as never before. It opens access everywhere and in everything. And, at the same time, logistics degrades those means and denigrates this access by driving them always toward a single end through valuation. That end is surplus: stolen, accumulated, regulated. By tapping our invaluable means to do this, logistics also confronts what we have called our logisticality, our capacity to be a means for itself, in selfless, unplotted, non-local incompleteness. Indeed, we can read the rise of logistics and the subject reaction that it encourages and instructs as attempts to regulate our logisticality. Logisticality is more than a counter-logistics, a countering of logistics. It is our means of movement, and our movement as means. Logistics seeks to impose a position, direction, and flow on our movement, our pedesis, our random walk, our wandering errancy, to trap us in this oscillation, this neurotic pacing back and forth. Logistics wants to position us, to have us take a position, and fortify, and settle. And yet logistics itself also has to keep moving even in its degraded way. This is where the algorithm gets put to work. Some say it was Alfred Sohn-Rethel who first figured out how the concept was, in this interplay of formation and enforcement, stolen into ownership, abducted and abstracted, weaponized in strategy. He said the abstraction of exchange, and later the abstraction of money, led us to think in the suspension of time and space, the suspension of materiality, and this led to the propriation of the concept. But Sohn-Rethel only picks up the trail of this theft with the thief, the individual, already formed and ready for the strategized and immaterial concept, already formed and readied by it. He wants to convict this thief. We want to take him home. The act of emplotting yourself in time and space is – perhaps paradoxically at first – also the act of being all but nowhere. That spot you mapped is dimensionless. It cannot be found precisely because your act claims that the point you will have occupied is universal, the abstract point every individual can and must make and from which humanity becomes possible, with and through and in which the human finds himself. And because it is nowhere, its relationship to place is, in fact, one of impunity. It is this impunity that founds modern morality and the idea of responsibility or sustainability which this act of impunity then hires as its security detail. Can there be a better description of the human: the being who lives with impunity on the earth and is sorry about it? So, the question of what has happened can be taken with the question of what will happen in a way for which normative ethical questioning makes room. Against this abstract preparation for the victory of reason over its rivals, this tilting of the board toward one point, there is a way to live history and place that is not part of the humanization, that is to say racialization, of our earth and its reduction to world, its degradation of its means to mere logistical ends and its forfeit of sharing to mere ownership, all of which require and are instantiated by emplotment and its rule(r). Amiri Baraka calls this entanglement of history and place “place/meant” and we hear him, now, through M. NourbeSe Philip’s amplification of “dis place,” as if he meant for that errant and supplemental “a” to signify a movement of and in place, a radical and irreducible movement that constitutes our undercommon indigeneity, our shared, native, ante-natal turning out of (re)turn.71 If emplotment is how we give up the undercommons for a common grave, then dis place/meant is how we find and mark the surrealistic spot. Black imagination in the face of fascism is certainly an example of this, living history and place without succumbing fully to this emplotment; but this is not to say living in some form of life that’s more ‘real.’ That’s not the point. It’s not even about the point and it’s not about pointing. Some of the earliest speculative fiction we have is black speculative fiction written in response to American fascism and it’s part of what is now the longest running and perhaps most successful, which is to say unsuccumbed to “success,” of the earth’s anti-colonial movements – the struggle by black people *all over the world* against the fascist colonial order called the United States of America. From Martin Delany to Octavia Butler, from Mary Prince to Frankétienne, emplotment is continuously disrupted in movement’s names. And we could also point to the continuous non-coercive rearrangements of desire, to take a turn again with Spivak, that constitute black music, which is neither metaphor nor allegory, which is nothing but generally ante-generic black social life as it brings around its history and mashes up its place again and again. This is what tells us that the answer to how to act is how we act. It’s C. L. R.’s and Etta’s future in the present, which is this train Sister Rosetta Tharpe is always talking about, that clean one Woody Guthrie sleeps on, as a pillow, with all the unscheduled calypsonians in shared logisticality; it’s Gladys Knight’s midnight train, the O’Jay’s friendship train, Bob Marley and the Wailer’s Zion train, Trane’s sun ship, Sun Ra’s funkadelic spaceship, the general blinds we ride. Time and space emplotment is fundamental to every capitalist production process, to all the circuits and metrics of production, beginning with the production of the human worker. **Bending time and space** to our offbeat beat and displaced place is bound to fuck that up, ‘cause it already will. Now, if you need some, come on, get some, before it’s too late. As long as you don’t steal, we share. But feel, which is the embrace of incompleteness undetermined by the economy of in/voluntarity, can’t be subdivided into a whole bunch of anesthetized feeling some kinda way about our incompleteness. To say we feel complicit in and as our individuation is to say we feel complicit *through* our individuation. To feel complicit in the work of an organization, a profession, a corporation, is not a form of consciousness (of which the unconscious is not just one among many). It can’t distinguish mental from manual labor or good jobs from bad jobs. To feel complicit all by yourself is to be a good employee. It is also to be a good citizen, to vote strategically, to make policy, to feel bad about loving your city. But to feelcomplicit in all our incompleteness is to be revolutionary – so much so you might even call it otherwise than being. To enter with accomplices, to work with unseen friends, to plan everyday with someone, to be with someone, is so much more than being someone in being less than someone. An individual’s felt complicity with an organization is (un)matched by real complicity in feel, which is unalone. To want to be with past the point of mere being, to feel the refuge of all the rest out of sight, to have accomplices in all you do – this is real complicity, still folded, still nautical, all naught. Feeling complicit and complicit nonbeing in the feel – the two cannot live together even as they live together in our complicity. Accomplices disrupt the individuation of the complicity we feel in the organization. But the organization, too – the museum, the hospital, the school – constantly interrupts and violates the complicity we build. And yet, the more we deepen our complicit, collective, uncorrected friendships, the more the individuation machine and its “strategic career in and out of the institution” malfunction. As Robinson was fond of saying, we “deepen the contradiction.” Mahalia Jackson pre-amplifies that formulation, singing about helping somebody along the way to the abolition of the efficient institution of somebody; Silva dubs it, talking about no-bodies helping no-bodies to dissolve the equations of value. As we hold on tighter to our complicities, the two can’t hold. Neither can you. Neither can I. Something’s gotta give and what gives is what gives. You and I are not complicit. We feel – we share – complicity. What does it mean to stand for improvement? Or worse, to stand for what business calls a ‘commitment to continuous improvement‘? It means to stand for the brutal speciation of all. To take a stand for speciation is the beginning of a diabolical usufruct. Improvement comes to us by way of an innovation in land tenure, where individuated ownership, derived from increasing the land’s productivity, is given in the perpetual, and thus arrested, becoming of exception’s miniature. This is to say that from the outset, the ability to own – and that ability’s first