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### 1NC – DA

#### Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.

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In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule, suggesting that democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent. In fact, many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements—large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.

China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to [innovate](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china). It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration. Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries. This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals. That’s why ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed 95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens. Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive, although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

#### Xi has committed to the commercial space industry as the linchpin of China’s rise – the plan is seen as a complete 180

**Patel 21** [Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called [Document 60](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml) that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

“Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”

As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a[2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx). More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it [released the first images taken by the satellite](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/spacenews.com/spacety-releases-first-sar-images/), Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding.

And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.

Making friends

The most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders.

“China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.

Although China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry, the nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about. While Chinese companies may look private on paper, they must still submit to government guidance and control, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy, especially if the government is a frequent customer. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often [very cagey about what its national program is even up to](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54076895).

And Hines adds that it’s not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

#### Shifts in regime perception threatens CCP’s legitimacy from nationalist hardliners

Weiss 19 Jessica Weiss 1-29-2019 “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China” <http://www.jessicachenweiss.com/uploads/3/0/6/3/30636001/19-01-24-elite-statements-isq-ca.pdf> (Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University)//Elmer

Public support—or the appearance of it—matters to many autocracies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool writes, modern dictatorships are “highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts to affect it.”6 Mao Zedong told his comrades: “When you make revolution, you must first manage public opinion.”7 Because autocracies often rely on **nationalist mythmaking**,8 success or failure in defending the national honor in international crises could burnish the leadership’s patriotic credentials or spark opposition. **Shared outrage at the regime’s foreign policy failures could galvanize street protests or elite fissures, creating intraparty upheaval** or inviting military officers to step in to restore order. Fearing a domestic backlash, authoritarian leaders may feel compelled to take a tough international stance. Although authoritarian leaders are rarely held accountable to public opinion through free and fair elections, fears of popular unrest and irregular ouster often weigh heavily on autocrats seeking to maximize their tenure in office. Considering the harsh consequences that authoritarian elites face if pushed out of office, even a small increase in the probability of ouster could alter authoritarian incentives in international crises.9 A history of nationalist uprisings make Chinese citizens and leaders especially aware of the linkage between international disputes and domestic unrest. The weakness of the PRC’s predecessor in defending Chinese sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 galvanized protests and a general strike, forcing the government to sack three officials and reject the Treaty of Versailles, which awarded territories in China to Japan. These precedents have made Chinese officials particularly sensitive to the appearance of hewing to public opinion. As the People’s Daily chief editor wrote: “History and reality have shown us that public opinion and regime safety are inseparable.”10 One Chinese scholar even claimed: “the Chinese government probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”11

#### Xi will launch diversionary war to domestic backlash – escalates in multiple hotspots

Norris 17, William J. Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges. CFR Discussion Paper, 2017. (Associate professor of Chinese foreign and security policy at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service)//Elmer

Populist pressures might tempt the **party leadership** to encourage **diversionary nationalism**. The logic of this concern is straightforward: the Communist Party might seek to **distract a restless domestic population** with **adventurism abroad**.19 The **Xi** administration wants to **appear tough** in its **defense of foreign encroachments** against China’s interests. This need stems from a long-running narrative about how a weak Qing dynasty was unable to defend China in the face of European imperial expansion, epitomized by the Opium Wars and the subsequent treaties imposed on China in the nineteenth century. The party is **particularly sensitive** to **perceptions of weakness** because much of its **claim to legitimacy**—manifested in **Xi’s Chinese Dream** campaign today—stems from the party’s claims of leading the **restoration of Chinese greatness**. For example, the May Fourth Movement, a popular protest in 1919 that helped catalyze the CPC, called into question the legitimacy of the Republic of China government running the country at that time because the regime was seen as not having effectively defended China’s territorial and sovereignty interests at the Versailles Peace Conference. **Diversionary nationalist frictions** would likely occur if the Chinese leadership portrayed a foreign adversary as having made the first move, thus forcing Xi to stand up for China’s interests. An example is the 2012 attempt by the nationalist governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private owner.20 Although the Japanese central government sought to avert a crisis by stepping in to purchase the islands—having them bought and administered by Ishihara’s Tokyo metropolitan government would have dragged Japan into a confrontation with China—China saw this move as part of a deliberate orchestration by Japan to nationalize the islands. Xi seemingly had no choice but to defend China’s claims against an attempt by Japan to consolidate its position on the dispute.21 This issue touched off a period of heated tensions between China and Japan, lasting more than two years.22 Such dynamics are not limited to Japan. Other possible areas of conflict include, but are not necessarily limited to, **Taiwan**, **India**, and the **South China Sea** (especially with the **Philippines** and **Vietnam**). The Chinese government will use such tactics if it believes that the costs are relatively low. Ideally, China would like to appear tough while avoiding material repercussions or a serious diplomatic breakdown. Standing up against foreign encroachment—without facing much blowback—could provide Xi’s administration with a tempting source of noneconomic legitimacy. However, over the next few years, Xi will probably not be actively looking to get embroiled abroad. Cushioning the fallout from slower growth while managing a structural economic transition will be difficult enough. Courting potential international crises that distract the central leadership would make this task even more daunting. Even if the top leadership did not wish to provoke conflict, a smaller budgetary allotment for security could cause **military interests** in China to **deliberately instigate trouble** to **justify** their **claims over increasingly scarce resources**. For example, an air force interested in ensuring its funding for a midair tanker program might find the existence of far-flung territorial disputes to be useful in making its case. Such a case would be made even stronger by a pattern of recent frictions that highlights the necessity of greater air power projection. Budgetary pressures may be partly behind a recent People’s Liberation Army reorganization and headcount reduction. A slowing economy might cause a further deceleration in China’s military spending, thus increasing such pressures as budgetary belts tighten. Challenges to Xi’s Leadership Xi Jinping’s efforts to address economic challenges could fail, unleashing consequences that extend well beyond China’s economic health. For example, an **economic collapse** could give rise to a Vladimir **Putin–like redemption figure** in China. Xi’s approach of centralizing authority over a diverse, complex, and massive social, political, and economic system is a **recipe for brittleness**. Rather than designing a resilient, decentralized governance structure that can gracefully cope with localized failures at particular nodes in a network, a highly centralized architecture **risks catastrophic**, **system-level failure**. Although centralized authority offers the tantalizing chimera of stronger control from the center, it also puts all the responsibility squarely on Xi’s shoulders. With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate **unintended international repercussions**. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have **ripple effects abroad**. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, **raising the risks** of **strategic miscalculation** on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23 Weakened Fetters of Economic Interdependence If China successfully transitioned away from its export-driven growth model toward a consumption-driven economic engine over the next four or five years, it could no longer feel as constrained by economic interdependence. To the extent that such constraints are loosened, the U.S.-China relationship will be more prone to conflict and friction.24 While China has never been the archetypal liberal economic power bent on benign integration with the global economy, its export-driven growth model produced a strong strategic preference for stability. Although past behavior is not necessarily indicative of future strategic calculus, China’s “economic circuit breaker” logic seems to have held its most aggressive nationalism below the threshold of war since 1979. A China that is both comparatively strong and less dependent on the global economy would be a novel development in modern geopolitics. As China changes the composition of its international economic linkages, global integration could place fewer constraints on it. Whereas China has been highly reliant on the import of raw materials and semifinished goods for reexport, a consumption-driven China could have a different international trade profile. China could still rely on imported goods, but their centrality to the country’s overall economic growth would be altered. Imports of luxury goods, consumer products, international brands, and services may not exert a significant constraining influence, since loss of access to such items may not be seen as strategically vital. If these flows were interrupted or jeopardized, the result would be more akin to an inconvenience than a strategic setback for China’s rise. That said, China is likely to continue to highly depend on imported oil even if the economic end to which that energy resource is directed shifts away from industrial and export production toward domestic consumption.

#### US–China war goes nuclear – crisis mis-management ensures conventional escalation - extinction

Kulacki 20 [Dr. Gregory Kulacki focuses on cross-cultural communication between the United States and China on nuclear and space arms control and is the China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020. Would China Use Nuclear Weapons First In A War With The United States?, Thediplomat.com, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/would-china-use-nuclear-weapons-first-in-a-war-with-the-united-states/] srey

