### T – A

#### **Interpretation – “A” is an indefinite article**

CCC ND (Capital Community College Foundation; No Date Given; <http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles>; *“Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”*; accessed 7/22/20; Capital Community College Foundation, a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation) RC/HB

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun) The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..). We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class.

#### Violation – they specify [x]

#### Vote neg for Limits and Ground -- they justify tiny affs out of the more than 170 countries which explodes neg research burden and skirts neg offense – Causes the neg to be pigeonholed into generics every round.

#### Potential abuse should be rejected because everything could be potentially abusive and theory solves aff ground because if the PIC can’t be beat, it probably skews aff strategy and limits clash.

#### Paradigm issues:

#### 1] Use competing interps – Reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention bc we don’t know ur bs meter

#### 2] No RVI’s – they are illogical because you shouldn’t win for meeting the burden of being fair and encourage baiting that allows the 1ar to collapse to the RVI.

#### 3] Drop the Debater on Topicality – they should be tied to their advocacy and being T is an aff burden.

### CP – ICJ

#### [Actor] should request the International Court of Justice issue an advisory opinion over whether they ought to establish an unconditional right to strike. [Actor] should abide by the outcome of the advisory opinion.

#### Solves – the ICJ will rule in favor of an unconditional right to strike.

Seifert ’18 (Achim; Professor of Law at the University of Jena, and adjunct professor at the University of Luxembourg; December 2018; “The protection of the right to strike in the ILO: some introductory remarks”; CIELO Laboral; http://www.cielolaboral.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/seifert\_noticias\_cielo\_n11\_2018.pdf; Accessed: 11-3-2021; AU)

The **recognition of a right to strike** in the legal order of the **International Labour Organization** (ILO) is probably one of the most controversial questions in international labor law. Since the foundation of the ILO in the aftermath of World War I, the recognition of the right to strike as a **core element** of the principle of freedom of association has been discussed in the International Labour Conference (ILC) as well as in the Governing Body and the International Labour Office. As is well known, the ILO, in its long history spanning almost one century, has not explicitly recognized a right to strike: neither Article 427 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles (1919), the Constitution of the ILO, including the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), nor the Conventions and Recommendations in the field of freedom of association - namely Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948) - have explicitly enshrined this right. However, the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), established in 1951 by the Governing Body, recognized in 1952 that Convention No. 87 guarantees also the **right to strike** as an **essential element of trade** union rights enabling workers to collectively defend their economic and social interests1. It is worthwhile to note that it was a complaint of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), at that time the Communist Union Federation on international level and front organization of the Soviet Union2, against the United Kingdom for having dissolved a strike in Jamaica by a police operation; since that time the controversy on the right to strike in the legal order of the ILO was also embedded in the wider context of the Cold War. In the complaint procedure initiated by the WFTU, the CFA **recognized** a **right to strike** under Convention No. 87 but considered that the police operation in question was lawful. In the more than six following decades, the CFA has elaborated a **very detailed case law** on the right to strike dealing with many concrete questions of this right and its limits (e.g. in essential services) and manifesting an even more complex structure than the national rules on industrial action in many a Member State. This case law of the CFA has been compiled in the “Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO”3. In 1959, i.e. seven years after case No. 28 of the CFA, the Committee of Experts for the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) also recognized the right to strike as **a core element of freedom** of association under Article 3 of Convention No. 874. Since then, the CEACR has **reconfirmed** its view on many occasions. Both CFA and CEACR coordinate their interpretation of Article 3 of Convention No. 875. Hence there is one single corpus of rules on the right to strike developed by both supervisory Committees of the Governing Body. Moreover, the ILC also has made clear in various Resolutions adopted since the 1950s that it considers the **right to strike** as an **essential element of freedom of association6**. On the whole, the recognition of the right to strike resulted therefore from the interpretative work of CFA and CEACR as well as of the understanding of the principle of freedom of association the ILC has expressed on various occasions. It should not be underestimated the wider political context of the Cold War had in this constant recognition of a right to strike under ILO Law. Although the very first recognition of the right to strike -as mentioned above- went back to a complaint procedure before the CFA, initiated by the Communist dominated WFTU, it was the Western world that particularly emphasized on the right to strike in order to blame the Communist Regimes of the Warsaw Pact that did not explicitly recognize a right to strike in their national law or, if they legally recognized it, made its exercise factually impossible; to this end, unions, employers’ associations but also Governments of the Western World built up an alliance in the bodies of the ILO7. In accomplishing their functions, CFA and CEACR necessarily have to interpret the Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO whose application in the Member States they shall control. In so doing, they need to concretize the principle of freedom of association that is only in general terms guaranteed by the ILO Conventions and Recommendations on freedom of association. But as supervisory bodies, which the Governing Body has established and which are not foreseen in the ILO Constitution, both probably do not have the power to interpret ILO law with binding effect8. This is also the opinion that the CEACR expresses itself in its yearly reports to the ILC when explaining that, “its opinions and recommendations are non-binding”9. As a matter of fact, the Governing Body, when establishing both Committees, could not delegate to them a power that it has never possessed itself: nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet10. According to Article 37(1) of the ILO Constitution, it is within the **competence of the International Court of Justice** to decide upon “any question or dispute relating to the **interpretation of this Constitution** or of any subsequent Convention concluded by the Members in pursuance of the provisions of this Constitution.” Furthermore, the ILC has not established yet under Article 37(2) of the ILO Constitution an ILO Tribunal, competent for an authentic interpretation of Conventions11. However, it **cannot be denied** that this constant interpretative work of CFA and CEACR possesses an **authoritative character** given the high esteem the twenty members of the CEACR -they are all internationally renowned experts in the field of labor law and social security law- and the nine members of the CFA with their specific expertise have. As the CEACR reiterates in its Reports, “[the opinions and recommendations of the Committee] derive their persuasive value from the legitimacy and rationality of the Committee’s work based on its impartiality, experience and expertise”12. Already this interpretative authority of both Committees justifies that **national legislators or courts take into consideration** the views of these supervisory bodies of the ILO when implementing ILO law. Furthermore, the long-standing and uncontradicted interpretation of the principle of freedom of association by CFA and CEACR as well as its recognition by the Member States may be considered as a **subsequent practice** in the application of the ILO Constitution under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1968): such subsequent practices shall be taken into account when interpreting the Agreement. Their constant supervisory practice probably reflects a volonté ultérieure, since other bodies of the ILO also have **recognized a right to strike** as the two above-mentioned Resolutions of the ILC of 1957 and 1970 as well as the constant practice of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards to examine **cases of violation** of the right to strike as **examples for breaches of the principle of freedom of association** demonstrate. As this constant practice of the organs of the ILO has not been contradicted by Member States, there is a **strong presumption** for recognition of a right to strike as a subsequent practice of the ILO under Article 31(3)(b) of the **Vienna Convention** on the Law of Treaties.

