### T – Extra

#### Topical affirmatives must only garner offense from “Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.”

#### They are Extra-Topical: The Aff establishes International Outer Space Authority, which is more than appropriation bad – it “parallels” the International Seabed Authority under UNCLOS -- that controls State AND private company exploitation which goes beyond the resolution. It is also responsible for rent, fund instruction and other unknown provisions. Lastly, the US won’t sign on so even if they’re topical, no solvency. Peninsula Inserts

**Pershing 19** [Abigail D. Pershing, J.D., Yale, “Interpreting the Outer Space Treaty’s Non-Appropriation Principle: Customary International Law from 1967 to Today,” 2019, *The Yale Journal of International Law*, Vol. 44, https://openyls.law.yale.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.13051/6733/Pershing.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y, EA] // gord0

B. A New Property Rights Proposal: Leasing Space One promising proposal that does not appear to have received much attention in the literature is the concept of leasing space to nations, private individuals, or companies rather than allocating it as permanently-owned property. It appears that the only authors who have even tangentially considered the possibility of leasing property rights in space beyond rights to mineral extraction are Marcel Williams and G.S. Sachdeva. Williams’ writing is limited to a thought experiment in which he imagines renting out up to one percent of the moon’s surface. This property would be directly leased to national governments, which in turn would be vested with the power to sublease sections of this territory to private companies or individuals.134 This proposal is not elaborated any further and is left as a broad-strokes outline. The second mention of leasing or renting space comes from G.S. Sachdeva, who argues that a U.N. Space Superintendence Authority could grant leases to those able to pay.135 Yet this theory is limited to a discussion of renting property rights in particular orbits to allow for hovering geostationary space hotels and does not delve into questions of renting land on celestial bodies. The concept of leasing outer space deserves greater consideration by space law scholars. This Section sketches a brief outline of how such a system might operate via an internationally-run space property rental system modeled on UNCLOS. Although UNCLOS itself is deeply problematic in its potentially devastating environmental consequences and negative impacts on indigenous peoples as it regulates deep-sea mining,136 the UNCLOS model may nonetheless be the best option for preserving non-space-faring nations’ rights with regard to outer space, given its success in providing developing nations with a voice in the regulation of the high seas and the seabed beyond national jurisdiction.137 It is worth noting that although very few scholars appear to have considered the possibility of renting space, several have examined the similarities between UNCLOS and space law.138 The approach advanced here differs from the conventional approach to this comparison in that it suggests that the international community move beyond merely authorizing nations or individuals to extract a certain quantity of minerals and instead consider the possibility of leasing out actual tracts of space land. Opened for signature on December 10, 1982, UNCLOS establishes the international rules that govern the use of the world’s oceans and their resources. An examination of UNCLOS is especially apt because it deals with resources— the high seas—that, like space, are not subject to national appropriation. In language strikingly similar to Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, Article 137 of UNCLOS reads: No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area [resources of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction] or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical person appropriate any part thereof.139 Although there are clear similarities between the two treaties, there are substantial differences as well, many of which would be useful in informing an update to the Outer Space Treaty. In addition to extending the prohibition on sovereignty to individuals as well as to nations, UNCLOS goes far beyond the Outer Space Treaty in detailing the limits of the non-appropriation principle. All of Part XI of UNCLOS, totaling fifty-eight Articles, gives a detailed description of how States can negotiate within the bounds of the non-appropriation principle to exploit ocean resources. Of particular relevance for purposes of crafting a parallel space law proposal is UNCLOS Part XI, Section 4, which lays out the rules governing the International Seabed Authority—the main mechanism through which States and private companies can legally exploit ocean resources, including mining of the deep seabed.140 Using UNCLOS as a model, a similar system may prove promising for the evolution of space law. However, the new space system should allow for rental of space land instead of merely allowing for the extraction of space resources. As with UNCLOS, any such space leasing system should be run through the United Nations. Situating such a system in this forum would help the international community stay true to the intentions of the Outer Space Treaty, which provides, in the words of one author, a “philosophical roadmap for the future development of the outer space legal regime.”141 Although a new committee within the United Nations could be formed for this purpose, the existing Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) would be an ideal environment for the creation and operation of such a system. UNCOPUOS is composed of eighty-seven geographically and economically diverse member States (including all the major space-faring States). Additionally, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations have observer status.142 Given its central mission to maintain space as a peaceful arena of international cooperation, as well as its representative composition,143 it would be an ideal body to bring a space leasing system to fruition. UNCOPUOS, in turn, should operationalize the leasing system by establishing a new International Outer Space Authority. This Outer Space Authority should parallel the International Seabed Authority described above.144 There should be similar provisions for the International Outer Space Authority relating to the makeup and functioning of the Authority (with each country getting one vote and decisions made by a two-thirds majority);145 the power of the Outer Space Authority to exercise control over space generally;146 the ability to decide how much rent to charge nations or individual corporations;147 and how to use these funds,148 among other provisions. For this proposed Outer Space Authority to be useful as well as operational, it is critical that it have jurisdiction over property rights in space beyond mining rights. Having rights to property in addition to rights to extracted minerals would add an extra layer of legal security for companies considering venturing into space for mining purposes. And, although businesses currently seem most interested in the possibilities of mining space resources, in the long term, questions of space tourism and the potential development of space colonies may arise. Having a flexible system in place that can adequately handle these concerns is therefore desirable. Instead of just focusing on mining, an Outer Space Authority with broader jurisdiction will have longer staying power and will require less reworking in the near future. Part of the appeal of this rental model is that it works so seamlessly with the current Outer Space Treaty. Turning again to the language of the Treaty and beginning with the non-appropriation principle, Article II lays out that “[o]uter space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”149 Because no State or individual would ever own land in space under a leasing system, this proposed leasing regime would not be in contravention to Article II. And yet, despite this, a leasing regime would establish enough legal security that exploitation of space resources would not be impeded—the main rationale for those who argue that the Treaty (or at least Article II) should be rescinded. Moreover, the principle established in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, that “[t]he exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind,” is also upheld under this leasing regime.150 Leasing not only allows nations and private companies to exploit space resources and reap the benefits of their labor, but also directly benefits developing countries not yet able to tap into the resources of space by redistributing some of the space-going nations’ profits via a leasing fee and a tax on extracted resources. A potential argument against this rental system, as well as any other international legal system that would seek to regulate property rights in space, is that the United States never signed on to UNCLOS and there is nothing different about this situation that would cause the United States to join an international treaty regulating property in space either. However, space law has a fairly different history than the law of the sea. These differences make it more likely (though unfortunately not certain) that a proposal for an International Outer Space Authority would be adopted by the United States despite the fact that the facially similar UNCLOS proposal failed to garner a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate. The major difference between UNCLOS and this proposed International Outer Space Authority is that the United States has self-interested reasons for supporting an International Outer Space Authority, whereas it did not have similar reasons to join UNCLOS. The United States has maintained that under customary international law, deep seabed mining is already permissible.151 Since the United States does not recognize limitations of deep seabed mining established in UNCLOS, it may legally undertake deep sea mining under customary international law—a right that is codified in domestic U.S. law in the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act: [I]t is the legal opinion of the United States that exploration for and commercial recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed are freedoms of the high seas subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their exercise of those and other freedoms recognized by general principles of international law . . . .152 The United States therefore already has access to what it wants without having to join UNCLOS. As an additional point, there is also not much pressure from American companies to ratify UNCLOS, in part because the American Exclusive Economic Zone (recognized by the United States under customary international law)153 and the continental shelf is hugely rich in the resources companies might otherwise have hoped to gain by joining the Treaty and gaining access to minerals from deep sea mining in other areas. Finally, not only does the United States stand to gain very little by ratifying the Treaty, there is an argument that ratification would disadvantage the United States. Under UNCLOS, “coastal States are required to make payments to the International Seabed Authority based on a percentage of revenues derived from the exploitation of the resources found within the continental margin beyond two hundred miles from the coast.”154 Notably, customary international law creates no such obligation.155 In stark contrast to UNCLOS, the new rental system proposed would directly benefit the United States. Unlike with deep sea mining, the United States and its citizens currently are bound by a treaty that prohibits appropriation of space: the Outer Space Treaty. Unlike the UNCLOS analogy, the United States has already relinquished rights in this arena. Agreeing to a leasing amendment would expand the scope of its rights, not infringe upon them. Additionally, the United States does not have access to an outer space “exclusive economic zone” in the same way that it does for the sea. Without some sort of agreement, the United States simply may not legally appropriate any in situ property in outer space. One final consideration increases the likelihood that the United States would in fact become a signatory to an amendment to the Outer Space Treaty. Such an amendment would likely have the support of businesses, environmental groups, and the military, an unlikely combination of key constituencies that would help push an amended treaty forward. Businesses would advocate for the change because it would provide a clearer mechanism for establishing property rights.156 Environmental groups might push for the amendment’s ratification because of the environmental protections that could be included in such an agreement.157 Finally, the military would also likely be a proponent of the system because having access to property in space gives strategic advantages158 and because it is likely that certain Cold War-era concerns that prompted spacefaring nations to sign the original Outer Space Treaty remain relevant—most notably, concerns over the weaponization of space.159 CONCLUSION The brief history of outer space law since the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967 highlights the ease with which customary international law shifts in this arena. Despite an original broad interpretation of the non-appropriation principle during the Treaty’s drafting, customary international law has since carved out an exception to this principle for extracted space resources. A second shift could be similarly underway. Driven by economic incentives, States may reinterpret the non-appropriation principle to allow for private appropriation of space property. Currently, States have an incentive to cooperate to establish a new international agreement concerning the use of outer space because international law, as it is presently understood, prohibits private property rights in space. A new amendment could broaden these rights, providing an enticing carrot to encourage State cooperation. But this enticement may soon disappear. Given the flexibility of the current outer space legal regime, customary international law could easily shift to interpret the non-appropriation principle as allowing private appropriation of property in space. Whatever the international community decides is the optimal solution regarding outer space property rights, it is vital that action be taken now to preserve the principles advanced by the Outer Space Treaty, such as equitable access and peaceful use of outer space. As the original drafters of the Outer Space Treaty recognized, these principles are best protected through a formal agreement and not merely through customary international law, which is often driven by the most powerful States. Regardless of whether a rental system similar to the one described above is established or some other method is used, the international community will have to act quickly if it wants to maintain shared international control over space. Pursuing an amendment to the Treaty as described also provides certainty and timeliness, two elements that would likely appeal to constituencies that might otherwise be supposed to be content with waiting for customary international law to shift.

