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## 1

**A just government ought to recognize the right of workers to strike except for police officers.**

**Police Strikes are used to combat racial progress and attempts to limit police power. Making them legal and easier only make progress much harder.**

Andrew **Grim 2020** What is the ‘blue flu’ and how has it increased police power? <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/01/what-is-blue-flu-how-has-it-increased-police-power/>

But the result of such protests matter deeply as we consider police reform today. Historically, **blue flu strikes have helped expand police power, ultimately limiting the ability of city governments to reform, constrain or conduct oversight over the police**. They **allow the police to leverage public fear of crime to extract concessions from municipalities.** This became clear in Detroit more than 50 years ago. In June 1967, tensions arose between Detroit Mayor Jerome Cavanagh and the Detroit Police Officers Association (DPOA), which represented the city’s 3,300 patrol officers. The two were at odds primarily over police demands for a pay increase. Cavanagh showed no signs of caving to the DPOA’s demands and had, in fact, proposed to cut the police department’s budget. On June 15, the DPOA escalated the dispute with a walkout: 323 officers called in sick. The number grew over the next several days as the blue flu spread, reaching a height of 800 absences on June 17. In tandem with the walkout, the DPOA launched a fearmongering media campaign to win over the public. They took out ads in local newspapers warning Detroit residents, “How does it feel to be held up? Stick around and find out!” This campaign took place at a time of rising urban crime rates and uprisings, and only a month before the 1967 Detroit riot, making it especially potent. The DPOA understood this climate and used it to its advantage. **With locals already afraid of crime and displeased at Cavanagh’s failure to rein it in, they would be more likely to demand the return of the police than to demand retribution against officer**s for an illegal strike. The DPOA’s strategy paid off. The walkout left Detroit Police Commissioner Ray Girardin feeling “practically helpless.” “I couldn’t force them to work,” he later told The Washington Post. Rather than risk public ire by allowing the blue flu to continue, Cavanagh relented. Ultimately, the DPOA got the raises it sought, making Detroit officers the highest paid in the nation. This was far from the end of the fight between Cavanagh and the DPOA. In the ensuing months and years, **they continued to tussle over wages, pensions, the budget, the integration of squad cars and the hiring of black officers.**The threat of another blue flu loomed over all these disputes, helping the union to win many of them. And Detroit was not an outlier. Throughout the 1960s, ’70s and ’80s, the blue flu was a [ubiquitous and highly effective](https://www.akpress.org/our-enemies-in-blue.html) tactic in Baltimore, Memphis, New Orleans, Chicago, Newark, New York and many other cities. In most cases, as author Kristian Williams writes, “When faced with a walkout or slowdown, the authorities usually decided that the pragmatic need to get the cops back to work trumped the city government’s long term interest in diminishing the rank and file’s power.” But each time a city relented to this pressure, they ceded more and more power to police unions, which would turn to the strategy repeatedly to defend officers’ interests — **particularly when it came to efforts to address systemic racism in police policies and practices.** In 1970, black residents of Pittsburgh’s North Side neighborhood raised an outcry over the “hostile sadistic treatment” they experienced at the hands of white police officers. They lobbied Mayor Peter F. Flaherty to assign more black officers to their neighborhood. The mayor agreed, transferring several white officers out of the North Side and replacing them with black officers. While residents cheered this decision, white officers and the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), which represented them, were furious. They slammed the transfer as “discrimination” against whites. About 425 of the Pittsburgh Police Department’s 1,600 police officers called out sick in protest. Notably, black police officers broke with their white colleagues and refused to join the walkout. They praised the transfer as a “long overdue action” and viewed the walkout as a betrayal of officers’ oath to protect the public. Nonetheless, the tactic paid off. After several days, Flaherty caved to the “open revolt” of white officers, agreeing to halt the transfers and instead submit the dispute to binding arbitration between the city and the police union. Black officers, though, continued to speak out against their union’s support of racist practices, and many of them later resigned from the union in protest. Similar scenarios played out in Detroit, Chicago and other cities in the 1960s and ’70s, as **white officers continually staged walkouts to preserve the segregated status quo in their departments**. These blue flu **strikes amounted to an authoritarian power grab by police officers bent on avoiding oversight, rejecting reforms and shoring up their own authority**~~. In the aftermath of the 1967 Detroit walkout, a police commissioner’s aide strongly criticized the police union’s strong-arm tactics, saying “it smacks of a police state.” The clash left one newspaper editor wondering, “Who’s the Boss of the Detroit Police?” But in the “law and order” climate of the late 1960s, such criticism did not resonate enough to stir a groundswell of public opinion against the blue flu. And police unions dismissed critics by arguing that officers had “no alternative” but to engage in walkouts to get city officials to make concessions. Crucially, the very effectiveness of the blue flu may be premised on a myth~~**~~. While police unions use public fear of crime skyrocketing without police on duty~~**~~, in many cases,~~**~~the absence of police did not lead to a rise in crime~~**~~. In New York City in 1971,~~[~~for example~~](https://untappedcities.com/2020/06/12/the-week-without-police-what-we-can-learn-from-the-1971-police-strike/)~~, 20,000 officers called out sick for five days over a pay dispute without any apparent increase in crime. The most striking aspect of the walkout, as one observer noted, “might be just how unimportant it seemed.” Today, municipalities are under immense pressure from activists who have taken to the streets to protest the police killings of black men and women. Some have already responded by enacting new policies and cutting police budgets. As it continues,~~**~~more~~**~~blue flus~~**~~are likely to follow as officers seek to wrest back control of the public debate on policing and reassert their independence.~~**

**Those strikes cement a police culture which leads to endless amounts of racist violence and the bolstering of the prison industrial complex.**

**Chaney and Ray 13**, Cassandra (Has a PhD and is a professor at LSU. Also has a strong focus in the structure of Black families) , and Ray V. Robertson (Also has a PhD and is a criminal justice professor at LSU). "Racism and police brutality in America." *Journal of African American Studies* 17.4 (2013): 480-505. SM//do I really need a card for this