derivative, self-possession – is entwined with the ability to make more productive. In order to be improved, to be rendered more productive, land must be violently reduced to its productivity, which is the regulatory diminishment and management of earthly generativity. Speciation is this general reduction of the earth to productivity and submission of the earth to techniques of domination that isolate and enforce particular increases in and accelerations of productivity. In this regard, (necessarily European) man, in and as the exception, imposes speciation upon himself, in an operation that extracts and excepts himself from the earth in order to confirm his supposed dominion over it. And just as the earth must be forcefully speciated to be possessed, man must forcefully speciate himself in order to enact this kind of possession. This is to say that racialization is present in the very idea of dominion over the earth; in the very idea and enactment of the exception; in the very nuts and bolts of possession-by-improvement. Forms of racialization that both Michel Foucault and, especially and most vividly, Robinson identify in medieval Europe become *usufructed* with modern possession through improvement. Speciated humans are endlessly improved through the endless work they do on their endless way to becoming Man. This is the usufruct of man. In early modern England, establishing title to land by making it more productive meant eliminating biodiversity and isolating and breeding a species – barley or rye or pigs. Localized ecosystems were aggressively transformed so that monocultural productivity smothers anacultural generativity. The emergent relation between speciation and racialization is the very conception and conceptualization of the settler. Maintenance of that relation is his vigil and his eve. For the encloser, possession is established through improvement – this is true for the possession of land and for the possession of self. The Enlightenment is the universalization/globalization of the imperative to possess and its corollary, the imperative to improve. However, this productivity must always confront its contradictory impoverishment: the destruction of its biosphere and its estrangement in, if not from, entanglement, both of which combine to ensure the liquidation of the human differential that is already present in the very idea of man, the exception. To stand for such improvement is to invoke policy, which attributes depletion to the difference, which is to say the wealth, whose simultaneous destruction and accumulation policy is meant to operationalize. This attribution of a supposedly essential lack, an inevitable and supposedly natural diminution, is achieved alongside the imposition of possession-by-improvement. To make policy is to impose speciation upon everybody and everything, to inflict impoverishment in the name of improvement, to invoke the universal law of the usufruct of man. In this context, continuous improvement, as it emerged with decolonization and particularly with the defeat of national capitalism in the 1970s, is the continuous crisis of speciation in the surround of the general antagonism. This is the contradiction Robinson constantly invoked and analyzed with the kind of profound and solemn optimism that comes from being with, and being of service to, your friends. We arrived at the conclusion that the world in the sense of the antecedent totality which makes comprehending existents possible can be understood in two ways: (a) as that which makes truth possible for us and (b) as that which makes it possible for individual things within the universum, and the universum as a sum of things, to be. Here again the phenomenon of human corporeity might be pivotal since our elevation out of the world, our individuation within the world, is an individuation of our subjective corporeity; we are individuals in carrying out the movements of our living, our corporeal movements. Individuation – that means movements in a world which is not a mere sum of individuals, a world that has a nonindividual aspect, which is prior to the individual. As Kant glimpsed it in his conception of space and time as forms which need to be understood first if it is to become evident that there are particulars which belong to a unified reality. It is as corporeal that we are individual. In their corporeity, humans stand at the boundary between being, indifferent to itself and to all else, and existence in the sense of a pure relation to the totality of all there is. On the basis of their corporeity humans are not only the beings of distance but also the beings of proximity, rooted beings, not only innerworldly beings but also beings in the world.82 If the concepts of the body, and the world, are born in and as a kind of mutual embalming, wherein philosophy overlooks that upon which theology must ruminate, then Donne’s rumination is given as a constant, residual freak-out over the fleshliness that neither the body nor its theft, neither the concept of the body nor its juridico-philosophical withholding, can contain. Innerworldly beings’ bear but cannot bear Kafka’s “inmost intensity;” underworldly nonbeings bear questions made of a disembodiment Fanon finds unbearable. If the concept of body, and of world as some kind of collective epistemic body politic, amounts to some kind of mummified institutionality, it does so within the context of a constant speaking of corruption, a constant, self-directed charge of corruption that actually constitutes a kind of embalming. In this regard, anxiety over corruption preserves the body and, the body in, the world. We speak of our corrupt institutions so they can be reformed; to speak of our corrupt institutions is, in fact, to reform them. This is how the interplay of so-called public relations and so-called investigative reporting becomes pseudo-democratic self-congratulation, wherein the institution in question refuses to decay, to disintegrate, to deform. More precisely, what’s at stake is not the reform of institutions but the deformation of the institution as such. How will this have been enacted? Through something like militant preservation. But this is where it gets tricky – in the redoubling of corruption’s innumerable little edges. Corruption is the impairment of purity. Its roots are in a verb that means, to break. The routes of those roots are unmoored, mangrovic and immeasurable. One follows them to the entanglement of generativity and decay, then disappears. What if the very concepts of body and world are each the embalming of the other? What if militant preservation is inseparable from a kind of decay? Then we would have to be concerned not only with what corruption does to the institutionality that kills us, but also what it does for us in the name of preservation. *The paradox of political corruption is that it is the modality through which brutal institutionality is maintained. The paradox of biosocial corruption is that it constitutes the militant preservation of a general, generative capacity to differ and diffuse.* These paradoxes combine to gild the edge of corruption, turn it towards a gift, which was already double-edged, which we might wear, or don, as if it were the very fabric of our skin. Of all on that the juridic and the scientific depend and append, property is perhaps the most obvious and the least straightforward. It is obvious in the sense that it is something that is had but it is not straightforward because this having can take the form of an attribute (a quality) or an article (a target, an object, or a goal). Un-com-prehensible incompleteness misses both, as it signals how all that exists has as missing that part through which each and everything exists with/as/in something else. Propriety, as referring to a rule or a principle, necessarily recalls these two aspects of what is had, and undoing so, it hopelessly brings up that which has the having. Improvement, Harney and Moten offer, is very much contingent on that figure – Man, Subject, Human, or Humanity – whose parts proceed in such a way as to render it not only the embodiment of perfection, but the body/mind that is capable of bringing other existing things to perfection. That thing with property, that is, the juridic-economic figure taking precedence over any alternative description of existence is not, however, self-sufficient. For it has always depended on colonial juridic-economic architectures and the | All Incomplete racial ethic-symbolic arsenal, improvement itself, the quality and capacity said to distinguish has also always being contingent upon our impropriety.

