## Doubles TOC – 1NC vs Saratoga AG

### 1NC – T

#### Interp – “space” is the entire universe. MacMillan n.d.

Macmillan n.d. (noun) American English definition and synonyms”, https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/space\_1

4. UNCOUNTABLE: the whole of the [universe](https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/universe) [outside](https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/outside) the [Earth](https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/earth#earth__1)’s [atmosphere](https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/atmosphere)

*man’s*[*ventures*](https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/venture_1)*into space*

*a space*[*mission*](https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/mission)

**in space**: *The*[*crew*](https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/crew_1)*have been*[*living*](https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/living_1)*in space for over three*[*months*](https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/month)*.*

#### Outer space starts at the Kármán line. Betz 21

Eric Betz, 3-5-2021, "The Kármán Line: Where does space begin?," Astronomy, https://astronomy.com/news/2021/03/the-krmn-line-where-does-space-begin

**23**

The Kármán Line: Where does space begin?

Earth ends and outer space starts at the Kármán line, some 62 miles (100 kilometers) above the planet’s surface.

These days, spacecraft are venturing into the final frontier at a record pace. And a deluge of [paying space tourists](https://astronomy.com/news/2020/08/six-ways-to-buy-a-ticket-to-space-in-2021) should soon follow. But to earn their astronaut wings, high-flying civilians will have to make it past the so-called Kármán line. This boundary sits some 62 miles (100 kilometers) above Earth's surface, and it's generally accepted as the place where Earth ends and outer space begins.

From a cosmic perspective, 100 km is a stone's throw; it's only one-sixth the driving distance between San Francisco and Los Angelas. It’s also well within the clutches of Earth's overpowering gravitational pull and expansive atmosphere. So, how did humans come to accept this relatively nearby location as the defining line between Earth and space?

The answer is partly based on physical reality and partly based on an arbitrary human construct. That's why the exact altitude where space begins is something scientists have been debating since before we even sent the first spacecraft into orbit.

What is the Kármán Line?

[Experts have suggested](https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Never_Ending_Dispute.html?id=fG4_AQAAIAAJ) the actual boundary between Earth and space lies anywhere from a mere 18.5 miles (30km) above the surface to more than a million miles (1.6 million km) away. However, for well over half a century, most — including regulatory bodies — have accepted something close to our current definition of the Kármán Line.

The Kármán line is based on physical reality in the sense that it roughly marks the altitude where traditional aircraft can no longer effectively fly. Anything traveling above the Kármán line needs a propulsion system that doesn’t rely on lift generated by Earth’s atmosphere — the air is simply too thin that high up. In other words, the Kármán line is where the physical laws governing a craft's ability to fly shift.

However, the Kármán line is also where the human laws governing aircraft and spacecraft diverge. There are no national borders that extend to outer space; it’s governed more like international waters. So, settling on a boundary for space is about much more than the semantics of who gets to be called an astronaut.

The United Nations has historically accepted the Kármán line as the boundary of space. And while the U.S. government has been reticent to agree to a specific height, people who fly above an altitude of 60 miles (100 km) typically earn astronaut wings from the Federal Aviation Administration. Even the Ansari X-prize chose the Kármán line as the benchmark height required to win its $10 million prize, which was claimed when Burt Rutan’s SpaceShipOne became the first privately-built spacecraft to carry a crew back in 2004.

#### Additionally, use of “the” before appropriation means that “outer space” is an identifier for “appropriation.” Collins n.d.

Collins Dictionary, "The," https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/the

The is the definite article. It is used at the beginning of noun groups. The is usually pronounced (ðə) before a consonant and (ði) before a vowel, but pronounced (ði) when you are emphasizing it.

**1. DETERMINER**

You use **the** at the beginning of noun groups to refer to someone or something that you have already mentioned or identified.

*Six of the 38 people were U.S. citizens.*

**2. DETERMINER**

You use *the* at the beginning of a noun group when the first noun is followed by an 'of' phrase or a clause which identifies the person or thing.

*There has been a slight increase in the consumption of meat.*

**3. DETERMINER**

You use **the** in front of some nouns that refer to something in our general experience of the world.

*It's always hard to speculate about the future.*

**4. DETERMINER**

You use **the** in front of nouns that refer to people, things, services, or institutions that are associated with everyday life.

*The doctor's on his way.*

**5. DETERMINER**

You use **the** instead of a possessive determiner, especially when you are talking about a part of someone's body or a member of their family.

*"How's the family?"—"Just fine, thank you."*

**6. DETERMINER**

You use **the** in front of a singular noun when you want to make a general statement about things or people of that type.

*An area in which the computer has made considerable strides in recent years is in playing chess.*

**7. DETERMINER**

You use **the** with the name of a musical instrument when you are talking about someone's ability to play the instrument.

*Did you play the piano as a child?*

**8. DETERMINER**

You use **the** with nationality adjectives and nouns to talk about the people who live in a country.

*The economic policies of the world's biggest nations are judged by results*

**9. DETERMINER**

You use **the** with words such as 'rich,' 'poor,' or 'unemployed' to refer to all people of a particular type.

*Conditions for the poor in Los Angeles have not improved.*

**10. DETERMINER**

If you want to refer to a whole family or to a married couple, you can make their surname into a plural and use **the** in front of it.

*The Taylors decided that they would employ an architect to do the work.*

**11. DETERMINER**

You use **the** in front of an adjective when you are referring to a particular thing that is described by that adjective.

*He knows he's wishing for the impossible.*

**12. DETERMINER**

You use **the** to indicate whether or not you have enough of the thing mentioned for a particular purpose.

*She may not have the money to maintain or restore her property.*

**13. DETERMINER**

You use **the** with some titles, place names, and other names.

*...the Seattle Times.*

*...the White House.*

*...The Great Gatsby.*

**14. DETERMINER**

You use **the** in front of numbers such as first, second, and third.

*The meeting should take place on the fifth of May.*

**15. DETERMINER**

You use **the** in front of numbers when they refer to decades.

*It's sometimes hard to imagine how bad things were in the thirties.*

**16. DETERMINER**

You use **the** in front of superlative adjectives and adverbs.

*Brisk daily walks are still the best exercise for young and old alike.*

**17. DETERMINER**

You use **the** in front of each of two comparative adjectives or adverbs when you are describing how one amount or quality changes in relation to another.

*The longer the therapy goes on, the more successful it will be.*

**18. DETERMINER**

When you express rates, prices, and measurements, you can use **the** to say how many units apply to each of the items being measured.

*...cars that get more miles to the gallon.*

**19. DETERMINER**

You use **the** to indicate that something or someone is the most famous, important, or best thing of its kind. In spoken English, you put more stress on it, and in written English, you often underline it or write it in capitals or italics.

*The circus is the place to be this Saturday or Sunday*

#### Violation – the plantext isn’t a prohibition. The only alternative is a restriction, which explodes affs. PEDIAA 15

PEDIAA 10-12-2015, "Difference Between Prohibited and Restricted," Pediaa, https://pediaa.com/difference-between-prohibited-and-restricted/

Main Difference – Prohibited vs. Restricted Prohibited and Restricted are used in reference to limitations and prevention. However, they cannot be used interchangeably as there is a distinct difference between them. Prohibited is used when we are talking about an impossibility. Restricted is used when we are talking about something that has specific conditions. The **main difference** between prohibited and restricted is that **prohibited** means something is **formally forbidden by law or authority** whereasrestricted means something is put under control or limits**.** What Does Prohibited Mean Prohibited is a variant of the verb prohibit. Prohibited can be taken as the past tense and [past participle](https://pediaa.com/difference-between-gerund-and-participle/) of prohibiting as well as an [adjective](https://pediaa.com/what-are-the-kinds-of-adjectives/). Prohibited means that something is formally forbidden by law or authority**.** When we say ‘smoking is prohibited’, it means that smoking is not allowed at all, there are no exceptions. Prohibit indicates an impossibility. This gives out the idea that it is not at all possible under any condition or circumstance. The term Prohibited goods is used to refer to items that are not allowed to enter or exit certain countries. For example, the government of South America lists Narcotic and habit-forming drugs in any form, Poison and other toxic substances, Fully automatic, military and unnumbered weapons, explosives and fireworks as prohibited goods. The following sentences will further explain the use of prohibited. *Inter-racial marriages were not prohibited by the government.* *He was proved guilty of using prohibited substances.* *No one was allowed to enter the grounds; entry was prohibited.* Prohibited imports are the items that are not allowed to enter a country. What Does Restricted Mean **Restrict means to put under limits or control.** Restricted can be either used as the past tense of restrict or as an adjective meaning limited. When we say something is restricted, it means that limits or conditions have been added to it. It does not mean that it is completely impossible. For example, Restricted goods are allowed to enter or exit a country under certain circumstances. A written permission can help you to import or export that item. Likewise, a restricted area does not mean that people are not allowed to enter; it means that a special permission is required to enter the place. Restricted information refers to information that are not disclosed to the general public for security purposes. The new regulations restricted the free movement of people. The club was restricted to its members and their family members. Only the highest military personnel had access to the restricted area. American scientists had only restricted access to the area. Difference Between Prohibited and Restricted Meaning **Prohibited** means banned or forbidden. Restricted means limited in extent, number, scope, or action Possibility Prohibited means that there is no possibility of doing something. Restricted means that something can be done under certain conditions. Adjective Prohibited functions as an adjective derived from prohibit. Restricted functions as an adjective derived from restrict. Past tense Prohibited is the past tense and past participle of prohibit. Restricted is the past tense and past participle of restrict.

#### Limits – they allow single asteroid affs, particular geospatial orbits, conditions on appropriation, and every cp becomes an aff, which is impossible to predict and explodes neg prep burden. Forcing the aff to defend a prohibition is the only model that prevents aff teams from racing to the margins and protects fairness

#### Ground – absent the aff defending an end to appropriation throughout all of outer space, winning “mining good” and all core neg generics isn’t sufficient for us to win because they can go for “other appropriation solves.” That forces a shift to process debates and backfile kritiks which kills education and their prep will always be more contextual

#### TVA: you get your aff as an advantage

#### Vote neg

#### Use competing interps – reasonability is subjective and causes a race to the bottom, but T is a yes/no question

#### Drop the debater – we can’t read a new disad in the 2nr so dropping the arg doesn’t solve

#### No RVIs – illogical for them to win because they’re T and incentivizes baiting, which outweighs frivolous theory

### 1NC – DA

#### Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.

