### OFF

#### Interpretation: The aff must defend that member nations reduce intellectual property protections for all medicines

#### The upward entailment test and adverb test determine the genericity of a bare plural

Leslie and Lerner 16 [Sarah-Jane Leslie, Ph.D., Princeton, 2007. Dean of the Graduate School and Class of 1943 Professor of Philosophy. Served as the vice dean for faculty development in the Office of the Dean of the Faculty, director of the Program in Linguistics, and founding director of the Program in Cognitive Science at Princeton University. Adam Lerner, PhD Philosophy, Postgraduate Research Associate, Princeton 2018. From 2018, Assistant Professor/Faculty Fellow in the Center for Bioethics at New York University. Member of the [Princeton Social Neuroscience Lab](http://psnlab.princeton.edu/).] “Generic Generalizations.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. April 24, 2016. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/> TG

1. Generics and Logical Form

In English, generics can be expressed using a variety of syntactic forms: bare plurals (e.g., “tigers are striped”), indefinite singulars (e.g., “a tiger is striped”), and definite singulars (“the tiger is striped”). However, none of these syntactic forms is dedicated to expressing generic claims; each can also be used to express existential and/or specific claims. Further, some generics express what appear to be generalizations over individuals (e.g., “tigers are striped”), while others appear to predicate properties directly of the kind (e.g., “dodos are extinct”). These facts and others give rise to a number of questions concerning the logical forms of generic statements.

1.1 Isolating the Generic Interpretation

Consider the following pairs of sentences:

(1)a.Tigers are striped.

b.Tigers are on the front lawn.

(2)a.A tiger is striped.

b.A tiger is on the front lawn.

(3)a.The tiger is striped.

b.The tiger is on the front lawn.

The sentence pairs above are prima facie syntactically parallel—both are subject-predicate sentences whose subjects consist of the same common noun coupled with the same, or no, article. However, the interpretation of first sentence of each pair is intuitively quite different from the interpretation of the second sentence in the pair. In the second sentences, we are talking about some particular tigers: a group of tigers in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), some individual tiger in ([2b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex2b)), and some unique salient or familiar tiger in ([3b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex3b))—a beloved pet, perhaps. In the first sentences, however, we are saying something general. There is/are no particular tiger or tigers that we are talking about.

The second sentences of the pairs receive what is called an existential interpretation. The hallmark of the existential interpretation of a sentence containing a bare plural or an indefinite singular is that it may be paraphrased with “some” with little or no change in meaning; hence the terminology “existential reading”. The application of the term “existential interpretation” is perhaps less appropriate when applied to the definite singular, but it is intended there to cover interpretation of the definite singular as referring to a unique contextually salient/familiar particular individual, not to a kind.

There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. Consider our examples above. In ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), we can replace “tiger” with “animal” salva veritate, but in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) we cannot. If “tigers are on the lawn” is true, then “animals are on the lawn” must be true. However, “tigers are striped” is true, yet “animals are striped” is false. ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) does not entail that animals are striped, but ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) entails that animals are on the front lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995).

Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al. 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) (e.g., “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g., “tigers are usually on the front lawn”). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually” to mark off the generic reading.)

#### It applies to “Medicines” – adding “generally” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning because the res never specified further

#### Vote negative:

#### 1] Precision – they justify arbitrarily mooting words in the resolution at their own whim in order to justify some potentially good interp.

#### 2] Limits and ground – their model allows affs to defend any medicine which explodes neg prep bc theres an infinite amount I can’t prepare for, like covid-19 vaccines, influenza, common colds, Marijuana, etc. and they all bracket out different DA’s

#### 3] TVA: Read a whole res aff with the same advantage

### OFF

#### “Reduce” means net decrease—merely conditioning reductions isn’t topical.

Waxman 82—(Speaker of the House). Harry Waxman. Public Law 87-253, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, 97th US Congress, Sept 8, 1982, Lexis

E) Prior to approving any application for a refund, the Secretary shall require evidence that such reduction in marketings has taken place and that such reduction is a net decrease in marketings of milk and has not been offset by expansion of production in other production facilities in which the person has an interest or by transfer of partial interest in the production facility or by the taking of any other action. which is a scheme or device to qualify for payment.

#### When authorized to ‘reduce’ the affirmative gets to decrease or eliminate --- changing the terms is not a reduction

Nebraska AG 73 (Office of the Attorney General of the State of Nebraska, 1973 Neb. AG LEXIS 25)//BB

In Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S. E. 2d 120, 176 Va. 281, the Virginia Supreme Court [\*4] stated that an item in an appropriation bill is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. In State ex rel. Meyer v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 185 Neb. 490, 176 N. W. 2d 920, the court referred to and noted certain appropriation items. It also referred to five appropriation items, one of which was, for example, land acquisition (Medical Center, University of Nebraska) in the amount of one million dollars. This is certainly a clear example of an item of appropriation. It has been held that the power to veto item does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions. Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S. E. 2d 120, 176 Va. 281. Under a Massachusetts constitutional provision which authorized the Governor to disapprove or reduce items or parts of items in any bill appropriating money the fact that the section relates solely to appropriation bills in conjunction with the word reduce shows that the expression "items or parts of items" refers to separable fiscal units and under such section, power is conferred on the Governor to reduce the sum of money appropriated [\*5] or to disapprove the appropriation entirely, but no power is conferred on him to change the terms of an appropriation except by reducing its amount. In re Opinion of the Justices, 2 N. E. 2d 789, 294 Mass. 616.

#### 2] Violation – They don’t remove the IP, the Trade Secret still has the same protection under law, it cannot be disclosed unless disclosure is in the public interest – the Aff only shifts who has to prove that NOT the actual protection.

#### 3] Standards –

#### a] Limits – Allowing the Aff’s to deal with the enforcement of IP rather than the actual protection explodes the Topic – Affs can modify court proceedings, specify which courts hear the cases, how long those proceedings last, which agencies pursue legal action, etc. – it eviscerates a predictable stasis by shifting it away from IPP good/bad.

#### b] Neg Ground – Shifting the topic to enforcement means DAs like Innovation, Biotech Heg, Politics no longer apply since the Aff doesn’t have to reduce anything related to the IPP itself – proven by the fact we can’t read Trade Secrets Good vs this Aff since the 1AR will shift to the IP itself doesn’t change and if they were good, the Aff wouldn’t be enforced proving modifications are infinitely abusive.

#### 4] TVA – eliminate Trade Secret protection of Pharma to eliminate deterrent litigation against whistle-blowers since there’s no longer a legal basis for enforcement.

#### 5] Paradigm Issues –

#### a] Topicality is Drop the Debater – it’s a fundamental baseline for debate-ability.

#### b] Use Competing Interps – 1] Topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical and 2] Reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation.

#### c] No RVI’s - 1] Forces the 1NC to go all-in on Theory which kills substance education, 2] Encourages Baiting since the 1AC will purposely be abusive, and 3] Illogical – you shouldn’t win for not being abusive.

#### d] Topicality outweighs 1AR Theory – 1] Outweighs on scope cause 1AC abuse effects every speech – we had to be abusive since the 1AC was abusive first and 2] Better for norming since we have more speeches to discuss what’s the best norm for debate.

### 1AC – Solvency

#### Zero Inherency or Uniqueness – the EU passed a Whistleblower Directive in 2019 – note they have card zero more recent – only card is 1AC HAI et Al 14 which doesn’t assume recent changes.

Sandeen and Mylly 20 Sharon K. Sandeen & Ulla-Maija Mylly 20, Trade Secrets and the Right to Information: A Comparative Analysis of E.U. and U.S. Approaches to Freedom of Expression and Whistleblowing, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2020). Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt/vol21/iss3/2 //sid