Racism and Discrimination According to Marger (2012), “racism is an ideology, or belief system, designed to justify and rationalize racial and ethnic inequality” (p. 25) and “discrimination, most basically, is behavior aimed at denying members of particular ethnic groups’ equal access to societal rewards” (p. 57). Defining both of these concepts from the onset is important for they provide the lens through which our focus on the racist and discriminatory practices of law enforcement can occur. Since the time that Africans [African Americans] were forcibly brought to America, they have been the victims of racist and discriminatory practices that have been spurred and/or substantiated by those who create and enforce the law. For example, The Watts Riots of 1965, the widespread assaults against Blacks in Harlem during the 1920s (King 2011), law enforcement violence against Black women (i.e., Malaika Brooks, Jaisha Akins, Frankie Perkins, Dr. Mae Jemison, Linda Billups, Clementine Applewhite) and other ethnic women of color (Ritchie 2006), the beating of Rodney King, and the deaths of Amadou Diallo in the 1990s and Trayvon Martin more recently are just a few public examples of the historical and contemporaneous ways in which Blacks in America have been assaulted by members of the police system (King 2011; Loyd 2012; Murch 2012; Rafail et al. 2012). In Punishing Race (2011), law professor Michael Tonry’s research findings point to the fact that Whites tend to excuse police brutality against Blacks because of the racial animus that they hold against Blacks. ~~Thus, to Whites, Blacks are viewed as deserving of harsh treatment in the criminal justice system (Peffley and Hurwitz 2013). At first glance, such an assertion may seem to be unfathomable, buy that there is an extensive body of literature which suggests that Black males are viewed as the “prototypical criminal,” and this notion is buttressed in the media, by the general public, and via disparate sentencing outcomes (Blair et al. 2004; Eberhardt et al. 2006; Gabiddon 2010; Maddox and Gray 2004; Oliver and Fonash 2002; Staples 2011). For instance, Blair et al. (2004) revealed that Black males with more Afrocentric features (e.g., dark skin, broad noses, full lips) may receive longer sentences than Blacks with less Afrocentric features, i.e., lighter skin and straighter hair (Eberhardt et al. 2006). Shaun Gabiddon in Criminological Theories on Race and Crime (2010) discussed the concept of “Negrophobia” which was more extensively examined by Armour (1997). Negrophobia can be surmised as an irrational of Blacks, which includes a fear of being victimized by Black, that can result in Whites shooting or harming an AfricanAmerican based on criminal/racial stereotypes (Armour 1997). The aforementioned racialized stereotypical assumptions can be deleterious because they can be used by Whites to justify shooting a Black person on the slightest of pretense (Gabiddon 2010). Finally, African-American males represent a group that has been much maligned in the larger society (Tonry 2011). Further, as victims of the burgeoning prison industrial complex, mass incarceration, and enduring racism, the barriers to truly independent Black male agency are ubiquitous and firmly entrenched (Alexander 2010; Chaney 2009; Baker 1996; Blackmon 2008; Dottolo and Stewart 2008; Karenga 2010; Martin et al. 2001; Smith and Hattery 2009). Thus, racism and discrimination heightens the psychological distress experienced by Blacks (Robertson 2011; Pieterse et al. 2012), as well as their decreased mortality in the USA (Muennig and Murphy 2011). Police Brutality Against Black Males According to Walker (2011), police brutality is defined as “the use of excessive physical force or verbal assault and psychological intimidation” (p. 579). Although one recent study suggests that the NYPD has become better behaved due to greater race and gender diversity (Kane and White 2009), Blacks are more likely to be the victims of police brutality. A growing body of scholarly research related to police brutality has revealed that Blacks are more likely than Whites to make complaints regarding police brutality (Smith and Holmes 2003), to be accosted while operating [driving] a motorized vehicle (“Driving While Black”), and to underreport how often they are stopped due to higher social desirability factors (TomaskovicDevey et al. 2006). Interestingly, data obtained from the General Social Survey (GSS), a representative sample conducted biennially by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago for the years 1994 through 2004, provide further proof regarding the acceptance of force against Blacks. In particular, the GSS found Whites to be significantly (29.5 %) more accepting of police use of force when a citizen was attempting to escape custody than Blacks when analyzed using the chi-squared statistical test (p The average Southern policeman is a promoted poor White with a legal sanction to use a weapon. His social heritage has taught him to despise the Negroes, and he has had little education which could have changed him….The result is that probably no group of Whites in America have a lower opinion of the Negro people and are more fixed in their views than Southern policeman. (Myrdal 1944, pp. 540–541) Myrdal (1944) was writing on results from a massive study that he undertook in the late 1930s. He was writing at a time that even the most conservative among us would have to admit was not a colorblind society (if one even believes in such things). But current research does corroborate his observations that less educated police officers tend to be the most aggressive and have the most formal complaints filed against them when compared to their more educated counterparts (Hassell and Archbold 2010; Jefferis et al. 2011). Tonry (2011) delineates some interesting findings from the 2001 Race, Crime, and Public Opinion Survey that can be applied to understanding why the larger society tolerates police misconduct when it comes to Black males. The survey, which involved approximately 978 non-Hispanic Whites and 1,010 Blacks, revealed a divergence in attitudes between Blacks and Whites concerning the criminal justice system (Tonry 2011). For instance, 38 % of Whites and 89 % of Blacks viewed the criminal justice system as biased against Blacks (Tonry 2011). Additionally, 8 % of Blacks and 56 % of Whites saw the criminal justice system as treating Blacks fairly (Tonry 2011). Perhaps most revealing when it comes to facilitating an environment ripe for police brutality against Black males, 68 % of Whites and only 18 % of Whites expressed confidence in law enforcement (Tonry 2011). Is a society wherein the dominant group overwhelming approves of police performance willing to do anything substantive to curtail police brutality against Black males? Police brutality is not a new phenomenon. The Department of Justice (DOJ) office of Civil Rights (OCR) has investigated more than a dozen police departments in major cities across the USA on allegations of either racial discrimination or police brutality (Gabbidon and Greene 2013). To make the aforementioned even more clear, according to Gabbidon and Greene (2013), “In 2010, the OCR was investigating 17 police departments across the country and monitoring five settlements regarding four police agencies” (pp. 119–120). Plant and Peruche (2005) provide some useful information into why police officers view Black males as potential perpetrators and could lead to acts of brutality. In their research, the authors suggest that since Black people in general, and Black males in particular, are caricatured as aggressive and criminal, police are more likely to view Black men as a threat which justifies the disproportionate use of deadly force. Therefore, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that police officers’ decisions to act aggressively may, to some extent, be influenced by race (Jefferis et al. 2011). The media’s portrayals of Black men are often less than sanguine. Bryson’s (1998) work in this area provides empirical evidence that the mass media that has been instrumental in portraying Black men as studs, super detectives, or imitation White men and has a general negative effect on how these men are regarded by others. Such characterizations can be so visceral in nature that “prototypes” of criminal suspects are more likely to be African-American (Oliver et al. 2004). Not surprisingly, the more Afrocentric the African-American’s facial features, the more prone he or she is expected to be deviant (Eberhardt et al. 2006). Interestingly, it is probable that less than flattering depictions of Black males on television and in news stories are activating pre-existing stereotypes possessed by Whites as opposed to facilitating their creation. According to Oliver et al. (2004), “it is important to keep in mind that media consumption is an active process, with viewers’ existing attitudes and beliefs playing a larger role in how images are attended to, interpreted, and remembered” (p. 89). Moreover, it is reductionist to presuppose that individual is powerless in constructing a palatable version of reality and is solely under the control of the media and exercises no agency. Lastly, Peffley and Hurwitz (2013) describe what can be perceived as one of the more deleterious results of negative media caricatures of Black males. More specifically, the authors posit that most Whites believe that Blacks are disproportionately inclined to engage in criminal behavior and are the deserving on harsh treatment by the criminal justice system. On the other hand, such an observation is curious because most urban areas are moderate to highly segregated residentially which would preclude the frequent and significant interaction needed to make such scathing indictments (Bonilla-Silva 2009). Consequently, the aforementioned racial animus has the effect of increased White support for capital punishment if questions regarding its legitimacy around if capital punishment is too frequently applied to Blacks (Peffley and Hurwitz 2013; Tonry 2011). Ultimately, erroneous (negative) portrayals of crime and community, community race and class identities, and concerns over neighborhood change all contribute to place-specific framing of “the crime problem.” These frames, in turn, shape both intergroup dynamics and support for criminal justice policy (Leverentz 2012).~~

## 2

#### Climate tech innovation is high now and set to improve. That’s necessary to solve warming.

Winkler 11/4 Amanda is the managing editor at Freethink. Prior to joining Freethink, she was a freelance filmmaker focused on issues related to foreign policy and the U.S. military. Her work has been featured on PBS and in film festivals. Before that, she was a video producer for Reason Magazine. November 4, 2021. “Climate tech is booming — and this is better news than COP26” [https://www.freethink.com/environment/climate-tech-is-booming-and-this-is-better-news-than-cop26 Accessed 11/6](https://www.freethink.com/environment/climate-tech-is-booming-and-this-is-better-news-than-cop26%20Accessed%2011/6) //gord0]

Climate technology is *in* again.As world leaders gather in Glasgow this week for COP26, a common refrain is emerging: policy and pledges alone aren’t going to get us to [net zero by 2050](https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050). We need more innovation. And fast.

**Policy shmolicy:** This year’s UN climate conference has so far proven to be no different than the other 25 summits that have been held in the past: policymakers make voluntary pledges to cut carbon emissions to prevent rising global temperatures.

However, there’s no way to hold the pledge-makers accountable, so these summits tend to be mostly hot (*warm?*) air. Six years after the major Paris climate agreement, the world isn’t anywhere close to achieving the accord’s goal of limiting global warming to below 2° C this century. (To have a shot of reaching that goal, we’d need to hit [net zero by 2050](https://www.fastcompany.com/90243693/the-future-of-the-world-is-on-the-line-and-our-chance-to-fix-it-is-now)).

Climate change is complex so there’s not going to be one technology that solves it — we’ll need to develop and deploy a range of technologies.

But a [new report](https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2021) shows that even if countries simply fulfilled their current climate pledges, we’ll still see at least a 2.7° C rise this century. This could [still cause](https://www.economist.com/briefing/2021/07/24/three-degrees-of-global-warming-is-quite-plausible-and-truly-disastrous) an increase in extreme and deadly weather events like rising sea levels and heatwaves.

**Many solutions:** Solving climate change is incredibly difficult: to decarbonize the world’s economy, we need to rethink how *every industry* generates energy. Agriculture, manufacturing, shipping, construction, fashion — all of these industries will need to modernize their equipment to use energy more sustainably. This takes time and billions of dollars. Meanwhile, the industries still need to make a profit.

Given the complexity of the problem, there’s likely not going to be one technology that solves climate change; instead, we’ll need to develop and deploy a range of technologies.

**Bring in the tech:** To achieve net zero by 2050, [it’s estimated](https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/cop26-2021-climate-change-finance-bubble) that 65% of emissions reductions can be achieved by existing technologies and policy changes. The other 35% will need to come from new ~~technologies.~~

~~Varun Sivaram, a senior advisor to John Kerry, told~~ *~~MIT Tech Review~~* ~~that the most important role the U.S. can play in leading global emissions reduction is to develop cheaper, better low-carbon technologies.~~

~~“The number one tool the U.S. has to speed the energy transition around the world is innovation,” he~~ [~~said~~](https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/10/28/1038845/cop26-glasgow-un-climate-change-conference-emissions-gap/)~~. By funding R&D efforts, he notes, the U.S. could make it easier for other countries — especially emerging countries — to decarbonize.~~

**~~Rise of the green economy:~~** ~~The good news is that~~ [~~a green energy economy~~](https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2021/a-new-energy-economy-is-emerging#abstract) ~~is emerging — and VCs have noticed. According to the Morning Brew, in 2021 over $30 billion has already been poured into climate technology startups, up 30% from last year.~~

~~Svenja Telle, Pitchbook analyst,~~ [~~told~~](https://www.morningbrew.com/emerging-tech/stories/2021/11/01/in-record-breaking-year-for-vc-funding-climate-tech-is-no-exception) ~~the Morning Brew that clean-industry technology is the fastest-growing sector of climate tech. This sector includes alternative energy and manufacturing innovation.~~

~~There’s a~~ [~~big boom~~](https://www.forbes.com/sites/mergermarket/2021/11/03/demand-for-metals-charges-up-lithium-ion-battery-recycling/?sh=1b433d106f43) ~~in lithium battery recycling. As more things are electrified, especially vehicles, we’ll need a way to recycle those batteries.~~

[~~Redwood Materials~~](https://techcrunch.com/2021/07/28/redwood-materials-raises-700m-to-expand-its-battery-recycling-operation/) ~~is among the startups leading the recycling charge. The company extracts materials that are usually mined — like cobalt, nickel, and lithium — from recycled consumer electronics and then sells those materials to its customers, like Panasonic.~~

~~Green hydrogen is also~~ [~~on the rise~~](https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2020/10/19/the-green-hydrogen-revolution-is-now-underway/?sh=6e78a4f5232c) ~~— this is a hydrogen fuel that can be made from renewable energy sources. It’s only byproduct is water. Right now, it’s too expensive to produce, but it may become cost-competitive in the near future. There are already a few~~ [~~massive hydrogen projects~~](https://www.freethink.com/environment/green-hydrogen) ~~underway.~~