#### Vote Neg for limits and ground – they explode the number of Affs on the topic by allowing for external offense and create the OSA which can make new provisions of space that still regulate property rights – which is their solvency advocate – zero’s all DA’s and means perm do the CP always wins since the Aff is an advantage counterplan which makes debates impossible for the Negative because that is unpredictable.

#### No PTX in a vacuum – you said you will defend the stuff our violation is based off “We’ll defend a leasing regime operationalized by the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) which should establish an International Outer Space Authority (IOSA). Forbidding appropriation through the end of permanent and exclusive claim over asteroids allows the streamlining and regulation of exploitation that provides the secure foundation for private space activities – the alternative is an ad-hoc CIL regime that decks legal certainty.” and it leads to the Aff putting all the words in the res in the plan text to meet T while defending distinct proposals to get out of DA’s. Determine violations based off their solvency evidence and what they say they’ll defend in the 1AC.

#### Competing Interps – Topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical and Reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation.

### 1NC – CP

#### States should enter into a prior and binding consultation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over a proposal to declare the appropriation of outer space by private actors via Large Satellite Constellations in Lower Earth Orbit unjust. States will support the proposal and adopt the results of consultation.

#### NATO says yes – appropriation is bad, and NATO is uniquely defensive and cooperative with I-Law.

Peace In Space 21 Peace In Space. March 25, 2021. “NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg: no weapons In space” [NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg: no weapons In space – Peace In Space](https://peaceinspace.com/2019/12/nato-secretary-general-stoltenberg-no-weapons-in-space/) Accessed 12-9 // gord0

In a November 20 speech to [NATO ministers in Brussels](https://peaceinspace.com/2019/12/10/nato-foreign-ministers-officially-recognise-space-as-an-operational-domain/), NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that while the organization’s security presence in space is vital, “NATO has no intention to put weapons in space — we are a defensive alliance.”

NATO members will continue to use space for observation and surveillance purposes, but will remain fully in line with international law, he said. “This approach can allow NATO planners to make requests for allies to provide capabilities and services, such as hours of satellite communications.”

“We are proud of NATO’s historic decision to recognise space as an operational domain, alongside air, land, sea and cyber. Space is part of our daily lives. It is also essential to the Alliance’s deterrence and defence, from navigation to intelligence to missile detection.” — [NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/who_is_who_49999.htm)

Observation and surveillance purposes

Stoltenberg further explained that NATO’s coordinated approach involves three strategic issues: relations with Russia, the rise of China, and arms control. “Making space an operational domain will help us ensure that all aspects are taken into account to ensure the success of our missions.”

NATO members will continue to use space for observation and surveillance purposes, but will remain “fully in line with international law,” he added. This approach “can allow NATO planners to make requests for allies to provide capabilities and services, such as hours of satellite communications.”

Stoltenberg noted that NATO keeps at the leading edge of technology with a “one billion dollar investment in eyes in the sky, AWACS surveillance aircraft. This modernization will ensure the fleet’s service to 2035 and provide the best possible intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.”

#### Consultation over space strengthens NATO legitimacy and operations – communication, positioning, missile warning and counter space ops

Louisa Remuss 10 Nina-Louisa Remuss holds a M. Litt, in International Security Studies from the University of St. Andrews and a B.A. in European Studies from the University of Maastricht. October, 2010. “NATO and Space: Why is Space Relevant for NATO?” [NATO and Space: Why is Space Relevant for NATO? (ethz.ch)](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/124749/ESPI_Perspectives_40.pdf) Page 2-3 Accessed 12-9 // gord0

The increasing reliance on space applications and the emerging global challenges and threats, place new demands on space capabilities.5 Given today’s multi-polar world, security providers face a very different security and threat environment than during the Cold War. At the same time, during the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had agreed not to attack each other’s space assets, which provided for a certain degree of transparency given that both were the sole actors in space. Characterizing conflicts as fundamentally unpredictable, NATO’s Allied Joint Doctrine stresses the added value of using technology. Accordingly, NATO’s operations are already dependent on space applications as NATO comes to rely on it for global situational awareness, decision superiority and precision engagement. In spite of NATO’s dependence on space operations, the Alliance is still missing a holistic approach to the subject. Space applications can be understood as force multipliers or enablers. The following section will rely on the EU’s experiences and will give four examples of areas where this is the case: in external security missions, in damage and impact assessment during post-crisis management, in the fight against piracy and in providing internal security, i.e. against nontraditional threats such as terrorism, natural disasters etc. In External Security Missions European Union external security missions, such as the EU Military Crisis Management Operations EUFOR Chad / RCA (from French: Central African Republic) rely on satellites for secure communications between the Operations Headquarters (OHQ) and units deployed on the field, as well as on satellite imagery for mapping in support of their mission, especially considering the local absence of terrestrial communications infrastructure and the large dimensions of the theatre of operations. NATO is relying on space applications to support its ISAF operations in Afghanistan. These range from communications, position, navigation and timing, environmental sensing, missile warning, personnel recover and infrared remote sensing, to counter space operations. Space capabilities are however not fully integrated and utilised as a result of, first the lack of NATO strategy to space applications, second the resulting limited exposure of space capabilities prior to the deployment and third the limited number of personnel among the ISAF staff with space expertise.

#### NATO is a force multiplier – solves a slew of existential threats

Burns 18 Nicholas Burns 7-11-2018 “What America Gets Out of NATO” <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/11/opinion/what-america-gets-out-of-nato.html> (former under-secretary of state and ambassador to NATO and teaches diplomacy and international relations at Harvard)//Elmer

None of this, of course, is likely to disturb Mr. Trump, who remains steadfast in his belief that whatever benefits the United States gained from the trans-Atlantic alliance in the past, the country no longer profits. But he’s wrong — there are compelling reasons that NATO in particular will be a distinct advantage for America’s security far into the future. First, NATO’s formidable conventional and nuclear forces are the most effective way to **protect North America and Europe** — the **heart of the democratic world** — from attack. Threats to our collective security have not vanished in the 21st century. Mr. Putin remains a determined adversary preying on Eastern Europe and American elections. **NATO is a force multiplier**: The United States has allies who will stand by us, while Russia has none. And while it’s true that most of America’s NATO allies need to increase their defense spending under the treaty, they’re not freeloaders: The United States has **relied on NATO allies to strike back against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Islamic State in the Middle East**. European troops have replaced American soldiers in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and contribute the large majority in Kosovo. Our NATO allies are also getting better about contributing their fair share. They have increased their defense spending by a total of more than $87 billion since Mr. Putin annexed Crimea in 2014. Fourteen more allies will reach NATO’s military spending target — 2 percent of gross domestic product — by 2024. Mr. Trump would be smart to claim credit for this at this week’s summit. A second reason for maintaining the trans-Atlantic alliance is America’s economic future. The European Union is our country’s largest trade partner, and its largest investor. The United States and the European Union are the world’s two largest economies, and can steer global trade to their advantage if they stick together. More than four million Americans work for European companies in the United States. Forty-five of the 50 states export more to Europe than to China. Mr. Trump is right that the two sides are also economic competitors, and trade disputes are inevitable. His predecessors kept this tension in balance lest there be damaging consequences for American businesses, workers and farmers — a good reminder for Mr. Trump, whose ill-conceived trade war with Canada and Europe risks harming the American economy. Third, future American leaders will find Europe is our most capable and willing partner in tackling the biggest threats to global security: **climate change; drug and cybercrime cartels; terrorism; pandemics and mass migration from Africa and the Middle East**. And America’s **NATO allies will continue to be indispensable in safeguarding democracy** and freedom, under assault by Russia and China.

### 1NC – DA

#### Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.

**Mitter and Johnson 21** [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, [Rana Mitter](https://hbr.org/search?term=rana%20mitter&search_type=search-all) is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. [Elsbeth Johnson](https://hbr.org/search?term=elsbeth%20johnson&search_type=search-all), formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, [https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21](https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china%20accessed%2012/14/21)] Adam

In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule, suggesting that democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent. In fact, many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements—large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.

