# 1AC – St Marks Round 2

## 1AC

### Plan

#### Plan: The member states of the European Union ought to reduce Intellectual Property protections for Covid-19 Vaccines.

#### Plan solves relations – alliance is strengthened over responses to global challenges – covid proves

Wang 20 [Earl Wang is doctoral researcher in political science at the Centre for International Studies (CERI) - Sciences Po/CNRS. He also undertakes lecturing duties at the university. December 9, 2020. “As Trump fades, the EU and US find common cause in facing up to China” <https://theconversation.com/as-trump-fades-the-eu-and-us-find-common-cause-in-facing-up-to-china-151640> //gord0]

On October 23, a new transatlantic coordination mechanism, the [“EU-US Dialogue on China”](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/87472/euus-joint-press-release-eeas-and-department-state-phone-call-between-jborrell-and-mpompeo_en) was officially launched. The European Union and the United States worked for four months to establish it after [confirming](https://www.politico.eu/article/pompeo-says-us-ready-to-team-up-on-china-but-eu-eyes-a-post-trump-world/) each other’s willingness at the end of June. The process was complicated by the arduous transatlantic relations and the numerous disagreements that accumulated between the EU and the US under the Trump administration. While the relations between Brussels and Washington were anything but easy over the past four years, the new dialogue did finally come to fruition. When it comes to China, at least, the two shores of the Atlantic have come to recognise the importance of their coordination and cooperation. Convoluted triangle: EU-US under Trump-Xi’s China For Washington-Beijing relations, this set of bilateral relations turned sour in [mid-2017](https://www.ft.com/content/49c4c5fc-5fc8-11e7-91a7-502f7ee26895). The Trump administration identified Xi’s party-state as [“strategic competitor”](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf) in the National Security Strategy, and phrases like US-China [“trade war”](https://theconversation.com/global/topics/us-china-trade-war-72804), [“tech war”](https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/Inside-the-US-campaign-to-cut-China-out-of-the-tech-supply-chain) and even [“new Cold War”](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/08/17/avoiding-a-new-cold-war-between-the-us-and-china/) have often hit headlines on news and analytical pieces. A shift in EU’s strategic thinking took place in recent years. In March 2019, the European Commission and EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy [indicated](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf) that China is not only a “cooperative or negotiating partner”, but also an “economic competitor” and a “systematic rival”. The COVID-19 pandemic further made EU and its [member states](https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/etnc_special_report_covid-19_china_europe_2020.pdf) [realise](https://ecfr.eu/publication/the_new_china_consensus_how_europe_is_growing_wary_of_beijing/) the ambition of Xi Jinping’s China on which they are over-dependent. In October this year, the 27 EU heads of state or government officially [endorsed](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/10/01/european-council-conclusions-on-external-relations-1-october-2020/) the strategy on Beijing set out in March 2019. The EU-US-China triangle, therefore, has been complicated by the explicit rivalry between the United States and China, the bumpy transatlantic relations, and the awakening EU, which found itself with an [naïve](https://www.lejdd.fr/International/josep-borrel-le-chef-de-la-diplomatie-europeenne-avec-la-chine-nous-avons-ete-un-peu-naifs-3965872) or even [inexact understanding of China](https://www.institutmontaigne.org/ressources/pdfs/publications/europes-pushback-china-intention-policy-paper.pdf) over the past decades. EU’s direction ahead: autonomous but closer to Washington In response to the dilemma, the EU’s Josep Borrell [expressed](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/80854/rougher-seas-eu%E2%80%99s-own-interests-and-values-should-be-our-compass_en) that the EU opted to be its own captain – navigated by the union’s values and interests – and move forward [together](https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/how-will-the-eu-answer-chinas-turn-toward-xi-jinping-thought-on-diplomacy/) after the EU-China Strategic Dialogue in mid-June. In September, some expressions from the [EU side](https://www.institutmontaigne.org/blog/chine-les-elements-dun-front-uni-europeen) on EU-US-China trilateral relations were heard for the first time. These include: China’s support for “multilateralism” is, in fact, selective and incoherent. It was incorrect to assume that political openness in China would naturally follow economic openness. The Chinese Communist Party actually controls the state as illustrated by the end of the “high degree of autonomy” in [Hong Kong](https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-la-fin-du-principe-un-pays-deux-systemes-139280) and ongoing cases of [human right violations](https://www.hrw.org/asia/china-and-tibet). The last two coincided the [discourses](https://www.state.gov/communist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future/) often made by the United States under Trump in regard to Xi’s China. The paramount element but one not so much discussed in the media or analyses in the past three months is that Josep Borrell [made it perspicuous](https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip2024.pdf): even if not choosing sides, the EU is still closer with Washington than with Beijing. With this short but straight-forward sentence, it provides the light at the end of the tunnel. The EU is still clear in mind that the US albeit being an impolite partner or even a cavalier competitor under Trump for [leaders](https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/26/europe-is-thinking-harder-about-divorcing-america-macron-merkel-trump/) in Brussels and some national capitals, Washington is at least not a systematic rival that is promoting an alternative model of governance. On the Chinese side, the “United Front” tactic has been in the blood of the ruling body of the state – the [Chinese Communist Party](https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/73/5/1597/216194) (CCP) – since [Mao’s