#### We live in a new age of logistics, not one driven by exclusion, but endless access - the endless desire to fill jobs and expand the rhythm of work to every aspect of society. This pathological desire for work seeks endless control and the destruction of subjectivity.

Harney 1, Stefano. "Hapticality in the Undercommons." (2015): 332. (Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University)//Elmer + gord0

**The coming post-colonial nations must break not only with the negations of history, culture, and personality wrought by colonialism but also with the ‘rhythm of work’ imposed by the European model.** And he clarifies: No, there is no question of a return to Nature. **It is simply a very concrete question of not dragging men [people] towards mutilation, of not imposing upon the brain rhythms that very quickly obliterate it and wreck it. The** pretext of catching up must not be used to push man around, to tear him away from himself or from his privacy, to break and kill him. Here is that word ‘rhythm’ again. ‘Rhythms imposed on the brain’ this time, imposed by a drive to ‘catch up’**. Catching up was a phrase much circulated in the takeoff theories of capitalist development pushed by the United States in the Cold War.** But, Fanon points out, this catching up institutes a rhythm that ‘breaks’ and ‘kills’ man**. This is a rhythm that ‘tears man away from himself’, that ‘obliterates’ and ‘wrecks’ his brain**. Fanon uses the metaphor of the ‘caravan’ for an entire system that tears man away from himself. No, we do not want to catch up with anyone. What we want to do is to go forward all the time, night and day, in the company of Man, in the company of all men. **The caravan should not be stretched out, for in that case each line will hardly see those who precede it; and men who no longer recognize each other meet less and less together, and talk to each other less and less. The ‘caravan’, or what would come to be called globalization, or indeed what might be termed more precisely, logistics.** Notice that the caravan, a term of trade, is here transposed to a chain of work, a line, an assembly line with a rhythm that breaks and kills man. This is a pathological caravan that ‘tears apart the functions’ of man. It is a question of the Third World starting a new history of Man, a history which will have regard to the sometimes prodigious theses which Europe has put forward, but which will also not forget Europe’s crimes, of which the most horrible was committed in the heart of man, and consisted of the pathological tearing apart of his functions and the crumbling away of his unity. **Fanon reminds us here too of the ‘prodigious theses’, Marxism and the history of enlightenment thought. But it has not been enough to prevent ‘the most horrible crimes.’ These crimes are racism and colonialism but these crimes wrap another at the heart of the model – this ‘pathological tearing apart of his functions’, Fanon says. It is this rhythm of work, this pathological global caravan of work, that is not only at the heart but is the truth of the European model. Even if racism and colonialism cannot be reduced to the crime of slave, indentured, and colonial labour, this truth lies at the heart. The European model of domination,** Fanon reminds us in his conclusion, was to steal land and people not to support their mode of production as in past empires, but **to impose a new rhythm of work on a global scale, a global assembly line tearing apart the functions of man. Social** **Factory Of course, there is an important difference between the rhythm of work Fanon is describing and the historical institution of Fordist and Taylorist rhythms of the assembly line. The Fordist and Taylorist factory had an outside, however unstable and unjust. Control of cooperation at work was given up, but was supposed to return individually, at least for white men and settlers, in politics, in rights, and votes. In the European model imposed on the colonies, there was no return.** **The rhythm was all in factory, field, and mine, on the ship, the road, and the rail, in the shop and the house. Or at least, this was the system’s intent.** In this sense **the colony was the first social factory. Everywhere you went in the colony it was work, or else it was criminality.** And any other connection, any other line, was conspiracy. **No citizenship, no consumers, no land, nation, or culture, no outside. That was the regime, the rhythm.** Fanon feared post-colonial nations would keep the regime and merely erect the outside, with flags, anthems, and new ruling classes. Who can say he was wrong? But Fanon’s warning was more than a post-colonial critique of the idea of the outside. It was an analysis of the European model and its tendency towards producing this rhythm without an outside. **Indeed Fanon saw the colony as the first social factory, where worker replaces subject in society as a whole. In the colony, in the first social factory, any move to other social being was, as it is today, criminal, conspiratorial.** The only sound in the social factory is the rhythm of work because that is what takes place in a factory. This may sound surprising to say: that there are no subjects in the social factory or that the rhythm of work is omnipresent today. **We face millions without work or not enough work in the North and amongst the migrants from the Global South seeking to reach the North or in it without being of it. We are told that the future of work in both ‘developed’ and ‘emerging’ economies is subjective, creative, professional, and most of all managerial, not rhythmic.** And at any rate from more reliable sources like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2011) we understand that we are living in an era when immaterial labour – cognitive and affective labour - dominates and commands other forms of labour, even if factories and warehouses are still widespread. **But** **this should not make us deaf to the rhythm we hear no matter where we go, the rhythm that breaks and kills humans.** **We have heard a lot from business about how we can become entrepreneurial, or how we can transform ourselves into leaders, of how we can become responsible for our own careers. And again from our comrades we have received a more accurate picture: conceptions of the artist, the bohemian, the researcher and the performer have been twisted by business to make us work harder, to convince us we can fulfil ourselves through work.** Andrew Ross’s (2004) work is excellent here. **Christian Marazzi has written about the way our bodies are today a kind of constant capital, machines for which we are responsible, which we must upkeep because they are the site of production. He is right.** Franco Berardi (2009) speaks of the way our psyche and our souls descend into work as if engulfing our whole being, and Emma Dowling (2007) of the way even our affect is measured and managed, brought into metrics. It is easy to feel that work for those who have it is about the risk of having your subjectivity and your talents swallowed whole, about having your virtuosity consumed as Paolo Virno (2004) might put it. But a factory is neither a collection of machines nor a collections of workers however skilled, however virtuoso. A factory is a line.

#### Economic policy has become a question of Operations Management. There is no longer a distinction between in-here and out-there, the factory has become ingrained within us, the constant rhythm that controls our thoughts. Opportunity has become a façade for Control

Harney 2, Stefano. "Hapticality in the Undercommons." (2015): 332. (Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University)//Elmer + gord0

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Operations Management The area of management studies concerned with the factory is operations management. **Operations management has always been pretty clear about what a factory is, and however much it has expanded its understanding of the factory, this definition has not wavered. This is business ‘knowledge’, with all its ideological limits, but it can be helpful to our own considerations here. For operations management, the factory is the scene of a process.** This is process in the sense of **procession, procedure and movement**. Inputs go into the factory to move along a process, a line, and outputs come out of the factory. **Most importantly what machines and especially workers do, according to operations management, is work on the process not the product.** In contemporary operations management theory this has meant improving that process. This is often designated by the Japanese term ‘kaizen’ originally associated with workers and managers devoting themselves to the continuous improvement of the line’s efficiency in Toyota factories. Soon kaizen expanded throughout service, extraction, information, and other sectors. Rather than attention to the product, including the immaterial product, which remains as much as ever the purview of a small fraction of the workforce, most workers are subjected to increased attention to the ‘assembly’ line**. For management science, this is what a factory is: a line, a process, a procession, a movement, a rhythm through from inputs to outputs. For operations management metrics differ from management precisely because they measure progress on the line itself, the improvement of the process, an improvement which knows no end, and so unlike measurement, metrics move**. And this too is what the social factory is. Its name is accurate even if we have sometimes been distracted by everything from the propaganda of creative classes to the critical discourse of the precariat. The social factory is about making and remaking the line better and better. But that is not all. Kaizen has been accompanied by another development in the line. This is the extension of the management of inputs and outputs, of the extension to supply chains understood as part of the line, not just raw clusters of labour, natural resources and machines waiting outside the door of the factory. And with logistics and reverse logistics this line is expanding exponentially, or rather, algorithmically. **Logistics and supply chain management extend the metrics of line in both directions, towards inputs and outputs which now have their own work rhythms.** **Synaptic Labour** This algorithmically expanding line means the outside of the factory is measured like the inside, aligned with the processual inside. And when the factory is virtual, post-Fordist, a social factory, the algorithms of the line extend the **rhythm of production, of assembly across our lives.** The two meanings of assembly, or perhaps two modes of assembly, begin to merge; to assemble is both to come together and to make, anywhere, anytime. **But what is made when we assemble and reassemble is the line itself first and foremost, not a product or a service. And we might go so far to say, with Marx, the first thing we make is ourselves as the line, not as subjects.** This is our work today. We take inventories of ourselves for components not the whole. We produce lean efforts to transconduct. We look to overcome constraints. We define values through metrics. These are all terms from operations management but they describe work far better than recourse the discourse of subject formation. Creativity itself, supposedly at the heart of the battle for the subject today, is nothing but what operations management calls variance in the line, a variance that may lead to what is in turn called a kaizen event, an improvement, and is then assimilated back into an even more sophisticated line, which in turn demands more. **Today ours is primarily the labour of adapting and translating, being commensurate and flexible, being a conduit and receptacle, a port for information but also a conductor of information, a wire, a travel plug.** We channel affect towards new connections. We do not just keep the flow of meaning, information, attention, taste, desire, and fear moving, we improve this flow continuously. We must remain open and attuned to the rhythm of the line, to its merciless variances in rhythm. This is primarily a neurological labour, a synaptic labour of making contact to keep the line flowing, and creating innovations that help it flow in new directions and at new speeds. **The worker operates like a synapse, sparking new lines of assembly in life. And she does so anywhere and everywhere because the rhythm of the line is anywhere and everywhere. The worker extends synaptic rhythms in every direction, every circumstance. With synpatic work, it is access not subjects that the line wants, an access, as Denise Ferreira da Silva (2007) reminds us, was long at the heart of the abuse of the affected ones, the ones who granted access out of love, out of being, out of the consent not to be one, even before tha­­­­t granting was abused.**

