### 1

#### Teacher strikes gut community bonds in Education

Finne 15 [Liv Finne is the education director at Washington Policy Center, an independent policy-research organization. September 1, 2015. “Teacher Strikes Hurt Students and Divide the Community” <https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/teachers-please-dont-strike-again/> Accessed 10/19 //gord0]

Families across our state are getting kids ready to go back to school. Yet too many families have to prepare for a different ritual — when a teacher strike hits their local school.

Teacher strikes close schools in Washington with depressing regularity. Reporting by the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that a child in Washington is at proportionately greater risk of missing school due to a union walkout here than in any other state.

A number of teacher strikes are looming now, on top of those called by union executives in just the last few years. Union executives in Seattle say they want to call a strike to get a 21 percent pay raise over three years. In Pasco, union leaders say they plan to close schools unless they receive a 9 percent pay increase. In April and May, union leaders around the state called rolling one-day strikes across the state, affecting 65 districts and closing the schools of 573,000 children, affecting more than half of all Washington students.

In recent years, union strikes in Tacoma temporarily closed schools to 30,000 students, closed schools in Bellingham to 10,000 students, closed schools in Kent to 26,000 students, and in Bellevue closed schools to 16,000 students.

As union executives call for new strikes to close schools, it is helpful to know how much teachers make now. On average, public-school teachers in Washington receive just over $83,000 in pay and benefits for a 10-month work year. This amount is scheduled to increase. This year, the Legislature increased school spending by 19 percent. It also provided full funding for two teacher pay raises over the next two years — a 3 percent cost-of-living raise to K-12 employees over the next two years, plus an additional temporary 1.8 percent increase that expires in 2017.

By comparison, the average worker pay with benefits in our state is about $68,300 for a 12-month work year. Most working families do not know whether they will receive a raise this year, let alone what they might receive over two years.

The relatively high level of average teacher pay is good news, both for the public and for children. Most teachers work hard and should be well paid. The work they do is essential to building bright futures for Washington’s children.

This is why strikes are so hurtful to communities, families and children. People work hard to pay their taxes and support local schools. When union executives continually ask for more and seek leverage in contract talks by shutting kids out of school, it weakens the bonds of community that should draw people together

Strikes divide parents from teachers, and teachers from administrators. Strikes damage the social fabric of school communities, especially when families are returning to school with high hopes for a successful year of learning.

The community is already working to boost teacher pay, even as many teachers make more than the average family income in their area.

The public money is already there. Union executives do not need to disrupt the lives of thousands of students and their families to get teacher pay increases.

Not all children are at risk of school closures. The education of students at religious and other private schools, students at public charter schools, and children who are home-schooled or take online courses are protected from the politics and controversy of union strikes. Strikes are illegal under state law, so in theory all children are protected — now parents, teachers and school board members need to work collaboratively to make this true in practice as well.

#### Quality of education is key for innovation to stop climate change

Kwauk et al 3/26’ [Christina Kwauk and Rebecca Winthrop, 3-26-2021, "Unleashing the creativity of teachers and students to combat climate change: An opportunity for global leadership," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/unleashing-the-creativity-of-teachers-and-students-to-combat-climate-change-an-opportunity-for-global-leadership/>]