Admiral Charles A. Richard, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, recently told the Senate Armed Service Committee he “could drive a truck” through the holes in China’s no first use policy. But when Senator John Hawley (R-MO) asked him why he said that, Commander Richard backtracked, described China’s policy as “very opaque” and said his assessment was based on “very little” information. That’s surprising. **China** has been exceptionally **clear** **about** its **intentions** **on** the possible **first** **use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons**. On the day of its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, China declared it “will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.” That **unambiguous** **statement** **has** **been** a **cornerstone** **of** **Chinese** **nuclear** **weapons** policy for 56 years and has been repeated frequently in authoritative Chinese publications for domestic and international audiences, including a highly classified training manual for the operators of China’s nuclear forces. Richard should know about those publications, particularly the training manual. A U.S. Department of Defense translation has been circulating within the U.S. nuclear weapons policy community for more than a decade. The commander’s comments to the committee indicate a familiarity with the most controversial section of the manual, which, in the eyes of some U.S. analysts, indicates there may be some circumstances where **China** **would** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **first** **in** a **war** **with** **the** **U**nited **S**tates. This U.S. misperception is understandable, especially given the difficulties the Defense Department encountered translating the text into English. The language, carefully considered in the context of the entire book, articulates a strong reaffirmation of China’s no first use policy. But it also reveals **Chinese** military planners are **struggling** **with** **crisis** **management** **and** **considering** **steps** **that** could **create** **ambiguity** **with** **disastrous** **consequences**. Towards the end of the 405-page text on the operations of China’s strategic rocket forces, in a chapter entitled, “Second Artillery Deterrence Operations,” the authors explain what China’s nuclear forces train to do if **“**a strong military power possessing nuclear‐armed missiles and an absolute advantage in high‐tech conventional weapons is carrying out intense and continuous attacks against our major strategic targets and we have no good military strategy to resist the enemy.**”** The military power they’re talking about is the United States. The authors indicate China’s nuclear missile forces train to take specific steps, including increasing readiness and conducting launch exercises, to “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks.” The manual refers to these steps as an “adjustment” to China’s nuclear policy and a “lowering” of China’s threshold for brandishing its nuclear forces. Chinese leaders would only take these steps in extreme circumstances. The text highlights several triggers such as U.S. conventional bombing of China’s nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, heavy conventional bombing of large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, or other acts of **conventional** **warfare** **that** “**seriously** **threatened**” the “safety and **survival**” of the nation. U.S. Misunderstanding Richard seems to believe this planned adjustment in China’s nuclear posture means China is **preparing** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** first under these circumstances. He told Hawley that there are a “number of situations where they may conclude that first use has occurred that do not meet our definition of first use.” The head of the U.S. Strategic Command appears to assume, as do other U.S. analysts, that the **Chinese** would **interpret** **these** types of U.S. conventional **attacks** **as** **equivalent** **to** a **U.S. first use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons** against China. But that’s not what the text says. “Lowering the threshold” refers to China putting its nuclear weapons on alert — it does not indicate Chinese leaders might lower their threshold for deciding to use nuclear weapons in a crisis. Nor does the text indicate Chinese nuclear forces are training to launch nuclear weapons first in a war with the United States. China, unlike the United States, keeps its nuclear forces off-alert. Its warheads are not mated to its missiles. China’s nuclear-armed submarines are not continuously at sea on armed patrols. The manual describes how China’s nuclear warheads and the missiles that deliver them are controlled by two separate chains of command. Chinese missileers train to bring them together and launch them after China has been attacked with nuclear weapons. All of these behaviors are consistent with a no first use policy. The “adjustment” Chinese nuclear forces are preparing to make if the United States is bombing China with impunity is to place China’s nuclear forces in a state of readiness similar to the state the nuclear forces of the United States are in all the time. This step is intended not only to end the bombing, but also to convince U.S. decision-makers they cannot expect to destroy China’s nuclear retaliatory capability if the crisis escalates. Chinese Miscalculation Unfortunately, alerting Chinese nuclear forces at such a moment could have terrifying consequences. Given the relatively small size of China’s nuclear force, a U.S. president might be tempted to try to limit the possible damage from a Chinese nuclear attack by destroying as many of China’s nuclear weapons as possible before they’re launched, especially if the head of the U.S. Strategic Command told the president China was preparing to strike first. One study concluded that if the United States used nuclear weapons to attempt to knock out a small fraction of the Chinese ICBMs that could reach the United States it may kill tens of millions of Chinese civilians. The authors of the text assume alerting China’s nuclear forces would “create a great shock in the enemy’s psyche.” That’s a fair assumption. But they also assume this shock could “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks against our major strategic targets.” That’s highly questionable. There is a **substantial** **risk** **the** **U**nited **S**tates **would** **respond** **to** this implicit **Chinese** **threat** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **by** **escalating**, rather than halting, its **conventional** **attacks**. If China’s nuclear forces were targeted, it would put even greater strain on the operators of China’s nuclear forces. A **slippery** **slope** **to** **nuclear** **war** Chinese military planners are aware that attempting to coerce the United States into halting conventional bombardment by alerting their nuclear forces could fail. They also know it might trigger a nuclear war. But if it does, they are equally clear China won’t be the one to start it. Nuclear attack is often preceded by nuclear coercion. Because of this, in the midst of the process of a high, strong degree of nuclear coercion we should prepare well for a nuclear retaliatory attack. The more complete the preparation, the higher the credibility of nuclear coercion, the easier it is to accomplish the objective of nuclear coercion, and the lower the possibility that the nuclear missile forces will be used in actual fighting. They assume if China demonstrates it is well prepared to retaliate the United States would not risk a damage limitation strike using nuclear weapons. And even if the United States were to attack China’s nuclear forces with conventional weapons, China still would not strike first. In the opening section of the next chapter on “nuclear retaliatory attack operations” the manual instructs, as it does on numerous occasions throughout the entire text: According to our country’s principle, its stand of no first use of nuclear weapons, the Second Artillery will carry out a nuclear missile attack against the enemy’s important strategic targets, according to the combat orders of the Supreme Command, only after the enemy has carried out a nuclear attack against our country. Richard is wrong. There are no holes in China’s no first use policy. But the worse-case planning articulated in this highly classified military text is a significant and deeply troubling departure from China’s traditional thinking about the role of nuclear weapons. Mao Zedong famously called nuclear weapons “a paper tiger.” Many assumed he was being cavalier about the consequences of nuclear war. But what he meant is that they would not be used to fight and win wars. U.S. nuclear threats during the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait Crisis in the 1950s – threats not followed by an actual nuclear attack – validated Mao’s intuition that nuclear weapons were primarily psychological weapons. Chinese leaders decided to acquire nuclear weapons to free their minds from what Mao’s generation called “**nuclear** **blackmail**.” A former director of China’s nuclear weapons laboratories told me China developed them so its leaders could “sit up with a straight spine.” Countering nuclear blackmail – along with compelling other nuclear weapons states to negotiate their elimination – were the only two purposes Chinese nuclear weapons were meant to serve. Contemporary Chinese military planners appear to have added a new purpose: compelling the United States to halt a conventional attack. Even though it only applies in extreme circumstances, it **increases** the **risk** **that** a **war** between the United States and China **will** **end** **in** a nuclear exchange with unpredictable and **catastrophic** **consequences**. Adding this new purpose could also be the first step on a slippery slope to an incremental broadening the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese national security policy. Americans would be a lot safer if we could avoid that. The United States government should applaud China’s no first use policy instead of repeatedly calling it into question. And it would be wise to adopt the same policy for the United States. If both countries declared they would never use nuclear weapons first it may not guarantee they can avoid a nuclear exchange during a military crisis, but it would make one far less likely.

## Case

### Solvency

#### Chinese space industry is overwhelmingly dominated by the government—private enterprises cannot exist independently under domestic law—private sector complementary to the public sector means 0 solvency

Nie 12-24 (Mingyan Nie, JD; Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Department of Law; 12-24-2021; "The Growth of China’s Non-governmental Space Sector in the Context of Government Support for Public-Private Partnerships: An Assessment of Major Legal Challenges";S*pace Policy* (2021) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2021.101461., accessed 1-14-2022; JPark)

* PPPs = public-private partnerships
* Strict and opaque governmental regulation basically makes it impossible for private entities to act independently and are subsumed by the state
* Laws are deliberately unclear to maximize state control – e.g., classifying launch vehicles as weapons

In light of China’s recent policies and other measures, it is evident that decision-makers in the space industry intend to privatize space activities to meet urgent market demands and social goals, including promoting PPPs.19 However, the **military dominates the Chinese space industry**, and the government **controls nearly all civil** space **activities**, while state-owned companies conduct programs related to space exploration. These dynamics have led to an unclear administration of space activities that has created an unstable environment for the growth of private enterprises. In addition, the reality of military-dominated space activities has engendered **harsh regulations** for **all non-governmental affairs** related to space exploration. 3.1. Complex administration of space activities and the non-governmental participation The role of the military and the government in the space field has resulted in a complicated framework for governing space activities in China. SASTIND, which was established under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the PRC (MIIT), is the main administrative body under the State Council tasked with coordinating and managing the country’s space activities20. The impact of China’s military on space activities is extremely relevant. The role of the Equipment Development Department (EDD), which belongs to the People’s Republic of China Central Military Commission,21 is also notable. The EDD is qualified to conduct space projects directly. For instance, the human spaceflight program and the launching infrastructure, including launching sites and the hub of China’s telemetry, tracking, and control network, are mainly operated by the EDD. Furthermore, the EDD collaborates with SASTIND to establish regulations, monitor their implementation, allocate research funds, and determine the qualification of private entities to enter the space industry [[17], p.13]. This **complicated** and **opaque organizational structure** is **detrimental** to the participation of private actors in space-related activities in China. Space facilities, including launching sites, are controlled by the military that does not distinguish the nature of space activities. Thus, private enterprises with a sole focus on developing commercial space activities will have to fulfill the same high-level military requirements as the government. Additionally, the co-existence of more than one administrative body with similar supervision functions impedes non-governmental enterprises’ involvement in space activities [[31], pp. 4–5]. 3.2. Strict supervision of non-governmental entry into the space field: focusing on launch activities and satellite development In contrast to the United States, which promotes private entities to comprehensively participate in numerous space areas through PPPs [5], existing Chinese PPP policies related to space activities stress the domains of space science research, the launching of commercial satellites, the manufacture and operation of satellites, space infrastructure construction, and so on.22 The newly defined scope of the new type of infrastructure in China contains satellite internet, which motivates the creation of PPPs in space programs, and demands the growth of private participants to succeed in doing so. The fields of most relevance to this are launching activities and satellite development (including micro-satellite). Furthermore, emerging non-governmental space corporations are mainly interested in developing their launching and satellite manufacturing capacities (including micro-satellites) [32]. This is consistent with the policy requirements and constitutes a good starting point for conducting space PPPs and will, in turn, contribute to the growth of the commercial space industry. However, the administration of the rules of these areas is unfavorable for the non-governmental sector. Concerning launch activities, in June 2019, SASTIND and EDD announced the ‘Notice on Promoting the Orderly Development of Commercial Launch Vehicles’ (2019 Notice) [33]. Commercial launch activities are divided into phases of research and development, manufacturing, and launching. For non-governmental entities that intend to get involved in any of these phases, authorization is required. However, conditions and other requirements for obtaining such permissions are unfavorable. For example, launch vehicles are identified as a weapon. Given that SASTIND provides authorization for the research, development, and manufacture of weapons, any related technology must comply with the ‘Regulation on the Administration of Licenses for Scientific Research and Production of Weapons and Equipment’23 and the ‘Measures for the Implementation of the License for Scientific Research and Production of Weapons and Equipment’.24 Furthermore, the 2019 Notice states that every applicant must receive support from the provincial government where its enterprise is registered. The involved provincial government must inform SASTIND by issuing a letter to express their support and elaborate supervision measures to ensure that relevant enterprises have conducted the authorized space activities in compliance with confidentiality, safety, security, and quality standards. Thus, before conducting authorized operations, a notification to SASTIND and the EDD is required. The requirements stipulated in the 2019 Notice are unfavorable to private entities starting space activities for many reasons. First, the 2019 Notice refers the notification process to the EDD. However, no further details are available on this procedure. Moreover, the specific functions of the EDD in this process are not explained. Second, the relevant provincial government’s letter is a prerequisite for applying to receive authorization. Also, the provincial government’s supervision measures are the primary basis for conducting permitted activities. However, how the applicants obtain the provincial government’s approval letter is unclear. Third, whether the supervision measures elaborated by the relevant provincial government are only applicable to the specific applicant or equally applicable to similar subsequent applicants is not addressed [[31], pp. 5–6]. In the context of conducting PPPs, provincial governments can act as the ‘public’ party, so if no specifics are clarified, it is **difficult** to ensure a **fair** **legal environment** for establishing PPPs in space, which may breed corruption. The launching phase is also strictly administrated. This phase mandates that the application of launching permits should generally be consistent with the ‘Interim Measures on the Administration of Permits for Civil Space Launch Project’, which was released in2002.25 However, an extra review process by the EDD has been added as the pre-condition for approving the permit. Furthermore, any launching activity should be carried out on officially authorized launching sites or testing grounds, administrated and controlled by the military department, and the rules thereof should be observed. When referring to the development of satellites, no regulations have been adopted thus far. Non-governmental enterprises that intend to invest in this field have to meet the requirements of national security safeguards. Accordingly, licenses are necessary. Since the government and military have historically been responsible for the research and manufacture of satellites, no specific rules applicable to the private sector can be found in this field. In 2008, the Aerospace Dongfanghong Development Ltd., Shenzhen (ADD Ltd.), a state-owned corporation, was established.26 This corporation focuses on micro-satellite development. It is the first Chinese company that received authorization to research and develop micro-satellites [35]. Before initiating micro-satellite development programs, this corporation established the ‘certified weapon and equipment quality management system’. Therefore, the corporation was qualified ‘as a weapon and equipment bearer’ and obtained permission to conduct weapon and equipment research and product and met the requirements of acting as a so-called ‘national secondary class confidential qualified corporation’.27 As a result, the ADD Ltd. example offers valuable insights into non-governmental entities that want to get involved in satellite development, especially micro-satellites, as part of the recent interest in building satellite-based interest as a new type of infrastructure. However, these conditions or qualifications are inconsistent with the fundamental policies of facilitating private growth in space-related activities. Specific rules must be formulated to remove or simplify the excessive obstacles that impede private participation in satellite development, including the development of micro-satellites and the implementation of relevant policies. Concerning the procedural requirements for satellites manufacturing, non-governmental enterprises have to get approval from the NDRC. These firms must submit application documents, including the files issued by the provincial development and reform commission, the application report, and the confidential agreement to begin work [36]. Similar to the launch permit application, these application requirements set forth by the NDRC allow for the provincial departments to determine the details of the process, creating an unstable legal environment for potential applicants. In brief, the inevitable growth of the private sector in space is the main reason for creating PPPs in space exploration. Yet, the **current dominant role of the military** in China’s space industry results in a **complex administrative framework** and **strict requirements** for those non-governmental entities willing to undertake space activities. This constrains the development of the private space sector that remains in an underdeveloped stage to date. In addition, ambiguous rules concerning the power of the relevant provincial departments in authorizing launching activities and satellite development make creating and effective implementation of space PPPs more difficult. However, given the growing importance of the private sector in the implementation of the PPP policies regarding space, the existing rules and regulations should be improved.