#### Credible ICJ solves Global Conflict

Davis 18, Christina L., and Julia C. Morse. "Protecting trade by legalizing political disputes: Why countries bring cases to the international court of justice." International Studies Quarterly 62.4 (2018): 709-722. (Professor of Government, Harvard University)//Elmer

Over the last seventy years, three broad trends have characterized international politics: an increase in economic interdependence between states, a growing number of international institutions, and a decrease in interstate war. Deepening exchanges between countries make states more vulnerable to disruptions in ongoing cooperation (Keohane and Nye, 1977). This vulnerability creates a demand for international institutions to constrain powerful states and preserve cooperative outcomes. As interdependence and institutionalized cooperation increase, they may be linked to a decrease in war (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2000; Russett and Oneal, 2001). A significant body of literature tests the relationship between bilateral trade and conflict, with mixed findings.1 Studies also show correlation between membership in international organizations and avoidance of conflict.2 But despite substantial work on this topic, the relationship between economic interdependence, institutions, and conflict remains ambiguous. How does economic interdependence shape political relations between states? In this paper, we examine the impact of economic interdependence on dispute resolution. More specifically, we ask whether trade increases the probability that countries will use the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ is one of the oldest international courts: established by the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, it began work the following year. Its long history and jurisdiction over many types of disputes make it ideal for analyzing how trade ties affect a country’s decision to seek third party mediation. We find that trade dependence creates demand for the ICJ. As countries develop stronger trading relationships, they are increasingly willing to settle disputes through the Court. This demonstrates a new pathway through which economic interdependence fosters peaceful relations – it encourages states to use legalized forms of dispute settlement. Whereas bilateral mediation efforts often remain secret, when a state files a complaint with the ICJ, it sends a public signal of its peaceful intentions to both governments and economic actors. Through our study of ICJ adjudication, we test how economic interdependence shapes the use of institutions as part of conflict management strategies. At first glance, it seems surprising that countries ever use legal venues to solve disputes. A court cannot change the underlying power distribution between states. Realist theory suggests that international law has no independent power in international affairs. Indeed, the ICJ seems to have been designed with this perspective in mind. For the ICJ to hear a case, both parties to a dispute must either have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court or have agreed to submit the specific dispute to the Court for a judgment. Even after the Court hears a case, states can essentially ignore its ruling since it cannot enforce its judgment. Why would a state bother to file a case under these circumstances? Yet despite these limitations, governments have turned to the ICJ for third-party dispute resolution on a range of issues including territorial claims, political asylum, and environmental damage. Ninety-two countries ranging widely in income and military capacity have participated in 134 ICJ cases since the Court’s inception in 1946. While this represents a small number relative to the total number of economic disputes addressed in the WTO or investment arbitration bodies, it nonetheless constitutes an important area of cooperation. Moreover, if one considers the frequency of usage given a potential dispute, the ICJ record looks strong. For example, perhaps the most common reason that states file cases at the ICJ is due to territorial disputes. Over the period from 1960 to 2000, Huth, Croco and Appel (2011) document 82 unique territorial disputes, and countries filed cases at the ICJ relating to 18 of them – a surprising 22 percent frequency when comparing filed cases to identified potential cases. The ICJ is a significant venue for interstate disputes, forming a key component in the legal structure of the international system. We argue that states use the ICJ to protect trade flows. Intense political disputes create uncertainty, which can depress trade flows. Legal action isolates the problem, minimizing the potential adverse effects on trade flows. Although delegating to an international court is not without costs – states incur high legal fees and risk the possibility of an unfavorable court ruling – these costs are offset by the economic gains from protecting an important trading relationship. Some disputes, of course, have such high stakes that political or strategic costs outweigh all other considerations, just as some trading relationships are so essential that even major disputes will not disrupt ties. On average, however, we argue that governments with higher trade dependence are more likely to decide that gambling on a court decision makes them better off than risking spill-over to trade. Surprisingly, with the exception of studies about economic policy disputes, research on international adjudication has given scarce attention to the role of economic interests. Instead, scholars have emphasized the importance of domestic political institutions, which encourage states engaged in territorial disputes to pursue adjudication as a means to overcome veto players or avoid blame (Simmons, 2002; Allee and Huth, 2006a). Others examine the legal context within a country or specific to the dispute. Mitchell and Powell (2011), for example, pay careful attention to how states view the law, arguing that domestic legal tradition shapes ICJ usage rates. Huth, Croco and Appel (2011) offer a different legal argument, suggesting that the strength of the legal claim shapes a country’s decision to delegate dispute settlement to a legal venue. These theories offer compelling insights, but ignore economic relations. Our theory aims to fill this gap by highlighting the connection between trade and international adjudication. More broadly, understanding the conditions that lead countries to initiate legal action will inform theories about bargaining strategies and conflict behavior (Fang, 2010; Chapman and Wolford, 2010). We assess the empirical implications of our argument through a comprehensive analysis of ICJ filing decisions, and we also revisit research on territorial disputes. We analyze the filing pattern observable in data on more than 190 countries from 1960 to 2013.3 We use several different approaches to identify potential disputes, modeling country characteristics that are associated with the dispute generating process. We first select a politically-relevant sample of countries that are likely to have frequent interaction as neighbors or great powers. Second, we use matching techniques to prune the politically-relevant sample of dyads to a subset with similar propensities for trade. We test our theory by estimating how trade dependence, measured as bilateral trade share of total trade for a potential applicant, changes the likelihood that a state files an ICJ case against its trade partner. Using a logistic regression, we estimate the effect of trade dependence on the probability of filing in a pooled cross-section time series analysis. We also apply conditional logit estimation to focus on variation in selection of respondents among those states that file an ICJ case. The conditional logit estimation helps to control for unobserved variables that may shape a state’s propensity to file cases. Our results show that higher trade dependence increases a country’s likelihood of filing a case against a trade partner. This relationship holds when we examine different sets of potential disputes and control for key variables like contiguity and power asymmetry. We also analyze how trade dependence reduces the likelihood that states use military force to resolve territorial disputes. Data on territorial disputes allows us to examine potential cases where military action looms large as an option for resolving a dispute (Huth, Croco and Appel, 2011). We find that trade dependence shapes a state’s selection of strategy, lowering the likelihood of militarized action. Examining ICJ adjudication and territorial disputes helps to alleviate the concern that an unobservable dyadic measure of political relations generates a spurious relationship between trade and peace.4 By focusing on dispute