**Mitter and Johnson 21** [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, [Rana Mitter](https://hbr.org/search?term=rana%20mitter&search_type=search-all) is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. [Elsbeth Johnson](https://hbr.org/search?term=elsbeth%20johnson&search_type=search-all), formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, [https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21](https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china%20accessed%2012/14/21)] Adam

In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule, suggesting that democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent. In fact, many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements—large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.

China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to [innovate](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china). It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration. Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries. This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals. That’s why ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed 95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens. Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive, although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

#### Xi has committed to the commercial space industry as the linchpin of China’s rise – the plan is seen as a complete 180

**Patel 21** [Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called [Document 60](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml) that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

“Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”

As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a[2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx). More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it [released the first images taken by the satellite](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/spacenews.com/spacety-releases-first-sar-images/), Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding.

And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.

Making friends

The most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders.

“China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.

Although China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry, the nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about. While Chinese companies may look private on paper, they must still submit to government guidance and control, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy, especially if the government is a frequent customer. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often [very cagey about what its national program is even up to](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54076895).

And Hines adds that it’s not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

#### Shifts in regime perception threatens CCP’s legitimacy from nationalist hardliners

Weiss 19 Jessica Weiss 1-29-2019 “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China” <http://www.jessicachenweiss.com/uploads/3/0/6/3/30636001/19-01-24-elite-statements-isq-ca.pdf> (Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University)//Elmer

Public support—or the appearance of it—matters to many autocracies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool writes, modern dictatorships are “highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts to affect it.”6 Mao Zedong told his comrades: “When you make revolution, you must first manage public opinion.”7 Because autocracies often rely on **nationalist mythmaking**,8 success or failure in defending the national honor in international crises could burnish the leadership’s patriotic credentials or spark opposition. **Shared outrage at the regime’s foreign policy failures could galvanize street protests or elite fissures, creating intraparty upheaval** or inviting military officers to step in to restore order. Fearing a domestic backlash, authoritarian leaders may feel compelled to take a tough international stance. Although authoritarian leaders are rarely held accountable to public opinion through free and fair elections, fears of popular unrest and irregular ouster often weigh heavily on autocrats seeking to maximize their tenure in office. Considering the harsh consequences that authoritarian elites face if pushed out of office, even a small increase in the probability of ouster could alter authoritarian incentives in international crises.9 A history of nationalist uprisings make Chinese citizens and leaders especially aware of the linkage between international disputes and domestic unrest. The weakness of the PRC’s predecessor in defending Chinese sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 galvanized protests and a general strike, forcing the government to sack three officials and reject the Treaty of Versailles, which awarded territories in China to Japan. These precedents have made Chinese officials particularly sensitive to the appearance of hewing to public opinion. As the People’s Daily chief editor wrote: “History and reality have shown us that public opinion and regime safety are inseparable.”10 One Chinese scholar even claimed: “the Chinese government probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”11

#### Xi will launch diversionary war to domestic backlash – escalates in multiple hotspots

Norris 17, William J. Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges. CFR Discussion Paper, 2017. (Associate professor of Chinese foreign and security policy at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service)//Elmer

Populist pressures might tempt the **party leadership** to encourage **diversionary nationalism**. The logic of this concern is straightforward: the Communist Party might seek to **distract a restless domestic population** with **adventurism abroad**.19 The **Xi** administration wants to **appear tough** in its **defense of foreign encroachments** against China’s interests. This need stems from a long-running narrative about how a weak Qing dynasty was unable to defend China in the face of European imperial expansion, epitomized by the Opium Wars and the subsequent treaties imposed on China in the nineteenth century. The party is **particularly sensitive** to **perceptions of weakness** because much of its **claim to legitimacy**—manifested in **Xi’s Chinese Dream** campaign today—stems from the party’s claims of leading the **restoration of Chinese greatness**. For example, the May Fourth Movement, a popular protest in 1919 that helped catalyze the CPC, called into question the legitimacy of the Republic of China government running the country at that time because the regime was seen as not having effectively defended China’s territorial and sovereignty interests at the Versailles Peace Conference. **Diversionary nationalist frictions** would likely occur if the Chinese leadership portrayed a foreign adversary as having made the first move, thus forcing Xi to stand up for China’s interests. An example is the 2012 attempt by the nationalist governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private owner.20 Although the Japanese central government sought to avert a crisis by stepping in to purchase the islands—having them bought and administered by Ishihara’s Tokyo metropolitan government would have dragged Japan into a confrontation with China—China saw this move as part of a deliberate orchestration by Japan to nationalize the islands. Xi seemingly had no choice but to defend China’s claims against an attempt by Japan to consolidate its position on the dispute.21 This issue touched off a period of heated tensions between China and Japan, lasting more than two years.22 Such dynamics are not limited to Japan. Other possible areas of conflict include, but are not necessarily limited to, **Taiwan**, **India**, and the **South China Sea** (especially with the **Philippines** and **Vietnam**). The Chinese government will use such tactics if it believes that the costs are relatively low. Ideally, China would like to appear tough while avoiding material repercussions or a serious diplomatic breakdown. Standing up against foreign encroachment—without facing much blowback—could provide Xi’s administration with a tempting source of noneconomic legitimacy. However, over the next few years, Xi will probably not be actively looking to get embroiled abroad. Cushioning the fallout from slower growth while managing a structural economic transition will be difficult enough. Courting potential international crises that distract the central leadership would make this task even more daunting. Even if the top leadership did not wish to provoke conflict, a smaller budgetary allotment for security could cause **military interests** in China to **deliberately instigate trouble** to **justify** their **claims over increasingly scarce resources**. For example, an air force interested in ensuring its funding for a midair tanker program might find the existence of far-flung territorial disputes to be useful in making its case. Such a case would be made even stronger by a pattern of recent frictions that highlights the necessity of greater air power projection. Budgetary pressures may be partly behind a recent People’s Liberation Army reorganization and headcount reduction. A slowing economy might cause a further deceleration in China’s military spending, thus increasing such pressures as budgetary belts tighten. Challenges to Xi’s Leadership Xi Jinping’s efforts to address economic challenges could fail, unleashing consequences that extend well beyond China’s economic health. For example, an **economic collapse** could give rise to a Vladimir **Putin–like redemption figure** in China. Xi’s approach of centralizing authority over a diverse, complex, and massive social, political, and economic system is a **recipe for brittleness**. Rather than designing a resilient, decentralized governance structure that can gracefully cope with localized failures at particular nodes in a network, a highly centralized architecture **risks catastrophic**, **system-level failure**. Although centralized authority offers the tantalizing chimera of stronger control from the center, it also puts all the responsibility squarely on Xi’s shoulders. With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate **unintended international repercussions**. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have **ripple effects abroad**. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, **raising the risks** of **strategic miscalculation** on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23 Weakened Fetters of Economic Interdependence If China successfully transitioned away from its export-driven growth model toward a consumption-driven economic engine over the next four or five years, it could no longer feel as constrained by economic interdependence. To the extent that such constraints are loosened, the U.S.-China relationship will be more prone to conflict and friction.24 While China has never been the archetypal liberal economic power bent on benign integration with the global economy, its export-driven growth model produced a strong strategic preference for stability. Although past behavior is not necessarily indicative of future strategic calculus, China’s “economic circuit breaker” logic seems to have held its most aggressive nationalism below the threshold of war since 1979. A China that is both comparatively strong and less dependent on the global economy would be a novel development in modern geopolitics. As China changes the composition of its international economic linkages, global integration could place fewer constraints on it. Whereas China has been highly reliant on the import of raw materials and semifinished goods for reexport, a consumption-driven China could have a different international trade profile. China could still rely on imported goods, but their centrality to the country’s overall economic growth would be altered. Imports of luxury goods, consumer products, international brands, and services may not exert a significant constraining influence, since loss of access to such items may not be seen as strategically vital. If these flows were interrupted or jeopardized, the result would be more akin to an inconvenience than a strategic setback for China’s rise. That said, China is likely to continue to highly depend on imported oil even if the economic end to which that energy resource is directed shifts away from industrial and export production toward domestic consumption.

#### US–China war goes nuclear – crisis mis-management ensures conventional escalation - extinction

Kulacki 20 [Dr. Gregory Kulacki focuses on cross-cultural communication between the United States and China on nuclear and space arms control and is the China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020. Would China Use Nuclear Weapons First In A War With The United States?, Thediplomat.com, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/would-china-use-nuclear-weapons-first-in-a-war-with-the-united-states/] srey

