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### Adv

#### Plan: A Just Hungary ought to recognize the right of workers to strike.

#### 1] The Hungarian Appeal Court undemocratically ruled that air traffic workers don’t have the right to strike now

ETWF 8/5 [European Transport Workers Federation. August 5, 2021. “Hungary: Stop denying air traffic workers their right to strike” [ETF: European Transport Workers' Federation | Hungary: Stop denying air traffic workers their right to strike - ETF: European Transport Workers' Federation (etf-europe.org)](https://www.etf-europe.org/hungary-stop-denying-air-traffic-workers-their-right-to-strike/) Accessed 11/8 // gord0]

The air traffic workers at Hungarian Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP)- HungaroControl are currently illegally forbidden to organise any strike.

After the negotiations between HungaroControl trade union and the Hungarian Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) had failed, a decision of the Hungarian Appeal Court from 20th of July 2021 clearly confirms their legal right to strike.

But, on the 26th of July, on the back of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Hungarian Government published two decrees that contradict the Appeal Courts’ decision. These two decrees not only dismiss the decision of the Hungarian Appeal Court but also violates Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

These seem to be clear intimidations orchestrated by the Hungarian government against their own air traffic workers and, at the same time, an abusive interference from the Hungarian Government into the provision of the Hungarian air navigation services.

It is inconceivable that such a thing would happen in any of the EU Member States. There is no place for interpretations: collective representation and collective bargaining are basic labour rights that must be equally respected within all 27 EU Member States!

Say NO to this new violation of the rule of law by the Hungarian Government and NO to union busting at HungaroControl air traffic workers!

#### 2] Orban is responsible for the decrees

Cseresnyes 7/27 [Peter, July 27, 2021. “Orbán Gov’t Prohibits Air Traffic Controllers’ Planned Strike” [Orbán Gov't Prohibits Air Traffic Controllers' Planned Strike (hungarytoday.hu)](https://hungarytoday.hu/orban-govt-prohibits-air-traffic-controllers-planned-strike/) Accessed 11/8 //gord0]

The government has introduced [two new decrees](https://magyarkozlony.hu/dokumentumok/4bf18ce43d5eda4be4a7d07291d00febddef4dcf/megtekintes) that seek to [prevent](https://24.hu/fn/gazdasag/2021/07/27/orban-viktor-ferihegy-sztrajk-veszelyhelyzet/) the air traffic control staff in Hungary from going on strikes, citing the ongoing state-of-emergency situation. The new legislations were published shortly after pro-government paper, *Magyar Nemzet,* [reported](https://magyarnemzet.hu/gazdasag/sztrajkra-keszulnek-a-legi-iranyitok-ferihegyen-10128764/) that air traffic controllers at Budapest Airport were planning to go on an indefinite strike as early as this Tuesday.

The trade union of Hungarian air traffic controllers at Budapest’s Liszt Ferenc International Airport may go on an indefinite strike, *Magyar Nemzet* reported on Monday.

Industry sources told the paper that negotiations between the state-owned air traffic control provider HungaroControl and the company’s three trade unions have been ongoing for three years.  Although agreements with two of them have been reached, wage negotiations with the Control Trade Union of Hungarian Air Traffic Controllers (CMLISZ) have not concluded successfully. Therefore, employees of the company decided to stop working as early as Tuesday.

According to the newspaper, the outcome of the negotiations was also influenced by the fact that the airline has suffered a 60% drop in traffic since March 2020 compared to the same period in 2019, which has led to a similar drop in revenue and a radical reduction in the workload of air traffic controllers of up to 30%. This June, HungaroControl proposed a five percent annual pay increase for the period of 2021-2023, 15% in total to the CMLISZ. The trade union, however, did not find the rate of increase acceptable and claimed that they would go on an indefinite strike.

It seems the two new decrees signed by PM Viktor Orbán and published in Hungary’s official gazette, *Magyar Közlöny,* on Monday are trying to prevent precisely that, however.

In addition to the regulation titled “Measures necessary to ensure the safety of air transport during a state of danger and the swift transport of equipment essential to protect against Covid,” another regulation has been published stating: “air traffic controllers and aeronautical information service officers employed by the civil air traffic control service shall, in accordance with the instructions of the civil air traffic control service, carry out the duties of on-the-job training and further training, and where other statutory conditions so require, fulfill the conditions necessary for the maintenance of the license authorizing them to exercise the privileges of that activity.”

#### 3] Hungary is trapped in a middle ground – authoritarian backsliding is not inevitable, but it’s likely now

Collins 19 Will Collins is a high school teacher in Eger, Hungary. May 6, 2019. “The New Authoritarian Hungary That Isn’t” [The New Authoritarian Hungary That Isn’t – Palladium (palladiummag.com)](https://palladiummag.com/2019/05/06/the-new-authoritarian-hungary-that-isnt/) Accessed 11/9 //gord0]

“Orbán” is Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian prime minister and international avatar of right-wing populism. Before Trump, Salvini, and Brexit, there was Orbán. Since his election as Prime Minister in 2010—following an earlier period in the same office from 1998 to 2002—he has defied traditional barometers of global influence to become a genuinely consequential figure outside Hungary’s borders. To his supporters, Orbán is a vital check on European Union overreach, mass migration, and the excesses of cultural liberalism. To his critics, Orbán is a budding authoritarian, someone who has more in common with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping than his fellow European heads-of-state.

