# OFF

## 1

#### Interpretation: member nations of the World Trade Organization is a generic bare plural. The aff may not defend that a subset of member nations ought to reduce IP protections for medicines.

Nebel 19 Jake Nebel [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs.] , 8-12-2019, "Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution," Briefly, https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/ SM

Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions. Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window. So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why. 1.1 “Colleges and Universities” “Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons. First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural. Second, “colleges and universities” fails the upward-entailment test for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals. Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universities generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. (Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution. Fourth, it is extremely unlikely that the topic committee would have written the resolution with the existential interpretation of “colleges and universities” in mind. If they intended the existential interpretation, they would have added explicit existential quantifiers like “some.” No such addition would be necessary or expected for the generic interpretation since generics lack explicit quantifiers by default. The topic committee’s likely intentions are not decisive, but they strongly suggest that the generic interpretation is correct, since it’s prima facie unlikely that a committee charged with writing a sentence to be debated would be so badly mistaken about what their sentence means (which they would be if they intended the existential interpretation). The committee, moreover, does not write resolutions for the 0.1 percent of debaters who debate on the national circuit; they write resolutions, at least in large part, to be debated by the vast majority of students on the vast majority of circuits, who would take the resolution to be (pretty obviously, I’d imagine) generic with respect to “colleges and universities,” given its face-value meaning and standard expectations about what LD resolutions tend to mean.

#### It applies to member nations:

#### Upward entailment test – spec fails the upward entailment test because saying “US ought to reduce IPP for medicines” doesn’t entail that all nations ought to

#### Adverb test – adding “usually” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning

#### Vote neg:

#### Semantics outweigh:

#### Topicality is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden, they agreed to debate the topic when they came to the tournament

#### Jurisdiction – you can’t vote aff if they haven’t affirmed the resolution

#### It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement, and there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it

#### Limits – there are countless affs accounting for any permutation of 164 member nations that are home to vastly different pharmaceutical industries and illnesses – unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden – potential abuse doesn’t justify foregoing the topic and 1AR theory checks PICs

#### Ground – spec guts core generics like WTO bad and the health multilateralism DA that rely on all nations reducing IP and shifts away from the core topic lit of WTO patent waivers – also means there is no universal DA to spec affs

### Paradigm Issues

#### Competing interps — reasonability is arbitrary and unpredictable and competiting interps is k2 making better models of debate

#### No RVIs—it's your burden to be fair and T—same reason you don't win for answering inherency or putting defense on a disad.

#### T comes before 1ar theory—the plan is the basis for debate so any of our abuse is justified

## 2

#### “Reduce” means net decrease—merely conditioning reductions isn’t topical.

Waxman 82—(Speaker of the House). Harry Waxman. Public Law 87-253, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, 97th US Congress, Sept 8, 1982, Lexis

E) Prior to approving any application for a refund, the Secretary shall require evidence that such reduction in marketings has taken place and that such reduction is a net decrease in marketings of milk and has not been offset by expansion of production in other production facilities in which the person has an interest or by transfer of partial interest in the production facility or by the taking of any other action. which is a scheme or device to qualify for payment.

#### When authorized to ‘reduce’ the affirmative gets to decrease or eliminate --- changing the terms is not a reduction

Nebraska AG 73 (Office of the Attorney General of the State of Nebraska, 1973 Neb. AG LEXIS 25)//BB

In Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S. E. 2d 120, 176 Va. 281, the Virginia Supreme Court [\*4] stated that an item in an appropriation bill is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. In State ex rel. Meyer v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 185 Neb. 490, 176 N. W. 2d 920, the court referred to and noted certain appropriation items. It also referred to five appropriation items, one of which was, for example, land acquisition (Medical Center, University of Nebraska) in the amount of one million dollars. This is certainly a clear example of an item of appropriation. It has been held that the power to veto item does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions. Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S. E. 2d 120, 176 Va. 281. Under a Massachusetts constitutional provision which authorized the Governor to disapprove or reduce items or parts of items in any bill appropriating money the fact that the section relates solely to appropriation bills in conjunction with the word reduce shows that the expression "items or parts of items" refers to separable fiscal units and under such section, power is conferred on the Governor to reduce the sum of money appropriated [\*5] or to disapprove the appropriation entirely, but no power is conferred on him to change the terms of an appropriation except by reducing its amount. In re Opinion of the Justices, 2 N. E. 2d 789, 294 Mass. 616.

**A topical aff must reduce the total number of patent protections, not modify their application which is distinct.**

**State v. Knutsen 03, 71 P. 3d 1065 - Idaho: Court of Appeals 2003**

By its plain language, Rule 35 grants a district court the authority within a limited period of time to reduce or modify a defendant's sentence after relinquishing jurisdiction. To "reduce" means to diminish in size, amount, extent or number, or to make smaller, lessen or shrink. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1905 (1993). To "modify" means to make more temperate and less extreme, or to lessen the severity of something. Id. at 1452. Thus, under the plain meaning of its language, Rule 35 authorizes a district court to diminish, lessen the severity of, or make more temperate a defendant's sentence. An order placing a defendant on probation lessens the severity of a defendant's sentence and thus falls within the district court's authority granted by Rule 35. Other state jurisdictions have held likewise in interpreting similar rules for reduction of sentence. See State v. Knapp, 739 P.2d 1229, 1231-32 (Wy.1987) (similar rule of criminal procedure authorizes reduction of a sentence of incarceration to probation); People v. Santana, 961 P.2d 498, 499 (Co.Ct.App.1997) (grant of probation is a "reduction" under Colorado Cr. R. 35(b)).

#### Aff is a modification because it modifies existing patent protections rather than reducing it – makes it less extreme for patent protections. The aff is an offset by expansion, which is modification not reduciton.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1—Limits—there are dozens of conditions that the aff could use to justify offsets in expansion: manufacturing, innovation, distribution, etc—makes NEG prep impossible.

#### 2—Ground—they don’t result in a tangible change to a world without IP Protections, unless the conditions are triggered—wrecks DA ground predicated on IPR good

# CASE

### Solvency

#### NO AFF – the one recent card they have read is not abt the EU. But, squo laws solve both advantages – burden of proof and protection has shifted.

BBC 19 [BBC News. April 16, 2019. “EU gives 'high-level' protection to whistleblowers” <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-47936682#:~:text=Whistleblowers%20across%20the%20European%20Union%20have%20won%20greater,allow%20them%20to%20report%20breaches%20of%20EU%20law>. Accessed 9/16 //gord0]

The new law, approved by the European Parliament on Tuesday, shields whistleblowers from retaliation.

It also creates "safe channels" to allow them to report breaches of EU law.

It is the first time whistleblowers have been given EU-wide protection.

The rules have previously been in the hands of member states, resulting in a range of vastly different approaches.

