### T – Framework

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must defend the hypothetical implementation of the resolution “Resolved: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike”

#### Violation: You don’t – its good that you re-stated words in the resolution, but in order to meet topicality you need to re-define the words in the resolution. Their interpretation of a few words in the res is not better then evidence.

#### 1] “Government” – implies political administration. You aren’t a government.

Dictionary.com “government” [Government Definition & Meaning | Dictionary.com](https://www.dictionary.com/browse/government) Accessed 11/19 //gord0

Noun. The political direction and control exercised over the actions of the members, citizens, or inhabitants of communities, societies, and states; direction of the affairs of a state, community, etc.; **political administration:**

#### 2] “Resolved:” refers to a legislative debate.

Louisiana State Legislature 16, “Glossary of Legislative Terms,” http://www.legis.state.la.us/glossary2.htm

Resolution: A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. (Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11, 13.1, 6.8, and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### 3] Right to strike – concerted activities related to bargaining or protection

NLRB [The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is comprised of a team of professionals who work to assure fair labor practices and workplace democracy nationwide. Since its creation by Congress in 1935, this small, highly respected, independent Federal agency has had daily impact on the way America's companies, industries and unions conduct business. Agency staff members investigate and remedy unfair labor practices by unions and employers. No date. “The Right to Strike”. [The Right to Strike | National Labor Relations Board (nlrb.gov)](https://www.nlrb.gov/strikes#:~:text=The%20Right%20to%20Strike.%20Section%207%20of%20the,concerted%20activities%20protected%20for%20employees%20by%20this%20section.) Accessed 11/20 // gord0

Section 7 of the [National Labor Relations Act](https://www.nlrb.gov/how-we-work/national-labor-relations-act) states in part, “Employees shall have the right. . . to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Strikes are included among the concerted activities protected for employees by this section. Section 13 also concerns the right to strike. It reads as follows: Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.

#### Vote Negative for Predictable limits: Their model has no resolutional bound and creates the possibility for an infinite number of 1ACs. Not debating the topic allows debaters to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months. They get to pick the topic ex post facto which incentivizes vague argumentation that’s not grounded in a consistent, stable mechanism – that causes a race to the margins where they’re incentivized to defend uncontestable statements like “racism bad” or “2+2=4.” Counter-interpretations are arbitrary, unpredictable, and don’t solve the world of neg prep because there’s no grounding in the resolution.

#### The impact is Fairness which outweighs:

#### 1] It’s an intrinsic good – some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity – if it didn’t exist, then there wouldn’t be value to the game since judges could literally vote whatever way they wanted regardless of the competing arguments made

#### 2] Probability – your ballot can’t solve their impacts but it can solve mine – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but can rectify skews.

#### 3] Internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education

#### 4] Comes before substance – deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it – any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, since it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it. This means they don’t get to weigh the aff.

#### Read it on the neg -- solves all of your offense because you have a 6 minute kritik of working conditions.

#### Competing interpretations --- reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention which o/w because it takes the debate out of the debaters’ hands.

#### No RVI’s or Impact turns against Topicality ---

#### 1] Logic – you shouldn’t win for meeting an affirmative burden

#### 2] Baiting – Allows affs to forego the topic in order to answer topicality for 4 minutes which moots 6 minutes of 1nc offense.

#### 3] Exclusions are inevitable – we can only resolve arguments in this debate so we should have those debates along reciprocal lines

#### 4] Impact turns are drop the argument – if they win that our interpretation is bad then we will not go for it which is sufficient recourse because anything else justifies infinite “independent voting issues” and prevents substantive debates.

### CP – ICJ

#### Just governments should request the International Court of Justice issue an advisory opinion over whether they ought to establish an unconditional right to strike. Just governments should abide by the outcome of the advisory opinion.

#### Solves – the ICJ will rule in favor of an unconditional right to strike.

Seifert ’18 (Achim; Professor of Law at the University of Jena, and adjunct professor at the University of Luxembourg; December 2018; “The protection of the right to strike in the ILO: some introductory remarks”; CIELO Laboral; http://www.cielolaboral.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/seifert\_noticias\_cielo\_n11\_2018.pdf; Accessed: 11-3-2021; AU)

The **recognition of a right to strike** in the legal order of the **International Labour Organization** (ILO) is probably one of the most controversial questions in international labor law. Since the foundation of the ILO in the aftermath of World War I, the recognition of the right to strike as a **core element** of the principle of freedom of association has been discussed in the International Labour Conference (ILC) as well as in the Governing Body and the International Labour Office. As is well known, the ILO, in its long history spanning almost one century, has not explicitly recognized a right to strike: neither Article 427 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles (1919), the Constitution of the ILO, including the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), nor the Conventions and Recommendations in the field of freedom of association - namely Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948) - have explicitly enshrined this right. However, the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), established in 1951 by the Governing Body, recognized in 1952 that Convention No. 87 guarantees also the **right to strike** as an **essential element of trade** union rights enabling workers to collectively defend their economic and social interests1. It is worthwhile to note that it was a complaint of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), at that time the Communist Union Federation on international level and front organization of the Soviet Union2, against the United Kingdom for having dissolved a strike in Jamaica by a police operation; since that time the controversy on the right to strike in the legal order of the ILO was also embedded in the wider context of the Cold War. In the complaint procedure initiated by the WFTU, the CFA **recognized** a **right to strike** under Convention No. 87 but considered that the police operation in question was lawful. In the more than six following decades, the CFA has elaborated a **very detailed case law** on the right to strike dealing with many concrete questions of this right and its limits (e.g. in essential services) and manifesting an even more complex structure than the national rules on industrial action in many a Member State. This case law of the CFA has been compiled in the “Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO”3. In 1959, i.e. seven years after case No. 28 of the CFA, the Committee of Experts for the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) also recognized the right to strike as **a core element of freedom** of association under Article 3 of Convention No. 874. Since then, the CEACR has **reconfirmed** its view on many occasions. Both CFA and CEACR coordinate their interpretation of Article 3 of Convention No. 875. Hence there is one single corpus of rules on the right to strike developed by both supervisory Committees of the Governing Body. Moreover, the ILC also has made clear in various Resolutions adopted since the 1950s that it considers the **right to strike** as an **essential element of freedom of association6**. On the whole, the recognition of the right to strike resulted therefore from the interpretative work of CFA and CEACR as well as of the understanding of the principle of freedom of association the ILC has expressed on various occasions. It should not be underestimated the wider political context of the Cold War had in this constant recognition of a right to strike under ILO Law. Although the very first recognition of the right to strike -as mentioned above- went back to a complaint procedure before the CFA, initiated by the Communist dominated WFTU, it was the Western world that particularly emphasized on the right to strike in order to blame the Communist Regimes of the Warsaw Pact that did not explicitly recognize a right to strike in their national law or, if they legally recognized it, made its exercise factually impossible; to this end, unions, employers’ associations but also Governments of the Western World built up an alliance in the bodies of the ILO7. In accomplishing their functions, CFA and CEACR necessarily have to interpret the Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO whose application in the Member States they shall control. In so doing, they need to concretize the principle of freedom of association that is only in general terms guaranteed by the ILO Conventions and Recommendations on freedom of association. But as supervisory bodies, which the Governing Body has established and which are not foreseen in the ILO Constitution, both probably do not have the power to interpret ILO law with binding effect8. This is also the opinion that the CEACR expresses itself in its yearly reports to the ILC when explaining that, “its opinions and recommendations are non-binding”9. As a matter of fact, the Governing Body, when establishing both Committees, could not delegate to them a power that it has never possessed itself: nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet10. According to Article 37(1) of the ILO Constitution, it is within the **competence of the International Court of Justice** to decide upon “any question or dispute relating to the **interpretation of this Constitution** or of any subsequent Convention concluded by the Members in pursuance of the provisions of this Constitution.” Furthermore, the ILC has not established yet under Article 37(2) of the ILO Constitution an ILO Tribunal, competent for an authentic interpretation of Conventions11. However, it **cannot be denied** that this constant interpretative work of CFA and CEACR possesses an **authoritative character** given the high esteem the twenty members of the CEACR -they are all internationally renowned experts in the field of labor law and social security law- and the nine members of the CFA with their specific expertise have. As the CEACR reiterates in its Reports, “[the opinions and recommendations of the Committee] derive their persuasive value from the legitimacy and rationality of the Committee’s work based on its impartiality, experience and expertise”12. Already this interpretative authority of both Committees justifies that **national legislators or courts take into consideration** the views of these supervisory bodies of the ILO when implementing ILO law. Furthermore, the long-standing and uncontradicted interpretation of the principle of freedom of association by CFA and CEACR as well as its recognition by the Member States may be considered as a **subsequent practice** in the application of the ILO Constitution under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1968): such subsequent practices shall be taken into account when interpreting the Agreement. Their constant supervisory practice probably reflects a volonté ultérieure, since other bodies of the ILO also have **recognized a right to strike** as the two above-mentioned Resolutions of the ILC of 1957 and 1970 as well as the constant practice of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards to examine **cases of violation** of the right to strike as **examples for breaches of the principle of freedom of association** demonstrate. As this constant practice of the organs of the ILO has not been contradicted by Member States, there is a **strong presumption** for recognition of a right to strike as a subsequent practice of the ILO under Article 31(3)(b) of the **Vienna Convention** on the Law of Treaties.