#### Private Chinese space ventures are subsumed by the public sphere and national interests under Xi

Patel '21 (Neel V. Patel; science and tech journalist, currently working as a senior editor at The Daily Beast and space reporter for MIT Tech Review; 1-21-2021; "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US"; https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/, MIT Technology Review, accessed 1-14-2022; JPark)

“The state is really great at large, ambitious projects like going to the moon or developing a large reconnaissance satellite,” says Lincoln Hines, a Cornell University researcher who focuses on Chinese foreign policy. “But it’s not responsive to meeting market needs”—one big way to encourage rapid technological growth and innovation. “I think the government thinks its commercial space sector can be **complementary** to the state,” he says. What are the market needs that Hines is referring to? Satellites, and rockets that can launch them into orbit. The space industry is undergoing a renaissance thanks to two big trends spurred by the commercial industry: we can make satellites for less money by making them smaller and using off-the-shelf hardware; and we can also make rockets for less money, by using less costly materials or reusing boosters after they’ve already flown (which SpaceX pioneered with its Falcon 9). These trends mean it is now cheaper to send stuff into space, and the services and data that satellites can offer have come down in price accordingly. China has seen an opportunity. A 2017 report by Bank of America Merrill Lynch estimates that the space industry could be worth up to $2.7 trillion by 2030. Setting foot on the moon and establishing a lunar colony might be a statement of national power, but securing a share of such a highly lucrative business is perhaps even more important to the **country’s future**. “In the future, there will be tens of thousands of satellites waiting to launch, which is a major opportunity for Galactic Energy” says Wu Yue, a company spokesperson. The problem is, China has to make up decades’ worth of ground lost to the West. How did China get here—and why? Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle. That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called Document 60 that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry. “**Xi’s goal** was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that **includes** the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.” As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a 2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses. More than half have been founded **since 2014**, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services. For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another. Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it released the first images taken by the satellite, Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost. To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence. Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding. And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities. There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike. Making friends The most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to **attract customers wary** of being seen to mix with the **Chinese government**. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders. “China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China. Although China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry, the nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about. **While Chinese companies may look private on paper, they must still submit to government guidance and control, and accept some level of interference.** It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy, especially if the government is a frequent customer. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often very cagey about what its national program is even up to. And Hines adds that it’s not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

#### The plan has no effect—private space ventures are inextricable from public interest.

Goswami '19 (Dr. Namrata Goswami; author, strategic analyst and consultant on counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, alternate futures, and great power politics, worked at IDSA, selected as a Jennings-Randolph Senior Fellow, won MINERVA grant and contract with JSOU; 4-5-2019; "Misplaced Confidence? The US Private Space Sector vs. China"; https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/misplaced-confidence-the-us-private-space-sector-vs-china/, The Diplomat, accessed 1-14-2022; JPark)

Over the past three years, nearly 60 private space startups have entered the private launch industry, supported by the Chinese state. Spokesperson of the China National Space Administration (CNSA), Li Guoping, specified: The output value of the satellite application sector makes up over 80 percent of the whole satellite industry chain. So we encourage private companies and social capital to invest in the application of satellite communication, remote sensing and navigation…When we make a top-level plan for China’s aerospace development, we will consider the development of commercial space activity. The government will open space programs that can be carried out in a commercial way, and buy services from commercial companies… Since 2014, Xi has urged China’s private space sector to emerge as the leader in the “implementation of **civil-military integration** strategy.” Xi’s policy guidance has been followed up by the PLA, which opened its Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (China’s primary launch facility) in the northwestern Gobi Desert for private rocket launches. This civil-military integration has been identified as a priority by Xi for China’s **overall national strategy** with regard to outer space. The planning chief of the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center, Jia Lide, stated that “favorable policies and targeted measures have been created for the benefit of private space enterprises.” The latter point is particularly important. The U.S. private sector does very well with strong government support, through programs like Commercial Orbital Transportation System (COTS), Commercial Crew Program, and now the Commercial Lunar Payload Service (CLPS). Most U.S. space industries still rely to a significant degree on the government market either to get started or to stay solvent.

### Heg

#### Unipolarity is unsustainable—COVID, widespread support for multilateralism, and Trump prove. China will welcome multipolarity, but continued American pursuit guarantees lash-0ut and conflict. Transition only existential if the US pursues heg

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Multilateralism was the driving theme of Xi Jinping’s 2021 World Economic Forum (WEF) speech in January, advancing his message there four years ago supporting economic globalization. Addressing post-pandemic global challenges, Xi insisted that “multilateralism should not be used as pretext for acts of unilateralism.” In addition, “differences in history, culture and social system should not be an excuse for antagonism or confrontation, but rather an incentive for cooperation.”1 Emphasizing a universal rules-based global governance system, Xi told Boao Forum partners in April, “what we need in today’s world is justice, not hegemony.” He reminded neighbors, “however strong it may grow, China will never seek hegemony, expansion, or a sphere of influence.”2 The Chinese state media contextualized President Joe Biden’s first overseas visit to Europe in June: “**the old international order in the post-World War II era led by the US has become increasingly unsustainable** and a new world order is far from being established, with the global system shifting from unipolar to multipolar.”3 **How do Chinese perceptions of the changing world order inform our understanding of Beijing’s external orientation in the Biden era?**

The Biden leadership extends Washington’s policy trajectory by identifying “a more assertive and authoritarian China” as “the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.”4 As Chinese observers point out, despite some openings for cooperation, Biden’s China policy leans toward “strategic competition and even confrontation.”5 Rejecting Trump’s unilateralism and explicit attacks on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Biden has chosen alternative tools of multilateralism and engagement with allies for the continued goal of constraining China’s influence. The first US-China talks in March displayed mounting frictions over human rights, Taiwan, cybersecurity, and “economic coercion toward our allies” according to Tony Blinken.6 The US Senate’s 2021 Strategic Competition Act in April signaled bipartisan consensus on a more aggressive China strategy,7 reinforcing debate on China’s response to a changing “hegemonic order.”8

This article assesses Chinese interpretations of the international order in the Biden era, focusing on views of hegemony and multilateralism. It first places these debates within China’s post-Cold War international relations discourse based on Wang Jisi’s review of Chinese worldviews in the 1990s and more recent conceptualization of “two orders” framing US-China relations. Second, it assesses current narratives on hegemony and multilateralism using Chinese academic publications in the first half of 2021. Third, it identifies how these views manifest in US-China interactions under the Biden administration. The concluding section considers prospects for Beijing and Washington’s respective agendas for global engagement.

Views of the Post-Cold War International Order

Conventional structural perspectives frame mainstream Chinese views of the “international order” (国际秩序), as “the most global, long-term, and strategic issue in world politics.”9 Official narratives reject hegemony and favor multilateralism in line with a post-Cold War shift to a multipolar order. In Xi’s post-pandemic world, “there is no fundamental change in the trend toward a multi-polar world; **economic globalization is showing renewed resilience; and the call for upholding multilateralism and enhancing communication and coordination has grown stronger.”**10 As Xi defined it in January, “multilateralism is about having international affairs addressed through consultation and the future of the world decided by everyone working together.”11 Interpretations of hegemony in this changing structural context have expanded from a primarily military focus to broader forms of expansionist behavior for regional or global dominance. From a Chinese official’s perspective, US “hegemonism” means “not occupying land but promoting its own system and ideology, in an attempt to meet its own national interests through domination of the world.”12 According to Yang Jiechi, **multilateralism today prevails over recent pressures of “unilateralism and bullying,” “populism and de-globalization,” and “ideological confrontation**.” In China’s pursuit of multilateral diplomacy, “we oppose hegemony and power politics, and oppose any practice of unilateralism in the name of multilateralism.”13

Despite such official claims, China’s multilateralism remains described as “strategic” and “opportunistic.”14 Yang Jiechi made clear in February, “we will resolutely defend our national interests and dignity at multilateral fora when our core and major interests are at stake.”15 Skeptics view China’s multilateral diplomacy as part of counter-hegemonic strategies.16 The “new Chinese multilateralism” that emerged by the 2000s “has to be understood with its combination with multipolarism, the two being used together as a double-track strategy to deal with the United States…and to shape China’s desired future structure of world politics.”17 Xi’s push for global governance reform “is directly linked to counterbalancing the dominance of a liberal-based international order.”18 Especially at the regional level, China-led multilateralism “is an interim arrangement in China’s drive to acquire regional and global dominance.”19

Hegemony and Multipolar Order

Chinese assessments of hegemony and multilateralism have evolved with perceptions of the changing world order. **Studies of the post-Cold War order identify a long-term shift to “multipolarization” and persistent threat of “hegemonism,” with a growing emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs.20 As Jiang Zemin indicated in 1997, while “the pattern of the world is moving in the direction of multipolarization,” “hegemonism and power politics continue to be the main source of threat to world peace and stability**.”21 Academic interpretations of such trends vary in terms of the dimensions and distribution of global power. But this multipolar transition is commonly linked to perceived changes in US power since the 1990s, when “one superpower, several great powers” characterized the international structure according to Chinese official assessments. Views of multipolarization not only assume more global resistance to US demands, but also disagreement within the West favoring alignment with Chinese worldviews.

From a historical cyclical perspective, power, interests, and rules shape the international order’s formation, involving “long-term competition and short-term compromise in the pursuit of common values.”22 **Uncertainty over the postwar liberal international order’s future has grown with the clear fragmentation of Western power.** China’s position in the existing order is viewed through the lens of US hegemony as the “peak form of Western historical hegemony.”23 US political elites advanced the “hegemonic” Bretton Woods system representing their preferences, successfully managing a domestic isolationist tradition and foreign resistance. **With the decline in US relative power, US policy shifted from “accepting” China into this dominant order to “rejecting” it.24 In particular, the United States can no longer accept a rising China as a strategic partner or member of the international system since “democratic discipline” has failed there**.25 China’s market transition from 1978 drove both US-China conciliation and eventual discord as China advanced its own economic and political agenda.

“Two Orders” in US-China Relations

Views of US hegemony have varied with shifts in US-China relations since the 1972 Shanghai Communique, which promised that “neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.”26 While Chinese concerns in the 1990s centered on external threats to Taiwan, domestic political stability, and ethnic minority regions, the scope of contention now extends to economic and technological competition. In addition, the transition from Deng’s “keeping a low profile” principle to Xi’s “striving for achievement” shifts China’s external focus from primarily economic gains to political support, raising questions about the normative dimensions of Chinese grand strategy.27

US-China debates in an evolving world order are primarily about rulemaking. “Two orders” form Wang Jisi’s view of current US-China relations, including the CCP-led domestic order challenged by the United States, and the US-led international order challenged by China. With increased interdependence, the United States frowns on the CCP leadership’s rulemaking at home not just for ideological reasons, but more importantly for the implications for US material interests. Conversely, US rulemaking at the global level threatens Chinese interests. **The US quest to “promote global democracy” defies China’s insistence on non-interference and the “democratization of international relations” granting the developing “global majority” a bigger voice**.28 Yang Jiechi told Blinken in March, “it is important for the United States to change its own image and to stop advancing its own democracy in the rest of the world.”29

As Wang Jisi argues, “in Sino-US competition and cooperation today, almost everything is connected to the issue of rules.”30 This issue will be the biggest point of future contention, not because the United States fears being displaced by China economically, but because “they are concerned about how they will manage once they have been overtaken.”31 As Wang asked in 1997, “what will China do in global and regional affairs when its international status is enhanced, economic growth sustained, military capabilities improved, and political stability ensured?”32 Current assessments of hegemony and multilateralism offer tentative answers.