resolution strategies, we gain insight into an important mechanism by which interdependence changes political relations. Our results demonstrate that trading states are more likely to work out their problems in court and are less likely to exchange fire We argue that countries turn to an international court in order to protect trade flows under conditions of strong economic interdependence. This argument is built on two key assumptions. First, states believe that an international dispute over territory, fishing rights, or another salient issue could harm trade. Second, states view international adjudication as an effective way to end the dispute. Each point merits further discussion as the building blocks for our theory about the economic rationale for turning to law. Given the risk of harm to economic relations and the potential for courts to contribute to conflict resolution, states with high trade value vested in a relationship will be more willing to undertake costly litigation. Extensive debate exists about the relationship between conflict and trade. The premise that conflict disrupts trade is central to the theory of commercial peace. Russett and Oneal (2001) draw on the work of philosopher Immanuel Kant to argue that interdependence deters conflict by raising its costs. According to this line of reasoning, war interrupts trade while peace promotes stable commerce, leading states to calculate that gains of peace are significant compared to the costs of war. Other perspectives focus on the informational role of interdependence to lower uncertainty between states (Reed, 2003). Gartzke, Li and Boehmer (2001) contend economic interdependence allows states to signal their resolve through their willingness to bear economic costs from confrontation.5 A host of empirical studies support the idea that conflict reduces trade (Keshk, Reuveny and Pollins, 2004; Long, 2008). Several potential channels connect trade and conflict, including direct damage to infrastructure and transportation resulting from actual conflict, sanctions policies, and informal discrimination by governments or private actors. In a comprehensive study of data from 1870 - 1997, Glick and Taylor (2010) find that the effect of war on trade is significant and persistent. The negative impact of conflict also extends to foreign direct investment (e.g. Lee and Mitchell, 2012). The negative relationship is not limited to full scale war. Several studies demonstrate that political tensions may also suppress trade (Pollins, 1989; Fuchs and Klann, 2013). In an analysis of the period from 1950 to 1995, Simmons (2005) finds that territorial disputes have a sizable negative impact on trade even in the absence of militarized action. Others suggest states anticipate the potential adverse impact of conflict on trade, and therefore trade less to begin with if they think that war is likely. In such a scenario, the marginal economic costs of war should be insufficient to change a state’s calculation for going to war (Barbieri, 2002; Morrow, 1999). Gowa and Hicks (forthcoming) contend that trade is largely diverted through third party channels, which compensates for having less direct trade with the adversary. In this paper, we assume that leaders and business constituencies on average believe that conflict damages trade relations. Political conflict could lead governments to adopt sanctions against an adversary or to restrict financial flows, and violence is likely to disrupt trading routes and slow the movement of goods from one country to another. Substitution through third parties could alleviate the harm, but this would still increase trade costs. The expected harm to trade underlies the motivation for states to pursue resolution of disputes. When states want to resolve an interstate dispute, why would they choose adjudication rather than negotiations, economic sanctions, or militarized action? In some cases, the decision follows an episode of military conflict as part of an effort to normalize relations. Such a decision may be taken in the immediate aftermath of a conflict or decades later, after a long process of normalization. Indonesia and Malaysia, for example, jointly submitted their territorial dispute over the Sipadan and Ligitan islands to the ICJ in 1998 after three decades of efforts to improve relations following an unofficial war between the countries in the 1960s. In other cases, countries may turn to a legal venue to prevent a problem from ever reaching the stage that could produce serious political tensions or threats of force. Adjudication reshapes the context of diplomatic negotiations. In most disputes, governments pursue negotiations first and only resort to international adjudication when diplomatic avenues have stalled. Initiating legal action reduces outside options as states agree to submit the matter to court proceedings. By taking this step, governments signal both their willingness to forgo the use of force, and their priority to resolve the dispute in a public process. After filing, negotiations often continue alongside the legal procedures, but participants have more information that the matter will neither escalate into violence nor disappear through neglect. The literature offers three broad types of explanations for why states might choose to pursue adjudication: legitimacy, informational benefits, and domestic obstacles to settlement. At the systemic level, international norms have developed to support peaceful conflict resolution over war; these norms are likely to influence the calculations of some states about how to settle disputes. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) contend that rule of law has come to shape the identity of states, which forms a meta-belief affecting views about appropriate action in both the domestic and international spheres. When international law has been established through fair procedures and offers coherent principles, it forms a legitimate source of authority in international affairs that generates an independent “compliance pull” on state behavior (Franck, 1990). International courts combine both legitimacy and authority as they help states solve specific disputes about how to interpret international law; the growing role for international courts in international affairs represents an important trend (Alter, 2014; Alter, Helfer and Madsen, 2015). This significance of the ICJ is supported by findings that the Court has a relatively high level of compliance with its rulings (Schulte, 2004; Mitchell and Hensel, 2007; Llamzon, 2007; Johns, 2011). Legal settlement can help states coordinate policies and produce more cooperative outcomes through the provision of information. A court ruling offers a focal point amidst uncertainty about how to interpret the terms of an agreement (Ginsburg and McAdams, 2004; Huth, Croco and Appel, 2011). As the recordkeeper of past actions, courts support systems of tit-for-tat and reputational enforcement (Milgrom, North and Weingast, 1990; Carrubba, 2005; Mitchell and Hensel, 2007). In these informational theories of courts, states may comply with court rulings in the absence of coercive measures or the threat of sanctions because the reputational costs of non-compliance are too high. Rather than simply interpret law, courts matter because they coordinate expectations about enforcement and engage the attention of third parties (Johns, 2011). In their empirical analysis of territorial disputes, Huth, Croco and Appel (2011) find that strong legal claims significantly increase the likelihood that leaders will negotiate resolutions to their disputes and avoid conflict. International courts also offer a way for states to frame settlement in a way that appeals to domestic audiences (Fang, 2008). Simmons notes that even when the same deal could be reached in negotiations or through a court decision, a negotiated settlement could be viewed as sign of weakness while a legal resolution would be seen as positive cooperation beneficial for future interactions (Simmons, 2002, p. 834). This dynamic occurs because “domestic groups will **find it more attractive to make concessions to** a disinterested institution **than to a political adversary**” (Simmons, 2002, p. 834). In research on several prominent ICJ cases, Fischer (1982) emphasizes the Court has helped governments to save face. Consequently, those governments unable to reach agreements over domestic opposition may find it easier to do so with the involvement of third party ruling. Allee and Huth (2006a) further extend this argument to show that governments with higher levels of domestic political constraints are more likely to choose adjudication over negotiation for settling territorial disputes. Domestic political constraints also increase the probability of filing complaints at the WTO (Davis, 2012).