Admiral Charles A. Richard, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, recently told the Senate Armed Service Committee he “could drive a truck” through the holes in China’s no first use policy. But when Senator John Hawley (R-MO) asked him why he said that, Commander Richard backtracked, described China’s policy as “very opaque” and said his assessment was based on “very little” information. That’s surprising. **China** has been exceptionally **clear** **about** its **intentions** **on** the possible **first** **use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons**. On the day of its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, China declared it “will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.” That **unambiguous** **statement** **has** **been** a **cornerstone** **of** **Chinese** **nuclear** **weapons** policy for 56 years and has been repeated frequently in authoritative Chinese publications for domestic and international audiences, including a highly classified training manual for the operators of China’s nuclear forces. Richard should know about those publications, particularly the training manual. A U.S. Department of Defense translation has been circulating within the U.S. nuclear weapons policy community for more than a decade. The commander’s comments to the committee indicate a familiarity with the most controversial section of the manual, which, in the eyes of some U.S. analysts, indicates there may be some circumstances where **China** **would** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **first** **in** a **war** **with** **the** **U**nited **S**tates. This U.S. misperception is understandable, especially given the difficulties the Defense Department encountered translating the text into English. The language, carefully considered in the context of the entire book, articulates a strong reaffirmation of China’s no first use policy. But it also reveals **Chinese** military planners are **struggling** **with** **crisis** **management** **and** **considering** **steps** **that** could **create** **ambiguity** **with** **disastrous** **consequences**. Towards the end of the 405-page text on the operations of China’s strategic rocket forces, in a chapter entitled, “Second Artillery Deterrence Operations,” the authors explain what China’s nuclear forces train to do if **“**a strong military power possessing nuclear‐armed missiles and an absolute advantage in high‐tech conventional weapons is carrying out intense and continuous attacks against our major strategic targets and we have no good military strategy to resist the enemy.**”** The military power they’re talking about is the United States. The authors indicate China’s nuclear missile forces train to take specific steps, including increasing readiness and conducting launch exercises, to “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks.” The manual refers to these steps as an “adjustment” to China’s nuclear policy and a “lowering” of China’s threshold for brandishing its nuclear forces. Chinese leaders would only take these steps in extreme circumstances. The text highlights several triggers such as U.S. conventional bombing of China’s nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, heavy conventional bombing of large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, or other acts of **conventional** **warfare** **that** “**seriously** **threatened**” the “safety and **survival**” of the nation. U.S. Misunderstanding Richard seems to believe this planned adjustment in China’s nuclear posture means China is **preparing** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** first under these circumstances. He told Hawley that there are a “number of situations where they may conclude that first use has occurred that do not meet our definition of first use.” The head of the U.S. Strategic Command appears to assume, as do other U.S. analysts, that the **Chinese** would **interpret** **these** types of U.S. conventional **attacks** **as** **equivalent** **to** a **U.S. first use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons** against China. But that’s not what the text says. “Lowering the threshold” refers to China putting its nuclear weapons on alert — it does not indicate Chinese leaders might lower their threshold for deciding to use nuclear weapons in a crisis. Nor does the text indicate Chinese nuclear forces are training to launch nuclear weapons first in a war with the United States. China, unlike the United States, keeps its nuclear forces off-alert. Its warheads are not mated to its missiles. China’s nuclear-armed submarines are not continuously at sea on armed patrols. The manual describes how China’s nuclear warheads and the missiles that deliver them are controlled by two separate chains of command. Chinese missileers train to bring them together and launch them after China has been attacked with nuclear weapons. All of these behaviors are consistent with a no first use policy. The “adjustment” Chinese nuclear forces are preparing to make if the United States is bombing China with impunity is to place China’s nuclear forces in a state of readiness similar to the state the nuclear forces of the United States are in all the time. This step is intended not only to end the bombing, but also to convince U.S. decision-makers they cannot expect to destroy China’s nuclear retaliatory capability if the crisis escalates. Chinese Miscalculation Unfortunately, alerting Chinese nuclear forces at such a moment could have terrifying consequences. Given the relatively small size of China’s nuclear force, a U.S. president might be tempted to try to limit the possible damage from a Chinese nuclear attack by destroying as many of China’s nuclear weapons as possible before they’re launched, especially if the head of the U.S. Strategic Command told the president China was preparing to strike first. One study concluded that if the United States used nuclear weapons to attempt to knock out a small fraction of the Chinese ICBMs that could reach the United States it may kill tens of millions of Chinese civilians. The authors of the text assume alerting China’s nuclear forces would “create a great shock in the enemy’s psyche.” That’s a fair assumption. But they also assume this shock could “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks against our major strategic targets.” That’s highly questionable. There is a **substantial** **risk** **the** **U**nited **S**tates **would** **respond** **to** this implicit **Chinese** **threat** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **by** **escalating**, rather than halting, its **conventional** **attacks**. If China’s nuclear forces were targeted, it would put even greater strain on the operators of China’s nuclear forces. A **slippery** **slope** **to** **nuclear** **war** Chinese military planners are aware that attempting to coerce the United States into halting conventional bombardment by alerting their nuclear forces could fail. They also know it might trigger a nuclear war. But if it does, they are equally clear China won’t be the one to start it. Nuclear attack is often preceded by nuclear coercion. Because of this, in the midst of the process of a high, strong degree of nuclear coercion we should prepare well for a nuclear retaliatory attack. The more complete the preparation, the higher the credibility of nuclear coercion, the easier it is to accomplish the objective of nuclear coercion, and the lower the possibility that the nuclear missile forces will be used in actual fighting. They assume if China demonstrates it is well prepared to retaliate the United States would not risk a damage limitation strike using nuclear weapons. And even if the United States were to attack China’s nuclear forces with conventional weapons, China still would not strike first. In the opening section of the next chapter on “nuclear retaliatory attack operations” the manual instructs, as it does on numerous occasions throughout the entire text: According to our country’s principle, its stand of no first use of nuclear weapons, the Second Artillery will carry out a nuclear missile attack against the enemy’s important strategic targets, according to the combat orders of the Supreme Command, only after the enemy has carried out a nuclear attack against our country. Richard is wrong. There are no holes in China’s no first use policy. But the worse-case planning articulated in this highly classified military text is a significant and deeply troubling departure from China’s traditional thinking about the role of nuclear weapons. Mao Zedong famously called nuclear weapons “a paper tiger.” Many assumed he was being cavalier about the consequences of nuclear war. But what he meant is that they would not be used to fight and win wars. U.S. nuclear threats during the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait Crisis in the 1950s – threats not followed by an actual nuclear attack – validated Mao’s intuition that nuclear weapons were primarily psychological weapons. Chinese leaders decided to acquire nuclear weapons to free their minds from what Mao’s generation called “**nuclear** **blackmail**.” A former director of China’s nuclear weapons laboratories told me China developed them so its leaders could “sit up with a straight spine.” Countering nuclear blackmail – along with compelling other nuclear weapons states to negotiate their elimination – were the only two purposes Chinese nuclear weapons were meant to serve. Contemporary Chinese military planners appear to have added a new purpose: compelling the United States to halt a conventional attack. Even though it only applies in extreme circumstances, it **increases** the **risk** **that** a **war** between the United States and China **will** **end** **in** a nuclear exchange with unpredictable and **catastrophic** **consequences**. Adding this new purpose could also be the first step on a slippery slope to an incremental broadening the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese national security policy. Americans would be a lot safer if we could avoid that. The United States government should applaud China’s no first use policy instead of repeatedly calling it into question. And it would be wise to adopt the same policy for the United States. If both countries declared they would never use nuclear weapons first it may not guarantee they can avoid a nuclear exchange during a military crisis, but it would make one far less likely.

### 1NC – CP

#### The appropriation of outer space through Keep-Out Zones from private entities should be decided by an artificial intelligence trained by outer space professionals designed to automate optimal outer space policy.

#### AI control in space allows for sustainable and effective exploration. The Counterplan ensures that artificial intelligence gives the go-ahead prior to private appropriation.

Soroka et al 19 Larysa, Ph.D. in Law, Associate Professor, Scientific Institute of Public Law (Kyiv, Ukraine). Kseniia Kurkova, Ph.D. in Law, Scientific Institute of Public Law (Kyiv, Ukraine). February 27, 2019. “Artificial Intelligence and Space Technologies: Legal, Ethical and Technological Issues” Page 133-134. Accessed 2-28 // gord0

During the last 60 years in the society there has appeared a transition from absolute euphoria in designing, perception of space activities and forecasting its results to awareness of the problems and restrictions, to economic pragmatics and growing criticism of the space activity area that, despite all its outstanding achievements, significant results and huge development potential, increasingly lacks effectiveness compared to other branches of human activities in the 21st century [Krichevsky, 2018: 93]. Modern space communication systems make use of sophisticated software to support scientific and space missions. Thanks to the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning, satellites can seamlessly manage these systems, making decisions in real time without waiting for instructions. Based on artificial intelligence, cognitive technologies are designed to make communication networks more effective and sustainable for the missions exploring the depths of outer space. A cognitive radio can mitigate the problems arising in the outer space environment, such as electromagnetic radiation emitted by the sun and other celestial bodies that fills the space with noise and can interrupt certain communication frequencies. Cognitive radio applications can transmit beyond the range of interference or eliminate distortions within the range using machine learning. For example, when a Mars rover conducting exploration of Mars needs to contact Earth, it takes up to 24 minutes to pass the signal between the two planets in one direction. It is rather long time for making decisions, that is why engineers are increasingly providing space robots with the ability to make decisions by themselves [Downer, 2018]. For a long time, space robots could control some on-board systems, such as power consumption. Now, artificial intelligence provides rovers and orbital apparatuses with the ability to collect and analyze scientific data and decide what information to send back to Earth that can be done without any human involvement. Since May 2016, NASA has tested an autonomous system on the Curiosity rover, which was sent to explore the Gail crater on Mars. A system called AEGIS (Autonomous Exploration for Gathering Increased Science) is reported to work well and have the potential for accelerating scientific discoveries. AEGIS was originally designed for the Opportunity rover on Mars in 2010 to help it identify and take pictures of boulders. However, since then it has been improved to examine them more closely and distinguish between certain materials. Artificial intelligence will play an important role in solving the mysteries of the Red Planet and, possibly, other planets in the future [Sim, 2018].