Current Views of Hegemony and Multilateralism

A general decline in Chinese academic interest in hegemony over the past two decades has accompanied a growth in interest in multilateralism, at a notably faster rate since 2016. Journal articles with the keyword “hegemonism” (霸权主义) fell in volume by 83 percent in 2000-2016, and became outnumbered by those with “multilateralism” (多边主义) from 2005 during the Hu Jintao administration.33 In both cases, the number of articles more than doubled in 2016-2019. But in 2019-2020, studies on hegemonism declined by 20 percent while those on multilateralism grew by another 49 percent. **While the multilateralism literature amounted to 10 percent of hegemonism studies in 2000 by publication volume, by 2020 it was almost five times greater.**

A perceived structural shift to a multipolarity contextualizes these trends. From the perspective of China’s international relations theorists like Qin Yaqing, one of the biggest changes in the past century is the end of not just US global hegemony but also hegemony itself as a world order. The current transition to a more pluralistic world of “inclusive multilateralism” points to “a multipolar power structure, multilevel institutional arrangements, and multidimensional ideas**.**”34 An alternative “one world, two systems” bipolar order lacks the material and institutional conditions for its formation, as well as US and Chinese support. In this changing external environment, **China’s participation in global governance has progressed in four stages since the PRC’s founding in 1949: 1) “anti-hegemonic governance” under Mao’s revolutionary diplomacy, 2) “active integration” after reform and opening, 3) “constructive participation,” and 4) the current phase of proposing “Chinese solutions.”35 As Chen Zhimin and Zhang Xueying indicate, China’s global role has shifted from a “revolutionary order-challenger” to a “reformist order shaper.”36 According to Yang Jiechi, Xi’s WEF speech this year embodied the need to “contribute China’s wisdom, visions and solutions.”37**

US-China power politics is a defining feature of the 21st century international order.38 Bilateral relations since diplomatic normalization in 1978 have evolved from “strategic coordination” to “strategic competition” under the Trump administration.39 **Relations have fluctuated with neoliberalism’s rise and fall in the West**. The 2008 financial crisis marked the most recent neoliberal crisis and decline in the US-China power gap, compelling new models for bilateral relations since the Obama administration.40 The competitive direction of US China policy is clear in the post-2008 trend of US economic strategy. According to Chen Yu, **bipartisan consensus emerged that “the US economic approach to China does not embed China in the hegemonic system under US leadership,” and instead facilitates** China’s rapid growth as a “revisionist” challenger to the US hegemonic order.41

**China’s international relations journals at the start of 2021 recognize a critical transition in the US-led liberal international order.** Current uncertainty surrounds a new phase of industrial and technological development, intensified major-power competition, globalization backlash, and vast repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic**. “Unilateralism, protectionism, and hegemony” present major external threats to the international order.42 Xi Jinping’s project of national revival enters a new stage in 2021, marking the 100th anniversary of the CCP’s founding and start of China’s 14th Five Year Plan (2021-2025).**

Post-Pandemic Debates: National Strategy, Global Governance, and Regional Order

**Two shocks to the global economy in 2020 frame current academic debates: the US “global trade war” to maintain “economic hegemony” while withdrawing from multilateralism, and COVID-19**.43 As the biggest global non-traditional security shock in a century, **COVID-19 catalyzed long-term changes in international strategic relations and US global leadership, placing multilateralism and global governance in a new external setting.**44 **Under the dual impacts of global health and economic crises, “the international order’s reform and reconstruction is imminent.”45 Specifically, while the United States has become the biggest destructive force by evading its global responsibilities, China has emerged as the biggest stabilizing force by assuming such obligations in line with its capabilities.** Current uncertainties reinforce the question of whether unilateralism or multilateralism will prevail. Xi Jinping’s WEF remarks this year favoring multilateralism intensified domestic debate on China’s strategic orientation, the ideological and practical dimensions of global governance reform, and the changing East Asian regional order.46

The historical pattern of the rise of great powers points to four strategic options: 1) protective unilateralism, 2) confrontational unilateralism, 3) centralized multilateralism, and 4) spontaneous multilateralism.47 In China’s case, its distinct advantages and constraints require building centralized multilateral networks in developing regions and a “virtuous economic cycle of internal-external linkages,” as Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) currently embodies. As National Development and Reform Commission researchers anticipate, post-pandemic uncertainties will drive China’s continued pursuit of such integration between domestic and international development.48 Other assessments are largely inward looking, proposing change in China’s development model given anti-globalization forces of trade protectionism, shrinking global industrial chains, and multilateralism’s reversal. Such proposals emphasize the expansion of domestic consumer markets, industrial investment, and indigenous technological innovation, as China’s current Five-Year Plan outlines.49

At the global level, the dispute over international rulemaking is a competition between Western and Chinese “legal discourse power,” as shown in enduring South China Sea disputes and recent human rights issues surrounding Beijing’s 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law. In the reshaping of rules, non-binding “soft law” not only has significant meaning but also drives the development of “hard law,” promoting multilateralism’s persistence.50 The debate on relative discourse power in commercial and maritime disputes has sharpened since COVID-19, focused increasingly on reconciling domestic and international legal systems.51 **According to Wang Lin, safeguarding national security requires opposing “Western legal hegemony” and a “colonialist legal mentality” in favor of “socialist law with Chinese characteristics.”52 From a cultural perspective of modernization, by promoting the expansion of individual values and decline of social justice, capitalism generates disorder in the form of great-power hegemonism.53**

As Xi Jinping warned in Davos, avoiding such a scenario requires a UN-centered global governance system “based on the rules and consensus reached among us, not on the order given by one or the few.”54 China supported the creation of the UN’s “Friends of Neutrality Group for Peace, Security, and Development” last year as a platform for “like-minded partners,”55 exemplifying its commitment to multilateralism unlike the United States. As Yang Jin argues, “contrary to insisting on neutrality, the US repeatedly interferes in internal affairs of other countries…In recent days, it has been working hard to build an anti-China coalition to contain China.” Such behavior shows that “Washington is motivated by the desire to maintain its global hegemony and interests, and implement its “America First” policy.”56

The irrelevance of Cold War-style alignments is most notable in Chinese visions of the changing regional order. East Asia’s transformation from the “hub and spoke” system of US alliances to a “multinodal” one generated a structural discrepancy between the US bilateral model and the region’s multilateral orientation.57 The alliance system’s growing ineffectiveness in responding to regional security threats underscores the need to rebuild an Asian order in line with this multipolar shift. Multilateralism’s rise is clear in the economic domain, where trade protectionism and COVID-19 accelerated the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)’s signing in November 2020. As Chinese leaders claimed, the free trade deal was the biggest “victory for multilateralism” and regional economic integration since the 1990s, and a major opening for advancing China’s domestic reforms and global development model.58

#### It’s too late for Biden to reverse it—he’s as hawkish and Trump and can’t restore alliance credibility

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Implications for US-China Relations in the Biden Era

The envisioned trajectory of US-China relations in the Biden era includes continuity, adjustment, and stabilization.59 **Most anticipate a return to multilateralism and short-term easing of tensions.60 Widespread criticism of Trump’s unilateralism and enduring “Trumpism” prevails, emphasizing Washington’s “irreversible” competitive turn**.61 As Tian Feilong indicates, “the new US-China relationship is centered on competition and conflict,” starting with the trade war and extending to a more comprehensive “new Cold War.” 62 Trumpism catalyzed the long-term qualitative change in bilateral relations, and the Biden leadership may only bring temporary adjustments.

Others project targeted and balanced adjustments with a continuation of Trump’s tough policy tone, urging Beijing to maintain “strategic rationality.”63 Especially given the level of economic interdependence, while “joint containment” with allies may replace “unilateral confrontation,” “conditional cooperation” will replace “direct confrontation.”64 For optimists, the Biden era opens an opportunity for pushing relations “back to the future” rather than “returning to the past” pattern of US China strategy guided by neoliberal ideology.65 The long-term stabilization of bilateral ties depends on building institutional mechanisms for grounding the relationship within this critical timeframe. Multilateralism is not just “the only correct path” of post-pandemic global development, but also requires US-China cooperation.66

The Trump-Biden Transition: Change and Continuity

Biden’s overarching diplomatic goal is to restore US global leadership after the damage of Trumpism, what Zhao Minghao terms a quest to renew the “West” in the face of rising challengers like China and Russia.67 This task relies primarily on reengaging allies, placing values at the center of US foreign policy, and building a “community of democratic nations.” Major-power competition remains a central force, through enhanced deterrence tools like NATO and US technological competitiveness. As Biden pursues post-pandemic cooperation on global health and environmental threats, the United States will only “selectively return” to multilateralism. According to Liu Guozhu, Biden’s national security strategy seeks to not just reverse Trump’s withdrawal from multilateralism but also “dominate the global governance system with US values and principles.”68

The key task of “de-Trumping” domestic and foreign affairs comes with an enduring deterioration in US-China relations. This trend extends to US relations with other major-powers, as evidenced by the “long-term freeze” in US-Russia ties.69 **The “misalignment of strategic goals” between the United States and Europe makes it difficult for the Biden administration to restore their traditional alliance**.70 But while the waning of the West reflects “European anxiety,” European partners may support the long-term consolidation of multilateralism.71 Soon after RCEP’s signing, the upgrading of ASEAN-EU relations into a strategic partnership at the end of 2020 signified a mutual willingness to uphold multilateralism.72 According to Fu Ying, **China and Europe’s “common interest in upholding multilateralism” is especially important at a time when “Europe needs space for independent thinking” amid US-China competition.73**

**The Biden leadership inherits Trump’s designation of China as a strategic competitor and revisionist power**. There are differences in the means of competition including multilateral mechanisms and the US alliance system Biden seeks to revamp. But under current conditions, China will more effectively respond to US strategy and actively shape the relationship. From this perspective, Wu Xinbo identifies three models of interaction in the next four years: 1) an ideal scenario of competition and cooperation, 2) competition-led relations, and 3) the worst-case scenario of competition-conflict.74

While most studies accentuate the second pattern, perceptions of US policy change and continuity in the Biden era depend on issue areas. Preliminary reviews center on four areas: Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy, “technological nationalism,” economic competition, and US domestic politics. While domestic concerns remain in rehabilitating the economy, controlling the pandemic, and relieving social grievances, bipartisan consensus reinforces views of continuity on key foreign policy issues.75 Despite Biden’s stronger emphasis on multilateralism, **continuity outweighs adjustments in Asia-Pacific security policy, with no substantive actions in the short term on regional economic integration**. Trump’s tough policy tone resonates in economic relations with China, and especially science and technology competition. Human rights concerns deflect attention from the United States’ own domestic problems.