#### This logistical imperative for the constant rhythm of controlled production yields a racialized speciation of all planetary existence which culminates in the destruction of the earth

**Moten and Harney ‘3** (Fred Moten, Professor of Performance Studies for the Tisch School of the Arts at NYU, PhD in English from UC Berkeley, 2020 MacArthur Genius Fellow, Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management for the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University, PhD in Social and Political Sciences from the University of Cambridge, co-founder of Ground Provisions—a curatorial collective, founder of the School for Study—a nomadic study collective, 2021, *All Incomplete*, pp 28-30) gz

What does it mean to stand for improvement? Or worse, to stand for what business calls **a ‘commitment to continuous improvement‘?** It **means** to stand for **the brutal speciation of all**. To take a stand for speciation is the beginning of a **diabolical usufruct**. **Improvement comes to us by way of an innovation in land tenure**, where **individuated ownership, derived from increasing the land’s productivity, is given in the perpetual**, and thus arrested, becoming of exception’s miniature. This is to say that from the outset, **the ability to own** – and that ability’s first derivative, **self-possession** – **is entwined with the ability to make more productive**. In order to be improved, to be rendered more productive, **land must be violently reduced to its productivity**, which is the **regulatory diminishment and management of earthly generativity**. Speciation is this general **reduction of the earth to productivity** and **submission of the earth to techniques of domination** that isolate and enforce particular increases in and accelerations of **productivity**. In this regard, (necessarily European) man, in and as the exception, imposes speciation upon himself, in an operation that **extracts and excepts himself from the earth** in order to confirm his supposed **dominion over it**. And just as **the earth must be forcefully speciated to be possessed**, man must **forcefully speciate himself** in order to enact this kind of possession. This is to say that **racialization is present in the very idea of dominion over the earth**; in the very idea and enactment of the exception; **in the very nuts and bolts of possession-by-improvement**. Forms of racialization that both Michel Foucault and, especially and most vividly, Robinson identify in medieval Europe become *usufructed* with modern possession through improvement. Speciated humans are **endlessly improved** through the **endless work** they do on their **endless way to becoming Man**. This is the usufruct of man. In early modern England, establishing title to land by making it more productive meant **eliminating biodiversity** and isolating and breeding a species – barley or rye or pigs. Localized ecosystems were aggressively transformed so that **monocultural productivity smothers anacultural generativity**. **The emergent relation between speciation and racialization is the very conception and conceptualization of the settler**. Maintenance of that relation is his vigil and his eve. For the encloser, possession is established through improvement – this is true for the possession of land and for the possession of self. **The Enlightenment is the universalization/ globalization of the imperative to possess and its corollary, the imperative to improve**. However, this productivity must always confront its contradictory impoverishment: the **destruction of its biosphere** and its **estrangement in, if not from, entanglement**, both of which combine to ensure **the liquidation of the human differential that is already present in the very idea of man, the exception**. To stand for such improvement is to **invoke policy**, which attributes depletion to the difference, which is to say the wealth, **whose simultaneous destruction and accumulation policy is meant to operationalize**. **This attribution of a supposedly essential lack**, an inevitable and supposedly natural diminution, is achieved alongside **the imposition of possession-by-improvement**. **To make policy is to impose speciation upon everybody and everything, to inflict impoverishment in the name of improvement, to invoke the universal law of the usufruct of man**. In this context, continuous improvement, as it emerged with decolonization and particularly with the defeat of national capitalism in the 1970s, is the continuous crisis of speciation in the surround of the general antagonism. This is the contradiction Robinson constantly invoked and analyzed with the kind of profound and solemn optimism that comes from being with, and being of service to, your friends.

#### A right to strike is not neutral but an active incorporation into systems of Debt and Credit that sustains Logistics – work to pay off your debts to society and gain credit. This process of Financialization, recuperating systems of value through racialized labor, containerizes individuals as commodities to ensure maximum productivity via governance

Moten and Harney 4 Fred Moten and Stefano Harney March 2010 "Debt and Study" <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/14/61305/debt-and-study/> (Stefano Harney is the Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University., Fred Moten is the professor of Performance Studies at New York University and has taught previously at University of California, Riverside, Duke University, Brown University, and the University of Iowa)//Elmer + gord0

Debt and Governance **We hear them say that what’s wrong with you is your bad debt. You’re not working. You fail to pay your debt to society. You have no credit, but that is to be expected. You have bad credit, and that is fine. But bad debt is a problem—debt seeking only other debt, detached from creditors, fugitive from restructurin**g. Destructuring debt, now that’s wrong. But even still, what’s wrong with you can be fixed. First we give you a chance—**that’s called governance, a chance to be interested, or even disinterested. That’s policy. Or if you are still wrong, still bad, we give you policy. Bad debt is senseless, which is to say it cannot be perceived by the senses of capital.** But therapy is available. Governance wants to reconnect your debt to the outside world. You are on the spectrum, the capitalist spectrum of interests. You are the wrong end. Your bad debt looks unconnected, autistic, in its own world. But you can be developed. **You can get credit after all. The key is to have interests. Tell us what you want. Tell us what you want and we can help you get it, on credit. We can lower the rate so you can take interest. We can raise the rate so you will pay attention. But we can’t do it alone. Governance only works when you work, when you tell us what you want, when you invest your interests back in debt and credit.** Governance is the therapy of your interests, and your interests will bring your credit back. You will have an investment, even in debt. And governance will gain new senses, new perceptions, new advances into the world of bad debt, new victories in the war on those without interests, those who will not speak for themselves, participate, identify their interests, invest, inform, demand credit. Go**vernance does not seek credit. It does not seek citizenship, although it is often understood to do so. Governance seeks debt, debt that will seek credit. Governance cannot not know what might be shared, what might be mutual, what might be common. Why award credit, why award citizenship? Only debt is productive, only debt makes credit possible, only debt allows credit to rule. Productivity always precedes rule,** even if the students of governance do not understand this, and even if governance itself barely does. But rule does come, and today it is called policy, the reign of precarity. And who knows where it will hit you, some creditor walking by you on the street. You keep your eyes down but he makes policy anyway, smashes anything you have conserved, any bad debt you are smuggling. **Your life reverts to vicious chance, to arbitrary violence, a new credit card, a new car loan, torn from those who hid you, ripped from those with whom you shared bad debt. They don’t hear from you again.**

#### The Economy is logistics. Rhetoric of uplift and improvement through government jobs creates the trope of the self-sufficient subject that sustains Logistics. This is a self-fulfilling prophesy, whose eternal growth and mastery over the world drives it to render all violence as justified ensuring environmental destruction, global war, and genocide