China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to [innovate](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china). It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration. Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries. This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals. That’s why ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed 95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens. Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive, although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

#### Xi has committed to the commercial space industry as the linchpin of China’s rise – the plan is seen as a complete 180

**Patel 21** [Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called [Document 60](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml) that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

“Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”

As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a[2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx). More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it [released the first images taken by the satellite](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/spacenews.com/spacety-releases-first-sar-images/), Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding.

And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.

Making friends

The most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders.

“China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.

Although China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry, the nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about. While Chinese companies may look private on paper, they must still submit to government guidance and control, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy, especially if the government is a frequent customer. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often [very cagey about what its national program is even up to](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54076895).

And Hines adds that it’s not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

#### Shifts in regime perception threatens CCP’s legitimacy from nationalist hardliners

Weiss 19 Jessica Weiss 1-29-2019 “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China” <http://www.jessicachenweiss.com/uploads/3/0/6/3/30636001/19-01-24-elite-statements-isq-ca.pdf> (Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University)//Elmer

Public support—or the appearance of it—matters to many autocracies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool writes, modern dictatorships are “highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts to affect it.”6 Mao Zedong told his comrades: “When you make revolution, you must first manage public opinion.”7 Because autocracies often rely on **nationalist mythmaking**,8 success or failure in defending the national honor in international crises could burnish the leadership’s patriotic credentials or spark opposition. **Shared outrage at the regime’s foreign policy failures could galvanize street protests or elite fissures, creating intraparty upheaval** or inviting military officers to step in to restore order. Fearing a domestic backlash, authoritarian leaders may feel compelled to take a tough international stance. Although authoritarian leaders are rarely held accountable to public opinion through free and fair elections, fears of popular unrest and irregular ouster often weigh heavily on autocrats seeking to maximize their tenure in office. Considering the harsh consequences that authoritarian elites face if pushed out of office, even a small increase in the probability of ouster could alter authoritarian incentives in international crises.9 A history of nationalist uprisings make Chinese citizens and leaders especially aware of the linkage between international disputes and domestic unrest. The weakness of the PRC’s predecessor in defending Chinese sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 galvanized protests and a general strike, forcing the government to sack three officials and reject the Treaty of Versailles, which awarded territories in China to Japan. These precedents have made Chinese officials particularly sensitive to the appearance of hewing to public opinion. As the People’s Daily chief editor wrote: “History and reality have shown us that public opinion and regime safety are inseparable.”10 One Chinese scholar even claimed: “the Chinese government probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”11

#### Xi will launch diversionary war to domestic backlash – escalates in multiple hotspots

Norris 17, William J. Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges. CFR Discussion Paper, 2017. (Associate professor of Chinese foreign and security policy at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service)//Elmer

Populist pressures might tempt the **party leadership** to encourage **diversionary nationalism**. The logic of this concern is straightforward: the Communist Party might seek to **distract a restless domestic population** with **adventurism abroad**.19 The **Xi** administration wants to **appear tough** in its **defense of foreign encroachments** against China’s interests. This need stems from a long-running narrative about how a weak Qing dynasty was unable to defend China in the face of European imperial expansion, epitomized by the Opium Wars and the subsequent treaties imposed on China in the nineteenth century. The party is **particularly sensitive** to **perceptions of weakness** because much of its **claim to legitimacy**—manifested in **Xi’s Chinese Dream** campaign today—stems from the party’s claims of leading the **restoration of Chinese greatness**. For example, the May Fourth Movement, a popular protest in 1919 that helped catalyze the CPC, called into question the legitimacy of the Republic of China government running the country at that time because the regime was seen as not having effectively defended China’s territorial and sovereignty interests at the Versailles Peace Conference. **Diversionary nationalist frictions** would likely occur if the Chinese leadership portrayed a foreign adversary as having made the first move, thus forcing Xi to stand up for China’s interests. An example is the 2012 attempt by the nationalist governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private owner.20 Although the Japanese central government sought to avert a crisis by stepping in to purchase the islands—having them bought and administered by Ishihara’s Tokyo metropolitan government would have dragged Japan into a confrontation with China—China saw this move as part of a deliberate orchestration by Japan to nationalize the islands. Xi seemingly had no choice but to defend China’s claims against an attempt by Japan to consolidate its position on the dispute.21 This issue touched off a period of heated tensions between China and Japan, lasting more than two years.22 Such dynamics are not limited to Japan. Other possible areas of conflict include, but are not necessarily limited to, **Taiwan**, **India**, and the **South China Sea** (especially with the **Philippines** and **Vietnam**). The Chinese government will use such tactics if it believes that the costs are relatively low. Ideally, China would like to appear tough while avoiding material repercussions or a serious diplomatic breakdown. Standing up against foreign encroachment—without facing much blowback—could provide Xi’s administration with a tempting source of noneconomic legitimacy. However, over the next few years, Xi will probably not be actively looking to get embroiled abroad. Cushioning the fallout from slower growth while managing a structural economic transition will be difficult enough. Courting potential international crises that distract the central leadership would make this task even more daunting. Even if the top leadership did not wish to provoke conflict, a smaller budgetary allotment for security could cause **military interests** in China to **deliberately instigate trouble** to **justify** their **claims over increasingly scarce resources**. For example, an air force interested in ensuring its funding for a midair tanker program might find the existence of far-flung territorial disputes to be useful in making its case. Such a case would be made even stronger by a pattern of recent frictions that highlights the necessity of greater air power projection. Budgetary pressures may be partly behind a recent People’s Liberation Army reorganization and headcount reduction. A slowing economy might cause a further deceleration in China’s military spending, thus increasing such pressures as budgetary belts tighten. Challenges to Xi’s Leadership Xi Jinping’s efforts to address economic challenges could fail, unleashing consequences that extend well beyond China’s economic health. For example, an **economic collapse** could give rise to a Vladimir **Putin–like redemption figure** in China. Xi’s approach of centralizing authority over a diverse, complex, and massive social, political, and economic system is a **recipe for brittleness**. Rather than designing a resilient, decentralized governance structure that can gracefully cope with localized failures at particular nodes in a network, a highly centralized architecture **risks catastrophic**, **system-level failure**. Although centralized authority offers the tantalizing chimera of stronger control from the center, it also puts all the responsibility squarely on Xi’s shoulders. With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate **unintended international repercussions**. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have **ripple effects abroad**. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, **raising the risks** of **strategic miscalculation** on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23 Weakened Fetters of Economic Interdependence If China successfully transitioned away from its export-driven growth model toward a consumption-driven economic engine over the next four or five years, it could no longer feel as constrained by economic interdependence. To the extent that such constraints are loosened, the U.S.-China relationship will be more prone to conflict and friction.24 While China has never been the archetypal liberal economic power bent on benign integration with the global economy, its export-driven growth model produced a strong strategic preference for stability. Although past behavior is not necessarily indicative of future strategic calculus, China’s “economic circuit breaker” logic seems to have held its most aggressive nationalism below the threshold of war since 1979. A China that is both comparatively strong and less dependent on the global economy would be a novel development in modern geopolitics. As China changes the composition of its international economic linkages, global integration could place fewer constraints on it. Whereas China has been highly reliant on the import of raw materials and semifinished goods for reexport, a consumption-driven China could have a different international trade profile. China could still rely on imported goods, but their centrality to the country’s overall economic growth would be altered. Imports of luxury goods, consumer products, international brands, and services may not exert a significant constraining influence, since loss of access to such items may not be seen as strategically vital. If these flows were interrupted or jeopardized, the result would be more akin to an inconvenience than a strategic setback for China’s rise. That said, China is likely to continue to highly depend on imported oil even if the economic end to which that energy resource is directed shifts away from industrial and export production toward domestic consumption.

#### US–China war goes nuclear – crisis mis-management ensures conventional escalation - extinction

Kulacki 20 [Dr. Gregory Kulacki focuses on cross-cultural communication between the United States and China on nuclear and space arms control and is the China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020. Would China Use Nuclear Weapons First In A War With The United States?, Thediplomat.com, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/would-china-use-nuclear-weapons-first-in-a-war-with-the-united-states/] srey