~~Another fast growing area is built-environment companies,~~ [~~said~~](https://www.morningbrew.com/emerging-tech/stories/2021/11/01/in-record-breaking-year-for-vc-funding-climate-tech-is-no-exception?utm_campaign=etb&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_source=morning_brew) ~~Telle. This includes building construction and operations, which are responsible for about 39% of global emissions.~~

~~The~~ *~~New York Times~~*[~~reports~~](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/26/business/climate-change-sustainable-real-estate.html) ~~that more investors are looking at~~ *~~sustainable real estate~~*~~, now that new technology and stricter standards enable better tracking of a development’s carbon footprint.”~~

~~“Five to 10 years ago, there was a lot of debate about sustainability, that, ‘It’s nice, but I don’t want to pay for it,’” Stephen Tross, chief investment officer at a Dutch investment firm, told the NYT. “Today, you don’t sacrifice returns for sustainability, you create returns with sustainability.”~~

~~Turntide Technologies~~ [~~recently raised $225 million~~](https://techcrunch.com/2021/06/30/sustainable-tech-developer-turntide-technologies-raises-225m/) ~~to continue developing their~~ [~~“smart motor~~](https://www.freethink.com/technology/turntide-technologies)~~” which makes motors much more efficient, reducing energy consumption by about 64%.~~

~~“Today, half of the world’s energy is used by electric motors and nearly half of that energy consumption is being wasted due to inefficiency and lack of intelligent controls,”  Ryan Morris, CEO, told TechCrunch.~~

~~Over $30 billion has already been poured into climate technology this year, up 30% from last year.~~

**~~Deja vu:~~** ~~From 2006 to 2011, we also saw a  “clean tech” boom that ended up being a disastrous bust — more than 90% of the cleantech startups funded during this time~~ [~~did not~~](https://energy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/MITEI-WP-2016-06.pdf) ~~return the money invested in them. (Hey,~~ [~~Solyndra~~](https://fortune.com/2015/08/27/remember-solyndra-mistake/)~~!)~~

~~However, this time~~ [~~appears to be different~~](https://www.forbes.com/sites/robtoews/2021/10/31/will-this-generation-of-climate-tech-be-different/?sh=78b53b094a62)~~. One major reason is that renewable energy is now~~ [~~price-competitive~~](https://www.irena.org/newsroom/pressreleases/2020/Jun/Renewables-Increasingly-Beat-Even-Cheapest-Coal-Competitors-on-Cost#:~:text=%E2%80%9CRenewable%20energy%20is%20increasingly%20the,benefits%20to%20the%20wider%20economy.) ~~with fossil fuels. That wasn’t the case in 2009, when solar power was~~ [*~~over four times~~*](https://ourworldindata.org/cheap-renewables-growth) ~~more expensive than fossil fuels. The price has fallen fast and is~~ [~~expected~~](https://about.bnef.com/new-energy-outlook/) ~~to get even cheaper. This has made a global transition to clean energy systems possible.~~

~~Another reason is that most of today’s climate technology startups are powered by software and machine learning. That means today’s startups are more likely to scale, compared to yesterday’s technology which leaned heavily on hard assets.~~

~~“Investors were scared after what happened with Clean Tech 1.0, but it’s different this time. Back then everything was focused on really R&D-heavy technologies in clean energy. This time it’s about decarbonizing the entire economy,” Telle told Morning Brew.~~

~~“Something that is relevant for every single sector. And it’s the only way forward.”~~

**Violent strike efforts are increasing – they slow innovation, specifically in the tech sector.**

**Hanasoge 16** [Chaithra; Senior Research Analyst, Market Researcher, Consumer Insights, Strategy Consulting; “The Union Strikes: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly,” Supply Wisdom; April/June 2016 (Doesn’t specifically say but this is the most recent event is cites); https://www.supplywisdom.com/resources/the-union-strikes-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/]//SJWen

The result: Verizon conceded to several of the workers’ demands including hiring union workers, protection against outsourcing of call-center jobs, and employee benefits such as salary hikes and higher pension contributions, among others and thus bringing an end to the strike in June.

The repercussion: The strike witnessed **several instances** of **social disorder**, **violence** and **clashes**, ultimately calling for third party intervention (Secretary of Labor – Thomas Perez) to initiate negotiations between the parties. Also, as a result of the strike, Verizon reported **lower** than **expected revenues** in the **second quarter of 2016**.

Trade unions/ labor unions aren’t just this millennia’s product and has been in vogue since times immemorial. **Unions**, to **ensure fairness** to the working class, have **gone on strike for better working conditions** and employee benefits since the **industrial revolution** and are as strong today as they were last century. With the **advent of technology and advancement in artificial intelligence**, machines are grabbing the jobs which were once the bastion of the humans. So, questions that arise here are, what relevance do unions have in today’s work scenario? And, are the strikes organized by them avoidable?

As long as the concept of labor exists and employees feel that they are not receiving their fair share of dues, unions will exist and thrive. Union protests in most cases cause work stoppages, and in certain cases, disruption of law and order. Like in March 2016, public servants at Federal Government **departments across Australia** went on a series of **strikes** over failed pay negotiations, **disrupting operations** of many **government departments** for a few days.  Besides such direct effects, there are many **indirect effects** as well such as **strained employee relations**, **slower work processes**, **lesser productivity** and **unnecessary legal hassles**.

Also, union strikes can **never be taken too lightly** as they have prompted major overturn of decisions, on a few occasions. Besides the **Verizon incident** that was a **crucial example** of this, nationwide strikes were witnessed in India in March and April this year when the national government introduced reforms related to the withdrawal regulations and interest rate of employee provident fund, terming it as ‘anti-working class’. This compelled the government to withhold the reform for further review. In France, strike against labor law reforms in May turned violent, resulting in riots and significant damage to property. The incident prompted the government to consider modifications to the proposed reforms.

However, aside from employee concerns, such incidents are also determined by a number of other factors such as the country’s political scenario, economy, size of the overall workforce and the unions, history of unionization, labor laws, and culture. For example, it is a popular saying that the French are always on strike as per tradition (although recent statistics indicate a decline in frequency). In a communist government like China, strikes have steadily risen in number. In 2015, China Labor Bulletin (CLB), a Hong Kong-based workers’ rights group recorded 2,700 incidents of strikes and protests, compared to 1,300 incidents in 2014. Most of them have stemmed out of failure by the government to respect the basic rights of employees and address labor concerns.

Interestingly, unions have **not been able to gain a strong foothold** in the **IT-BPO industry**. While many countries do have a separate union to represent workers from the sector, incidents of strikes like Verizon **have been relatively lo**w.  However, workplace regulations, in addition to other factors mentioned could be a trigger for such incidents, even if on a smaller scale. For example, a recent survey that **interviewed several BPO employees** in India revealed that while **forming a union** in the BPO sector was **difficult**, irksome workplace regulations such as constant surveillance, irregular timings and incentives have prompted employees to express their resentment in smaller ways such as corruption of internal servers and so on.  Such risks are further enhanced in a city like Kolkata, which carries a strong trade union culture.

#### Technology is rapidly shifting towards climate change prevention – NASA proves

Smith 10/19 [Hayley Smith. October 19, 2021. “NASA turns technology back toward Earth to focus on climate change” [https://phys.org/news/2021-10-nasa-technology-earth-focus-climate.html Accessed 11/6](https://phys.org/news/2021-10-nasa-technology-earth-focus-climate.html%20Accessed%2011/6) //gord0]

After decades of gazing into space, NASA is turning its technology back toward Earth to study the effects of drought, fire and climate change on the Blue Planet.

At the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in La Cañada Flintridge last Thursday, scientists and [state officials](https://phys.org/tags/state+officials/) gathered to discuss how [satellite data](https://phys.org/tags/satellite+data/), 3D imaging and new radar and laser technologies can provide invaluable insights into Earth's rapidly changing systems.

Some said the meeting marked a sea change for previously siloed agencies, and underscored the need to work together to solve the climate crisis.

"I don't want to be overly dramatic, but in truth, this discussion is about saving our planet," NASA Administrator Bill Nelson told the group of attendees, which included Earth and space scientists from NASA and JPL, local congressional representatives and California environmental secretaries Wade Crowfoot and Jared Blumenfeld.

Upcoming Earth-centric missions will provide a more precise look at "everything that's happening" with the oceans, the land and the atmosphere than ever before, Nelson said. Among the big-ticket items were new tools to measure snowpack and groundwater, satellites to monitor methane emissions and remote sensing assets to assess the impact of hazards such as wildfires, earthquakes and mudslides.

"We're facing an existential crisis on this planet," said Crowfoot, the state's natural resources secretary. "These challenges are intense. ... But there's no better place than California to do this work, because we understand the gravity of the threat."

The meeting between California and [federal officials](https://phys.org/tags/federal+officials/) was a far cry from 2018, when—frustrated by the Trump administration's efforts to scuttle climate research—then-Gov. Jerry Brown insisted that California would launch "our own damn satellite, to figure out where the pollution is and how are we going to end it."

Now, three years later, Californians need only look out their windows to get a sense of what scientists can observe from above. Wildfires are burning record acreage across the West, while worsening drought is draining the region's water supplies to unseen levels. The state also recorded its hottest summer ever in 2021.

Many at the meeting hoped NASA and JPL's findings would help combat global warming by informing decision-makers as they determine the best paths forward.

"It's really a game changer to be able to have this data," NASA Deputy Administrator Pam Melroy said, noting that the U.S. can also lead the rest of the world in utilizing the same tools. "Because we'll never solve climate until everybody is a participant."