Regional Security and Indo-Pacific Strategy

Security alliances are central to perceived US hegemonic strategies. The Asia-Pacific alliance system remains a key tool for containing competitors and maintaining regional order. According to Ling Shengli and Li Hang, to mitigate Trump’s regional policy impact, Biden has moved from “America-first” to an emphasis on common values, and from coercive strategy to institutional mechanisms of coordination.76 While alliance goals increasingly point to global governance, US Indo-Pacific strategy continues to frame regional cooperation.77 Quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India underpins this strategy as a mechanism to contain China’s rise, with major repercussions for China’s bilateral relations with US partners. As Lan Jiang and Jiang Wenyu argue, Biden’s push for the framework’s institutionalization and normalization as a “paramilitary alliance” “poses a serious threat to China’s security environment and national interests.”78 **By strengthening the Indo-Pacific multilateral security architecture targeting China, the initiative indicates US efforts to diplomatically isolate China and strategically encircle it**. In addition, Quad partners have signaled their intentions to continue targeting China politically and strategically but expand economic relations based on their own interests. According to Chinese ambassador to South Korea Xing Haiming, the Quad exemplifies “fake multilateralism” as “a small political circle that excludes and targets a specific country.”79

Shifts in US Asia strategy are perceived in the context of declining US regional hegemony and domestic political factors. While Trump prioritized maintaining US hegemony in the South China Sea, Biden will focus more on cooperating with allies, implementing “Freedom of Navigation Operations,” and accommodating some diplomatic coordination with Beijing.80 In Northeast Asia, Washington will use the Taiwan issue to “strategically contain” China.81 Japan’s foreign policy under the Suga leadership aligns more closely with Biden’s proposals compared to the case during the Trump era. Tokyo will coordinate China policy with Washington by emphasizing “checks and balances” centered on the US-Japan alliance, promoting China threat perceptions and human rights concerns, and adopting a more cautious attitude toward Beijing.82 Although pressure on US-South Korea relations under Trump resulted in renewed agreement on trade, the Moon administration’s “delay tactics” on defense burden-sharing highlight “the initiative of weak countries in the alliance” according to Dong Xiangrong and Zhang Jiawei.83 Under the Indo-Pacific framework, the United States and South Korea will strengthen multilateral cooperation in addition to repairing the bilateral alliance. But the overall consolidation of US alliance relationships in Asia remains susceptible to the influence of domestic politics, as Tang Yanglin and Jiao Jian argue.84

From a broader perspective, the United States’ strategic orientation in the Asia-Pacific is tied to US strategy in other key regions. According to Jin Liangxiang, the reallocation of resources from the Middle East since the Obama administration remains only “partially implemented” due to the region’s significance to US global hegemony and US domestic politics.85 The Biden leadership is likely to adjust the means of allocation by committing hard resources in Asia and diplomacy and aid in the Middle East. Rather than treating them as mutually exclusive, Biden will move from “balancing” to “integrating” US regional strategies as parts of broader global strategy.

Technological Development and Technological Nationalism

US science and technology policy since the Trump administration is a major point of interest.86 For some America experts, relative capabilities in technological innovation are “the decisive factor” in great-power competition.87 Current debate responds to the US National Security Innovation Base since 2017 supporting the Defense Department’s “principle priorities” of “long-term strategic competition with China and Russia.”88 As a “whole of society” approach to promoting emerging technologies, the initiative “embodies a strong trend of technological nationalism and technological security” according to Liu Guozhu and Shi Bowei.89 US competition significantly challenges China as the post-pandemic external environment threatens the global technology supply chain. In Yin Nannan and Liu Guozhu’s view, the US emerging technology governance system in particular “shows obvious protectionism and technological nationalism, obeying and serving its national security strategy.”90 **Specifically, the Biden administration is “actively committed to modernizing the US technology governance system and capabilities, and attempting to adopt a multilateral strategy to restrict and block the development of China’s emerging technologies**.” While domestic political fragmentation constrains the governance process, US approaches to technology governance at the global level impede international cooperation.

Such views align with broader perceptions of a new “technological nationalism” wave, fueled by the contemporary stage of development, great-power politics, and historical memories of China’s “century of national humiliation.”91 In this context, US hegemony’s impact also extends to internet culture and internet freedom, as shown by the global spread of American culture through technology-driven entertainment products and social media. As Zhou Qiange argues, the internet facilitates “cyber hegemony” in the international competition for discourse power, where the Chinese media confronts the “linguistic and discursive hegemony” of the English language.92

Trade Rules and Economic Competition

Views of US-China economic relations focus on continued trade competition since Trump, and Biden’s emphasis on the American middle class. Despite the cooperative aspects of Biden’s China policy, the main trend of bilateral economic relations “is still fundamental opposition and suppression.”93 **As Chen Yu argues, since Trump’s labeling of China as a strategic competitor, the focus of US economic strategy has shifted to “regulating China’s economic competition, aiming to comprehensively contain it.”**94 Strategic competition presents a “mutual test” in post-pandemic economic relations in the short term according to Tong Jiaodong and Ju Xin.95 The test for the United States extends to managing multiple “crises” in domestic pandemic control, identity politics, foreign economic policy, and alliance relations. China’s challenges lie in the US “reconstruction of order,” regional integration and the BRI’s development, and intellectual property protection. But the long-term impact of competitive US policy depends on China’s response as well as economic complementarities and mutual interests.96

In the struggle over the reconstruction of international economic institutions, the US “strategic intention to contain China’s development is clear.”97 But in many assessments, the US-China dispute over rules links to their domestic systems as China pursues its own development path. As Zhu Caihua and Liu Rangqun indicate, competition prevails in the form of divergent preferences on WTO reform, and exclusivity in US-led rules “de-Sinicizing” and “stigmatizing” the Chinese system. Such trends may divide the world into two systems of rules and promote the regional rule system’s dominance, requiring China to pursue a more inclusive approach to mitigate US “institutional checks and balances.” While China and the United States will prioritize WTO rules when managing trade conflict, the bilateral trade war is rooted in US domestic constraints according to Peng Yue. The US government has renewed concepts like “embedded liberalism” to shift domestic legal and political constraints to trade partners.98

In contrast to Trump’s unilateralism, Biden’s approach to trade focuses on protecting the interests of American workers while restoring US international leadership. Washington’s tough position on trade is expected to continue in the name of “fair trade” and US “national security.”99 Diao Daming calls Biden’s “middle-class diplomacy” a “compromise” with Trump’s foreign policy, aimed at restoring the United States’ global status while narrowing differences within the Democratic Party.100 Given divergent domestic demands and government interests challenging this agenda, Biden’s foreign policy adjustments may not fully satisfy his overarching goal of serving the American middle class.

#### Clinging causes great power war.

Layne 18—University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley [Christopher, January 2018, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana”, International Affairs, Volume 94, Issue 1, pgs 89-111]