**Recent research shows** that if only 16 percent of high school students in high- and middle-income countries were to receive climate change education, we could see a nearly 19 gigaton reduction of carbon dioxide by 2050.When education helps students develop a strong personal connection to climate solutions, as well as a sense of personal agency and empowerment, it can have consequential impact on students’ daily behaviors and decisionmaking that reduces their overall lifetime carbon footprint. **Imagine if 100 percent of students in the world received such an education.** New evidence also shows that the combination of women’s empowerment and education that includes everyone—especially the 132 million out-of-school girls across the developing world—could result in an 85 gigaton reduction of carbon dioxide by 2050. By these estimates, leveraging the power of education is potentially more powerful than solely increasing investments in onshore wind turbines (47 gigaton reduction) or concentrated solar power (19 gigaton reduction) alone. **When we say that all climate solutions are needed to draw down greenhouse gases, we must also mean education solutions, too. When we say that all climate solutions are needed to draw down greenhouse gases,** we must also mean education solutions, too. But beyond education’s potential impact on reducing carbon emissions, education—especially for girls—can save lives in the context of natural disasters exacerbated by climate change by reducing climate risk vulnerability. In a study of 125 countries, researchers found that the death toll caused by floods, droughts, wildfires, extreme temperature events, and extreme weather events could be 60 percent lower by 2050 if 70 percent of women were able to achieve a lower-secondary-school education. **Imagine if 100 percent of women were to achieve a full 12 years of education.** An equally important outcome of education is its potential to increase young people’s capacity to adapt to the harsh impacts of climate change by building important knowledge and a breadth of “green skills.” **For example, young people need both a strong knowledge base around the causes of a warming climate but also a strong set of skills that will allow them to apply their knowledge in the real world, including problem-solving, critical thinking, teamwork, coping with uncertainty, empathy, and negotiation. Indeed these very “transferable skills” are needed equally to thrive in the world of work and to be constructive citizens. Today it is those communities that have historically contributed the least to present-day carbon emissions—such as minority and indigenous communities in the U.S. and many low- and middle-income countries and small island developing states✎ EditSign—that are often the most vulnerable to its risks and impacts. In the U.S. for example, 6,000 schools are located in flood zones and 1 million children had their learning disrupted during California’s 2018-2019 wildfire season, hitting students in low-income communities the hardest. Across the globe, schools and entire communities in the poorest countries in the world are regularly upended due to severe floods and hurricanes, all expected to worsen in intensity and frequency due to climate change. For example, in 2013 Super Typhoon Haiyan✎ EditSign killed more than 6,000 people in the Philippines, damaged or destroyed more than 3,200 schools and day care centers, disrupted the education of more than a million children, and placed 49,000 young girls and women✎ EditSign at risk of sex trafficking due to their displacement in crowded and unsafe shelters**. For these communities, climate change is an unchecked threat multiplier. Combating climate change is a move toward climate justice and gender justice. And education has a role to play. High quality climate-change education can also help empower girls and youth to become powerful change agents for sustainability in their communities, charting new paths forward for what life can and should be like.

#### Climate change destroys the world.

Specktor 19 [Brandon; writes about the science of everyday life for Live Science, and previously for Reader's Digest magazine, where he served as an editor for five years; "Human Civilization Will Crumble by 2050 If We Don't Stop Climate Change Now, New Paper Claims," livescience, 6/4/19; <https://www.livescience.com/65633-climate-change-dooms-humans-by-2050.html>] Justin

The current climate crisis, they say, is larger and more complex than any humans have ever dealt with before. General climate models — like the one that the [United Nations' Panel on Climate Change](https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/) (IPCC) used in 2018 to predict that a global temperature increase of 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit (2 degrees Celsius) could put hundreds of millions of people at risk — fail to account for the sheer complexity of Earth's many interlinked geological processes; as such, they fail to adequately predict the scale of the potential consequences. The truth, the authors wrote, is probably far worse than any models can fathom. How the world ends What might an accurate worst-case picture of the planet's climate-addled future actually look like, then? The authors provide one particularly grim scenario that begins with world governments "politely ignoring" the advice of scientists and the will of the public to decarbonize the economy (finding alternative energy sources), resulting in a global temperature increase 5.4 F (3 C) by the year 2050. At this point, the world's ice sheets vanish; brutal droughts kill many of the trees in the [Amazon rainforest](https://www.livescience.com/57266-amazon-river.html) (removing one of the world's largest carbon offsets); and the planet plunges into a feedback loop of ever-hotter, ever-deadlier conditions. "Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of [lethal heat conditions](https://www.livescience.com/55129-how-heat-waves-kill-so-quickly.html), beyond the threshold of human survivability," the authors hypothesized. Meanwhile, droughts, floods and wildfires regularly ravage the land. Nearly one-third of the world's land surface turns to desert. Entire ecosystems collapse, beginning with the planet's coral reefs, the rainforest and the Arctic ice sheets. The world's tropics are hit hardest by these new climate extremes, destroying the region's agriculture and turning more than 1 billion people into refugees. This mass movement of refugees — coupled with [shrinking coastlines](https://www.livescience.com/51990-sea-level-rise-unknowns.html) and severe drops in food and water availability — begin to stress the fabric of the world's largest nations, including the United States. Armed conflicts over resources, perhaps culminating in nuclear war, are likely. The result, according to the new paper, is "outright chaos" and perhaps "the end of human global civilization as we know it."

