### 1NC – T

#### Interpretation: Topical affirmatives may only garner offense from the hypothetical implementation by governments that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. Any 1AR reclarification or spin is still extra T which equally links to our offense.

#### Resolved requires policy action

Louisiana State Legislature (<https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx>) Ngong

**Resolution**

**A legislative instrument** that generally is **used for** making declarations, **stating policies**, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution **uses the term "resolved".** Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### Appropriation

TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

Topicality is key to limits and ground---redefining portions of the resolution permits endless reclarification AND creates incentives for avoidance---only aligning research with agent and mechanism solves.

#### Two impacts:

#### 1---Fairness---an unlimited, unpredictable topic disparately raises the research burden for the negative -- treat this is a sufficient win condition because fairness is the logical structure that undergirds all impacts AND controls any benefit to debate.

**Dascal and Knoll** ’**11** [Marcelo and Amnon; May 18th; former Professor of Philosophy at Tel Aviv University, B.A. in Philosophy from the University of Sao Paulo; former Professor of Philosophy at Tel Aviv University; Argumentation: Cognition and Community, "'Cognitive systemic dichotomization' in public argumentation and controversies," p. 20-25]

He opposes positions whose ‘exclusionist’ outlook rejects the normative approach to the political sphere on the grounds that “normative statements can never be subjected to a reasonable discussion” (ibid.: 2), because—he argues—the discussion of politics “is an area of vital interest to all of us and should clearly not be excluded from argumentative reasonableness” (ibid.: 3)—a view with which we are prone to agree. Nevertheless, he admits that in the present situation critical discussion is far from being systematically and successfully applied to that vital area: “In representative democracies, however, the out-comes of the political process tend to be predominantly the product of negotiations be-tween political leaders rather than the result of a universal and mutual process of deliberative disputation” (ibid.). Political debates, therefore, are ‘quasi-discussions’, i.e., “monologues calculated only to win the audience’s consent to one’s own views”, rather than ‘genuine discussions’, i.e., serious attempts to have an intellectual exchange, which is typical of critical discussions (ibid.). In order to overcome this situation, “democracy should always have promoted such a critical discussion of standpoints as a central aim. Only if this is the case can stimulating participation in political discourse enhance the quality of democracy" (ibid.). This can be achieved, however, only by following “the dialectical rules for argumentative discourse that make up a code of conduct for political discourse [and] are therefore of crucial importance to giving substance to the ideal of participatory democracy” (ibid.: 4); thereby fully acknowledging that “education in processing argumentation in a critical discussion is indispensable for a democratic society (van Eemeren 1995: 145-146).

The reasons provided for the failure of the adoption of the critical discussion model in reality ranges from a general allusion to human nature (“in real-life contexts, it has to be taken into account that human interaction is not always automatically 'naturally' and fully oriented toward the ideal of dialectical reasonableness "; van Eemeren 2010: 4) to specific political sphere argumentation handicaps (unwillingness of people “to subject their thinking to critical scrutiny”; “vested interest in particular outcome”; “inequality in power and resources; “different levels of critical skills”; and “a practical demand for an immediate settlement”; van Eemeren 2010: 4). Although these causes may have some explanatory value in some cases, in our opinion their modus operandi is not accounted for and, what is more important, they do not cover the full spectrum of challenges that the successful use of critical discussion in the public and political spheres must face, as we have seen (cf. sections 2 and 3).

No wonder that van Eemeren himself raises the question “whether maintaining the dialectical ideal of critical discussion in political and other real-life contexts is not utopian” (ibid.), to which he replies by admitting that "[t]he ideal of a critical discussion is by definition not a description of any kind of reality but sets a theoretical standard that can be used for heuristic, analytic and evaluative purpose” (ibid.). This ideal seems to be so inspiring that it remains valid as a pure theoretical ideal, “even if the argumentative discourse falls short of the dialectical ideal” (ibid.).

In the light of the substantial gap between the normative ideal and the actual practices of public and political argumentation that PD’s description and explanation provides, a number of doubts arise: Are there structural, rather than merely contingent obstacles in idealized critical discussion that prevents even its approximate use in the public sphere? Can a theory that claims to be a praxis based normative system fulfill its promise if it sets up a threshold that no one who tries to apply it to the public sphere can reach? Doesn’t the very fact that argumentation is excessively idealized in the model PD proposes cause the gap by distancing people concerned by public issues from argumentation at all? All these doubts suggest that a powerful structural phenomenon like the existence of CSDs in the public sphere is perhaps overlooked by PD and requires, for its overcoming, a radically different approach.

4.2 Discrepancies between the PD approach and reasonable argumentation in the public sphere

The discrepancies in question have to do with basic parameters relevant to every argumentative process, namely:

(A) The discussants’ goals and targets: what do they expect to achieve through the argumentation process and what is it capable of providing.

(B) The preconditions for initiating a critical discussion: what are the discussants presumed to know and accept of these preconditions.

(C) The argumentative process that is supposed to lead to the achievement of the discussants’ goals.

(D) The influence of context and agents on the argumentative process.

4.2.1 Goals

Assuming that argumentation is a voluntary endeavor, the parties are presumed to engage in it if and only if: (i) the process will serve their goals; (ii) these goals cannot be achieved by different, better means.

PD describes as follows the aim of engaging in an argumentative process:

Argumentation is basically aimed at resolving a difference of opinion about the acceptability of a standpoint by making an appeal to the other party's reasonableness. (van Eemeren 2010: 1, with reference to van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 11-18)

The difference of opinion is resolved when the antagonist accepts the protagonist's viewpoint on the basis of the arguments advanced or when the protagonist abandons his viewpoint as a result of the critical responses of the antagonist. (van Eemeren 2010: 33)

Simply put, the basic assumption is that a critical discussion’s aim consists in putting forth a certain position by one of the parties for the critical examination of the other, who calls it into question. The latter undertakes to refute the former’s position, while its proponent is committed to defend it. Four stages (see below) are supposed to ensure a valid performance of the refutation and defense tasks. The essential point is that at the end of the four stages the parties clearly agree whether the proponent’s position has been refuted or not and, accordingly, change their position (either retracting it or withdrawing from his questioning). In ‘mixed’ disagreements, in which the antagonist not only questions but also puts forth an opposed position, the same process takes place sequentially, i.e., at first one side (A) attacks trying to refute the other’s (B) position, and after this stage is concluded, they switch roles and the second side (B) proceeds to attack the first (A) in the same fashion.

Regardless of whether the described process is indeed capable to yield a conclusive decision about the refutation of a position, and of whether the linearity of the refutation process makes sense, it is obvious that debates in the public sphere are for the most part ‘mixed’. Furthermore, in so far as these debates involve dichotomous positions (rather than just opposed ones), it is necessary that at the end of the PD process one of the parties accept the position of the other.