In the future, it is likely that AI will also resolve the issues that will arise in outer space, rather than waiting for human prompts from Earth. For example, we will send spaceships farther into outer space than ever before. Because of this distance, they are not always within the reach of transmitting information back to Earth. This means that a spacecraft must be smart enough to learn and ultimately decide when and how to return the data they have collected. As we travel further into the unknown, these spacecrafts will also have to make their own decisions in new conditions (for example, new gravitational forces, different temperature ranges and unknown collisions with dust or an asteroid). When sending astronauts to longer missions and other destinations in the Solar System, artificial intelligence will also be used to help people react to unexpected events. The software that can respond and make decisions in emergencies will better prepare astronauts for these future missions. For example, if a medical procedure is to be conducted on board a spacecraft, an astronaut that is far from Earth will not always be able to get a live conversation with a physician or surgeon on Earth. Instead, the spacecraft will be able to learn and reason to help in such a situation. In June 2018, a small robot named CIMON flew in the SpaceX Dragon cargo capsule to the space station. Designed by European Airbus on behalf of the German DLR, the 5-kilogram sphere can communicate with people whom it can recognize using face recognition software [Skripin, 2018]. By conducting experiments and helping astronauts, the robot was a valuable mission partner during its short two-day stay at the station. This project is intended to demonstrate how people and machines can effectively interact and collaborate in space missions. In general, new spacecraft will be able to be more independent, self-dependent and autonomous. Since scientists cannot predict when or where space discoveries will be made, artificial intelligence will be a useful tool for helping space technology to keep track of things, notice important discoveries and send important information to us on Earth. Finally, artificial intelligence will diminish costs by reducing the necessary earthly human activities that also means it can reduce the risks for human workers

#### Regulatory AI creates a perfect administrative state ― ensures expertise-based decision-making which solves any deficit.

**Coglianese, 21** -- University of Pennsylvania Edward B. Shils Professor of Law

[Cary, political science professor and Director of the Penn Program on Regulation, "Administrative Law in the Automated State," Daedalus, 150.3, Summer 2021, https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/daedalus/downloads/Daedalus\_Su21\_The-Administrative-State.pdf#page=91, accessed 8-23-21]

In important respects, a shift to automated administration could even be said to represent something of an **apotheosis of** the principles behind **administrative law**. Much of administrative law has been focused on the potential problems created by the discretion that human officials exercise under delegated authority. By automating administration, those problems can be mitigated, and the control of human discretion may be enhanced by the **literal hardwiring of** certain **governmental tasks**.

Automation can advance two major themes that have long characterized much of U.S. administrative law: one theme centers on **keeping the exercise of administrative authority** democratically accountable, while the other seeks to ensure that such authority is **based on sound expert judgment**. The reason-giving thrust behind the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard, for example, reflects both of these themes. Reasoned decision-making provides a basis for helping ensure that agencies both remain faithful to their democratic mandates and base their decisions on sound evidence and analysis. Likewise, the institutionalized regimen of White House review of prospective regulations both facilitates greater accountability to a democratically elected president and promotes expert agency decision-making through the benefit-cost analysis that it calls on agencies to conduct.24

In the same vein, in approving judicial deference to agencies’ statutory interpretations, it is little accident that the Supreme Court’s widely cited decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council stressed both reasons of democratic accountability and substantive expertise.25 It highlighted how agencies are situated within a “political branch of the Government’’ as well as how they simultaneously possess “great expertise” - and thus are better suited than courts to make judgments about the meaning of ambiguous statutory terms.26 Although the future of the Chevron doctrine itself appears uncertain at best, the Court’s underlying emphasis on accountability and expertise is unlikely to disappear, as they are inherent qualities of administrative governance.

Both qualities can be enhanced by machine learning and automation. It is perhaps most obvious that automation can contribute to the goal of expert administration. When automated systems improve the accuracy of agency decisionmaking-which is what makes machine learning and other data analytic techniques look so promising - this will necessarily promote administrative law’s goal of enhancing agency expertise. **A**rtificial **i**ntelligence **promises** to deliver the **state of the art** when it comes to **expert governing**. When the Veterans Administration (VA), for example, recently opted to rely on an automated algorithmic system to predict which veterans are at a higher risk of suicide (and thus in need of more urgent care), it did so because this analytic system was smarter than even experienced psychiatrists.27 “The fact is, we can’t rely on trained medical experts to identify people who are truly at high risk [because they are] no good at it,” noted one VA psychiatrist.28

Likewise, when it comes to administrative law’s other main goal - democratic accountability - automated systems can also advance the ball. The democratic advantages of automation may seem counterintuitive at first: machine-based governance would hardly seem consistent with a Lincolnesque notion of government by “the people.’’ But the reality is that automated systems themselves still demand people who can design, test, and audit such systems. As long as these human designers and overseers operate systems in a manner consistent with the parameters set out for an agency in its governing statute, automated systems themselves can prevent the kind of slippage and shirking that can occur when agencies must rely on thousands of human officials to carry out major national programs and policies. Even when it comes to making new rules under authority delegated to it by Congress, agencies could very well find that automation promotes democratic accountability rather than detracts from it. Some level of accountability will be demanded by the properties of machine learning algorithms themselves. To function, these algorithms depend not merely on an “intelligible principle” to guide them; they need a principle that can be precisely specified in mathematical terms.29 In this way, automation could very well drive the demand for still greater specification and clarity in statutes about the goals of administration, more than even any potential judicial reinvigoration of the nondelegation doctrine might produce.

Although oversight of the design and development of automated systems will remain important to ensure that they are created in accord with democratically affirmed values, once operating, they should pose far fewer opportunities for the kinds of problems, such as **capture and corruption**, that administrative law has long sought to prevent. Unlike human beings, who might pursue their own narrow interests instead of those of the broader public, algorithms will be programmed to optimize the objectives defined by their designers. As long as those designers are accountable to the public, and as long as the system objectives are defined in non-self-interested ways that comport with relevant legislation, then the algorithms themselves pose no risk of capture and corruption. In an important sense, they will be more accountable in their execution than even human officials can be when it comes to implementing law.

#### Quick AI adoption is key to cyber-security

Richberg, 21 – former Senior Advisor to the Director of National Intelligence on cyber issues

[Jim, "No time to waste: Modernizing federal cybersecurity," Federal News Network, 7-8-2021, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/federal-insights/2021/07/no-time-to-waste-modernizing-federal-cybersecurity/, accessed 8-23-2021]

To meet some of the EO’s requirements related to communication will require the intersection of increasingly mature artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) with security platforms. An AI-enabled security platform can both minimize the likelihood of network penetration and limit the damage should a breach occur.

AI-powered instrumentation and advanced analytics can support a network of sensors that can identify normal and abnormal activity in real time, and even differentiate between merely abnormal and malicious activity. It turns what is often touted as one of cybersecurity’s greatest challenges—the growing size and complexity of the attack surface—into a net advantage, using this surface as a giant collection network capable of detecting would-be intruders before they succeed in penetrating their target. And because of its speed and accuracy, the use of AI and automation not only saves staff time, it has the potential to take away the attacker’s advantages of stealth and speed.

The smart use of AI/ML and automation can also help compensate for the cybersecurity workforce skills shortage that agencies continue to face. The improved visibility and control provided by an effective AI/ML implementation can be both global and granular, extending both around the world and down to the level of specific application processes running on a device.

Modernization Needs to Happen Now

Meeting the requirements laid out in the EO isn’t going to be easy, but it needs to happen. The best time to have modernized cybersecurity would have been years ago. The next best time is now. There’s no time to waste because cyberattacks are becoming more aggressive and more damaging every day. Hackers certainly aren’t delaying their activities and neither should we.

#### Cyber-vulnerabilities spur nuclear war- deterrence breakdown is uniquely likely

Dongxiao, 21 -- Shanghai Institutes for International Studies president

[Chen, "China-U.S. Cyber-Nuclear C3 Stability," Forewords, Carnegie and the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, 4-8-21, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/04/08/china-u.s.-cyber-nuclear-c3-stability-pub-84182, accessed 8-23-21]

The impact of cyber on nuclear stability is one of the most forward-looking and strategic topics in the current international security field. The Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) have conducted a joint study around this topic, aiming to provide a reference for the establishment of cyber and nuclear stability mechanisms among nuclear states.

Cyber attacks on nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems have become a potential source of conflict escalation among nuclear powers. Yet major powers have not established effective risk-reduction mechanisms in this regard. While information technology strengthens nuclear strategic forces in many ways, including the modernization of NC3, it also poses an increasingly serious cyber threat to nuclear command and control systems. Cyber operations against the strategic command and control systems of nuclear states—including those probing major vulnerabilities in the command and control systems and satellite communications systems, cyber threats from third parties, and the lack of strategic trust in cyberspace—have exacerbated the impact of cybersecurity on nuclear stability.

Because of the unique nature of nuclear weapons, any cyber incidents concerning nuclear weapons would cause state alarm, anxiety, confusion, and erode state confidence in the reliability and integrity of nuclear deterrent. Cyber attacks against a nuclear command and control system would expose the attacked state to significant pressure to escalate conflict and even use nuclear weapons before its nuclear capabilities are compromised. At the same time, compared to the mature experience and full-fledged mechanisms in nuclear deterrence, crisis management, and conflict escalation/de-escalation among the traditional nuclear powers, states not only lack a comprehensive and accurate perception of the threat posed by cyber operations but also lack consensus on crisis management and conflict de-escalation initiatives.

Given that not enough attention has been paid to this new type of threat on the agenda of security dialogue between nuclear powers, SIIS and CEIP launched a joint research project on cyber and nuclear stability in U.S.-China relations in 2017, focusing on exploring the possibility of building consensus and agreement among nuclear states. It is hoped that the cyber-nuclear nexus will awaken national policymakers to the urgency of maintaining cyber stability and that nuclear states will fully recognize the dangers of cyber attacks and their respective vulnerabilities to such attacks, and thus take steps to reduce nuclear instability accompanying advancing cyber technologies and prevent nuclear war.

on and beyond the globe.

### 1NC – T

#### Undisclosed new affs are a voting issue.

#### Disclosure is a predictable practice. Not arbitrary. The standard is disclosing affs, this practice is the aberration. People open-source their evidence, post on the wiki, and sign up for scouting. We know it enhances the quality of debate. Their model deletes in-depth research and clash – outweighs their offense, since disclosure is technically an arbitrary non-resolutional norm, but we’d all clearly agree it’s a good practice.