### FW

Debates over the effects of the plan are good –

Only evaluate the desirability of the plan – anything else explodes aff prep and moots the 1nc by making words or assumptions aff offense – the impact is clash which turns aff offense. Fairness is an independent impact necessary to evaluate the game.

1 – Nuanced debates about foreign policy creates students who can compromise with allies and adversaries and make accurate predictions

2 – Prioritizing details and good strategy ensure the few debaters that inevitably enter government can help balance capitlaims.

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being

#### 1] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first. Intuitions outweigh—they’re the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions are most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why.

#### 2] Actor specificity—governments must aggregate because their policies benefit some and harm others. The only non-arbitrary way to prioritize is by helping the most amount of people. Actor-specificity comes first because different agents have different ethical obligations

Mack 4 [(Peter, MBBS, FRCS(Ed), FRCS (Glasg), PhD, MBA, MHlthEcon) “Utilitarian Ethics in Healthcare.” International Journal of the Computer, the Internet, and Management Vol. 12, No.3. 2004. Department of Surgery. Singapore General Hospital.] SJDI

Medicine is a costly science, but of greater concern to the health economist is that it is also a limitless art. Every medical advance created new needs that did not exist until the means of meeting them came into existence. Physicians are reputed to have an infinite capacity to do ever more things, and perform ever more expensive interventions for their patients so long as any of their patients’ health needs remain unfulfilled. The traditional stance of the physician is that each patient is an isolated universe. When confronted with a situation in which his duty involves a competition for scarce medications or treatments, he would plead the patient’s cause by all methods, short of deceit. However, when the physician’s decision involves more than just his own patient, or has some commitment to public health, other issues have to be considered. He then has to recognise that the unbridled advocacy of the patient may not square with what the economist perceives to be the most advantageous policy to society as a whole. Medical professionals characteristically deplore scarcities. Many of them are simply not prepared to modify their intransigent principle of unwavering duty to their patients’ individual interest. However, in decisions involving multiple patients, making available more medication, labour or expenses for one patient will mean leaving less for another. The physician is then compelled by his competing loyalties to enter into a decision mode of one versus many, where the underlying constraint is one of finiteness of the commodities. Although the medical treatment may be simple and inexpensive in many instances, there are situations such as in renal dialysis, where prioritisation of treatment poses a moral dilemma because some patients will be denied the treatment and perish. Ethics and economics share areas of overlap. They both deal with how people should behave, what policies the state should pursue and what obligations citizens owe to their governments. The centrality of the human person in both normative economics and normative ethics is pertinent to this discussion. Economics is the study of human action in the marketplace whereas ethics deals with the “rightness” or “wrongness” of human action in general. Both disciplines are rooted in human reason and human nature and the two disciplines intersect at the human person and the analysis of human action. From the economist’s perspective, ethics is identified with the investigation of rationally justifiable bases for resolving conflict among persons with divergent aims and who share a common world. Because of the scarcity of resources, one’s success is another person’s failure. Therefore ethics search for rationally justifiable standards for the resolution of interpersonal conflict. While the realities of human life have given rise to the concepts of property, justice and scarcity, the management of scarcity requires the exercise of choice, since having more of some goods means having less of others. Exercising choice in turn involves comparisons, and comparisons are based on principles. As ethicists, the meaning of these principles must be sought in the moral basis that implementing them would require. For instance, if the implementation of distributive justice in healthcare is founded on the basis of welfare-based principles, as opposed to say resource-based principles, it means that the health system is motivated by the idea that what is of primary moral importance is the level of welfare of the people. This means that all distributive questions should be settled according to which distribution maximises welfare. Utilitarianism is fundamentally welfarist in its philosophy. Application of the principle to healthcare requires a prior understanding of the welfarist theory as expounded by the economist. Conceptually, welfarist theory is built on four tenets: utility maximisation, consumer sovereignty, consequentialism and welfarism. Utility maximisation embodies the behavioural proposition that individuals choose rationally, but it does not address the morality of rational choice. Consumer sovereignty is the maxim that individuals are the best judge of their own welfare. Consequentialism holds that any action or choice must be judged exclusively in terms of outcomes. Welfarism is the proposition that the “goodness” of the resource allocation be judged solely on the welfare or utility levels in that situation. Taken together these four tenets require that a policy be judged solely in terms of the resulting utilities achieved by individuals as assessed by the individuals themselves. Issues of who receives the utility, the source of the utility and any non-utility aspects of the situation are ignored.