It is also worth noticing that, contrary to deliberative democracy approaches, which in some cases approve the attempt to reach agreement in a (public) debate as a form of justification of political systems, PD claims that it is not a consensus theory at all. Instead, it conceives itself as a theory based on Popper’s critical rationality, i.e., as having as its principal goal to provide each party with the means—i.e., refutation attempts—to test critically its position:

[T]he conception of reasonableness upheld in pragma-dialectics insights from critical rationalist epistemology and utilitarian ethics conjoin … The intersubjective acceptability we attribute to the procedure, which is eventually expected to lend conventional validity to the procedure, is primarily based on its instrumentality in doing the job it is intended to do: re-solving a difference of opinion. … This means that, philosophically speaking, the rationale for accepting the pragma-dialectical procedure is pragmatic—more precisely, utilitarian [italics in quoted text]. … However, based on Popper's falsification idea, this is a ‘negative’ and not ‘positive’, utilitarianism. … Rather than maximization of agreement, minimization of disagreement is to be aimed for. (van Eemeren 2010: 34)

The distinction between maximization of agreement and minimization of disagreement purports to stress that PD doesn’t view agreement as the suitable end of the process, but just as “an intermediate step on the way to new, and more advanced, disagreements” (van Eemeren 2010: 26n). Nevertheless, no explanation is given of how these “more advanced disagreements” are engendered as a part of the dynamics of the critical process, nor what is the role or value of such disagreements in the public sphere or elsewhere. This may be due to the fact that PD’s ‘critical discussion’ is not tuned to the generation of new positions or ideas but only to the testing of extant ones, thus echoing once again Popper, now in his focus on the justification rather than on the discovery of theories (see sections 4.2.4 and 5).

In any case, it is quite clear that the only practical result of the critical discussion à la PD of opposed positions on a public issue is to determine whether one discussant succeeded in refuting the other’s position, thus obtaining the adversary’s agreement, who will then share his/her position, at least for some time. In this respect, PD’s critical discussion is close to Habermas’s ‘reasonable argumentation’, whose aim is to reach consensus.15 In spite of the apparent difference between a critical examination of a position aiming at its refutation or at its acceptance, even van Eemeren admits, to some extent, their similarity. He points out that “the pragma-dialectical procedure deals only with ‘first order’ conditions for resolving differences of opinion on the merits by means of critical discussion” (van Eemeren 2010: 34), and stresses that there are ‘higher order’ conditions, ‘internal’ and ‘external’, that are “beyond the agent’s control”, conditions that are similar to Habermas’s “ideal speech conditions” (van Eemeren 2010: 35n). Anyhow, whether according to PD the main goal of the critical discussion process in the public alliance is to create the opportunity for refutation or for agreement (meaning that one of the discussants acknowledges that his position is wrong), the essential assumption of this process is that the participants in it in the public sphere (or elsewhere) must be aware that one of them holds a wrong position and will have to explicitly acknowledge this.

Is such a goal, especially when conceived as the ultimate aim of the proposed argumentative process, feasible and acceptable in the public sphere?

In our opinion, there are at least four reasons for arguing that it is a utopian, hence unacceptable goal, if one takes seriously what should be expected from argumentative practice and theory in the public sphere. First, because PD deserves a critique similar to the one leveled against the Popperian version of critical rationalism it espouses,16 which defends a theory of knowledge “without a knowing subject” (Popper 1972); obviously, such a-contextual position becomes even more problematic if applied to the public and political spheres, where it must operate in a context essentially involved with practical rationality. Second, due to its analogy with theories such as Habermas’s that were discussed in this section as well as in 2.2—an analogy that deserves additional criticism because, unlike Habermasianism, PD overlooks the relationship between the political and public context and argumentative practice. Third, because of PD’s total overlooking of the role of CSDs in public argumentation (cf. 4.2.2). And fourth, due to unilateral value judgments of positions in the public sphere, which lead to simplistic criteria of refutation or acceptance in a domain where complexity is the rule (cf. 2.1.1 and 4.2.3).

(ii) Let us admit, for the sake of argument, that the refutation goal as claimed by PD is central, feasible, acceptable, and useful in public argumentation. Aren’t there better ways to achieve this goal?

The refutation and defense moves stipulated by the PD critical discussion model include, on the one side, the antagonist’s critical remarks or demands and on the other, the proponent’s replies. We believe that it must be assumed that neither the critique nor the replies are previously known to the contenders, which is why they have an interest in engage in the argumentation process: presumably, the expression of both, counter-arguments and defensive-arguments, is good to both sides. In spite of its usefulness in certain situations, this kind of exchange does not amount to the full manifestation of the dialectical critical process, wherein the context and co-text of the dialectical exchange, as well as the cognitive interaction that takes place and evolves throughout the exchange, play a decisive role in the design and ‘inner’ justification of each of the participants’ moves. Argumentation strategies that take into account these resources and make full use of their potential are no doubt setting up another, broader span of goals for the argumentative process, and are more likely to achieve these goals more effectively than they certainly would achieve their PD more limited counterparts (cf. 4.2.4 and 5).

4.2.2 Preconditions

The ideal PD critical discussion can only be realized if some preconditions are satisfied. The most important ones are a) a clear-cut identification of the standpoint that provokes the disagreement, b) the decision of the parties to engage in a discussion, and c) the participants’ commitment to obey the procedural rules. As we shall see, these preconditions share a common assumption, which calls into question the feasibility of using critical discussion in the public sphere.

(A) This precondition assumes that it is possible to isolate rigorously the subject matter of a critical discussion, so as to conduct a focused discussion that makes use only of relevant arguments. This precondition is quite strict, for whenever both discussants defend contrary standpoints, their disagreement should be treated as two separate fully fledged discussions: “… if another discussion begins, it must go through the same stages again—from confrontation stage to concluding stage” (van Eemeren 2010: 10n).

(B) This precondition subordinates the decision to engage in the discussion to the evaluation that the discussants share enough common ground to pursue it adequately: “After the parties have decided that there is enough common ground to conduct a discussion …” (van Eemeren 2010: 33).

(C) This precondition stresses the ‘contractual’ character of a critical discussion, which requires explicit mutual commitments by the discussants. Its rationale is that without such commitments the aim of the critical discussion, i.e., the resolution of the difference of opinions, will not be achieved, which makes engaging in the discussion pointless: “There is no point in venturing to resolve a difference … if there is no mutual commitment to a common starting point, which may include procedural commitments as well as substantive agreement” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 60).

These ‘first order’ preconditions, as they are labeled in PD (cf. van Eemeren 2010: 33), are the conditions that candidates to participate in a critical discussion must fulfill if they intend to do so and can afford it personally (a ‘second order’ condition) and politically (a ‘third order’ condition).17 In addition, the first order conditions demand from the prospective discussants a clear, distinct, and detailed picture of the scope of the discussion that they are about to engage in. This means not mixing up the various differences of opinion that the discussion may involve, and being able to separate them properly as the subject matter for independent discussions; a further requirement is the anticipated identification of the pieces of the ‘substantive agreement’ forming the starting point in order to ensure that they are sufficient for conducting the discussion up to a satisfactory closure.