The E.U. adopted a Directive for the protection of whistleblowers (“Whistleblower Directive”) in April 2019.199 The objective of the Directive is to give further protection to whistleblowers to prevent breaches of law which are harmful to the public interest (Recital 1). The material scope of the Whistleblower Directive covers among others the following areas of E.U. law: food and feed safety, transport safety, consumer protection, nuclear safety, public health, environmental protection, public procurement, financial services and protection of privacy (Article 2). Thus, even though the Whistleblower Directive covers many areas of E.U. law, the approach is still sector specific, which is similar to the U.S. approach albeit in the U.S. there are different laws for different situations and sectors. Before the introduction of the Whistleblower Directive, some urged a need for a horizontal approach. But the E.U. does not have a power to legislate in all areas of law, which ruled out a horizontal approach.200 Moreover, the material scope of the Whistleblower Directive does not cover all breaches of Union law, but only breaches in the areas of Union law which are explicitly mentioned under Article 2. From the recitals of the Whistleblower Directive, one can learn that areas selected are the ones where breaches may cause serious harm to public interest and welfare of society.201 However, E.U. Member States are allowed to extend the application of the Directive to other areas of law. Moreover, the Whistleblower Directive does not have an impact on legislation already at place in the Member States for reporting wrongdoings in some specific areas of law. Under Article 21(7) of the Whistleblower Directive, if there is a need to disclose trade secrets, when reporting or disclosing information, which falls within the scope of the Whistleblower Directive, such disclosures are considered to be lawful disclosures under Article 3(2) of the Trade Secret Directive. Consequently, the Whistleblower Directive is a lex specialis within the scope of the Whistleblower Directive. However, these two Directives are understood as complementing each other and it is clearly highlighted that when cases do not belong to the scope of the Whistleblower Directive, the exceptions provided in the Trade Secret Directive remain applicable (Recital 100); for instance, freedom of expression exceptions may apply. However, the introduction of the Whistleblower Directive may have an impact on interpretations of the Trade Secret Directive. For example, the material scope of the Whistleblower Directive can provide some guidance when analyzing when there is a public interest in disclosing misconduct, wrongdoing or illegal activity under the Trade Secret Directive. But the interpretation of the exceptions in the Trade Secret Directive should not become more limited, even though there might be less need to rely on provisions of the Trade Secret Directive, as the material and the personal scopes of the Whistleblower Directive are very broad. The personal scope of the Whistleblower Directive is quite all- encompassing. Even though the provision refers to the persons who learn the information in work-related situations, the definitions applied also cover job-applicants, trainees, freelancers, sub-contractors and different type of collaborators who could face some harmful consequences due to disclosures. In addition, it is applicable both to public and private sectors (Article 4). Also, in the Trade Secret Directive the personal scope of the whistleblowing provision is wide, but it has been reached through defining the exception to cover the disclosure activity without making any reference to the personal scope of the exception. In accordance with the Whistleblower Directive, Member States are obligated to set up procedures for internal and external reporting. The Whistleblower Directive clearly refers to and draws upon the ECtHR’s practice on this issue (Recital 32). Under the Trade Secret Directive, the recitals only referred to the Charter provisions, but in the Whistleblower Directive there is a direct reference also to the ECHR. Moreover, one can see the impact of the ECtHR’s case law in the structuring of the internal and external reporting channels. How an entity’s internal reporting channels and relevant public authorities should be preferred before disclosing the wrongdoing to the general public seems to stem from the case law of the ECtHR. This preference is also illustrated in the cases discussed above. The disclosure to the public should always be the last resort. However, the Directive also provides some flexibility for cases when these preferred reporting channels are deemed to be impractical. In such cases the wrongdoings could be reported directly to the public. Article 15 sets up specific conditions when public disclosures are allowed. First, one is allowed to disclose information to the public, if they first have used internal and/or external reporting channels, but there has been no action taken within the timeframes set in the Whistleblower Directive. Moreover, one is allowed to disclose information to the public when one has reasonable grounds to believe that there is an imminent or manifest danger to the public interest. Likewise, public disclosure is allowed in cases of external reporting if one believes that because of the specific circumstances of the case there is a risk of retaliation or low prospect of the case being addressed, such as that evidence may be concealed or destroyed or that an authority is in collusion with the perpetrator of the breach or involved in the breach. This provision defines the conditions in a quite detailed manner.

#### Final wording of the EU Trade Secrets Directive doesn’t require that defendants prove they acted in the public interest, but only that they had reasonable cause to believe they did.

Sandeen and Mylly 20 Sharon K. Sandeen & Ulla-Maija Mylly 20, Trade Secrets and the Right to Information: A Comparative Analysis of E.U. and U.S. Approaches to Freedom of Expression and Whistleblowing, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2020). Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt/vol21/iss3/2 //sid

The final wording of the whistleblowing provision is different to the one proposed by the Commission. In the initial version it was further required that the disclosure of the trade secret should be “necessary” for revealing the misconduct. The initial proposal was interpreted to mean that even though some disclosures would be in the public interest, they might not always be necessary.188 The final wording seems to set a somewhat more lenient requirement for disclosures.189 However, when read together with preamble 20, “insofar as directly relevant misconduct [] is revealed,” the end result of the interpretation comes very close to the initial wording of Article 5 (b). Some have been concerned that whistleblowers may still be in a vulnerable situation because they have the burden of proof that their disclosure activities are in the public interest.191 However, it should be recognized that in accordance with preamble 20, national authorities are allowed to apply the whistleblower exception also in cases where “the respondent had every reason to believe in good faith that his or her conduct satisfied the appropriate criteria set out in this Directive.” Consequently, it seems that the burden of proof is not overly heavy, at least if this flexibility is utilized. Moreover, the personal scope of the applicability is not limited in any way. Therefore, it is applicable beyond work-related situations and extends both to private and public sectors. As previously noted, when analyzing the Trade Secret Directive and comparing it with the Information Society Directive, one might be puzzled that freedom of expression is provided as a direct exception to trade secret protection. Article 5(a) exempts remedies when acquisition, use or disclosure of the trade secret was carried out “for exercising the right to freedom of expression and information as set out in the Charter, including respect for the freedom and pluralism of the media.”192 This is very different from the exceptions provided in the Information Society Directive for copyright protection. One could, for example, find a freedom of expression fundamental right behind the parody exception for copyright (as the Deckmyn case discussed above illustrates), but none of the exceptions in the Information Society Directive implicate fundamental rights as directly as under the Trade Secret Directive. The case law of the CJEU on freedom of expression and copyright suggests that even though some legal provision under copyright legislation (or trade secret legislation) may be understood as an exception, it still has to be interpreted in a manner to give full effect to the rule and which would at the same fully adhere to the fundamental rights under the Charter, interpreted in the light of the ECtHR case law.193 Yet, the most recent case law from the CJEU in fact limits the room of interpretation in the copyright context in two important ways, as already discussed above. Firstly, the interpretation has to be in compliance with the wording of the specific exception. Secondly, the Member States need to apply the three-step test in accordance with Article 5(5) of the Information Society Directive when implementing and interpreting copyright exceptions.

### 1NC – Econ

#### Collapse by 2050 is inevitable---rebound effects, lack of decoupling, large environmental footprints from renewables, and a lack of viable sequestration technology make growth unsustainable

Giorgos Kallis 18, ICREA Research Professor at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, environmental scientist working on ecological economics and political ecology, formerly Marie Curie International Fellow at the Energy and Resources Group of the University of California at Berkeley, PhD in Environmental Policy and Planning from the University of the Aegean in Greece, et al., 5/31/18, “Annual Review of Environment and Resources: Research On Degrowth,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources, Vol. 43, p. 296-298 recut gord0

3. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: THE LIMITS OF GREEN GROWTH¶ Although driven by political, institutional, and discursive processes, growth is also biophysical. The economic process converts energy, resources, and matter to goods, services, and waste (34). In theory, it seems possible to decouple material throughput from economic output by improving the resource efficiency of production. Ecological economists, however, argue that in practice absolute decoupling is unlikely, even though relative decoupling is common (34). Efficiency should not be confused with scale (35): The more efficiently we use resources, the lower they cost, and the more of them we end up using (36). This is, in essence, growth. Just as increases in labor productivity lead to growth and new jobs, not to less employment, increases in resource productivity increase output and resource use (37). Capitalist economies grow by using more resources and more people, more intensively. Accelerating this is unlikely to spare resources.¶ Growth can become “cleaner” or “greener” by substituting, for example, fossil fuels with solar power, or scarce, environmentally intensive metals with more abundant and less intensive metals. But new substitutes have resource requirements, and life-cycle impacts that cross space and time. Energy is a vital source of useful work (38); growth has been possible because fossil fuels did things human labor alone could not do. Ending the use of fossil fuels is likely to reduce labor productivity and limit output (34). Solar and wind power are constrained only by their rate of flow, but unlike fossil fuels, they are diffuse—more like rain than a lake (3). To collect and concentrate a diffuse flow of energy, more energy is necessary and more land is required. The EROIs (energy returns on energy investment) of renewable energies are between 10:1 and 20:1, compared to more than 50:1 for earlier deposits of oil and coal (39). An economy powered by a diffuse energy flow is then likely to be an economy of lower net energy and lower output than one powered by concentrated stocks (3). Land use for solar or wind also competes with the use of land for food production, and rare materials are necessary for infrastructures and batteries that store their intermittent flows, with significant environmental effects.¶ Historical data corroborate ecological economic theory (40). Ayres & Warr (38) find that the use of net energy after conversion losses explains a big portion of the United States’ total factor productivity and economic growth. At the global level, GDP and material use have increased approximately 1:1. Carbon emissions have increased somewhat slower than GDP, but still have increased (34). This is unlikely to be a coincidence. Exceptions may exist, but cross-panel data analysis shows that overall, 1% growth of a national economy is associated with 0.6% to 0.8% increase in its carbon emissions (41) and 0.8% growth in its resource use (42). ¶ Global resource use follows currently the “collapse by 2050” scenario foreseen in the “Limits to Growth” 1971 report (43–45). Domestic material use in some developed OECD economies has reached a plateau, but this is because of globalization and trade. If we take into account imported goods, then the material requirements of products and services consumed in OECD countries have grown hand in hand with GDP, with no decoupling (46). For water use, the effects of growth overwhelm any realistic savings from technologies and efficiency (47); water footprints have increased even in regions such as California where water withdrawals were stabilized (40). ¶ Carbon emissions in some EU (European Union) countries have been declining, even after trade is taken into account, suggesting some substitution of fossil fuels by cleaner energies. [Although recession also played a role (34).] These declines are nowhere near the 8–10%, year-after-year reductions in carbon emissions required for developed nations under scenarios compatible with a 50% chance of limiting warming to 2◦C (48). Further reductions will be harder to sustain once one-off substitutions of oil or coal with natural gas are exhausted (34). ¶ Resource use or carbon emissions are a product of the scale of the economy (GDP) times its resource or carbon intensity (kg/GDP or kgCO2/GDP). With 1.5% annual increase in global income per capita, carbon intensity has to decline 4.4% each year for staying within 2◦C; with 0% growth, carbon intensity has to fall 2.9% each year (49). In the period 1970–2013, the average annual reduction rate for carbon intensity was less than 1.5%—and this gets harder to sustain as the share of carbon-intensive economies in global output increases (49). As Jackson (50) showed in his seminal work, it is practically impossible to envisage viable climate mitigation scenarios that involve growth. This calls for research on managing, or prospering, without growth (50, 51). ¶ Some scenarios deem possible meeting climate targets while sustaining growth, but these generally assume after 2050 some sort of “negative emissions technology,” geo-engineering or otherwise. According to a recent Nature editorial, these technologies remain currently “magical thinking” (52). Clean energy investments can stimulate the economy in the short run, but in the long run growth may be limited by their low EROIs. Studies suggest that economic growth requires a minimum EROI of close to 11:1 (53). Less EROI means less labor productivity, and hence less growth. Indeed, “Limits to Growth” scenarios do not predict growth ending when resources are exhausted but, rather, when the quality of resources declines to such an extent that further extraction diverts more and more investment away from productive industry (44).¶ Degrowth is defined by ecological economists as an equitable downscaling of throughput, with a concomitant securing of wellbeing. If there is a fundamental coupling of economic activity and resource use, as ecological economics suggests there is, then serious environmental or climate policies will slow down the economy. Vice versa, a slower economy will use less resources and emit less carbon (40). This is not the same as saying that the degrowth goal is to reduce GDP (54); slowing down the economy is not an end but a likely outcome in a transition toward equitable wellbeing and environmental sustainability. ¶ Advancing a position of “a-growth,” van den Bergh (54) proposes ignoring GDP and implementing a global carbon price, indifferent to what its effect on growth turns out to be. Ignoring GDP is a normative position—but at the end, the economy will either grow or not, and if it does not, then there should be plans for managing without growth. Given how entrenched GDP growth is in existing institutional and political structures, a-growth approaches must be advanced as part of broader systemic change (55).¶ Is it possible to secure a decent standard of living for all while throughput and output degrow? Substantive evidence indicates that prosperity does not depend on high levels of production and consumption. Kubiszewski et al. (56) find that the Genuine Progress Indicator, an indicator that includes environmental and social costs alongside output, peaked in 1978, despite subsequent global growth. A similar indicator, the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, has stayed at the same levels in the United States since 1950, despite a threefold growth of GDP (57). ¶ Wealthier countries on average have higher levels of life expectancy and education than poorer ones, but above a certain level of GDP, income does not make a difference in wellbeing—equality does. Satisfactory levels of wellbeing are achieved by countries such as Vietnam or Costa Rica at a fraction (one-third or less) of the output, energy, or resource use of countries such as the United States. Even the lower levels of resource use of mid-income countries, however, would not be sustainable if they were to be generalized to the planet as a whole. No country currently satisfies social wellbeing standards while staying within its share of planetary boundaries, suggesting that radical changes in provisioning systems are necessary (58). ¶ Wealthier people within a country are on average happier than others, but in the long run, overall happiness does not increase as a country’s income rises (59). Nuances of this income-happiness paradox depend on the sample of countries included and how one defines and asks about happiness. Within societies, individuals with higher incomes evaluate their lives as better than others, but do not enjoy better emotional wellbeing (60). Income determines social rank, and rank affects individuals’ assessments of their lives. Growth does not change relative rank or relative access to positional goods (those signifying position) but it does inflate expectations and prices of material goods, increasing frustration (61). Relative comparisons matter for personal wellbeing in low-income and high-income countries; for both, the more equally income is distributed, the happier people are (62). Pro-environmental behaviors and sharing are also strongly associated with personal wellbeing (63). This suggests that an economic contraction may not impact wellbeing negatively if accompanied by redistribution, sharing, and value shifts (34).