#### 3] Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions

Moen 16, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267. SM

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good. 3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Although pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difﬁculty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one speciﬁc individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More speciﬁcally, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justiﬁed punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

### CASE

#### 1] Strikes violate individual autonomy by exercising coercion.

Gourevitch 18 [Alex; Brown University; “The Right to Strike: A Radical View,” American Political Science Review; 2018; [https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321%5d//SJWen) Justin

\*\*Edited for ableist language

Every liberal democracy recognizes that workers have a right to strike. That right is protected in law, sometimes in the constitution itself. Yet strikes pose serious problems for liberal societies. They involve violence and coercion, they often violate some basic liberal liberties, they appear to involve group rights having priority over individual ones, and they can threaten public order itself. Strikes are also one of the most common forms of disruptive collective protest in modern history. Even given the dramatic decline in strike activity since its peak in the 1970s, they can play significant roles in our lives. For instance, just over the past few years in the United States, large illegal strikes by teachers ~~paralyzed~~ froze major school districts in Chicago and Seattle, as well as statewide in West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Colorado; a strike by taxi drivers played a major role in debates and court decisions regarding immigration; and strikes by retail and foodservice workers were instrumental in getting new minimum wage and other legislation passed in states like California, New York, and North Carolina. Yet, despite their significance, there is almost no political philosophy written about strikes.1 This despite the enormous literature on neighboring forms of protest like nonviolence, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and social movements.

The right to strike raises far more issues than a single essay can handle. In what follows, I address a particularly significant problem regarding the right to strike and its relation to coercive strike tactics. I argue that strikes present a dilemma for liberal societies because for most workers to have a reasonable chance of success they need to use some coercive strike tactics. But these coercive strike tactics both violate the law and infringe upon what are widely held to be basic liberal rights. To resolve this dilemma, we have to know why workers have the right to strike in the first place. I argue that the best way of understanding the right to strike is as a right to resist the oppression that workers face in the standard liberal capitalist economy. This way of understanding the right explains why the use of coercive strike tactics is not morally constrained by the requirement to respect the basic liberties nor the related laws that strikers violate when using certain coercive tactics.

#### 2] Means to an end: employees ignore their duty to help their patients in favor of higher wages which treats them as a means to an end.