2---Clash---forfeiting government action sanctions retreat from controversy and forces the negative to concede solvency before winning a link -- clash is the necessary condition for distinguishing debate from discussion, but negation exists on a sliding scale -- that jumpstarts the process of critical thinking, reflexivity, and argument refinement.

TVA---Only the one piece of offense they read, if that’s all they defend we get a link

Switch side debate solves all of their offense—there’s no specific reason why their arguments have to be read on the aff—that solves predictability and accesses their education impact turns because plans on the aff and Ks on the neg can challenge perspectives, stances, representations, and epistemologies.

### 1NC – CP

#### Text: The appropriation of outer space by private corporations is unjust except for satellite broadband services.

#### Starlink is key to rural broadband expansion

Weinschenk 2/25 [(Carl, IT and telecom journalist for Telecompetitor, Teleco Transformation, and IT Business Edge) “Report: Starlink Looks Very Promising for Rural Broadband,” Telecompetitor, 2/25/2021] JL

SpaceX’s Starlink satellite broadband service has the potential to be a game changer for rural broadband, according to an analysis by PCMag of Starlink speeds. The analysis is based on beta tester data exclusively provided to it by Ookla Speedtest.

The site looked at data from rural, suburban and urban areas. Among its more than 10,000 users in its semi-public beta were “a perplexing” number in urban and suburban areas where a variety of high-speed options already are available. The story cites Chicago, Seattle and Minneapolis as places where there were testers, despite readily available alternatives.

The site compared download speeds against other fixed service providers in 30 counties with at least 30 samples in any month from December 30 to February 24. The counties in which the fixed providers had the biggest speed advantage over Spacelink were urban or suburban: Los Angeles and Santa Clara counties, CA; Cook County, IL; King County, WA and Washington County, MN.

It is in rural areas that Starlink shines, according to the research. The five counties in which Starlink had the biggest download speed advantage over the fixed group were rural: Vilas County, WI; Ravali County, MT; Waldo County, ME; Okanogan County, WA and Lamoile County, VT.

The number of counties in which Starlink beat the fixed providers and those in which the fixed providers beat Starlink appeared to be about equal, as was the speed differential.

“Our own analysis shows that Starlink will make the biggest difference in rural, low-density, low-population counties with few options other than lower-quality satellite services,” wrote Sascha Segan, author of the PCMag article about Startlink rural speeds.

#### Broadband is key to precision agriculture transition

ABI 19 [(American Broadband Initiative, a leading force in driving changes across Federal Agencies to identify and remove barriers to broadband access and leverage public assets and resources to expand our Nation’s broadband infrastructure capacity.) “A Case for Rural Broadband,” The United States Department of Agriculture, 4/2019] BC

HOW E-CONNECTIVITY WILL TRANSFORM THE BUSINESS OF AGRICULTURE

Across the agricultural production cycle, farmers and ranchers can implement digital technologies as other modern businesses are doing, enhancing agriculture by driving decision-making based on integrated data, automating processes to increase operational efficiency, improving productivity with tasks driven by real-time insights, augmenting the role of management in the business of farming, and creating new markets with extended geographic reach.

These patterns of digital transformation create fundamental shifts in agricultural production, developing new ways of working that make the industry more productive, attractive, and financially sustainable for farmers and ranchers. Tech companies which stand to benefit from industry transformation continue to capitalize on these shifts by developing new technologies, which according to one recent study, may help position themselves to capture a portion of an estimated $254 billion to $340 billion in global addressable digital agriculture market.13

BUSINESS MANAGEMENT shifts decisionmaking from instinct to integrated data

Precision Agriculture is transforming the way producers collect, organize, and rely on information to make key decisions. Traditionally, producers’ long-term experiences have created a competitive advantage: years of experiments have produced insights and instincts about the land they have farmed and the animals they have raised. But the volume of data that is possible

to collect today can accelerate that learning curve, helping producers learn faster and more rapidly adapt to market shifts—particularly on new fields and with new animals—and creating more nuanced insights, enabling them to act on leading indicators. This creates a disparity between producers who can utilize high-speed Internet service and those who cannot. Examples include the ability to do the following:

create decision tools to help farmers and ranchers estimate the potential profit and economic risks associated with growing one particular crop over another • decide which fertilizer is best for current soil conditions • apply pesticides in targeted areas of the field, to control pests rather than applying pesticides over the entire field • use limited water resources more effectively • respond to findings of sensors that monitor animal health and nutrition

Better choices about what, where, and when to plant, fertilize, and harvest—or breed, feed, and slaughter—can drive above-average returns by removing unrecognized inefficiencies and scaling insights.

DIGITIZATION shifts supply chain management and resource allocation from generic to precise

Precision Agriculture helps make the business of farming more efficient by minimizing inputs— such as raw materials and labor—and maximizing outputs.

For example, previous research has found that 40 percent of fields are over-fertilized, which not only inflates the cost of inputs but also results in 15 percent–20 percent yield loss suffered from improper fertilizer application.14 Precise application of inputs, such as fertilizer, herbicides, and pesticides, allows farmers to adjust inputs to location-based characteristics and use exact amounts needed, which saves money and increases sustainability due to more efficient resource stewardship. Improved fertilizer, soil, and water use can significantly improve water quality with less runoff and reduce climate gas emissions, which is important since agriculture accounts for 10-15 percent of worldwide emissions.15 Despite reductions in necessary inputs, Next Generation Precision Agriculture helps maintain or increase yields, leading to significant gains in efficiency14.

Real-time insights also improve logistics. When growing melons, for instance, real-time data can help farmers overcome challenges in storing and shipping their products. Melons should be stored in an optimal refrigeration environment to minimize spoilage, and real-time precision sensors can reduce spoilage by alerting staff to suboptimal variations in temperature and humidity, allowing the execution of remedies before major losses occur. When refrigerated storage is full or the market price is at a peak, the “Internet of Things” can provide real-time information about where trucks are located and locating customers to market products to help make the sale.

LABOR EFFICIENCY boosts productivity by automating routine processes and enabling real-time response

Connected devices equip farmers with a clear picture of their operations at any moment, making it possible to prioritize tasks more effectively and triage the most pressing issues. While routine inspection and scouting has typically been a regular part of farm management and has increased farm profitability14, connected technologies can track, sense, and flag where a producer should focus their time and attention that day. Similarly, e-connectivity has allowed rural farms to access new training resources and high-skilled labor that has not been previously available.

#### Food insecurity causes state collapse, nuclear war, and terror – extinction

DeFeo 17 [(Michael, Regional Organizing Director at Arizona Democratic Party who graduated in 2019 with a bachelor’s degree in political science from Gettysburg College) “Food Insecurity and the Threat to Global Stability and Security in the 21st Century” Inquires Journal, 2017] BC

Poor Institutional Capacity

Although the developed world experiences food insecurity, it is the lack of infrastructure and government institutions in developing countries that contribute to civil wars and state fragility. Foreign exchange shortages can provoke food and fuel scarcities that force governments to spend less on essential services and public goods. Accordingly, citizens see their medical and educational entitlements melt away. Such circumstances create breeding grounds for internal conflict.