Hungarian directness is an interesting window into the country’s culture. From talking frankly about sex, to relaxed habits of dress, to a certain fondness for casual vulgarity, Hungarians are generally unconcerned with what we might call bourgeois norms. “Budafcknpest,” the capital’s unofficial slogan, adorns signs, stores, and T-shirts throughout the city. Depending on who you ask, Hungary is either the last hope of Christian Europe or a reactionary outpost of hidebound traditionalism. It is also awash in garish tattoos, exotic piercings, and thigh-hugging mini skirts.

Why are bourgeois norms so thin on the ground in Hungary? The simplest explanation is that the country’s bourgeois epoch was notably short-lived. The urban middle class did enjoy a brief period of ascendance in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Before World War I, Budapest’s famous cafes were populated by writers, journalists, and other liberal intellectuals, while a self-consciously Anglophilic upper class modeled its habits and genteel liberalism on British society. Then came war, and a nationalistic, rural reaction to bourgeois, cosmopolitan Budapest that produced [Admiral Horthy’s interwar regency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikl%C3%B3s_Horthy). The Second World War and Communism destroyed what was left of the urban middle class and the liberal upper crust.

Hungary’s flirtations with Western Europe have always been interrupted by invaders from the East. The medieval kingdom reached its apex under a French dynasty but was crippled by the Mongols and then defeated and occupied by the Turks. Following the Habsburg conquest, Hungary rejoined Europe as an eastern outpost of the continent’s most sclerotic Great Power. The defeated but independent Hungarian state that emerged from World War I balanced its authoritarian and revanchist tendencies with a loose adherence to the norms and procedures of Western parliamentary democracies. This vestigial liberalism was swept away by World War II and the Red Army, the latest invader to sever Hungary from the western half of the continent.

Hungary seems trapped in a liminal state, forever tilting between Eastern and Western Europe. You could say the same of many Eastern European countries, but the precarity of Hungary’s position is particularly striking because of its geographic and cultural proximity to the West. When crossing into Austria from Hungary, you won’t notice any profound geographic or architectural changes. The Great Pannonian Plain stretches on, and the buildings and churches on both sides of the border are almost indistinguishable. “It’s as if they took a Hungarian neighborhood and power-washed it,” a friend once remarked while driving through a small Austrian town. One wonders how things would look if the Turks had captured Vienna, or if the Red Army hadn’t withdrawn from Eastern Austria in 1955.

Political scientists have struggled to define the strange middle ground that Hungary now occupies. None of the academic terminology is particularly satisfying. A “transitional democracy” raises the question of what, exactly, Eastern Europe is transitioning towards. The Western European model has been tarnished by economic stagnation and political conflict, and Hungarians are unlikely to be enticed by the prospect of becoming a miniature, landlocked version of the United States. “Competitive autocracy” implies a degree of authoritarianism that does not exist. “Managed democracy” sounds like it could apply to any country with institutional checks on majoritarian rule.

Hungary’s status is ambiguous, but Orbán’s critics are not always wrong. State-backed media outlets usually parrot the ruling Fidesz party’s talking points, and the scarcity of independent journalism is noticeable. The media landscape is particularly barren in rural areas, where alternative outlets are scarce and most older, Fidesz-leaning voters get their news from slanted state TV programs. The December 2018 protests in Budapest that erupted over a [controversial change](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46651428) to the country’s labor laws culminated in opposition political leaders trying (and failing) to get a hearing on state television.

#### 4] Reversing status quo strike rules is key – uniquely cements authoritarianism

Verseck 18 Keno. December 17, 2018. “Hungarians protest draconian 'slave law' as Orban cracks down on dissent” [Hungarians protest draconian ′slave law′ as Orban cracks down on dissent | Europe | News and current affairs from around the continent | DW | 17.12.2018](https://www.dw.com/en/hungarians-protest-draconian-slave-law-as-orban-cracks-down-on-dissent/a-46778497) Accessed 11/9 //gord0]

For days, thousands of Hungarians have been protesting against the Orban government's social policies and against the anti-democratic restructuring of their country. It's [a wave of protests](https://www.dw.com/en/hungary-15000-take-to-streets-in-4th-day-of-protests/a-46766318) the likes of which Hungary hasn't experienced in a long time.

In some cases, police have been using violence and teargas against protesters in the last few days, even though before that there had merely been some scuffles with the officers. Dozens of people, some of them not even part of the protests, were arrested, and many were only released after 12 hours or more.