Admiral Charles A. Richard, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, recently told the Senate Armed Service Committee he “could drive a truck” through the holes in China’s no first use policy. But when Senator John Hawley (R-MO) asked him why he said that, Commander Richard backtracked, described China’s policy as “very opaque” and said his assessment was based on “very little” information. That’s surprising. **China** has been exceptionally **clear** **about** its **intentions** **on** the possible **first** **use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons**. On the day of its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, China declared it “will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.” That **unambiguous** **statement** **has** **been** a **cornerstone** **of** **Chinese** **nuclear** **weapons** policy for 56 years and has been repeated frequently in authoritative Chinese publications for domestic and international audiences, including a highly classified training manual for the operators of China’s nuclear forces. Richard should know about those publications, particularly the training manual. A U.S. Department of Defense translation has been circulating within the U.S. nuclear weapons policy community for more than a decade. The commander’s comments to the committee indicate a familiarity with the most controversial section of the manual, which, in the eyes of some U.S. analysts, indicates there may be some circumstances where **China** **would** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **first** **in** a **war** **with** **the** **U**nited **S**tates. This U.S. misperception is understandable, especially given the difficulties the Defense Department encountered translating the text into English. The language, carefully considered in the context of the entire book, articulates a strong reaffirmation of China’s no first use policy. But it also reveals **Chinese** military planners are **struggling** **with** **crisis** **management** **and** **considering** **steps** **that** could **create** **ambiguity** **with** **disastrous** **consequences**. Towards the end of the 405-page text on the operations of China’s strategic rocket forces, in a chapter entitled, “Second Artillery Deterrence Operations,” the authors explain what China’s nuclear forces train to do if **“**a strong military power possessing nuclear‐armed missiles and an absolute advantage in high‐tech conventional weapons is carrying out intense and continuous attacks against our major strategic targets and we have no good military strategy to resist the enemy.**”** The military power they’re talking about is the United States. The authors indicate China’s nuclear missile forces train to take specific steps, including increasing readiness and conducting launch exercises, to “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks.” The manual refers to these steps as an “adjustment” to China’s nuclear policy and a “lowering” of China’s threshold for brandishing its nuclear forces. Chinese leaders would only take these steps in extreme circumstances. The text highlights several triggers such as U.S. conventional bombing of China’s nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, heavy conventional bombing of large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, or other acts of **conventional** **warfare** **that** “**seriously** **threatened**” the “safety and **survival**” of the nation. U.S. Misunderstanding Richard seems to believe this planned adjustment in China’s nuclear posture means China is **preparing** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** first under these circumstances. He told Hawley that there are a “number of situations where they may conclude that first use has occurred that do not meet our definition of first use.” The head of the U.S. Strategic Command appears to assume, as do other U.S. analysts, that the **Chinese** would **interpret** **these** types of U.S. conventional **attacks** **as** **equivalent** **to** a **U.S. first use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons** against China. But that’s not what the text says. “Lowering the threshold” refers to China putting its nuclear weapons on alert — it does not indicate Chinese leaders might lower their threshold for deciding to use nuclear weapons in a crisis. Nor does the text indicate Chinese nuclear forces are training to launch nuclear weapons first in a war with the United States. China, unlike the United States, keeps its nuclear forces off-alert. Its warheads are not mated to its missiles. China’s nuclear-armed submarines are not continuously at sea on armed patrols. The manual describes how China’s nuclear warheads and the missiles that deliver them are controlled by two separate chains of command. Chinese missileers train to bring them together and launch them after China has been attacked with nuclear weapons. All of these behaviors are consistent with a no first use policy. The “adjustment” Chinese nuclear forces are preparing to make if the United States is bombing China with impunity is to place China’s nuclear forces in a state of readiness similar to the state the nuclear forces of the United States are in all the time. This step is intended not only to end the bombing, but also to convince U.S. decision-makers they cannot expect to destroy China’s nuclear retaliatory capability if the crisis escalates. Chinese Miscalculation Unfortunately, alerting Chinese nuclear forces at such a moment could have terrifying consequences. Given the relatively small size of China’s nuclear force, a U.S. president might be tempted to try to limit the possible damage from a Chinese nuclear attack by destroying as many of China’s nuclear weapons as possible before they’re launched, especially if the head of the U.S. Strategic Command told the president China was preparing to strike first. One study concluded that if the United States used nuclear weapons to attempt to knock out a small fraction of the Chinese ICBMs that could reach the United States it may kill tens of millions of Chinese civilians. The authors of the text assume alerting China’s nuclear forces would “create a great shock in the enemy’s psyche.” That’s a fair assumption. But they also assume this shock could “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks against our major strategic targets.” That’s highly questionable. There is a **substantial** **risk** **the** **U**nited **S**tates **would** **respond** **to** this implicit **Chinese** **threat** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **by** **escalating**, rather than halting, its **conventional** **attacks**. If China’s nuclear forces were targeted, it would put even greater strain on the operators of China’s nuclear forces. A **slippery** **slope** **to** **nuclear** **war** Chinese military planners are aware that attempting to coerce the United States into halting conventional bombardment by alerting their nuclear forces could fail. They also know it might trigger a nuclear war. But if it does, they are equally clear China won’t be the one to start it. Nuclear attack is often preceded by nuclear coercion. Because of this, in the midst of the process of a high, strong degree of nuclear coercion we should prepare well for a nuclear retaliatory attack. The more complete the preparation, the higher the credibility of nuclear coercion, the easier it is to accomplish the objective of nuclear coercion, and the lower the possibility that the nuclear missile forces will be used in actual fighting. They assume if China demonstrates it is well prepared to retaliate the United States would not risk a damage limitation strike using nuclear weapons. And even if the United States were to attack China’s nuclear forces with conventional weapons, China still would not strike first. In the opening section of the next chapter on “nuclear retaliatory attack operations” the manual instructs, as it does on numerous occasions throughout the entire text: According to our country’s principle, its stand of no first use of nuclear weapons, the Second Artillery will carry out a nuclear missile attack against the enemy’s important strategic targets, according to the combat orders of the Supreme Command, only after the enemy has carried out a nuclear attack against our country. Richard is wrong. There are no holes in China’s no first use policy. But the worse-case planning articulated in this highly classified military text is a significant and deeply troubling departure from China’s traditional thinking about the role of nuclear weapons. Mao Zedong famously called nuclear weapons “a paper tiger.” Many assumed he was being cavalier about the consequences of nuclear war. But what he meant is that they would not be used to fight and win wars. U.S. nuclear threats during the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait Crisis in the 1950s – threats not followed by an actual nuclear attack – validated Mao’s intuition that nuclear weapons were primarily psychological weapons. Chinese leaders decided to acquire nuclear weapons to free their minds from what Mao’s generation called “**nuclear** **blackmail**.” A former director of China’s nuclear weapons laboratories told me China developed them so its leaders could “sit up with a straight spine.” Countering nuclear blackmail – along with compelling other nuclear weapons states to negotiate their elimination – were the only two purposes Chinese nuclear weapons were meant to serve. Contemporary Chinese military planners appear to have added a new purpose: compelling the United States to halt a conventional attack. Even though it only applies in extreme circumstances, it **increases** the **risk** **that** a **war** between the United States and China **will** **end** **in** a nuclear exchange with unpredictable and **catastrophic** **consequences**. Adding this new purpose could also be the first step on a slippery slope to an incremental broadening the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese national security policy. Americans would be a lot safer if we could avoid that. The United States government should applaud China’s no first use policy instead of repeatedly calling it into question. And it would be wise to adopt the same policy for the United States. If both countries declared they would never use nuclear weapons first it may not guarantee they can avoid a nuclear exchange during a military crisis, but it would make one far less likely.

## Case

### Space Col

#### Space colonization can’t solve existential threats – space imperialism guarantees that efforts will fail

Yun 20 [(Board certified in radiology, Yun served on the clinical faculty at Stanford from 2000 to 2006. Yun has served on numerous boards, and he is currently a trustee of the Salk Institute. Joon and his wife Kimberly launched the $1 million Palo Alto Longevity Prize and donated $2 million to support the National Academy of Medicine’s Longevity Grand Challenge. He received his M.D. from Duke Medical School and B.A. from Harvard College.) Joon Yun, 1-2-2020, "The Problem With Today's Ideas About Space Exploration," Worth, <https://www.worth.com/is-space-the-next-frontier-for-the-same-old-story-of-imperialism/> TDI