All violent conflicts destroy land, water, and social resources for food production. Developing countries do not have massive industrial machines that can remedy such losses, therefore, the population will suffer. Food insecurity is a recruitment tool for violent extremist groups. Promising food and water to a starving population, especially in urban areas, makes recruiting young and disgruntled youth easier (Messer & Cohen, 2015). Syria had limited institutional capacity to deal with the mass displacement, and that lead to a civilian revolt and recruitment into the Islamic State.

Countries that fail to provide their people with basic services often experience gross economic inequality, and even human-rights violations, as was the case in both Syria and Sudan. Both countries are classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs). LDCs are distinguished not just by their widespread poverty, but also by their structural weaknesses in economic, institutional, and human resources that make them unable to maintain stability during a drought. The combination of drought and political instability or violence led to famine in Somalia (another LDC) in 2011. Even with urgent humanitarian action, the country still plunged into chaos and violence (Messer & Cohen, 2015). Severe drought, like Somalia's, may result in crop failure in major food producing areas, which in turn is a significant threat to social stability and peace (Wischnath, 2014).

Sometimes droughts of exceptional severity (and the civil unrest that follows) are attributed to climate change, especially in particularly arid regions. Scholars are divided on whether climate change actually impacts civil conflict. That is why African countries like Somalia and Sudan are prime case studies. Africa has the lowest percentage of irrigated land in the world. Agriculture is the most important sector of most African countries. Very high percentages of civilians in African countries live in rural areas. Those characteristics combined with low economic and state capacity make African, particularly sub-Saharan African countries the most vulnerable to climate change and civil instability. Africa experiences more civil conflict than other parts of the world, therefore, it is possible to argue that a lack of climate variability effect on civil conflict in Africa would make it unlikely to cause civil conflict in other parts of the world (Koubi et al., 2012). Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon attributed the conflict in Darfur to an ecological crisis arising “at least in part from climate change” (Ki-moon, 2007). The Fourth Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessed that climate change will continue to worsen. As it does, it will increase food shortages, which may lead to conflict (AR4, 2007). The report also stated that forced displacement and rising social instability is the most likely result of food insecurity. This is almost exactly what happened in Syria. The first step towards conflict might be food riots, which often occur during a food shortage or when there is an unequal distribution of food. These are usually caused by food price increases, food speculation, transport problems, or extreme weather. In 1977, Egyptians became so desperate for food that they attacked shops, markets, and government buildings just to obtain bread and grain (Paveliuc-Olariu, 2013).

Moreover, civil war can create economic opportunities for certain groups, so they try to avoid resolving the conflict. Urban elites in Somalia profited tremendously off of internal conflict because of the absurd amount of foreign aid that was pumped into the country and then largely stolen (Shortland, Christopoulou, & Makatsoris, 2013). Once a country experiences a food shortage, it may lead to protests, riots, and violence. This all contributes to state instability, but it is not the state alone that suffers. If one country fails, it creates a crisis that could destabilize an entire region.

State Failure and the Threat to Regional Stability

Although fragile governments in developing countries are at a heightened risk for internal conflict that could topple them, that risk also threatens the country’s neighbors. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Afghanistan found itself alone in regional trade. Without a guaranteed source of cereal, the government had to turn to Iran and Pakistan for support in order to avoid its own collapse (Clarke, 2000). Unlike Afghanistan, many other developing countries have been unable to work together on food and water security. Thirteen of the twenty-two members of the Arab League rank among the most water-scarce nations on the planet. Food cannot be grown without water. The majority of the world is engaged in some sort of agreement with neighboring countries to share water supplies, but thirty-seven countries still do not share their water resources (El Hassan, 2014). Lack of cooperation can cause civil as well as interstate conflict. South Sudan legally has no share of the Nile River and the effects of that lack of water access have been mass starvation and violence.

The effects of climate change, water shortages, and mass migrations have resulted in acute food insecurity not just in Syria, but across the region (El Hassan, 2014). Food insecurity, plus an increase in the prices of staple foods have destabilized much of the area. The Arab Spring was the beginning of multiple conflicts that have affected countries like Syria, Egypt, and Libya. In Syria, food insecurity resulted in mass violence and has now created an international crisis involving multiple world powers.

Food insecurity is such a threat to entire regions because people cannot live without food and people want to live. When a region experiences food scarcity and that population feels threatened by hunger, it will relinquish dependency on any political authority and take up arms in order to ensure its well-being (Paveliuc-Olariu, 2013). This is human survivalism. It is important for developing countries in areas that are at risk for food insecurity to formulate policy that ensures aid goes to the food insecurity hotspots so as to maintain stability.

South Sudan experienced what happens when countries do not work together to feed their people. After gaining its independence from Sudan in 2011, 360,000 South Sudanese refugees returned to the country. This influx of human beings, coupled with drought conditions exacerbated economic strain and drove food prices up. The increases were the result of trade restrictions between Sudan and South Sudan. The overall reason for the food crisis, however, was the government's preoccupation with fighting a political and quasi-ethnic civil war rather than negotiating fair access to the Nile River (Tappis et al., 2013). Because of South Sudan’s weak institutions, it has done little to address the food shortage. That inability to solve the problem fuels insurgent recruitment that continues the bloodshed in South Sudan. The conflict is keeping regional rivalries alive with Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan; all of whom have attempted to intervene in South Sudan militarily to bring about stability (Council on Foreign Affairs 2016). Aside from South Sudan, multiple conflicts across Africa are consuming massive amounts of diplomatic, political, and humanitarian resources in a region that faces a multitude of threats.

South Sudan, Somalia, and Syria are all failing states that are experiencing huge food shortages, humanitarian crises, and most importantly, extreme civil violence. South Sudan is mired in a civil war. Somalia is controlled by warlords and terror organizations. Syria has both of those problems. Conflict has turned these countries into “breeding grounds of instability, mass migration, and murder” rather than sovereign states with a monopoly on violence and control over their borders (Rotberg, 2002). To be sure, failing states are a concern because of their ability to destabilize entire regions, but states at risk for failure are also very important. Countries like Pakistan that are politically unstable and have food and water shortages could result in uncontrollable civil upheaval (The Fund for Peace, 2016).

Global Consequences of State Failure

Failing states and destabilized regions are not just a problem for the developing world. They are a very real concern for the United States and other developed countries as well. The Islamic State fed off of the Syrian Civil War and helped destabilize Iraq, Syria, Libya, and even Afghanistan and the Philippines. They have at also inspired terror attacks in Europe and the United States. They are a threat to both the developed and developing world. State instability allows them to recruit and train without government interference, which in turn allows them to plan attacks outside the region. An important source of income for the Islamic State has been agriculture from Iraq and Syria. While this revenue has received less media attention than oil extraction, it is still an important part of their economy (Jaafar & Woertz, 2016). It is also a key aspect of their political legitimacy because it allows them to feed their soldiers and those they control. Controlling some of the most fertile regions of the two countries has also helped the Islamic State starve off areas that have resisted them (Jaafar & Woertz, 2016). If Syria or Iraq are ever going to stabilize, those breadbaskets must be retaken and the food must reach the civilians in the cut off areas.