### CP

#### The Egyptian government should

#### Establish a policy of non-retaliation in the case of Iranian Aggression

#### The Israelian government should

#### Establish a policy of non-retaliation in the case of Egyptian Aggression

#### The Russian government should not sell arms or any sort of military aid to Egypt.

### DA – Economy

#### Business recovery is strong. Business confidence is high.

Halloran ’9-14 [Michael; 2021; M.B.A. from Carnegie Mellon University, former aerospace research engineer, Equity Strategist; Janney, “Despite Potential Headwinds, Key Labor Market Indicators Bode Well for the Economy,” https://www.janney.com/latest-articles-commentary/all-insights/insights/2021/09/14/despite-potential-headwinds-key-labor-market-indicators-bode-well-for-the-economy]

However, we remain encouraged by the recovery that has been unfolding since the economy began reopening. We continue to see improvement in important cyclical sectors of the economy while consumers are historically healthy and still have pent-up demand. Business confidence has rebounded with strong corporate profits that should support further capital spending and hiring (there are now more job openings than there are unemployed people by a record amount).

We expect to see further improvement in the international backdrop, supported by unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus and accelerating rates of vaccination. Although the impact of the Delta wave is still being felt, recent evidence confirms the effectiveness of vaccines in limiting deaths and hospitalizations. With the pace of vaccination now picking up in the areas most impacted by this wave—Asia and Australia—the case for fading headwinds leading to improving economic growth later this year remains positive.

The signals from financial markets themselves remain positive. Despite consolidating last week, stocks remain near record highs while the 10-year Treasury remains well above the lows of earlier this summer when concerns about Delta first emerged.

These factors support our view of a durable economic recovery from the pandemic that should continue supporting stock prices. A healthy labor market is a critical element for a sustainable recovery that supports profit growth and last week’s news from the labor market remains encouraging.

#### Unions devastate growth and worsen inequality – gains for workers shift costs to other parts of the economy

Epstein 20 [Richard A. Epstein Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institution. "The Decline Of Unions Is Good News." https://www.hoover.org/research/decline-unions-good-news]

This continued trend has elicited howls of protest from union supporters who, of course, want to see an increase in union membership. It has also led several Democratic presidential candidates to make calls to reconfigure labor law. Bernie Sanders wants to double union membership and give federal workers the right to strike, as well as ban at-will contracts of employment, so that any dismissal could be subject to litigation under a “for cause” standard. Not to be outdone, Elizabeth Warren wants to make it illegal for firms to hire permanent replacements for striking workers. They are joined by Pete Buttigieg in demanding a change in federal labor law so that states may no longer pass right-to-work laws that insulate workers from the requirement to pay union dues in unionized firms. All of these new devices are proven job killers.

The arguments in favor of unions are also coming from some unexpected sources in academia, where a conservative case has been put forward on the ground that an increase in union membership is needed to combat job insecurity and economic inequality.

All of these pro-union critiques miss the basic point that the decline of union power is good news, not bad. That conclusion is driven not by some insidious effort to stifle the welfare of workers, but by the simple and profound point that the greatest protection for workers lies in a competitive economy that opens up more doors than it closes. The only way to achieve that result is by slashing the various restrictions that prevent job formation, as Justin Haskins of the Heartland Institute notes in a recent article at The Hill. The central economic insight is that jobs get created only when there is the prospect of gains from trade. Those gains in turn are maximized by cutting the multitude of regulations and taxes that do nothing more than shrink overall wealth by directing social resources to less productive ends.

#### The right to strike causes supply chain disruptions and economic volatility

Epstein 20 [Richard A. Epstein Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institution. "The Decline Of Unions Is Good News." https://www.hoover.org/research/decline-unions-good-news]

Unions are monopoly institutions that raise wages through collective bargaining, not productivity improvements. The ensuing higher labor costs, higher costs of negotiating collective bargaining agreements, and higher labor market uncertainty all undercut the gains to union workers just as they magnify losses to nonunion employers, as well as to the shareholders, suppliers, and customers of these unionized firms. They also increase the risk of market disruption from strikes, lockouts, or firm bankruptcies whenever unions or employers overplay their hands in negotiation. These net losses in capital values reduce the pension fund values of unionized and nonunionized workers alike.

Employers are right to oppose unionization by any means within the law, because any gains for union workers come at the expense of everyone else. Of course, the best way for employers to proceed would be to seek efficiency gains by encouraging employee input into workplace operations—firms are quite willing to pay for good suggestions that lower cost or raise output. But such direct communications between workers and management are blocked by Section 8(a)(2) the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which mandates strict separation between workers and firms. This lowers overall productivity and often prevents entry-level employees from rising through the ranks.

#### Recessions cause global crises – ensuring continued growth is key

Baird ’20 [Zoe; October 2020; C.E.O. and President of the Markle Foundation, Member of the Aspen Strategy Group and former Trustee at the Council on Foreign Relations, J.D. and A.B. from the University of California at Berkeley; Domestic and International (Dis)order: A Strategic Response, “Equitable Economic Recovery is a National Security Imperative,” Ch. 13]

A strong and inclusive economy is essential for American national security and global leadership. As the nation seeks to return from a historic economic crisis, the national security community should support an equitable recovery that helps every worker adapt to the seismic shifts underway in our economy.

Broadly shared economic prosperity is a bedrock of America’s economic and political strength—both domestically and in the international arena. A strong and equitable recovery from the economic crisis created by COVID-19 would be a powerful testament to the resilience of the American system and its ability to create prosperity at a time of seismic change and persistent global crisis. Such a recovery could attack the profound economic inequities that have developed over the past several decades. Without bold action to help all workers access good jobs as the economy returns, the United States risks undermining the legitimacy of its institutions and its international standing. The outcome will be a key determinant of America’s national security for years to come.

An equitable recovery requires a national commitment to help all workers obtain good jobs—particularly the two-thirds of adults without a bachelor’s degree and people of color who have been most affected by the crisis and were denied opportunity before it. As the nation engages in a historic debate about how to accelerate economic recovery, ambitious public investment is necessary to put Americans back to work with dignity and opportunity. We need an intentional effort to make sure that the jobs that come back are good jobs with decent wages, benefits, and mobility and to empower workers to access these opportunities in a profoundly changed labor market.

To achieve these goals, American policy makers need to establish job growth strategies that address urgent public needs through major programs in green energy, infrastructure, and health. Alongside these job growth strategies, we need to recognize and develop the talents of workers by creating an adult learning system that meets workers’ needs and develops skills for the digital economy. The national security community must lend its support to this cause. And as it does so, it can bring home the lessons from the advances made in these areas in other countries, particularly our European allies, and consider this a realm of international cooperation and international engagement.

Shared Economic Prosperity Is a National Security Asset

A strong economy is essential to America’s security and diplomatic strategy. Economic strength increases our influence on the global stage, expands markets, and funds a strong and agile military and national defense. Yet it is not enough for America’s economy to be strong for some—prosperity must be broadly shared. Widespread belief in the ability of the American economic system to create economic security and mobility for all—the American Dream— creates credibility and legitimacy for America’s values, governance, and alliances around the world.

After World War II, the United States grew the middle class to historic size and strength. This achievement made America the model of the free world—setting the stage for decades of American political and economic leadership. Domestically, broad participation in the economy is core to the legitimacy of our democracy and the strength of our political institutions. A belief that the economic system works for millions is an important part of creating trust in a democratic government’s ability to meet the needs of the people.

The COVID-19 Crisis Puts Millions of American Workers at Risk

For the last several decades, the American Dream has been on the wane. Opportunity has been increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small share of workers able to access the knowledge economy. Too many Americans, particularly those without four-year degrees, experienced stagnant wages, less stability, and fewer opportunities for advancement.