#### EU econ collapse is inevitable

Bet 8-22 [Martina Bet, 8-22-2020, "EU at risk of collapse? Gisela Stuart unravels Brussels' key to survival ", Express.co.uk, https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1325865/eu-news-eurozone-euro-coronavirus-recovery-fund-gisela-stuart-two-tier-spt, Accessed 10-1-2020] HWL recut LHSSN

EU at risk of collapse? Gisela Stuart unravels Brussels' key to survival THE EUROPEAN UNION will have to go through deep restructuring if it wants to survive in the long-term, former Labour MP Gisela Stuart exclusively told Express.co.uk. The eurozone’s economic rebound from the coronavirus pandemic is losing steam after a few months of improvement, according to a survey of business activity. The IHS Markit flash composite purchasing managers’ index for the euro area fell to 51.6 in August, down from 54.9 in July. According to a Reuters poll, even if a reading above the 50 mark indicates that a majority of businesses reported an expansion in activity, the reading undershot the expectations of most economists, who on average had expected activity to plateau. The disappointing data hit the euro in early trading on Friday and called into question the strength of Europe’s third-quarter economic recovery. The recent resurgence of coronavirus infections in many European countries to levels not seen since May has triggered fresh quarantine requirements and localised lockdowns, raising doubts over the sustainability of the recovery. The discouraging data comes a month after EU leaders struck a deal on a huge coronavirus recovery package. The €750billion (£677billionn) coronavirus fund will be used as loans and grants to the countries hit hardest by the virus. The remaining money represents the EU budget for the next seven years. As many wonder whether the measures will ultimately deepen the bloc’s economic integration or cause its demise, in an exclusive interview with Express.co.uk, former Labour MP and prominent Brexiteer Gisela Stuart claimed the package was a necessary step for the future of the bloc.

#### The Euro makes continual economic crisis inevitable – turns your impact

Stiglitz 17 -- Joseph E. Stiglitz (Nobel Prize winning American economist, public policy analyst, and a professor at Columbia University. Recipient of the Economics Nobel Prize and the John Bates Clark Medal), The Fundamental Flaws in the Euro Zone Framework, https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/sites/jstiglitz/files/The%20Fundamental%20Flaws%20in%20the%20Euro%20Zone%20Framework.pdf WJ