In the 20th century, state failure had few implications for international peace and security. Thanks to globalization, that is no longer the case. Failed states pose a threat to themselves, their neighbors, and the entire international community (Rotberg, 2002). Islamic State - inspired terror attacks in Belgium and France are a direct result of state collapse in Syria and Iraq. Preventing states from failing, rather than having to intervene militarily when they do, ought to be a top priority in the foreign policy of rich nations. Although the situations in Syria, Somalia, and South Sudan seem beyond repair, nation-building projects have had success in the past. Tajikistan, Lebanon, Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor are all examples of relatively successful attempts to put failing states back on the right track (Rotberg, 2002). Developed countries must have the political will to ensure that people in developing countries are fed so that they remain pacified. It is often severe food insecurity that precedes ethnic or religious violence, as has been the case in South Sudan, therefore, adequate food is paramount to avoiding humanitarian crises that accompany ethnic and sectarian conflict (The Economist, 2016).

While it is true that many developed countries, especially the United States, are weary of providing so much financial aid and intervening militarily in war-torn, developing countries, it is imperative that the rich do not abandon the poor to a fate of internal destruction. Money must not be thrown blindly towards humanitarian crises and military intervention must be the last resort. Developed countries provided $1.4 billion for humanitarian aid in South Sudan in its first year of independence, but without specific conditions, that money went to kleptocrats rather than infrastructure projects or public services (The Economist, 2016).

Paying to help developing nations is expensive and will continue to be so. Afghanistan and Iraq are proof of that. But the war on terror, repeated military intervention, and humanitarian aid are expensive as well. In 2002, Robert Rotberg suggested that a new Marshall Plan was required for places like Afghanistan, the DRC, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. If it is true that food and water security are the keys to keeping relative peace in new and developing countries and their collapse threatens the safety of the developed world, it seems logical that assisting those countries is wise.

In 1999, Susan L. Woodward argued that military leaders focus too much on force versus force combat rather than the issues of insurgency and terrorism in failed states. In 2017, military leaders have adjusted their strategies accordingly. Woodward believed that globalization made states less important, but their failure would still be felt around the world. Failed states cannot exercise their monopoly on violence and they cannot control their borders, thus threatening more than just the failed state (Woodward, 1999). Because state failure is so consequential, the United States military must continue to look into measures it can take to prevent it.

The Threat of the Future

Finally, the threats from food shortages in South Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria are important to the United States and the international community at large, but there is one country that, while it is not a failing state right now, could easily become one if the wealthy nations of the world do not ensure its stability. That country is Pakistan. The Fund for Peace ranked Pakistan as the 14th most fragile state in the world in 2016, giving it a “High Alert” designation for state failure (The Fund for Peace, 2016). Its Demographic Pressure Indicator was an 8.9 - 10.2 Although it improved by one-tenth of a point last year, its decade trend is worse by seven-tenths of a point and its five-year trend is worse by four-tenths of a point, suggesting that the food situation is actually worsening overall (The Fund for Peace, 2016). If internal conflict and potential state failure at its most basic level begins with food and water insecurity, then Pakistan could become a real problem very soon.

Considering the risk of state failure, Pakistan poses the greatest threat to the rest of the world because of the existence of nuclear weapons within the country. Pakistan is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, yet it has about 120 nuclear weapons. It also has a Shaheen 1A ballistic missile that can reach targets 550 miles away (Pakistan Defence, 2015). Should a food crisis arise in Pakistan that results in civil war and governmental collapse, those weapons could end up in the hands of a group that intends to use them maliciously as an act of terror. That prospect should be incentive enough for the developed countries to realize that they cannot and must not leave food insecure countries to devour themselves.

While it is difficult to argue that food insecurity immediately and directly causes civil conflict, there is no denying that people need food and water and will fight to survive. In South Sudan, ethnic and political armies fight one another. In Syria, rebels and government forces fight each other while also fighting the Islamic State. And in Somalia, warlords and their armies fight. The Syrian Civil War began six years ago after a water shortage forced thousands of migrants into urban centers. Developing countries tend to be most affected by climate change, poor governance, and food price increases. Therefore, they are the most prone to instability that may lead to outright violence. Without the wherewithal to handle civil conflict, these countries may become fragile or even failing states. Once that happens, they represent a threat not just in their region of influence, but the whole world. That is why the developed Western nations must pay attention and provide aid to the developing world in order to maintain stability. There will be more food crises in developing countries in the future, but if the North has the strength to continue aiding the South, perhaps it will be able to curb mass starvation and avoid the horrendous violence that consumes starving countries.

## Case

### Case

#### 1. Vote neg on presumption – they adhere to norms like spreading, speech times, docs, email chains, disclosure etc., which prove they don’t inject toxicity into debate space and can’t resolve their impacts

#### A) Nothing spills over – there’s no connection between the ballot and chancing people’s attitudes. You encourage more teams to read framework which turns your offense and prevents the alteration of mindsets.

#### B) No warrant for a ballot – the competitive nature of debate coopts any ethical value of advocating the aff – winning rounds only makes it look like they just want to win which proves framework and means advocating by losing is more effective.

#### Ballot paradox – either they don’t care about winning and you should vote negative, or they want to win which proves that debate is competitive, and fairness is an impact

#### C) Debate – none of their evidence is specific to it – sets a high threshold for solvency and ignores how communicative norms operate.

#### D) Voting aff doesn’t access social change, but voting neg resolves our procedural impacts.

Ritter ‘13 (JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1)

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually **incapable of creating any social change**, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with **nonapplicable** rhetorical **theory** that **fails to account for the unique aspects** of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: **“Can debate cause social change?”** Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen **not to prove this fundamental assumption**, which—as this article argues—is **merely a fiction** that is **harmful in** most, if not **all, respects**. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterized as a **fiction** than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is **not provable** by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be **incredibly critical** of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes.

#### 2. Framing Issue – there is no reason why any of their offense about, zines, handing out preventative materials, etc. is intrinsic to debate – BUT there is a risk that by introducing that within debate creates a perverse incentive for violence to continue – so the moment of radicality can happen.