In July 16, 2019, Jeff Bezos went on primetime national television to tell the world about his investment thesis in space. The founder of Amazon, who also founded the space company Blue Origin, [outlined his ambition](https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/jeff-bezos-space-travel-essential-because-destroying-planet-2019-7-1028364726) to preserve a dying Earth by “using the resources of space” and by moving high-polluting industries like manufacturing to other planets. For a change, the rest of us got a window into what he wants rather than the other way around. But what Bezos wants is a bit troubling. While he is no doubt well-intentioned, isn’t that precisely the kind of thinking that got us into this whole mess of planetary degradation in the first place? After all, **the zero-sum strategies of exporting problems to distant lands and extracting resources from them are as old as the history of imperialism**. Are we sure we want to lurch forward into the age of interplanetary imperialism as the latest frontier of the same old story? Before we mount our high horses, however, let’s also consider our own everyday complicity in that story. In the illusory emotional safety of morning coffees and pajamas, our keystrokes extract natural resources from anonymous mines in other continents to deliver disposable goods that become permanent trash shipped to anywhere but our backyard. Digital imperialism starts at our fingertips. Not surprisingly, people don’t generally think of themselves as imperialists. We reserve the word to characterize the behavior of others even though we are each other’s other. In that sense, even our protestations reek of moral imperialism: Extract the credit and dump the blame. Yet, seen from a higher plane, we—all of us—are in some ways part of the problem, and only by accepting collective responsibility do we stand a chance of not destroying our lands, oceans and skies. The us-versus-them instinct is alive and unwell in all of us. None of us are above it all. Our collective self-blindness to this heads-we-win-tails-you-lose thinking has been no small oversight. The expanding concentric circles of imperialism have hit their planetary limits, and now we can see its accumulated consequences: pollution, [consumerism](https://www.worth.com/the-dark-side-of-recycling/) and the dystopian desperations. Growing by extracting resources from others is the [self-defeating algorithm of cancer](https://www.worth.com/can-understanding-cancerous-behaviors-among-humans-inspire-new-strategies-to-cure-cancer/) that eventually kills the host. Looking back, once humans shifted from [highly genetically aligned social hives](https://www.worth.com/changing-the-arc-of-history-through-inclusive-stakeholding/) to lowly aligned ones, leaders began ruling over the people rather than on behalf of them. Such systems are inherently ravenous for power, to be disbursed for the purposes of maintaining internal loyalty. When unchecked, these self-serving systems turn into self-expanding beasts that feed themselves through external conquests, crusades and imperialism. This has led to today’s endless array of imperialistic gambits, fueled by a “grow-or-die” mentality—reflecting what mathematician and economist Eric Weinstein calls “[embedded growth obligations](https://bigthink.com/culture-religion/eric-weinstein-intellectual-dark-web).” Robbing Mars to pay Earth is a not-so-heavenly version of the Ponzi scheme of imperialism**. In trying to solve Earthly pollution by polluting other planets, we are merely perpetuating the same problem.** As if that weren’t ungracious enough, today we find ourselves also extracting resources from future generations, the voiceless stakeholders upon whom we are dumping federal deficits, pension Ponzi schemes and other unfunded liabilities: all part of our intertemporal imperialism. It shouldn’t take an Einstein to see that the relentless forces of imperialism are spreading across space and time. The world needs a better narrative than human colonization of other planets for the purposes of dumping our poor behaviors there or setting up a new habitat to escape a planet that we have destroyed ([Elon Musk’s vision](https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/22/17991736/jeff-bezos-elon-musk-colonizing-mars-moon-space-blue-origin-spacex)). **Both of these defeatist ideologies will virtually ensure that we fail to find the solutions to our civilization’s fallibilities** before metastasizing these same cancerous behaviors to distant planets.

#### There is no risk on Earth sufficient to justify the expense of a space colonization – answers Baum.

Szocik 18 [(Konrad Szocik is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow.) Szocik, K. (2018). Should and could humans go to Mars? Yes, but not now and not in the near future. Futures.] TDI // gord0

**Space refuge is justified only when there is at least one kind of catastrophe on Earth which will lead to extinction of the entire human species**. Baum (2015) and Baum et al. (2015) do not believe that space settlement offers advantage over terrestrial refuge. If terrestrial refuge (aquatic and/or subterranean) is able to protect against the strongest catastrophes including asteroid impact, the unique serious rationale accepted by public opinion for space human mission fails. As Alexey Turchin and Brian Patrick Green (2017) show, aquatic refuges based on adaptation of nuclear submarines may effectively play their role. They may be surface independent, which is the basic criterion of any refuge (Baum et al. 2015). They are cheaper and easier in engineering terms when compared with Mars settlement. A space refuge would not be able to cope with currently-occurring risks, e.g. overpopulation and climate change. Human overpopulation can be limited only on Earth by terrestrial policy and, if this can be done, no space base is necessary. If it is not possible, then no space base can solve this problem. For example, space settlement is not able to alleviate global warming, against Milligan’s suggestion. The unique way to do that on Earth is to reduce methane emission and/or to cool Earth by turning sunlight into space, as Solar Radiation Management proposes (Farquhar et al. 2017). There is only indirect, not direct applicability of space exploration. For instance, space technology might be applied to cope with asteroid impact or increasing the Sun temperature (Crawford). But these exogenous catastrophes caused by cosmic events are unlikely in lifespan of current and future generations (Tegmark and Bostrom 2005, p. 754), and for this reason they offer poor incentive for human space program. The unique rationale for space refuge mission could be future development of the Sun which will be getting more and more warmer in next billions years. But this threat does not justify human space settlement due to its high risk and high costliness (Jebari 2015). Nick Beckstead speculates on possible disasters on Earth deleterious also for humans living in shelters, e.g. scenarios that include invasion of aliens, runaway AI, or ecophagy caused by nanotechnology (Beckstead 2015).9 Beckstead rightly adds that the big challenge is not only rate of survival immediately after catastrophe but also chances for survival in longterm scale including collapse in food production and supply chain, and associated social and 9 The status of epidemics and/or pandemics as existential threat is doubtful. Beckstead (2015), citing Doherty (2013) argues that even in the past when human progress in medical knowledge was weak – we can add poor hygienic standards – smaller human population did not extinct despite epidemics and pandemics. This historical track may suggest to not exaggerate putative lethal role played by future pandemics. The same – as Beckstead notes – may be the case of global food crisis which does not have to lead to human extinction**.** ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 15 political collapse. It is hard to imagine catastrophe which kills the entire Earth population excluding people living in refuge. In this case, rationale for refuge fails.