#### Disclosing new affirmatives in the pre-round solves any research-based offense, since the only functional difference between our two models is filtering out shitty affs that only get by with 5 minutes of negative prep. Under their model, there’s a perverse incentive to write the affirmative simply to not disclose it. A screenshot of a computer screen Description automatically generated

### Ilaw

#### International law fails.

Chellaney 19 Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the New Delhi–based Centre for Policy Research and fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin. [The illusion of a rules-based global order, 12-23-2019, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-illusion-of-a-rules-based-global-order/]

Today, such optimism looks more than a little naive. Even as the international legal system has ostensibly grown increasingly robust—underpinned, for example, by United Nations conventions, global accords like the 2015 Paris climate agreement, and the International Criminal Court—the rule of force has continued to trump the rule of law. Perhaps no country has taken more advantage of this state of affairs than China. Consider China’s dam projects in the Mekong River, which flows from the Chinese-controlled Tibetan Plateau to the South China Sea, through Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. By building 11 mega-dams near the border of the Tibetan Plateau, just before the river crosses into Southeast Asia, China has irreparably damaged the river system and wreaked broader environmental havoc, including saltwater intrusion in the Mekong Delta that has caused the delta to retreat. Today, the Mekong is running at its lowest level in 100 years, and droughts are intensifying in downriver countries. This gives China powerful leverage over its neighbours. And yet China has faced no consequences for its weaponisation of the Mekong’s waters. It should thus be no surprise that the country is building or planning at least eight more mega-dams on the river. China’s actions in the South China Sea may be even more brazen. This month marks the sixth anniversary of the country’s launch of a massive land-reclamation program in the highly strategic corridor, which connects the Indian and Pacific oceans. By constructing and militarising artificial islands, China has redrawn the region’s geopolitical map without firing a shot—or incurring any international costs. In July 2016, an international arbitral tribunal set up by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled that China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea lacked legitimacy under international law. But China’s leaders simply disregarded the ruling, calling it a ‘farce’. Unless something changes, the US-led plan to establish a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ will remain little more than a paper vision. China’s open contempt for the tribunal’s ruling stood in sharp contrast with India’s response to a 2014 ruling awarding Bangladesh nearly 80% of 25,602 square kilometres of disputed territory in the Bay of Bengal. Although the decision was split (unlike the South China Sea tribunal’s unanimous verdict) and included obvious flaws—it left a sizeable ‘grey area’ in the bay—India accepted it readily. In fact, between 2013 and 2016—while the Philippines-initiated proceedings on China’s claims in the South China Sea were underway—three different tribunals ruled against India in disputes with Bangladesh, Italy and Pakistan. India complied with all of them. The implication is clear: for large and influential countries, respecting the rules-based order is a choice—one that China, with its regime’s particular character, is unwilling to make. Against this background, Vietnam’s possible legal action on its own territorial disputes with China—which has been interfering in Vietnam’s longstanding oil and gas activities within its exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea—is unlikely to amount to much. Vietnam knows that China will ignore any ruling against it and use its trade leverage to punish its less powerful neighbour. That is why an enforcement mechanism for international law is so badly needed. Disputes between states will always arise. Peace demands mechanisms for resolving them fairly and effectively, and reinforcing respect for existing frontiers. Yet such a mechanism seems unlikely to emerge anytime soon. After all, China isn’t alone in violating international law with impunity: its fellow permanent members of the UN Security Council—France, Russia, the UK and the US—have all done so. These are the very countries that the UN charter entrusted with upholding international peace and security. Nowadays, international law is powerful against the powerless, and powerless against the powerful. Despite tectonic shifts in the economy, geopolitics and the environment, this seems set to remain true, with the mightiest states using international law to impose their will on their weaker counterparts, while ignoring it themselves. As long as this is true, a rules-based global order will remain a fig leaf for the forcible pursuit of national interests.

#### International law can’t solve security risks.

Elaraby 18 Nabil Elaraby is an Egyptian diplomat and lawyer, Secretary General of the League of Arab States from 2011–16, former judge at the International Court of Justice from 2001 to 2006. [Failure of the International Security System, 3-3-2018, https://www.thecairoreview.com/global-forum/failure-of-the-international-security-system/]

A quick look at the contemporary international order reveals that the collective security system established by the United Nations Charter and put into place following the end of World War II has failed to protect international peace and security. The tragedy last year in Aleppo and throughout Syria at present is the biggest proof of this failure. For many years, the system’s inability to achieve peace has been attributed to the Cold War. So when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union collapsed, there was a wave of optimism that mirrored the preamble to the UN Charter which states: “We the peoples of the world are determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” This was essentially the purpose of founding the United Nations, whose main objective was “to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.” Hopes were high that these lofty goals would see the light of day after the end of the Cold War, and that the world would renounce the law of the jungle so that peace and justice would finally prevail. Indeed the first ever Security Council summit meeting following the end of the cold war on January 31, 1992 saw world leaders ask the new UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to report on the nature of post-Cold War international relations. Boutros-Ghali presented his famous report “An Agenda for Peace”. In May 1992 the general assembly appointed a committee of the whole, which I presided, to put the proposed contained in the “Agenda for Peace” into effect. However, it soon became clear that the maintenance of world peace would not come about with the end of the Cold War, because the interests of the great powers still conflicted with one another. Thus the Security Council’s inability to take effective and urgent measures to impose peace will, regrettably, continue. \*\*\* To understand the reason for this we must look back at what I call the “grand design” that was concluded in 1945 at the San Francisco Conference when the UN Charter was adopted. It was agreed then to establish a Security Council that would oversee the protection of international peace and security. The Council was given unprecedented wide powers to eliminate all threats to peace. It was also agreed that the five permanent members would have the power to veto substantive resolutions but not procedural resolutions. Unfortunately, the Charter did not clearly delineate the nature and delimitation of the procedural resolutions that could not be impeded. More importantly, the Charter granted the five permanent members veto power, which means that they could block resolutions even with the majority vote needed to pass. The argument behind this open-ended unprecedented license was that it was the responsibility of these five great powers to protect world peace, not their own narrow interests. The five great powers at the San Francisco Conference tried moreover to gain the right to veto non-procedural resolutions regardless of their content, and to incorporate this right explicitly into the charter, but they failed because of the opposition of most countries. At present, it is clear that the interlocking political and economic interests of the five great powers make it inconceivable that any action taken by the Council would directly or indirectly affect those interests. Simply put the Security Council, with its present structure, has been made to be in a state of permanent paralysis the recent deliberations in the council on Ghouta-Syria reflect this paralysis. As a result, the international protection system enshrined in the UN Charter no longer exists. This is what the Arab countries have struggled with over the past seven decades when it came to Palestine, and what the region is struggling with now when it comes to Syria. \*\*\* It is noteworthy that the Security Council’s paralysis [failure] does not hinge solely on the actual use of the veto power. I was the representative of Egypt in the Security Council in 1996 and 1997. I chaired the Council in June 1996 and witnessed first-hand the five great powers threatening in the negotiation phase to veto many crucial resolutions. Ultimately, when the G-5 accept to pass a resolution, it usually ends up formulated as follows: Refraining from taking the action required to end the conflict, and merely appointing an envoy to manage the conflict. The best example of this are the resolutions on Palestine. Imposing sanctions that do not change the situation much but often harm many innocent people. Using distorted ineffective verbal formulations such as the repeated condemnations and denunciations we see now in the Council’s resolutions that do not call for any action that would change the tragic situation in question. The net result is that the Council is being confined to managing conflicts, not ending them.

**Artemis doesn’t pass**

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(Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, "The Outer Space Treaty", in the Global Governance Working Paper feature, Council on Foreign Relations, 2-23-2021, https://www.cfr.org/report/outer-space-treaty, ILake-MO)

States should pursue **innovative** **multilateralism**. Given the challenges surrounding the CD, states should consider setting up a body akin to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to address some of the pressing challenges in outer space. Similar to the GGE, the group could be established through a **UN** **General** **Assembly resolution,** but for a period of two or three years. Such a group of international experts could be mandated to **review universal challenges** confronting every state, including space debris, the outer space arms race, and counter-space capabilities, and produce an outcome document that can be submitted to the UN secretary-general. The group could be an inclusive platform with **policy** and **technical** **experts** from developing and developed countries, thus **providing a voice** to emerging powers. States could also consider creating an institution modeled after the International Civil Aviation Organization, given the importance of space traffic management in handling outer space affairs. Having a group of technical experts ideating possible resolutions could alleviate some of the political issues that have **prevented consensus** among major powers. States could also pursue smaller, technical agreements addressing a particular threat rather than attempt all-encompassing treaties, which are difficult to build support for.

The United States has taken the lead in lunar exploration.

The United States’ Artemis Accords are an innovative attempt at forging international cooperation, but the bilateral approach has limits. The United States has taken the lead in lunar exploration through a series of bilateral agreements, reinforcing many of the norms and principles enshrined in the OST. Although countries including Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom have signed on, space powers such as **China, India, and Russia** have not. Geopolitical rivalry with the United States will likely prevent China from accepting these arrangements, and India and others have avoided signing on because it is not a **multilateral agreement** under the UN umbrella. A better approach to promoting OST norms in lunar exploration would be developed under the aegis of a multilateral entity.

#### No space war – limited accessibility, norms, and interdependence

Pavur and Martinovic 19 [James Pavur, DPhil Researcher Cybersecurity Centre for Doctoral Training Oxford University, Ivan Martinovic, Professor of Computer Science Department of Computer Science Oxford University, “The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space,” 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle, <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_12_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf>]

STABILITY IN SPACE Given the uncomfortable combination of high dependency and low survivability, one might expect to observe frequent attacks against critical military assets in orbit. However, **despite decades of recurring prophesies of impending space war, no such conflict has broken out** [14]–[18]. It is true that a handful of space security crises have occurred; most notably, the 2007 Chinese anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test and the 2008 US ASAT demonstration in response [19]. Moreover, a recent Centre for Strategic and International Studies report suggests increasing interest in attacking US space assets, particularly among the Chinese, Russian, North Korean and Iranian militaries [20]. Overall, however, the space domain has remained puzzlingly peaceful. In this section, we outline three major contributors to this enduring stability: limited accessibility, attributable norms, and environmental interdependence. A. Limited Accessibility Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420]. Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23]. B. Attributable Norms There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. **Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit.** Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. **Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition** [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that **states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly.** One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For **kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible**. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. **This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing**, particularly during peacetime. C. Environmental Interdependence A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. **Space debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.**

#### Space miscalc doesn’t go nuclear---response will be proportional

Zack Cooper 18, senior fellow for Asian security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Thomas G. Roberts is a research assistant and program coordinator for the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS, 1/2/18, "Deterrence in the Last Sanctuary," War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/deterrence-last-sanctuary/>

Until recently, resilience in space was largely an afterthought. It was assumed that a conflict in space would likely lead to or precede a major nuclear exchange. Therefore, the focus was on cost-effective architectures that maximized satellite capabilities, often at the cost of resilience. Recently, however, some have hoped that new architectures could enhance resilience and prevent critical military operations from being significantly impeded in an attack. Although resilience can be expensive, American investments in smaller satellites and more distributed space architectures could minimize adversary incentives to carry out first strikes in space.