#### 3. The ROB is To Vote for the better debater: anything else is arbitrary and self serving which is a voter for fairness because its impossible to predict

#### Reducing existential risks is the top priority in any coherent moral theory

Plummer 15 (Theron, Philosophy @St. Andrews http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/)

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### Weigh magnitude, futurity is great and probability focus is rooted in social bias

Clarke 08 [Lee, member of a National Academy of Science committee that considered decision-making models, Anschutz Distinguished Scholar at Princeton University, Fellow of AAAS, Professor Sociology (Rutgers), Ph.D. (SUNY), “Possibilistic Thinking: A New Conceptual Tool for Thinking about Extreme Events,” Fall, Social Research 75.3, JSTOR]

In scholarly work, the subfield of disasters is often seen as narrow. One reason for this is that a lot of scholarship on disasters is practically oriented, for obvious reasons, and the social sciences have a deep-seated suspicion of practical work. This is especially true in sociology. Tierney (2007b) has treated this topic at length, so there is no reason to repeat the point here. There is another, somewhat unappreciated reason that work on disaster is seen as narrow, a reason that holds some irony for the main thrust of my argument here: disasters are unusual and the social sciences are generally biased toward phenomena that are frequent. Methods textbooks caution against using case stud- ies as representative of anything, and articles in mainstreams journals that are not based on probability samples must issue similar obligatory caveats. The premise, itself narrow, is that the only way to be certain that we know something about the social world, and the only way to control for subjective influences in data acquisition, is to follow the tenets of probabilistic sampling. This view is a correlate of the central way of defining rational action and rational policy in academic work of all varieties and also in much practical work, which is to say in terms of probabilities. The irony is that probabilistic thinking has its own biases, which, if unacknowledged and uncorrected for, lead to a conceptual neglect of extreme events. This leaves us, as scholars, paying attention to disasters only when they happen and doing that makes the accumulation of good ideas about disaster vulnerable to issue-attention cycles (Birkland, 2007). These conceptual blinders lead to a neglect of disasters as "strategic research sites" (Merton, 1987), which results in learning less about disaster than we could and in missing opportunities to use disaster to learn about society (cf. Sorokin, 1942). We need new conceptual tools because of an upward trend in frequency and severity of disaster since 1970 (Perrow, 2007), and because of a growing intellectual attention to the idea of worst cases (Clarke, 2006b; Clarke, in press). For instance, the chief scientist in charge of studying earthquakes for the US Geological Service, Lucile Jones, has worked on the combination of events that could happen in California that would constitute a "give up scenario": a very long-shaking earthquake in southern California just when the Santa Anna winds are making everything dry and likely to burn. In such conditions, meaningful response to the fires would be impossible and recovery would take an extraordinarily long time. There are other similar pockets of scholarly interest in extreme events, some spurred by September 11 and many catalyzed by Katrina. The consequences of disasters are also becoming more severe, both in terms of lives lost and property damaged. People and their places are becoming more vulnerable. The most important reason that vulnerabilities are increasing is population concentration (Clarke, 2006b). This is a general phenomenon and includes, for example, flying in jumbo jets, working in tall buildings, and attending events in large capacity sports arenas. Considering disasters whose origin is a natural hazard, the specific cause of increased vulnerability is that people are moving to where hazards originate, and most especially to where the water is. In some places, this makes them vulnerable to hurricanes that can create devastating storm surges; in others it makes them vulnerable to earthquakes that can create tsunamis. In any case, the general problem is that people concentrate themselves in dangerous places, so when the hazard comes disasters are intensified. More than one-half of Florida's population lives within 20 miles of the sea. Additionally, Florida's population grows every year, along with increasing development along the coasts. The risk of exposure to a devastating hurricane is obviously high in Florida. No one should be surprised if during the next hurricane season Florida becomes the scene of great tragedy. The demographic pressures and attendant development are wide- spread. People are concentrating along the coasts of the United States, and, like Florida, this puts people at risk of water-related hazards. Or consider the Pacific Rim, the coastline down the west coasts of North and South America, south to Oceania, and then up the eastern coast- line of Asia. There the hazards are particularly threatening. Maps of population concentration around the Pacific Rim should be seen as target maps, because along those shorelines are some of the most active tectonic plates in the world. The 2004 Indonesian earthquake and tsunami, which killed at least 250,000 people, demonstrated the kind of damage that issues from the movement of tectonic plates. (Few in the United States recognize that there is a subduction zone just off the coast of Oregon and Washington that is quite similar to the one in Indonesia.) Additionally, volcanoes reside atop the meeting of tectonic plates; the typhoons that originate in the Pacific Ocean generate furiously fatal winds. Perrow (2007) has generalized the point about concentration, arguing not only that we increase vulnerabilities by increasing the breadth and depth of exposure to hazards but also by concentrating industrial facilities with catastrophic potential. Some of Perrow's most important examples concern chemical production facilities. These are facilities that bring together in a single place multiple stages of production used in the production of toxic substances. Key to Perrow's argument is that there is no technically necessary reason for such concentration, although there may be good economic reasons for it. The general point is that we can expect more disasters, whether their origins are "natural" or "technological." We can also expect more death and destruction from them. I predict we will continue to be poorly prepared to deal with disaster. People around the world were appalled with the incompetence of America's leaders and orga- nizations in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Day after day we watched people suffering unnecessarily. Leaders were slow to grasp the importance of the event. With a few notable exceptions, organi- zations lumbered to a late rescue. Setting aside our moral reaction to the official neglect, perhaps we ought to ask why we should have expected a competent response at all? Are US leaders and organiza- tions particularly attuned to the suffering of people in disasters? Is the political economy of the United States organized so that people, espe- cially poor people, are attended to quickly and effectively in noncri- sis situations? The answers to these questions are obvious. If social systems are not arranged to ensure people's well-being in normal times, there is no good reason to expect them to be so inclined in disastrous times. Still, if we are ever going to be reasonably well prepared to avoid or respond to the next Katrina-like event, we need to identify the barriers to effective thinking about, and effective response to, disas- ters. One of those barriers is that we do not have a set of concepts that would help us think rigorously about out-sized events. The chief toolkit of concepts that we have for thinking about important social events comes from probability theory. There are good reasons for this, as probability theory has obviously served social research well. Still, the toolkit is incomplete when it comes to extreme events, especially when it is used as a base whence to make normative judgments about what people, organizations, and governments should and should not do. As a complement to probabilistic thinking I propose that we need possibilistic thinking. In this paper I explicate the notion of possibilistic thinking. I first discuss the equation of probabilism with rationality in scholarly thought, followed by a section that shows the ubiquity of possibilis- tic thinking in everyday life. Demonstrating the latter will provide an opportunity to explore the limits of the probabilistic approach: that possibilistic thinking is widespread suggests it could be used more rigorously in social research. I will then address the most vexing prob- lem with advancing and employing possibilistic thinking: the prob- lem of infinite imagination. I argue that possibilism can be used with discipline, and that we can be smarter about responding to disasters by doing so.