Harney et Al 3 (, Stefano, Cuppini, Niccolò, and Mattia Frapporti. "Logistics Genealogies: A Dialogue with Stefano Harney." Social Text 36.3 (136) (2018): 95-110. (Niccolo Cuppini is a PhD University of Applied Sciences and Arts of Southern Switzerland · Department of Business Economics, Health and Social Care (DEASS), Mattia Frapporti is a PhD in Economics at the University of Bologna)//Elmer + gord0

Amidst these prefiguring’s, however, something also starts to emerge — something Du Buois would teach us about as he came to understand the global color line. (I recommend the unmatched work of Nahum Chandler on Du Buois here.) **These global supply chains and the way they are labored, most especially by African slave labor, by the motley crew, and by indentured colonial labor, produced a new kind of collectivity that runs not only along those lines but along and across the ones collectively forged insight from these lines — the archive of curves, swerves, revisions, and improvisations of logisticality**. This is Nadia Ellis’s being “at large.” And of course, we hear an echo of criminality in the notion of being at large, uncaptured, escaped. **The lines and the curves mean such collective being can show up anywhere. Collectivity at large, logisticality, produces the generalized fears of blackness, of communism, of queerness. Being at large along these lines means “they could be anywhere.” Yet against these possibilities the beginnings of the factory also mark a frightening new development with which we still live and against which we must still ­fight**. As I mentioned, Fred and I have adapted that term usufruct to talk about this coming together at the end of the eighteenth century of **two kinds of improvement — economic improvement and especially the improvement of property, including human property — and self-improvement, especially the quest to prove one can improve oneself and by so doing be quali­fied to supervise the improvement of property and of others.** The **rise of this self-improving “subject” who needs only himself to improve, to be self-authoring, self-suf­ficient is truly a genocidal and geocidal ­gure**. This ­figure has been threatening since the birth of European colonialism, but he was initially guided by anti-Moor Christianity then and thus not self-improving, as only God can improve someone, though this makes the ­figure no less brutal in his way. But he really takes hold with the combination of improvement in commercial and plantation agriculture and the improvement ideologies of the Enlightenment**. And then he becomes the factory owner. His claims to self-suff­iciency, to being self-made, are as ludicrous and as dangerous as the idea that the colonial fort was sovereign and self-suffi­cient.** Of course, it relied on the land and people it was built to attack continuously for their resources**. So, too, with this self- made, self-improving bourgeois subject — he too requires massive resources to pronounce himself self-suff­icient, resources he can never acknowledge. Beyond all the social reproductive labor of women, children, the elders, and servants, he requires these supply chains and the labor on them, and the assembly line and all the labor on that, and behind this the massive exploitation of the earth upon which that system is based, monocrop destruction of biospheres, mining, et cetera.** That’s the “self- suf­ficient” bourgeois subject, the entrepreneur, and with his “democratization,” as Angela Mitropolous says, through what Du Buois calls democratic despotism “he and his” confront us still with genocidal and geocidal consequences. Of course the proliferation of these modern subjects chases the logisticality of those who reject the idea of the individuation all around the globe. Thus, the situation is more volatile than ever worldwide. **Continuous improvement only barely “holds the line” against continuous revolution.**

#### Thus, we affirm that the Under commons ought to provide haptic jobs as a mean to strike.

#### This is a process of Haptic care, understanding our mutual indebtedness to each other is a just m oment of reflection. Instead of abiding by the rules of financialization pre-figured by the resolution’s call for state care, we affirm communal care. Caring for each other no matter what, no matter who. You should “feel at home with the homeless, at ease with the fugitive, at peace with the pursed”. This feeling is the Undercommons.

Harney and Moten 5 (Harney, Stefano, and Fred Moten. "The undercommons: Fugitive planning and black study." (2013): 1. Pgs 87-91 (Stefano Harney is the Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University., Fred Moten is the professor of Performance Studies at New York University and has taught previously at University of California, Riverside, Duke University, Brown University, and the University of Iowa)//Elmer

Never being on the right side of the Atlantic is an unsettled feeling, the feeling of a thing that unsettles with others. It’s a feeling, if you ride with it, that produces a certain distance from the settled, from those who determine themselves in space and time, who locate themselves in a determined history. To have been shipped **is to have been moved** **by others, with others**. It is to feel at home with the homeless, at ease with the fugitive, at peace with the pursued, at rest with the ones who consent not to be one. Outlawed, interdicted, intimate things of the hold, containerized contagion, logistics externalizes logic itself to reach you, but this is not enough to get at the social logics, the social poesis, **running through logisticality**. Because while certain abilities – to connect, to translate, to adapt, to travel – were forged in the experiment of hold, they were not the point. As David Rudder sings, “how we vote is not how we party.” The hold’s terrible gift was to gather dispossessed feelings in common, to create a new feel in the undercommons. Previously, this kind of feel was only an exception, **an aberration, a shaman, a witch, a seer, a poet amongst others**, who felt through others, through other things. Previously, except in these instances, feeling was mine or it was ours. But in the hold, in the undercommons of a new feel, another kind of feeling became common. Tis form of feeling was not collective, not given to decision, not adhering or reattaching to settlement, nation, state, territory or historical story; nor was it repossessed by the group, which could not now feel as one, reunified in time and space. No, when Black Shadow sings “are you feelin’ the feelin?’’ he is asking about something else. He is asking about a way of feeling through others, a **feel for feeling others feeling you**. Tis is modernity’s insurgent feel, its inherited caress, its skin talk, tongue touch, breath speech, hand laugh. Tis is the feel that no individual can stand, and no state abide. This is the feel we might call hapticality. Hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, the interiority of sentiment, the feel that what is to come is here. Hapticality, the capacity to feel though others, for others to feel through you, for you to feel them feeling you, this feel of the shipped is not regulated, at least not successfully, by a state, a religion, a people, an empire, a piece of land, a totem. Or perhaps we could say these are now recomposed in the wake of the shipped. To feel others is unmediated, immediately social, amongst us, our thing, and even when we recompose religion, it comes from us, and even when we recompose race, we do it as race women and men. Refused these things, we first refuse them, in the contained, amongst the contained, lying together in the ship, the boxcar, the prison, the hostel. Skin, against epidermalisation, senses touching. Thrown together touching each other we were denied all sentiment, denied all the things that were supposed to produce sentiment, family, nation, language, religion, place, home. Tough forced to touch and be touched, to sense and be sensed in that space of no space, though refused sentiment, history and home, we feel (for) each other. A feel, a sentiment with its own interiority, there on skin, soul no longer inside but there for all to hear, for all to move. **Soul music is a medium of this interiority on the skin, its regret the lament for broken hapticality, its self-regulatory powers the invitation to build sentimentality together again, feeling each other again, how we party**. This is our hapticality, our love. This is love for the shipped, love as the shipped. There’s a touch, a feel you want more of, which releases you. The closest Marx ever got to the general antagonism was when he said “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need” but we have read this as the possession of ability and the possession of need. What if we thought of the experiment of the hold as the absolute fluidity, the informality, of this condition of need and ability? What if ability and need were in constant play and we found someone who dispossessed us so that this movement was our inheritance. Your love makes me strong, your love makes me weak. What if “the between the two,” the lost desire, the articulation, was this rhythm, this inherited experiment of the shipped in the churning waters of flesh and expression that could **grasp by letting go ability** and need in constant recombination. If he moves me, sends me, sets me adrift in this way, amongst us in the undercommons. So long as she does this, she does not have to be.