#### 3] The aff homogenizes all strikes as an unconditional right which is unethical.

Loewy 2K, Erich H. "Of healthcare professionals, ethics, and strikes." Cambridge Q. Healthcare Ethics 9 (2000): 513. (Erich H. Loewy M.D., F.A.C.P., was born in Vienna, Austria in 1927 and was able to escape first to England and then to the U.S. in late 1938. He was initially trained as a cardiologist. He taught at Case Western Reserve and practiced in Cleveland, Ohio. After 14 years he devoted himself fully to Bioethics and taught at the University of Illinois for 12 years. In 1996 he was selected as the first endowed Alumni Association Chair of Bioethics at the University of California Davis School of Medicine and has taught there since.) JG

It would seem then that the ethical considerations for workers striking in an industry such as a shoe factory or a chain grocery store are quite different from the ethical considerations for workers in sanitation, police, or fire departments, or for professionals such as teachers or those involved directly in healthcare. Even in the latter “professional” category, there are subtle but distinct differences of “rights” and obligations. However, one cannot conclude that for workers in essential industries strikes are simply ethically not permissible, whereas they are permissible for workers in less essential industries. Strikes, by necessity, injure another, and injuring another cannot be ethically neutral. Injuring others is prima facie ethically problematic—that is, unless a good and weighty argument for doing so can be made, injuring another is not ethically proper. Striking by a worker, in as much as doing so injures another or others, is only a conditional right. A compelling ethical argument in favor of striking is needed as well as an ethical argument in favor of striking at the time and in the way planned. It remains to delineate the conditions under which strikes, especially strikes by workers in essential industries and even more so by persons who consider themselves to be “professionals,” may legitimately proceed and yet fulfill their basic purpose.

#### 4] Free-riding: strikes are a form of free-riding since those who don’t participate still reap the benefits.

Dolsak and Prakash 19 [Nives and Aseem; We write on environmental issues, climate politics and NGOs; “Climate Strikes: What They Accomplish And How They Could Have More Impact,” 9/14/19; Forbes; <https://www.forbes.com/sites/prakashdolsak/2019/09/14/climate-strikes-what-they-accomplish-and-how-they-could-have-more-impact/?sh=2244a9bd5eed>] Justin

While strikes and protests build solidarity among their supporters, they are susceptible to collective action problems. This is because **the goals that strikers pursue tend to create non-excludable benefits**. That is, benefits such as climate protection can be enjoyed by both strikers and non-strikers. Thus, large participation in climate strikes will reveal that in spite of free-riding problems, a large number of people have a strong preference for climate action.

#### No transition wars---

#### a. Cooperation---countries turn inwards, downplay threats to justify defense cuts, and pursue heterodox foreign policy---that’s Clary---prefer him---he uses rare event analysis which is the best way to study and predict conflict due to the small historical sample size.

#### b. Empirics---past economic downturns such as 2008 prove that war is unthinkable even during economic strife---

#### c. Lack of public support---US polling data disproves the rally around the flag effect---leaders don’t benefit from going to war---

#### d. No nuke winter---that takes out the terminal impact---their models are one-dimensional that overestimate smoke levels---latest studies from MIT find that cooling would not be prolonged and humans can bounce back

#### e. Even if there is a conflict, they won’t use nukes---that’s Quinlan---the psychological pressures of starting a nuclear war mean that each side is looking for a chance to deescalate---the benefits of nuclear war will never outweigh the costs for states.

#### Economic collapse creates a forced choice to sustainability---empirics prove---Cuba after being cut off from the Soviet Union’s energy supply turned inwards, established low-tech, local production---crisis is key to force the mindset shift---that’s Alexander.

#### Economic crisis causes a paradigm shift---green activists have prefigured movements.

Alexander 15—Lecturer and research fellow at the University of Melbourne, co-director of the Simplicity Institute, and a PhD [Samuel, *Sufficiency Economy: Enough for Everyone, Forever*, p. 270-273]

Again, one must not romanticise such theories or transitions. The Cuban crisis, for example, entailed much hardship. But it does expose the mechanisms by which crisis can induce significant societal change in ways that, in the end, are not always negative. In the face of a global crisis or breakdown, therefore, it could be that elements of the deep green vision (such as organic agriculture, frugal living, sharing, radical recycling, post-oil transportation, etc.) come to be forced upon humanity, in which case the question of strategy has less to do with avoiding a deep crisis or collapse (which may be inevitable) and more to do with negotiating the descent as wisely as possible. This is hardly a reliable path to the deep green alternative, but it presents itself as a possible path.