#### Extinction is not inevitable—empirical claim without warrant, squo is sustainable but the DA is existential

#### The 1AC produces new discourses of health that rely on and reproduce the same structure of healthism they critique – any new framework of embodiment or resistance is fed back through affective control to maintain biopolitical governance

Butler-Wall, 16 (Karisa, 2016, Ph.D Candidate in American Studies with a minor in Feminist and Critical Sexuality Studies, “Viral Transmissions: Safer Sex Videos, Disability, and Queer Politics,” DSQ, Vol 36, No 4, 2016)

Staging a new form of what we might call guerrilla biopolitics, safer sex activism actively resisted the necropolitical elimination of queer life, marking a major cultural shift in which formerly "unhealthy" behaviors were incorporated into a more inclusive definition of health. The success of Chance of a Lifetime as an educational tool helped to inspire the production of a number of other erotic safer sex videos in the 1980s and early 1990s, and in 1989 GMHC undertook a second video project: the Safer Sex Shorts. 5 Influenced by the rise of direct action tactics in connection with the formation of the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) in 1987, this series of seven videos represented what producers Jean Carlomusto and Gregg Bordowitz described as "a guerrilla-type production of safer sex 'propaganda'." 6 Intended to be "distributed in as many ways as possible," each video was under five minutes in length, drawing on conventions of music videos, television advertisements, and video pornography for their camera and editing techniques. While Chance was designed to be shown as part of a GMHC workshop, the Shorts were designed to be screened in bars and bathhouses and as trailers on commercial porn videos, in order to disseminate the message of safer sex beyond GMHC's core constituency of middle-class white gay men. 7 By working with directors and focus groups from specific communities, GMHC used video as a means to reach audiences who had been excluded from traditional forms of AIDS prevention. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the invention of safer sex during the early years of the AIDS epidemic has served as an important touchstone within the development of a queer political and social imaginary, providing an example of a sustainable, creative sexual culture, a "counterpublic" that fostered shared modes of intimacy and structures of feeling. 8 As Douglas Crimp famously argued in his 1988 essay, "How to Have Promiscuity in an Epidemic," gays "were able to invent safer sex" because the liberationist ethos of the 1970s served as "psychic preparation" for the adoption of risk reduction practices in the face of AIDS. According to Crimp, it was their familiarity with "the great multiplicity" of pleasurable sexual activities that enabled many gay men to adopt life-saving safer sex practices. 9 Within the queer political imaginary, safer sex was conceived "not as a practice to be imposed on the reluctant, but as a form of political resistance and community building that achieves both sexual liberation and sexual health." 10 Yet this celebratory narrative obscures a more complicated relationship between health, dis/ability, and queer politics within the history of safer sex. Despite a rhetoric of liberatory community building, the development of safer sex by and for gay men themselves indexed a shift toward new forms of individual and collective self-governance, in which marginalized communities used alternative media to create their own norms of "healthy" behavior and embodiment. In this sense, the development of safer sex must be understood not as an exception to but rather as an expansion of biopolitical governance. In contrast to state-based public health campaigns or the market imperatives of the privatized health industry, community-based safer sex activism represented a more subtle mechanism through which desire became linked to new modes of compulsory able-bodiedness. This article brings disability studies into conversation with queer histories of AIDS activism as a means to "crip" our understandings of safer sex discourses and practices. Despite the fact that, as Robert McRuer has noted, "the various opportunistic infections caused by HIV/AIDS have been disabling (reducing energy and mobility, sometimes leading to the loss of vision or other functions)," scholarship on the AIDS epidemic has not commonly engaged directly with disability studies. 11 Bringing a critical disability analytic to bear on the history of safer sex activism, this article examines how safer sex discourses promoted a definition of sexual "health" that relied on and reproduced racialized and classed ideologies of ableism. From a crip theoretical perspective, the project of protecting the "healthy" (negative serostatus) body from infection resonates with the imperatives of compulsory able-bodiedness. Assuming that HIV negativity is a universally desired status eliminates alternative ways of valuing the affective capacity of bodies that may not conform to idealized models of able-bodiedness. I argue that by linking risk reduction techniques to a particular vision of sexual health and identity, GMHC's efforts to incorporate formerly marginalized groups into the biopolitical project of fostering life and health ultimately precluded alternative expressions of queer and crip life. Technologies of Desire Whereas early models of AIDS prevention had focused on providing information about transmission and risk, by the mid-1980s it had become clear that even though most gay men were aware that unprotected sex put them at risk of contracting AIDS, this information was not enough to change their behaviors. A 1984 study commissioned by the San Francisco AIDS Foundation found that "information about risk is not, by itself, sufficient to effect behavioral change," insofar as the "motivational issue" remained to be addressed. 13 Along with workshops and print materials, the newly accessible medium of video technology emerged as a unique tool through which safer sex educators hoped to "motivate" their audiences to adopt a new set of risk reduction techniques. More than simply a practical set of health guidelines, "safer sex" signified a specific affective investment in health that tied sexual pleasure to new practices of risk management. Focusing on the material practices, representations, affects, and institutions that were brought together under the sign of "safer sex," I consider safer sex as techne, a "technique, an habitus, ethos, or lived practice" that builds associations between various activities, objects, and affects. 14 While I attend to a wide array of bodies, objects, and practices that were brought together under the rubric of safer sex, I privilege video technology as a unique interface for the conjunction of health, risk, and pleasure during this period. The advent of video technology was integral to the development of safer sex, providing a platform that linked burgeoning forms of gay and lesbian erotic cultural production to new activist media strategies and tactics. As media scholar and filmmaker Alexandra Juhasz has shown, video served as a primary medium of AIDS activism more broadly during the 1980s, enabling otherwise marginalized individuals and groups to create their own forms of alternative media with the availability of camcorder technology and low-cost editing. 15 New technologies enabled individuals from "'minority,' 'disenfranchised,' and 'marginal' communities" to "make politics in a way rarely, if ever, available to them before: in a 'dominant' cultural form, yet in a personal voice; by, for, and about themselves, but easily available to outsiders."

#### Futurism key to Queer politics - they ensure continual subjugation and homophobia

Bateman 06

R. Benjamin Bateman is a doctoral candidate in English at the University of Virginia, The Minnesota Review, Spring 2006, "The Future of Queer Theory", http://www.theminnesotareview.org/journal/ns6566/bateman\_r\_benjamin\_ns6566\_stf1.shtml

Since its inception, queer theory has provoked readers with its radical negativity—its hostility to identity politics, to all essentialist accounts of gender and sexuality and to anything smacking of heteronormativity. Michel Foucault problematized the homosexual subject of gay and lesbian politics by showing its indebtedness to disciplinary discourses inherited from nineteenth century sexology and eugenics. Judith Butler, whose Gender Trouble galvanized queer theory, alleged that sex and not simply gender is socially constructed and that political appeals to the category "woman" entrench an exclusionary essentialism. And Leo Bersani argued that queer culture models anti-communalism through its sadomasochistic and frequently anonymous sexual practices. Gaining credibility as a queer theorist, it appears, necessitates the assumption of increasingly radical, and at times counterintuitive, political positions.

Such extremity finds full expression in Lee Edelman's polemic, No Future. Subtitled Queer Theory and the Death Drive, the book argues that politics as we know it relies upon a future-oriented logic that is indissociably intertwined with heterosexuality and with what Edelman terms "reproductive futurism." On Edelman's reading, the face of the child, epitomized by Dickens's Tiny Tim, coerces us—through conjuring our compassion—into subordinating our present wants and enjoyments to the always-deferred, future needs of "innocent" children. Tim's vulnerability turns vindictive, Edelman proceeds, when conservatives use 'protecting children' as a pretext for discriminating against gays and lesbians. Nowhere is this disguised homophobia more apparent than in recent 'arguments' against gay marriage. But when gays and lesbians respond by insisting that they value marriage, children, and their society's future—and not simply the ephemeral delights of sex and drugs, as conservatives would have it—they abandon the subversive force of queer sexuality. Instead of pleading for seats at heteronormativity's table, Edelman argues, queers should consent to their figuration as parasites upon the social order and embody the death drive for which they have come to stand.