In the remainder of this section, I describe several of the underlying structural properties of the Euro Zone that, if they do not make crises inevitable, certainly make them more likely to occur. (What is required is not so much the structural adjustment of the individual countries, but the structural adjustment of the euro framework.) Many of these were rules that reflected the neoclassical model, with the associated neoliberal policy prescriptions, which were fashionable (in some circles) at the time of the creation of the euro. Europe made two fundamental mistakes: first, it enshrined in its “constitution” these fads and fashions, the concerns of the time, without providing enough flexibility in responding to changing circumstances and understandings. And secondly, even at the time, the limits of the neoclassical model had been widely exposed—the problems posed, for instance, by imperfect competition, information, and markets to which I alluded earlier. The neoclassical model failed to recognize the many market failures that require government intervention, or in which government intervention would improve the performance of the economy. Thus, most importantly from a macroeconomic perspective, there was the belief that so long as the government maintained a stable macro-economy—typically interpreted as maintaining price stability—overall economic performance would be assured. By the same token, if the government kept budgets in line (kept deficits and debts within the limit set by Maastricht Convention) the economies would “converge,” so that the single currency system would work. The founders of the Euro Zone seemed to think that these budgetary/macroconditions were necessary and essentially sufficient for the countries to converge, that is, to have sufficient “similarity” that a common currency would work. They were wrong. The founders of the Euro Zone were also focused on government failure, rather than market failure, and thus they circumscribed governments, setting the stage four the market failures that would bring on the euro crisis. Much of the framework built into the Euro Zone would have enhanced efficiency, if Europe had gotten the details right and if the neoclassical model were correct. But the devil is in the detail, and some of the provisions, even within the neoliberal framework, led to inefficiency and instability. Free mobility of factors without a common debt leads to the inefficient and unstable allocation of factors. The principle of free mobility is to ensure that factors move to where (marginal) returns are highest, and if factor prices are equal to marginal productivity, that should happen. But what individuals care about, for instance, is the after-tax returns to labor, and this depends not only on the marginal productivity of labor (in the neoclassical model) but also on taxes and the provision of public goods. Taxes, in turn, depend in part on the burden imposed by inherited debt. Ireland, Greece and Spain face high levels of inherited debt. In these countries, the incentive for outmigration, and is especially so, because that debt did not increase to its current levels as a result of investments in education, technology, or infrastructure that is, through the acquisition of assets, but rather as a result of financial and macro-economic mismanagement. This implies migration away from these highly indebted countries to those with less indebtedness, even when marginal productivities are the same; and the more individuals move out, the greater the “equilibrium” tax burden on the remainder, accelerating the movement of labor away from an efficient allocation.2 (Of course, in the short run, migration may have positive benefits to the crisis country, both because it reduces the burden of unemployment insurance, and as the remittances back home provide enhanced domestic purchasing power. Whether in the short run these “benefits” to migration out-weight the adverse effects noted above is an empirical question. The migration also hides the severity of the underlying downturn, since it means that the unemployment rate is less, possibly far less, than it otherwise would be.)3 Free mobility of capital and goods without tax harmonization can lead to an inefficient allocation of capital and/or reduce the potential for redistributive taxation, leading to high levels of after-tax and transfer inequality. Competition among jurisdictions can be healthy, but there can also be a race to the bottom. Capital goes to the jurisdiction which taxes it at the lowest rate, not where its marginal productivity is the highest. To compete, other jurisdictions must lower the taxes they impose on capital, and since capital is more unequally distributed than labor, this reduces the scope for redistributive taxation. (A similar argument goes for the allocation of skilled labor.) Inequality, it is increasingly recognized, is not just a moral issue: it also affects the performance of the economy in numerous ways (Stiglitz 2012). Free migration might result in politically unacceptable patterns of location of economic activity. The general theory of migration/local public goods has shown that decentralized patterns of migration may well result in inefficient and socially undesirable patterns of location of economic activity and concentrations of population. There can be congestion and agglomeration externalities (both positive and negative) that arise from free migration. That is why many countries have an explicit policy for regional development, attempting to offset the inefficient and/or socially unacceptable patterns emerging from unfettered markets. In the context of Europe, free migration (especially that arising from debt obligations inherited from the past) may result in a depopulation not only of certain regions within countries but also of certain countries. One of the important adjustment mechanisms in the United States (which shares a common currency) is migration; and if such migration leads to the depopulation of an entire state, there is limited concern.4 But Greece or Ireland are, and should be, concerned about the depopulation of their countries. The single market principle for financial institutions and capital too can lead to a regulatory race to the bottom, with at least some of the costs of the failures borne by other jurisdictions. The failure of a financial institution imposes costs on others (evidenced so clearly in the crisis of 2008), and governments will not typically take into account these cross-border costs. That is why either there has to be regulation by the host country (Stiglitz et al. 2010), or there has to be strong regulation at the European level. Worse still, confidence in any country’s banking system rests partially in the confidence of the ability and willingness of the bank’s government to bail it out (and/or to the existence of institutional frameworks that reduce the likelihood that a bailout will be necessary, that there are funds set aside should a bailout be necessary, and that there are procedures in place to ensure that depositors will be made whole). Typically, there is an implicit subsidy, from which banks in jurisdictions with governments with greater bailout capacity benefit. Thus, money flowed into the United States after the 2008 global crisis, which failures in the United States had brought about, simply because there was more confidence that the United States had the willingness and ability to bail out its banks. Similarly, today in Europe: what Spaniard or Greek would rationally keep his money in a local bank, when there is (almost) equal convenience and greater safety in putting it in a German bank?5 Only by paying much higher interest rates can banks in those countries compete, but such an action would put them at a competitive disadvantage; and the increase in interest rates that is required may be too great— the bank would quickly appear to be non-viable. What happens typically is capital flight (or, in the current case, what has been described as a capital jog: the surprise is not that capital is leaving, but that it is not leaving faster). But that sets into motion a downward spiral: as capital leaves, the country’s banks restrict lending, the economy weakens, the perceived ability of the country to bail out its banks weakens, and capital is further incentivized to leave. There are two more fallacies that are related to the current (and inevitable) failures of the Euro Zone. The first is the belief that there are natural forces for convergence in productivity, without government intervention. There can be increasing returns (reflected in clustering), the consequence of which is that countries with technological advantages maintain those advantages, unless there are countervailing forces brought about by government (industrial) policies. But European competition laws prevented, or at least inhibited, such policies.6 The second is the belief that necessary, and almost sufficient, for good macroeconomic performance is that the monetary authorities maintain low and stable inflation. This led to the mandate of the European Central Bank to focus on inflation, in contrast to that of the Federal Reserve, whose mandate includes growth, employment, and (now) financial stability. The contrasting mandates can lead to an especially counterproductive response to a crisis, especially one which is accompanied by cost-push inflation arising from high energy or food prices. While the Fed lowered interest rates in response to the crisis, the continuing inflationary concerns in Europe did not lead to matching reductions there. The consequence was an appreciating euro, with adverse effects on European output. Had the ECB taken actions to weaken the euro, it would have stimulated the economy, partially offsetting the effects of austerity. As it was, it allowed the US to engage in competitive devaluation against it. It also meant that the ECB (and central banks within each of the member countries) studiously avoided doing anything about the real estate bubbles that were mounting in several of the countries. This was in spite of the fact that the East Asian crisis had shown that private sector misconduct—even when there is misconduct in government—could lead to an economic crisis. Europe similarly paid no attention to mounting current account balances in several of the countries. Ex post, many policymakers admit that it was a mistake to ignore these current account imbalances or financial market excesses. But the underlying ideology then (and still) provides no framework for identifying good “imbalances,” when capital is flowing into the country because markets have rationally identified good investment opportunities, and those that are attributable to market excesses.

#### Decline doesn’t cause war

Christina L. **Davis &** Krzysztof J. **Pelc 17**, Christina L. Davis is a Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton; Krzysztof J. Pelc is an Associate Professor of Political Science at McGill University, “Cooperation in Hard Times: Self-restraint of Trade Protection,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(2): 398-429

Conclusion Political economy theory would lead us to expect rising trade protection during hard times. Yet empirical evidence on this count has been mixed. Some studies find a correlation between poor macroeconomic conditions and protection, but the worst recession since the Great Depression has generated surprisingly moderate levels of protection. We explain this apparent contradiction. Our statistical findings show that under conditions of pervasive economic crisis at the international level, states exercise more restraint than they would when facing crisis alone. These results throw light on behavior not only during the crisis, but throughout the WTO period, from 1995 to the present. One concern may be that the restraint we observe during widespread crises is actually the result of a decrease in aggregate demand and that domestic pressure for import relief is lessened by the decline of world trade. By controlling for product-level imports, we show that the restraint on remedy use is not a byproduct of declining imports. We also take into account the ability of some countries to manipulate their currency and demonstrate that the relationship between crisis and trade protection holds independent of exchange rate policies. Government decisions to impose costs on their trade partners by taking advantage of their legal right to use flexibility measures are driven not only by the domestic situation but also by circumstances abroad. This can give rise to an individual incentive for strategic self-restraint toward trade partners in similar economic trouble. Under conditions of widespread crisis, government leaders fear the repercussions that their own use of trade protection may have on the behavior of trade partners at a time when they cannot afford the economic cost of a trade war. Institutions provide monitoring and a venue for leader interaction that facilitates coordination among states. Here the key function is to reinforce expectations that any move to protect industries will trigger similar moves in other countries. Such coordination often draws on shared historical analogies, such as the Smoot–Hawley lesson, which form a focal point to shape beliefs about appropriate state behavior. Much of the literature has focused on the more visible action of legal enforcement through dispute settlement, but this only captures part of the story. Our research suggests that tools of informal governance such as leader pledges, guidance from the Director General, trade policy reviews, and plenary meetings play a real role within the trade regime. In the absence of sufficiently stringent rules over flexibility measures, compliance alone is insufficient during a global economic crisis. These circumstances trigger informal mechanisms that complement legal rules to support cooperation. During widespread crisis, legal enforcement would be inadequate, and informal governance helps to bolster the system. Informal coordination is by nature difficult to observe, and we are unable to directly measure this process. Instead, we examine the variation in responses across crises of varying severity, within the context of the same formal setting of the WTO. Yet by focusing on discretionary tools of protection—trade remedies and tariff hikes within the bound rate—we can offer conclusions about how systemic crises shape country restraint independent of formal institutional constraints. Insofar as institutions are generating such restraint, we offer that it is by facilitating informal coordination, since all these instruments of trade protection fall within the letter of the law. Future research should explore trade policy at the micro level to identify which pathway is the most important for coordination. Research at a more macro-historical scope could compare how countries respond to crises under fundamentally different institutional contexts. In sum, the determinants of protection include economic downturns not only at home but also abroad. Rather than reinforcing pressure for protection, pervasive crisis in the global economy is shown to generate countervailing pressure for restraint in response to domestic crisis. In some cases, hard times bring more, not less, international cooperation.

#### Stopping growth solves extinction from eco collapse – decoupling is impossible even under perfect conditions, and transition dangers are overhyped

Hickel 18 [Jason Hickel is an anthropologist, author, and a fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. Why Growth Can’t Be Green. Foreign Policy Magazine. September 12, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/why-growth-cant-be-green/]

Warnings about ecological breakdown have become ubiquitous. Over the past few years, major newspapers, including the Guardian and the New York Times, have carried alarming stories on soil depletion, deforestation, and the collapse of fish stocks and insect populations. These crises are being driven by global economic growth, and its accompanying consumption, which is destroying the Earth’s biosphere and blowing past key planetary boundaries that scientists say must be respected to avoid triggering collapse.

Many policymakers have responded by pushing for what has come to be called “green growth.” All we need to do, they argue, is invest in more efficient technology and introduce the right incentives, and we’ll be able to keep growing while simultaneously reducing our impact on the natural world, which is already at an unsustainable level. In technical terms, the goal is to achieve “absolute decoupling” of GDP from the total use of natural resources, according to the U.N. definition.

It sounds like an elegant solution to an otherwise catastrophic problem. There’s just one hitch: New evidence suggests that green growth isn’t the panacea everyone has been hoping for. In fact, it isn’t even possible.

Green growth first became a buzz phrase in 2012 at the United Nations Cosnference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro. In the run-up to the conference, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the U.N. Environment Program all produced reports promoting green growth. Today, it is a core plank of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals.

But the promise of green growth turns out to have been based more on wishful thinking than on evidence. In the years since the Rio conference, three major empirical studies have arrived at the same rather troubling conclusion: Even under the best conditions, absolute decoupling of GDP from resource use is not possible on a global scale.

A team of scientists led by the German researcher Monika Dittrich first raised doubts in 2012. The group ran a sophisticated computer model that predicted what would happen to global resource use if economic growth continued on its current trajectory, increasing at about 2 to 3 percent per year. It found that human consumption of natural resources (including fish, livestock, forests, metals, minerals, and fossil fuels) would rise from 70 billion metric tons per year in 2012 to 180 billion metric tons per year by 2050. For reference, a sustainable level of resource use is about 50 billion metric tons per year—a boundary we breached back in 2000.