#### Credible ICJ solves Global Conflict

Davis 18, Christina L., and Julia C. Morse. "Protecting trade by legalizing political disputes: Why countries bring cases to the international court of justice." International Studies Quarterly 62.4 (2018): 709-722. (Professor of Government, Harvard University)//Elmer

Over the last seventy years, three broad trends have characterized international politics: an increase in economic interdependence between states, a growing number of international institutions, and a decrease in interstate war. Deepening exchanges between countries make states more vulnerable to disruptions in ongoing cooperation (Keohane and Nye, 1977). This vulnerability creates a demand for international institutions to constrain powerful states and preserve cooperative outcomes. As interdependence and institutionalized cooperation increase, they may be linked to a decrease in war (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2000; Russett and Oneal, 2001). A significant body of literature tests the relationship between bilateral trade and conflict, with mixed findings.1 Studies also show correlation between membership in international organizations and avoidance of conflict.2 But despite substantial work on this topic, the relationship between economic interdependence, institutions, and conflict remains ambiguous. How does economic interdependence shape political relations between states? In this paper, we examine the impact of economic interdependence on dispute resolution. More specifically, we ask whether trade increases the probability that countries will use the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ is one of the oldest international courts: established by the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, it began work the following year. Its long history and jurisdiction over many types of disputes make it ideal for analyzing how trade ties affect a country’s decision to seek third party mediation. We find that trade dependence creates demand for the ICJ. As countries develop stronger trading relationships, they are increasingly willing to settle disputes through the Court. This demonstrates a new pathway through which economic interdependence fosters peaceful relations – it encourages states to use legalized forms of dispute settlement. Whereas bilateral mediation efforts often remain secret, when a state files a complaint with the ICJ, it sends a public signal of its peaceful intentions to both governments and economic actors. Through our study of ICJ adjudication, we test how economic interdependence shapes the use of institutions as part of conflict management strategies. At first glance, it seems surprising that countries ever use legal venues to solve disputes. A court cannot change the underlying power distribution between states. Realist theory suggests that international law has no independent power in international affairs. Indeed, the ICJ seems to have been designed with this perspective in mind. For the ICJ to hear a case, both parties to a dispute must either have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court or have agreed to submit the specific dispute to the Court for a judgment. Even after the Court hears a case, states can essentially ignore its ruling since it cannot enforce its judgment. Why would a state bother to file a case under these circumstances? Yet despite these limitations, governments have turned to the ICJ for third-party dispute resolution on a range of issues including territorial claims, political asylum, and environmental damage. Ninety-two countries ranging widely in income and military capacity have participated in 134 ICJ cases since the Court’s inception in 1946. While this represents a small number relative to the total number of economic disputes addressed in the WTO or investment arbitration bodies, it nonetheless constitutes an important area of cooperation. Moreover, if one considers the frequency of usage given a potential dispute, the ICJ record looks strong. For example, perhaps the most common reason that states file cases at the ICJ is due to territorial disputes. Over the period from 1960 to 2000, Huth, Croco and Appel (2011) document 82 unique territorial disputes, and countries filed cases at the ICJ relating to 18 of them – a surprising 22 percent frequency when comparing filed cases to identified potential cases. The ICJ is a significant venue for interstate disputes, forming a key component in the legal structure of the international system. We argue that states use the ICJ to protect trade flows. Intense political disputes create uncertainty, which can depress trade flows. Legal action isolates the problem, minimizing the potential adverse effects on trade flows. Although delegating to an international court is not without costs – states incur high legal fees and risk the possibility of an unfavorable court ruling – these costs are offset by the economic gains from protecting an important trading relationship. Some disputes, of course, have such high stakes that political or strategic costs outweigh all other considerations, just as some trading relationships are so essential that even major disputes will not disrupt ties. On average, however, we argue that governments with higher trade dependence are more likely to decide that gambling on a court decision makes them better off than risking spill-over to trade. Surprisingly, with the exception of studies about economic policy disputes, research on international adjudication has given scarce attention to the role of economic interests. Instead, scholars have emphasized the importance of domestic political institutions, which encourage states engaged in territorial disputes to pursue adjudication as a means to overcome veto players or avoid blame (Simmons, 2002; Allee and Huth, 2006a). Others examine the legal context within a country or specific to the dispute. Mitchell and Powell (2011), for example, pay careful attention to how states view the law, arguing that domestic legal tradition shapes ICJ usage rates. Huth, Croco and Appel (2011) offer a different legal argument, suggesting that the strength of the legal claim shapes a country’s decision to delegate dispute settlement to a legal venue. These theories offer compelling insights, but ignore economic relations. Our theory aims to fill this gap by highlighting the connection between trade and international adjudication. More broadly, understanding the conditions that lead countries to initiate legal action will inform theories about bargaining strategies and conflict behavior (Fang, 2010; Chapman and Wolford, 2010). We assess the empirical implications of our argument through a comprehensive analysis of ICJ filing decisions, and we also revisit research on territorial disputes. We analyze the filing pattern observable in data on more than 190 countries from 1960 to 2013.3 We use several different approaches to identify potential disputes, modeling country characteristics that are associated with the dispute generating process. We first select a politically-relevant sample of countries that are likely to have frequent interaction as neighbors or great powers. Second, we use matching techniques to prune the politically-relevant sample of dyads to a subset with similar propensities for trade. We test our theory by estimating how trade dependence, measured as bilateral trade share of total trade for a potential applicant, changes the likelihood that a state files an ICJ case against its trade partner. Using a logistic regression, we estimate the effect of trade dependence on the probability of filing in a pooled cross-section time series analysis. We also apply conditional logit estimation to focus on variation in selection of respondents among those states that file an ICJ case. The conditional logit estimation helps to control for unobserved variables that may shape a state’s propensity to file cases. Our results show that higher trade dependence increases a country’s likelihood of filing a case against a trade partner. This relationship holds when we examine different sets of potential disputes and control for key variables like contiguity and power asymmetry. We also analyze how trade dependence reduces the likelihood that states use military force to resolve territorial disputes. Data on territorial disputes allows us to examine potential cases where military action looms large as an option for resolving a dispute (Huth, Croco and Appel, 2011). We find that trade dependence shapes a state’s selection of strategy, lowering the likelihood of militarized action. Examining ICJ adjudication and territorial disputes helps to alleviate the concern that an unobservable dyadic measure of political relations generates a spurious relationship between trade and peace.4 By focusing on dispute