The law was [approved by 591 votes, with 29 votes against and 33 abstentions.](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190410IPR37529/protecting-whistle-blowers-new-eu-wide-rules-approved)

What does the law say?

The new legislation gives whistleblowers who report breaches of EU law a "high level of protection".

It establishes "safe channels" for reporting the information, both within an organisation and to public authorities.

If no appropriate action is taken or in cases where reporting to the authorities would not work, whistleblowers are permitted to make a public disclosure – including by speaking to the media.

[The law](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2018/0218/COM_COM(2018)0218_EN.pdf) protects whistleblowers against dismissal, demotion and other forms of punishment.

National authorities are required to train officials in how to deal with whistleblowers under the legislation.

Why was it introduced?

The legislation says whistleblowers play a "key role" in preventing breaches of EU law and protecting society.

But, it argues, "potential whistleblowers are often discouraged from reporting their concerns or suspicions for fear of retaliation."

"We should protect whistleblowers from being punished, sacked, demoted or sued in court for doing the right thing for society," European Commission Vice President Frans Timmermans said.

"This will help tackle fraud, corruption, corporate tax avoidance and damage to people's health and the environment."

Transparency International has said the "pathbreaking legislation" will also give employers "greater legal certainty around their rights and obligations".

High-profile leaks

**LuxLeaks:** [Whistleblowers working for PricewaterhouseCoopers leaked documents](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36662636) exposing favourable tax arrangements offered by Luxembourg to some of the world's biggest companies while European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker was prime minister.

**Paradise Papers:** [Millions of financial documents were leaked](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-41880153), detailing offshore tax-avoidance schemes. The papers revealed details about how the ultra-wealthy secretly invest cash in offshore tax havens.

**Cambridge Analytica:** [The British data analytics company was accused of harvesting the personal data of millions of Facebook users](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-43465968) without their consent.

**Panama Papers:** [About 11 million confidential documents were leaked from a Panamanian law firm](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-46449696), showing how it helped clients to launder money, dodge sanctions and evade tax.

What were the previous rules on whistleblowing?

Laws on whistleblowing were previously handled by the individual member states, resulting in major differences in legislation across the bloc.

The European Commission says just 10 members - France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK - had a "comprehensive law" protecting whistleblowers.

Has everyone supported the legislation?

During the talks, some states sought to water down the legislation.

Luxembourg, Ireland and Hungary wanted tax matters to be excluded, but they were ultimately retained, according to Reuters.

If member states fail to properly implement the law, the European Commission can take formal disciplinary steps against the country and could ultimately refer the case to the European Court of Justice.

#### Vote neg on presumption – the aff doesn’t do anything because everything that their old ass solvency cards talk about has already happened.

### Whistleblowing

#### 1] Squo directive key to prevent harmful actions that infringe on employer privacy

Worhatch Law [Worhatch Law, No Date. “Trade Secrets & Whistleblowers” <https://www.worhatchlaw.com/employee-rights-faq/trade-secrets-whistleblowers/> Accessed 9/17 //gord0]

Does the law protect the whistleblower?

There are significant protections for individuals who turn their employers in for violating laws in ways that amount to felonies or acting in ways that jeopardize the public’s health or safety. The law also guards against adverse job action being taken after public employees point out instances of budget abuse or failure of management to abide by laws or regulations governing the administration of public services. Anyone reporting a violation of occupational health and safety regulations to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has additional protections under federal law.

But not all “whistleblowers” can take advantage of those protections under all circumstances. Laws protecting the “whistleblower” spell out precisely who is covered by the protections afforded under the statute, the steps the whistleblower must first have taken to secure management’s cooperation in recognizing and solving the problem, and the precise steps the whistleblower must then take—and the time frame during which those additional steps must be taken—to preserve his or her rights to protection under the whistleblower law.

If an employer is able to show that its employee either did not have a good faith basis for approaching authorities, did not make a good faith effort to determine the accuracy of the information reported to authorities, or did not otherwise follow the steps that would entitle the employee to whistleblower protection, the employer can avoid liability under the whistleblower law.

The time for laying the foundation for full protection as an employee with whistleblower status under the law is before you take any steps to report the information you have to someone outside of the company. If you are in that position and wonder whether the whistleblower law might help you, contact my office for an appointment to discuss your individual circumstances.

What constitutes “trade secrets” and what are my duties and my employer’s rights to protect them?

A “trade secret” is any information that:

Derives independent economic value—whether actual or potential—from not being generally known to and not being readily ascertainable by persons outside of the staff of the employer’s business except by proper means.

Is the subject of efforts made by the employer that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain the secrecy of such information.

The only proper means for outsiders to obtain an employer’s trade secret would be a disclosure made with the express or implied consent of the employer by license, contract, or course of dealing or performance under a commercial transaction to which the employer was a party.

Unauthorized disclosure of a trade secret subjects the violator to liability for "misappropriation” of the trade secret. Not all disclosures rise to the level of misappropriation, but enough of them do so as to merit your careful attention to the law in the event you are contemplating the act of using the trade secret of a current or former employer for yourself or for the benefit of any third party.

#### 2] Lack of impact uq means its inevitable – Dreyfus gets u to “whistleblowers are good to reveal information” not that revealing information solves future pandemics or covid

#### ~~3] We read~~

**~~Veron and Di Ciommo 20~~** ~~– Veron, Pauline, and Di Ciommo, Mariella, October 2020 – “The EU’s Role in Global Health in the Era of COVID-19,” The European Centre for Development Policy Management, Pauline Veron is a Junior Policy Officer for the European External Affairs programme (75%) and Migration programme (25%).  She has an undergraduate degree in Political Science Science Po Strasbourg with time at Trinity College Dublin, and a Masters in Public Administration and another in International Relations and Regional Integration Process also from Science Po Strasbourg. Mariella Di Ciommo is a Policy Officer in the European External Affairs programme. Before joining ECDPM she worked in different roles at Development Initiatives in the UK and then in Brazil. In Brazil, as a Strategic Partnerships Manager, she led DI’s work on data for development at country level and international engagement on South-South cooperation, climate finance and poverty. She holds a master in Social Anthropology from the London School of Economics and one in Economics from Bocconi University. [Harker KB]~~