#### Space colonization leads to immeasurable conflict – lack of inter-space policy guarantees escalation

Torres 18[(Phil Torres is the director of the Project for Human Flourishing and the author of Morality, Foresight, and Human Flourishing: an Introduction to Existential Risks) “Why We Should Think Twice About Colonizing Space” Nautilus, July 23, 2018] TDI  
There are lots of reasons why colonizing space seems compelling. The popular astronomer Neil deGrasse Tyson [argues](https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/neil-degrasse-tyson-how-space-exploration-can-make-america-great-again/253989/) that it would stimulate the economy and inspire the next generation of scientists. Elon Musk, who founded SpaceX, argues that “there is a strong humanitarian argument for making life multiplanetary…to safeguard the existence of humanity in the event that something catastrophic were to happen.” The former administrator of NASA, Michael Griffin, frames it as a matter of the “survival of the species.” And the late astrophysicist Stephen Hawking has [conjectured](https://www.popsci.com/stephen-hawking-human-extinction-colonize-mars) that if humanity fails to colonize space within 100 years, we could face extinction. To be sure, humanity will eventually need to escape Earth to survive, since the sun will make the planet uninhabitable in about 1 billion years. But for many “space expansionists,” escaping Earth is about much more than dodging the bullet of extinction: it’s about realizing [astronomical](https://nickbostrom.com/astronomical/waste.html) amounts of value by exploiting the universe’s vast resources to create something [resembling](https://nickbostrom.com/utopia.html) utopia. For example, the astrobiologist Milan Cirkovic [calculates that](https://www.jetpress.org/volume12/CosmologicalForecast.pdf) some 1046 people per century could come into existence if we were to colonize our Local Supercluster, Virgo. This leads Nick Bostrom to [argue that](https://nickbostrom.com/astronomical/waste.html) failing to colonize space would be tragic because it would mean that these potential “worthwhile lives” would never exist, and this would be morally bad. But would these trillions of lives actually be worthwhile? Or would colonization of space lead to a dystopia? In a [recent article](https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/d9aaad_5c9b881731054ee8bca5fd30699e7df9.pdf) in Futures, which was inspired by political scientist Daniel Deudney’s forthcoming book Dark Skies, I decided to take a closer look at this question. My conclusion is that in a colonized universe the probability of the annihilation of the human race could actually rise rather than fall. The argument is based on ideas from evolutionary biology and international relations theory, and it assumes that there aren’t any other technologically advanced lifeforms capable of colonizing the universe (as a [recent study](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) suggests is the case). Consider what is likely to happen as humanity hops from Earth to Mars, and from Mars to relatively nearby, potentially habitable exoplanets like [Epsilon Eridani b](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epsilon_Eridani_b), [Gliese 674 b](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gliese_674_b), and [Gliese 581 d](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gliese_581d). Each of these planets has its own unique environments that will drive Darwinian evolution, resulting in the emergence of novel species over time, just as species that migrate to a new island will evolve different traits than their parent species. The same applies to the artificial environments of spacecraft like “[O’Neill Cylinders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O'Neill_cylinder),” which are large cylindrical structures that rotate to produce artificial gravity. Insofar as future beings satisfy the basic [conditions of evolution](http://petergodfreysmith.com/ConditionsNS-07-JP-web.pdf) by natural selection—such as differential reproduction, heritability, and variation of traits across the population—then evolutionary pressures will yield new forms of life. But the process of “[cyborgization](https://www.thefreedictionary.com/Cyborgization)”—that is, of using technology to modify and enhance our bodies and brains—is much more likely to influence the evolutionary trajectories of future populations living on exoplanets or in spacecraft. The result could be beings with completely novel cognitive architectures (or mental abilities), emotional repertoires, physical capabilities, lifespans, and so on.In other words, natural selection and cyborgization as humanity spreads throughout the cosmos will result in species diversification. At the same time, expanding across space will also result in ideological diversification. Space-hopping populations will create their own cultures, languages, governments, political institutions, religions, technologies, rituals, norms, worldviews, and so on. As a result, different species will find it increasingly difficult over time to understand each other’s motivations, intentions, behaviors, decisions, and so on. It could even make [communication](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300405) between species with alien languages almost impossible. Furthermore, some species might begin to wonder whether the proverbial “[Other](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Other_(philosophy))” is [conscious](http://nautil.us/issue/37/currents/zombies-must-be-dualists). This matters because if a species Y cannot consciously experience pain, then another species X might not feel morally obligated to care about Y. After all, we don’t worry about kicking stones down the street because we don’t believe that rocks can feel pain. Thus, as I write in the [paper](https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/d9aaad_5c9b881731054ee8bca5fd30699e7df9.pdf), phylogenetic and ideological diversification will engender a situation in which many species will be “not merely aliens to each other but, more significantly, alienated from each other.” But this yields some problems. First, extreme differences like those just listed will undercut trust between species. If you don’t trust that your neighbor isn’t going to steal from, harm, or kill you, then you’re going to be suspicious of your neighbor. And if you’re suspicious of your neighbor, you might want an effective defense strategy to stop an attack—just in case one were to happen. But your neighbor might reason the same way: she’s not entirely sure that you won’t kill her, so she establishes a defense as well. The problem is that, since you don’t fully trust her, you wonder whether her defense is actually part of an attack plan. So you start carrying a knife around with you, which she interprets as a threat to her, thus leading her to buy a gun, and so on. Within the field of international relations, this is called the “[security dilemma](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_dilemma),” and it results in a spiral of militarization that can significantly increase the probability of conflict, even in cases where all actors have genuinely peaceful intentions. So, how can actors extricate themselves from the security dilemma if they can’t fully trust each other? On the level of individuals, one solution has involved what Thomas Hobbes’ calls the “[Leviathan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leviathan_(Hobbes_book)).” The key idea is that people get together and say, “Look, since we can’t fully trust each other, let’s establish an independent governing system—a referee of sorts—that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. By replacing anarchy with hierarchy, we can also replace the constant threat of harm with law and order.” Hobbes didn’t believe that this happened historically, only that this predicament is what justifies the existence of the state. [According](https://books.google.com/books?id=J7ATQb6LZX0C&pg=PT19&lpg=PT19&dq=can+defuse+the+%5bindividual%5d+temptation+of+exploitative+attack,+inhibit+the+impulse+for+revenge,+and+circumvent&source=bl&ots=6BStfGA3vK&sig=tnJvB3i8FFbJuobt2Il4IpPOpiU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjYqcLOtO_bAhVDp1kKHRrOAMwQ6AEIKTAA#v=snippet&q=) to Steven Pinker, the Leviathan is a major reason that violence has declined in recent centuries. The point is that if individuals—you and I—can overcome the constant threat of harm posed by our neighbors by establishing a governing system, then maybe future species could get together and create some sort of cosmic governing system that could similarly guarantee peace by replacing anarchy with hierarchy. Unfortunately, this looks unpromising within the “cosmopolitical” realm. One reason is that for states to maintain law and order among their citizens, their various appendages—e.g., law enforcement, courts—need to be properly coordinated. If you call the police about a robbery and they don’t show up for three weeks, then what’s the point of living in that society? You’d be just as well off on your own! The question is, then, whether the appendages of a cosmic governing system could be sufficiently well-coordinated to respond to conflicts and make top-down decisions about how to respond to particular situations. To put it differently: If conflict were to break out in some region of the universe, could the relevant governing authorities respond soon enough for it to matter, for it to make a difference? Probably not, because of the immense vastness of space. For example, consider again Epsilon Eridani b, Gliese 674 b, and Gliese 581 d. These are, respectively, 10.5, 14.8, and 20.4 light-years from Earth. This means that a signal sent as of this writing, in 2018, wouldn’t reach Gliese 581 d until 2038. A spaceship traveling at one-quarter the cosmic speed limit wouldn’t arrive until 2098, and a message to simply affirm that it had arrived safely wouldn’t return to Earth until 2118. And Gliese 581 is relatively close as far as exoplanets go. Just consider that he Andromeda Galaxy is some 2.5 million light-years from Earth and the Triangulum Galaxy about 3 million light-years away. What’s more, there are some 54 galaxies in our Local Group, which is about 10 million light-years wide, within a universe that stretches some 93 billion light-years across. These facts make it look hopeless for a governing system to effectively coordinate law enforcement activities, judicial decisions, and so on, across cosmic distances. The universe is simply too big for a government to establish law and order in a top-down fashion. But there is another strategy for achieving peace: Future civilizations could use a policy of deterrence to prevent other civilizations from launching first strikes. A policy of this sort, which must be credible to work, says: “I won’t attack you first, but if you attack me first, I have the capabilities to destroy you in retaliation.” This was the predicament of the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War, known as “mutually-assured destruction” (MAD). But could this work in the cosmopolitical realm of space? It seems unlikely. First, consider how many future species there could be: upwards of many billions. While some of these species would be too far away to pose a threat to each other—although see the qualification below—there will nonetheless exist a huge number within one’s galactic backyard. The point is that the sheer number would make it incredibly hard to determine who initiated a first strike, if one is attacked. And without a method for identifying instigators with high reliability, one’s policy of deterrence won’t be credible. And if one’s policy of deterrence isn’t credible, then one has no such policy! Second, ponder the sorts of weapons that could become available to future spacefaring civilizations. Redirected asteroids (a.k.a., “planetoid bombs”), “[rods from God](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kinetic_bombardment),” [sun guns](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sun_gun), [laser weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Directed-energy_weapon), and no doubt an array of exceptionally powerful super-weapons that we can’t currently imagine. It has even been speculated that the universe might exist in a [“metastable” state](https://cosmosmagazine.com/physics/vacuum-decay-ultimate-catastrophe) and that a high-powered particle accelerator could tip the universe into a more stable state. This would create a bubble of total annihilation that spreads in all directions at the speed of light—which opens up the possibility that a [suicidal cult, or whatever](https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/d9aaad_d9c1dceb74df4dccab498e50d296746d.pdf), weaponizes a particle accelerator to destroy the universe. The question, then, is whether defensive technologies could effectively neutralize such risks. There’s a lot to say here, but for the present purposes just note that, historically speaking, defensive measures have very often lagged behind offensive measures, thus resulting in periods of heightened vulnerability. This is an important point because when it comes to existentially dangerous super-weapons, one only needs to be vulnerable for a short period to risk annihilation. So far as I can tell, this seriously undercuts the credibility of policies of deterrence. Again, if species A cannot convince species B that if B strikes it, A will launch an effective and devastating counter strike, then B may take a chance at attacking A. In fact, B does not need to be malicious to do this: it only needs to worry that A might, at some point in the near- or long-term future, attack B, thus making it rational for B to launch a preemptive strike (to eliminate the potential danger). Thinking about this predicament in the radically multi-polar conditions of space, it seems fairly obvious that conflict will be extremely difficult to avoid. the lesson of this argument is not to uncritically assume that venturing into the heavens will necessarily make us safer or more existentially secure. This is a point that organizations hoping to colonize Mars, such as [SpaceX](http://www.spacex.com/mars), [NASA](https://www.nasa.gov/content/journey-to-mars-overview), and [Mars One](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mars_One) should seriously contemplate. How can humanity migrate to another planet without bringing our problems with us? And how can different species that spread throughout the cosmos maintain peace when sufficient mutual trust is unattainable and advanced weaponry could destroy entire civilizations? Human beings have made many catastrophically bad decisions in the past. Some of these outcomes could have been avoided if only the decision-makers had deliberated a bit more about what could go wrong—i.e., had done a [“premortem” analysis](https://www.edge.org/response-detail/27174). We are in that privileged position right now with respect to space colonization. Let’s not dive head-first into waters that turn out to be shallow.

### Debris

#### Debris creates existential deterrence by raising the bar for conflict – international norms fail

Miller 7/31 [(Gregory, Chair of the Department of Space Power at the Air Command and Staff College, Ph.D. in Political Science from The Ohio State University) “Deterrence by Debris: The Downside to Cleaning up Space,” Space Policy, 7/31/2021] JL

The danger of kinetic strikes increasing orbital debris is a common theme in the literature, but the positive deterrent effects of some debris are often overlooked. The debris resulting from destroyed satellites, or other space objects, creates a deterrent effect on actors who might otherwise violate international norms and strike at objects in space, either to test their capabilities or as an act of hostilities. This is not deterrence in the traditional sense, of one actor publicly threatening punishment in response to another actor’s unwanted actions. It is not deterrence by denial since the attacker is not damaged and may even achieve its objective. Nor is it deterrence by punishment because the debris itself does not threaten to punish the attacker’s country. But debris can increase the future costs to the aggressor, even if their initial attack succeeds, and thus it has a similar restraining effect on certain behavior. Like the automated response of the U.S. tripwire in West Germany, the threat that debris can pose to state interests acts as a form of deterrence, at least to prevent some actors from taking certain types of actions. Removing the danger of debris will weaken that restraint and thus weaken deterrence, making ASAT tests and hostile actions in space more likely.

Several factors may deter a state from launching kinetic tests or striking against an adversary’s interests in space. For one thing, if a state’s adversary has similar capabilities to destroy objects in space, deterrence would be a function of not wanting to escalate tensions. Although international law only explicitly prohibits states from placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit, international space law, like the Outer Space Treaty [30], does provide a framework for addressing the activities of one state that lead to the damage of another state’s property. Likewise, there are international norms (informal but expected rules of behavior) against the weaponization of space. But these norms seem to be in decline [31], and such norms only deter a state from engaging in certain types of behavior if the state cares about following norms, if it cares about how states perceive its behavior, or if it believes other states are willing to enforce the norms. The beauty of debris as a deterrent is that it does not rely on the enforcement of norms or the credibility of states to succeed.