The team then reran the model to see what would happen if every nation on Earth immediately adopted best practice in efficient resource use (an extremely optimistic assumption). The results improved; resource consumption would hit only 93 billion metric tons by 2050. But that is still a lot more than we’re consuming today. Burning through all those resources could hardly be described as absolute decoupling or green growth.

In 2016, a second team of scientists tested a different premise: one in which the world’s nations all agreed to go above and beyond existing best practice. In their best-case scenario, the researchers assumed a tax that would raise the global price of carbon from $50 to $236 per metric ton and imagined technological innovations that would double the efficiency with which we use resources. The results were almost exactly the same as in Dittrich’s study. Under these conditions, if the global economy kept growing by 3 percent each year, we’d still hit about 95 billion metric tons of resource use by 2050. Bottom line: no absolute decoupling.

Finally, last year the U.N. Environment Program—once one of the main cheerleaders of green growth theory—weighed in on the debate. It tested a scenario with carbon priced at a whopping $573 per metric ton, slapped on a resource extraction tax, and assumed rapid technological innovation spurred by strong government support. The result? We hit 132 billion metric tons by 2050. This finding is worse than those of the two previous studies because the researchers accounted for the “rebound effect,” whereby improvements in resource efficiency drive down prices and cause demand to rise—thus canceling out some of the gains.

Study after study shows the same thing. Scientists are beginning to realize that there are physical limits to how efficiently we can use resources. Sure, we might be able to produce cars and iPhones and skyscrapers more efficiently, but we can’t produce them out of thin air. We might shift the economy to services such as education and yoga, but even universities and workout studios require material inputs. Once we reach the limits of efficiency, pursuing any degree of economic growth drives resource use back up.

These problems throw the entire concept of green growth into doubt and necessitate some radical rethinking. Remember that each of the three studies used highly optimistic assumptions. We are nowhere near imposing a global carbon tax today, much less one of nearly $600 per metric ton, and resource efficiency is currently getting worse, not better. Yet the studies suggest that even if we do everything right, decoupling economic growth with resource use will remain elusive and our environmental problems will continue to worsen.

Preventing that outcome will require a whole new paradigm. High taxes and technological innovation will help, but they’re not going to be enough. The only realistic shot humanity has at averting ecological collapse is to impose hard caps on resource use, as the economist Daniel O’Neill recently proposed. Such caps, enforced by national governments or by international treaties, could ensure that we do not extract more from the land and the seas than the Earth can safely regenerate. We could also ditch GDP as an indicator of economic success and adopt a more balanced measure like the genuine progress indicator (GPI), which accounts for pollution and natural asset depletion. Using GPI would help us maximize socially good outcomes while minimizing ecologically bad ones.

But there’s no escaping the obvious conclusion. Ultimately, bringing our civilization back within planetary boundaries is going to require that we liberate ourselves from our dependence on economic growth—starting with rich nations. This might sound scarier than it really is. Ending growth doesn’t mean shutting down economic activity—it simply means that next year we can’t produce and consume more than we are doing this year. It might also mean shrinking certain sectors that are particularly damaging to our ecology and that are unnecessary for human flourishing, such as advertising, commuting, and single-use products.

But ending growth doesn’t mean that living standards need to take a hit. Our planet provides more than enough for all of us; the problem is that its resources are not equally distributed. We can improve people’s lives right now simply by sharing what we already have more fairly, rather than plundering the Earth for more. Maybe this means better public services. Maybe it means basic income. Maybe it means a shorter working week that allows us to scale down production while still delivering full employment. Policies such as these—and countless others—will be crucial to not only surviving the 21st century but also flourishing in it.

#### Decline causes transition---crisis fundamentally changes entrenched models of growth and empowers calls for degrowth

Derk Loorbach 16, director of DRIFT and Professor of Socio-economic Transitions at the Faculty of Social Science, both at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “The economic crisis as a game changer? Exploring the role of social construction in sustainability transitions,” *Ecology and Society*, Volume 21, Issue 4, 2016, <http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol21/iss4/art15/>

Meanwhile, many political and public debates seem to be primarily concerned with standard, relatively short-term, economic issues, such as monetary losses, stop-and-start economic growth, increasing unemployment, falling real estate prices, failing banks, virtually bankrupt nations, and how to get back on course to economic growth. The standard responses when national governments are struggling to get their economies healthy again are mostly about inducing more money, austerity measures, and introducing financial regulations, all often part of a broader financial–economic logic (Stiglitz 2010). The dominant focus on fighting economic deficits and problems at the expense of investing in social and ecological deficits—thereby failing to address persistent problems in these areas—can be argued to be a short-term strategy to prop up an inherently unmanageable system. Examples are the support of system banks with public money and the green growth strategy (OECD 2009, 2013a). Transition theory (Grin et al. 2010, Markard et al. 2012) suggests that such short-term fixes are typical regime-based strategies to sustain existing structures, cultures, and practices, and to fend off the threats of more radical systemic change.¶ The transition perspective suggests that most regular policy and governance strategies essentially reproduce existing systems and, by definition, do not address the root causes of problems that are embedded in the same structures and cultures that determine how solutions are framed and implemented. Such path-dependent development optimizing existing institutional structures

will inevitably lead to recurring crises and ultimately a more disruptive, shock-wise structural change of an incumbent regime. Transition studies thus argue that solutions that address symptoms rather than the underlying structural causes tend to reinforce a lock-in and result in further emergent problems (Rotmans and Loorbach 2010, Schuitmaker 2012). We argue that the underlying causes and mechanisms of the economic crises have not been thoroughly analyzed, let alone addressed through effective policies. In a globalized economy, fundamental changes will not likely come from actions by (national) governments or incumbent businesses, as these are inherently intertwined with and dependent upon the currently still dominant financial–economic systems and their governance. The need for alternative economic approaches, discourses, and systems is increasingly emphasized (Schor 2010, Simms 2013, Jackson 2013, van den Bergh 2013, Schor and Thompson, 2014). Even though the benefits of liberalization are still significant, it seems that the transfer of control from government to markets has substantially diminished possibilities for top-down policy making, adding to brittleness, complexity, and lock-in (Loorbach and Lijnis-Huffenreuter 2013).¶ In this paper, we take a transition perspective on transformative social innovation to conceptualize and map the systemic dynamics that have caused the economic crisis, as well as how it influences the dynamics of social transformation. We explore how the economic crisis might be considered as a phase in a broader economic transition and which types of changes coincide to develop into this direction. We thus view the economic crisis not as a phenomenon in isolation within a relatively short time frame, but as an intrinsic part, or perhaps a symptom, of deeper underlying structural societal changes over the longer term.