resolution strategies, we gain insight into an important mechanism by which interdependence changes political relations. Our results demonstrate that trading states are more likely to work out their problems in court and are less likely to exchange fire We argue that countries turn to an international court in order to protect trade flows under conditions of strong economic interdependence. This argument is built on two key assumptions. First, states believe that an international dispute over territory, fishing rights, or another salient issue could harm trade. Second, states view international adjudication as an effective way to end the dispute. Each point merits further discussion as the building blocks for our theory about the economic rationale for turning to law. Given the risk of harm to economic relations and the potential for courts to contribute to conflict resolution, states with high trade value vested in a relationship will be more willing to undertake costly litigation. Extensive debate exists about the relationship between conflict and trade. The premise that conflict disrupts trade is central to the theory of commercial peace. Russett and Oneal (2001) draw on the work of philosopher Immanuel Kant to argue that interdependence deters conflict by raising its costs. According to this line of reasoning, war interrupts trade while peace promotes stable commerce, leading states to calculate that gains of peace are significant compared to the costs of war. Other perspectives focus on the informational role of interdependence to lower uncertainty between states (Reed, 2003). Gartzke, Li and Boehmer (2001) contend economic interdependence allows states to signal their resolve through their willingness to bear economic costs from confrontation.5 A host of empirical studies support the idea that conflict reduces trade (Keshk, Reuveny and Pollins, 2004; Long, 2008). Several potential channels connect trade and conflict, including direct damage to infrastructure and transportation resulting from actual conflict, sanctions policies, and informal discrimination by governments or private actors. In a comprehensive study of data from 1870 - 1997, Glick and Taylor (2010) find that the effect of war on trade is significant and persistent. The negative impact of conflict also extends to foreign direct investment (e.g. Lee and Mitchell, 2012). The negative relationship is not limited to full scale war. Several studies demonstrate that political tensions may also suppress trade (Pollins, 1989; Fuchs and Klann, 2013). In an analysis of the period from 1950 to 1995, Simmons (2005) finds that territorial disputes have a sizable negative impact on trade even in the absence of militarized action. Others suggest states anticipate the potential adverse impact of conflict on trade, and therefore trade less to begin with if they think that war is likely. In such a scenario, the marginal economic costs of war should be insufficient to change a state’s calculation for going to war (Barbieri, 2002; Morrow, 1999). Gowa and Hicks (forthcoming) contend that trade is largely diverted through third party channels, which compensates for having less direct trade with the adversary. In this paper, we assume that leaders and business constituencies on average believe that conflict damages trade relations. Political conflict could lead governments to adopt sanctions against an adversary or to restrict financial flows, and violence is likely to disrupt trading routes and slow the movement of goods from one country to another. Substitution through third parties could alleviate the harm, but this would still increase trade costs. The expected harm to trade underlies the motivation for states to pursue resolution of disputes. When states want to resolve an interstate dispute, why would they choose adjudication rather than negotiations, economic sanctions, or militarized action? In some cases, the decision follows an episode of military conflict as part of an effort to normalize relations. Such a decision may be taken in the immediate aftermath of a conflict or decades later, after a long process of normalization. Indonesia and Malaysia, for example, jointly submitted their territorial dispute over the Sipadan and Ligitan islands to the ICJ in 1998 after three decades of efforts to improve relations following an unofficial war between the countries in the 1960s. In other cases, countries may turn to a legal venue to prevent a problem from ever reaching the stage that could produce serious political tensions or threats of force. Adjudication reshapes the context of diplomatic negotiations. In most disputes, governments pursue negotiations first and only resort to international adjudication when diplomatic avenues have stalled. Initiating legal action reduces outside options as states agree to submit the matter to court proceedings. By taking this step, governments signal both their willingness to forgo the use of force, and their priority to resolve the dispute in a public process. After filing, negotiations often continue alongside the legal procedures, but participants have more information that the matter will neither escalate into violence nor disappear through neglect. The literature offers three broad types of explanations for why states might choose to pursue adjudication: legitimacy, informational benefits, and domestic obstacles to settlement. At the systemic level, international norms have developed to support peaceful conflict resolution over war; these norms are likely to influence the calculations of some states about how to settle disputes. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) contend that rule of law has come to shape the identity of states, which forms a meta-belief affecting views about appropriate action in both the domestic and international spheres. When international law has been established through fair procedures and offers coherent principles, it forms a legitimate source of authority in international affairs that generates an independent “compliance pull” on state behavior (Franck, 1990). International courts combine both legitimacy and authority as they help states solve specific disputes about how to interpret international law; the growing role for international courts in international affairs represents an important trend (Alter, 2014; Alter, Helfer and Madsen, 2015). This significance of the ICJ is supported by findings that the Court has a relatively high level of compliance with its rulings (Schulte, 2004; Mitchell and Hensel, 2007; Llamzon, 2007; Johns, 2011). Legal settlement can help states coordinate policies and produce more cooperative outcomes through the provision of information. A court ruling offers a focal point amidst uncertainty about how to interpret the terms of an agreement (Ginsburg and McAdams, 2004; Huth, Croco and Appel, 2011). As the recordkeeper of past actions, courts support systems of tit-for-tat and reputational enforcement (Milgrom, North and Weingast, 1990; Carrubba, 2005; Mitchell and Hensel, 2007). In these informational theories of courts, states may comply with court rulings in the absence of coercive measures or the threat of sanctions because the reputational costs of non-compliance are too high. Rather than simply interpret law, courts matter because they coordinate expectations about enforcement and engage the attention of third parties (Johns, 2011). In their empirical analysis of territorial disputes, Huth, Croco and Appel (2011) find that strong legal claims significantly increase the likelihood that leaders will negotiate resolutions to their disputes and avoid conflict. International courts also offer a way for states to frame settlement in a way that appeals to domestic audiences (Fang, 2008). Simmons notes that even when the same deal could be reached in negotiations or through a court decision, a negotiated settlement could be viewed as sign of weakness while a legal resolution would be seen as positive cooperation beneficial for future interactions (Simmons, 2002, p. 834). This dynamic occurs because “domestic groups will **find it more attractive to make concessions to** a disinterested institution **than to a political adversary**” (Simmons, 2002, p. 834). In research on several prominent ICJ cases, Fischer (1982) emphasizes the Court has helped governments to save face. Consequently, those governments unable to reach agreements over domestic opposition may find it easier to do so with the involvement of third party ruling. Allee and Huth (2006a) further extend this argument to show that governments with higher levels of domestic political constraints are more likely to choose adjudication over negotiation for settling territorial disputes. Domestic political constraints also increase the probability of filing complaints at the WTO (Davis, 2012).