era](https://protorp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/magicweaponsanne-mariebradyseptember162017.pdf). One main principle and spirit of such a tactic is to build an alliance – including working with the secondary enemy – to [fight against the primary enemy](https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/sw-in-pdf/sw-flp-1965-v2.pdf). The iconic [example](http://www.jstor.org/stable/259678) was CCP’s collaboration with the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) during the war of resistance against Japan before the CCP turned to fight against Kuomintang and later against the government of Taiwan hitherto. Under Trump, it is not hard to see China’s endeavours to align itself with the EU by [stating](http://www.chinamission.be/eng/zywj/zywd/t1623330.htm) the two sides’ “common” aspiration to multilateralism and creating the “win-win” fashion of comprehensive strategic partnership. Leaders of both sides of the Atlantic would [not want to](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1485323?journalCode=rwaq20) get trapped by Beijing’s tactic. The key is to look into Beijing’s real actions – particularly the honouring of [commitments](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_1648) – rather than the façade shown or the words provided. EU-US partnership remains critical for engaging Beijing A crucial distinction in interpretation has to be made when understanding EU’s aim to [follow its own way](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/80854/rougher-seas-eu%E2%80%99s-own-interests-and-values-should-be-our-compass_en) among the rivalry between Washington and Beijing. It may be understood that the EU decides not to align fully with the US in its approach of interacting with China – even under the incoming [Biden administration](https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/03/biden-trump-europeans-united-states-election/). There are voices calling for EU-US [“renewed cooperation”](https://www.politico.eu/article/joe-biden-us-eu-renewed-transatlantic-cooperation/) with Washington’s leadership from Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. At the same time, some other founding EU capitals set their sights on a more “European approach”. For example, French President Macron has recently [reiterated](https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2020/11/16/macron/) the urge for the EU to pursue its sovereignty under the contemporary context of international political arena. Furthermore, [Berlin](https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/WP01_2020_wkr_FG7.pdf) and [Paris](https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/publications/promoting-european-china-policy-france-and-germany-together?&extc=6dcBVz2) have also started their systematic and constructive exchanges on the making of an up-to-date EU-as-a-whole policy on China which stresses the need to work with the US while maintaining EU’s strategic autonomy. Observers in Washington [expect](https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/06/biden-china-trump-election/) that the Biden administration will continue the hard-line strategy toward Beijing but will accentuate and step up efforts to work with allies on issues related to Beijing. Biden’s appointment of Antony Blinken as the designate Secretary of State may be a good reason to expect such scenario. Blinken has [already emphasized](https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Transcript%20--%20Dialogues%20on%20American%20Foreign%20Policy%20and%20World%20Affairs%20--%20A%20Conversation%20with%20Former%20Deputy%20Secretary%20of%20State%20Antony%20Blinken.pdf) the importance of the US taking Europe as a “vital partner” in facing global challenges and to team up with allies on linking shared values – in competition with Beijing’s – to the strategy toward China. Meanwhile, two EU documents in progress were [reported](https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-extends-a-hand-or-two-to-joe-biden/) to advocate reuniting the transatlantic alliance to cope with global challenges, including [Beijing](https://www.ft.com/content/e8e5cf90-7448-459e-8b9f-6f34f03ab77a). Moreover, other [news sources](https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-plans-two-summits-with-us-next-year-aiming-to-forge-new-alliance-in-face-of-china/) also covered the invitation by the EU side to President-elect Biden for 2 direct dialogues in the first six months of 2021. Therefore, it does not mean that EU-US coordination and cooperation on issues concerning China will not take place or work out. In reality, Brussels and national capitals as well as Washington [need each other](https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/mike-pompeo-on-nous-a-accuses-de-nous-retirer-du-monde-c-est-l-exact-contraire-20201116) more than ever before to face Xi’s China that is [“more assertive, expansionist and authoritarian”](https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip2024.pdf). United in Specificity: partners with non-identical interests or resources Two shores of the Atlantic might not adopt fully identical approaches to interacting with Beijing because they possess [non-homogeneous interests or resources](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/26/the-future-of-trans-atlantic-collaboration-on-china-what-the-eu-china-summit-showed/). Yet, it also means that the EU and the US own respective comparative advantages which, if coordination shall augment, can lead to the most vigorous effect on China. Fair trade and reciprocal investment practices, geo-strategy in Africa, Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, capabilities and standards regarding cutting-edge technologies, commitments to work together on the fight against coronavirus pandemic as well as the protection of Planet Earth, and strengthening the alliance of the democratic system of governance are all prime examples in need for transatlantic joint efforts when engaging Beijing. No matter whether it is Trump in the White House in the past 4 years or the forthcoming Biden presidency, on issues related to Xi’s China, it remains critical for the EU and the US to be “united in specificity” as a force for good, together with other [like-minded partners](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/83644/china-united-states-and-us_en) in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