Reading No Future, one is reminded of Michael Warner's polemic, The Trouble with Normal, which argued that queers should contest all sexual norms and defend everything heterosexuals find detestable in queer culture—promiscuous sex, bathhouses, pornography, drugs, and so on. But where that book occupied queer culture as a site from which to imagine a more ethical future, Edelman's project, due to its anti-futurism, imagines very little. Edelman is at his best and most hilarious when exposing the hypocrisy, false piety and pseudo-morality of religious conservatives and of "reformed" homosexuals like Larry Kramer. He is also at his best when demonstrating how, in an impressive range of literary classics, movies, and contemporary political examples, heterosexual culture deploys the child, disingenuously, as a weapon against queer sexuality.

But his book falters as it comes increasingly to rely upon arcane appeals to Lacanian psychoanalysis (conspicuously absent from this book is a single reference to Foucault). Edelman's argument runs something like this: a stubborn kernel of non-meaning resides at the core of language, forcing each signifier to find its meaning in the next ad infinitum, thus preventing signification from ever completing itself or establishing meaning once and for all. This internal limit subtends and makes possible all meaning-making while simultaneously disrupting it. An unbridgeable gap, it marks the place of a recalcitrant, functionless, and socially corrosive jouissance—an excessive enjoyment over which language, society, and the future stumble. Heterosexual culture, anxious to name and contain this minatory abyss, casts homosexuals as it and into it. They are "…the violent undoing of meaning, the loss of identity and coherence, the unnatural access to jouissance…"(132).

One might fault Edelman, as John Brenkman has, for transposing a rule of language onto the order of being. But even if one takes his equation seriously, one must ask what is gained by actively occupying a structurally necessary role. In other words, if the Real must exist for the Symbolic to function, then the abyss will remain whether homosexuals agree to inhabit it or not. Edelman acknowledges this reality but argues that if homosexuals exit the abyss a new subaltern will be compelled to enter it. Better, then, to remain inside and mirror back to heterosexuality what troubles it most—meaninglessness, death and antisocial desire. Unfortunately, Edelman provides few details as to how we might accomplish this task, and his insistence elsewhere that the powers-that-be will clamp down with unmitigated force to repress and disavow the encroaching Real renders such a strategy less than appealing. At one point he encourages queers to pursue a more traditional politics alongside his radical recommendation (29), but he fails to acknowledge that if the former succeeds—and the dominant culture brings queers and/or their practices into its fold—then the latter's intended audience will no longer be listening.

The most telling moment in Edelman's book, and the most important for grasping the current state of queer theory, comes in its discussion of Judith Butler's recent work, Antigone's Claim. Antigone's plea, according to Butler, is that the life she lives and the love she harbors (for her brother) become intelligible in and through the Symbolic order. In other words, Antigone functions for Butler as something of a queer avant la lettre, insisting, even from beyond the grave, that society acknowledge and accommodate her stigmatized desire and refusal of heterosexual reproduction, that queers like her be spared a "social death" (Edelman 102). Butler's politics, Edelman complains, is one of liberal-humanist inclusiveness. Against Butler, Edelman argues that the Symbolic will always be exclusionary and that Antigone represents a radical rejection of intelligibility, a refusal to become recognizable on society's terms. Butler and Edelman thus give two strikingly different faces to queer theory. The former advocates working in the social to achieve recognition for marginalized groups and to making norms inhabitable and livable for queer sexualities; the latter insists that queer must remain radically "other" to the dominant order, perpetually disruptive and parasitic upon its smooth functioning.

Certain readers might chafe at Edelman's suggestion that Butler's politics is insufficiently radical. After all, Butler has been criticized, like Edelman, for trafficking in recondite theories and postmodern argot and for failing to offer a viable model of political agency. To be sure, Butler's post-structuralist and Foucaultian commitments constrain her ability to posit a stable political agent and to conceive a politics that would radically oppose, rather than merely reinforce or marginally reinflect, a dominant cultural order. But in her recent work, perhaps most strikingly in 2004's Undoing Gender, Butler has turned to the "question of social transformation" (the title of UG's tenth chapter), arguing, quite programmatically, that social transformation "…is a question of developing, within law, within psychiatry, within social and literary theory, a new legitimating lexicon for the gender complexity that we have always been living" (219). Lest she be accused of nominalism, Butler stresses the importance of real bodies in forging such a vocabulary: "…the body is that which can occupy the norm in myriad ways, exceed the norm, rework the norm, and expose realities to which we thought we were confined as open to transformation" (217). While Edelman rejects the future as a site of social reproduction, Butler prizes it as a space of uncertainty, an ambiguous terrain upon which competing and perhaps unforeseeable claims will be made and new social orders elaborated.

Butler's model offers queer theory a brighter future than Edelman's, not simply because it confers agency upon social actors and highlights the social's capacity for transformation, but because it supersedes the liberal inclusiveness for which Edelman faults it. Butler's queer world is not one in which the dominant order remains stable as it incorporates, or ingests, peripheral sexualities into its fold. Rather, it is one in which the periphery remakes the center, rearticulating what it means to be "normal" or "American" or "queer." Thus, queers do not simply enter society on heterosexuality's terms; they recast such terms, seizing upon instabilities in signification to elaborate previously unarticulated and perhaps unanticipatable ways of life. Edelman's point that 'queer' names "the resistance of the social to itself" (2002) combats the very anti-futurism he endorses; in this formulation, queerness functions as the force that prevents a particular social order from coinciding with itself, from congealing into a futureless nightmare. Queer, then, might denote the instability of all norms and social orders, their intrinsic capacity for change.

Queer theorists more politically programmatic than Edelman frequently neglect this point. Michael Warner, for example, accuses gays and lesbians who aspire to marriage of caving, in assimilationist fashion, to heterosexual norms perceived as demands. But queers never exist completely outside such norms—and thus cannot, logically, succumb to them—and marriage and childrearing might not look the same with gays on board. After all, gays who have been traumatized by their parents' homophobia and lessons of compulsory heterosexuality are probably less likely than their heterosexual counterparts to repeat such mistakes. Insofar as married gays retain connections to less traditional elements of queer culture, we cannot assume that they will abandon their fights for sexual freedom, conform entirely to all matrimonial traditions, or turn their backs upon their promiscuous peers. Some might, but many will not.

Edelman's book works well as an intensely academic polemic but as a political resource it proves insufficient. If queer theory is to have a social impact, it must interpellate the gay and lesbian audience to whom, after all, it is primarily addressed. Few of these people, we can safely assume, want to live in a void or die Antigone's death. Queer culture should keep insisting that we not sacrifice present, pressing needs to heterosexual fantasies, but to secure its future it must imagine a political order in which the needs of children are not inimical to the interests of queers, and it must celebrate—as Eve Sedgwick does so passionately in "How to Grow Your Kids Up Gay" – that which is most queer, and queer-able, in children.