~~The COVID-19 pandemic is a real test for the EU’s international leadership ambitions. To some extent, the EU has risen to the healthcare and political challenge of mounting an effective response to the pandemic by putting together a collective and comprehensive ‘Team Europe’ package, leveraging its research and innovation assets, and catalysing bold, multilateral action at a time when global governance is being questioned. It has successfully promoted global initiatives, such as the ACT Accelerator, and has positioned itself as a convener of both state and non-state actors.~~ **~~Yet~~**~~, given the scale and urgency of the challenge,~~ **~~the EU’s response would have been much stronger had there been more coherence among the various areas of action and more coordination with member states~~**~~. Better coherence and more coordination within Europe could be achieved only if the ‘rules of the game’ with member states and within EU institutions were to be changed. It would also require prioritising health in an already packed political agenda. A robust strategy linking the various levels and spheres of EU intervention would help to make EU action on global health more impactful and consistent. But a strategy alone will not do the trick. Political energy needs to be expended on overcoming the bottlenecks that arise from the EU’s limited health competences, the differing mandates of EU institutions and their limited resources, the divergent interests and views of EU member states that hamper stronger collaboration across the EU institutions and with member states – while still preserving the variety of European experiences in health and their respective added values. The EU’s standing as a global health actor suffered greatly from its inability to control the crisis within its own borders at the onset of the outbreak. While the German EU Council Presidency and the leadership of the European Commission would appear to have generated a political momentum for strengthening health sovereignty and European structures for crisis preparedness, it is unclear whether this momentum will hold beyond the crisis, given the many other pressing priorities, and be able to reverse long-standing battles over health competences. 22 The linkages between domestic and international EU action on health also need to be reinforced. Although many effective plans have been made and the EU possesses good capabilities, if it wants to be a strategic global player, it will need to adopt a more joined-up approach to global health beyond humanitarian and development assistance to include services with a domestic mandate, but with international relevance. The shared sense of purpose that drove the EU’s response to COVID-19 needs to be retained in adopting an EU-wide approach that can harness the best of EU institutions across DGs – for example on R&I, trade, health, international partnerships and others. Partner countries would benefit much more from such integrated and comprehensive offers than from aid alone. Such an integrated approach also lies the core of the SDGs and should inform any future new EU strategy for the health sector. Where international cooperation is concerned, Team Europe could form an opportunity to deepen collaboration at the EU and among the member states. However, it would first need to resolve some of the ambiguities about what novelties it entails and how different – or similar – it is to other initiatives with similar aims (such as working better together, joint implementation and joint programming). A close monitoring of Team Europe and public, open communication about its achievements and limitations will be crucial.~~ **~~If the EU wishes to play a bigger role in global health, it will have to upscale its support for health systems~~** ~~as a whole, as opposed to simply producing a narrow emergency response to future outbreaks. This is the soundest health investment for the economy and for human development and is in line with the approach outlined in the 2010 Communication on the EU’s role in global health. It will require action at country, regional and global level.~~

### Uniformity

#### Collapse by 2050 is inevitable---rebound effects, lack of decoupling, large environmental footprints from renewables, and a lack of viable sequestration technology make growth unsustainable

Giorgos Kallis 18, ICREA Research Professor at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, environmental scientist working on ecological economics and political ecology, formerly Marie Curie International Fellow at the Energy and Resources Group of the University of California at Berkeley, PhD in Environmental Policy and Planning from the University of the Aegean in Greece, et al., 5/31/18, “Annual Review of Environment and Resources: Research On Degrowth,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources, Vol. 43, p. 296-298 recut gord0

3. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: THE LIMITS OF GREEN GROWTH¶ Although driven by political, institutional, and discursive processes, growth is also biophysical. The economic process converts energy, resources, and matter to goods, services, and waste (34). In theory, it seems possible to decouple material throughput from economic output by improving the resource efficiency of production. Ecological economists, however, argue that in practice absolute decoupling is unlikely, even though relative decoupling is common (34). Efficiency should not be confused with scale (35): The more efficiently we use resources, the lower they cost, and the more of them we end up using (36). This is, in essence, growth. Just as increases in labor productivity lead to growth and new jobs, not to less employment, increases in resource productivity increase output and resource use (37). Capitalist economies grow by using more resources and more people, more intensively. Accelerating this is unlikely to spare resources.¶ Growth can become “cleaner” or “greener” by substituting, for example, fossil fuels with solar power, or scarce, environmentally intensive metals with more abundant and less intensive metals. But new substitutes have resource requirements, and life-cycle impacts that cross space and time. Energy is a vital source of useful work (38); growth has been possible because fossil fuels did things human labor alone could not do. Ending the use of fossil fuels is likely to reduce labor productivity and limit output (34). Solar and wind power are constrained only by their rate of flow, but unlike fossil fuels, they are diffuse—more like rain than a lake (3). To collect and concentrate a diffuse flow of energy, more energy is necessary and more land is required. The EROIs (energy returns on energy investment) of renewable energies are between 10:1 and 20:1, compared to more than 50:1 for earlier deposits of oil and coal (39). An economy powered by a diffuse energy flow is then likely to be an economy of lower net energy and lower output than one powered by concentrated stocks (3). Land use for solar or wind also competes with the use of land for food production, and rare materials are necessary for infrastructures and batteries that store their intermittent flows, with significant environmental effects.¶ Historical data corroborate ecological economic theory (40). Ayres & Warr (38) find that the use of net energy after conversion losses explains a big portion of the United States’ total factor productivity and economic growth. At the global level, GDP and material use have increased approximately 1:1. Carbon emissions have increased somewhat slower than GDP, but still have increased (34). This is unlikely to be a coincidence. Exceptions may exist, but cross-panel data analysis shows that overall, 1% growth of a national economy is associated with 0.6% to 0.8% increase in its carbon emissions (41) and 0.8% growth in its resource use (42). ¶ Global resource use follows currently the “collapse by 2050” scenario foreseen in the “Limits to Growth” 1971 report (43–45). Domestic material use in some developed OECD economies has reached a plateau, but this is because of globalization and trade. If we take into account imported goods, then the material requirements of products and services consumed in OECD countries have grown hand in hand with GDP, with no decoupling (46). For water use, the effects of growth overwhelm any realistic savings from technologies and efficiency (47); water footprints have increased even in regions such as California where water withdrawals were stabilized (40). ¶ Carbon emissions in some EU (European Union) countries have been declining, even after trade is taken into account, suggesting some substitution of fossil fuels by cleaner energies. [Although recession also played a role (34).] These declines are nowhere near the 8–10%, year-after-year reductions in carbon emissions required for developed nations under scenarios compatible with a 50% chance of limiting warming to 2◦C (48). Further reductions will be harder to sustain once one-off substitutions of oil or coal with natural gas are exhausted (34). ¶ Resource use or carbon emissions are a product of the scale of the economy (GDP) times its resource or carbon intensity (kg/GDP or kgCO2/GDP). With 1.5% annual increase in global income per capita, carbon intensity has to decline 4.4% each year for staying within 2◦C; with 0% growth, carbon intensity has to fall 2.9% each year (49). In the period 1970–2013, the average annual reduction rate for carbon intensity was less than 1.5%—and this gets harder to sustain as the share of carbon-intensive economies in global output increases (49). As Jackson (50) showed in his seminal work, it is practically impossible to envisage viable climate mitigation scenarios that involve growth. This calls for research on managing, or prospering, without growth (50, 51). ¶ Some scenarios deem possible meeting climate targets while sustaining growth, but these generally assume after 2050 some sort of “negative emissions technology,” geo-engineering or otherwise. According to a recent Nature editorial, these technologies remain currently “magical thinking” (52). Clean energy investments can stimulate the economy in the short run, but in the long run growth may be limited by their low EROIs. Studies suggest that economic growth requires a minimum EROI of close to 11:1 (53). Less EROI means less labor productivity, and hence less growth. Indeed, “Limits to Growth” scenarios do not predict growth ending when resources are exhausted but, rather, when the quality of resources declines to such an extent that further extraction diverts more and more investment away from productive industry (44).¶ Degrowth is defined by ecological economists as an equitable downscaling of throughput, with a concomitant securing of wellbeing. If there is a fundamental coupling of economic activity and resource use, as ecological economics suggests there is, then serious environmental or climate policies will slow down the economy. Vice versa, a slower economy will use less resources and emit less carbon (40). This is not the same as saying that the degrowth goal is to reduce GDP (54); slowing down the economy is not an end but a likely outcome in a transition toward equitable wellbeing and environmental sustainability. ¶ Advancing a position of “a-growth,” van den Bergh (54) proposes ignoring GDP and implementing a global carbon price, indifferent to what its effect on growth turns out to be. Ignoring GDP is a normative position—but at the end, the economy will either grow or not, and if it does not, then there should be plans for managing without growth. Given how entrenched GDP growth is in existing institutional and political structures, a-growth approaches must be advanced as part of broader systemic change (55).¶ Is it possible to secure a decent standard of living for all while throughput and output degrow? Substantive evidence indicates that prosperity does not depend on high levels of production and consumption. Kubiszewski et al. (56) find that the Genuine Progress Indicator, an indicator that includes environmental and social costs alongside output, peaked in 1978, despite subsequent global growth. A similar indicator, the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, has stayed at the same levels in the United States since 1950, despite a threefold growth of GDP (57). ¶ Wealthier countries on average have higher levels of life expectancy and education than poorer ones, but above a certain level of GDP, income does not make a difference in wellbeing—equality does. Satisfactory levels of wellbeing are achieved by countries such as Vietnam or Costa Rica at a fraction (one-third or less) of the output, energy, or resource use of countries such as the United States. Even the lower levels of resource use of mid-income countries, however, would not be sustainable if they were to be generalized to the planet as a whole. No country currently satisfies social wellbeing standards while staying within its share of planetary boundaries, suggesting that radical changes in provisioning systems are necessary (58). ¶ Wealthier people within a country are on average happier than others, but in the long run, overall happiness does not increase as a country’s income rises (59). Nuances of this income-happiness paradox depend on the sample of countries included and how one defines and asks about happiness. Within societies, individuals with higher incomes evaluate their lives as better than others, but do not enjoy better emotional wellbeing (60). Income determines social rank, and rank affects individuals’ assessments of their lives. Growth does not change relative rank or relative access to positional goods (those signifying position) but it does inflate expectations and prices of material goods, increasing frustration (61). Relative comparisons matter for personal wellbeing in low-income and high-income countries; for both, the more equally income is distributed, the happier people are (62). Pro-environmental behaviors and sharing are also strongly associated with personal wellbeing (63). This suggests that an economic contraction may not impact wellbeing negatively if accompanied by redistribution, sharing, and value shifts (34).