#### The Role of the Judge is to affirm Debate as an act of Planning, not Policy – instead of forcing normative outcomes via spaces of study, you should affirm acts of self-preservation within political spaces

Greer 18, G. H. "Who Needs the Undercommons? Refuge and Resistance in Public High Schools." Brock Education: A Journal of Educational Research and Practice 28.1 (2018): 5-18. (Concordia University (Canada), Art Education Department, Graduate Student.)//Elmer

Planning While study in the undercommons is a sociality that provides **refuge, joy, and resilience**, planning is the ongoing process of resistance which protects study. In the terms of complexity theory, planning creates the conditions for study to emerge. Planning defends study, for example, by attending **to methods**, when economic forces are oriented toward outcomes. In such a case, study thrives in the fascination required to build a car from scratch but is extinguished by a production line. Planning may then take the form of activism against the process of de-skilling workers. Generally, study is in trouble where labour is detached from purpose, discovery, and agency; and planning poses resistance to such divisions. Resistance may take a passive form like absenteeism or an active form like student strikes; it is an ongoing social experiment. The subjects of difference who inhabit the undercommons initiate planning in support of further difference: “planning in the undercommons is not an activity, not fishing or dancing or teaching or loving, but the ceaseless experiment with the future presence of the forms of life that make such activities possible” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 74). Importantly, “[p]lanning is self-sufficiency at the social level, and it reproduces in its experiment not just what it needs, life, but what it wants, life in difference…” (p. 76). Planning resists the austerity of conformity. Difference may bring the concept of diversity to mind for social justice educators. There are a number of distinctions between the difference that propels planning in the undercommons and diversity as it is understood in the field of education. Social justice education organized around diversity involves “eliminating the injustice created when differences are sorted and ranked in a hierarchy that unequally confers power…” (Adams, Bell, Goodman, & Joshi, 2016, p. 3, emphasis in original). In this sense, equitable diversity is an end goal that is, significantly, often supported by the implementation of policy. Planning, on the other hand, is a process, rather than an outcome, that resists policy, as explained below. Planning appears distorted, if at all, **from the commons where the rules are made**: “Because from the perspective of **policy it is too dark in there, in** the black **heart of the undercommons, to see**” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 79). Planning may become invisible or **appear criminal in the light**. Historical examples of such distortions are plentiful. The Freedom Riders were planning in 1961, boarding buses into their own brutalization to desegregate the southern United States; in the light of curricular history, Freedom Riders disappear and are replaced by parliamentary motions. There was planning at the Stonewall Riots in June of 1969 when homeless queer kids led by trans women of colour revolted against police brutality; the political necessity of Stonewall disappears in the parade lights of Pride every year on its own anniversary. Planning made visible but distorted is apparent in current events in the criminalization of self-preservation: from immigration (Ackerman & Furman, 2013), to activism (Matthews & Cyril, 2017; Alonso, Barcena, & Gorostidi, 2013), to panhandling (Chesnay, 2013). Educators who wish to see the planning of the undercommons, or to make it visible to students, must research to discover the exclusions of curriculum. When we include stories like the Stonewall Riots or the Freedom Riders in our teaching, we offer a connection to students who see their lives reflected therein. Stories of resistance to injustice, particular to local contexts, are important educational resources. In addition to these, pedagogical models which support the development and scholastic direction, of planning skills among students include: problem-based learning (Walker, Leary, Hmelo-Silver, & Ertmer, 2015), choice-based art education (Douglas, & Jaquith, 2009), critical media literacy (Funk, Kellner, & Share, 2016), and anti-oppressive education (Kumashiro, 2000). Policy From the perspective of the undercommons, policy inevitably conflicts with the forms of study and planning described above. Policy is the **instrument of efficiency**; it seeks measurable, predictable outcomes. The immeasurable social experiments and emerging differences of planning and study cannot be reconciled with administrative control as exercised through policy. Policy from the perspective of the undercommons operates under three rules. First, it diagnoses planners as problematic and prescribes itself as the solution; “This is the first rule of policy. It **fixes others**” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 78). Second, policy requires the participation of planners in the fixing of themselves; “Participating in change is the second rule of policy.” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 80). In this way, participantsimplicate themselvesin order to fulfill the third rule of policy: that “wrong participation” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 81) provokes all manner of crises. If there is no crisis then the participant is fixed and may be deputised in order to fix others. More commonly, any crisis at all proves that policy was right about the planners all along; and of course, they were bound to fail. The circular logic of policy as viewed from the undercommons reflects what Spade (2015) calls administrative violence. Spade (2015) details a story which I relate here to clarify the operations of policy. Bianca, a trans girl, was sent home from her high school in 1999 for wearing clothing that affirmed her gender. She was not allowed to return to her classes. Bianca’s parents called the school and received no response. Spade met Bianca in 2002 when she was homeless, unemployed, and attempting to leave an abusive relationship. Bianca had enrolled in a welfare work program but was outed as a trans woman by her male identification (ID). She was subsequently harassed and forced to quit, losing her income and making her ineligible for Medicaid. She became homeless, and because of her male ID she was barred from women’s shelters and fearful of further abuse at shelters for men. Without an address, medical benefits, or an income Bianca was unable to complete the process to correct her ID and could not afford the hormone treatments that allowed her to maintain a feminine appearance. Bianca’s ability to pass as a cisgender woman protected her on the street from further harassment by both the public and the police. In order to afford hormone injections, Bianca engaged in sex work. The injections were not regulated because they had to be obtained illegally which placed Bianca at increased risk of infection by HIV, hepatitis, and other diseases. Although Bianca’s story is not recent, the factors that contributed to her difficulties are relevant: transgender youth are still significantly over-represented in groups of early school leavers, homeless youth, and survivors of violence (Morton et al., 2018; Keuroghlian, Shtasel, & Bassuk, 2014). In the language of the undercommons Bianca planned to survive by expressing her gender, but this plan was subverted by school policy, causing her not to graduate and significantly reducing her prospects for employment. Following the first rule of policy according to the undercommons, Bianca’s school would not accept her attendance until she fixed her gender. Bianca then followed the second rule of policy and made attempts to become a participant. She tried to stay at shelters and enrolled in a social welfare work program. In each of these cases, she experienced the crisis of harassment. Following the third rule of policy, these crises were framed as the result of Bianca’s wrong participation: she did not have the right identification. For survival, Bianca must then become a fugitive by engaging in criminalized activity: sex work and the illegal procurement of hormones. In an educational context, considering policy, according to The Undercommons, pushes educators to ask how the rules in our schools create, rather than respond to, fugitivity among students. Fugitivity Being a fugitive according to The Undercommons means being marked as an outsider. Fugitivity happens to people when: first they act, and second policy outlaws those actions. But fugitivity must also be embraced. Those who refuse the rules of policy, as outlined above, become fugitive. Fugitives will not be fixed, refuse to participate, and deny responsibility for the crises that befall them. Fugitivity recognises systemic racism, classism, ableism, and cis/heteronormativity in the disallowance of demographic-specific behaviour. It is fugitive sociality that composes the undercommons in order to provide refuge and resistance. In high schools, the undercommons provides social refuge in the form of patient listening and covert smiles to: hat wearing, cell phone texting, hall running, affection displaying, fugitive students; and granola bar giving, grade fudging, student failing, smiling before Christmas, fugitive teachers. These now-fugitive activities are planning behaviours, they sustain study for those that commit them. These things have been happening since before policy determined that education is a predictable and measurable thing. Fugitive planners generate study with unforeseeable ends and immeasurable learning. Turning planners into fugitives has some effects: ease of administration and evaluation is one; the reinforcement of unjust hierarchies is another.