### DA – Economy

#### Business recovery is strong. Business confidence is high.

Halloran ’9-14 [Michael; 2021; M.B.A. from Carnegie Mellon University, former aerospace research engineer, Equity Strategist; Janney, “Despite Potential Headwinds, Key Labor Market Indicators Bode Well for the Economy,” https://www.janney.com/latest-articles-commentary/all-insights/insights/2021/09/14/despite-potential-headwinds-key-labor-market-indicators-bode-well-for-the-economy]

However, we remain encouraged by the recovery that has been unfolding since the economy began reopening. We continue to see improvement in important cyclical sectors of the economy while consumers are historically healthy and still have pent-up demand. Business confidence has rebounded with strong corporate profits that should support further capital spending and hiring (there are now more job openings than there are unemployed people by a record amount).

We expect to see further improvement in the international backdrop, supported by unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus and accelerating rates of vaccination. Although the impact of the Delta wave is still being felt, recent evidence confirms the effectiveness of vaccines in limiting deaths and hospitalizations. With the pace of vaccination now picking up in the areas most impacted by this wave—Asia and Australia—the case for fading headwinds leading to improving economic growth later this year remains positive.

The signals from financial markets themselves remain positive. Despite consolidating last week, stocks remain near record highs while the 10-year Treasury remains well above the lows of earlier this summer when concerns about Delta first emerged.

These factors support our view of a durable economic recovery from the pandemic that should continue supporting stock prices. A healthy labor market is a critical element for a sustainable recovery that supports profit growth and last week’s news from the labor market remains encouraging.

#### Unions devastate growth and worsen inequality – gains for workers shift costs to other parts of the economy

Epstein 20 [Richard A. Epstein Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institution. "The Decline Of Unions Is Good News." https://www.hoover.org/research/decline-unions-good-news]

This continued trend has elicited howls of protest from union supporters who, of course, want to see an increase in union membership. It has also led several Democratic presidential candidates to make calls to reconfigure labor law. Bernie Sanders wants to double union membership and give federal workers the right to strike, as well as ban at-will contracts of employment, so that any dismissal could be subject to litigation under a “for cause” standard. Not to be outdone, Elizabeth Warren wants to make it illegal for firms to hire permanent replacements for striking workers. They are joined by Pete Buttigieg in demanding a change in federal labor law so that states may no longer pass right-to-work laws that insulate workers from the requirement to pay union dues in unionized firms. All of these new devices are proven job killers.

The arguments in favor of unions are also coming from some unexpected sources in academia, where a conservative case has been put forward on the ground that an increase in union membership is needed to combat job insecurity and economic inequality.

All of these pro-union critiques miss the basic point that the decline of union power is good news, not bad. That conclusion is driven not by some insidious effort to stifle the welfare of workers, but by the simple and profound point that the greatest protection for workers lies in a competitive economy that opens up more doors than it closes. The only way to achieve that result is by slashing the various restrictions that prevent job formation, as Justin Haskins of the Heartland Institute notes in a recent article at The Hill. The central economic insight is that jobs get created only when there is the prospect of gains from trade. Those gains in turn are maximized by cutting the multitude of regulations and taxes that do nothing more than shrink overall wealth by directing social resources to less productive ends.

#### The right to strike causes supply chain disruptions and economic volatility

Epstein 20 [Richard A. Epstein Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institution. "The Decline Of Unions Is Good News." https://www.hoover.org/research/decline-unions-good-news]

Unions are monopoly institutions that raise wages through collective bargaining, not productivity improvements. The ensuing higher labor costs, higher costs of negotiating collective bargaining agreements, and higher labor market uncertainty all undercut the gains to union workers just as they magnify losses to nonunion employers, as well as to the shareholders, suppliers, and customers of these unionized firms. They also increase the risk of market disruption from strikes, lockouts, or firm bankruptcies whenever unions or employers overplay their hands in negotiation. These net losses in capital values reduce the pension fund values of unionized and nonunionized workers alike.

Employers are right to oppose unionization by any means within the law, because any gains for union workers come at the expense of everyone else. Of course, the best way for employers to proceed would be to seek efficiency gains by encouraging employee input into workplace operations—firms are quite willing to pay for good suggestions that lower cost or raise output. But such direct communications between workers and management are blocked by Section 8(a)(2) the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which mandates strict separation between workers and firms. This lowers overall productivity and often prevents entry-level employees from rising through the ranks.

#### Recessions cause global crises – ensuring continued growth is key

Baird ’20 [Zoe; October 2020; C.E.O. and President of the Markle Foundation, Member of the Aspen Strategy Group and former Trustee at the Council on Foreign Relations, J.D. and A.B. from the University of California at Berkeley; Domestic and International (Dis)order: A Strategic Response, “Equitable Economic Recovery is a National Security Imperative,” Ch. 13]

A strong and inclusive economy is essential for American national security and global leadership. As the nation seeks to return from a historic economic crisis, the national security community should support an equitable recovery that helps every worker adapt to the seismic shifts underway in our economy.