Perhaps a more reliable path could be based on the possibility that, rather than imposing an alternative way of life on a society through sudden collapse, a deep crisis could provoke a social or political revolution in consciousness that opens up space for the deep green vision to be embraced and implemented as some form of crisis management strategy. Currently, there is insufficient social or political support for such an alternative, but perhaps a deep crisis will shake the world awake. Indeed, perhaps that is the only way to create the necessary mindset. After all, today we are hardly lacking in evidence of the need for radical change (Turner, 2012), suggesting that shock and response may be the form the transition takes, rather than it being induced through orderly, rational planning, whether from ‘top down’ or ‘from below’. Again, this ‘nonideal’ pathway to a post-growth or post-industrial society could be built into the other strategies discussed above, adding some realism to strategies that might otherwise appear too utopian. That is to say, it may be that only deep crisis will create the social support or political will needed for radical reformism, eco-socialism, or ecoanarchism to emerge as social or political movements capable of rapid transformation. Furthermore, it would be wise to keep an open and evolving mind regarding the best strategy to adopt, because the relative effectiveness of various strategies may change over time, depending on how forthcoming crises unfold.

It was Milton Friedman (1982: ix) who once wrote: ‘Only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around.’ What this ‘collapse’ or ‘crisis’ theory of change suggests, as a matter of strategy, is that deep green social and political movements should be doing all they can to mainstream the practices and values of their alternative vision. By doing so they would be aiming to ‘prefigure’ the deep green social, economic, and political structures, so far as that it is possible, in the hope that deep green ideas and systems are alive and available when the crises hit. Although Friedman obviously had a very different notion of what ideas should be ‘lying around’, the relevance of his point to this discussion is that in times of crisis, the politically or socially impossible can become politically or socially inevitable (Friedman, 1982: ix); or, one might say, if not inevitable, then perhaps much more likely.

It is sometimes stated that every crisis is an opportunity – from which the optimist infers that the more crises there are, the more opportunities there are. This may encapsulate one of the most realistic forms of hope we have left.

#### The threat of total collapse gets business and politicians on board --- the transition solves--- triple star this card.

Taylor 14—Adjunct Research Fellow at the Environmental Futures Research Institute at Griffith University, Coordinator of BEST Futures, and a PhD in Environment at Griffith University [Graeme, “The Next 20 Years: A Time of Transformation,” *Journal of Futures Studies*, Vol. 19, Issue 2, p. 115-126, Emory Libraries]

Different types of crises develop at different speeds and have different impacts. For example, while major environmental crises (e.g. climate change) tend to develop more slowly than financial crises, they will have more significant and longer-lasting impacts. I believe the following scenario is likely: 1) Crises are worsening due to interacting problems (Korowicz, 2013): –growing economic crises (e.g. global financial failures; increasing unemployment and poverty); –growing social crises (e.g. growing inequality; increasing political polarisation); –growing environmental crises (e.g. climate change; collapsing fisheries); –growing resource shortages (e.g. of water; food; cheap energy; critical minerals). 2) Governments and businesses will initially respond by denying the existence of structural problems and engaging in short-term crisis management (e.g. supporting failing financial institutions; stimulus programs) 3) As more and more people are negatively affected by growing crises, they will lose faith (and economic stakes) in existing institutions (Greer, 2013). 4) Global awareness of the need for fundamental structural changes will increase (e.g. for taxation policies that support environmentally and socially beneficial outcomes). Knowledge of sustainable alternatives will also spread (e.g. the circular economy). 5) The combination of growing crises and growing awareness will lead to political shifts. While these will at first be small-scale, sectoral and regional in nature, increasingly movements for change will link up to form national and international coalitions focused on systemic transformation. 6) Tipping points will be reached when a critical mass of credible political and business leaders realise that: environmental, economic and social crises are rapidly worsening; these crises cannot be managed with conventional methods; structural change will be necessary for civilisation to survive; for this to happen power will have to be devolved and shared with emerging popular movements (Lütkenhorst et al., 2014).