#### EU econ collapse is inevitable

Bet 8-22 [Martina Bet, 8-22-2020, "EU at risk of collapse? Gisela Stuart unravels Brussels' key to survival ", Express.co.uk, https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1325865/eu-news-eurozone-euro-coronavirus-recovery-fund-gisela-stuart-two-tier-spt, Accessed 10-1-2020] HWL recut LHSSN

EU at risk of collapse? Gisela Stuart unravels Brussels' key to survival THE EUROPEAN UNION will have to go through deep restructuring if it wants to survive in the long-term, former Labour MP Gisela Stuart exclusively told Express.co.uk. The eurozone’s economic rebound from the coronavirus pandemic is losing steam after a few months of improvement, according to a survey of business activity. The IHS Markit flash composite purchasing managers’ index for the euro area fell to 51.6 in August, down from 54.9 in July. According to a Reuters poll, even if a reading above the 50 mark indicates that a majority of businesses reported an expansion in activity, the reading undershot the expectations of most economists, who on average had expected activity to plateau. The disappointing data hit the euro in early trading on Friday and called into question the strength of Europe’s third-quarter economic recovery. The recent resurgence of coronavirus infections in many European countries to levels not seen since May has triggered fresh quarantine requirements and localised lockdowns, raising doubts over the sustainability of the recovery. The discouraging data comes a month after EU leaders struck a deal on a huge coronavirus recovery package. The €750billion (£677billionn) coronavirus fund will be used as loans and grants to the countries hit hardest by the virus. The remaining money represents the EU budget for the next seven years. As many wonder whether the measures will ultimately deepen the bloc’s economic integration or cause its demise, in an exclusive interview with Express.co.uk, former Labour MP and prominent Brexiteer Gisela Stuart claimed the package was a necessary step for the future of the bloc.

#### ~~The Euro makes continual economic crisis inevitable – turns your impact~~

~~Stiglitz 17 -- Joseph E. Stiglitz (Nobel Prize winning American economist, public policy analyst, and a professor at Columbia University. Recipient of the Economics Nobel Prize and the John Bates Clark Medal), The Fundamental Flaws in the Euro Zone Framework, https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/sites/jstiglitz/files/The%20Fundamental%20Flaws%20in%20the%20Euro%20Zone%20Framework.pdf WJ~~