Broadly shared economic prosperity is a bedrock of America’s economic and political strength—both domestically and in the international arena. A strong and equitable recovery from the economic crisis created by COVID-19 would be a powerful testament to the resilience of the American system and its ability to create prosperity at a time of seismic change and persistent global crisis. Such a recovery could attack the profound economic inequities that have developed over the past several decades. Without bold action to help all workers access good jobs as the economy returns, the United States risks undermining the legitimacy of its institutions and its international standing. The outcome will be a key determinant of America’s national security for years to come.

An equitable recovery requires a national commitment to help all workers obtain good jobs—particularly the two-thirds of adults without a bachelor’s degree and people of color who have been most affected by the crisis and were denied opportunity before it. As the nation engages in a historic debate about how to accelerate economic recovery, ambitious public investment is necessary to put Americans back to work with dignity and opportunity. We need an intentional effort to make sure that the jobs that come back are good jobs with decent wages, benefits, and mobility and to empower workers to access these opportunities in a profoundly changed labor market.

To achieve these goals, American policy makers need to establish job growth strategies that address urgent public needs through major programs in green energy, infrastructure, and health. Alongside these job growth strategies, we need to recognize and develop the talents of workers by creating an adult learning system that meets workers’ needs and develops skills for the digital economy. The national security community must lend its support to this cause. And as it does so, it can bring home the lessons from the advances made in these areas in other countries, particularly our European allies, and consider this a realm of international cooperation and international engagement.

Shared Economic Prosperity Is a National Security Asset

A strong economy is essential to America’s security and diplomatic strategy. Economic strength increases our influence on the global stage, expands markets, and funds a strong and agile military and national defense. Yet it is not enough for America’s economy to be strong for some—prosperity must be broadly shared. Widespread belief in the ability of the American economic system to create economic security and mobility for all—the American Dream— creates credibility and legitimacy for America’s values, governance, and alliances around the world.

After World War II, the United States grew the middle class to historic size and strength. This achievement made America the model of the free world—setting the stage for decades of American political and economic leadership. Domestically, broad participation in the economy is core to the legitimacy of our democracy and the strength of our political institutions. A belief that the economic system works for millions is an important part of creating trust in a democratic government’s ability to meet the needs of the people.

The COVID-19 Crisis Puts Millions of American Workers at Risk

For the last several decades, the American Dream has been on the wane. Opportunity has been increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small share of workers able to access the knowledge economy. Too many Americans, particularly those without four-year degrees, experienced stagnant wages, less stability, and fewer opportunities for advancement.

Since COVID-19 hit, millions have lost their jobs or income and are struggling to meet their basic needs—including food, housing, and medical care.1 The crisis has impacted sectors like hospitality, leisure, and retail, which employ a large share of America’s most economically vulnerable workers, resulting in alarming disparities in unemployment rates along education and racial lines. In August, the unemployment rate for those with a high school degree or less was more than double the rate for those with a bachelor’s degree.2 Black and Hispanic Americans are experiencing disproportionately high unemployment, with the gulf widening as the crisis continues.3

The experience of the Great Recession shows that without intentional effort to drive an inclusive recovery, inequality may get worse: while workers with a high school education or less experienced the majority of job losses, nearly all new jobs went to workers with postsecondary education. Inequalities across racial lines also increased as workers of color worked in the hardest-hit sectors and were slower to recover earnings and income than White workers.4

The Case for an Inclusive Recovery

A recovery that promotes broad economic participation, renewed opportunity, and equity will strengthen American moral and political authority around the world. It will send a strong message about the strength and resilience of democratic government and the American people’s ability to adapt to a changing global economic landscape. An inclusive recovery will reaffirm American leadership as core to the success of our most critical international alliances, which are rooted in the notion of shared destiny and interdependence. For example, NATO, which has been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and a force of global stability for decades, has suffered from American disengagement in recent years. A strong American recovery—coupled with a renewed openness to international collaboration—is core to NATO’s ability to solve shared geopolitical and security challenges. A renewed partnership with our European allies from a position of economic strength will enable us to address global crises such as climate change, global pandemics, and refugees. Together, the United States and Europe can pursue a commitment to investing in workers for shared economic competitiveness, innovation, and long-term prosperity.

The U.S. has unique advantages that give it the tools to emerge from the crisis with tremendous economic strength— including an entrepreneurial spirit and the technological and scientific infrastructure to lead global efforts in developing industries like green energy and biosciences that will shape the international economy for decades to come.

### 1NC – Framing

#### Frame all their arguments through several filters:

#### Their evidence doesn’t assume the mechanics of debate, i.e. dropped arguments are presumed to be true.

#### CP and turns case prove we access their framing and have an intent to solve for structural violence.

#### Don’t prioritize probability – weigh impacts using expected value – magnitude times probability is best

Harris & Bender 17 (John, Politico editor-in-chief, & Bryan, Politico national security editor. "Bill Perry Is Terrified. Why Aren't You?". Interview with Bill Perry, mathematician, engineer, businessman and former Secretary of Defense. Currently the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (emeritus) at Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering. He is also a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. He serves as director of the Preventive Defense Project. He is an expert in U.S. foreign policy, national security and arms control. In 2013 he founded the William J Perry Project (http://www.wjperryproject.org/), a non-profit effort to educate the public on the current dangers of nuclear weapons. [www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/william-perry-nuclear-weapons-proliferation-214604](http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/william-perry-nuclear-weapons-proliferation-214604))