The question we seek to address is how the economic crisis interacts with broader societal changes as well as which dynamics might accelerate or hamper more structural (sustainability) transitions. To this end, we ask when and how a macrolevel or landscape development like the economic crisis fundamentally changes the dominant logic, rules, and conditions of incumbent regimes. In other words, when does a macrodevelopment become a game changer (cf. Avelino et al. 2014)?¶ The paper builds upon theoretical work from the European FP7 project TRANSIT, which draws on transition theory to develop an empirically grounded theory on transformative social innovation. In this paper, we introduce the analytical perspective that we developed on transformative social innovation and two empirical examples. Although our analytical perspective suggests that alternatives and breakthroughs can come from any sector or actor, in this paper, we focus on the agency of social innovation and civil-society-led initiatives in providing and producing alternatives. The paper was developed through a number of iterations, workshops, and theoretical synthesizing. To develop our arguments, we build upon insights from sustainability transitions literature (Grin et al. 2010, Markard et al. 2012), social innovation research (Mulgan 2006, Murray et al. 2010, Franz et al. 2012, Westley 2013, Moulaert et al. 2013) and other fields aiming to understand the economic crisis. In addition, we include two empirical cases, transnational networks of social innovation, time banks, and the transition movement. For both cases, we draw upon a general literature review.¶ The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, “Economic change or transition?,” we introduce the economic crisis as a multifarious phenomenon, how we understand it from a transition perspective, and how it is understood from an economist’s point of view. We illustrate that it is an ambiguous phenomenon that is simultaneously seen as part of regular changes in that it is part of disruptive or transformative change. In the section “Making sense of the economic crisis?,” we present a number of alternative perspectives on the economic crisis that put forward particular fundamental and systemic causes of the economic crisis and how these are translated in so called “narratives of change.” In “Transformative social innovations,” we highlight two specific social innovation initiatives, time banks and transition towns, which have an evident transformative claim and potential, and reflect upon how such transformative social innovations relate (themselves) to the economic crisis. In “Reconceptualizing societal transformations and the role of the economic crisis,” we synthesize our findings and argue that the concepts of game changers and narratives could help to unpack the landscape and better understand how macro- and microlevels interact to trigger transformative changes at the mesolevel. In conclusion, we address the need for a better understanding of the transformative impacts of the different shades of change (in coevolution) vis-é-vis the restorative dynamics associated with incumbent regimes.¶ ECONOMIC CHANGE OR TRANSITION?¶ The economic crisis has an empirical basis in factual events and economic statistics, but is also a social construct. In a narrow sense, the term economic crisis refers to the worldwide recession of 2007–2008, which changed economic circumstances and investors’ outlooks and caused governments to nationalize and/or invest in failing banks and to stimulate the economy inter alia through bail outs, expansion of the money supply (quantitative easing), and low interest rates. It changed the lives of many whose employment or work conditions were drastically affected (Melike 2014). It also made many observers much more critical about capitalism and the stability of markets, especially financial markets (Murphy 2011, Stephan and Weaver 2011, Rifkin 2014, Weaver 2014). In Europe, the economic crisis was accompanied by (perceptions of) a debt crisis, a banking crisis, and a euro crisis, all interrelated. The financial crisis, debt crisis, bank crisis, neo-liberal crisis, and global financial collapse are not just different names but also refer to different, albeit closely related, empirical phenomena. Importantly, the perception and representation of such phenomena in crisis terms can give scope for motivating and/or justifying responses.¶ This economic crisis has led to measures and dynamics with profound impacts on society. Impacts that hardly could have been predicted or anticipated proactively in an objective and neutral way. As most of the formal and institutional measures originate from either governmental or financial institutes, it is to be expected that these favor nondisruptive and reinforcing measures that shift the cost of recovery toward society and strengthen even more the potential for financial–economic growth. The resulting austerity measures and state budget cuts put pressure on public sector employment, transfer payments, and social welfare systems, contributing to rising unemployment and underemployment among young and old, and lower disposable incomes for many in society. The state investments in the recovery of the banking system as well as budget cuts in welfare, health care, and education have been put forward as necessary to restabilize the economy and return to economic growth as before. Although the economy now seems on a path to recovery, many of the social and ecological tensions and challenges still persist.¶ From a countermovement perspective, the dominant measures have mainly strengthened incumbent regimes and even made more apparent the need for structural change. This becomes apparent by a growing dissatisfaction with capitalism, a lack of trust in financial institutions, and an increasing pressure on democratic political institutions (Castells 2010, Murphy 2011, Rifkin 2014, Weaver 2014). These in turn focus attention on the meaning and quality of life, which can intensify individuals’ desires to live in a more responsible and meaningful way as citizens, workers, and consumers, which again are accompanied by an increasing attention to social value creation (based on the attention to these issues in magazines and business literature) (see O’Riordan 2013).¶ Over 70 years ago, Polanyi (1944) described countermovements as critical responses to the rise of liberal market economies in the interwar period. Polanyi argued that countermovements tend to include both progressive and regressive forces, and he related the rise of fascism as part of a double countermovement in reaction to the rise of liberal market economy (Worth 2013). Similarly, contemporary counternarratives do not only include progressive sustainability-oriented ideas, but also more regressive ideas as manifested in populist and/or extremist political parties. Moreover, counternarratives and grassroots movements are also not always easily discernible from mainstream discourses. Although discourses on, e.g., solidarity economy can be constructed as counternarratives, they have considerable overlaps with mainstream policy discourses on the “Big Society” (UK) and “the participation society” (The Netherlands). When comparing discourses on the circular economy and the sharing economy, one can find differences in the former being partly associated with a corporate movement (see, e.g., McKinsey and the Ellen McArthur Foundation) the latter being more associated with grassroots social movements (e.g., Peerby). Different discourses are intermingled, changing over time, forming double movements (Polanyi 1944), or rather multilayered narratives of change.¶ We use here narratives of change as an accessible and short summary of discourses on change and innovation (Avelino et al. 2014). Social (counter)movements, such as the environmental movement or the antiglobalization movement, can be experienced as counternarratives of change. These social movements “struggle against pre-existing cultural and institutional narratives and the structures of meaning and power they convey” (Davies 2002:25). They achieve this partly through counternarratives, which “modify existing beliefs and symbols and their resonance comes from their appeal to values and expectations that people already hold” (Davies 2002:25). This challenges us to expand beyond the hegemonic mainstream narrative on, e.g., the economic crisis, by including a discussion of counternarratives around the new economy.¶ Thus, we see a double device of addressing the economic crisis through measures to prevent the breakdown and restabilization of the existing system, and the rise of counternarratives and movements that find legitimacy in exactly these processes and measures. From antiglobalization or Occupy movements, we can discern a loss of trust in the dominant economic model of the growth society and its associated livelihood model where most material needs are satisfied through impersonal market exchange. The formalized and impersonal market exchange is questioned, resulting in concepts such as sharing, reciprocity, generalized exchange, or restricted exchange (see Befu 1977, Peebles 2010 for an overview). Although the mainstream discourse is still about how to regain adequate rates of economic growth, an underlying longer-sighted discourse (i.e., counternarrative) is emerging about alternatives for this growth model. This includes (longstanding and more recent) ideas on degrowth (Schumacher 1973, Fournier 2008), green growth (OECD 2009, 2013a), or postgrowth (Jackson 2009). These (counter)narratives also question the market logic that constructs human beings as well as nature as resources and commodities in the production of goods (Freudenburg et al. 1995).

#### Economic crises cause increased cooperation, not war

Christopher Clary 15, Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2597712

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles.

Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination

I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically.

This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant political-military threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further:

The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3

Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.5

Why Might Economic Crisis Cause Rivalry Termination?

Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.

### 1NC – Disease

#### Their extinction warrant is biologically manipulated disease which isn’t the type of disease they solve

#### Infectious diseases don’t cause extinction

Owen Cotton-Barratt 17, et al, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, 2/3/2017, Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and

other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic.

One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.3

#### Large-scale diseases solve nuclear war---it’s likely now.

Barry. R. Posen 20. Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and Director Emeritus of the MIT Security Studies Program. 4/23/2020. “Do Pandemics Promote Peace?” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-23/do-pandemics-promote-peace>. DOA: 9/2/2020. SIR.

As the novel coronavirus infects the globe, states compete for scientific and medical supplies and blame one another for the pandemic’s spread. Policy analysts have started asking whether such tensions could eventually erupt into military conflict. Has the pandemic increased or decreased the motive and opportunity of states to wage war? War is a risky business, with potentially very high costs. The historian Geoffrey Blainey argued in The Causes of War that most wars share a common characteristic at their outset: optimism. The belligerents usually start out sanguine about their odds of military success. When elites on both or all sides are confident, they are more willing to take the plunge—and less likely to negotiate, because they think they will come out better by fighting. Peace, by contrast, is served by pessimism. Even one party’s pessimism can be helpful: that party will be more inclined to negotiate and even accept an unfavorable bargain in order to avoid war. When one side gains a sudden and pronounced advantage, however, this de-escalatory logic can break down: the optimistic side will increase its demands faster than the pessimistic side can appease. Some analysts worry that something like this could happen in U.S.-Chinese relations as a result of the new coronavirus. The United States is experiencing a moment of domestic crisis. China, some fear, might see the pandemic as playing to its advantage and be tempted to throw its military weight around in the western Pacific. What these analysts miss is that COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus, is weakening all of the great and middle powers more or less equally. None is likely to gain a meaningful advantage over the others. All will have ample reason to be pessimistic about their military capabilities and their overall readiness for war. For the duration of the pandemic, at least, and probably for years afterward, the odds of a war between major powers will go down, not up. PAX EPIDEMICA? A cursory survey of the scholarly literature on war and disease appears to confirm Blainey’s observation that pessimism is conducive to peace. Scholars have documented again and again how war creates permissive conditions for disease—in armies as well as civilians in the fought-over territories. But one seldom finds any discussion of epidemics causing wars or of wars deliberately started in the middle of widespread outbreaks of infectious disease. (The diseases that European colonists carried to the New World did weaken indigenous populations to the point that they were more vulnerable to conquest; in addition, some localized conflicts were fought during the influenza pandemic of 1919–21, but these were occasioned by major shifts in regional balances of power following the destruction of four empires in World War I.) That sickness slows the march to war is partly due to the fact that war depends on people. When people fall ill, they can’t be counted on to perform well in combat. Military medicine made enormous strides in the years leading up to World War I, prior to which armies suffered higher numbers of casualties from disease than from combat. But pandemics still threaten military units, as those onboard U.S. and French aircraft carriers, hundreds of whom tested positive for COVID-19, know well. Sailors and soldiers in the field are among the most vulnerable because they are packed together. But even airmen are at risk, since they must take refuge from air attacks in bunkers, where the virus could also spread rapidly. Ground campaigns in urban areas pose still greater dangers in pandemic times. Much recent ground combat has been in cities in poor countries with few or no public health resources, environments highly favorable to illness. Ground combat also usually produces prisoners, any of whom can be infected. A vaccine may eventually solve these problems, but an abundance of caution is likely to persist for some time after it comes into use. Major outbreaks damage national economies, which are the source of military power. The most important reason disease inhibits war is economic. Major outbreaks damage national economies, which are the source of military power. COVID-19 is a pandemic—by definition a worldwide phenomenon. All great and middle powers appear to be adversely affected, and all have reason to be pessimistic about their military prospects. Their economies are shrinking fast, and there is great uncertainty about when and how quickly they will start growing again. Even China, which has slowed the spread of the disease and begun to reopen its economy, will be hurting for years to come. It took an enormous hit to GDP in the first quarter of 2020, ending 40 years of steady growth. And its trading partners, burned by their dependence on China for much of the equipment needed to fight COVID-19, will surely scale back their imports. An export-dependent China will have to rely more on its domestic market, something it has been attempting for years with only limited success. It is little wonder, then, that the International Monetary Fund [forecasts](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oz56lV17s9o) slower growth in China this year than at any time since the 1970s. Even after a vaccine is developed and made widely available, economic troubles may linger for years. States will emerge from this crisis with enormous debts. They will spend years paying for the bailout and stimulus packages they used to protect citizens and businesses from the economic consequences of social distancing. Drained treasuries will give them one more reason to be pessimistic about their military might. LESS TRADE, LESS FRICTION How long is the pacifying effect of pessimism likely to last? If a vaccine is developed quickly, enabling a relatively swift economic recovery, the mood may prove short-lived. But it is equally likely that the coronavirus crisis will last long enough to change the world in important ways, some of which will likely dampen the appetite for conflict for some time—perhaps up to five or ten years. After all, the world is experiencing both the biggest pandemic and the biggest economic downturn in a century. Most governments have not covered themselves with glory managing the pandemic, and even the most autocratic worry about popular support. Over the next few years, people will want evidence that their governments are working to protect them from disease and economic dislocation. Citizens will see themselves as dependent on the state, and they will be less inclined to support adventures abroad. At the same time, governments and businesses will likely try to reduce their reliance on imports of critical materials, having watched global supply chains break down during the pandemic. The result will probably be diminished trade, something liberal internationalists see as a bad thing. But for the last five years or so, trade has not helped improve relations between states but rather fueled resentment. Less trade could mean less friction between major powers, thereby reducing the intensity of their rivalries. In the Chinese context, less international trade could have positive knock-on effects. Focused on growing the domestic economy, and burdened by hefty bills from fighting the virus, Beijing could be forced to table the Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious trade and investment project that has unnerved the foreign policy establishments of great and middle powers. The suspension of the BRI would soothe the fears of those who see it as an instrument of Chinese world domination. Interstate wars have become relatively rare since the end of World War II. The United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a four-decade Cold War, which included an intense nuclear and conventional arms race, but they never fought each other directly, even with conventional weapons. Theorists debate the reasons behind the continued rarity of great-power conflict. I am inclined to believe that the risk of escalation to a nuclear confrontation is simply too great. COVID-19 does nothing to mitigate such risks for world leaders—and a great deal to feed their reasonable pessimism about the likely outcome of even a conventional war.