On Sunday, a large-scale peaceful rally organized by opposition parties and Hungarian trade unions took place without problems — initially. But late on Sunday evening the police again used tear gas against demonstrators when they mobbed the building of Hungary's public radio station.

Sunday night, a group of members of parliament, who have free access to the radio building, demanded in vain to be allowed to read a live petition on the news. They continued their protest in the radio building on Monday. At one point, one of the parliamentary protesters was forcibly thrown out of the building, although this is not permitted under current law for various reasons including parliamentary immunity.

**Workers further disenfranchised**

The wave of protests was triggered by an amendment to Hungarian labor law, now known to the public as the "slave law," which was passed in parliament last week. The law increases the possible number of overtime hours per year per employee from 250 to 400. At the same time, employers can now take three years instead of one year to pay overtime.

The amendment was passed over massive protests by trade unions, the opposition and civil organizations. The vote was riotous because the opposition had occupied the podium of the parliamentary president.

When Orban and his government reformed labor and tax law years ago in favor of companies, there were hardly any protests. In the meantime, the right to strike has been severely restricted and companies pay lower taxes in Hungary than anywhere else in the EU.

Hungarian trade unions are now weak and politically fragmented. Most opposition parties are only marginally concerned with sociopolitical issues, while non-governmental organizations have concentrated mainly on the issue of undermining the rule of law in recent years.

But now, a certain part of the Hungarian public is directing all of their anger toward the "slave law." The amendment is putting major social problems — which Orban's system has created in the first place — on the shoulders on employees, and doing so in a brazen way that many consider humiliating. In addition, there is a massive shortage of labor in Hungary as a result of the large number of people leaving the country, which in turn is largely a result of the frustration of many Hungarians with Orban's policies.

Over the past eight years, some 600,000 mostly well-educated citizens have migrated from Hungary because of the oppressive political climate, the poor organization and underfunding of some parts of the education and health care systems, and the high dependence of private companies on government support. Now the government apparently wants to combat the massive labor shortage simply by increasing overtime.

#### 5] Plan solves – the right to strike spurs collective bargaining and a shift to democracy

Nkabinde 09 Bess Nkabinde, The Right to Strike, an Essential Component of Workplace Democracy: Its Scope and Global Economy, 24 Md. J. Int'l L. 270 (2009). [The Right to Strike, an Essential Component of Workplace Democracy: Its Scope and Global Economy (umaryland.edu)](https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1508&context=mjil) Accessed 11/9 // gord0 \*Bracketed for gendered language

Viewing labor rights as part of a wider struggle for democracy is essential for the growth of the labor movement. Most people believe in democracy in their polity but seem to be unable to imagine having democracy in their workplace. For more than a century, trade unions have sought to identify the right to strike as an essential part of democracy, along with many other rights. However, the common law courts have always regarded strikes as a breach of contract and picketing, depending on the violence employed, as a criminal act. Most courts declined to hear plaintiffs who sought redress from union militancy by directing them in the first instance to industrial relation tribunals.11 Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not legally binding, its principles have acquired the status of standards respected by many states and its impact has moved it in the direction of universal acceptance. It has also become a common reference in the human rights field for many nations. Many governments have incorporated the provisions of the Declaration in their constitutions, making it legally binding upon those states. Interestingly, although South Africa was one of the eight countries that abstained when the UDHR was presented and adopted in Paris in 1948, South Africa is the quintessence of countries in the world that have incorporated the provisions of the Declarations and most of the subsequent Conventions in its Constitution and labor laws. The exploitation of workers was a feature of life in South Africa for a long time. Apartheid thrived on cheap labor: workers had to contend with the migrant labor system, passes and influx control, job reservation, poverty and oppressive laws. Trade unions were nevertheless an important source of resistance.12 The South African Constitution contains a detailed provision directed towards balanced protection for workers and trade unions as well as employee and employer associations in labor relations and collective bargaining.13 Section 23 guarantees workers the right to fair labor practices, to form and join trade unions, and to participate in union activities and strikes.14 Likewise, employers have the right to form and join employers’ organizations and to take part in their activities. These groups have the right to organize, form federations, and engage in collective bargaining.15 The right to strike is entrenched in the South African Constitution;16 but, the right of employers to lock out their workers is not expressly included.17 The Labour Relations Act (LRA) came into force on November 11, 1996, and was intended to bring labor law into conformity with the Constitution and with international law. It recognizes and regulates the rights of workers to organize and join trade unions, as well as the right to strike. The LRA guarantees trade union representatives access to the workplace and regulates the right of employers to lock workers out in certain situations. In addition to these guarantees, the LRA facilitates collective bargaining and makes provision for bargaining councils. It establishes bodies such as the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, which creates simple procedures for the arbitration and resolution of labor conflicts, and the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Courts, which adjudicate disputes. The legislation prohibits unfair dismissal and defines dismissal as automatically unfair if it is due to the exercise of labor rights (including participation in or support for a legal strike or protest), pregnancy, or unfair discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, and others grounds. The South African Constitution recognizes that there are potent lessons to be learned not only from the apartheid past, but also from the experience of other countries around the world. It enjoins the Constitutional Court, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, to consider international law and it encourages the courts to use foreign law. The conventions and recommendations of the International Labour Organization (ILO),18 one of the oldest international organizations in existence, are some of the important resources for the interpretation of the labor provisions in the Constitution and the LRA. THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT Traditionally, the ability of workers to take industrial action was an important factor in the maintenance of fair wages and reasonable working conditions, thereby improving the economic and social welfare of a significant proportion of the population. This was and continues to be based on the understanding that there is an imbalance in bargaining power between an employer and employee such that, in the absence of a right to strike, collective bargaining would amount to ―collective begging.‖ The social justice argument seems to have won judicial and legislative recognition of the entitlement of workers to take industrial action in certain countries. A worker has no other means of defending his or her [their] real wage other than seeking an increased money wage. If an employer does not grant such an increase, he or she [they] can be forced to come to a negotiation table by striking workers. The worker can do this because employer earnings are contingent upon the workers continuing to work. The argument is based on the fact that the employer’s income is nothing other than what is alienated from the worker in the process of production. When workers stop working, employers stop earning. It needs to be said, however, that the withdrawal of labor has a detrimental effect on the profits of business and the economy as a whole,19 indirectly placing pressure on business and state to heed workers’ demands.20