The fate of international orders is closely linked to power transition dynamics. Throughout modern international history the prevailing international order has reflected the balance of power that existed at the time of its creation. When that balance changes sufficiently, the old order will be replaced by a new one. Viewed from this perspective, what are the Pax Americana's prospects? How will China's rise, and America's decline, affect the international order in the years ahead? The surprising answer given by top US security studies scholars is: ‘Not much.’ The United States, so the argument goes, can ‘lock in’ the Pax Americana's essential features, including its rules, norms and institutions.65 John Ikenberry, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth are the leading proponents of the lock-in thesis. Ikenberry was the first to set out the concept, arguing in After victory that a hegemon, by building an institutionalized, rules-based international order, ‘can lock-in favorable arrangements that continue beyond the zenith of its power’.66 In other words, the international order can remain intact even after the hegemonic power that created it has lost its pre-eminent position in the international political system. On this point, Ikenberry echoes Robert Keohane's argument in After hegemony that, once a liberal international order has been established by a hegemonic power, if the hegemon declines it is possible for a small group of Great Powers to take the place of the former hegemon and collectively manage the international system.67 That is, under certain conditions ‘hegemonic stability’ can exist even if there is no hegemonic power. In Liberal Leviathan, Ikenberry built on this logic to argue that, even if the Pax Americana were to wither completely, the LRBIO would nevertheless survive. As Ikenberry put it: ‘America's position in the global system may decline but the international order it leads can remain the dominating logic of the twenty-first century.’68 Ikenberry's view seems to have evolved, however. In jointly authored articles in International Security and Foreign Affairs, Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth embrace hegemonic stability theory.69 That is, they contend that, like all international orders, the post-1945 international order does, in fact, require a hegemonic power to maintain it—and not just any hegemon, but the United States. The logic of their argument is that the LRBIO and the Pax Americana are one and the same, and that US pre-eminence is a necessary condition for the LRBIO. According to them, the United States must exercise ‘global leadership’—the US foreign policy establishment's code phrase for hegemony—by acting as a security provider and geopolitical stabilizer; by maintaining an open, liberal international economy; and by promoting global cooperation through upholding and revising the post-1945 liberal order—which is both ‘institutional and normative’—created by the Pax Americana.70 They also claim that the post-1945 Pax Americana ‘allows the United States to … wrap its hegemonic rule in a rules-based order’.71 This helps to conceal the actual motives of self-interest and realpolitik that underlie American hegemony. Read together, the International Security and Foreign Affairs articles by Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth make clear the authors' view that the post-1945 LRBIO is inextricably linked to US hegemony; that is, to the Pax Americana. This is in keeping with the common understanding of hegemonic stability theory. As they see it, the post-1945 international order based on American pre-eminence ‘has served the US well for the past six decades and there is no reason to give it up now’.72 The argument has special force given that, according to the—correct—logic of their argument (and of hegemonic stability theory), if American hegemony goes, the LRBIO goes with it. In their preference for maintaining the post-1945 hegemonic American international order, Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth echo the renowned late nineteenth-century British statesman Lord Salisbury. Presiding over a hegemonic Britain that was already perceptibly declining, he famously said: ‘Whatever happens will be for the worse. Therefore, it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible.’ The post-1945 international order is (or was) a concrete manifestation of America's hegemonic status. So, of course, the US foreign policy establishment wants as little change as possible in international politics. Why would it wish otherwise, when change would inevitably be both the cause and effect of diminishing American power and influence? The United States has every incentive for wanting to prolong the post-1945 international order. After all, for most of the last 70 years or so, the US has occupied the geopolitical penthouse (‘when America ruled the world’). From that lofty height, however, the only direction it can go is down. The lock-in strategy is seductive because it holds out (or appears to hold out) the possibility that the United States can preserve the status quo—the post-1945 international order—even as the geopolitical status quo of American hegemony is changing. Lock-in is attractive—superficially—because it assumes that China's rise will not effect a major change in the international system. Specifically, lock-in holds that China's rise can be managed by integrating it into the post-1945 international order, and ensuring that the exercise of Chinese power takes place within that order's rules and institutions.73 By doing so, it is claimed, the United States can offset its declining power and ‘ensure the international order it leads can remain the dominating logic of the twenty-first century’.74 Lock-in assumes that China has no interest in overturning—or significantly modifying—the post-1945 international order in which it rose and became wealthy. Certainly, China did rise within the Pax Americana's LRBIO. However, China did not rise to preserve that American-dominated order. For some three decades (beginning with Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms) China took a low profile in international politics, and avoided confrontation both with the United States and with its regional neighbours. Integration into the open international economy spurred China's rapid growth. China's self-described ‘peaceful rise’ followed the script written by Deng Xiaoping: ‘Lie low. Hide your capabilities. Bide your time.’ However, the fact that China bandwagoned with the United States in joining the international economic order did not mean that its longer-term intention was—or is—to preserve the post-1945 international order. In joining the liberal economic order, Beijing's goal was not simply to get rich; by integrating itself into the post-1945 international order, China was able to avoid conflict with the United States until it became wealthy enough to acquire the military capabilities necessary to compete with America for regional hegemony in east Asia.75 Judging from Xi Jinping's policy pronouncements, China's days of biding its time and hiding its capabilities are over. Lock-in proponents argue that even as the Sino-American military and economic balance continues to tilt increasingly in Beijing's favour, the post-1945 international order's rules, institutions and norms will offset America's loss of hard power. There is historical evidence that suggests this is wishful thinking. Take the case of Britain after the Second World War. Despite the dramatic weakening of Britain's economic and financial clout caused by its efforts in the two world wars, after 1945 British leaders believed that the United Kingdom could remain one of three major world powers. In pursuit of this goal, they formulated their own version of lock-in. As the historian John Darwin puts it, officials in London thought that by transforming the Commonwealth, Britain could transition ‘from an empire of rule to an empire of influence’.76 Specifically, they believed that ‘free from the authoritarian, acquisitive and exploitative traditions of the old version of empire’, the reconfigured Commonwealth ‘would make the British connection voluntary, democratic, and mutually beneficial’.77 The reformed Commonwealth therefore would serve as the institutional instrument of continuing British world power, within which shared values and norms would bind Britain's former colonies and dominions to London's leadership.78 The reasons why British policy-makers bought into this vision sound an awful lot like the reasons why the present-day American proponents of lock-in think it will preserve the United States' global leadership even as its hard power erodes. Lock-in did not work for Britain following the Second World War, and there is scant reason to think it will work for the United States in the coming years of the twenty-first century. The lock-in strategy also assumes that if the Pax Americana's institutions are reformed, Beijing (and other non-western emerging powers) will find it more attractive to remain in the post-1945 international order than to overturn it. That assumption, however, is logically flawed: achieving lock-in by reforming the existing international order presumes that the United States can have its cake (preserving the Pax Americana) and eat it too (reforming the current international system's legacy institutions). But, as we all know, when the cake is eaten, it's gone. Reform—at least, any kind of reform that would appeal to China—would mean the United States yielding significant power in international institutions to accommodate Beijing. However, doing so would reduce US ability to shape outcomes, diminish Washington's voice in international institutions, and impose constraints on US autonomy in foreign and domestic policy.79 As University of Birmingham lecturer Sevasti-Eleni Vezirgiannidou observes with respect to institutional reform: ‘It is questionable whether this will really preserve US influence or rather, on the contrary, diminish it, as the United States will have to share power in a reformed order and thus will be restricted in its ability to act unilaterally.’80 The US foreign policy establishment may talk the talk of reforming the international order (and the institutions that underpin it), but it is doubtful it will walk the walk with respect to reform, because that would mean accepting a downsized American role in international politics. On the contrary, Washington's opposition to the AIIB indicates that the United States is not prepared to see its influence in the international order diminished. And, with respect to reforming the post-1945 international order to accommodate the reality of a risen China, this is the nub of the problem: instead of preserving the Pax Americana, reform would lead to changes in the international order that would undermine it. Of course, regardless of whether there is institutional reform, the coming decades are likely to witness major changes in the international order irrespective of America's preferences. What will happen to the international order as China continues to rise, and America's relative power continues to decline? As Yogi Berra, the greatest of all American philosophers (immortalized in baseball's Hall of Fame), said: ‘Making predictions is hard. Especially about the future.’ However, one thing seems pretty certain: China is not on the verge of either of ruling the world, or becoming a global hegemon comparable to the United States after the Second World War; not yet, anyway. Thus, for the next several decades (at least) it will be neither China's world nor America's: international leadership will be contested.81 During this period, China can be expected to act pretty much as one would expect any Great Power to act while making the shift from rising to risen: it will use its newfound power to seek a much greater voice in managing—and shaping—the international order, and its underlying norms. For example, China will want others to acknowledge its ‘core interests’, including respect for its territorial integrity and its sovereignty. Beijing has expanded the geographic scope of its core interests beyond Tibet and Taiwan to include the South and East China Seas and Xinjiang. And, reflecting its insistence that states should refrain from intervening in others' internal affairs, preservation of its political, economic and social systems also has been defined as a core interest.82 During the period of contested international leadership there is unlikely to be wholesale abandonment of the post-1945 international institutions. For example, as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Beijing is an acknowledged part of the Great Power club. Similarly, we should not expect to see a dramatic overhaul of the international economic system. As the world's top-ranking exporter and trading state, China benefits hugely from economic openness. However, the state plays a much greater role in China's economy than it does in the United States and Europe. Beijing will want rules that protect its semi-mercantilist economic policies and also ensure that its state-owned industries are not disadvantaged. Beijing will continue pressing for an even greater voice, both for itself and for the developing world, in institutions such as the IMF and World Bank (unless or until they are superseded by new ‘made in China’ institutions). In this respect, China will position itself as the developing world's champion—a role for which it is well suited. Like many nations in the developing world—but unlike the United States—China has been a victim of western Great Power policies of imperialism and colonialism. As such, China has a claim to prominence in constructing a new international order that reflects the values of the developing world rather than those of the United States and the West.83 Even though the international economy will remain (more or less) open, in other respects the international system is likely to become much less liberal politically. The Chinese Communist Party's 19th Congress demonstrated that China is not converging with the West: it is not going to become a democracy any time soon—if ever. Consequently, as China's role in shaping the international agenda increases, democracy and human rights will become less salient. China will almost certainly try to change the norms that favour democracy promotion, ‘humanitarian’ intervention, human rights and the Responsibility to Protect. Beijing will resist norms that divide states into two camps, ranging democratic ‘good guys’ against non-democratic ‘bad guys’.84 Instead, it will offer its policy of ‘market authoritarianism’ to developing states as a better model of political, social and economic development than the US model based on the Washington Consensus. As its power continues to increase, China will seek to recast the world order in a way that not only advances its interests but also acknowledges both its enhanced power and its claims to status and prestige equal to those of the declining hegemon.85 For now, Beijing is (mostly) ‘working within the system’ to revise the post-1945 international order while simultaneously laying the groundwork for an alternative international order that eventually could displace the Pax Americana. As a 2007 report by the Center for a New American Security concluded: Rather than seeking to weaken or confront the United States directly, Chinese leaders are pursuing a subtle, multifaceted, long-term grand strategy that aims to derive as many benefits as possible from the existing international system while accumulating the economic wherewithal, military strength, and soft power resources to reinforce China's emerging position as at least a regional great power.86 Even as it stays within the post-1945 international order, Beijing is not doing so to preserve it. In this sense, as Martin Jacques has observed, China is playing a double game. It is operating ‘both within and outside the existing international system while at the same time, in effect, sponsoring a new China-centric international system which will exist alongside the present system and probably slowly begin to usurp it’.87 The creation of the AIIB, which Beijing intends should ultimately eclipse the IMF and World Bank, is a good example of this strategy. American scholars and policy-makers believe that a lock-in strategy can be employed to head off any Chinese attempt to create a new international order, or to create a parallel order. They believe this because they have imbued the concept of a ‘rules-based, institutionalized, liberal international order’ with a talismanic quality. In so doing they have air-brushed Great Power politics out of the picture. As they see it, rules and institutions are politically neutral and, ipso facto, beneficial for all. Hence, they can be an effective substitute for declining hard power. However, rather than existing separately from the balance of power, rules, norms and institutions reflect it. Hence the world is no more likely to continue upholding the Pax Americana once US power declines than Britain's dominions and former colonies were inclined to perpetuate the empire after the Second World War. The fate of the Pax Americana, and that of the international order, will be determined by the outcome of the Sino-American rivalry. As the British scholar E. H. Carr observed, a rules-based international order ‘cannot be understood independently of the political foundation on which it rests and the political interests which it serves’.88 The post-Second World War international order is an American order that privileges US interests.89 Even the discourse of ‘liberal order’ cannot disguise this fact. Today, the ground is shifting beneath the Pax Americana's foundations. Those who believe that lock-in can work view international politics as being, in essence, geopolitically antiseptic. For them, Great Power competition and conflict are transcended by international institutions, rules and norms. This is not how the real world works, however.90 Great Power politics is about power. Rules and institutions do not exist in a vacuum, hermetically sealed off from Great Power politics. Nor are they neutral. Rather, they reflect the distribution of power in the international system. In international politics, who rules makes the rules. In his classic study of international relations between the world wars, The Twenty years' crisis, Carr analysed the political crisis of the 1930s caused by the breakdown of the post-First World War order symbolized by the Versailles Treaty.91 The Versailles system cracked, Carr argued, because of the widening gap between the order it represented and the actual distribution of power in Europe. Carr used the events of the 1930s to make a larger geopolitical point. International orders reflect the balance of power that exists at time of their creation. Over time, however, the relative power of states changes, and eventually the international order no longer reflects the actual distribution of power between or among the leading Great Powers. When that happens, the legitimacy of the prevailing order is called into question, and it will be challenged by the rising power(s). When the balance of power swings—or is perceived to swing—in its direction, a rising power becomes increasingly dissatisfied with the international order, and seeks to revise it. The challenger wants to change the rules embodied in the existing international order—rules written, of course, by the once dominant but now declining Great Power that created it. It also wants the allocation of prestige and status changed to reflect its newly acquired power. The incumbent hegemon, of course, wants to preserve the existing international order as is—an order that it midwifed to advance, and consolidate, its own interests. The E. H. Carr Moment presents the incumbent hegemon with a choice. It can dig in its heels and try to preserve the prevailing order—and its privileged position therein; or it can accede to the rising challenger's demands for revision. If it chooses the former course of action, it runs the risk of war with the dissatisfied challenger. If it chooses the latter, it must come to terms with the reality of its decline

, and the end of its hegemonic position. The E. H. Carr Moment is where the geopolitical rubber meets the road: the status quo power(s) must choose between accommodating or opposing the revisionist demands of the rising power(s). Liberal internationalists such as John Ikenberry argue that China will not challenge the current international order, even as the distribution of power continues to shift in its favour. This is a doubtful proposition. The geopolitical question—the E. H. Carr Moment—of our time is whether the declining hegemon in east Asia, the United States, will try to preserve a status quo that is becoming increasingly out of sync with the shifting distribution of power, or whether it can reconcile itself to a rising China's revisionist demands that the international order in east Asia be realigned to reflect the emerging power realities. Unless the United States can adjust gracefully to this tectonic geopolitical shift, the chances of a Sino-American war are high—as they always are during power transitions.92 However, whether change comes peacefully or violently, the Pax Americana's days are numbered.