Since COVID-19 hit, millions have lost their jobs or income and are struggling to meet their basic needs—including food, housing, and medical care.1 The crisis has impacted sectors like hospitality, leisure, and retail, which employ a large share of America’s most economically vulnerable workers, resulting in alarming disparities in unemployment rates along education and racial lines. In August, the unemployment rate for those with a high school degree or less was more than double the rate for those with a bachelor’s degree.2 Black and Hispanic Americans are experiencing disproportionately high unemployment, with the gulf widening as the crisis continues.3

The experience of the Great Recession shows that without intentional effort to drive an inclusive recovery, inequality may get worse: while workers with a high school education or less experienced the majority of job losses, nearly all new jobs went to workers with postsecondary education. Inequalities across racial lines also increased as workers of color worked in the hardest-hit sectors and were slower to recover earnings and income than White workers.4

The Case for an Inclusive Recovery

A recovery that promotes broad economic participation, renewed opportunity, and equity will strengthen American moral and political authority around the world. It will send a strong message about the strength and resilience of democratic government and the American people’s ability to adapt to a changing global economic landscape. An inclusive recovery will reaffirm American leadership as core to the success of our most critical international alliances, which are rooted in the notion of shared destiny and interdependence. For example, NATO, which has been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and a force of global stability for decades, has suffered from American disengagement in recent years. A strong American recovery—coupled with a renewed openness to international collaboration—is core to NATO’s ability to solve shared geopolitical and security challenges. A renewed partnership with our European allies from a position of economic strength will enable us to address global crises such as climate change, global pandemics, and refugees. Together, the United States and Europe can pursue a commitment to investing in workers for shared economic competitiveness, innovation, and long-term prosperity.

The U.S. has unique advantages that give it the tools to emerge from the crisis with tremendous economic strength— including an entrepreneurial spirit and the technological and scientific infrastructure to lead global efforts in developing industries like green energy and biosciences that will shape the international economy for decades to come.

## Egypt

Cards are too old – either no strike laws prohigibitng stirkes or impact is non UQ proven by al sisi never getting dminisihed in popularit

NO middle east conflict – Yemen and 123948320 civil wars all prove wont go nuclear – wont expand

#### No scenario for draw in

John Glaser 17, Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute., 1-9-2017, "Does the U.S. Military Actually Protect Middle East Oil?," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/does-the-us-military-actually-protect-middle-east-oil-18995?page=0%2C1

In addition, the balance of power globally and in the region today is favorable for energy security. First, an external power gaining a stranglehold over the Persian Gulf region is implausible. The Soviet Union is long gone and today’s Russia suffers from systemic economic problems that hinder its potential to project power in the Middle East. China, while increasingly powerful in its own sphere, lacks the political will to dominate the Gulf . The regional balance of power is also favorable. According to Joshua Rovner , “the chance that a regional hegemon will emerge in the Persian Gulf during the next twenty years is slim to none. This is true even if the United States withdraws completely.” No state in the region possesses the capabilities necessary to conquer neighboring territories or gain a controlling influence over oil resources, and most are bogged down and distracted by internal problems. Overall the region is in a state of defense dominance: while too weak to project power beyond their borders, the major states do have the capability to deter their neighbors, making the costs of offensive action prohibitively high. So, three of the major scenarios that have traditionally justified a forward deployed military presence in the Persian Gulf—the entrance of a hostile external power, the rise of a regional hegemon and a military clash among the major states—are exceedingly unlikely even absent the U.S. military presence.

### 1NC – Alt Causes

#### Their impact is empirically denied – and too many alt causes to solve.

Cordesman 18 – Anthony H. Cordesman is the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, April 9th (“Stability in the Middle East: The Range of Short and Long-Term Causes”; Center For Strategy and International Studies, Available online at <https://www.csis.org/analysis/stability-middle-east-range-short-and-long-term-causes>, Accessed 03-25-2019) KS

The Middle East has long been one of the most unstable regions in the world, and there are no present prospects for change in the near future. This instability is the result of ongoing conflicts and tensions, and a variety of political tensions and divisions. It also, however, is the result of a wide variety of long-term pressures growing out of poor governance, corruption, economic failures, demographic pressures and other forces within the civil sector.

The Short and Long-Term Forces Shaping Stability and Instability

The immediate sources of instability are clear. Most of the region has some form of internal conflict, faces rising external threats, or is dealing with violent extremism. The violence and wars that have resulted from the political upheavals in 2011 will at best leave lasting challenges for unity and development even if the fighting ends. All the major causes of violent extremism remain, and there are few prospects that the fight against ISIS will eliminate the extremist threat in even one MENA country. Tensions between Israel and the Palestinian persist, each side has seen rising internal political barriers to a compromise peace, and the tensions between Israel and Iran and Hezbollah are creating new military threats.

The longer-term pressures are less clear, although a wide range of international organizations like the UN, World Bank, and IMF have warned about the individual forces involved for decades. Arab experts have documented the level of such pressures in the UN's Arab Development Reports since 2002, and many of the forces involved have consistent trends lines and can be quantified by country. These reports reveal radical differences between the countries in the region, but highlight the fact that given countries have mix of poor and abusive governance, ethnic and sectarian differences, corruption and self-seeking elites, poor or failed economic development, employment and career problems, and population pressures that challenge national unity and stability, and help lead to violent extremism.

Taken together, it is clear that there is no simply way to model or predict the level of stability in any given country, much less the region. There are too many variables involved, and the variables differ so much even between neighboring countries that focusing on one set of variables can at best describe the current situation in a single country – not the situation in the Arab world or MENA region.

### 1NC – Middle East

#### Israel strikes inevitable

Bennis 18 [Phyllis Bennis is a fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies. Her most recent book is the 7th updated edition of Understanding the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: A Primer. 5/11. "Is Trump’s Abandonment of the Iran Nuke Deal a Prelude to War?" https://www.thenation.com/article/is-trumps-abandonment-of-the-iran-nuke-deal-a-prelude-to-war/]

Trump’s withdrawal from the deal, and his re-imposition of the nuclear-related sanctions that the JCPOA required the United States to lift, constitutes the only violation so far. And so far, Iran has made clear that it intends to stick to the terms of the deal, based on the fact that the other six signatories—Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the EU—are still on board. But if forces within the Iranian government that were always skeptical of the deal use the US withdrawal to gain the upper hand and get Tehran to withdraw from it, the consequences could be incredibly dangerous, since not only the Trump regime in Washington but Israel and Saudi Arabia too would almost certainly respond by calling for war. What is preventing such a move so far is the Iranian government’s maturity and commitment to diplomacy.

### 2NC – Defense – Middle East

#### That’s especially true with the US --- our alliance system and military strength is unparalleled, so nobody would risk it

Mead 14 [Walter Russell Mead Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College; Editor-at-Large of The American Interest magazine. 7/7. "Have We Gone From a Post-War to a Pre-War World?" https://www.huffingtonpost.com/walter-russell-mead/new-global-war\_b\_5562664.html]

The Middle East today bears an ominous resemblance to the Balkans of that period. The contemporary Middle East has an unstable blend of ethnicities and religions uneasily coexisting within boundaries arbitrarily marked off by external empires. Ninety-five years after the French and the British first parceled out the lands of the fallen Ottoman caliphate, that arrangement is now coming to an end. Events in Iraq and Syria suggest that the Middle East could be in for carnage and upheaval as great as anything the Balkans saw. The great powers are losing the ability to hold their clients in check; the Middle East today is at least as explosive as the Balkan region was a century ago.