#### 6] Democratic failure cascades and causes nuclear war

Diamond 19, is a professor of Sociology and Political Science at Stanford University, PhD in Sociology. (Larry, 2019, Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency, p. 199-202)

The most obvious response to the ill winds blowing from the world’s autocracies is to help the winds of freedom blowing in the other direction. The democracies of the West cannot save themselves if they do not stand with democrats around the world. This is truer now than ever, for several reasons. We live in a globalized world, one in which models, trends, and ideas cascade across borders. Any wind of change may gather quickly and blow with gale force. People everywhere form ideas about how to govern—or simply about which forms of government and sources of power may be irresistible—based on what they see happening elsewhere. We are now immersed in a fierce global contest of ideas, information, and norms. In the digital age, that contest is moving at lightning speed, shaping how people think about their political systems and the way the world runs. As doubts about and threats to democracy are mounting in the West, this is not a contest that the democracies can afford to lose. Globalization, with its flows of trade and information, raises the stakes for us in another way. Authoritarian and badly governed regimes increasingly pose a direct threat to popular sovereignty and the rule of law in our own democracies. Covert flows of money and influence are subverting and corrupting our democratic processes and institutions. They will not stop just because Americans and others pretend that we have no stake in the future of freedom in the world. If we want to defend the core principles of self-government, transparency, and accountability in our own democracies, we have no choice but to promote them globally. It is not enough to say that dictatorship is bad and that democracy, however flawed, is still better. Popular enthusiasm for a lesser evil cannot be sustained indefinitely. People need the inspiration of a positive vision. Democracy must demonstrate that it is a just and fair political system that advances humane values and the common good. To make our republics more perfect, established democracies must not only adopt reforms to more fully include and empower their own citizens. They must also support people, groups, and institutions struggling to achieve democratic values elsewhere. The best way to counter Russian rage and Chinese ambition is to show that Moscow and Beijing are on the wrong side of history; that people everywhere yearn to be free; and that they can make freedom work to achieve a more just, sustainable, and prosperous society. In our networked age, both idealism and the harder imperatives of global power and security argue for more democracy, not less. For one thing, if we do not worry about the quality of governance in lower-income countries, we will face more and more troubled and failing states. Famine and genocide are the curse of authoritarian states, not democratic ones. Outright state collapse is the ultimate, bitter fruit of tyranny. When countries like Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan descend into civil war; when poor states in Africa cannot generate jobs and improve their citizens’ lives due to rule by corrupt and callous strongmen; when Central American societies are held hostage by brutal gangs and kleptocratic rulers, people flee—and wash up on the shores of the democracies. Europe and the United States cannot withstand the rising pressures of immigration unless they work to support better, more stable and accountable government in troubled countries. The world has simply grown too small, too flat, and too fast to wall off rotten states and pretend they are on some other planet. Hard security interests are at stake. As even the Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy makes clear, the main threats to U.S. national security all stem from authoritarianism, whether in the form of tyrannies from Russia and China to Iran and North Korea or in the guise of antidemocratic terrorist movements such as ISIS.1 By supporting the development of democracy around the world, we can deny these authoritarian adversaries the geopolitical running room they seek. Just as Russia, China, and Iran are trying to undermine democracies to bend other countries to their will, so too can we contain these autocrats’ ambitions by helping other countries build effective, resilient democracies that can withstand the dictators’ malevolence. Of course, democratically elected governments with open societies will not support the American line on every issue. But no free society wants to mortgage its future to another country. The American national interest would best be secured by a pluralistic world of free countries—one in which autocrats can no longer use corruption and coercion to gobble up resources, alliances, and territory. If you look back over our history to see who has posed a threat to the United States and our allies, it has always been authoritarian regimes and empires. As political scientists have long noted, no two democracies have ever gone to war with each other—ever. It is not the democracies of the world that are supporting international terrorism, proliferating weapons of mass destruction, or threatening the territory of their neighbors.