Perry wishes more people were familiar with the concept of “expected value.” That is a statistical way of understanding events of very large magnitude that have a low probability. The large magnitude event could be something good, like winning a lottery ticket. Or it could be something bad, like a nuclear bomb exploding. Because the odds of winning the lottery are so low, the rational thing is to save your money and not buy the ticket. As for a nuclear explosion, by Perry’s lights, the consequences are so grave that the rational thing would be for people in the United States and everywhere to be in a state of peak alarm about their vulnerability, and for political debate to be dominated by discussion of how to reduce the risk. And just how high is the risk? The answer of course is ultimately unknowable. Perry’s point, though, is that it’s a hell of a lot higher than you think. Perry invites his listeners to consider all the various scenarios that might lead to a nuclear event. “Mathematically speaking, you add those all together in one year it is still just a possibility, not a probability,” he reckons. “But then you go out ten, twenty years and each time this possibility repeats itself, and then it starts to become a probability. How much time we have to get those possibility numbers lower, I don’t know. But sooner or later the odds are going to get us, I am afraid.” \*\*\* Almost uniquely among living Americans, Bill Perry has actually faced down the prospect of nuclear war before—twice. In the fall of 1962, Bill Perry was 35, father of five young children, living in the Bay Area and serving as director of Sylvania’s Electronic Defense Laboratories—driving his station wagon to recitals in between studying missile trajectories and the radius of nuclear detonations. Where he resided was not then called Silicon Valley, but the exuberance and spirit of creative possibility we now associate with the region was already evident. The giants then were Bill Hewlett and David Packard, men Perry deeply admired and wished to emulate in his own business career. The innovation engine at that time, however, was not consumer technology; it was the government’s appetite for advantage in a mortal struggle against a powerful Soviet foe. Perry was known as a star in the highly complex field of weapons surveillance and interpretation. So it was not a surprise, one bright October day, for Perry to get a call from Albert “Bud” Wheelon, a friend at the Central Intelligence Agency. Wheelon said he wanted Perry in Washington for a consultation. Perry said he’d juggle his schedule and be there the next week. “No,” Wheelon responded. “I need to see you right away.” Perry caught the red-eye from San Francisco, and went straight to the CIA, where he was handed photographs whose meaning was instantly clear to him. They were of Soviet missiles stationed in Cuba. For the next couple weeks, Perry would stay up past midnight each evening poring over the latest reconnaissance photos and help write the analysis that senior officials would present the next morning to President Kennedy. Perry experienced the crisis partly as ordinary citizen, hearing Kennedy on television draw an unambiguous line against Soviet missiles in this hemisphere and promising that any attack would be met with “a full retaliatory response.” But he possessed context, about the capabilities of weapons and the daily state of play in the crisis, that gave him a vantage point superior to that of all but perhaps a few dozen people. “I was part of a small team—six or eight people,” he recounted of those days 54 years earlier. “Half of them technical experts, half of them intelligence analysts, or photo interpreters. It was a minor role but I was seeing all the information coming in. I thought every day when I went back to the hotel it was the last day of my life because I knew exactly what nuclear weapons could do. I knew it was not just a lot of people getting killed. It was the end of civilization and I thought it was about to happen.” It was years later that Perry, like other more senior participants in the crisis, learned how right that appraisal was. Nuclear bombs weren’t only heading toward Cuba on Soviet ships, as Kennedy believed and announced to Americans at the time. Some of them were already there, and local commanders had been given authority to use them if Americans launched a preemptive raid on Cuba, as Kennedy was being urged, goaded even, by Air Force Gen. Curtis LeMay and other military commanders. At the same time, Soviet submarines were armed and one commander had been on the verge of launching them until other officers on the vessel talked him out of it. Either event would have in turn sent U.S. missiles flying. The Cuban Missile Crisis recounting is one of the dramatic peaks in “My Journey on the Nuclear Brink,” the memoir Perry published last fall. It is a book laced with other close calls—like November 9, 1979, when Perry was awakened in the middle of the night by a watch officer at the North American Aerospace and Defense Command (NORAD) reporting that his computers showed 200 Soviet missiles in flight toward the United States. For a frozen moment, Perry thought: This is it—This is how it ends. The watch officer soon set him at ease. It was a computer error, and he was calling to see whether Perry, the technology expert, had any explanation. It took a couple days to discover the low-tech answer: Someone had carelessly left a crisis-simulation training tape in the computer. All was well. But what if this blunder had happened in the middle of a real crisis, with leaders in Washington and Moscow already on high alert? The inescapable conclusion was the same as it was in 1962: The world skirting nuclear Armageddon as much by good luck as by skilled crisis management. Perry is part of a distinct cohort in American history, one that didn’t come home with the large-living ethos of the World War II generation, but took responsibility for cleaning up the world that the war bequeathed. He was a 14-year-old in Butler, Pennsylvania when he heard the news of the Pearl Harbor attack in a friend’s living room, and had the disappointed realization that the war might be over by the time he was old enough to fight in it. That turned out to be true—he was just shy of 18 at war’s end—a fact that places Perry in what demographers have called the “Silent Generation,” too young for one war but already middle-aged by the time college campuses erupted over Vietnam. Like many in his generation, Perry was not so much silent as deeply dutiful, with an understated style that served as a genial, dry-witted exterior to a life in which success was defined by how faithfully one met his responsibilities. Perry said he became aware, first gradually and over time profoundly, of the surreal contradictions of his professional life. His work—first at Sylvania and then at ESL, a highly successful defense contracting firm he co-founded in 1963—was relentlessly logical, analyzing Soviet threats and intentions and coming up with rational responses to deter them. But each rational move was part of a supremely irrational dynamic—“mutually assured destruction”—that placed the threat of massive casualties at the heart of America’s basic strategic thinking. It was the kind of framework in which policymakers could accept that a mere 25 million people dead was good news. Also the kind that in one year alone led the United States to produce 8,000 nuclear bombs. By the end, the Cold War left the planet with about 70,000 bombs (a total that is now down to about 15,500). “I think probably everybody who was involved in nuclear weapons in those days would see the two sides of it,” Perry recalls, “the logic of deterrence and the madness of deterrence, and there was no mistake, I think, that the acronym was MAD.” \*\*\* Perry has been at the forefront of a movement that he considers the sane and only alternative, and he has joined forces with other leading Cold Warriors who in another era would likely have derided their vision as naïve. In January 2007, he was a co-author of a remarkable commentary that ran on the op-ed page of the Wall Street Journal. It was signed also by two former secretaries of state, George Schulz and Henry Kissinger and by Sam Nunn, a former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee—all leading military hawks and foreign policy realists who came together to argue for something radical: that the goal of U.S. policy should be not merely the reduction and control of atomic arms, it should be the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons. This sounded like gauzy utopianism, especially bizarre coming from supremely pragmatic men. But Perry and the others always made clear they were describing a long-term ideal, one that would only be achieved through a series of more incremental steps. The vision was stirring enough that it was endorsed by President Obama in his opening weeks in office, in a March 2009 address in Prague. In retrospect, Obama’s speech may have been the high point for the vision of abolition. “A huge amount of progress was made,” recalled Shultz, now 93. “Now it is going in the other direction.” “We have less danger of an all-out war with Russia,” in Nunn’s view. “But we have more danger of some type of accident, miscalculation, cyber interference, a terrorist group getting a nuclear weapon. It requires a lot more attention than world leaders are giving it.” Perry’s goal now is much more defensive than it was just a few years ago—halting what has become inexorable momentum toward reviving Cold War assumptions about the central role of nukes in national security. More recently he’s added yet another recruit to his cause: California Governor Jerry Brown. Brown, now 78, met Perry a year ago, after deciding that he wanted to devote his remaining time in public service mainly to what he sees as civilization’s two existential issues, climate change and nuclear weapons. Brown said he became fixated on spreading Perry’s message after reading his memoir: He recently gave a copy to President Obama and is trying to bend the ear of others with influence in Washington. If Bill Perry has a gift for understatement, Brown has a gift for the theatrical. In an interview at the governor’s mansion in Sacramento, he wonders why everyone is not paying attention to his new friend and his warnings for mankind. “He is at the brink! At the brink! Not WAS at the brink—IS at the brink,” Brown exclaimed. “But no one else is.” A California governor can have more influence, at least indirectly, than one might think, due to the state’s outsized role in policy debates and the fact that the University of California’s Board of Regents helps manage some of the nation’s top weapons laboratories, which study and design nuclear weapons. Brown, who was a vocal critic in the 1980s of what he called America's "nuclear addiction," reviewed Perry's recent memoir in the New York Review of Books, and said he is determined to help his new friend spread his message. “Everybody is, 'we are not at the brink,' and we have this guy Perry who says we are. It is the thesis that is being ignored." Even if more influential people wake up to Perry’s message—a nuclear event is more likely and will be more terrible than you realize—a hard questions remains: Now what? This is where Perry’s pragmatism comes back into play. The smartest move, he thinks, is to eliminate the riskiest part of the system. If we can’t eliminate all nukes, Perry argues, we could at least eliminate one leg of the so-called nuclear triad, intercontinental ballistic missiles. These are especially prone to an accidental nuclear war, if they are launched by accident or due to miscalculation by a leader operating with only minutes to spare. Nuclear weapons carried by submarines beneath the sea or aboard bomber planes, he argues, are logically more than enough to deter Russia. The problem, he knows, is that logic is not necessarily the prevailing force in political debates. Psychology is, and this seems to be dictating not merely that we deter a Russian military force that is modernizing its weapons but that we have a force that is self-evidently superior to them. It is an argument that strikes Perry as drearily familiar to the old days. Which leads him the conclusion that the only long-term way out is to persuade a younger generation to make a different choice. His granddaughter, Lisa Perry, is precisely in the cohort he needs to reach. At first she had some uncomfortable news for her grandfather: Not many in her generation thought much about the issue. “The more I learned from him about nuclear weapons the more concerned I was that my generation had this massive and dangerous blind spot in our understanding of the world,” she said in an interview. “Nuclear weapons are the biggest public health issue I can think of.” But she has not lost hope that their efforts can make a difference, and today she has put her graduate studies in public health on hold to work full time for the Perry Project as its social media and web manager. “It can be easy to get discouraged about being able to do anything to change our course,” she said. “But the good news is that nuclear weapons are actually something that we as humans can control...but first we need to start the conversation.” It was with her help that Perry went on Reddit to field questions ranging from how his PhD in mathematics prepared him to what young people need to understand. “As a 90s baby I never lived in the Cold War era,” wrote one participant, with the Reddit username BobinForApples. “What is one thing today's generations will never understand about life during the Cold War?” Perry’s answered, as SecDef19: “Because you were born in the 1990s, you did not experience the daily terror of ‘duck and cover’ drills as my children did. Therefore the appropriate fear of nuclear weapons is not part of your heritage, but the danger is just as real now as it was then. It will be up to your generation to develop the policies to deal with the deadly nuclear legacy that is still very much with us.” For the former defense secretary, the task now is to finally—belatedly—prove Einstein wrong. The physicist said in 1946: “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” In Perry’s view the only way to avoid it is by directly contemplating catastrophe—and doing so face to face with the world’s largest nuclear power, Russia, as he recently did in a forum in Luxembourg with several like-minded Russians he says are brave enough to speak out about nuclear dangers in the era of Putin. “We could solve it,” he said. “When you’re a prophet of doom, what keeps you going is not just prophesizing doom but saying there are things we do to avoid that doom. That’s where the optimism is.”