#### No heg impact and retrenchment’s stabilizing – prefer cross-regional estimates and new statistics.

Fettweis 18—Associate professor of political science at Tulane University [Christopher J., 2018, *Psychology of a Superpower: Security and Dominance in U.S. Foreign Policy*, Chapter 1: Unipolarity and the System, pgs 28-34, Columbia University Press, Accessed through the Wake Forest Library]

Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that U.S. influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call the "strong points," or most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and the Persian Gulf.70 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great-power peace than to the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phe-nomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some sup-port to the hegemonic-stability case.71 In general, Washington has shown less interest in the affairs of the global South since the end of the Cold War, and the level of violence in almost all regions has declined. The United States intervenes far less in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and the states of the region are more peaceful. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as noted above, as is relative U.S. interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance. Regional peace and stability exist where there is active U.S. intervention, in other words, as well as where there is not. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions. The U.S. sheriff certainly appears to have enforced rules upon the great powers. Since we do not have a "control" Europe, however, one without the presence of U.S. troops and alliance commitments, it is dif-ficult to know what is causing those states to behave. In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington's intervention choices have at best been erratic: crises in Libya and Kosovo inspired responses, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Dar-fur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. When U.S. intervention has occurred, its wisdom and efficacy have not been encouraging. The security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East, to cite the most obvious example, would be better off if U.S. troops had stayed home.72 In recent years, substantial hard-power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. The region may well be essentially unpacifiable and immune to outside policing. At the very least, it seems hard to make the case that the U.S. presence has improved matters. In this strong point, unipolarity has failed to bring peace. To say that the United States has not always been successful in impos-ing peace on willing combatants would be to understate. The fruitless effort to encourage the various combatants in Syria to stop killing one another is a prominent example, and there are others. The United States also took the peacemaking lead during one of the rare interstate conflicts of the New Peace era, the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. A high-level U.S. delegation containing former and future national-security advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but it was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the con-flict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.73 The war did not end until the Ethiopians essentially won in late 2000. The globocop was irrelevant. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious U.S. involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primar-ily attributable to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative levia- than or that of its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work. CONFLICT AND U.S. CHOICES If U.S. power is the only thing holding back the forces of global chaos, then we would expect to see some variation in violence as the relative capabilities of the United States wax and wane. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense by about 25 percent, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 than it did in 1990.74 To those believers in the neoconservative version of hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace," argued Kristol and Kagan at the time.75 The world grew dramatically more peaceful while the United States cut its forces, however, and it stayed just as peaceful even as spending rebounded after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the military budget was cut under President Clin-ton, kept declining (though more slowly) as the Bush administration ramped it back up, and stayed steady as Obama cut back again. U.S. mili-tary spending has varied during the New Peace from a low in constant dollars of less than $400 billion to a high of more than $700 billion, but war does not seem to have noticed. The same nonrelationship exists between other potential proxy mea-surements for U.S. power and conflict. No connections exist between warfare and fluctuations in U.S. GDP, or alliance commitments, or for-ward military presence. Europe experienced very little fighting when there were 300,000 American troops stationed there, for example, and very little after 90 percent of those troops were removed. It is hard to find much correlation between U.S. actions and systemic stability. Noth-ing the United States actually does seems to matter to the New Peace. Absolute military spending might not be as important as relative. Although Washington cut back on spending during the 1990s, its advan-tage over all possible rivals never wavered. The United States has accounted for between 35 and 41 percent of global military spending every year since the collapse of the Soviet Union.76 Perhaps perceptions of U.S. power, as well as its willingness to use it, keep the peace. Fluc-tuations in its enormous defense budget might be unimportant com-pared to how the United States chooses to employ that budget. In other words, perhaps the grand strategy of the United States, rather than its absolute capability, is decisive in maintaining stability. Perceptions of U.S. power and the strength of its hegemony are to some degree functions of its willingness to use that power. A strong United States that chose to stand on the sidelines during crises would not encourage or enforce international cooperation. If indeed U.S. stra-tegic choices are directly related to international stability, then variation in its choices ought to have consequences for levels of conflict. A restrained United States would presumably be less likely to play the role of sheriff than one following a more activist approach. Indeed, hege-monic-stability theorists warn that following a grand strategy that did not make global policing a priority would court disaster. The "present danger" about which Kristol, Kagan, and their fellow travelers warned is that the United States "will shrink its responsibilities and—in a fit of absentmindedness, or parsimony, or indifference—allow the interna-tional order that it created and sustains to collapse."77 The Pulitzer Prize—winning journalist Brett Stephens predicted that an insufficiently activist U.S. grand strategy would result in "global pandemonium." 78 Liberals fear restraint as well and also warn that a militarized version of primacy would also be counterproductive in the long run. Washing-ton can undermine its creation over time through thoughtless unilat-eral actions that violate its own rules. Many liberals predicted that the invasion of Iraq and its general contempt for international institutions and law would call the legitimacy of the order into question. Ikenberry worried that Bush's "geostrategic wrecking ball" would lead to a more hostile, divided, and dangerous world.79 Thus while all hegemonic- stability theorists expect a rise of chaos during a restrained presidency, liberals also have grave concerns regarding primacy. If either version is correct—that global stability is provided by U.S. hegemony—then maintaining that stability through a grand strategy based on either primacy (to neoconservatives) or "deep engagement" (to liberals) is clearly wise.80 If, however, U.S. actions are only tangentially related to the outbreak of the New Peace or if any of the other proposed explanations are decisive, then the United States could retrench with-out fear of negative consequences. The grand strategy of the United States is therefore crucial to theo-ries of hegemonic stability. And, once again, there is no evidence that U.S. choices matter much. Although few observers would agree on the details, most would probably acknowledge that post—Cold War grand strategies of American presidents have differed in some important ways. As it happens, each administration is a reasonable representation of one the four ideal types of grand strategy laid out by Posen and Ross in 1996.81 Under George H.W. Bush, the United States followed the path of "selective engagement," which is sometimes referred to as "balance-of- power realism"; Bill Clinton's grand strategy looks a great deal like what Posen and Ross call "cooperative security" and others call "liberal inter- nationalism"; George W. Bush, especially in his first term, forged a strat-egy that was as close to "primacy" as any president is likely to get; and Barack Obama, despite some early flirtation with liberalism, followed a restrained realist path, which Posen and Ross label "neoisolationism" but its proponents refer to as "strategic restraint."82 In the lingo of political science, we have substantial variation in the independent variable, more than enough to determine its effect on the phenomenon under consider-ation. The result is clear (see table 1.1). Armed-conflict levels fell steadily throughout the post—Cold War era, irrespective of the grand strategic path Washington chose. Neither the primacy of George W. Bush nor the restraint of Barack Obama had much effect on the level of global violence. Despite continued warnings (and the high-profile mess in Syria), the world has not experienced an increase in violence while U.S. behavior became more restrained. Once again, if the grand strategy of the United States is responsible for the New Peace, it is leaving no trace in the evidence. If a correlation did exist between U.S. actions and international stabil-ity, if other states had reacted differently to fluctuations in U.S. military spending or grand strategy, then surely hegemonic-stability theorists would argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. Many liberals were on the lookout for chaos while George W. Bush was in the White House, just as neoconservatives have been quick to identify apparent worldwide catastrophe under President Obama.83 If increases in vio-lence would have been evidence for the wisdom of hegemonic strate-gies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the relationship between U.S. power and international stability suggests that the two are unrelated. The rest of the world appears quite capable and willing to operate effectively without the presence of a global police~~man~~. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. Hegemonic stability is a belief, in other words, rather than an estab-lished fact, and as such it deserves a different kind of examination.

#### China’s drive for regional hegemony is peaceful and not zero-sum with the US – aggressive containment increases risk of war

Heer 19 [Paul, National Intelligence Officer for East Asia in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from 2007 to 2015, the Robert E. Wilhelm Research Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies and an Adjunct Professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, Jan 8, 2019, “Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia,” <https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-40972>]

First, China is pursuing hegemony in East Asia, but not an exclusive hostile hegemony. It is not trying to extrude the United States from the region or deny American access there. The Chinese have long recognized the utility—and the benefits to China itself—of U.S. engagement with the region, and they have indicated receptivity to peaceful coexistence and overlapping spheres of influence with the United States there. Moreover, China is not trying to impose its political or economic system on its neighbors, and it does not seek to obstruct commercial freedom of navigation in the region (because no country is more dependent on freedom of the seas than China itself). In short, Beijing wants

to extend its power and influence within East Asia, but not as part of a “winner-take-all” contest.

China does have unsettled and vexing sovereignty claims over Taiwan, most of the islands and other features in the East and South China Seas, and their adjacent waters. Although Beijing has demonstrated a willingness to use force in defense or pursuit of these claims, it is not looking for excuses to do so. Whether these disputes can be managed or resolved in a way that is mutually acceptable to the relevant parties and consistent with U.S. interests in the region is an open, long-term question. But that possibility should not be ruled out on the basis of—or made more difficult by—false assumptions of irreconcilable interests. On the contrary, it should be pursued on the basis of a recognition that all the parties want to avoid conflict—and that the sovereignty disputes in the region ultimately are not military problems requiring military solutions. And since Washington has never been opposed in principle to reunification between China and Taiwan as long as it is peaceful, and similarly takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the other disputed features, their long-term disposition need not be the litmus test of either U.S. or Chinese hegemony in the region.

Of course, China would prefer not to have forward-deployed U.S. military forces in the Western Pacific that could be used against it, but Beijing has long tolerated and arguably could indefinitely tolerate an American military presence in the region—unless that presence is clearly and exclusively aimed at coercing or containing China. It is also true that Beijing disagrees with American principles of military freedom of navigation in the region; and this constitutes a significant challenge in waters where China claims territorial jurisdiction in violation of the UN Commission on the Law of the Sea. But this should not be conflated with a Chinese desire or intention to exclusively “control” all the waters within the first island chain in the Western Pacific. The Chinese almost certainly recognize that exclusive control or “domination” of the neighborhood is not achievable at any reasonable cost, and that pursuing it would be counterproductive by inviting pushback and challenges that would negate the objective.

So what would Chinese “hegemony” in East Asia mean or look like? Beijing probably thinks in terms of something much like American primacy in the Western Hemisphere: a model in which China is generally recognized and acknowledged as the de facto central or primary power in the region, but has little need or incentive for militarily adventurism because the mutual benefits of economic interdependence prevail and the neighbors have no reason—and inherent disincentives—to challenge China’s vital interests or security. And as a parallel to China’s economic and diplomatic engagement in Latin America, Beijing would neither exclude nor be hostile to continued U.S. engagement in East Asia.

A standard counterargument to this relatively benign scenario is that Beijing would not be content with it for long because China’s strategic ambitions will expand as its capabilities grow. This is a valid hypothesis, but it usually overlooks the greater possibility that China’s external ambitions will expand not because its inherent capabilities have grown, but because Beijing sees the need to be more assertive in response to external challenges to Chinese interests or security. Indeed, much of China’s “assertiveness” within East Asia over the past decade—when Beijing probably would prefer to focus on domestic priorities—has been a reaction to such perceived challenges. Accordingly, Beijing’s willingness to settle for a narrowly-defined, peaceable version of regional preeminence will depend heavily on whether it perceives other countries—especially the United States—as trying to deny China this option and instead obstruct Chinese interests or security in the region.

#### Even if it rises, it’s peaceful

* China seeks limited predation not outright competition
* Strategy and policy moves show coop over conflict
* Care most about stability

Shifrinson 19 [Joshua Shifrinson is an Assistant Professor of International Relations with the Pardee School of Global Affairs at Boston University. Should the United States Fear China’s Rise? Winter 2019. www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2019/01/Winter-2019\_Shifrinson\_0.pdf]

In short, limited predation—not an overt and outright push to overtake and challenge the United States—is the name of China’s current and highly rational game. As significantly, it appears Chinese leaders are aware of the structural logic of the situation. Despite ongoing debate over the extent to which China has departed from its long-standing “hide strength, bide time” strategy first formulated by Deng Xiaoping in favor a more assertive course seeking to increase Chinese influence in world affairs, Chinese leaders and China watchers have been at pains to point out that Chinese strategy still seeks to avoid provoking conflict with the United States.49 As one analyst notes, China’s decision to carve out a more prominent role for itself in world politics has been coupled with an effort to reassure and engage the United States so as to avoid unneeded competition while facilitating stability.50 Chinese leaders echo these themes, with one senior official noting in 2014 that Chinese policy focused on “properly addressing] conflicts and differences through dialogue and cooperation instead of confrontational approaches.”51 Xi Jinping himself has underlined these currents, arguing even before taking office that U.S.-Chinese relations should be premised on “preventing conflict and confrontation,” and more recently vowing that “China will promote coordination and cooperation with other major countries.”52 Ultimately, as one scholar observes, there is “hardly evidence that [... China has] begun to focus on hegemonic competition.”53 Put another way, China’s leaders appear aware of the risks of taking an overly confrontational stance toward a still-potent United States and have scoped Chinese ambitions accordingly.