Many of the projects have been in development for years, but a recent memorandum of understanding between the state and JPL helped get additional projects off the ground, Crowfoot said—including critical items focused on water resiliency. The Western U.S. in recent months has seen such severe drought conditions that officials closed Lake Oroville's hydroelectric power plant for the first time and declared the first-ever water shortage on the Colorado River, among other actions.

One new web-based platform, OpenET, will provide satellite-based information on evapotranspiration, the process through which water leaves plants, soils and other surfaces, which could help state officials understand water usage in agricultural areas and assist farmers with precision irrigation.

"As states, we do our best to manage this resource of water, but we're never going to do it with the sophistication we need to without partners like NASA," Crowfoot said, adding that the agency could be the "tip of the spear" when it comes to combating climate change.

Other water-related items include surface water and ocean topography tools known as SWOT that will contribute to NASA's first-ever global survey of the Earth's surface water. Every 21 days, SWOT will survey almost 600,000 miles of global rivers at least twice, aiding drought forecasters and hazardous-flood preparations, officials said. It is set to launch in 2022.

JPL interim Director Larry James said the next generation of water-measuring spacecraft will also allow scientists to measure freshwater body heights and flows for the first time, while laser-imaging spectrometers will help study snowmelt and snow volume.

But scientists aren't just studying water. Methane was also a focus of discussion, with a new satellite due to launch in 2023 that will help monitor concentrations of the harmful emission, the second-largest contributor to greenhouse warming after carbon dioxide.

Blumenfeld, California's secretary for environmental protection, said the three largest producers of methane in the state are the oil and gas industry, landfills and agriculture (particularly, large animal operations and dairies). The new tool will enable anyone to see whether an oil refinery, for example, is leaking methane.

"It gives accountability, which is a critical element we need to get to in order to deal with the climate crisis, and it would not happen without NASA and JPL," Blumenfeld said. "Globally, and living in California, this is a really big deal."

But space missions have also come under scrutiny for their own environmental impact, as propellants required to launch rockets into space can expel carbon dioxide, liquid hydrogen, kerosene or other chemicals into the atmosphere.

The launch of a Falcon Heavy rocket from SpaceX, Elon Musk's privately owned space transportation company, burned about 400 metric tons of kerosene and emitted more [carbon dioxide](https://phys.org/tags/carbon+dioxide/) in a few minutes than an average car would in more than two centuries, reports found—and the number of commercial spaceflights is expected to increase tenfold in the coming years.

But NASA administrators say that the scale of their projects is getting "smaller and smarter," with one official noting that the methane satellite is "the size of a shoebox."

"It's an absolutely minuscule part, but it is a real concern," Melroy said of rocket emissions, noting that the agency is working on developing more sustainable fuels.

And while many of the [new tools](https://phys.org/tags/new+tools/) provide big-picture views of massive global challenges, some are much more local. Nelson said people don't have to be scientists to understand the impact of wildfires, drought, sinkholes or floods.

"There are places in the country, and represented in the halls of government, that are going to be very resistant, so we have to tell the story," he said. "We've got to educate the people, and unfortunately, increasingly, all of these disasters are helping us to do that."

Nearly 2.5 million acres have burned in California's wildfires so far this year—a number second only to 2020, the state's worst wildfire season on record. Entire towns have been leveled by flames.

Some of NASA's tools can help identify where wildfires are spotting, or shooting out embers that could potentially endanger firefighters and ignite new blazes, officials said. Others can employ sophisticated radar systems over disaster areas to assess damage and assist first responders.

JPL Earth science and technology director Jim Graf said they can also fly over the 1,100-mile levee system in the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta to quickly identify sinking or weaknesses. That information could help officials make decisions on critical infrastructure, such as roads, bridges and aqueducts.

Officials on Thursday also showed off their NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar satellite, or NISAR, which is still under construction and will "provide an unprecedented view of Earth" when it launches in 2023, they said. The satellite will monitor the entire globe as it scans for disturbances in glaciers, volcanoes and other systems.

"Basically, it's going to use two radar instruments that will look at changes in the Earth's surface," said Susan Owen McCollum, deputy project scientist for NISAR. "That actually can tell you a lot: how fast the ice sheets are melting, how fast the ground is moving."

Another aspect of the radar will enable officials to monitor how forest biomass is changing through carbon containment or other processes, McCollum said, which could be essential for studying places like the Amazon.

"Radar is a very powerful imaging tool—it sees the Earth in way that's different," she said.

But NASA and JPL also haven't lost sight of the final frontier, and officials on Thursday offered a tour of the control room for the Mars Perseverance rover. The rover, which landed on Mars in February, is collecting rock samples that will be returned to Earth for closer study.

The Ingenuity helicopter that arrived with the rover has also completed more than a dozen flights, they said, demonstrating for the first time that powered, controlled flight on another planet is possible.

Yet while the challenges of space exploration may seem a world away from those here on Earth, Perseverance project scientist Ken Farley said much can be learned from the red planet. Some of the rocks his team is studying are 3.5 billion years old and come from a time when liquid water flowed on the surface of Mars.

There is no liquid water on the Martian surface today, he said, and there is essentially no atmosphere.

"It is an example of massive [climate change](https://phys.org/tags/climate+change/)—from a planet that we believe would have been inhabitable to a planet that, at least on the surface, is not," Farley said. "It is a clear example that climate changes, and it can change enormously."

Nelson, the NASA administrator, echoed those sentiments when he addressed the rover's control team.

"That's one of the profound things that I think happens to every person that's had the privilege of looking out the window of a spacecraft when you orbit the Earth," he said. "You see how beautiful it is, but how fragile."

#### Warming causes extinction — their card

## Case

### Case Proper

#### 1] Literally none of their solvency cards implicate unconditional RTS being key – they have to prove that having an unconditional RTS is better for democracy than any conditional RTS

#### 2]

### Democracy CT

#### Reject democratic peace – 52 years of analysis and newest models

Grabmeier ’15 (Jeff; 9/3/15; Senior Director of Research and Innovation at Ohio State University, citing a 52-year study; Phys.org, “'Democratic peace' may not prevent international conflict,” <https://phys.org/news/2015-09-democratic-peace-international-conflict.html)>

Using a new technique to analyze **52 years of international conflict**, researchers suggest that there may be **no such thing** as a "democratic peace." In addition, a model developed with this new technique was found to predict international conflict five and even ten years in the future better than any existing model. Democratic peace is the widely held theory that democracies are less likely to go to war against each other than countries with other types of government. In the new study, researchers found that economic trade relationships and participation in international governmental organizations play a strong role in keeping the peace among countries. But democracy? Not so much. "That's a startling finding because the value of joint democracy in preventing war is what we thought was the closest thing to a law in international politics," said Skyler Cranmer, lead author of the study and The Carter Phillips and Sue Henry Associate Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University. "There's been empirical research supporting this theory for the past 50 years. Even U.S. presidents have touted the value of a democratic peace, but it **doesn't seem to hold up**, at least the way we looked at it." The study appears this week in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Cranmer's co-authors are Elizabeth Menninga, assistant professor of political science at the University of Iowa and recent Ph.D. graduate in political science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; and Peter Mucha, professor of mathematics in the College of Arts and Sciences at UNC-Chapel Hill. Along with casting doubt on democratic peace theory, the study also developed a new way to **predict levels** of international conflict that is **more accurate than any previous model**. The researchers used a new technique to examine all violent conflicts between countries during the period of 1948 to 2000. The result was a model of international conflict that was 47 percent better than the standard model at predicting the level of worldwide conflict five and even 10 years into the future. "The Department of Defense needs to know at least that far in advance what the world situation is going to be like, because it can't react in a year to changes in levels of conflict due to bureaucratic inertia and its longer funding cycle," Cranmer said. "Being able to have a sense of the global climate in five or 10 years would be extremely helpful from a policy and planning perspective." The researchers started the study with a famous idea posed by the philosopher Immanuel Kant back in 1795: that the world could enjoy a "perpetual peace" if countries would become more interconnected in three ways. The modern interpretation of those three ways is: Through the spread of democratic states, more economic interdependence through trade, and more joint membership in international governmental organizations, or IGOs. (Modern examples range from regional agricultural organizations to the European Union and NATO.) Many studies have looked at how these three elements, either together or separately, affect conflict between countries. But even when they were considered together, the impact of the three individual factors were considered additively. What makes this study unique is that the researchers were the first to use a new **statistical measure** developed by Mucha - called multislice community detection—to analyze **all three of these components** collectively. They were able to examine, for the first time, how each component was related to each other. For example, how membership in IGOs affected trade agreements between counties, and vice versa. "When we looked at these networks holistically, we found communities of countries that are similar not only in terms of their IGO memberships, or trade agreements, or in their democratic governments, but in terms of all these three elements together," Cranmer said. The separation between such communities in the world is what the researchers called "Kantian Fractionalization." "You might think of it as the number of cliques the world is split up into and how easy it is to isolate those cliques from one another," Cranmer said. But the deeper the separation between communities or cliques there are in the world at one time, the more dangerous the world becomes. By measuring these communities in the world at one specific time, the researchers could predict with **better accuracy** than ever before how many violent conflicts would occur in one, 5 or 10 years in the future. This study had a broad definition of conflict: any military skirmish where one country deliberately kills a member of another country. Many of the conflicts in this study were relatively small, but it also includes major wars. Predicting one year into the future, this new model was 13 percent better than the standard model at predicting levels of worldwide conflict. But it was 47 percent better at predicting conflict 5 and 10 years into the future. "We measured how fragile these networks are to breaking up into communities," Mucha said. "Remarkably, that fragility in a mathematical sense has a clear political consequence in terms of increased conflict." The linear relationship between higher levels of Kantian fractionalization and more future conflict was so strong that Cranmer couldn't believe it at first. "I threw up my hands in frustration when I first saw the results. I thought we surely must have made a mistake because you almost never see the kind of **clean, linear relationship** that we found outside of textbooks," Cranmer said. "But we confirmed that there is this strong relationship."