#### Their args about rejecting ILs justify policy and plans generally don’t solve so vote neg on presumption.

#### Existential risks outweigh.

Ord 20. Toby Ord, Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford University & world-renowned risk-assessment expert who’s advised the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, the US National Intelligence Council and the UK Prime Minister’s Office. (3-3-2020, “The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity,” Hachette Book Group & Bloomsbury Publishing, <https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Precipice/3aSiDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0>, Google Books)//pacc + AM \*bracketed for clarity\*

UNDERSTANDING EXISTENTIAL RISK

Humanity’s future is ripe with possibility. We have achieved a rich understanding of the world we inhabit and a level of health and prosperity of which our ancestors could only dream. We have begun to explore the other worlds in the heavens above us, and to create virtual worlds completely beyond our ancestors’ comprehension. We know of almost no limits to what we might ultimately achieve.

Human extinction would foreclose our future. It would destroy our potential. It would eliminate all possibilities but one: a world ~~bereft~~ [lacking] of human flourishing. Extinction would bring about this failed world and lock it in forever—there would be no coming back.

The philosopher Nick Bostrom showed that extinction is not the only way this could happen: there are other catastrophic outcomes in which we lose not just the present, but all our potential for the future.

Consider a world in ruins: an immense catastrophe has triggered a global collapse of civilization, reducing humanity to a pre-agricultural state. During this catastrophe, the Earth’s environment was damaged so severely that it has become impossible for the survivors to ever reestablish civilization. Even if such a catastrophe did not cause our extinction, it would have a similar effect on our future. The vast realm of futures currently open to us would have collapsed to a narrow range of meager options. We would have a failed world with no way back.

Or consider a world in chains: in a future reminiscent of George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, the entire world has become locked under the rule of an oppressive totalitarian regime, determined to perpetuate itself. Through powerful, technologically enabled indoctrination, surveillance and enforcement, it has become impossible for even a handful of dissidents to find each other, let alone stage an uprising. With everyone on Earth living under such rule, the regime is stable from threats, internal and external. If such a regime could be maintained indefinitely, then descent into this totalitarian future would also have much in common with extinction: just a narrow range of terrible futures remaining, and no way out.

[FIGURE 2.1 Omitted]

Following Bostrom, I shall call these “existential catastrophes,” defining them as follows: 3

An existential catastrophe is the destruction of humanity’s longterm potential.

An existential risk is a risk that threatens the destruction of humanity’s longterm potential.

These definitions capture the idea that the outcome of an existential catastrophe is both dismal and irrevocable. We will not just fail to fulfill our potential, but this very potential itself will be permanently lost. While I want to keep the official definitions succinct, there are several areas that warrant clarification.

First, I am understanding humanity’s longterm potential in terms of the set of all possible futures that remain open to us. 4 This is an expansive idea of possibility, including everything that humanity could eventually achieve, even if we have yet to invent the means of achieving it. 5 But it follows that while our choices can lock things in, closing off possibilities, they can’t open up new ones. So any reduction in humanity’s potential should be understood as permanent. The challenge of our time is to preserve our vast potential, and to protect it against the risk of future destruction. The ultimate purpose is to allow our descendants to fulfill our potential, realizing one of the best possible futures open to us.

While it may seem abstract at this scale, this is really a familiar idea that we encounter every day. Consider a child with high longterm potential: with futures open to her in which she leads a great life. It is important that her potential is preserved: that her best futures aren’t cut off due to accident, trauma or lack of education. It is important that her potential is protected: that we build in safeguards to make such a loss of potential extremely unlikely. And it is important that she ultimately fulfills her potential: that she ends up taking one of the best paths open to her. So too for humanity.