GERMANS THEN, CHINESE NOW

What blew the Archduke's murder up into a catastrophic world war, though, was not the tribal struggle in southeastern Europe. It took the hegemonic ambitions of the German Empire to turn a local conflict into a universal conflagration. Having eclipsed France as the dominant military power in Europe, Germany aimed to surpass Britain on the seas and to recast the emerging world order along lines that better suited it. Yet the rising power was also insecure, fearing that worried neighbors would gang up against it. In the crisis in the Balkans, Germany both felt a need to back its weak ally Austria and saw a chance to deal with its opponents on favorable terms.

Could something like that happen again? China today is both rising and turning to the sea in ways that Kaiser Wilhelm would understand. Like Germany in 1914, China has emerged in the last 30 years as a major economic power, and it has chosen to invest a growing share of its growing wealth in military spending.

But here the analogy begins to get complicated and even breaks down a bit. Neither China nor any Chinese ally is competing directly with the United States and its allies in the Middle East. China isn't (yet) taking a side in the Sunni-Shia dispute, and all it really wants in the Middle East is quiet; China wants that oil to flow as peacefully and cheaply as possible.

AMERICA HAS ALL THE ALLIES

And there's another difference: alliance systems. The Great Powers of 1914 were divided into two roughly equal military blocs: Austria, Germany, Italy and potentially the Ottoman Empire confronted Russia, France and potentially Britain.

Today the global U.S. alliance system has no rival or peer; while China, Russia and a handful of lesser powers are disengaged from, and in some cases even hostile to, the U.S. system, the military balance isn't even close.

#### 4---Multilateral institutions, nuclear deterrence, and political weariness all ensure states don’t escalate beyond regional skirmishes

Lubin 14 [Gus worked here from 2009 to 2017. In that time he was a senior correspondent, editor-in-chief of Tech Insider, executive editor of Business Insider, and more. 7/26. "Why Today Is Different From The 1914 Outbreak Of World War I." https://www.businessinsider.com/differences-between-now-and-1914-outbreak-of-wwi-2014-7]

With the world caught in a series of potential proxy wars from Ukraine to the Middle East and tensions ratcheting in East Asia and elsewhere, many have compared the present to 1914, when a trigger event in Sarajevo activated military alliances and led to a devastating global war.

Especially on the 100-year anniversary of the start of World War I, the similarities come to mind easily, but is history really repeating?

Richard Evans, the Regius Professor of History at Cambridge, identified key difference between now and then in a January article in the New Statesman. These include balancing tendencies of the multipolar world we live in now as well as the emergence of "institutions of collective security" like the United Nations, which makes a big difference even if they may seem ineffective.

Above all, he believes people have learned from history, as he said in an interview with the New Republic:

I think the major difference now is that we've had two World Wars, and we've had the nuclear age. Whereas in 1914, states, and for that matter most of the public in most nations, had what we now think of as a very irresponsible attitude toward war. They went into it in a gung-ho way. Now I think we are much more afraid of a major war, and we are much more cautious about it. I think the attitude of politicians today is very different from what it was in 1914.

As for WWI not preventing WWII, many see the latter as an extension of the former, and anyway WWII had a greater effect. Writes Evans:

The destruction caused by the Second World War, with its 50 million or more dead, its ruined cities, its genocides, its widespread negation of civilised values, had a far more powerful effect than the deaths caused by the First World War, which were (with exceptions, notably the genocide of a million or more Armenian civilians, killed by the Turks in 1915) largely confined to troops on active service. In 1945, Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided an additional, ter­rible warning of what would happen if the world went to war again.

Harvard Professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr. similarly commented on changing attitudes toward war in a January article:

Today's world is different from the world of 1914 in several important ways. One is that nuclear weapons give political leaders the equivalent of a crystal ball that shows what their world would look like after escalation. Perhaps if the Emperor, the Kaiser, and the Czar had had a crystal ball showing their empires destroyed and their thrones lost in 1918, they would have been more prudent in 1914. Certainly, the crystal-ball effect had a strong influence on US and Soviet leaders during the Cuban missile crisis. It would likely have a similar influence on US and Chinese leaders today.

Another difference is that the ideology of war is much weaker nowadays. In 1914, war really was thought to be inevitable, a fatalistic view reinforced by the Social Darwinist argument that war should be welcomed, because it would "clear the air" like a good summer storm.

## US AID

#### The oil crisis means that Russia can’t expand in the Middle East.

Cook 4-9. Steven A. Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 4-9-2020, "Russia Is Losing the Oil War—and the Middle East," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/09/russia-saudi-arabia-oil-price-war-middle-east/ //kent - wh