#### Overpopulation---it guarantees conflict and diseases are key to solve it.

Doug Findley 20. Professor at UC Davis. 5/11/2020. “COVID-19 Is Natural Population Control.” <http://www.chronline.com/opinion/letter-to-the-editor-covid-19-is-natural-population-control/article_a5b30c1e-93d4-11ea-882a-0781e1057c30.html>. DOA: 9/4/2020. SIR.

In past years I have voiced my opinion on the need to encourage population control to hold the earth’s human population down to a number that is within the carrying capacity of the planet. A finite amount of resources and arable land cannot support an infinite growth in population. Though there are vast open land areas on earth much of it is not suitable for agriculture. In order to support a growing population science has provided farmers with chemical fertilizers and high-yield hybrid seed to increase the amount of food an acre of land will produce. We ignore the need for us to limit our population, in fact population growth is encouraged by many factions. Overcrowding reduces the distance between incompatible cultures. This results in friction that spawns conflict and terrorism. The earth has the capacity to heal itself, nature has defenses that enable it to overcome out of balance growth. Because of the need to support our population we have created industries responsible for global warming. We are literally battling Mother Earth. Unfortunately the earth’s solution to any species overpopulation is disease. If you cram too many animals together eventually one will acquire a fatal illness that will spread to the general population. We are experiencing this phenomenon currently. The COVID-19 plague/pandemic is nature’s way of controlling our population. Though we humans have had the means to control our population growth for many years we have behaved irresponsibly by going forth and multiplying. Now it seems our numbers will be controlled the hard way. As we return to the behaviors of the past and mix freely, this new virus may force the return to a population level that the earth can support.

#### disease pandemics decrease the likelihood of war

Walt 20 (Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University; “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”; Foreign Policy; May 13, 2020; <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/>; ERB)

By many measures, 2020 is looking to be the worst year that humankind has faced in many decades. We’re in the midst of a pandemic that has already claimed more than 280,000 lives, sickened millions of people, and is certain to afflict millions more before it ends. The world economy is in free fall, with unemployment rising dramatically, trade and output plummeting, and no hopeful end in sight. A plague of locusts is back for a second time in Africa, and last week we learned about murderous killer wasps threatening the bee population in the United States. Americans have a head-in-the-sand president who prescribes potentially lethal nostrums and ignores the advice of his scientific advisors. Even if all those things magically disappeared tomorrow—and they won’t—we still face the looming long-term danger from climate change. Given all that, what could possibly make things worse? Here’s one possibility: war. It is therefore worth asking whether the combination of a pandemic and a major economic depression is making war more or less likely. What does history and theory tell us about that question? For starters, we know neither plague nor depression make war impossible. World War I ended just as the 1918-1919 influenza was beginning to devastate the world, but that pandemic didn’t stop the Russian Civil War, the Russo-Polish War, or several other serious conflicts. The Great Depression that began in 1929 didn’t prevent Japan from invading Manchuria in 1931, and it helped fuel the rise of fascism in the 1930s and made World War II more likely. So if you think major war simply can’t happen during COVID-19 and the accompanying global recession, think again. But war could still be much less likely. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Barry Posen has already considered the likely impact of the current pandemic on the probability of war, and he believes COVID-19 is more likely to promote peace instead. He argues that the current pandemic is affecting all the major powers adversely, which means it isn’t creating tempting windows of opportunity for unaffected states while leaving others weaker and therefore vulnerable. Instead, it is making all governments more pessimistic about their short- to medium-term prospects. Because states often go to war out of sense of overconfidence (however misplaced it sometimes turns out to be), pandemic-induced pessimism should be conducive to peace. Moreover, by its very nature war requires states to assemble lots of people in close proximity—at training camps, military bases, mobilization areas, ships at sea, etc.—and that’s not something you want to do in the middle of a pandemic. For the moment at least, beleaguered governments of all types are focusing on convincing their citizens they are doing everything in their power to protect the public from the disease. Taken together, these considerations might explain why even an impulsive and headstrong warmaker like Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman has gotten more interested in winding down his brutal and unsuccessful military campaign in Yemen. Posen adds that COVID-19 is also likely to reduce international trade in the short to medium term. Those who believe economic interdependence is a powerful barrier to war might be alarmed by this development, but he points out that trade issues have been a source of considerable friction in recent years—especially between the United States and China—and a degree of decoupling might reduce tensions somewhat and cause the odds of war to recede. For these reasons, the pandemic itself may be conducive to peace. But what about the relationship between broader economic conditions and the likelihood of war? Might a few leaders still convince themselves that provoking a crisis and going to war could still advance either long-term national interests or their own political fortunes? Are the other paths by which a deep and sustained economic downturn might make serious global conflict more likely? One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose. This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after pose an imminent threat to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too. Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure. I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is hard to imagine any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment when debt levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct ways to stimulate the economy—infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do. Economic downturns can encourage war in some special circumstances, especially when a war would enable a country facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value. Saddam Hussein’s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 fits this model perfectly: The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran; unemployment was threatening Saddam’s domestic position; Kuwait’s vast oil riches were a considerable prize; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do. Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money, and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off the books overnight. In this case, Iraq’s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely. Yet I cannot think of any country in similar circumstances today. Now is hardly the time for Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for China to make a play for Taiwan, because the costs of doing so would clearly outweigh the economic benefits. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that Trump occasionally hints at—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but that scenario is not even remotely possible. If one takes a longer-term perspective, however, a sustained economic depression could make war more likely by strengthening fascist or xenophobic political movements, fueling protectionism and hypernationalism, and making it more difficult for countries to reach mutually acceptable bargains with each other. The history of the 1930s shows where such trends can lead, although the economic effects of the Depression are hardly the only reason world politics took such a deadly turn in the 1930s. Nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarian rule were making a comeback well before COVID-19 struck, but the economic misery now occurring in every corner of the world could intensify these trends and leave us in a more war-prone condition when fear of the virus has diminished. On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).” Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself. The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success. Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then. The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term.

#### Pandemics promote peace AND solve war

Sebastian Mallaby 20 (Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT's Security Studies Program, 4-23-2020, "Do Pandemics Promote Peace?", Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-23/do-pandemics-promote-peace, accessed: 9-25-2020)//yeed

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War is a risky business, with potentially very high costs. The historian Geoffrey Blainey argued in The Causes of War that most wars share a common characteristic at their outset: optimism. The belligerents usually start out sanguine about their odds of military success. When elites on both or all sides are confident, they are more willing to take the plunge—and less likely to negotiate, because they think they will come out better by fighting. Peace, by contrast, is served by pessimism. Even one party’s pessimism can be helpful: that party will be more inclined to negotiate and even accept an unfavorable bargain in order to avoid war.

When one side gains a sudden and pronounced advantage, however, this de-escalatory logic can break down: the optimistic side will increase its demands faster than the pessimistic side can appease. Some analysts worry that something like this could happen in U.S.-Chinese relations as a result of the new coronavirus. The United States is experiencing a moment of domestic crisis. China, some fear, might see the pandemic as playing to its advantage and be tempted to throw its military weight around in the western Pacific.

What these analysts miss is that COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus, is weakening all of the great and middle powers more or less equally. None is likely to gain a meaningful advantage over the others. All will have ample reason to be pessimistic about their military capabilities and their overall readiness for war. For the duration of the pandemic, at least, and probably for years afterward, the odds of a war between major powers will go down, not up.

PAX EPIDEMICA?

A cursory survey of the scholarly literature on war and disease appears to confirm Blainey’s observation that pessimism is conducive to peace. Scholars have documented again and again how war creates permissive conditions for disease—in armies as well as civilians in the fought-over territories. But one seldom finds any discussion of epidemics causing wars or of wars deliberately started in the middle of widespread outbreaks of infectious disease. (The diseases that European colonists carried to the New World did weaken indigenous populations to the point that they were more vulnerable to conquest; in addition, some localized conflicts were fought during the influenza pandemic of 1919–21, but these were occasioned by major shifts in regional balances of power following the destruction of four empires in World War I.)