#### Collapse of democracy’s inevitable – transition to Chinese autocracy solves.

Schiavenza ’17 (Matt; 1/19/17; Senior Content Manager at Asia Society; Asia Society; “Could China's System Replace Democracy?”; <http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/could-chinas-system-replace-democracy>; DOA: 12/6/17)

Two decades later, this notion seems increasingly unfeasible. **Democracy is** **struggling**. According to Freedom House, the number of democracies has **fallen since** reaching a peak in **2006**. The world’s non-democracies, meanwhile, have become **more authoritarian**. Russia, once a tentative democracy, is now under the control of Vladimir Putin, a **nationalist leader** whose regime has centralized power, targeted opposition journalists, and seized sovereign territory of other countries. Then there’s China. For years, conventional wisdom stated that as the People’s Republic grew more prosperous, the country would naturally transition to a liberal democracy. But this prediction — dubbed the “China Fantasy” by the author James Mann — has not happened. If anything, China’s economic success has only **further solidified the C**hinese **C**ommunist **P**arty: The current ruler, Xi Jinping, is widely considered to be the country’s **most powerful** since Deng Xiaoping. Democracy’s ill health has also **infected the U**nited **S**tates **and Europe**. The president of Hungary, a formerly Communist state whose accession to the European Union in 2004 was a triumph for the West, has sought to “**end liberal democracy**” in his country by clamping down on press freedom and judicial independence. These trends are also evident in neighboring Poland. Far-right parties — like the United Kingdom Independence Party, the orchestrator of Brexit — have **gained popularity** across the continent. During his successful campaign for president of the United States, Donald Trump expressed, at best, an indifference toward democratic norms and ideals. Trump called for his opponent, Hillary Clinton, to be imprisoned, raised false accusations of voter fraud, threatened legal action against the media, and refused to commit to honoring the results of the election. Trump has repeatedly professed his **admiration for Putin**, Russia’s dictatorial leader, for being “**a strong leader**”; as president-elect, he **praised the Kazakh dictator** Nursultan Nazarbayev for “achieving a miracle” in his country. Where Did Democracy Go Wrong? According to Brian Klaas, author of the new book The Despot’s Accomplice: How the West Is Aiding and Abetting the Decline of Democracy, there are **three main reasons**. One is **American hypocrisy**, or, as Klaas puts it, the “Saudi effect.” President George W. Bush made democracy promotion an explicit centerpiece of American foreign policy during his second inaugural speech in 2005, yet the following year when Hamas won democratic elections to govern the Gaza Strip, the U.S. refused to honor the results. And as Washington invested billions of dollars and thousands of American lives to **impose democracy by force** in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. government forged a military deal with Uzbekistan’s tyrannical regime and maintained a close relationship with Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s most repressive countries. A second reason for democracy’s decline is the **resurgence of China and Russia**. As China’s economic rise continued without interruption in the quarter-century after Tiananmen Square, observers began wondering whether the Chinese miracle was **because of**, rather than in spite of, **its autocratic government**. (The slower growth of India, a messy democracy, only seemed to strengthen this argument.) And while Russia’s economic fortunes in the Putin era have lived and died with the price of oil, there’s little question that the country is **wealthier and more stable** than it had been under Boris Yeltsin. The success of both countries, sustainable or not, seemed to indicate that democracy and growth were not necessarily co-dependent. Klaas’ third reason is the **weaknesses embedded in** modern **American democracy** itself. Last year’s presidential election was a multi-billion dollar, 18-month saga that resulted in the election of a candidate who had **never served in government** or the military and one, incidentally, who earned **three million fewer votes** than his main opponent. “Not many people looked at our election and thought that they were missing out,” Klaas told Asia Society. “I even heard a Thai general say that if ‘democracy means Donald Trump, **we don’t want it**.’” What About China's System? There’s **no doubt** that liberal democracy is in crisis. But the next question — whether plausible alternatives exist — is less certain. Consider China. The country’s ability to push through major infrastructure projects, such as a nationwide high-speed rail network, without political obstruction has dazzled Westerners frustrated at the gridlock endemic to American politics. In a 2010 episode of Meet the Press, the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman famously admitted to fantasizing that the U.S. “could be China for a day” simply as a means to get things done. Daniel Bell, a professor of political science at Shandong University in eastern China, has written extensively about the meritocratic advantages of China’s political system. Chinese leaders must pass a series of examinations and negotiate a complex bureaucracy before achieving national power. Xi Jinping may have benefited from nepotism: His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a key Mao-era official. But the Chinese president also accumulated experience as the governor of two major Chinese provinces and a stint as vice president. This, Bell argues, has given Xi legitimacy in spite of never having to face voters. “I disagree with the view that there’s only one morally legitimate way of selecting leaders: one person, one vote,” Bell said in an appearance at Asia Society in 2015. State-run media in China spun the chaotic outcome of the Arab Spring uprisings as an example of democracy’s inherent flaws. The election of Donald Trump only served to further reinforce this notion. “I remember talking to the Chinese ambassador, and he made a crack about how in the U.S. you can be a nobody one day and the next day rise to power,” said Isaac Stone Fish, a senior fellow at Asia Society, “and you can’t do that in China because you have to go through all these different levels and rise through the system.” Bell acknowledges that the Chinese system has serious drawbacks. The prohibition of free speech, ban on political opposition, and absence of an independent judiciary mean that there are no checks against official abuse of power, something that has emerged as a major crisis in the past decade in the country. The high-profile anti-corruption campaign launched by President Xi has reduced visible signs of excess, such as lavish banquets and fast cars. But critics believe that the campaign also serves as cover for Xi’s sidelining of rivals within the Communist Party. Defenders of China’s Communist Party point to the country’s near-four-decade run of economic growth as proof that the system works. But in structural terms, the modern Party is little different from the one that, under Chairman Mao, presided over widespread political persecution, a deadly famine, and a disastrous period of social upheaval known as the Cultural Revolution. Even after Deng Xiaoping reversed Mao’s policies and adopted a pragmatic economic approach, the Party has still implemented policies whose consequences threaten stability and prosperity. The One Child Policy, adopted in 1980 without public debate, created a demographic imbalance that, three decades later, has prematurely reduced China’s working-age population. Even the much-vaunted record of economic growth is built on a shaky foundation of debt-fueled investment. "There have been 30 instances in the postwar period when a country's debt increased by 40 percent over a 5-year horizon," Ruchir Sharma, an economics expert at Morgan Stanley, said of China in an appearance at Asia Society in December. “And in 100 percent of these instances, the country got into a deep economic trouble within the next five years." China has taken steps to systematize its government by introducing a mandatory retirement age for senior officials and establishing term limits for its leaders. The Communist Party’s Standing Committee of the Politburo, a seven-man body that stands atop China’s government pyramid, is designed to divide the responsibilities of government and ensure no one individual assumes too much power. The behavior of Xi Jinping over the past three years, though, has raised questions whether these norms are durable. Xi has assumed positions within the Chinese government once shared by fellow leaders and has weakened Li Keqiang, his prime minister, by denying him the office’s traditional stewardship of economic policy. Xi has abetted and re-established a cult of personality, something explicitly discouraged in China after the Maoist era, by encouraging the singing of songs in his name. And, as the Wall Street Journal recently reported, there are questions that Xi may not name a successor at this fall’s 19th Party Congress in order to continue as president beyond the customary 10-year term. The Consequences of Democracy's Decline China, for what it’s worth, has never claimed that its system of government was universally applicable. In contrast to the United States or the Soviet Union, Beijing has never tried to install its system in a foreign country by force. Even still, democracy’s decline may prove advantageous to China in other ways. For one, it would weaken the democratic movement in Hong Kong, which has vied with pro-Beijing elements for political control of the Chinese territory, and deter would-be Chinese dissidents from challenging Communist Party rule on the mainland. In addition, Klaas argues, the American absence of support for democracy leaves a vacuum in emerging states that Washington’s geopolitical rivals in Moscow and Beijing might fill. “The ‘America First’ mentality, or the mentality that it’s not our business, makes the mistake that thinking that the withdrawal of Western influence means there’s self-determination,” says Klaas. “ [But what it means is] that China and Russia control things. It’s not something where if the West leaves, then, say, Malawi will be free to choose. It’s a global foreign policy battle, and the West’s losses are China's and Russia’s gains.” Before the U.S. can promote democracy overseas, though the country may need to firm up support for it at home. A Harvard study conducted in November found that just 19 percent of American millennials believe that a military takeover is not legitimate in democracy compared to 45 percent of those older. 26 percent of millennials likewise feel that choosing leaders through free elections is “unimportant,” a sentiment shared by just 14 percent of Baby Boomers. “A lot of people growing up now don’t understand what it’s like not to live in a free society in the West,” says Klaas. “That, combined with the "end of history," assumed that democracy is the natural way of things. “In fact, democracy is the least organic and least natural way we’ve had."