For the past few years, the foreign-policy community has collectively come to believe that a new era in international politics is emerging. The defining features of this post-post-Cold War order are great-power competition and the realignment of America’s relationships around the world. Nowhere is this more apparent than the Middle East, where U.S. allies are developing diplomatic, commercial, and military relationships with the very powers with which Washington is supposed to be competing—China and Russia—and precisely at a time when so many U.S. experts, analysts, officials, and politicians are expressing a desire to retrench from the Middle East. That has led many of the same folks to conclude that the new regional order will be forged in either Beijing or Moscow. There are plenty of reasons to doubt that—some of which have become clearer in recent weeks. Most acute is the ongoing oil price war between Moscow and Riyadh, which has demonstrated how Russia has overplayed its hand in the region. Almost 30 years after the end of the Cold War, leaders around the Middle East are indeed more welcoming of the exercise of Russian power. With the ideological baggage of Soviet communism gone and the United States proving itself to be a spent, feckless, incompetent force, Moscow has seemed to regional leaders not quite an alternative to Washington but at least a more constructive regional player. The contrast between the way former U.S. President Barack Obama is perceived to have abandoned Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intervention in Syria to save Bashar al-Assad made a big impression on Arab potentates. Added to the negative perception of the United States is the fact that Middle Eastern economies and political systems have more in common with Russia—their dependence on oil revenues, their authoritarianism—than with the United States. Washington has contributed to their developing relationship. By fracking its way to what U.S. President Donald Trump calls “energy independence” (whatever that is supposed to mean), the United States has flooded markets with natural gas and oil. That has created downward pressure on energy prices, which is why in 2016 members of OPEC (but really Saudi Arabia) and Russia agreed to limit production in the service of higher prices. The agreement, which was actually the result of a previous oil war during which the Saudis refused to cut production hoping to damage U.S. shale producers (it didn’t), stabilized energy markets. The price of a barrel of oil returned to a level that helped the Saudis and Russians pay for the things they have wanted to do, whether prosecute wars—see Ukraine, Syria, Yemen, Libya—and invest in social transformation. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 is expensive, after all. The agreement was about oil production, but it held out the prospect of a changed configuration of relations in the Persian Gulf. For the Saudis, the Russians were a hedge against an unpredictable United States, where, despite political dysfunction and polarization, there seems to be broad agreement on the need to leave the Middle East. Russia, in turn, got a boost in its regional profile and influence by working with Saudi Arabia. Whether this was actually at America’s expense is debatable, but perception is often more important than reality. At the least, Putin wanted everyone to believe that he could nudge the Saudis—as he has done with the Turks and Egyptians—away from the United States. Setting Russian trolling aside, this is why after Trump did not respond militarily against Iran for its attacks on Saudi oil processing facilities in September 2019, Putin offered to sell the Saudis the S-400 air defense system (the same weapon system that Turkey purchased from Moscow, straining ties between Washington and Ankara). Yet for all the apparent overlap of Saudi and Russian interests, especially in energy, the Saudi-Russian era was not to be. The Russians have only themselves to blame. Since even before the killing of the Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, Mohammed bin Salman was portrayed as impetuous and highhanded. That he has proved to be so on any number of previous occasions makes it easy to believe that recklessness led to the steep drop in oil prices over the last month. But that is not the case. The Saudis came to a meeting of OPEC+ (which includes 10 nonmembers of the oil cartel, including Russia) in early March and said basically the following: There is even less demand for our products now given the global pandemic, so let’s take a million barrels off the market. From a Saudi perspective, this seemed to be an entirely reasonable position, but the Russians rejected it, saying they wanted to assess the full effects of the novel coronavirus on the global economy before cutting production. This didn’t make a lot of sense because by then it was clear to most that the coronavirus was forcing economies to shut down one after another and thus depressing demand for oil and gas. More likely, the Russians did not want to cut production because they were more interested in hurting U.S. shale producers and snatching market share from the Saudis. It was the latter that made the Saudis so angry. They are intent on not being played for suckers. Saudi officials have proposed that they, the Russians, the United States, and a number of other players cut production proportionally. According to the Saudis, the Russians want them to cut relatively more than the others. The Russian position is stoking fears in Riyadh that whatever agreement the Saudis make with Moscow, Russia will still have motive to cheat, undermining Saudi Arabia’s revenue and market share—the worst of all possible worlds. As a result, Saudi Arabia walked away from the meeting vowing to increase production to 10 million barrels per day and began offering steep discounts on its oil. This was an effort to intimidate the Russians and coerce them back to the negotiating table, but the Russians declared they could withstand low oil prices. The Saudis said they could do the same, and global oil prices plunged. The United States seems to be a casualty of this oil war; members of Congress from states where the fossil fuel industry is important have been especially distressed. But it’s hard to find any winners. Perhaps only the Chinese qualify, as they can look forward to cranking up their post-coronavirus economy with the help of cheap oil. Analysts expect that the oil war may come to an end during Thursday’s meeting of OPEC+. Either way, one likely outcome of this episode will be an end to the idea that Moscow will play a significant role in establishing a new regional order. In a different context, the Italian Marxist political theorist Antonio Gramsci once wrote about the “interregnum” after the death of one order while the “new [order] cannot be born.” It is in this period that Gramsci observed “morbid symptoms appear.” We are in such a moment now, which is why those searching for a new order should not mistake the apparent strengthening of Saudi-Russian ties in the previous few years for anything other than a function of decay, not a feature of an emerging and novel global system.

#### Russian exports high now and resilient.

Episkopos 6-11-2019 – PhD Student in history @ American U (Mark, See How Russia Is Selling Lots of Military Hardware Around the Globe, *National Interest*, [https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/see-how-russia-selling-lots-military-hardware-around-globe-62097)](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/see-how-russia-selling-lots-military-hardware-around-globe-62097)//BB)

Spurred by a revised business strategy and favorable international climate, Russia’s chief arms exporter-- Rosoboronexport-- is seeing record profits. Rosoboronexport has sold 5.7 billion dollars worth of weapons since the beginning of 2019, setting the Russian defense industry up for its strongest-grossing year decades. Though 2019 is shaping up to be a particularly profitable earnings period on the heels of Moscow’s multi-billion dollar S-400 deal with Ankara, this cannot be dismissed as a one-off occurrence. Currently sitting at a whopping 55 billion dollars, Rosoboronexport’s portfolio has steadily grown over the past decade. Agency chief Alexander Mikheyev assured Russian state news that Rosoboronexport is not resting on its laurels: "As a world arms export leader, we are not only watching and following global trends today but are also developing unique areas of work for the market, including financial mechanisms for foreign trade activity." But can Russia's arms trade sustain its impressive pace of growth over the coming decades? Since the 2014 Crimean annexation, Rosoboronexport executives have wasted no time in arguing that the the Russian defense industry would be in even better financial shape were it not for the effects of the western sanctions regime: "For five years, Russia and Rosoboronexport have been confronted with serious restrictions from some international financial institutions that have become strongly dependent on the political will of some world arms market players. We can only perceive them as unfair competition and the attempts of pressure on us and our partners," said Mikheyev. Mikheyev’s claim is inarguably true as far as the secondary effects of sanctions are concerned; the Kremlin is currently being denied western capital inflows that, among other things, could otherwise have contributed to the growth of the Russian defense sector. However, sanctions have had no discernable effect on Moscow’s ability to secure a series of lucrative arms deals over the past several years. The reason is hardly surprising: the nations most likely to abide by the sanctions regime are western NATO members who are already militarily and politically invested in NATO’s defense infrastructure, and thus were never prospective Russian clients to begin with. Meanwhile, sanctions have done little to stop some of the world’s biggest arms importers from doing business with Russia. It was only last year that India signed a gargantuan 5.43 billion dollar weapons deal with Russia. There was talk of punishing India under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), but Washington is dragging its heels over concerns of alienating New Delhi. Washington successfully sanctioned China under CAATSA, but this had no discernible effect on the burgeoning Sino-Russian defense relationship. Most recently, Moscow exploited the growing political rift between NATO-aligned Turkey and the west to not only sell the S-400 to Ankara, but to secure a joint Russian-Turkish manufacturing deal for its upcoming S-500 anti air system. In keeping with their ongoing export strategy of targeting prospective clients who are beyond the reach of western sanctions, Rosoboronexport plans to make further inroads in Africa, Latin America, the Middle-East, and Central Asia. Furthermore, the Russian arms trade is aggressively competing for second and third world import markets with a glut of cheaper, Soviet-inherited hardware that may lack the technical bells and whistles of their latest offerings, but nonetheless offers cost-effective performance for low and medium intensity warfare. Rosoboronexport’s ongoing success presents the Washington security establishment with a stark political reality that shows no signs of changing over the coming years: Russia’s remarkably resilient arms export business has not only survived, but is thriving, under the post-Crimea sanctions regime.