That sickness slows the march to war is partly due to the fact that war depends on people. When people fall ill, they can’t be counted on to perform well in combat. Military medicine made enormous strides in the years leading up to World War I, prior to which armies suffered higher numbers of casualties from disease than from combat. But pandemics still threaten military units, as those onboard U.S. and French aircraft carriers, hundreds of whom tested positive for COVID-19, know well. Sailors and soldiers in the field are among the most vulnerable because they are packed together. But even airmen are at risk, since they must take refuge from air attacks in bunkers, where the virus could also spread rapidly.

Ground campaigns in urban areas pose still greater dangers in pandemic times. Much recent ground combat has been in cities in poor countries with few or no public health resources, environments highly favorable to illness. Ground combat also usually produces prisoners, any of whom can be infected. A vaccine may eventually solve these problems, but an abundance of caution is likely to persist for some time after it comes into use.

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The most important reason disease inhibits war is economic. Major outbreaks damage national economies, which are the source of military power. COVID-19 is a pandemic—by definition a worldwide phenomenon. All great and middle powers appear to be adversely affected, and all have reason to be pessimistic about their military prospects. Their economies are shrinking fast, and there is great uncertainty about when and how quickly they will start growing again.

Even China, which has slowed the spread of the disease and begun to reopen its economy, will be hurting for years to come. It took an enormous hit to GDP in the first quarter of 2020, ending 40 years of steady growth. And its trading partners, burned by their dependence on China for much of the equipment needed to fight COVID-19, will surely scale back their imports. An export-dependent China will have to rely more on its domestic market, something it has been attempting for years with only limited success. It is little wonder, then, that the International Monetary Fund forecasts slower growth in China this year than at any time since the 1970s.

Even after a vaccine is developed and made widely available, economic troubles may linger for years. States will emerge from this crisis with enormous debts. They will spend years paying for the bailout and stimulus packages they used to protect citizens and businesses from the economic consequences of social distancing. Drained treasuries will give them one more reason to be pessimistic about their military might.

LESS TRADE, LESS FRICTION

How long is the pacifying effect of pessimism likely to last? If a vaccine is developed quickly, enabling a relatively swift economic recovery, the mood may prove short-lived. But it is equally likely that the coronavirus crisis will last long enough to change the world in important ways, some of which will likely dampen the appetite for conflict for some time—perhaps up to five or ten years. After all, the world is experiencing both the biggest pandemic and the biggest economic downturn in a century.

Most governments have not covered themselves with glory managing the pandemic, and even the most autocratic worry about popular support. Over the next few years, people will want evidence that their governments are working to protect them from disease and economic dislocation. Citizens will see themselves as dependent on the state, and they will be less inclined to support adventures abroad.

At the same time, governments and businesses will likely try to reduce their reliance on imports of critical materials, having watched global supply chains break down during the pandemic. The result will probably be diminished trade, something liberal internationalists see as a bad thing. But for the last five years or so, trade has not helped improve relations between states but rather fueled resentment. Less trade could mean less friction between major powers, thereby reducing the intensity of their rivalries.

In the Chinese context, less international trade could have positive knock-on effects. Focused on growing the domestic economy, and burdened by hefty bills from fighting the virus, Beijing could be forced to table the Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious trade and investment project that has unnerved the foreign policy establishments of great and middle powers. The suspension of the BRI would soothe the fears of those who see it as an instrument of Chinese world domination.

Interstate wars have become relatively rare since the end of World War II. The United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a four-decade Cold War, which included an intense nuclear and conventional arms race, but they never fought each other directly, even with conventional weapons. Theorists debate the reasons behind the continued rarity of great-power conflict. I am inclined to believe that the risk of escalation to a nuclear confrontation is simply too great. COVID-19 does nothing to mitigate such risks for world leaders—and a great deal to feed their reasonable pessimism about the likely outcome of even a conventional war.

#### Ceasefires and peace talks---COVID proves that pandemics incentivize them to avoid disease spread which caps global escalation.

Deirdre Shesgreen 20. Foreign Affairs Reporter at USA Today. 4/28/2020. “'War and disease travel together': Why the pandemic push for a global cease-fire is gaining ground.” <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2020/04/28/coronavirus-un-secretary-wants-global-cease-fire-amid-pandemic/5163972002/>. DOA: 9/4/2020. SIR.

When the head of the United Nations first called for a “global cease-fire” on March 23, it seemed like a quixotic quest that would fall on the deaf ears of warring guerrillas, militant terrorists and belligerent governments across the globe. But over the past month, fighters from [Colombia](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-52090169) to [Ukraine](https://www.unian.info/war/10932227-mp-ukraine-asks-russia-via-osce-to-ensure-full-ceasefire-in-donbas-amid-coronavirus-crisis.html) have signaled a willingness to put down their weapons as the world confronts [a deadly pandemic](https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019) that could devastate civilian populations and armies alike. The [15-member U.N. Security Council](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/) may vote as early as this week on a resolution that demands an “immediate cessation of hostilities in all countries on its agenda” and calls for armed groups to engage in a 30-day cease-fire, according to a draft of the measure obtained by USA TODAY. Its fate is uncertain, and experts say it comes with many caveats and exceptions – including a loophole that could allow Russia to continue [bombing civilians in Syria](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2020/03/13/syria-war-bashar-assad-prospers-9-years-barbarity-confusion/4939671002/). Right now, world powers are still quibbling over several provisions. The Trump administration has objected to any language expressing support for [the World Health Organization](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2020/04/22/who-chief-tedros-adhanom-ghebreyesus-pilloried-by-trump-and-gop-allies-amid-coronavirus-pandemic/5163962002/), among other provisions – disputes that could sink or stall the effort. President Donald Trump has blasted the WHO being biased toward China and accepting Beijing's statements about the coronavirus outbreak at face value. A State Department official declined to comment on the draft, citing ongoing negotiations. The official, who was not authorized to speak on the record, said the Trump administration supports the call for a global cease-fire but wants to ensure it will not hinder U.S. counterterrorism missions. If it passes, experts say its impact could be significant – albeit not sweeping – during an otherwise bleak moment of global crisis. “This is not a piece of paper that’s going to save the planet, and it’s not even going to stop some of the nasty wars that are burning out there,” said Richard Gowan, an expert on the United Nations and peacekeeping with the International Crisis Group, a nonpartisan organization that seeks to prevent conflict. “But it’s at least something which could help ease middle-sized and smaller conflicts in countries ranging from [Colombia to Sudan](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/global-ceasefire-call-deserves-un-security-councils-full-support), where we know that armed groups are actually interested in pausing violence and talking about peace during the COVID crisis.” It could also help staunch the flow of refugees in some war-ravaged countries – and thus slow the spread of COVID-19, said Barry Posen, an international professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "War and disease travel together and are usually causative," Posen said. While a global cease-fire may sound lofty and idealistic, he said, it's also [quite practical](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-23/do-pandemics-promote-peace?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=Do%20Pandemics%20Promote%20Peace?%20%20%20&utm_content=20200423&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017), particularly in places like Syria and Yemen, where health care is scarce and civilians are extremely vulnerable to disease. "The intrusion of COVID into that situation would make what's already a horror show into an even bigger horror show," he said. "If you can do a little something to suppress these wars at the moment, you would also be doing a little something to suppress the disease." And because these conflicts are also producing refugees, it could help limit the further spread of the illness if civilians are not forced to flee conflict zones. [In this handout image released by the United Nations, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres holds a virtual press conference on April 3, 2020, at UN headquarters in New York. Guterres Friday renewed his call for a global cease-fire, urging all parties to conflict to lay down arms and allow war-torn nations to combat the coronavirus pandemic. "The worst is yet to come," Guterres said, referring to countries beset with fighting like Syria, Libya and Yemen. "The COVID-19 storm is now coming to all these theatres of conflict."](https://www.un.org/sg/en) The United Nation's secretary-general, , has used both lofty rhetoric and harsh reality in his pitch for the cease-fire. "There should be only one fight in our world today: our shared battle against COVID-19," he said in an [April 3 news briefing](https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/04/1061012) on his effort. French President [Emmanuel Macron](https://www.ft.com/content/317b4f61-672e-4c4b-b816-71e0ff63cab2) has also championed the cease-fire proposal. So far, about 16 armed groups and more than 100 countries have endorsed the measure, according to an informal tally kept by U.N. officials. A few examples: In Colombia, a [left-wing rebel group](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-52090169) known as the ELN agreed to a cease-fire starting April and said it would consider reviving peace talks with the government. In Yemen, one side of that brutal war – the [Saudi Arabia-led coalition](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-saudi/saudi-led-coalition-announces-one-month-extension-of-yemen-ceasefire-idUSKCN2261GS) – agreed to a unilateral cease-fire for at least a month, to help control the spread of coronavirus in a country already ravaged by starvation and other diseases. The Houthis, backed by Iran, have not yet signed on. In Syria, the Kurdish-led [Syrian Democratic Forces agreed](https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/36baafd8-e08b-4e7f-bedc-3acb28c5ba90) to a cease-fire, saying its fighters would defend themselves against attacks but not engage in offensive military action. “We hope that this humanitarian truce will help to open the door for dialogue and political solution and to put an end to the war in the world and Syria,” the SDF said in a statement.