In the late 20th century, minor escalations against space systems were treated as major events, since they typically threatened the superpowers’ nuclear architectures. Today, the proliferation of counter-space capabilities and the wide array of possible types of attacks means that most attacks against U.S. space systems are unlikely to warrant a nuclear response. It is critical that policymakers understand the likely break points in any conflict involving space systems. Strategists should explore whether the characteristics of different types of attacks against space systems create different thresholds, paying particular attention to attribution, reversibility, the defender’s awareness of an attack, the attacker’s ability to assess an attack’s effectiveness, and the risks of collateral damage (e.g., orbital debris). Competitors may attempt to use non-kinetic weapons and reversible actions to stay below the threshold that would trigger a strong U.S. response. The 2017 National Security Strategy warns.

### Escalation

#### Sino Russian partnership is self-defeating

Baker & Glosserman 15 (Carl Baker is the director of programs and co-editor of Comparative Connections at Pacific Forum, CSIS and an adjunct professor with the International Studies Department at Hawaii Pacific University. P A graduate of the Air War College, he has an M.A. in public administration from the University of Oklahoma and a B.A. in anthropology from the University of Iowa. Brad Glosserman is executive director at Pacific Forum CSIS and co-editor of Comparative Connections.J.D. from George Washington University, an M.A. from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a B.A. from Reed College. May 2015 “Comparative Connections A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations”, http://csis.org/files/publication/1501q.pdf)

As a result, China and Russia have been reluctant to turn their strategic partnership relationship into an alliance, even if they perceive that their strategic space is been squeezed by tightening of the military alliances by the world’s most powerful countries (NATO and the US-led alliances with Asian countries) in the name of collective defense. It that sense, China and Russia are not just being haunted by the ghost of WWII, but also that of World War I, when major powers in the West (except the US) declared war on each other in 10 days. If anything, the world today is more dangerous than 100 years ago with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of nation-states in a far less balanced world than either the pre-World War I era or the Cold War. In this context, one wonders how long the current strategic partnership relationship (not alliance) between Russia and China would continue.

#### Russia-China alliance doesn’t cause wars.

Ikenberry 14 (G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and George Eastman Visiting Professor at Balliol College, University of Oxford. MAY/JUNE 2014 ISSUE, “The Illusion of Geopolitics The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order”)

Not only does Mead underestimate the strength of the United States and the order it built; he also overstates the degree to which China and Russia are seeking to resist both. (Apart from its nuclear ambitions, Iran looks like a state engaged more in futile protest than actual resistance, so it shouldn’t be considered anything close to a revisionist power.) Without a doubt, China and Russia desire greater regional influence. China has made aggressive claims over maritime rights and nearby contested islands, and it has embarked on an arms buildup. Putin has visions of reclaiming Russia’s dominance in its “near abroad.” Both great powers bristle at U.S. leadership and resist it when they can.

But China and Russia are not true revisionists. As former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami has said, Putin’s foreign policy is “more a reflection of his resentment of Russia’s geopolitical marginalization than a battle cry from a rising empire.” China, of course, is an actual rising power, and this does invite dangerous competition with U.S. allies in Asia. But China is not currently trying to break those alliances or overthrow the wider system of regional security governance embodied in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the East Asia Summit. And even if China harbors ambitions of eventually doing so, U.S. security partnerships in the region are, if anything, getting stronger, not weaker. At most, China and Russia are spoilers. They do not have the interests—let alone the ideas, capacities, or allies—to lead them to upend existing global rules and institutions.

In fact, although they resent that the United States stands at the top of the current geopolitical system, they embrace the underlying logic of that framework, and with good reason. Openness gives them access to trade, investment, and technology from other societies. Rules give them tools to protect their sovereignty and interests.

Despite controversies over the new idea of “the responsibility to protect” (which has been applied only selectively), the current world order enshrines the age-old norms of state sovereignty and nonintervention. Those Westphalian principles remain the bedrock of world politics—and China and Russia have tied their national interests to them (despite Putin’s disturbing irredentism).

It should come as no surprise, then, that China and Russia have become deeply integrated into the existing international order. They are both permanent members of the UN Security Council, with veto rights, and they both participate actively in the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the G-20. They are geopolitical insiders, sitting at all the high tables of global governance.

#### No competitiveness impact

Fettweis 17 [Christopher Fettweis, associate professor of political science at Tulane University. Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace. May 8, 2017. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394?needAccess=true]

After three years in the White House, Ronald Reagan had learned something surprising: “Many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans,” he wrote in his autobiography. He continued: “Perhaps this shouldn’t have surprised me, but it did … I’d always felt that from our deeds it must be clear to anyone that Americans were a moral people who starting at the birth of our nation had always used our power only as a force for good in the world…. During my first years in Washington, I think many of us took it for granted that the Russians, like ourselves, considered it unthinkable that the United States would launch a first strike against them.” 100 Reagan is certainly not alone in believing in the essential benevolent image of his nation. While it is common for actors to attribute negative motivations to the behavior of others, it is exceedingly difficult for them to accept that anyone could interpret their actions in negative ways. Leaders are well aware of their own motives and tend to assume that their peaceful intentions are obvious and transparent.

Both strains of the hegemonic-stability explanation assume not only that US power is benevolent, but that others perceive it that way. Hegemonic stability depends on the perceptions of other states to be successful; it has no hope to succeed if it encounters resistance from the less powerful members of the system, or even if they simply refuse to follow the rules. Relatively small police forces require the general cooperation of large communities to have any chance of establishing order. They must perceive the sheriff as just, rational, and essentially nonthreatening. The lack of balancing behavior in the system, which has been puzzling to many realists, seems to support the notion of widespread perceptions of benevolent hegemony.101 Were they threatened by the order constructed by the United States, the argument goes, smaller states would react in ways that reflected their fears. Since internal and external balancing accompanied previous attempts to achieve hegemony, the absence of such behavior today suggests that something is different about the US version.

Hegemonic-stability theorists purport to understand the perceptions of others, at times better than those others understand themselves. Complain as they may at times, other countries know that the United States is acting in the common interest. Objections to unipolarity, though widespread, are not “very seriously intended,” wrote Kagan, since “the truth about America’s dominant role in the world is known to most observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world’s population.” 102 In the 1990s, Russian protests regarding NATO expansion—though nearly universal—were not taken seriously, since US planners believed the alliance’s benevolent intentions were apparent to all. Sagacious Russians understood that expansion would actually be beneficial, since it would bring stability to their western border.103 President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher were caught off guard by the hostility of their counterparts regarding the issue at a summit in Budapest in December 1994.104 Despite warnings from the vast majority of academic and policy experts about the likely Russian reaction and overall wisdom of expansion itself, the administration failed to anticipate Moscow’s position.105 The Russians did not seem to believe American assurances that expansion would actually be good for them. The United States overestimated the degree to which others saw it as benevolent.

Once again, the culture of the United States might make its leaders more vulnerable to this misperception. The need for positive self-regard appears to be particularly strong in North American societies compared to elsewhere.106 Western egos tend to be gratified through self-promotion rather than humility, and independence rather than interdependence. Americans are more likely to feel good if they are unique rather than a good cog in society’s wheel, and uniquely good. The need to be perceived as benevolent, though universal, may well exert stronger encouragement for US observers to project their perceptions onto others.

The United States almost certainly frightens others more than its leaders perceive. A quarter of the 68,000 respondents to a 2013 Gallup poll in sixty-five countries identified the United States as the “greatest threat to world peace,” which was more than three times the total for the second-place country (Pakistan).107 The international community always has to worry about the potential for police brutality, even if it occurs rarely. Such ungratefulness tends to come as a surprise to US leaders. In 2003, Condoleezza Rice was dismayed to discover resistance to US initiatives in Iraq: “There were times,” she said later, “that it appeared that American power was seen to be more dangerous than, perhaps, Saddam Hussein.” 108 Both liberals and neoconservatives probably exaggerate the extent to which US hegemony is everywhere secretly welcomed; it is not just petulant resentment, but understandable disagreement with US policies, that motivates counterhegemonic beliefs and behavior.

To review, assuming for a moment that US leaders are subject to the same forces that affect every human being, they overestimate the amount of control they have over other actors, and are not as important to decisions made elsewhere as they believe themselves to be. And they probably perceive their own benevolence to be much greater than do others. These common phenomena all influence US beliefs in the same direction, and may well increase the apparent explanatory power of hegemony beyond what the facts would otherwise support. The United States is probably not as central to the New Peace as either liberals or neoconservatives believe.

In the end, what can be said about the relationship between US power and international stability? Probably not much that will satisfy partisans, and the pacifying virtue of US hegemony will remain largely an article of faith in some circles in the policy world. Like most beliefs, it will remain immune to alteration by logic and evidence. Beliefs rarely change, so debates rarely end.