#### The role of the collaborative negation and what our spaces provide for haptic Strikes appear not as isolated events proven by Nei Mongol, Wild Cat Strikes, Black Kaizen in Detroit, Black Bear Ranch, Korean insurgencies, and PCI action that provided fugitive scenarios that created a wake to the disorganizing of capital

**Moten and Harney ‘6** (Fred Moten, Professor of Performance Studies for the Tisch School of the Arts at NYU, PhD in English from UC Berkeley, 2020 MacArthur Genius Fellow, Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management for the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University, PhD in Social and Political Sciences from the University of Cambridge, co-founder of Ground Provisions—a curatorial collective, founder of the School for Study—a nomadic study collective, 2021, *All Incomplete*,)//Joey

If the increase in Japanese industrial productivity is essentially fictive, so too is the ascendancy of quality. The oil shocks of 1973 and 1978 – part of a complex class struggle in the oil-producing regions, as the Midnight Notes Collective teach us – coincide not with the more reliable, higher quality Japanese durable goods that are supposed to be the products of a management miracle, but with cheaper cars that have better fuel efficiency. These cheaper cars appear amidst another class struggle not unrelated to the one in the oil fields. It is here that we can pick up the thread of operations management, especially ‘quality control,’ and its latent power as a class weapon. For while there is no evidence that total quality management was in any way responsible for the Japanese miracle, it was a useful tool in disciplining a collectivist insurgency in Japanese labor. Moreover, in the 1970s with the final breakdown of productivity deals in the United States, amid **wildcat strikes** and the rise of organizations like the League of **Revolutionary Black Workers** in Detroit’s auto industry, American management was looking for a new form of control. It is here that the failed management theory of Deming and company, burnished by the rise, for very different reasons, of competition in the car, electronics, and machine industries with Japan, finally had its day. This capacity to think and represent the inability to stave off errancy in the human, **to regulate** and manage **black and inhuman flaw**, is what makes us want to think Van Peebles and his ante-hero Jeff Gerber as a precursor to the Kafka we propose, who offers us a picture of Gregor’s anti-heroic condition as, in part, an inability to claim a certain monstrosity, an accession rather than a resistance to or refusal of total access. Is there a difference between Gregor and that sassy, all but sapphirically watermelon mannishness – in which one wakes up and realizes that he is not insofar as he is black, which blackness he has been trying to allay in a strenuous regime of constant improvement, so that Gerber is revealed as someone who’s been passing all along? Watermelon Man, whose self-improvement breaks down seemingly under its own weight, as if he literally sweated away his own makeup, his own capacity to keep (self-)making up for something, given in and as a whiteface that practically teases us with its audacious visual failure, doesn’t die alone in the room that is no longer, but has also never been, his own; rather, he enters into black sociality, walking into the blues with a drink in his hand. In *The Metamorphosis* we propose, Gregor will have realized he was a monster all along thereby claiming, which is to say radicalizing, the status of the shipped, the sold, in a general **refusal** and suspension of, a general strike against, calculation. The brain, **in**/and its **synapses**, is just another bad concept, a brutal conceptualization – by way of body, its spatiotemporal constitution, and its attendant metaphysics of the possessive individual self in networked relationality – of held flesh. What is valued is work directed toward the improvement of the flow, and in the social factory the flow of the line can run anywhere, and we must enter its streams. The pathway to the lived experience of impossible individuation goes through rigid conformity, whose severed, separate performances are strictly accounted for. School is where the social contract is taken out on kids. In good schools, network’s eclipse of contact is enacted with great efficiency; in bad schools, an experiment might happen, either accidentally, where networks and the networked don’t apply, or under the protection of an idea of the alternative. The loss of empathy in the submission of the social to the contractual ought only ever make us want to ask, can there be cybernetic bruise? Cybernetic caress? Cybernetic sensation? This we do in remembrance of the general antagonism and the general strike we keep all but enacting, **recognizing** that these questions arise not from the fact of new **computational hardware** but rather from the values that animate old computational software – a spiritless theory of mind/hand coordination manifest most clearly in the reduction of reverent touch to instrumental grasp. It’s not that touch is nonviolent. It’s that we need lovingly to return such violence from resource improvement back to its multiple sources. We want to intensify our thoughtful feel of bad complicity in the interest of its brush against the good so that no one can ever say, ‘Watch me make my own way through this bullshit.’ The record shows, no one can take the blows and remain intact in the effort to remain intact, which is only given in the taking of the blows. If we want to fight for the good, we have to overturn the bad rather than navigate it by ourselves in crowded loneliness. It’s all nappy and out of all compass – dread, naught, knotty, naughty, dred as worn cover and rent vessel. The oldness, the oldheadedness of the people, is given in their recognition and refusal of this turbulence we go through. There, they study what also can’t be there. It’s like a band straining against development, trying to make a music that studies it while avoiding it. Is there a point where you can’t go on indefinitely? Is that space limited or unlimited? The broken document of a workshop that breaks out into poetry by breaking from the crafting of poems is a concert film. The record of thoughtful play becomes a play. The act of emplotting yourself in time and space is – perhaps paradoxically at first – also the act of being all but nowhere. That spot you mapped is dimensionless. It cannot be found precisely because your act claims that the point you will have occupied is universal, the abstract point every individual can and must make and from which humanity becomes possible, with and through and in which the human finds himself. And because it is nowhere, its relationship to place is, in fact, one of impunity. It is this impunity that founds modern morality and the idea of responsibility or sustainability which this act of impunity then hires as its security detail. Can there be a better description of the human: the being who lives with impunity on the earth and is sorry about it? So, the question of what has happened can be taken with the question of what will happen in a way for which normative ethical questioning makes room. Against this abstract preparation for the victory of reason over its rivals, this tilting of the board toward one point, there is a way to live history and place that is not part of the humanization, that is to say racialization, of our earth and its reduction to world, its degradation of its means to mere logistical ends and its forfeit of sharing to mere ownership, all of which require and are instantiated by emplotment and its rule(r). Amiri Baraka calls this entanglement of history and place “place/meant” and we hear him, now, through M. NourbeSe Philip’s amplification of “dis place,” as if he meant for that errant and supplemental “a” to signify a movement of and in place, a radical and irreducible movement that **constitutes** our **undercommon indigeneity**, our shared, native, ante-natal turning out of (re)turn.71 If emplotment is how we give up the undercommons for a common grave, then dis place/meant is how we find and mark the surrealistic spot. The intensity of the trouble lies in that shit like this happens amongst *us*, the good people of every rotten, brutal, delusional nation-state. Every single person who isn’t really one, and knows why they aren’t and can’t really be one, means well when they speak for those for whom such personhood was less an object of desire and more a ghostly matter to beware and avoid and destroy. Hell, we mean well right now, hoping there’s something in what we say that pierces what we assume in saying it. It’s just that such hope is nothing without practice, such faith is nothing without work, without toil, without that constant, active, undergrounding labor whose by-product will have been our disappearance. This is the content of Cabral’s prophetic description. He sharpens the weapon of theory for us so that we can cut through theory and ourselves. He gives us a chance to see more clearly that the competing chauvinisms of native and immigrant, when the color line constitutes the interdiction of their convergence, obscures intra-diasporic, intra- and international class warfare in every outpost and refuge of Afrodiasporic life. The lives and struggles of Negro toilers remain to be thought, and inhabited, as the unswerving apposition of the unthought, the unhabitants’ fugitive deconstruction of world and reconstruction of earth. The weapon of theory lets us see through to the social lens we want to see through when we are Negro toilers, too.79