~~In the remainder of this section, I describe several of the underlying structural properties of the Euro Zone that, if they do not make crises inevitable, certainly make them more likely to occur. (What is required is not so much the structural adjustment of the individual countries, but the structural adjustment of the euro framework.) Many of these were rules that reflected the neoclassical model, with the associated neoliberal policy prescriptions, which were fashionable (in some circles) at the time of the creation of the euro. Europe made two fundamental mistakes: first, it enshrined in its “constitution” these fads and fashions, the concerns of the time, without providing enough flexibility in responding to changing circumstances and understandings. And secondly, even at the time, the limits of the neoclassical model had been widely exposed—the problems posed, for instance, by imperfect competition, information, and markets to which I alluded earlier. The neoclassical model failed to recognize the many market failures that require government intervention, or in which government intervention would improve the performance of the economy. Thus, most importantly from a macroeconomic perspective, there was the belief that so long as the government maintained a stable macro-economy—typically interpreted as maintaining price stability—overall economic performance would be assured. By the same token, if the government kept budgets in line (kept deficits and debts within the limit set by Maastricht Convention) the economies would “converge,” so that the single currency system would work. The founders of the Euro Zone seemed to think that these budgetary/macroconditions were necessary and essentially sufficient for the countries to converge, that is, to have sufficient “similarity” that a common currency would work. They were wrong. The founders of the Euro Zone were also focused on government failure, rather than market failure, and thus they circumscribed governments, setting the stage four the market failures that would bring on the euro crisis. Much of the framework built into the Euro Zone would have enhanced efficiency, if Europe had gotten the details right and if the neoclassical model were correct. But the devil is in the detail, and some of the provisions, even within the neoliberal framework, led to inefficiency and instability. Free mobility of factors without a common debt leads to the inefficient and unstable allocation of factors. The principle of free mobility is to ensure that factors move to where (marginal) returns are highest, and if factor prices are equal to marginal productivity, that should happen. But what individuals care about, for instance, is the after-tax returns to labor, and this depends not only on the marginal productivity of labor (in the neoclassical model) but also on taxes and the provision of public goods. Taxes, in turn, depend in part on the burden imposed by inherited debt. Ireland, Greece and Spain face high levels of inherited debt. In these countries, the incentive for outmigration, and is especially so, because that debt did not increase to its current levels as a result of investments in education, technology, or infrastructure that is, through the acquisition of assets, but rather as a result of financial and macro-economic mismanagement. This implies migration away from these highly indebted countries to those with less indebtedness, even when marginal productivities are the same; and the more individuals move out, the greater the “equilibrium” tax burden on the remainder, accelerating the movement of labor away from an efficient allocation.2 (Of course, in the short run, migration may have positive benefits to the crisis country, both because it reduces the burden of unemployment insurance, and as the remittances back home provide enhanced domestic purchasing power. Whether in the short run these “benefits” to migration out-weight the adverse effects noted above is an empirical question. The migration also hides the severity of the underlying downturn, since it means that the unemployment rate is less, possibly far less, than it otherwise would be.)3 Free mobility of capital and goods without tax harmonization can lead to an inefficient allocation of capital and/or reduce the potential for redistributive taxation, leading to high levels of after-tax and transfer inequality. Competition among jurisdictions can be healthy, but there can also be a race to the bottom. Capital goes to the jurisdiction which taxes it at the lowest rate, not where its marginal productivity is the highest. To compete, other jurisdictions must lower the taxes they impose on capital, and since capital is more unequally distributed than labor, this reduces the scope for redistributive taxation. (A similar argument goes for the allocation of skilled labor.) Inequality, it is increasingly recognized, is not just a moral issue: it also affects the performance of the economy in numerous ways (Stiglitz 2012). Free migration might result in politically unacceptable patterns of location of economic activity. The general theory of migration/local public goods has shown that decentralized patterns of migration may well result in inefficient and socially undesirable patterns of location of economic activity and concentrations of population. There can be congestion and agglomeration externalities (both positive and negative) that arise from free migration. That is why many countries have an explicit policy for regional development, attempting to offset the inefficient and/or socially unacceptable patterns emerging from unfettered markets. In the context of Europe, free migration (especially that arising from debt obligations inherited from the past) may result in a depopulation not only of certain regions within countries but also of certain countries. One of the important adjustment mechanisms in the United States (which shares a common currency) is migration; and if such migration leads to the depopulation of an entire state, there is limited concern.4 But Greece or Ireland are, and should be, concerned about the depopulation of their countries. The single market principle for financial institutions and capital too can lead to a regulatory race to the bottom, with at least some of the costs of the failures borne by other jurisdictions. The failure of a financial institution imposes costs on others (evidenced so clearly in the crisis of 2008), and governments will not typically take into account these cross-border costs. That is why either there has to be regulation by the host country (Stiglitz et al. 2010), or there has to be strong regulation at the European level. Worse still, confidence in any country’s banking system rests partially in the confidence of the ability and willingness of the bank’s government to bail it out (and/or to the existence of institutional frameworks that reduce the likelihood that a bailout will be necessary, that there are funds set aside should a bailout be necessary, and that there are procedures in place to ensure that depositors will be made whole). Typically, there is an implicit subsidy, from which banks in jurisdictions with governments with greater bailout capacity benefit. Thus, money flowed into the United States after the 2008 global crisis, which failures in the United States had brought about, simply because there was more confidence that the United States had the willingness and ability to bail out its banks. Similarly, today in Europe: what Spaniard or Greek would rationally keep his money in a local bank, when there is (almost) equal convenience and greater safety in putting it in a German bank?5 Only by paying much higher interest rates can banks in those countries compete, but such an action would put them at a competitive disadvantage; and the increase in interest rates that is required may be too great— the bank would quickly appear to be non-viable. What happens typically is capital flight (or, in the current case, what has been described as a capital jog: the surprise is not that capital is leaving, but that it is not leaving faster). But that sets into motion a downward spiral: as capital leaves, the country’s banks restrict lending, the economy weakens, the perceived ability of the country to bail out its banks weakens, and capital is further incentivized to leave. There are two more fallacies that are related to the current (and inevitable) failures of the Euro Zone. The first is the belief that there are natural forces for convergence in productivity, without government intervention. There can be increasing returns (reflected in clustering), the consequence of which is that countries with technological advantages maintain those advantages, unless there are countervailing forces brought about by government (industrial) policies. But European competition laws prevented, or at least inhibited, such policies.6 The second is the belief that necessary, and almost sufficient, for good macroeconomic performance is that the monetary authorities maintain low and stable inflation. This led to the mandate of the European Central Bank to focus on inflation, in contrast to that of the Federal Reserve, whose mandate includes growth, employment, and (now) financial stability. The contrasting mandates can lead to an especially counterproductive response to a crisis, especially one which is accompanied by cost-push inflation arising from high energy or food prices. While the Fed lowered interest rates in response to the crisis, the continuing inflationary concerns in Europe did not lead to matching reductions there. The consequence was an appreciating euro, with adverse effects on European output. Had the ECB taken actions to weaken the euro, it would have stimulated the economy, partially offsetting the effects of austerity. As it was, it allowed the US to engage in competitive devaluation against it. It also meant that the ECB (and central banks within each of the member countries) studiously avoided doing anything about the real estate bubbles that were mounting in several of the countries. This was in spite of the fact that the East Asian crisis had shown that private sector misconduct—even when there is misconduct in government—could lead to an economic crisis. Europe similarly paid no attention to mounting current account balances in several of the countries. Ex post, many policymakers admit that it was a mistake to ignore these current account imbalances or financial market excesses. But the underlying ideology then (and still) provides no framework for identifying good “imbalances,” when capital is flowing into the country because markets have rationally identified good investment opportunities, and those that are attributable to market excesses.~~