For those not yet fully converted, however, perhaps it will be significant that corroborating evidence for the relationship is extremely hard to identify. If indeed hegemonic stability exists, it does so without leaving much of a trace. Neither Washington’s spending, nor its interventions, nor its overall grand strategy seem to matter much to the levels of armed conflict around the world (apart from those wars that Uncle Sam starts). The empirical record does not contain strong reasons to believe that unipolarity and the New Peace are related, and insights from political psychology suggest that hegemonic stability is a belief particularly susceptible to misperception. US leaders probably exaggerate the degree to which their power matters, and could retrench without much risk to themselves or the world around them. Researchers will need to look elsewhere to explain why the world has entered into the most peaceful period in its history.

The good news from this is that the New Peace will probably persist for quite some time, no matter how dominant the United States is, or what policies President Trump follows, or how much resentment its actions cause in the periphery. The people of the twenty-first century are likely to be much safer and more secure than any of their predecessors, even if many of them do not always believe it.

#### Sino – Russia ties are increasing – small issues don’t influence the overall relationship – non UQ

Sputnik 12/21 – sputnik news (“China-Russia Relations are 'Mature and Stable' – Ambassador”, 21.12.2016, <https://sputniknews.com/politics/201612211048817557-china-russia-relations/>) RMT

MOSCOW (Sputnik) — Bilateral relations between Russia and China are mature and changes in international relations globally do not have a negative impact on these ties, China's Ambassador to Russia Li Hui told Sputnik in an interview.

"The relations between China and Russia are not affected by any changes in the international situation. They are mature and stable. It is a classic example of relations between modern states," Li said, adding that 20 years of strategic partnership between the two nations had contributed to the interests of both Moscow and Beijing and to the peace and stability both in the region and in the world.

The diplomat added that he was confident that in 2017 the ties between Moscow and China would receive an additional impetus in the light of the achievements reached in 2016.

"In 2016, China and Russia have moved further toward strengthening of strategic mutual trust, deepening of business cooperation, reinforcing of well-established friendly relations… I am certain that because of joint efforts of the two countries, Chinese-Russian relations in 2017 will gain further momentum and will achieve success," Li added.

After Russia’s relations with the West deteriorated following the start of the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Moscow boosted it cooperation with Beijing, negotiating gas delivery contracts and intensifying diplomatic ties.

Currently Russia and China are actively cooperating in a multitude of fields, most notably on energy, infrastructure, finance and defense.

#### Deepened cooperation creates military alliance between Russia and china – no war

Clarke and Ricketts 16 - Michael ClarkeAnthony Ricketts February 1, 2016 (“Should America Fear the China-Russia Relationship?” <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/should-america-fear-the-china-russia-relationship-15075>) RMT

Diplomatically, Russia and China have often exhibited their shared interests through the use of their veto power in the U.N. Security Council. In the past decade, China has used six vetoes, each in concert with Russia, which has used its veto eleven times in the same period. Most recently, this alignment was exhibited in Moscow and Beijing’s vetoing of four U.N. resolutions on Syria since 2012. This excessive use of the veto has been understood as both a challenge to Western leadership and a tool to slow down the pace of American military interference in the Middle East.

#### Existing deterrence checks Chinese miscalculations

Gertz 18 (Bill Gertz is a journalist and author who has spent decades covering defense and national security affairs. He is the author of six national security books ,The National Interest, March 5, 2018, “Is America Preparing for a Nuclear War with China?” <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/america-preparing-nuclear-war-china-24753?page=0%2C1>, accessed 8/21/18)

Russia’s leader Vladimir Putin unveiled several new nuclear weapons last week in a replay of the Cold War. China, meanwhile, is continuing a similar buildup of high-technology strategic nuclear forces that remains largely hidden from view.

Chinese secrecy about its nuclear forces and their use was a major theme of the Pentagon’s recently completed Nuclear Posture Review that outlined a new “tailored deterrence” policy for China.

The new plan is aimed at persuading Chinese leaders to avoid military miscalculations – like provocative actions in the South China Sea, or hostile activities related to Taiwan or Japan – that could quickly escalate into a nuclear exchange.

The unclassified posture review shed little light on the details of the buildup of China’s nuclear forces other than identifying what were called “entirely new nuclear capabilities.” They include several new types of missiles, including hypersonic weapons, satellite-killing missiles and regional intermediate-range nuclear forces.

The review takes note of the main threat of a nuclear war between the United States and China: A military encounter that escalates into a regional conflict culminating in a nuclear exchange involving China’s regional nuclear-armed missiles.

“Our tailored strategy for China is designed to prevent Beijing from mistakenly concluding that it could secure an advantage through the limited use of its theater nuclear capabilities, or that any use of nuclear weapons, however limited, is acceptable,” the review states.

The Pentagon did not specify how tailored deterrence would work. It warned that the United States “will maintain the capability to credibly threaten intolerable damage as Chinese leaders calculate costs and benefits, such that the costs incurred as a result of Chinese nuclear employment, at any level of escalation, would vastly outweigh any benefit.”

Strategic military planning for China, however, would likely seek to put at risk what Chinese leaders hold most dearly: Continued rule by the Communist Party of China. Thus, U.S. tailored deterrence would involve signaling to the Chinese leadership that any future conflict would result in the destruction of the Chinese Communist Party, and its military arm, the People’s Liberation Army.

Robust security for Chinese leaders

Chinese leadership statements and military writings make clear China probably understands that strategy, and the military has invested heavily in defending Party leaders.

#### China isn’t revisionist---it prefers economic integration

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This phenomenon seems odd because most realists and even many liberals have traditionally assumed that an incumbent hegemon must necessarily be committed to the defense of the existing international order. It is a satisfied or status-quo power because it has supposedly the most to gain from this order. Conversely, a rising state is usually said to challenge this order because it is assumed to be dissatisfied and revisionist, seeking to alter the existing norms and rules of international conduct. This view claims that a rising power is necessarily dissatisfied and revisionist because it did not have a voice in shaping and creating the current international order. Such an expectation, however, overlooks the effects of socialization as the rising power becomes more engaged with other states. This country’s very rise also gives it an increased stake in the international order that has permitted its ascent thus far. As a result, it should have less incentive to upset this order even though it now has more capability to challenge it. Conversely, a declining hegemon should have a smaller stake and hence less incentive to defend the existing order and more reason to demand its revision in the hope of arresting and reversing its decline. It is in a better position to demand such revision because it still has more capability than others to alter the rules to further extend its advantages. The current literature does not consider these possibilities. Instead, it shuttles its logic in attributing a revisionist motivation to the rising power and a status-quo motivation to the ruling power. It focuses on a rising power’s increased capabilities to challenge the existing international order without considering that it now has a larger stake in preserving this order than before. At the same time, it emphasizes a ruling power’s stake in this order even though this stake is diminishing due to its relative decline. Given this decline, this country should be more motivated to change the international order and should have less incentive to defend it (as suggested by recent US trade spats with not only China, but also its neighbors and allies). Moreover, the extant literature fails to consider that even though the rules of the current system are rigged in favor of the ruling power (e.g. Gilpin, 1981; Organski, 1958), it may still try to change them to advance its interests even further because, after all, it has the greatest capability to do so. Although this literature has taken up the socialization of a rising state like China in multilateral diplomacy (e.g. Johnston, 2008), it has overlooked why this same process has seemingly worked in reverse when an established hegemon like the US decides to withdraw from UNESCO, boycotts the International Labor Organization, abrogates the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and rescinds its support for the Trans Pacific Partnership, the Paris Climate Accord, and the International Criminal Court. These are not isolated events, but suggest an increasing pattern. Thus, current discourse on the revisionist or status-quo orientations of states tends to take the attribution of these orientations for granted rather than treating it as a matter subject to contesting interpretation (but see Johnston, 2003; Schweller, 2015). Why should the incumbent hegemon refrain from changing international rules after it has attained global supremacy? Offensive realists would/should at least expect this country to continue its push for more advantages and power until it has attained undisputed world domination (Mearsheimer, 2001: 45). Is a rising power necessarily revisionist and a threat to destabilizing the international order because it now has more power to upend it? Or, alternatively, can a declining power also be dangerous because it has an incentive to wage a preventive war to forestall an impending power transition (Copeland, 2000; Levy, 1987, 2008)? Is it possible for a rising power to become more status-quo oriented, and a declining hegemon to become more revisionist? Theoretical motivation These questions bring us to the power-transition theory, our article’s focus.5 It has often been applied by International Relations scholars to study “China’s rise,” addressing particularly the danger of war between this country and the US, the incumbent global hegemon. Graham Allison’s (2017) recent book further calls attention to the so-called Thucydides’ Trap,