#### Philosophical Cosmopolitics are a priori – Accelerating the drive of the Anthropocene as well as technology predicated on recursive Empires throughout the university

**Hui ‘17** (Yuk Hui. Kaizen event author. “Cosmotechnics as Cosmopolitics”. https://www.e-flux.com/journal/86/161887/cosmotechnics-as-cosmopolitics/.)//Joey

The end of unilateral globalization and the arrival of the Anthropocene force us to talk about cosmopolitics. These two factors correlate with one another and correspond to two different senses of the word “cosmopolitics”: cosmopolitics as a commercial regime, and cosmopolitics as a politics of nature. Second, the human species on earth is confronting the crisis of the Anthropocene. The earth and the cosmos have been transformed into a gigantic technological system, the culmination of the epistemological and methodological rupture which we call modernity. The loss of the cosmos is the end of metaphysics in the sense that we no longer perceive anything behind or beyond the perfection of science and technology. When historians like Rémi Brague and Alexandre Koyré write about end of the cosmos in seventeen- and eighteenth-century Europe, this should be read in our present Anthropocene context as an invitation to develop a cosmo-politics, not only in the sense of cosmopolitanism but also in the sense of a politics of the cosmos. In response to this invitation, I would like to suggest that in order to develop such a cosmopolitics it is necessary to elucidate the question of cosmotechnics. I have been developing this concept of cosmotechnics in order to reopen the question of technology by undoing certain translations that were driven by the search for equivalence during modernization. This problematization can be presented in terms of a Kantian antinomy: Thesis: Technology is an anthropological universal, understood as an exteriorization of memory and the liberation of organs, as some anthropologists and philosophers of technology have formulated it; In order to elaborate the relation between cosmotechnics and cosmopolitics, I will divide this article into three parts. First, I will demonstrate how the Kantian concept of cosmopolitics is rooted in Kant’s concept of nature. In the second part, I situate the “multi-naturalism” proposed by the “ontological turn” in anthropology as a different cosmopolitics, one which, in contrast to Kant’s pursuit of the universal, suggests a certain relativism as the condition of possibility for coexistence. In the third part, I will try to show why it is necessary to move from cosmology to cosmotechnics as a politics to come. §1. Cosmopolitanism: Between Nature and Technology The main difficulty of all cosmopolitics is the reconciliation between the universal and the particular. The universal tends to contemplate the particulars from above, as in the way that Kant regarded the French Revolution, like a spectator considering a violent piece of theater from the mezzanine. Universality is the view of a spectator, never that of an actor. Kant writes, in his “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim”: There is no other way out for the philosopher—who, regarding human beings and their play in the large, cannot at all presuppose any rational aim of theirs—than to try whether he can discover an aim of nature in this nonsensical course of things human; from which aim a history in accordance with a determinate plan of nature might nevertheless be possible even of creatures who do not behave in accordance with their own plan … [Nature] did produce a Kepler, who subjected the eccentric paths of the planets in an unexpected way to determinate laws, and a Newton, who explained these laws from a universal natural cause. In Beyond Culture and Nature, Descola has proposed an ontological pluralism that is irreducible to social constructivism. He suggests that recognizing these ontological differences can serve as an antidote to the dominance of naturalism since the advent of European modernity. But does this focus on nature (or the cosmos, we might say) in the interest of opposing European naturalism actually revive the enchantment of nature, this time in the name of indigenous knowledge? This seems to be a hidden problem with the ontological-turn movement: many anthropologists associated with the ontological turn have focused on the question of nature and the politics of the nonhuman (largely animals, plants, minerals, spirits, and the dead). This is evident when we recall that Descola proposes to call his discipline an “anthropology of nature.” Furthermore, this tendency also suggests that the question of technics is not sufficiently addressed in the ontological-turn movement. For example, Descola talks often of practice, which may indicate his (laudable) desire to avoid an opposition between nature and technics; but by doing so, he also obscures the question of technology. Descola shows that analogism, rather than naturalism, was a significant presence in Europe during the Renaissance; if this is the case, the “turn” that took place during European modernity seems to have resulted in a completely different ontology and epistemology. If naturalism has succeeded in dominating modern thought, it is because such a peculiar cosmological imagination is compatible with its techno-logical development: nature should be mastered for the good of man, and it can indeed be mastered according to the laws of nature. Or put another way: nature is regarded as the source of contingency due to its “weakness of concept,” and therefore it has to be overcome by logic. These oppositions between nature and technics, mythology and reason, give rise to various illusions that belong to one of two extremes. On the one hand, there are rationalists or “progressivists” who hysterically struggle to maintain their monotheism after having murdered god, wishfully believing that the world process will stamp out differences and diversities and lead to a “theodicy.” On the other hand, there are left intellectuals who feel the need to extol indigenous ontology or biology as a way out of modernity. A French revolutionary thinker recently described this situation thus: A funny thing to see these days is how all these absurd modern leftists, all unable to see anything, all lost in themselves, all feeling so bad, all desperately trying to exist and to find their existence in the eyes of the Other—how all these people are jumping on the “savage,” the “indigenous,” the “traditional” in order to escape and not face themselves. I am not speaking of being critical towards one’s “whiteness,” towards one’s “modernism.” I am talking of the ability to peer inside [transpercer] oneself. My refusal of the above two extremes does not come out of any postcolonial “political correctness,” but rather out of an attempt to go beyond postcolonialism’s critique. (Indeed, I have elsewhere reproached postcolonialism for its failure to tackle the question of technology.) I hold the thesis that an ontological pluralism can only be realized by reflecting on the question of technology and a politics of technology. Kant was aware of the importance of technology in his comment on trading as communication; however, he didn’t pay much attention to the technological difference that finally led to planetary modernization, and now planetary computation, since what was at stake for him was the question of the whole that absorbs all differences. Kant criticized the impolite guests, the greedy colonizers who brought with them “oppression of the native inhabitants, the incitement of the different states involved to expansive wars, famine, unrest, faithlessness, and the whole litany of evils that weigh upon the human species.” Commenting on the defense strategies of China and Japan, Kant said that both countries have wisely, limited such interaction. Whereas the former has allowed contact with, but not entrance to its territories, the latter has allowed this contact to only one European people, the Dutch, yet while doing so it excludes them, as if they were prisoners, from associating with the native inhabitants. When Kant wrote this in 1795, it was too early for him to anticipate the modernization and colonization that would take place in Japan and China. If this phase of globalization was able to take place, it was because of the technological advancement of the West, which allowed it to defeat the Japanese, the Chinese, and other Asian civilizations. Nature, the guarantee of perpetual peace, didn’t really lead us to perpetual peace but rather to wars and more wars. To appeal for a cosmopolitanism today, I think we must reread Kant’s cosmopolitanism according to the process of modernization and revisit the question of nature and technology anew. The arrival of modern technology in non-European countries in recent centuries has created a transformation unthinkable to European observers. The restoration of “indigenous natures” itself has to first be questioned, not because it doesn’t exist but because it is situated in a new epoch and is transformed to the extent that there is hardly any way to go back and restore it.