Existential risks threaten the destruction of humanity’s potential. This includes cases where this destruction is complete (such as extinction) and where it is nearly complete, such as a permanent collapse of civilization in which the possibility for some very minor types of flourishing remain, or where there remains some remote chance of recovery. 6 I leave the thresholds vague, but it should be understood that in any existential catastrophe the greater part of our potential is gone and very little remains.

Second, my focus on humanity in the definitions is not supposed to exclude considerations of the value of the environment, other animals, successors to Homo sapiens, or creatures elsewhere in the cosmos. It is not that I think only humans count. Instead, it is that humans are the only beings we know of that are responsive to moral reasons and moral argument—the beings who can examine the world and decide to do what is best. If we fail, that upward force, that capacity to push toward what is best or what is just, will vanish from the world.

Our potential is a matter of what humanity can achieve through the combined actions of each and every human. The value of our actions will stem in part from what we do to and for humans, but it will depend on the effects of our actions on non-humans too. If we somehow give rise to new kinds of moral agents in the future, the term “humanity” in my definition should be taken to include them.

My focus on humanity prevents threats to a single country or culture from counting as existential risks. There is a similar term that gets used this way—when people say that something is “an existential threat to this country.” Setting aside the fact that these claims are usually hyperbole, they are expressing a similar idea: that something threatens to permanently destroy the longterm potential of a country or culture.

Third, any notion of risk must involve some kind of probability. What kind is involved in existential risk? Understanding the probability in terms of objective long-run frequencies won’t work, as the existential catastrophes we are concerned with can only ever happen once, and will always be unprecedented until the moment it is too late. We can’t say the probability of an existential catastrophe is precisely zero just because it hasn’t happened yet.

Situations like these require an evidential sense of probability, which describes the appropriate degree of belief we should have on the basis of the available information. This is the familiar type of probability used in courtrooms, banks and betting shops. When I speak of the probability of an existential catastrophe, I will mean the credence humanity should have that it will occur, in light of our best evidence.9

There are many utterly terrible outcomes that do not count as existential catastrophes.

One way this could happen is if there were no single precipitous event, but a multitude of smaller failures. This is because I take on the usual sense of catastrophe as a single, decisive event, rather than any combination of events that is bad in sum. If we were to squander our future simply by continually treating each other badly, or by never getting around to doing anything great, this could be just as bad an outcome but wouldn’t have come about via a catastrophe.

Alternatively, there might be a single catastrophe, but one that leaves open some way for humanity to eventually recover. From our own vantage, looking out to the next few generations, this may appear equally bleak. But a thousand years hence it may be considered just one of several dark episodes in the human story. A true existential catastrophe must by its very nature be the decisive moment of human history—the point where we failed.

Even catastrophes large enough to bring about the global collapse of civilization may fall short of being existential catastrophes. While colloquially referred to as “the end of the world,” a global collapse of civilization need not be the end of the human story. It has the required severity, but may not be permanent or irrevocable.

In this book, I shall use the term civilization collapse quite literally, to refer to an outcome where humanity across the globe loses civilization (at least temporarily), being reduced to a pre-agricultural way of life. The term is often used loosely to refer merely to a massive breakdown of order, the loss of modern technology, or an end to our culture. But I am talking about a world without writing, cities, law, or any of the other trappings of civilization.

This would be a very severe disaster and extremely hard to trigger. For all the historical pressures on civilizations, never once has this happened— not even on the scale of a continent.10 The fact that Europe survived losing 25 to 50 percent of its population in the Black Death, while keeping civilization firmly intact, suggests that triggering the collapse of civilization would require more than 50 percent fatality in every region of the world.11

Even if civilization did collapse, it is likely that it could be reestablished. As we have seen, civilization has already been independently established at least seven times by isolated peoples.12 While one might think resource depletion could make this harder, it is more likely that it has become substantially easier. Most disasters short of human extinction would leave our domesticated animals and plants, as well as copious material resources in the ruins of our cities—it is much easier to re-forge iron from old railings than to smelt it from ore. Even expendable resources such as coal would be much easier to access, via abandoned reserves and mines, than they ever were in the eighteenth century. 13 Moreover, evidence that civilization is possible, and the tools and knowledge to help rebuild, would be scattered across the world.

There are, however, two close connections between the collapse of civilization and existential risk. First, a collapse would count as an existential catastrophe if it were unrecoverable. For example, it is conceivable that some form of extreme climate change or engineered plague might make the planet so inhospitable that humanity would be irrevocably reduced to scattered foragers.14 And second, a global collapse of civilization could increase the chance of extinction, by leaving us more vulnerable to subsequent catastrophe.

One way a collapse could lead to extinction is if the population of the largest remaining group fell below the minimum viable population—the level needed for a population to survive. There is no precise figure for this, as it is usually defined probabilistically and depends on many details of the situation: where the population is, what technology they have access to, the sort of catastrophe they have suffered. Estimates range from hundreds of people up to tens of thousands.15 If a catastrophe directly reduces human population to below these levels, it will be more useful to classify it as a direct extinction event, rather than an unrecoverable collapse. And I expect that this will be one of the more common pathways to extinction.

We rarely think seriously about risks to humanity’s entire potential. We encounter them mostly in action films, where our emotional reactions are dulled by their overuse as an easy way to heighten the drama.16 Or we see them in online lists of “ten ways the world could end,” aimed primarily to thrill and entertain. Since the end of the Cold War, we rarely encounter sober discussions by our leading thinkers on what extinction would mean for us, our cultures or humanity. 17 And so in casual contexts people are sometimes flippant about the prospect of human extinction.

But when a risk is made vivid and credible—when it is clear that billions of lives and all future generations are actually on the line—the importance of protecting humanity’s longterm potential is not, for most people, controversial. If we learned that a large asteroid was heading toward Earth, posing a greater than 10 percent chance of human extinction later this century, there would be little debate about whether to make serious efforts to build a deflection system, or to ignore the issue and run the risk. To the contrary, responding to the threat would immediately become one of the world’s top priorities. Thus our lack of concern about these threats is much more to do with not yet believing that there are such threats, than it is about seriously doubting the immensity of the stakes.

Yet it is important to spend a little while trying to understand more clearly the different sources of this importance. Such an understanding can buttress feeling and inspire action; it can bring to light new considerations; and it can aid in decisions about how to set our priorities.

#### Prefer consequentialist utilitarianism over intent-based ethics

Greene 2010 – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University (The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf)

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood what Kant and like-minded deontologists are all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get characteristically deontological answers. Some will be tautological: "Because it's murder!" Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

### 1NC – Oppression

#### ROB – vote for the team that does the better debating – anything else is self-serving or arbitrary and prefers one team over another

#### No impact to their aff’s performance – them reading Spanish to me has no consequence because they made no attempt to have me engage in it or understand it.

#### They have no framework in this round or clear explanation for any sort of out of round impact.

#### It is probably worse to assume that spreading through Spanish at 300 WPM will somehow resolve oppression and increase education. Turn --