#### No Russia Shift--- Russian weapons are not interoperable with Western weapons and they cost too much

Weitz 19 — Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, former Senior Staff Member at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, 2019 (“Saudi Arabia Should Be Careful About Buying Russian Weapons,” *The National Interest*, October 12th, Available Online at <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/saudi-arabia-should-be-careful-about-buying-russian-weapons-87946>, Accessed 10-13-2019)

Seeing an opportunity to make some money and weaken U.S. prestige, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed, during a meeting with the Iranian and Turkish presidents, that Saudi Arabia follow these two countries’ example and buy Russian air and missile defense systems. Other countries, including Qatar, India, and Iraq are likewise reportedly considering purchasing Russia’s advanced surface-to-air interceptors.

Countries should avoid such a perilous path. Acquiring Russian arms would be contrary to their defense, diplomatic, and economic interests.

Russia’s military-industrial complex designs these weapons’ information systems, which likely remain accessible to, and under the potential control of, their Russian software coders. Purchasers are unlikely to have access to the systems’ electronic codes and internal data, leaving friend-or-foe identification under Moscow’s control.

Fielded by Saudi Arabia or Qatar, these air defenses could more likely shoot down U.S. or Israeli warplanes than those of Iran since they could identify the U.S.-made planes as unfriendly. Moreover, these systems may be blind to potential threats from Iran and Syria because the two countries already have Russian air defense technology and may have learned how to spoof them.

The Pentagon insists that the sophisticated intelligence collection capabilities of the S-400 would endanger U.S. aviation systems to operate in its vicinity. When Turkey acquired the S-400, the White House immediately canceled plans to provide the NATO ally the premier U.S. F-35 strike fighter.

Should Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or any other country receive the S-400, the United States would deny them the best U.S. defense technologies and redeploy any U.S. military aircraft based there. The Saudis and other Gulf states have an urgent need for U.S. protection and cannot wait to assimilate complex Russian hardware and train their forces to use them.

Besides depriving a country of access to U.S. weapons, training, and other security benefits, buying Russian arms exposes a state to dire financial peril. The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act penalizes countries, corporations, and individuals that engage in “significant transactions” with Russia’s military-industrial complex. The sanctions could deprive a Russian weapons buyer of debt-service guarantees, bond underwriting, and other U.S. financial services.

Russian defense technologies are incompatible with the U.S. weapons systems that preponderate in the arsenals of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and, increasingly, India. Any stand-alone Russian air defense batteries would have ~~crippled~~ [destroyed] capabilities because they lack interoperability with Western systems.

Turkey, Egypt, and Indonesia all thump.

#### Arms sales not key to Russian expansionism---Putin doesn’t view it as a component of his strategy.

Reaves 18 – MA in Security Studies (Andrew, “RUSSIAN ARMS SALES IN THE AGE OF PUTIN: FOR POLITICS OR PROFIT?,” Na*val Postgraduate School Thesis Archives*, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/59571/18Jun_Reaves_Andrew.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)//BB>, ability edited

It is unlikely that Russian arms sales will disappear in the near future, but their strategic pull is weakening. Influence and leverage, as arms export analyst Andrew Pierre notes, are indeed transitory phenomena.687 While Putin has successfully integrated arms sales into his strategy of fostering polycentrism, challenging American hegemony, and reestablishing Russia’s presence globally, his strategic end state of returning Russia to its former world power status lacks international attractiveness. Furthermore, his focus on short-term political gains in lieu of a more farsighted plan to achieve his strategic end state has ~~handicapped~~ [limited] his use of arms exports.688 In fact, arms sales have merely supported multiple pragmatic relationships, not an anti-Western coalition, as states seek to maximize their benefits at the expense of Russia. As Lo observes, Putin’s policy “is frequently held hostage to short-term political and economic expediency...and the over-personalization of decision-making.”689 Thus, while Russia’s recent dispersal of arms might strengthen the ability of other states to either reduce the power of the West or promote regional balancing, it does not mean that Russia’s overall strength and influence rise reciprocally. For as long as Putin’s strategy remains myopic as he seeks partners in a quixotic quest to renew Russia’s grandeur and global influence, states will continue to gain reverse leverage on Russia. Recently imprisoned anti-Putin activist Aleksey Navalny phrased it best in his ominous foreshowing of Putin’s future: This regime is doomed, I’ve said it and I will repeat it, but of course, I will not mention specific dates: in the eleventh year I said that they had a year and a half left, and I will not say anything more. Doom is obvious, because [Putin’s regime] is [a] feudal power, in the post-industrial world unthinkable [sic]; because it prevents us from developing, inventing, building, growing, teaching and healing.690 While Navalny’s words might err on the dramatic, there is truth within them. Although Putin might still view arms sales as an important item inside his political toolbox, military exports are quickly becoming a dull and impractical instrument unable to yield the outcomes that Putin desires regardless of the previous benefits they once provided.

#### No Russian Expansionism Impact---they’re defensive.

Carpenter 19 — Ted Galen Carpenter, Senior Fellow for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, former Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, holds a Ph.D. in U.S. Diplomatic History from the University of Texas, 2019 (“Russia Sure Behaves Strangely for a Country Bent on Conquest,” *Cato Institute,* January 15th, Available online at <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/russia-sure-behaves-strangely-country-bent-conquest>, Accessed on 1-22-2019)

Such hyperbole has continued and even increased over the past five years on both sides of the Atlantic. In a March 2017 interview, Dalia Grybauskaitė, president of Lithuania, stated bluntly: “Russia is a threat not only to Lithuania but to the whole region and to all of Europe.” Poland’s foreign minister, Witold Waszczykowski, was equally alarmist, insisting that Russia’s behavior posed an “existential threat” even greater than ISIS.

Russia’s conduct has been abrasive and aggressive at times, but there is no evidence that Moscow harbors expansionist ambitions remotely comparable to those of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Kremlin’s actions suggest a much more limited, perhaps even defensive, agenda. As professors Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman observed in Foreign Affairs, “To many in the West, Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia seemed to prove the Kremlin’s land hunger.” But such a conclusion reflects poor logic: “Kremlin leaders bent on expansion would surely have ordered troops all the way to Tbilisi to depose [Georgia President Mikheil] Saakashvili. At the least, Russian forces would have taken control of the oil and gas pipelines that cross Georgia. Instead, the Russians left those pipelines alone and quickly withdrew to the mountains.”

Shleifer and Treisman raise a very important point. If Putin is a rogue leader with massive expansionist objectives, why would he relinquish territory that Russian forces had occupied? Indeed, with very little additional effort, Russia could have captured Tbilisi and the rest of Georgia. Yet it did not attempt to do so. Hitler never willingly gave up any of his conquests, and until the collapse of the Eastern European satellite empire in 1989-1991, the USSR disgorged only one occupied area: the portion of Austria it controlled at the end of World War II. Even that modest retreat took place only after laborious negotiations for a treaty guaranteeing Austria’s strict neutrality. If Putin truly harbors malignantly expansionist ambitions comparable to those of Hitler and Stalin, declining to conquer and absorb all of Georgia when that achievement was easily within reach showed curious restraint. His decision merely to perpetuate and consolidate Moscow’s treatment of Georgia’s two secessionist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as Russian protectorates suggests much more limited ambitions.