suggesting that a war between a rising state and a ruling state becomes more likely when their power relationship becomes more balanced. All but four of Allison’s 16 historical cases of power transition ended in war. It is not clear, however, why these cases were chosen but not others (for instance, Germany’s peaceful overtaking of Britain and France after the Second World War was included in his study but not China’s peaceful overtaking of Japan and Russia). There appears to be a serious sample bias, a problem shared by the power-transition theory. This theory includes the FrancoPrussian War and the Russo-Japanese War as positive examples supporting its proposition but disregards the Spanish–American War and dismisses the peaceful overtaking of Britain by the US before both world wars (Organski and Kugler, 1980). As originally formulated (Organski and Kugler, 1980), the power-transition theory explains war occurrence as a joint product of two variables. The probability of war is expected to increase when a rising state overtakes an incumbent hegemon, and when this rising state is motivated by a revisionist agenda. In subsequent analyses, however, the second variable has been largely ignored by scholars. Some even argue that the most powerful country simply cannot be a revisionist state. For example, Ronald Tammen and his coauthors (2000: 9) state: “By definition, the dominant power is satisfied … [and therefore] is the defender of the status quo. After all, it creates and maintains the global or regional hierarchy from which it accrues substantial benefits.” This view naturally strips the concept of revisionism of any additional analytic content that is separate from a country’s relative power, and treats a country’s revisionist, or status-quo, motivation as a matter of definitional fiat rather than empirical assessment. Moreover, by stipulating that the dominant power is necessarily a status-quo power, one is by default assigning any rising power that disagrees with it to the category of dissatisfied or revisionist states. This sleight of hand thereby equates any opposition to the incumbent hegemon as an attempt to undermine the international order. By treating the dominant power and the international order as synonyms, a disagreement with the incumbent hegemon is transformed into a challenge to the global community. Several scholars have confronted directly the need to incorporate states’ foreign policy orientation or motivation in their application of the power-transition theory. However, their operationalization of this concept of revisionism (or its opposite, status-quo orientation) seems problematic. They have used, for example, a state’s military spending or its alliance portfolio to infer its revisionist or status-quo orientation (e.g. De Soysa et al., 1997; Kim, 1991, 1992, 1996; Kim and Morrow, 1992; Lemke and Reed, 1996, 1998; Lemke and Werner, 1996; Oneal et al., 1988; Werner and Kugler, 1996). These variables, however, tend to be correlated with the other independent variable in the power-transition theory (namely, the measurement of national power) and its dependent variable (the occurrence of war). These tendencies threaten valid interpretation due to multicollinearity and endogeneity. This is because military spending and alliances are also used to measure national power, thus conflating a country’s revisionist or status-quo orientation with its power. It is also not unnatural for a state to increase its defense expenditure and seek allies in preparation for an anticipated war, thus causing the endogeneity problem. Such behavior does not say much about its revisionist or status-quo orientation. Moreover, a state’s international alignment — whether it joins an alliance led by the dominant power — does not say anything about this orientation, unless, of course, one assumes that the dominant power is always a status-quo power and, ipso facto, its allies are also committed to the international order. Indeed, it is a truism to say that states that go to war against each other are dissatisfied with each other and with their current relationship. However, this is very different from saying that one or the other belligerent must be dissatisfied with the existing international order. Some people conflate power structure and international order. Power structure refers to the distribution of power in the international system. A rising power will certainly affect the existing power configuration in the system. If international order is defined as the distribution of national power, then changes in major states’ relative capabilities naturally threaten to upset this order. This definitional move renders any claim about the relationship between interstate power shifts and international order tautological. Moreover, because all countries are presumably interested in improving their international position, this move is tantamount to characterizing all such motivations as revisionist. Henry Kissinger (2014: 9) points to the above distinction when he says that international relations consist of two components: “a set of commonly accepted rules that define the limits of permissible action and a balance of power that enforces restraints where rules break down, preventing one political unit from subjugating all others.” It is important to emphasize this distinction: the interstate system based on the distribution of power, coexisting with the international society where rules, norms and institutions also shape states’ outlook and behavior. Some people take the position that when an incumbent hegemon pursues and even extends its primacy, it cannot but be preserving the international status quo. They thus equate “status quo” with the hegemon’s continued and even enhanced dominance. They perceive any changes to the existing distribution of power as a threat to this country’s dominance and hence a challenge to the international “status quo.” We disagree with this view because it confuses the two components of international relations just explicated. This flawed view would interpret any action by the hegemon, regardless of how it may affect the existing international normative consensus, as intended to defend the status quo. In this view, the hegemon cannot be a revisionist state by definition. Concomitantly, it would treat any change to the existing power relationships caused by a late rising state’s relative gains as revisionist by default. Such a view clearly contradicts the power-transition theory, which, as already explained, relies on two variables to predict war between great powers: changes in the distribution of interstate power and whether a rising state is revisionist. When speaking about the latter variable, Organski and Kugler (1980) have in mind whether this state seeks to challenge, or revise, the prevailing international order, defined as the norms and rules adopted by most states. It is important to emphasize again that in this conception, the international order is not the same as the existing interstate distribution of power. Otherwise, power-transition theory’s two variables would be duplicative. It should also be evident from this discussion that changes in the interstate power distribution do not necessarily imply changes in international order (He and Feng, 2018; Welch, 2018). So, even if China overtakes the US, it does not mean that the US-led international order will necessarily be upended. In the following, we present several empirical indicators of Beijing’s and Washington’s behavior toward the international order, behavior that reflects, in our view, their revisionist or status-quo orientations. All too often, current discourse tends to deploy labels of revisionist or status-quo impulses as a rhetorical device without any attempt at empirical assessment. We argue that there is a compelling need to be transparent and systematic in disclosing the evidence and logic used to support these attributions. Other analysts may well disagree with our indicators or rationale, but it is necessary and important for them to suggest better alternatives. Our focus on comparing China and the US directly and explicitly distinguishes this analysis from most other studies. Other analysts have asked whether China is a revisionist or status-quo country (e.g. Johnston, 2003; Kastner and Saunders, 2011). They do not, however, compare China with the US. They therefore do not ask the extent to which Beijing’s behavior is different from Washington’s or other major powers’ conduct. By examining changes in Chinese and US behavior over time, we hope to address whether a rising state’s increasing power will necessarily make it more revisionist and aggressive (as offensive realism would suggest), and, conversely, whether a declining hegemon can become less committed to the existing international order and increasingly motivated to object to its prevailing rules. Has China become a more status-quo state as it gains more relative power, and has the US become less so as it suffers a relative decline? Which country has become more aligned with the rest of the international community and which country finds itself more often outside of general international consensus? One cannot obviously just rely on a government’s words to predict its future intentions, which are always subject to change. Therefore, we rely on evidence from words as well as deeds. Naturally, to the extent that these two kinds of data correspond and to the extent that data from many different sources converge, we will have stronger confidence in our inferences. The costlier, longer, and more irreversible are a state’s announcements and conduct, the more credible should be its commitment to its declared intentions (Fearon, 1995). As just alluded to, we do not believe that any individual indicator can be conclusive about a state’s foreign policy orientation or intention. We therefore accept and encourage multiple indicators while acknowledging that they can each have important limitations. However, if multiple indicators from different sources converge on the same interpretation, then we can have more confidence in the construct validity of our measurement. Contrary to other scholars’ tendency to assign binary labels of revisionist and status-quo states, our approach emphasizes the direction of their change over time to become more, or less, revisionist. Moreover, we do not insist that one of the two countries studied here must be revisionist and the other must be status-quo oriented; both China and the US can be revisionist to a varying extent and this tendency can be different in different issue areas.

#### Multiple checks on US China conflict

Leon 17(David Pak Yu - Assistant Professor Department of Political Science & History, Keuka College, “Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Situating China's Economic and Military Rise,” Asian Politics & Policy, vol 9, is 1, January 2017, Wiley //Red)

China has, in the past 30 years, experienced economic growth and military modernization to such an extent as to position itself as a power capable of shaping the Asian regional order and, potentially, the rules and institutions governing the international system.1 In the existing literature, various policy analysts and international relations scholars have argued that, historically, systemic risks of conflicts tend to increase at critical junctures of power transitions or major power shifts when the power gap narrows between a hegemon and a rising challenger, especially a revisionist one committed to overturning the established set of institutional arrangements (see Copeland, 2000; Gilpin, 1983; Kugler & Lemke, 1996; Organski, 1958; see also Chan, 2008; Harris, 2014). An increasingly powerful China in the context of the relative decline of the United States (Layne, 2012; Zakaria, 2008; although see Beckley, 2011) has brought these debates into sharper relief because whether or not China can rise peacefully and whether or not it will challenge the United States in its dual role as the premier global power and traditional underwriter of global governance institutions will have major implications for both theory and policy as analytical apparatuses are reexamined and reworked, and policy prescriptions developed and dispensed. This article first suggests that neither theoretical nor policy questions pertaining to China's rise can be properly addressed without examining the nature and meaning of any power shifts that are said to be in process, or the balance of economic and military forces within the intersecting global and East Asian regional systems. Clarifying these issues in turn requires an analysis of such factors as the trajectories, reversibility, and distributional consequences of differential growth; the possibilities and constraints of China's current and expected military capabilities, especially in relation to power projection and strategic means of coercion (i.e., naval and air forces capable of long-range operations, as well as nuclear forces and the capabilities and ranges of delivery vehicles); economic interdependence; and China's dispositions toward rule-based international institutional complexes. This article argues that while China has seen tremendous economic growth and substantial military modernization, sustaining its economic prosperity depends to a large extent on global trade, internal and external stability, and the ability to access natural resources. A deep level of international institutional engagement that it has exhibited while rising in wealth and power is quite dissimilar to aggressive rising challengers in the past (e.g., Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany) where autarky or economic self-sufficiency and aloofness from rule-based institutions tended to mark their behavior. Inasmuch as engagement and enmeshment continue to be prioritized in Chinese foreign policy, China will likely have strong disincentives to initiate conflicts that may disrupt trade and resource flows and essentially slow its own rise. For the foreseeable future, its military also does not have the kind of power projection capability and its foundational sources—or what can be called the command of the commons (Pose, 2003)—that would allow it to mount a serious challenge to U.S. military primacy in the Western Pacific, much less to initiate a revisionist war to reorder the core systemic arrangements; on the contrary, it has seldom been more involved and engaged in such arrangements in modern times. This relatively benign conclusion, however, is conditional on China's continued access to the resources necessary for further development and growth by means of trade or acquisition, which also serves as a linchpin of domestic regime stability. This can be attributed to Deng Xiaoping's admonition for China to “hide its capabilities and bide its time” in international politics, a concept traceable to Sun Tzu's classic notion that high strategic virtue lies in winning without a fight (see Sun, 2009; see also Friedberg, 2011; Kissinger, 2011). It is still too early to tell if tensions in China's geographical periphery and China's more recent assertiveness in international affairs indicate a fundamental reorientation or an adjustment in policy, but in any case, such tensions and the possibility of escalation should not be taken lightly. In short, China has been rising within a rule-based system characterized by the institutionalization of world trade and politics (Baviera, 2016; Ikenberry, 2011), conceived initially as U.S.-led institutional design, and more broadly intensified in the closing decades of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. If this institutional architecture proves not to be robust and resilient enough to ensure reasonably unhindered access to the lifeblood of growth, dangers may still loom for a concerted drive for autarky that in earlier times had emanated from great power anxieties and heralded international conflicts. The very existence and pervasiveness of contemporary global institutions, however, do present China with the possibility to rewrite or create its own set of global institutions, something that totalitarian rising powers in the first half of the 20th century did not seriously attempt to do.