**7] Dyadic DPT is true – prefer our evidence, it uses survey empirics instead of assumptions about history.**

**Tomz and Weeks ’13** (Tomz, Michael, and Jessica L. Weeks. “Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace”. *American Political Science Review 107, no. 3*. August 2013. https://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/pubs/TomzWeeks-2013-02.pdf)

The fact that democracies almost never fight each other is one of the most striking findings in political science. Yet scholars continue to debate whether the relationship between democracy and peace is causal, and what mechanisms explain it. This article uses experiments, embedded in public opinion polls, to shed new light on the democratic peace. Our research supports the hypothesis that peace among democracies could be due, at least in part, to public opinion. Countless studies have shown that democratic leaders are responsive to public opinion on matters of foreign policy; we demonstrate that the public discriminates between democratic and autocratic targets. Public opinion may, therefore, foster a special zone of peace among democracies. Moreover, our experimental approach allows us to conclude with confidence that the effect of democracy is genuinely causal. Democracy affects preferences independent of confounders such as alliances, power, and trade. While our experiments confirm the intuition of skeptics that at least part of the peace among democracies is due to shared interests, military power, and economic ties, we nonetheless find clear evidence that democracy has an independent effect on support for war. Our experiments also reveal the mechanisms through which democracy dampens support for war. The finding that democracies view other democracies as less threatening, which in turn reduces support for using force, accords with major works on the democratic peace emphasizing threat perception (Russett 1993, Risse-Kappen 1995). Understanding how and why democracies trust fellow democracies, but not autocracies, is an important avenue for future research (Kahl 1998, Williams 2001). We also found that perceptions of cost do not explain the public aversion to fighting democracies, and that expectations about success explain only a small amount of the effect. Finally, we found that morality plays an important role in the democratic peace. The regime type of the target affects moral calculations, which in turn changes preferences about the use of force. Surprisingly few scholars have explored morality as a potential source of peace. This should be a major topic for future research. There are numerous opportunities for follow-up studies. For example, the experiments in this article cannot distinguish between “normative” and “structural” theories, both of which predict that democracy reduces threat perception. Do democracies seem less threatening because people think democracies will externalize their domestic values of peaceful coexistence, because they believe democratic institutions will slow or prevent the march to war, or both? Researchers could find out by randomizing information about the normative and structural attributes of regimes. One could also test whether the perceived credibility of threats and promises varies by regime type (Fearon 1994, Schultz 2001, Slantchev 2005, 2011), whether people think democracies would be more willing to make peaceful bargains (Debs and Goemans 2010), and whether democracy leads to perceptions of shared preferences (Oneal and Russett 1999). Moreover, our study provides a template for research on issues other than nuclear proliferation. Historically, no issue has driven countries toward war more often than national boundaries (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). While shared democracy may prevent territorial disputes from escalating, some have claimed that the militarization of territorial disputes should not vary by regime type (Gibler 2007). Countries also spar over domestic policies such as respect for human rights and cracking down on terrorism. Democracy may contribute to peace in these instances, but since changing the domestic policies of another country involves interference in that country’s internal affairs, democracy could matter mainly by affecting beliefs about the morality of intervention, rather than by reducing perceptions of threat. Researchers could design experiments to assess these predictions. Future studies could also explore policy responses other than military force. Countries can deal with international disputes in a variety of ways, including diplomacy and mediation (Dixon 1994); appealing to international law and organizations (Russett and Oneal 2001); or applying economic sanctions. New surveys could ask respondents to evaluate a wide range of military and nonmilitary options, thereby revealing how democracy affects not only decisions about war, but also the use of non-violent foreign policy tools and the willingness to escalate from peaceful measures to violent ones. Finally, our study focused on the public in the U.K. and the U.S. Researchers could replicate our experiments in other countries, to see how our findings generalize to other parts of the world. Additionally, researchers could interview government officials and other policy elites to assess how democracy affects the preferences and perceptions of the people who ultimately decide whether to go to war. Some scholars have found that elites and the public have similar beliefs about foreign policy issues, 24 while others have concluded that elites and masses respond differently to international cues, with elites demonstrating more complex strategic thinking.25 Future studies could assess whether policymakers respond to democracy differently than the masses. For decades, U.S. and foreign leaders have cited the democratic peace when analyzing foreign affairs and justifying efforts to spread democracy around the globe. This topic remains critical today, given the tremendous pressure for democracy around the world. By providing micro-level evidence about the democratic peace and its causes, this article has important implications for policymakers, as well. For example, policymakers who want to cooperate with autocracies must recognize that citizens in democracies distrust dictators and have fewer moral reservations about using force against them. On the flip side, our findings suggest that democratization may have security benefits. When a democracy and an autocracy take identical actions, the democracy receives the benefit of the doubt from citizens in fellow democracies, while the autocracy is viewed with much greater suspicion. Advocates of democracy promotion could therefore cite our findings as evidence that joining the club of democracies confers significant benefits not only at home, but also abroad.