#### Democracy causes Russia war -- tons of empirics prove.

Babayan ’15 (Nelli Babayan is a senior researcher at the Center for Transnational Relations, Foreign and Security Policy at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Freie Universita¨t Berlin. “The return of the empire? Russia's counteraction to transatlantic democracy promotion in its near abroad” Democratization, 2015 Vol. 22, No. 3, 438 -- 45)

How did Russia counteract EaP in Armenia? Since its independence from the Soviet Union, Armenia has welcomed democracy promotion efforts and committed to the regional policies of the EU and the US, including democracy promotion. The expulsion of Russian military bases from Georgia after the 2008 conflict and their move to Armenia made the latter last remaining stronghold of Russian military power in the region. The entire spectrum of Russia's instruments in counteracting democracy promotion or for that matter any EU/US policy deemed as challenging were particularly evident in the case of Armenia's 2013 “U-turn”59 from the EU AA to Russia's Customs Union. The case of Armenia demonstrates that Russia is most prone to counteract the EU and the US when faced with imminent effectiveness of democracy promotion supported by local actors or when faced with challenges to its geostrategic interests. As Delcour and Wolczuk show in this special issue, this logic also applies to Russia's actions in Georgia and Ukraine. By the employment of economic and military instruments and through the promotion of alternative regional institutions, Russia counteracted EU policy, which has also been supported by the US. Thus, Russian efforts for counteracting the initiatives within the EaP peaked with success in September 2013: Armenia turned to the Eurasian Customs Union and in November 2013 Ukraine withdrew from initialling the AA despite a wave of domestic protests in both countries.60 Energy, more specifically gas, and the protracted conflicts are the main pressure points used by Russia in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. Devoid of natural energy resources and with a protracted conflict at hand, Armenia makes a compliant target for Russia's energy and military pressures. In the mid-2000s Russia successfully blocked the diversification of Armenia's gas sources by imposing restrictions on the pipeline from Iran.61 Regular Armenian concessions in terms of infrastructure and cooperation with other neighbours secured comparatively lower gas prices. However, after Armenia concluded the sixth round of DCFTA negotiations leading to the initialling of the AA, in July 2013 Russia threatened to increase gas prices by 60%, while suggesting that the costs may be subsidized and not increase in the next five years should Armenia join the Customs Union.62 Consequently, Armenia entered negotiations for an 18% rise. It allowed Russian gas-monopoly Gazprom to acquire the remaining 20% of shares of the gas procuring company ArmRusGazprom, which had previously belonged to the Armenian government. Russian media, which is also widely viewed in Armenia, publicized a number of preferential agreements and possible subsidies promised by Putin to Armenia's President Serzh Sargsyan in return for joining the Customs Union. In addition, Russia promised larger investments into prolonging the exploitation of the Armenian nuclear power plant and other factories, regarded as obsolete or environmentally hazardous by the EU and the US.63 Besides economic threats, Russia has also been taking advantage of the protracted conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh region. While Azerbaijan's energy industry has allowed it to exponentially multiply its military budget, Armenia has been largely reliant on Russia for its security against possible military actions by Azerbaijan. While Armenia showed growing interest in its partnership with the EU and did not attend a June 2013 meeting of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, Russia subsequently increased its arms export to Azerbaijan by US$1 billion.64 This move served as a clear warning to Armenia that Russia may no longer support it in the framework of the conflict. Regularly playing two sides of the conflict against each other using the promise or threat of arms sales, Russia has managed to keep the South Caucasus divided and hindered regional projects of the EU and the US. Armenia backpedalled on AA after two years of preparations and previously expressed confidence by the Armenian authorities that “the AAs with some partner countries, including Armenia, will be initialled” in November 2013.65 The EU delegation in Armenia confirmed that the latter was on track for signing the AA. Former Prime Minister Tigran Sarkisian also repeatedly argued against Armenian entry into the Customs Union, due to the lack of common borders with Russia, Belarus, or Kazakhstan.66 Thus, the decision to reject initialling the AA bewildered both the EU and the Armenian public, which took to the streets in protest (even if with limited coverage by Western media). Given the pressures coming from the Kremlin, Armenian officials attempted to frame the decision in pragmatic terms, calling Russia the “military security choice” and the DCFTA the “economic choice”, since “in terms of security, Armenia is tied to Russia”.67 However, while the Armenian government and the Kremlin have attempted to present the Customs Union as a better economic and trade choice for Armenia,68 the benefits of joining it are hardly identifiable. Due to its closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and lack of a border with Russia, Armenia conducts most of its trade through Georgia. Since Georgia signed the DCFTA in summer 2014, these two neighbouring countries will now have to abide by different tariffs and agreements, further straining Armenia's already weak economy. The stagnation of democracy in post-Soviet countries has been the result of a set of factors, such as low resonance of democracy, high adaptation costs to democracy, protracted conflicts, weak institutions, or illiberal elites. Yet, through economic sanctions, military threats, and even through such formal institutions as the Eurasian Union, Russia has contributed to the stagnation of democratization in its near abroad. It counteracted democracy promotion or, for that matter, any other Western policies, which it considered a threat to its geostrategic interests and ambitions for restoring its great power status. At the same time, even if the level of democracy in its near abroad has gradually deteriorated, there is no evidence of Russia promoting autocracy or any other regime alternative to democracy. Russia's actions are hardly surprising. For centuries under the direct influence of Russia, the regions of Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia did not only constitute parts of the Russia-led Soviet Union but also of the earlier Russian Empire. The exposure to Western principles (along with material incentives) and democratization under the guidance of the EU or the US may potentially steer the allegiance of its near abroad away from Russia. Moreover, just as the EU and the US have continuously preferred stability over democracy,69 Russia has also strived to maintain the status quo and safeguard its interests in its own neighbourhood. At the same time, the EU and the US currently do not match either the level of political prowess -- borderline blackmail -- or the type of economic or security pressures employed by Russia in its near abroad.

#### Russia will freak out -- causes intervention and trade wars.

Babayan ’15 (Nelli Babayan is a senior researcher at the Center for Transnational Relations, Foreign and Security Policy at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Freie Universita¨t Berlin. “The return of the empire? Russia's counteraction to transatlantic democracy promotion in its near abroad” Democratization, 2015 Vol. 22, No. 3, 438 -- 45)

This special issue has suggested that from the perspective of target countries, the resonance of promoted democratic rules among domestic elites and the population, the economic and military importance, and to some extent cultural/historical proximity to an illiberal power are likely drivers for counteraction of democracy promotion. This section considers these assumptions by overviewing Russia's actions in EaP countries and proceeds to more detailed discussion of Russia's strategies in counteracting democracy promotion using the example of Armenia's withdrawal from initialling the EU's AA. While not a frontrunner in democratization, Armenia has endeavoured to develop closer relations with both Russia and the EU, being particularly enthusiastic about new targeted policies. Precisely this endeavour to integrate into European structures rather than to democratize induces Russia to counteract Western policies. To reinforce the argument that counteraction to democracy promotion is a byproduct of Russia protecting its strategic interests, the article briefly refers to Russia's relations with Azerbaijan and Belarus. Due to their already consolidated authoritarian regimes and disregard of European “shared values”, Azerbaijan and Belarus are least likely to be pressured by Russia because of their possible democratic aspirations. However, their interactions with Russia show that the latter used the same instruments toward these countries whenever the latter ignored its interests. Realizing that the previously forced allegiance of Eastern Europe had moved to the EU, president Putin prioritized the post-Soviet countries in Russia's foreign policy.45 Along with its historical ties, Russia has vested economic and security interests in all EaP countries. Thus in terms of the drivers for possible counteraction to democracy promotion (see the introduction to this issue by Risse and Babayan) all three apply to Russia's near abroad, though to different extents depending on the country. While geographic proximity and shared history apply to all six EaP partners, resonance of democracy among local political actors is most pronounced in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine (see Delcour and Wolczuk in this special issue). Economic and military interests and leverage are emphasized in the cases of Armenia -- a host to the only Russian military base in an EaP country -- and Azerbaijan -- a potential though smaller rival in energy exports to Europe. While both Armenia and Azerbaijan are democratic laggards, the rhetorical resonance of democracy and the willingness to participate in EU policies is more pronounced among Armenian political elites and the population.46 Apart from democracy indices such as Freedom House, frequent and tolerated criticism of the authorities in the media, and the visibility of opposition parties'47 support this observation. These factors and the argued attractiveness of the EU's incentives have induced Russia to realize that democratization of these countries may result in their closer partnership with the EU and the US at the expense of Russia's own regional interests. Thus, democracy promotion policies have been viewed by Russia as contradicting its own interests in the region. By pressuring its neighbouring countries through military power and economic investments or sanctions, Russia has, perhaps, inadvertently countered democracy promotion and stabilized authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet space. To extend its influence and to counter the policies of the EU and the US even before the launch of the EaP in 2009, Russia had forgiven debts in exchange for military-industrial enterprises and purchased large shares in telecommunications, energy, electricity networks, and banking industries.48 Thus, it inter alia engaged in specific business development based on its own strategic interests, however, framing those as serving the development of its neighbours. This strategy has underlined the employment of non-military instruments in reinforcing Russia's policies and obtaining a dominant status in the economies of its former satellites. It has also presented the post-Soviet countries with potentially less cumbersome opportunities for economic gains: unlike EU and US policies, Russia's cooperation has not been tied to domestically costly political reforms or lengthy harmonization processes. Russia considered its growing regional dominance to be challenged when in 2010 the European Commission started negotiations on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) with EaP countries. Despite the reassurances from the former EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana that the EaP had not been designed against Russia, foreign minister Sergey Lavrov interpreted the choice given to EaP partners as either being with Russia, or with the European Union. Russia inter alia reacted by urging EaP countries to join its Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan -- a precursor to Putin's envisaged Eurasian Union. The EU has repeatedly stated that signing any customs agreements with Russia would endanger the AA, since the prerequisites of Russia's aspiring Eurasian Union contradicted the EU-offered DCFTA. Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev also underlined the incompatibility of the two structures.49 However, the Customs Union has been viewed not only as another alternative agreement but also as possible leverage over the EU's neighbours, since, as expected, Russia did apply pressure, including: misuse of energy pricing; artificial trade obstacles such as import bans of dubious World Trade Organization (WTO) compatibility and cumbersome customs procedures; military cooperation and security guarantees; and the instrumentalization of protracted conflicts.50 To “minimize the impact of … new ties with the EU”,51 Russia took more substantial measures when it engaged in trade wars with the countries which were most enthusiastic about their European aspirations. While Moldova repeatedly stated that signing of the AA would not damage its export prospects and economic relations with Russia, the latter banned the import of Moldovan wine.52 Largely viewed as retaliation against a pro-EU Ukrainian businessman -- later Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko -- Russia banned imports of a Ukrainian chocolate brand in July 2013 and dairy products in April 2014.53 The coordinated action by the EU and the US guided Georgia and Ukraine to the signing of the AA in June 2014; however, the determination of Russia to prevent shifts in its regional dominance persisted. Under admitted Russian pressure and threats of “asymmetric measures” in response to Western sanctions, in September 2014 the EU suspended the enforcement of DCFTA with Ukraine and postponed it from November 2014 to December 2015.54 In this special issue Delcour and Wolczuk discuss interactions between Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, and democracy promoters in more detail. Yet, not only EU-enthusiasts may be targeted by trade sanctions, showing that these instruments do not aim to restrict democratization per se but to punish incompliance with the Kremlin's interests. Russia has employed similar strategies against long-time partners, who do not even welcome democracy promotion. Trade wars between Belarus and Russia and Russia's mass purchase of Azerbaijani energy are cases in point. Given the resistance of the Belarusian regime to democratization and the string of EU and US sanctions,55 trade and cooperation with Russia are vital for Belarus. Nevertheless, on several occasions President Alexander Lukashenko denounced Russia's dominance in their relations. In response, Russia imposed various sanctions at the end of the 2000s and early 2010s, including banning import of Belarusian food products and flights of the Belarusian national carrier. Similarly, Azerbaijani authorities display no willingness to democratize or to integrate into European structures but they welcome business opportunities. Thus, Russia is interested in curtailing the supply of Caspian gas to the EU, since that would hinder Russia's economic interests56 and to some extent compete with Russia's gas exports. Russia promised Azerbaijan “serious consequences” for its participation in the EaP and the Nabucco pipeline project and by buying the gas intended for Nabucco basically left the pipeline without supply.57 While seemingly a more profitable deal for Azerbaijan, selling large amounts of gas to Russia has the potential of endangering the former's export diversification plans and decreasing its bargaining power against Russia.58