#### Their China Alternative card is power-tagged – it says China’s a candidate but they’re focused domestically - here’s a re-cutting – sage in Green

1AC Haass 17 Richard Haass is President of the Council on Foreign Relations. “Who Will Fill America’s Shoes?” Project Syndicate. June 21st, 2017. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/global-leadership-successor-to-america-by-richard-n--haass-2017-06

Still, a shift away from a US-dominated world of structured relationships and standing institutions and toward something else is under way. What this alternative will be, however, remains largely unknowable. What we do know is that there is no alternative great power willing and able to step in and assume what had been the US role. China is a frequently mentioned candidate, but its leadership is focused mostly on consolidating domestic order and maintaining artificially high economic-growth rates to stave off popular unrest. China’s interest in regional and global institutions seems designed mostly to bolster its economy and geopolitical influence, rather than to help set rules and create broadly beneficial arrangements. Likewise, Russia is a country with a narrowly-based economy led by a government focused on retaining power at home and re-establishing Russian influence in the Middle East and Europe. India is preoccupied with the challenge of economic development and is tied down by its problematic relationship with Pakistan. Japan is held back by its declining population, domestic political and economic constraints, and its neighbors’ suspicions. Europe, for its part, is distracted by questions surrounding the relationship between member states and the European Union. As a result, the whole of the continent is less than the sum of its parts – none of which is large enough to succeed America on the world stage. But the absence of a single successor to the US does not mean that what awaits is chaos. At least in principle, the world’s most powerful countries could come together to fill America’s shoes. In practice, though, this will not happen, as these countries lack the capabilities, experience, and, above all, a consensus on what needs doing and who needs to do it. A more likely development is the emergence of a mix of order and disorder at both the regional and global level. China will promote various trade, infrastructure, and security mechanisms in Asia. The 11 remaining members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership may launch their trade pact without the US. Less clear is whether China is prepared to use its influence to **restrain North Korea**, **how India and Pakistan will avoid conflict**, and the resolution of Asia’s many **territorial disputes.** It is all too easy to imagine an Asian and Pacific future characterized by higher spending on arms of all types – and thus **more susceptible to violent conflict**. The Middle East is already suffering **unprecedented instability**, the result of local rivalries and realities, and of 15 years during which the US arguably first did too much and then too little to shape the region’s future. The immediate danger is not just further deterioration in failed states such as Yemen, Syria, and Libya, but also direct conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

#### Yes china is revisionist in a regional sense – that’s why their ev indicates its taken an adversarial stance when contested in the scs/ecs – BUT 0 warrants why global primacy is their end game

### Space War

#### China’s ASATs are operated by the Strategic Support Force – proven by 1AC Chow and Kelley.

#### The SSF is a governmental entity – they’re not a private actor.

Pollpeter et Al 17 Pollpeter, Kevin L., Michael S. Chase, and Eric Heginbotham. The creation of the PLA strategic support force and its implications for Chinese Military Space Operations. RAND Corporation Santa Monica United States, 2017. (Analyst at Rand)//Elmer

This report explores the missions and organization of China's military space enterprise, focusing on the organizational structure of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force (SSF). Created on December 31, 2015, as part of a major reorganization of China's military, the SSF is charged with developing and employing most of the PLA's space capabilities. Its creation signifies a shift in the PLA's prioritization of space and an increased role for PLA space capabilities. Chinese military strategists see military space capabilities and operations as a key component of strategic deterrence, critical to enabling the PLA to fight informatized local wars and counter U.S. military intervention in the region and essential for supporting operations aimed at protecting China's emerging interests in more-distant parts of the world. The main function of the SSF's space component appears to be the launch and operation of satellites to provide the PLA with command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. It appears that information warfare, including space warfare, long identified by PLA analysts as a critical element of future military operations, has entered a new phase of development in which an emphasis on space and information warfare, long-range precision strikes, and the requirements associated with conducting operations at greater distances from China has necessitated the establishment of a new and different type of organization.

#### This means the Aff doesn’t effect ASATs – they will say Commercial Sectors produce them, that’s irrelevant since the PLA operates them as an act of appropriation which isn’t effected by the plan.

#### Russia thumps the aff – their ev say they develop same co orbital dual use tech

#### No space war – it’s hype and systems are redundant

Johnson-Freese and Hitchens 16 [Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese is a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and author of Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens. Views expressed are those of the author alone. Theresa Hitchens is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), and the former Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, Switzerland. Stop The Fearmongering Over War In Space: The Sky’s Not Falling, Part 1. December 27, 2016. https://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/stop-the-fearmongering-over-war-in-space-the-skys-not-falling-part-1/]

In the last two years, we’ve seen rising hysteria over a future war in space. Fanning the flames are not only dire assessments from the US military, but also breathless coverage from a cooperative and credulous press. This reporting doesn’t only muddy public debate over whether we really need expensive systems. It could also become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The irony is that nothing makes the currently slim possibility of war in space more likely than fearmongering over the threat of war in space.

Two television programs in the past two years show how egregious this fearmongering can get. In April 2015, the CBS show 60 Minutes ran a segment called “The Battle Above.” In an interview with General John Hyten, the then-chief of U.S. Air Force Space Command, it came across loud and clear that the United States was being forced to prepare for a battle in space — specifically against China — that it really didn’t want.

It was explained by Hyten and other guests that China is building a considerable amount of hardware and accumulating significant know-how regarding space, all threatening to space assets Americans depend on every day. If viewers weren’t frightened after watching the segment, it wasn’t for lack of trying on the part of CBS.

Using terms like “offensive counterspace” as a 1984 NewSpeak euphemism for “weapons,” it was made clear that the United States had no choice but to spend billions of dollars on offensive counterspace technology to not just thwart the Chinese threat, but control and dominate space. While it didn’t actually distort facts — just omit facts about current U.S. space capabilities — the segment was basically a cost-free commercial for the military-industrial complex.

In retrospect though, “The Battle Above” was pretty good compared to CNN’s recent special, War in Space: The Next Battlefield. The latter might as well have been called Sharknado in Space – because the only far-out weapons technology our potential adversaries don’t have, according to the broadcast, seems to be “sharks with frickin’ laser beams attached to their heads!”

First, CNN needs to hire some fact checkers. Saying “unlike its adversaries, the U.S. has not yet weaponized space” is deeply misleading, like saying “unlike his political opponents, President-Elect Donald Trump has not sprouted wings and flown away”: A few (admittedly alarming) weapons tests aside, no country in the world has yet weaponized space. Contrary to CNN, stock market transactions are not timed nor synchronized through GPS, but a closed system. Cruise missiles can find their targets even without GPS, because they have both GPS and precision inertial measurement units onboard, and IMUs don’t rely on satellite data. Oh, and the British rock group Pink Floyd holds the only claim to the Dark Side of the Moon: There is a “far side” of the Moon — the side always turned away from the Earth — but not a “dark side” — which would be a side always turned away from the Sun.

More nefariously, the segment sensationalized nuggets of truth within a barrage of half-truths, backed by a heavy bass, dramatic soundtrack (and gravelly-voiced reporter Jim Sciutto) and accompanied by sexy and scary visuals.

Make no mistake there are dangers in space, and the United States has the most to lose if space assets are lost. The question is how best to protect them. Here are a few facts CNN omitted.

The Reality

The U.S. has all of the technologies described on the CNN segment and deemed potentially offensive: maneuverable satellites, nano-satellites, lasers, jamming capabilities, robotic arms, ballistic missiles that can be used as anti-satellite weapons, etc. In fact, the United States is more technologically advanced than other countries in both military and commercial space.

That technological superiority scares other countries; just as the U.S. military space community is scared of other countries obtaining those technologies in the future. The U.S. military space budget is more than 10 times greater than that of all the countries in the world combined. That also causes other countries concern.

More unsettling still, the United States has long been leery of treaty-based efforts to constrain a potential arms race in outer space, as supported by nearly every other country in the world for decades. Indeed, under the administration of George W. Bush, the U.S. talking points centered on the mantra “there is no arms race in outer space,” so there is no need for diplomat instruments to constrain one. Now, a decade later, the U.S. military – backed by the Intelligence Community which operates the nation’s spy satellites – seems to be shouting to the rooftops that the United States is in danger of losing the space arms race already begun by its potential adversaries. The underlying assumption — a convenient one for advocates of more military spending — is that now there is nothing that diplomacy can do.

However, it must be remembered that most space-related technologies – with the exception of ballistic missiles and dedicated jammers – have both military and civil/commercial uses; both benign — indeed, helpful — and nefarious uses. For example, giving satellites the ability to maneuver on orbit can allow useful inspections of ailing satellites and possibly even repairs.

Further, the United States is not unable to protect its satellites, as repeated during the CNN broadcast by various interviewees and the host. Many U.S. government-owned satellites, including precious spy satellites, have capabilities to maneuver. Many are hardened against electro-magnetic pulse, sport “shutters” to protect optical “eyes” from solar flares and lasers, and use radio frequency hopping to resist jamming.

Offensive weapons, deployed on the ground to attack satellites, or in space, are not a silver bullet. To the contrary, U.S. deployment of such weapons may actually be detrimental to U.S. and international security in space (as we argued in a recent Atlantic Council publication, Towards a New National Security Space Strategy). Further, there are benefits to efforts started by the Obama Administration to find diplomatic tools to restrain and constrain dangerous military activities in space.

These diplomatic efforts, however, would be undercut by a full-out U.S. pursuit of “space dominance.” This includes dialogue with China, the lack of which Gen. William Shelton, retired commander of Air Force Space Command, lamented in the CNN report.

Given CNN’s “cast,” the spin was not surprising. Starting with Ghost Fleet author Peter Singer set the sensationalist tone, which never altered. The apocalyptic opening, inspired by Ghost Fleet, posited a scenario where all U.S. satellites are taken off-line in nearly one fell swoop. Unless we are talking about an alien invasion, that scenario is nigh on impossible. No potential adversary has such capabilities, nor will they ever likely do so. There is just too much redundancy in the system.

#### No China space war – the only scenario for conflict is Earthbound – Chinese military plans prove

Cheng 17 [Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy Heritage. The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Deterring Gray Zone Coercion in the Maritime, Cyber, and Space Domains. Chapter 6. Space Deterrence, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and Asian Security: A U.S. Perspective. Rand Corporation. 2017]

But while there may be clashes in space, the actual source of any Sino-American conflict will remain earthbound, most likely stemming from tensions associated with the situation in the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, or the South China Sea. This suggests that U.S. and allied decisionmakers (both in Asia and Europe) should be focusing on deterring aggression in general, rather than concentrating primarily on trying to forestall actions in space. Indeed, there is little evidence that Chinese military planners are contemplating a conflict limited to space. While there may be actions against space systems, Chinese writings suggest that they would either be limited in nature, as part of a signaling and coercive effort, or else would be integrated with broader terrestrial military operations.