#### 8] Nuke war causes extinction and outweighs other existential risks

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf> //Re-cut by Elmer

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about **20 percent** for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.

#### 9] Hungary’s violent posturing and authoritarianism wrecks global alliances – NATO is split and neighbors are joining nationalist efforts led by Orban

Bergmann and Cicarelli 20 [Max, Siena, August 17, 2020 “Why Hungary’s Democratic Backsliding Should Prompt Nato To Act” Max Bergmann is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. Siena Cicarelli is a research assistant for National Security and International Policy at the Center. <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2020/08/17/489552/hungarys-democratic-backsliding-prompt-nato-act/> //gord0]

On June 6, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Órban visited a small town on the Hungarian-Slovak border to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Trianon. The agreement, signed in the wake of World War I, dramatically shrunk Hungary’s territory from its Austro-Hungarian empire borders, resulting in Hungary ceding two-thirds of its territory and leaving sizable populations of ethnic Hungarians outside of the new boundaries. In [his speech](http://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/primeminister-viktor-orbans-commemoration-speech-trianon/), which was imbued with nationalist resentment, Órban described every Hungarian child inside and outside of the country’s borders as a “guard post” to protect national identity. Additionally, he boasted about the speed at which Hungary has increased defense spending and built “a new army,” proclaiming, “We haven’t been this strong in a hundred years.”

Órban’s deliberately provocative and threatening speech was not a nationalist dog whistle intended only for the Hungarian public. Rather, it directly suggested that a significant amount of territory belonging to Hungary’s neighbors to the east—Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine—should be considered Hungarian.

Órban’s rhetoric—and Hungary’s rapidly backsliding democracy—should serve as a wake-up call to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Today, the alliance faces a growing and pernicious threat: the rise of illiberal nationalism within its ranks. This internal threat is one that an alliance built on cooperation of individual nation-states and premised on states working together is ill-suited to address. For instance, NATO has been encouraging member states to [devote more resources](https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2018-12/2018%20-%20BURDEN%20SHARING%20NEW%20COMMITMENTS%20IN%20A%20NEW%20ERA%20-%20MESTERHAZY%20REPORT%20-%20170%20DSCTC%2018%20E%20rev1%20fin.pdf) to national defense. However, this begs the question of whether the alliance should encourage an autocratic Hungary to massively increase its defense spending when it could use its military capabilities to threaten its neighbors. With Turkey [stoking tension](https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2020/08/11/world/europe/ap-eu-greece-turkey.html) with Greece in the eastern Mediterranean, leading to fears of conflict between two NATO members, the internal threat of nationalism to NATO’s cohesion is clear. It is time for the NATO alliance to get serious about the threat posed by rising nationalism and democratic backsliding among its member states. A backsliding HungaryOver the past decade, the Órban regime has relentlessly attacked Hungarian democracy. Today, Freedom House [maintains](https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/nations-transit/2020) that, given the government’s tight control over the media and independent institutions, Hungary can no longer be considered a democracy. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Órban has taken on emergency powers that allow him to rule by decree, [further consolidating](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/16/world/europe/hungary-coronavirus-orban.html) his power over the government. This descent into authoritarianism has also gone hand in hand with the regime’s efforts to inflame Hungarian nationalism and provoke confrontation with Hungary’s neighbors.

Órban has followed a [tactic](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/one-million-passports-putin-has-weaponized-citizenship-in-occupied-eastern-ukraine/) employed by Russia, wherein President Vladimir Putin issued passports to Russian populations outside of their borders. In 2011, Órban similarly expanded Hungary’s citizenship laws, issuing passports to ethnic Hungarians in surrounding countries. And while Órban has made it exceedingly difficult for Hungarians who have moved abroad to vote, Hungarian minorities in surrounding countries have become a major base of support for the Órban government. For instance, in the Romanian region of Transylvania, there are [1.2 million](https://balkaninsight.com/2020/01/30/living-like-in-hungary-orban-bankrolling-romania-ethnic-parallelism/#:~:text=Transylvania%20is%20home%20to%20the,ethnic%20minority%20communities%20in%20Europe.) ethnic Hungarians, making it one of the largest ethnic minority populations in Europe. This has created what Tamás Kiss, a researcher at the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities, [described](https://balkaninsight.com/2020/01/30/living-like-in-hungary-orban-bankrolling-romania-ethnic-parallelism/) as a system of “ethnic parallelism – to build up and maintain a system in which Hungarians can live their life as it would be not in Romania but in Hungary.” Using local proxies in ethnic Hungarian communities in Slovenia, Serbia, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Romania, Órban has pumped money into Hungarian-centric media and cultural programs. Akos Keller-Alant, a Hungarian journalist, [describes](https://balkaninsight.com/2020/01/30/living-like-in-hungary-orban-bankrolling-romania-ethnic-parallelism/) this strategy as a way to pursue “the ‘virtual unification’ of all Hungarians,” including by making it “easier for them to gain Hungarian citizenship.”