#### Space debris creates existential deterrence and a taboo

Bowen 18 [(Bleddyn, lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester) “The Art of Space Deterrence,” European Leadership Network, February 20, 2018, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/] TDI

Fourth, the ubiquity of space infrastructure and the fragility of the space environment may create a degree of existential deterrence. As space is so useful to modern economies and military forces, a large-scale disruption of space infrastructure may be so intuitively escalatory to decision-makers that there may be a natural caution against a wholesale assault on a state’s entire space capabilities because the consequences of doing so approach the mentalities of total war, or nuclear responses if a society begins tearing itself apart because of the collapse of optimised energy grids and just-in-time supply chains. In addition, the problem of space debris and the political-legal hurdles to conducting debris clean-up operations mean that even a handful of explosive events in space can render a region of Earth orbit unusable for everyone. This could caution a country like China from excessive kinetic intercept missions because its own military and economy is increasingly reliant on outer space, but perhaps not a country like North Korea which does not rely on space. The usefulness, sensitivity, and fragility of space may have some existential deterrent effect. China’s catastrophic anti-satellite weapons test in 2007 is a valuable lesson for all on the potentially devastating effect of kinetic warfare in orbit.

#### No impact to debris – it hits stations all the time.

Cain ’15 (Fraser; 12/23/15; writer for Universe Today; “How Do Astronauts Avoid Debris”; http://www.universetoday.com/121067/how-do-astronauts-avoid-debris)

So, just how do we keep our space stations, ships and astronauts from being riddled with holes from all of the space junk in orbit around Earth? We revel in the terror grab bag of all the magical ways to get snuffed in space. Almost as much as we celebrate the giant brass backbones of the people who travel there. We’ve already talked about all the scary ways that astronauts can die in space. My personal recurring “Hail Mary full of grace, please don’t let me die in space” nightmare is orbital debris. We’re talking about a vast collection of spent rockets, dead satellites, flotsam, jetsam, lagan and derelict. It’s not a short list. NASA figures there are **21,000 bits of junk** bigger than 10 cm, **500,000 particles** between 1 and 10 cm, and more than **100 million** smaller than 1 cm. Sound familiar, humans? This is our high tech, sci fi great Pacific garbage patch. Sure, a tiny rivet or piece of scrap foil doesn’t sound very dangerous, but consider the fact that astronauts are orbiting the Earth at a velocity of about 28,000 km/h. And the Tang packets, uneaten dehydrated ice cream, and astronaut poops are also traveling at 28,000 km/h. Then think about what happens when they collide. Yikes… or yuck. Here’s the International Space Station’s solar array. See that tiny hole? Embiggen and clarinosticate! That’s a tiny puncture hole made in the array by a piece of orbital crap. The whole station is **pummeled by tiny pieces of space program junk drawer contents**. Back when the Space Shuttle was flying, NASA had to **constantly replace their windows because of the damage they were experiencing** from the orbital equivalent of Dennis the Menace hurling paint chips, fingernail clippings, and frozen scabs.

**Probability – 0.1% chance of a collision.**

**Salter 16** [(Alexander William, Economics Professor at Texas Tech) “SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS” 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 \*numbers replaced with English words] TDI

The probability of a collision is currently low. Bradley and Wein estimate that the maximum probability in LEO of a collision over the lifetime of a spacecraft remains below one in one thousand, conditional on continued compliance with NASA’s deorbiting guidelines.3 However, the possibility of a future “snowballing” effect, whereby debris collides with other objects, further congesting orbit space, remains a significant concern.4 Levin and Carroll estimate the average immediate destruction of wealth created by a collision to be approximately $30 million, with an additional $200 million in damages to all currently existing space assets from the debris created by the initial collision.5 The expected value of destroyed wealth because of collisions, currently small because of the low probability of a collision, can quickly become significant if future collisions result in runaway debris growth.

**Time frame – Kessler effect 200 years away**

**Stubbe 17** [(Peter, PhD in law @ Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt) “State Accountability for Space Debris: A Legal Study of Responsibility for Polluting the Space Environment and Liability for Damage Caused by Space Debris,” Koninklijke Brill Publishing, ISBN 978-90-04-31407-8, p. 27-31] TDI

The prediction of possible scenarios of the future evolution of the debris p o p ulation involves many uncertainties. Long-term forecasting means the prediction of the evolution of the future debris environment in time periods of decades or even centuries. Predictions are based on models84 that work with certain assumptions, and altering these parameters significantly influences the outcomes of the predictions. Assumptions on the future space traffic and on the initial object environment are particularly critical to the results of modeling efforts.85 A well-known pattern for the evolution of the debris population is the so-called Kessler effect’, which assumes that there is a certain collision probability among space objects because many satellites operate in similar orbital regions. These collisions create fragments, and thus additional objects in the respective orbits, which in turn enhances the risk of further collisions. Consequently, the num ber of objects and collisions increases exponentially and eventually results in the formation of a self-sustaining debris belt aroundthe Earth. While it has long been assumed that such a process of collisional cascading is likely to occur only in a very long-term perspective (meaning a time 1 n of several hundred years),87 a consensus has evolved in recent years that an uncontrolled growth of the debris population in certain altitudes could become reality much sooner.88 In fact, a recent cooperative study undertaken by various space agencies in the scope of i a d c shows that the current l e o debris population is unstable, even if current mitigation measures are applied. The study concludes:

Even with a 90% implementation of the commonly-adopted mitigation measures [...] the l e o debris population is expected to increase by an average of 30% in the next 200 years. The population growth is primarily driven by catastrophic collisions between 700 and 1000 km altitudes and such collisions are likely to occur every 5 to 9 years.89

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### Satellites

#### No one’s going to war over a downed satellite

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Space is often an afterthought or a miscellaneous ancillary in the grand strategic views of top-level decision-makers. A president may not care that one satellite may be lost or go dark; it may cause panic and Twitter-based hysteria for the space community, of course. But the terrestrial context and consequences, as well as the political stakes and symbolism of any exchange of hostilities in space matters more. The political and media dimension can magnify or minimise the perceived consequences of losing specific satellites out of all proportion to their actual strategic effect.

#### No escalation - If we don’t have sufficient data we move the satellite to ‘lost’ category

Hoots ’15 [Felix; Fall 2015; Distinguished Engineer in the System Analysis and Simulation Subdivision, Ph.D. in Mathematics from Auburn University, M.S. in Mathematics from Tennessee Tech University; Crosslink, “Keeping Track: Space Surveillance for Operational Support,” <https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/Crosslink%20Fall%202015%20V16N1%20.pdf>; RP]

The JSpOC tasks these sensors to track specific satellites and to record data such as time, azimuth, elevation, and range. This data is used to create orbital element sets or state vectors that represent the observed position of the satellite. The observed position can then be compared with the predicted position. The dynamic models used for predicting satellite motion are not perfect; factors such as atmospheric density variation caused by unmodeled solar activity can cause the predicted position to gradually stray from the true position. The observations are used to correct the predicted trajectory so the network can continue to track the satellite. This process of using observations to correct and refine an orbit in an ongoing feedback loop is called catalog maintenance, and it continues as long as the satellite remains in orbit. Ideally, the process is automatic, with manual intervention only required when satellites maneuver or get near to reentry due to atmospheric drag.

Sometimes, however, more effort is required. For example, a sensor may encounter a satellite trajectory that does not correspond well to anything in the catalog. Such observations are known as partially correlated observations if they are somewhat close to a known orbit or uncorrelated observations (or uncorrelated tracks) if they are far from any known orbit. Also, if a satellite is not tracked for five days, it is placed on an attention list for manual intervention. In that case, an analyst will attempt to match the wayward satellite to one of these partially correlated or uncorrelated tracks. If that effort succeeds, then the element sets are updated, and the object is returned to automatic catalog maintenance. On the other hand, if the satellite cannot be matched to a partially correlated or uncorrelated track, the satellite information continues to age. If it reaches 30 days without a match, the satellite is placed on the lost list.

One of the most visible uses of the catalog is to warn about collision risks for active payloads. This function predicts potential close approaches three to five days in advance to allow time to plan avoidance maneuvers, if necessary. Unplanned maneuvers may disturb normal operations and deplete resources for future maneuvers, so one would like to have high confidence in the collision-risk predictions. The reliability of the predictions depends directly on the accuracy of the orbit calculation, which in turn depends on the quality and quantity of the tracking data, which is limited by the capability of the Space Surveillance Network. Simply put, there are not enough tracking resources in the network to achieve high-quality orbits for every object in the catalog. Furthermore, many smaller objects can only be tracked by the most sensitive radars, and this tracking is infrequent. Most objects in the catalog are considered debris, which can neither maneuver nor broadcast telemetry. On the other hand, some satellite operators depend exclusively on the satellite catalog to know where their satellites are, and users of the satellite orbital data depend on the catalog to know when the satellites will be within view.

This situation creates a challenging problem in balancing Space Surveillance Network resources to support the collision-warning task (tracking as many potential hazards as possible) while also providing highly accurate support to operational satellites (tracking the spacecraft as precisely as possible). The practical solution is to perform collision risk assessment using a large screening radius to ensure no close approaches are missed despite lower-quality predictions. Once an object is identified as having a potentially close approach, then the tasking level is raised, with the expectation that more tracking data will be obtained to refine the collision risk calculations. When the danger has passed, the object reverts to a normal tracking level.