#### Decline doesn’t cause war

Christina L. **Davis &** Krzysztof J. **Pelc 17**, Christina L. Davis is a Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton; Krzysztof J. Pelc is an Associate Professor of Political Science at McGill University, “Cooperation in Hard Times: Self-restraint of Trade Protection,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(2): 398-429

Conclusion Political economy theory would lead us to expect rising trade protection during hard times. Yet empirical evidence on this count has been mixed. Some studies find a correlation between poor macroeconomic conditions and protection, but the worst recession since the Great Depression has generated surprisingly moderate levels of protection. We explain this apparent contradiction. Our statistical findings show that under conditions of pervasive economic crisis at the international level, states exercise more restraint than they would when facing crisis alone. These results throw light on behavior not only during the crisis, but throughout the WTO period, from 1995 to the present. One concern may be that the restraint we observe during widespread crises is actually the result of a decrease in aggregate demand and that domestic pressure for import relief is lessened by the decline of world trade. By controlling for product-level imports, we show that the restraint on remedy use is not a byproduct of declining imports. We also take into account the ability of some countries to manipulate their currency and demonstrate that the relationship between crisis and trade protection holds independent of exchange rate policies. Government decisions to impose costs on their trade partners by taking advantage of their legal right to use flexibility measures are driven not only by the domestic situation but also by circumstances abroad. This can give rise to an individual incentive for strategic self-restraint toward trade partners in similar economic trouble. Under conditions of widespread crisis, government leaders fear the repercussions that their own use of trade protection may have on the behavior of trade partners at a time when they cannot afford the economic cost of a trade war. Institutions provide monitoring and a venue for leader interaction that facilitates coordination among states. Here the key function is to reinforce expectations that any move to protect industries will trigger similar moves in other countries. Such coordination often draws on shared historical analogies, such as the Smoot–Hawley lesson, which form a focal point to shape beliefs about appropriate state behavior. Much of the literature has focused on the more visible action of legal enforcement through dispute settlement, but this only captures part of the story. Our research suggests that tools of informal governance such as leader pledges, guidance from the Director General, trade policy reviews, and plenary meetings play a real role within the trade regime. In the absence of sufficiently stringent rules over flexibility measures, compliance alone is insufficient during a global economic crisis. These circumstances trigger informal mechanisms that complement legal rules to support cooperation. During widespread crisis, legal enforcement would be inadequate, and informal governance helps to bolster the system. Informal coordination is by nature difficult to observe, and we are unable to directly measure this process. Instead, we examine the variation in responses across crises of varying severity, within the context of the same formal setting of the WTO. Yet by focusing on discretionary tools of protection—trade remedies and tariff hikes within the bound rate—we can offer conclusions about how systemic crises shape country restraint independent of formal institutional constraints. Insofar as institutions are generating such restraint, we offer that it is by facilitating informal coordination, since all these instruments of trade protection fall within the letter of the law. Future research should explore trade policy at the micro level to identify which pathway is the most important for coordination. Research at a more macro-historical scope could compare how countries respond to crises under fundamentally different institutional contexts. In sum, the determinants of protection include economic downturns not only at home but also abroad. Rather than reinforcing pressure for protection, pervasive crisis in the global economy is shown to generate countervailing pressure for restraint in response to domestic crisis. In some cases, hard times bring more, not less, international cooperation.

#### Stopping growth solves extinction from eco collapse – decoupling is impossible even under perfect conditions, and transition dangers are overhyped

Hickel 18 [Jason Hickel is an anthropologist, author, and a fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. Why Growth Can’t Be Green. Foreign Policy Magazine. September 12, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/why-growth-cant-be-green/]

Warnings about ecological breakdown have become ubiquitous. Over the past few years, major newspapers, including the Guardian and the New York Times, have carried alarming stories on soil depletion, deforestation, and the collapse of fish stocks and insect populations. These crises are being driven by global economic growth, and its accompanying consumption, which is destroying the Earth’s biosphere and blowing past key planetary boundaries that scientists say must be respected to avoid triggering collapse.

Many policymakers have responded by pushing for what has come to be called “green growth.” All we need to do, they argue, is invest in more efficient technology and introduce the right incentives, and we’ll be able to keep growing while simultaneously reducing our impact on the natural world, which is already at an unsustainable level. In technical terms, the goal is to achieve “absolute decoupling” of GDP from the total use of natural resources, according to the U.N. definition.

It sounds like an elegant solution to an otherwise catastrophic problem. There’s just one hitch: New evidence suggests that green growth isn’t the panacea everyone has been hoping for. In fact, it isn’t even possible.

Green growth first became a buzz phrase in 2012 at the United Nations Cosnference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro. In the run-up to the conference, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the U.N. Environment Program all produced reports promoting green growth. Today, it is a core plank of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals.

But the promise of green growth turns out to have been based more on wishful thinking than on evidence. In the years since the Rio conference, three major empirical studies have arrived at the same rather troubling conclusion: Even under the best conditions, absolute decoupling of GDP from resource use is not possible on a global scale.

A team of scientists led by the German researcher Monika Dittrich first raised doubts in 2012. The group ran a sophisticated computer model that predicted what would happen to global resource use if economic growth continued on its current trajectory, increasing at about 2 to 3 percent per year. It found that human consumption of natural resources (including fish, livestock, forests, metals, minerals, and fossil fuels) would rise from 70 billion metric tons per year in 2012 to 180 billion metric tons per year by 2050. For reference, a sustainable level of resource use is about 50 billion metric tons per year—a boundary we breached back in 2000.

The team then reran the model to see what would happen if every nation on Earth immediately adopted best practice in efficient resource use (an extremely optimistic assumption). The results improved; resource consumption would hit only 93 billion metric tons by 2050. But that is still a lot more than we’re consuming today. Burning through all those resources could hardly be described as absolute decoupling or green growth.

In 2016, a second team of scientists tested a different premise: one in which the world’s nations all agreed to go above and beyond existing best practice. In their best-case scenario, the researchers assumed a tax that would raise the global price of carbon from $50 to $236 per metric ton and imagined technological innovations that would double the efficiency with which we use resources. The results were almost exactly the same as in Dittrich’s study. Under these conditions, if the global economy kept growing by 3 percent each year, we’d still hit about 95 billion metric tons of resource use by 2050. Bottom line: no absolute decoupling.