Meanwhile, tensions with Hungary’s neighbors have [grown](https://www.romaniajournal.ro/politics/hungary-accuses-president-iohannis-of-inciting-to-hatred-following-statements-on-szeklerland-autonomy-law-mae-szijjarto-diverted-iohannis-message/). The Órban regime has been quick to [stoke resentment](https://balkaninsight.com/2020/02/12/slovak-election-to-test-orbans-clout-among-ethnic-hungarians/) over various perceived slights—both real and imagined—within Hungarian minority populations. This, in turn, has provoked a backlash among Hungary’s neighbors, exacerbating tensions and increasing anti-Hungarian sentiment. This gives the Órban regime a nationalist dial, so to speak, to aggravate territorial grievances whenever it chooses. With the upheaval and uncertainty caused by COVID-19, the ability to distract the nation from the government’s response to the pandemic would likely become increasingly politically appealing.

#### 10] Global Security Alliances key to solve Existential Threats – Superintelligence and Bioterrorism

Sears 20, Nathan Alexander. "Existential Security: Towards a Security Framework for the Survival of Humanity." Global Policy 11.2 (2020): 255-266. (PhD Candidate in Political Science at The University of Toronto. Trudeau Fellow in Peace, Conflict and Justice at the Munk School of Global Affairs; and 2019/2020 Cadieux‐Léger Fellow at Global Affairs Canada)//Elmer

Anthropogenic existential threats pose serious challenges to the means and modes of protection as conventionally understood by the national security frame. ‘Self‐help’ makes little sense if nation states are unable to ‘help themselves’ with respect to anthropogenic existential threats. One challenge is the inadequacy of national capabilities. When not even the great powers can ensure their national survival – whether from ‘nuclear armageddon’, a ‘hothouse earth’, ‘bioterrorism’, or ‘superintelligence’ – then the material limits of national power reveal the political limits of security via national self‐help. Security from anthropogenic existential threats necessitates global security cooperation, which means that self‐help can only be achieved by ‘we‐help’. In other words, the national security interest cannot be achieved by individual nations alone, but only through their collective capacity to ensure their common survival from anthropogenic existential threats.

The modes of protection are equally misguided. Balancing is fundamentally a relative gains/losses conception of security (Grieco, 1988), whereby changes in the distribution of power/capabilities amongst states contribute to – or detract from – national security. The decoupling of balancing and security was already underway during the Cold War,8 since the security that could be obtained by increasing a nation’s nuclear arsenal experienced diminishing returns (and potentially negative returns for nuclear ‘safety’) (Brodie, 1959); and since achieving a military advantage over one’s nuclear adversary could undermine deterrence (e.g. by threatening their second‐strike capability), and thereby exacerbate the risk of nuclear war (e.g. by increasing pressure for a first‐strike) (Jervis, 1989).

Balancing as an instrument of security policy is even less useful with respect to other anthropogenic existential threats. Not only is military balancing irrelevant for combatting climate change or superintelligence, but a relative gains/losses perspective of security would most likely exacerbate the risks. For instance, if climate change comes to threaten the national survival of some states more than – or before – others, then they may perceive ‘geoengineering’ as their only option for national security (Corry, 2017). Geoengineering presents a potentially serious ‘security dilemma’ (Jervis, 1978), since one state’s attempts to unilaterally alter the climate may inadvertently threaten others. It is even conceivable that the geopolitical struggle for power and security in ‘the Anthropocene’ (Crutzen, 2002) could extend to control over Earth’s climate system. Such a world would leave all states less secure than one in which global cooperation succeeded in curbing the security consequences of climate change for humanity. Similarly, there is a growing tendency for nations to perceive AIresearch and development as a strategic competition – or an ‘arms race’ – between great powers. In 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that, ‘Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind… Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world’.9 However, if nation states perceive AI as potentially providing a ‘decisive strategic advantage’ in a struggle for global hegemony, then they may be more likely to prioritize speed over safety in AI research (Armstrong et al., 2016; Bostrom, 2014). The desire to gain a strategic advantage – or fear of ‘falling behind’ – could increase the risks of ‘loss‐of‐control’ over powerful emerging technologies (Danzig, 2018; Scharre, 2018), including the threat of ‘misaligned superintelligence’ (p. 38). Finally, the national security frame conceives of nation states as the principal security actors; it fails to capture the growing disjuncture between the nation state as ‘political unit’ and ‘security unit’. While states maintain both their *de jure* political authority and *de facto* monopoly of military force, there may be anthropogenic existential threats beyond their direct control. Bioterrorism is one threat. Advances in biotechnology could make it easier for terrorists – ‘lone wolves’ or terrorist organizations – to design and release ‘bioengineered pathogens’ (Posner, 2004; Rees, 2003; Torres, 2017). Climate change is another threat in which essentially everyone – individuals, corporations, governments, and humanity as a whole – is a relevant security actor, because effectively everyone contributes to either greenhouse gas emissions and/or the degradation of carbon sinks. AI, too, is such a threat, since much of the research that could eventually produce ‘superintelligence’ is being driven by big technology firms, and technological openness and diffusion could some day put the final step within the power of individuals – such as the decision to connect superintelligence to the Internet (Bostrom, 2014, 2017).