#### Russian adventurism and political interference risk nuclear war.

Stephen J. Cimbala, Political Science @ Penn State, ’20, *The United States, Russia and Nuclear Peace*, Springer, ISBN 978-3-030-38088-5

First, the information age will change how we think about deterrence, but the velocity and direction of those changes are not entirely clear. In the abstract, cyber war and nuclear deterrence seem to be polar opposites.

Nuclear war is the ultimate in mass destruction, whereas most cyber war does not have immediate physical effects (based on experience—although the future may be different). In addition, the problem of attribution means that the unambiguous identification of the source for an attack on computer software or networks is not always possible. On the other hand, any state that launches a nuclear attack against another state territory will be revealed as the culprit by the United States and by other intelligence sources. (Terrorist uses of a bomb are another matter and identification may be more challenging, although not impossible). A third difference between cyber war and nuclear deterrence is that the tools for cyberattack are widely available and comparatively inexpensive for state and non-state actors: including criminals, hackers, IT entrepreneurs, Internet buccaneers, and others. Almost anyone can play at Internet mischief, although how skillfully and for how long will vary as among players. A nuclear weapons capability, on the other hand, requires an industrial infrastructure, research and development expenses and telltale signatures of preparations for nuclear test launches and the fabrication of nuclear materials (enriched uranium and reprocessed plutonium).

This impression that nuclear and cyber activities are polar opposites in some ways does not mean that their points of conjunction are insignificant. The use of information weapons before or during a nuclear crisis could complicate the efforts of heads of state to resolve the crisis without war.3 We know that cyberattacks have already been used against the nuclear infrastructure of at least one state (centrifuges in Iran) and against the missile launch control systems of another (North Korea). We also know that hackers assumed to be Russians have penetrated US industrial control systems, including those related to the national and regional power grids. An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack caused by one or more nuclear detonations could disrupt US electric power and telecommunications infrastructures, medical services and transportation on a regional or national basis. Despite warnings from federal agencies and technical experts, few American states have developed any EMP attack emergency response plan.

In addition to these possible physical effects on infrastructure and communications, cyberattacks by one state can create confusion and polarization within another country. Russian interference in the US presidential election of 2016, according to US intelligence agencies, was designed not only to assist one candidate against another, but also to create additional political polarization and distrust within the wider community of American politicians, media and voters. Russian trolls on social media were accompanied by hacks against the Democratic National Committee and the Hillary Clinton campaign, seeking to sow discord within the national Democratic Party and to influence its primary voters against the Democratic front-runner. Russia’s omnivorous information campaign included some tried and true former Soviet instruments of influence, now aided by modern technology: active measures; disinformation; reflexive control; strategic deception; and, of course, masking of the actual identities of digital dirigistes by imposter addresses and fake names. Even these information operations had some physical effects, if you count the efforts by trolls to create fake demonstrations by crowdsourcing in various US cities.4 If Russian hackers will go this far to influence an American election in peacetime, what efforts might be undertaken during a nuclear crisis or in advance of a Russian military move against the Baltics or other NATO member states? Expert military analyst Michael Kofman has suggested:

Buttressed by a growing conventional and nuclear deterrent, Moscow is more confident in pursuing indirect competition via hacking, political warfare, and other forms of coercion against the United States, in the hope of imposing costs over time. This is both a form of retaliation for Western sanctions, and a more “medieval” approach to great power contests, leveraging the ability to reach in and directly affect political cohesion among Western states.5

#### Democracy spreads disease – Chinese autocracy solves.

Schwartz ’12 – Schwartz, Poli Sci Prof @ State University of New York, 12 (Jonathon, Compensating for the ‘Authoritarian Advantage’ in Crisis Response: A Comparative Case Study of SARS Pandemic Responses in China and Taiwan, J OF CHIN POLIT SCI (2012) 17:313–331)

In the aftermath of the SARS epidemic much was made of China’s **effective efforts** at disease control and prevention. China’s perceived success in controlling SARS stands in stark contrast with Taiwan’s troubled response to its own SARS outbreak. Why does Taiwan, a geographically small, densely populated country with a democratic government, wealthy and modern knowledge-based economy, fail to effectively respond to SARS whereas big, heavily populated, relatively under-developed and authoritarian China succeeds? Does regime type explain China’s relative success, and to the extent that regime type matters, what can be done to compensate for **China’s ‘authoritarian advantage’** in crisis response? To address these questions I conduct a comparative analysis of pandemic response by Taiwan and China. Due to space limitations, I focus primarily on Taiwan, drawing on previous studies of China to highlight the differences between Chinese and Taiwanese responses. In the final section I draw on this comparison to identify means to compensate for China’s ‘authoritarian advantage’. Crisis and Response The crisis literature distinguishes between routine crises and novel crises. In routine crises (frequently recurring crises such as fires and floods), political leaders may defer to operational commanders – people such as fire fighters or police officers - who have dealt with similar crises in the past. These operational commanders have trained for, and perhaps experienced similar crises and are able to respond effectively with only moderate adaptation of existing crisis response procedures [1]. However, this approach cannot be followed in the case of novel crises. Novel crises are crises where there is little past experience to draw on. Such crises include massive events such as hurricane Katrina, the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami or the 9/11 attacks on the United States that explode on the scene, or more insidious crises such as the spread of a previously unknown infectious disease that only slowly makes itself evident. Of the two types of novel crises the insidious type is often far more dangerous. The danger lies in the likelihood that the leadership will fail to recognize the insidious crisis as a crisis because it develops only slowly and seems amenable to existing response strategies. As a result, the leadership may become aware of the crisis only after it has become widespread or more threatening [2]. SARS is an example of insidious crises. It at first went unrecognized and only slowly did the leadership come to realize the immensity of the threat it represented. Both forms of novel crises require flexible leadership and response capabilities. The leadership must quickly identify the challenge, engage relevant bureaucracies, implement a response, communicate the nature of the crisis and response effectively and clearly to the public, and control the message as it is being broadcast by the media to the public. These already extremely challenging tasks must be accomplished in a compressed timeframe under highly stressful conditions. Not surprisingly, governments often fail. Some authors argue that an already challenging situation for leaders is made even more so if they are functioning in a democratic system. In democracies, major emergencies require involvement by multiple jurisdictions and many levels of representative government. Coordinating among these often overlapping and contentious jurisdictions can be difficult. Politicians must identify and justify priorities and actions to local leaders, the public and the mass media.1 These same authors suggest that the challenges are less significant in authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian leaders enjoy an ‘authoritarian advantage’, being less likely to need to negotiate with bureaucracies over jurisdictional powers or struggle to disentangle overlapping institutions. Furthermore, the media and by extension the message to the public are more easily controlled.

#### Extinction.

Bar-Yam ’16 (Yaneer, MIT PhD, Founding President of the New England Complex Systems Institute, PhD in Physics, “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world,” NECSI, July 3, 2016, http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition)

Watch as one of the more aggressive – brighter red  –  strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7]. In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2). When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase. So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable.