Finally, last year the U.N. Environment Program—once one of the main cheerleaders of green growth theory—weighed in on the debate. It tested a scenario with carbon priced at a whopping $573 per metric ton, slapped on a resource extraction tax, and assumed rapid technological ~~innovation spurred by strong government support. The result? We hit 132 billion metric tons by 2050. This finding is worse than those of the two previous studies because the researchers accounted for the “rebound effect,” whereby improvements in resource efficiency drive down prices and cause demand to rise—thus canceling out some of the gains.~~

~~Study after study shows the same thing. Scientists are beginning to realize that there are physical limits to how efficiently we can use resources. Sure, we might be able to produce cars and iPhones and skyscrapers more efficiently, but we can’t produce them out of thin air. We might shift the economy to services such as education and yoga, but even universities and workout studios require material inputs. Once we reach the limits of efficiency, pursuing any degree of economic growth drives resource use back up.~~

~~These problems throw the entire concept of green growth into doubt and necessitate some radical rethinking. Remember that each of the three studies used highly optimistic assumptions. We are nowhere near imposing a global carbon tax today, much less one of nearly $600 per metric ton, and resource efficiency is currently getting worse, not better. Yet the studies suggest that even if we do everything right, decoupling economic growth with resource use will remain elusive and our environmental problems will continue to worsen.~~

~~Preventing that outcome will require a whole new paradigm. High taxes and technological innovation will help, but they’re not going to be enough. The only realistic shot humanity has at averting ecological collapse is to impose hard caps on resource use, as the economist Daniel O’Neill recently proposed. Such caps, enforced by national governments or by international treaties, could ensure that we do not extract more from the land and the seas than the Earth can safely regenerate. We could also ditch GDP as an indicator of economic success and adopt a more balanced measure like the genuine progress indicator (GPI), which accounts for pollution and natural asset depletion. Using GPI would help us maximize socially good outcomes while minimizing ecologically bad ones.~~

~~But there’s no escaping the obvious conclusion. Ultimately, bringing our civilization back within planetary boundaries is going to require that we liberate ourselves from our dependence on economic growth—starting with rich nations. This might sound scarier than it really is. Ending growth doesn’t mean shutting down economic activity—it simply means that next year we can’t produce and consume more than we are doing this year. It might also mean shrinking certain sectors that are particularly damaging to our ecology and that are unnecessary for human flourishing, such as advertising, commuting, and single-use products.~~

~~But ending growth doesn’t mean that living standards need to take a hit. Our planet provides more than enough for all of us; the problem is that its resources are not equally distributed. We can improve people’s lives right now simply by sharing what we already have more fairly, rather than plundering the Earth for more. Maybe this means better public services. Maybe it means basic income. Maybe it means a shorter working week that allows us to scale down production while still delivering full employment. Policies such as these—and countless others—will be crucial to not only surviving the 21st century but also flourishing in it.~~

#### Decline causes transition---crisis fundamentally changes entrenched models of growth and empowers calls for degrowth

Derk Loorbach 16, director of DRIFT and Professor of Socio-economic Transitions at the Faculty of Social Science, both at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “The economic crisis as a game changer? Exploring the role of social construction in sustainability transitions,” *Ecology and Society*, Volume 21, Issue 4, 2016, <http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol21/iss4/art15/>

Meanwhile, many political and public debates seem to be primarily concerned with standard, relatively short-term, economic issues, such as monetary losses, stop-and-start economic growth, increasing unemployment, falling real estate prices, failing banks, virtually bankrupt nations, and how to get back on course to economic growth. The standard responses when national governments are struggling to get their economies healthy again are mostly about inducing more money, austerity measures, and introducing financial regulations, all often part of a broader financial–economic logic (Stiglitz 2010). The dominant focus on fighting economic deficits and problems at the expense of investing in social and ecological deficits—thereby failing to address persistent problems in these areas—can be argued to be a short-term strategy to prop up an inherently unmanageable system. Examples are the support of system banks with public money and the green growth strategy (OECD 2009, 2013a). Transition theory (Grin et al. 2010, Markard et al. 2012) suggests that such short-term fixes are typical regime-based strategies to sustain existing structures, cultures, and practices, and to fend off the threats of more radical systemic change.¶ The transition perspective suggests that most regular policy and governance strategies essentially reproduce existing systems and, by definition, do not address the root causes of problems that are embedded in the same structures and cultures that determine how solutions are framed and implemented. Such path-dependent development optimizing existing institutional structures will inevitably lead to recurring crises and ultimately a more disruptive, shock-wise structural change of an incumbent regime. Transition studies thus argue that solutions that address symptoms rather than the underlying structural causes tend to reinforce a lock-in and result in further emergent problems (Rotmans and Loorbach 2010, Schuitmaker 2012). We argue that the underlying causes and mechanisms of the economic crises have not been thoroughly analyzed, let alone addressed through effective policies. In a globalized economy, fundamental changes will not likely come from actions by (national) governments or incumbent businesses, as these are inherently intertwined with and dependent upon the currently still dominant financial–economic systems and their governance. The need for alternative economic approaches, discourses, and systems is increasingly emphasized (Schor 2010, Simms 2013, Jackson 2013, van den Bergh 2013, Schor and Thompson, 2014). Even though the benefits of liberalization are still significant, it seems that the transfer of control from government to markets has substantially diminished possibilities for top-down policy making, adding to brittleness, complexity, and lock-in (Loorbach and Lijnis-Huffenreuter 2013).¶ In this paper, we take a transition perspective on transformative social innovation to conceptualize and map the systemic dynamics that have caused the economic crisis, as well as how it influences the dynamics of social transformation. We explore how the economic crisis might be considered as a phase in a broader economic transition and which types of changes coincide to develop into this direction. We thus view the economic crisis not as a phenomenon in isolation ~~within a relatively short time frame, but as an intrinsic part, or perhaps a symptom, of deeper underlying structural societal changes over the longer term.~~