Collisions and spontaneous breakups do happen. The first satellite breakup occurred on June 29, 1961, when residual fuel in an Ablestar rocket body exploded, creating 296 trackable pieces of debris. Since that time, there have been more than 200 satellite breakups, the most notable being the missile intercept of the Fengyun-1C satellite, which created more than 3300 trackable fragments. In most cases, these breakups are first detected by the phased-array radars in the Space Surveillance Network. When multiple objects are observed where only one was expected, the downstream sensors are alerted, but no tasking is issued because specific debris orbits are not yet established. Tracks are taken and tagged as uncorrelated. Analysts at JSpOC then attempt to link uncorrelated tracks from different sensors to form a candidate orbit. Subsequent tracking improves the orbit to the point that the object can be named and numbered and moved into the catalog for automatic maintenance.

### Smart Cities

#### Smart cities rely on M2M interactions – results in cascading grid shut-down and turns case

Reys ’16 (Nicolas; 2016; Consultant, Cyber Security Services; Control Risks; “SMART CITIES AND CYBER THREATS”; <https://cdn-prd-com.azureedge.net/-/media/corporate/files/our-thinking/insights/smart-cities-and-cyber-threats/smart-cities-article.pdf?modified=20170710141720>; DOA: 11/27/17)

The benefits of and opportunities presented by smart cities - for both citizens and businesses - are broad-ranging. With proper implementation, smart cities will provide tremendous economic, social and cultural advantages for their inhabitants. For instance, a city’s electricity infrastructure could be significantly improved with the introduction of technologies such as ‘smart meters’ – electric or gas meters that provide real-time data, via an internet connection, to the consumer and the electricity company regarding each user’s consumption. This allows better management of electricity supplies by tailoring them to the live demand, thereby reducing overall cost as well as the impact and incidence of power outages. Indeed, smart cities are dependent on machine-to-machine (M2M) interactions and decision-making. This is, in part, a product of the sheer number of inputs and the frequency and speed with which associated calculations need to be completed. In the case of the energy grid, it would be impossible for a human operator to process all the data necessary to make decisions at the speed required by the system. However, while M2M decision-making (M2MD) is an unavoidable and beneficial feature of smart cities, it is also one of the greatest risks. NEW CITY, NEW RISK M2MD is a highly promising means of ensuring efficient automation across smart cities. However, given the absence of human operators, the risk of a cascading error is significant. A cascading error refers to the potential for a small, unchecked mistake to spread through a system and become a systemic risk. For instance, if a minor computing error caused a smart electricity reader to transmit inaccurate data readings to its control centre for a period of time this could lead to an automated, and mistaken, assessment that a particular private organisation’s premises required an increased amount of electricity. This would necessitate rerouting some of the existing energy supply to this facility which, in turn, could culminate in increased costs for the affected business, as well as for the city, and a reduced pool of electricity for other companies and citizens. Although minimal at this scale, the consequences of such errors when they affect a larger area – an entire block or an industrial zone for example – could be far more substantial.

#### Smart cities invite massive cyber-attacks---extinction and turns case

Reyes 16 – Nicolas Reyes is a Consultant for CSS. ("SMART CITIES AND CYBER THREATS”, 2016, https://cdn-prd-com.azureedge.net/-/media/corporate/files/our-thinking/insights/smart-cities-and-cyber-threats/smart-cities-article.pdf?modified=20170710141720)//jkuffour \*shout out monta vista

Indeed, smart cities are dependent on machine-to-machine (M2M) interactions and decision-making. This is, in part, a product of the sheer number of inputs and the frequency and speed with which associated calculations need to be completed. In the case of the energy grid, it would be impossible for a human operator to process all the data necessary to make decisions at the speed required by the system. However, while M2M decision-making (M2MD) is an unavoidable and beneficial feature of smart cities, it is also one of the greatest risks.

NEW CITY, NEW RISK

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SMART CITIES AND CYBER THREATS

Beyond the potential for human or computer error, smart cities will provide cyber threat actors with a large attack surface to target and potentially exploit and incorporate into broader campaigns:

Cybercriminals

As we have described above, smart cities will be composed of thousands – if not millions – of interconnected devices. Such a structure is a boon to criminal actors able to create or purchase and subsequently deploy self-propagating malware, variants of which have been known to proliferate across multiple connected networks. These ‘worms’ could be used to acquire easily commoditized information such as healthcare information, social security numbers and banking credentials, or even to take control of a significant number of systems.

Were attackers able to successfully hijack these systems they could then be used for extremely powerful distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks or to hold an entire city for ransom in extortion attacks. Ransomware variants could be designed to encrypt and ~~cripple~~ [destroy] an entire city’s grid, with ransom demands likely to be considerable in such a scenario. These tactics could be highly profitable for cybercriminals and represent a natural evolution of trends that we have observed in the current cybercriminal community. Incident response will become increasingly difficult in the case of city-wide compromise. Private sector organisations and municipal authorities will share ownership of systems and the responsibility for their security. Beyond adding legal and financial costs for the private sector, this will create the need for highly complex pre-planned incident response schemes involving multiple parties.

Cyber activists

As cyber activist groups grow increasingly capable and in some cases, more radical, smart cities will provide them with an attack surface enabling a broad range of attacks from those akin to nuisances such as defacements of a city’s billboards, to the more extreme targeting of a smart city’s energy grid with the aim of physical destruction.

In addition, many cyber activist groups are supporting physical protesters by launching cyber attacks. This practice in a smart city environment could allow cyber activists to take a leading role in coercing governments and private sector organisations in meeting their demands.

The potential destructiveness of a cyber attack on smart cities is such that even the threat of compromise of the city’s system is likely to be treated by governments and businesses as an existential one. When threat actors such as cyber activists, who arguably lack the self-control of other groups, have the possibility of causing serious physical damages, the security of smart cities becomes essential to the cities’ survival.

Nation states

As the underlying network of smart cities will encompass most aspects of life within the city, if that network were to be compromised by an attacker, it would grant them unfettered access to a target individual or organisation. For instance, state-owned competitors could compromise a smart city’s infrastructure to gather intelligence on a large number of rival private sector firms. This information could include movements of their executives within the city, private and commercial communications grabbed from the ubiquitous presence of ‘free Wi-Fi hotspots’ managed by the city, and many more. Moreover, organisations operating within the city are likely to have their networks overlap to some extent with the city’s own network, or at the very least, have frequent data transfers from their networks to that of the city. This would enable highly advanced threat actors such as nation states to exploit weaknesses within a city’s infrastructure to reach a target organisation and compromise the confidentiality of its network.

Beyond traditional espionage operations, the large-scale destruction or disruption of physical infrastructure via computer systems could become a technical reality with the advent of smart cities. The interconnectedness of systems within smart cities will lead to the reliance of components on the availability of the entire system to function properly. As such, an advanced cyber attack seeking to destroy parts of the system could have catastrophic cascading effects onto the wider network. This would enable a determined nation state actor to cause large-scale physical destruction throughout an entire city.

Although indirect, a belligerent nation state actor could abruptly interrupt the traffic light system of an entire city to cause significant damages and potentially the loss of human lives. Similar scenarios are conceivable for the interruption of energy supplies or water networks. Whilst such events will become more plausible with the increase in smart cities, the actual likelihood of them being undertaken is low because of the possibility that such an attack would provide a potentially justifiable basis – legally and ethically – for military retaliation, something which the perpetrator would presumably appreciate.

### Resource Wars

#### No correlation between resources and war- and no internal link their evidence is about “competitive mining” conflicts over oil and land which is what their impact ev says

Atkins 16 (Ed —PhD Candidate in Energy, Environment & Resilience at the University of Bristol, “Environmental Conflict: A Misnomer?,” <http://www.e-ir.info/2016/05/12/environmental-conflict-a-misnomer/>, dml)

The economic and strategic importance of oil and other non-renewable resource is indisputable. Yet the globalised character of international commerce has resulted in many nations ceasing to perceive resource dependency as a threat to autonomy or survival (Deudney, 1990). This interdependence has resulted in the decreased likelihood of inter-state conflict over control of resources, due to the price shocks these actions could propel across the system and the increasingly technological developments (Lipschutz and Holdren, 1990). Such dynamics are well illustrated by the 1973 oil crisis (Dabelko and Dabelko, 1993). Although the move by the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) to restrict exports resulted in record price rises and the transformation of the international sphere, thus illustrating the economic relevance of resources, it did not result in international violent conflict. Furthermore, Le Billon (2001) has stated that the spectre of resource scarcity has resulted in the escalation of socioeconomic innovation and economic diversification – with the market mechanisms of contemporary capitalism creating an important impediment to conflict.

In Botswana and Norway, minerals and oil, respectively, have been mobilised to ensure peaceful development rather than violent confrontation (Le Billon, 2001). Furthermore, in many cases potential scarcity has resulted in increased inter-state cooperation due to the shared interest in continued supply. The continued sanctity of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, between Pakistan and India, is an important example, with the spirit of cooperation over water resources enduring despite increased political tensions between the two nations (Wolf, 1998).