#### 11] Super-intelligence armed with genius weapons cause Extinction

Del Monte 18, Louis A. Genius Weapons: Artificial Intelligence, Autonomous Weaponry, and the Future of Warfare. Amherst, New York: Prometheus, 2018. (a bestselling author, award winning physicist, CEO of Del Monte & Associates, Inc. and a featured speaker. He is considered a top futurist on artificial intelligence technology and nanoweapons)//Elmer

Concurrently, though, AI technology continues its relentless **exponential advancement**. AI researchers predict there is a 50 percent probability that AI will equal human intelligence in the 2040 to 2050 timeframe.8 Those same experts predict that AI will greatly exceed the **cognitive performance of humans** in virtually all domains of interest as early as 2070, which is termed the “singularity.”9 Here are three important terms we will use in this book: 1. We can term a computer at the point of and after the singularity as “superintelligence,” as is common in the field of AI. 2. When referring to the class of computers with this level of AI, we will use the term “superintelligences.” 3. In addition, we can term weapons controlled by superintelligence as “genius weapons.” Following the singularity, humanity will face superintelligences, computers that greatly exceed the cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of interest. This raises a question: **How will superintelligences view humanity**? Obviously, our history suggests we engage in devastating wars and release malicious computer viruses, both of **which could adversely affect these machines**. Will superintelligences view humanity as a threat to their existence? If the answer is yes, this raises another question: Should we give such machines military capabilities (i.e., **create genius weapons**) that they could potentially use against us? A cursory view of AI suggests it is yielding numerous benefits. In fact, most of humanity perceives only the positive aspects of AI technology, like automotive navigation systems, Xbox games, and heart pacemakers. Mesmerized by AI technology, they fail to see the dark side. Nonetheless, there is a dark side. For example, the US military is deploying AI into almost every aspect of warfare, from Air Force drones to Navy torpedoes. Humanity acquired the ability to destroy itself with the invention of the atom bomb. During the Cold War, the world lived in perpetual fear that the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would engulf the world in a nuclear conflict. Although we came dangerously close to both intentional and unintentional nuclear holocaust on numerous occasions, the doctrine of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) and **human judgment kept the nuclear genie in the bottle**. If we arm superintelligences **with genius weapons**, will they be able to replicate human judgment? In 2008, experts surveyed at the Global Catastrophic Risk Conference at the University of Oxford suggested a **19 percent chance of human extinction** by the end of this century, 10 citing the top four most probable causes: 1. Molecular nanotechnology weapons: 5 percent probability 2. Superintelligent AI: 5 percent probability 3. Wars: 4 percent probability 4. Engineered pandemic: 2 percent probability Currently, the United States, Russia, and China are relentlessly developing and **deploying AI in lethal weapon systems**. If we consider the Oxford assessment, this suggests that humanity is combining three of the four elements necessary to edge us **closer to extinction**.

#### 12] Bioweapons threaten human existence

Millett & Snyder-Beattie ‘17. Millett, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford; and Snyder-Beattie, M.S., Director of Research, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. 08-01-2017. “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” Health Security, 15(4), PubMed

In the decades to come, advanced bioweapons could threaten human existence. Although the probability of human extinction from bioweapons may be low, the expected value of reducing the risk could still be large, since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future generations. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).9 In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-21 Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a long historical track record ofstate-run bioweapon research applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology.23,24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention.25 The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27

### Framing

**Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable.**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable.** **On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have.** “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 **The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so**, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but **for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” **If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.**3 As Aristotle observes**: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.**”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

#### That justifies Hedonism – we must aggregate in order to determine how behaviors will be conducted based on what is most pleasurable. Anything else is arbitrary and always allows for exclusions, but aggregation solves because it allows us to determine what behaviors are most likely given relative evaluations of pleasure and pain.

#### Thus, the standard is maximizing expected well-being – prefer:

#### 1] Actor specificity

#### A] Governments must aggregate since every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.

#### B] States lack wills or intentions since policies are collective actions. Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Link turns calc indites because the alt would be *no* action.

#### 2] **No act-omission distinction—governments are responsible for everything in the public sphere so inaction is implicit authorization of action: they have to yes/no bills, which means everything collapse to aggregation.**

#### 3] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital via intuitions. Intuitions are the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions are most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why.

#### 4] Existential threats independently outweigh – all life has infinite value and extinction eliminates the possibility for future generations

GPP 17 (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>,

1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. ... The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.65 In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75