~~The question we seek to address is how the economic crisis interacts with broader societal changes as well as which dynamics might accelerate or hamper more structural (sustainability) transitions. To this end, we ask when and how a macrolevel or landscape development like the economic crisis fundamentally changes the dominant logic, rules, and conditions of incumbent regimes. In other words, when does a macrodevelopment become a game changer (cf. Avelino et al. 2014)?¶ The paper builds upon theoretical work from the European FP7 project TRANSIT, which draws on transition theory to develop an empirically grounded theory on transformative social innovation. In this paper, we introduce the analytical perspective that we developed on transformative social innovation and two empirical examples. Although our analytical perspective suggests that alternatives and breakthroughs can come from any sector or actor, in this paper, we focus on the agency of social innovation and civil-society-led initiatives in providing and producing alternatives. The paper was developed through a number of iterations, workshops, and theoretical synthesizing. To develop our arguments, we build upon insights from sustainability transitions literature (Grin et al. 2010, Markard et al. 2012), social innovation research (Mulgan 2006, Murray et al. 2010, Franz et al. 2012, Westley 2013, Moulaert et al. 2013) and other fields aiming to understand the economic crisis. In addition, we include two empirical cases, transnational networks of social innovation, time banks, and the transition movement. For both cases, we draw upon a general literature review.¶ The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, “Economic change or transition?,” we introduce the economic crisis as a multifarious phenomenon, how we understand it from a transition perspective, and how it is understood from an economist’s point of view. We illustrate that it is an ambiguous phenomenon that is simultaneously seen as part of regular changes in that it is part of disruptive or transformative change. In the section “Making sense of the economic crisis?,” we present a number of alternative perspectives on the economic crisis that put forward particular fundamental and systemic causes of the economic crisis and how these are translated in so called “narratives of change.” In “Transformative social innovations,” we highlight two specific social innovation initiatives, time banks and transition towns, which have an evident transformative claim and potential, and reflect upon how such transformative social innovations relate (themselves) to the economic crisis. In “Reconceptualizing societal transformations and the role of the economic crisis,” we synthesize our findings and argue that the concepts of game changers and narratives could help to unpack the landscape and better understand how macro- and microlevels interact to trigger transformative changes at the mesolevel. In conclusion, we address the need for a better understanding of the transformative impacts of the different shades of change (in coevolution) vis-é-vis the restorative dynamics associated with incumbent regimes.¶ ECONOMIC CHANGE OR TRANSITION?¶ The economic crisis has an empirical basis in factual events and economic statistics, but is also a social construct. In a narrow sense, the term economic crisis refers to the worldwide recession of 2007–2008, which changed economic circumstances and investors’ outlooks and caused governments to nationalize and/or invest in failing banks and to stimulate the economy inter alia through bail outs, expansion of the money supply (quantitative easing), and low interest rates. It changed the lives of many whose employment or work conditions were drastically affected (Melike 2014). It also made many observers much more critical about capitalism and the stability of markets, especially financial markets (Murphy 2011, Stephan and Weaver 2011, Rifkin 2014, Weaver 2014). In Europe, the economic crisis was accompanied by (perceptions of) a debt crisis, a banking crisis, and a euro crisis, all interrelated. The financial crisis, debt crisis, bank crisis, neo-liberal crisis, and global financial collapse are not just different names but also refer to different, albeit closely related, empirical phenomena. Importantly, the perception and representation of such phenomena in crisis terms can give scope for motivating and/or justifying responses.¶ This economic crisis has led to measures and dynamics with profound impacts on society. Impacts that hardly could have been predicted or anticipated proactively in an objective and neutral way. As most of the formal and institutional measures originate from either governmental or financial institutes, it is to be expected that these favor nondisruptive and reinforcing measures that shift the cost of recovery toward society and strengthen even more the potential for financial–economic growth. The resulting austerity measures and state budget cuts put pressure on public sector employment, transfer payments, and social welfare systems, contributing to rising unemployment and underemployment among young and old, and lower disposable incomes for many in society. The state investments in the recovery of the banking system as well as budget cuts in welfare, health care, and education have been put forward as necessary to restabilize the economy and return to economic growth as before. Although the economy now seems on a path to recovery, many of the social and ecological tensions and challenges still persist.¶ From a countermovement perspective, the dominant measures have mainly strengthened incumbent regimes and even made more apparent the need for structural change. This becomes apparent by a growing dissatisfaction with capitalism, a lack of trust in financial institutions, and an increasing pressure on democratic political institutions (Castells 2010, Murphy 2011, Rifkin 2014, Weaver 2014). These in turn focus attention on the meaning and quality of life, which can intensify individuals’ desires to live in a more responsible and meaningful way as citizens, workers, and consumers, which again are accompanied by an increasing attention to social value creation (based on the attention to these issues in magazines and business literature) (see O’Riordan 2013).¶ Over 70 years ago, Polanyi (1944) described countermovements as critical responses to the rise of liberal market economies in the interwar period. Polanyi argued that countermovements tend to include both progressive and regressive forces, and he related the rise of fascism as part of a double countermovement in reaction to the rise of liberal market economy (Worth 2013). Similarly, contemporary counternarratives do not only include progressive sustainability-oriented ideas, but also more regressive ideas as manifested in populist and/or extremist political parties. Moreover, counternarratives and grassroots movements are also not always easily discernible from mainstream discourses. Although discourses on, e.g., solidarity economy can be constructed as counternarratives, they have considerable overlaps with mainstream policy discourses on the “Big Society” (UK) and “the participation society” (The Netherlands). When comparing discourses on the circular economy and the sharing economy, one can find differences in the former being partly associated with a corporate movement (see, e.g., McKinsey and the Ellen McArthur Foundation) the latter being more associated with grassroots social movements (e.g., Peerby). Different discourses are intermingled, changing over time, forming double movements (Polanyi 1944), or rather multilayered narratives of change.¶ We use here narratives of change as an accessible and short summary of discourses on change and innovation (Avelino et al. 2014). Social (counter)movements, such as the environmental movement or the antiglobalization movement, can be experienced as counternarratives of change. These social movements “struggle against pre-existing cultural and institutional narratives and the structures of meaning and power they convey” (Davies 2002:25). They achieve this partly through counternarratives, which “modify existing beliefs and symbols and their resonance comes from their appeal to values and expectations that people already hold” (Davies 2002:25). This challenges us to expand beyond the hegemonic mainstream narrative on, e.g., the economic crisis, by including a discussion of counternarratives around the new economy.¶ Thus, we see a double device of addressing the economic crisis through measures to prevent the breakdown and restabilization of the existing system, and the rise of counternarratives and movements that find legitimacy in exactly these processes and measures. From antiglobalization or Occupy movements, we can discern a loss of trust in the dominant economic model of the growth society and its associated livelihood model where most material needs are satisfied through impersonal market exchange. The formalized and impersonal market exchange is questioned, resulting in concepts such as sharing, reciprocity, generalized exchange, or restricted exchange (see Befu 1977, Peebles 2010 for an overview). Although the mainstream discourse is still about how to regain adequate rates of economic growth, an underlying longer-sighted discourse (i.e., counternarrative) is emerging about alternatives for this growth model. This includes (longstanding and more recent) ideas on degrowth (Schumacher 1973, Fournier 2008), green growth (OECD 2009, 2013a), or postgrowth (Jackson 2009). These (counter)narratives also question the market logic that constructs human beings as well as nature as resources and commodities in the production of goods (Freudenburg et al. 1995).~~

#### ~~Economic crises cause increased cooperation, not war~~

~~Christopher Clary 15, Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2597712~~

~~Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles.~~

~~Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination~~

~~I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically.~~

~~This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant political-military threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further:~~

~~The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3~~

~~Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.5~~

~~Why Might Economic Crisis Cause Rivalry Termination?~~

~~Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.~~