#### Democracy causes great power nuclear war -- backsliding solves.

Muller ’15 -- director of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, professor of International Relations at Goethe University (Harald, Democracy, Peace, and Security, Lexington Books pp. 44-49)

My own proposal for solving the problem. developed together with my colleague Jonas Wolff (Müllcr 2004. Muller/Wolff 2006). turns the issue upside down: We do not start with explaining mutual democratic peacefulness, but its opposite. the proven capability of democracies to act aggressively against non-democracies. We note that—apart from self-defense where there is no difference between democracies and non-democracies——democratic states go to war—in contrast to non-democracies—to uphold international law (or their own interpretation thereof), to prevent anarchy through state failure, to “save strangers” when dictatorships massacre their own people, and to promote democracy. None of these acts is likely to find its target in a democracy. Since the use of force by democracies is hardly possible without public justification, even the rhetorical use of the said reasons will not stand public scrutiny when uttered against a democracy—people will not believe it, War other than for self-defense thus can only be fought by democracies against non-democracies because against a fellow democracy justification would fail. Because whether this is the case or not to a degree that justifies war as the ‘ultimate means” must rely on practical judgments. and practical judgments can differ among even reasonable people. democracies might disagree whether or not the judgment applies in specific cases. Democracies also show variance in that regard due (o a systematic. political-culturally rooted different propensity to judge situations as justifing war or not, and to participate in such wars (Gels et al, 2013). It should also be noted that, given the continuum between autocracy, anocracy and democracy, whether a given state is a democracy or not can be subject to interpretation. and this interpretation may even change over time (Oren 1995, Hayes 2013). The fact is that there are a couple of fairly warlike democracies, and that the democracies participating most frequently in military disputes (apart from the special case of Israel) are, by and large. major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom. France. or India. This pattern is important to keep in mind when the question of the utility of democratic peace for today ‘s world problems is to be answered. Transnational terrorism, failed states, civil wars and the like dominate the international agenda on war and peace. At the classical level of international relations, in the relationships among major powers. developments arc undcr way which potentially pose an even greater threat than this diverse collection of non-interstate problems presently does. We are living in an era of rather rapid and disturbing power change (Tammcn et al. 2000). The United States are still the leading power of the world with unprecedented militany and economic poer. But others are coming closer: China. India. Braiil and Indonesia, China is at the top of this cohort, All major power changes chal lenge existing structures and thus contain the potential for great disturbance. The leading power may start to fear for its dominant position and take measures to ensure its position at the lop. These actions may frustrate emerging powers and even lead to the perception that their security is endangered. which would motivate counter-measures that further propel a political escala tion spiral. An increasingly focused competition in which a true power change appears increasingly possible. that is. a change of position at the top of the international hierarchy, has an even greater risk potential. If the inherent dangers are not contained—which remains always a possibility major power war may ensue defying all propositions that major war has become obsolete or that nuclear deterrence will prevent this calamity once and for all. Of course, states can grow peacefully into roles of higher responsibility. status and influence on the world stage. There arc no natural laws saving that changes in the world’s power structure must end in war, despite all distur bances and ensuing risks (Rauch 2014). The less conflict an emerging power experiences with established ones, and with peer challengers that emerge simultaneously, the better the chances that the rise will travel a peaceful trajectory. Looking through this lens. thc relations of only one emerging power with the present hegemon appear to be partially conflict-pronc. and seriously so: it concerns the pair China/United States. The Iwo great powers are rivals for preponderance in East and South East Asia and eventually for being the number one at the global level. There is also Chinese resentment stemming from the US role in China’s past as a victim of Western imperialism. On the other hand. China’s authoritarian system of rule and ensuing violations of human and political rights trigger the liberal resentment discussed in the first part of this chapter. which is rooted particularly strongly in US political culture. The Chinese—US relationship is thus thc key to a peaceful. tense or even violent future at the world stage. A small group of major powers. Including the United States and China, is interconnected today by a complex conflict system. China has territorial claims against Japan, South Korea, Vietnam. the Philippines. Brunci. and India which it pursues by a variety of means, not shying away from the limited, small scale usc of militan force in some cases, notably against obviously weaker counterparts (Ellcman ci al. 2012). China’s relation (o wards Japan is the one most burdened by China’s past as a victim of Japanese oppression and related cruelties, and the propcnsit of the conservative part of Japan’s elite to display cavalier attitudes towards this past or even sort of celebrate it (as through visits to the notorious Yasukuni shrine hosting the remnants of war criminals) only adds to anti-Japanese feelings in China (Russia. another great power. also openly pursues a revisionist agenda. as vividly shown in the recent Crimean move, but these territorial ambitions are not part of the most virulent conflict complex in Asia). Territorial claims are always emotionalized and dangerous. Territorial claims by a major power bear particular risks, because threatened countries look for protective allies which are, by necessity, major powers with the capability to project power into the region of concern. The great power claimant and the great power protector then position themselves on the opposite sides of the conflict. A classical constellation of great power conflict results that looks far more traditional than all the talk about post-modern global relations in which state power struggles fade into oblivion would suggest. In the Asian conflict complex that structures the shape of the US—Chinese contest (Foot/Walter 201 1). Japan. South Korea and the Philippines arc for mall allied ith the United Slates. India and Vietnam today entertain rda (ions ith the United States that can be depicted as cordial entente, already include military cooperation, and might move further towards an alliance. depending on deelopmens in Asia. The United States is also a protector of Taiwan. officially a Chinese province, factualh an independent political entity. and the main object of Chinese interest because of the unfinished agenda of national re-unification. Given the enormous asymmetries between China and Taiwan. the latter’s independence depends fully and unambiguously on the US guarantee. Russia and China have a fairly ambivalent relation with each other that is officially called a strategic partnership. Ambiguous as this relationship is, it is predictable that the more the West and Russia are at loggerheads, the closer the Russian—Chinese relations might become. On the other hand. Chi na is the stronger partner and harbors not completely friendly feelings to wards Moscow. as Russia took part in China’s humiliation during the imperi alist period no less than the United States did. Russian fears concerning covert immigration into Eastern Siberia and demographic repercussions and political consequences that might result therefrom add to the uneasiness. China and India arc natural rivals for regional preponderance in Asia (Gilbov/Hcginbotham 2012). Both arc developing rapidly. with China still ahead. Territorial disputes. India’s liospitalit Lo TibeLan exiles including the Dalai Lama. China’s close relation to Pakistan and a growing naval rivalry spanning the Indian Ocean from the Strait of Malacca to Iranian shores (Garofano/Dew 2013) run parallel to rapidly growing economic relations and ostensible efforts lo present the relationship if not as amiable then at least as partner-like. The United States, China, Russia and India even today conduct a multi- pronged nuclear arms race (Fingar 2011: Gangul /Thompson 2011: O’Neill 2013. Müllcr 2014). In this race, conventional components like missile de fense. Intercontinental strike options, space-based assets and the specter of cbcr war play their role, as does the issue of extended dcterrcncc The general US militar’ superiority induces Russia and China to improve their nuclear arsenals, while India tries not to be left too far behind the Chinese in terms of nuclear capability. Pakistan and North Korea ork as potential spoilers at the fringe of this arms race. They are not powerful but thc arc capable of stirring up trouble, whenever they move. In tems of the military constellation, the most disquieting development is the drafting of pre-emptive strategies of a first (most likely conventional) strike by the United States and China, on either side motivated by the per ceived need to keep the upper hand early in a potential clash close to Chinese shores (such as in the context of a Taiwan conflict). China is building up middle-range ballistic capabilities to pre-empt US aircraft carrier groups from coming into striking distance and to desiroy US Air Force assets in Okinawa. while the United States is developing means to neutralize exactly these Chinese capabilities. They are steering towards a hair-trigger security dilemma in which the mutual postures cry out for being used first before the enemy might destroy them (Goldstein 2013: Le Miôre 2012). It cannot be excluded that this whole conflict system might collapse into two opposing blocks one da the spark for a major violent cataclysm could even be lighted by uncontrolled non-state actors inside some of the powers. or—in analogy to the role of Serbia in 1914— a ‘spoiler” state with a particularly idios ncralic agenda. Pakistan. North Korea or Tai an arc con ceivable in this role. Even Japan might be considered, if nationalism in Nippon grows further and seeks confrontation with the old rival China. If anything. this constellation does not look much better than the one which drove Europe into World War I a century ago. and it contains a nuclear component. To trust in the infallibility of nuclear deterrence in this mufti- pronged constellation needs quite a lot of optimism Can democratic peace be helpful in this constellation? Our conflict system includes democracies—the United States, India, Japan. Indonesia and non- democracies such as China. Russia, and Vietnam, but not necessarily on the same side. Should the European theater become connected to the Asian one through continuous US—Russian disputes and a Russian—Chinese entente. defective democracies like Ukraine and Georgia may feature rather importantly as potential triggers for a worsening of relationships. While democracy is useful in excluding certain conflict dyads in the whole complex, such as India and the United States. Japan and the United States. Japan and India. from the risk that they might escalate into a violent conflict, and as democratic peace is pacifying parts of the world. such as South America or Europe. it helps little in disputes between democracies and non-democracies. To the contrary: as discussed above, democracies have a more or less moral-emotional inclination to demonize non-democracies once they dis agree, and to feel a missionary drive to turn them democratic. This might exacerbate the existing, more interest-based conflicts between democracies and non-democracies, and it creates fears in the hearts of autocratic leaders that they might be up for democratization sooner or later. The close inter- democratic relations which democratic peace tends to produce, in turn, only exacerbate these fears as democracies tend to be rich, well organized, and powerful and dispose together of much more potent military capabilities than their potential non-dcnwcratic counterparts. Rather than helping with peace. the inter-democratic consequences of the democratic peace tend to exacerbate the security dilemma which exists between democracies and non-democracics an way. This non-peaceful dark side of democratic peace has escaped the attention of most academic writings on this subject and certainly all political utterances about democratic peace in our political systems. But democratic militancy is the Siamese twin of democratic peace as the Bush Administration unambiguously taught us (Gels et al. 2013: Müllcr 2014b).