### Adv – Relations

#### The advantage is Relations ---

#### US-EU alliance not strong enough now, but its key to stop China tech initiatives

Overly et al 3/2 [Steven Overly covers technology policy and politics for POLITICO with a special focus on the industry's effort to influence decisions in Washington. He previously spent seven years as a reporter and editor at The Washington Post. Steven holds a degree in journalism from the University of Maryland, College Park, and a master's degree from Columbia University, where he studied as a Knight-Bagehot Fellow in Economics and Business Journalism. Melissa Heikkilä is a reporter at POLITICO Europe. March 2, 2021. “China wants to dominate AI. The U.S. and Europe need each other to tame it.” <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/02/china-us-europe-ai-regulation-472120> //gord0]

Political leaders in the U.S. and Europe are becoming increasingly alarmed by China’s use of artificial intelligence to track its people and engage in other authoritarian behavior. But so far, the long-time allies are not united over rules for the rapidly evolving technology. Europewill soonpropose strict AI regulations as part of a push to wield greater influence over the world’s emerging technologies. The U.S., which is home to the world’s leading AI developers, has instead chosen to draw up voluntary guidelines shaped in part by industry. Officials on both sides of the Atlantic say those parallel tracks will need to converge to counterbalance Beijing’s technological ambitions. Making that happen would requirethe allies to agree on regulations that protect civil liberties without hampering innovation. “Strategically, both the U.S. and the EU are concerned about China, so they need a tech policy that acknowledges a very aggressive position that China has taken in AI,” said Marc Rotenberg, director of the Center on AI and Digital Policy at the Michael Dukakis Institute, a technology and leadership think tank in Boston. Elected officials in Europe and the U.S. began laying the groundwork on Monday at an EU parliamentary hearing. Rep. Robin Kelly (D-Ill.), who has championed a U.S. national strategy on AI, asked her European counterparts during testimony to be “narrow and flexible” while pushing ahead with their “desire to be the first to write regulations.” The U.S. and Europe need to stand together as China seeks to write the global playbook,she added. “Nations that do not share our commitment to democratic values are racing to be the leaders in AI and set the rules for the world,” Kelly said. “We cannot allow this to happen.” AI is poised to help governments and industry achieve lofty goals**.** Deploying it faster has economic advantages. It can monitor and mitigate emissions from manufacturing plants, and allow doctors to more quickly diagnose and develop new treatments for illnesses. In law enforcement and defense, AI-enabled software is already used to identify suspected criminals or target weapons on the battlefield. But consumer and civil rights advocates have already raised concerns about its potential to displace workers and threaten personal privacy — outcomesthey warn can have damaging consequences without the proper safeguards. The U.S. and Europe are beginning to address those side effects. Whether the allies develop complementary sets of rules that emphasize privacy and human rights — rules that industry groups caution shouldn’t stifle innovation — could be key to balancing the approach taken by China. In a [report released Monday](https://reports.nscai.gov/final-report/table-of-contents/), the U.S. National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence outlined the stakes, finding the “magnitude of the technological opportunity coincides with a moment of strategic vulnerability.” Working with Europe and other allies to develop AI rules and invest in research is essential to defense and economic prosperity in the face of a foe as powerful as China, the report concludes. China is pouring large sums of money into developing AI and has a key advantage over its rivals: large quantities of data, which is needed to train computer algorithms, and few restrictions on how the government can use it. Though China released its own ethical AI principles in 2019, technology has already been developed to facilitate mass surveillance and suppress minorities — authoritarian tools that are then exported to other countries, [according to media reports](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/china-ai-surveillance/614197/). The U.S. and Europe are already at odds on other tech issues. They are renegotiating a thorny deal about how to [transfer data across their borders](https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/04/us-eu-relations-data-privacy-442773) and trying to figure out how to tax digital giants like Facebook and Google. But recent comments from President Joe Biden indicate that the U.S. is ready to collaborate on policies for “democratic values.” [Speaking at the Munich Security Conference in February](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/19/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-2021-virtual-munich-security-conference/), Biden said that the “transatlantic alliance is back.” “We must shape the rules that will govern the advance of technology and the norms of behavior in cyberspace, artificial intelligence, biotechnology so that they are used to lift people up, not used to pin them down,” Biden said. “We must stand up for the democratic values that make it possible for us to accomplish any of this, pushing back against those who would monopolize and normalize repression.” Europe forges ahead The need to engage Europe on tech issues is urgent, even as the Biden administration grapples with the coronavirus pandemic and subsequent economic downturn. Europe has made clear in recent months that it plans to push ahead with its digital sovereignty agenda. There is already domestic pressure brewing from industry groups and tech-minded members of Congress. Without U.S. input, they fear Europe could again set the regulatory standards that U.S. companies follow around the world — much as it has done in recent years with privacy rules for consumer data. The European Union’s executive arm will release its proposal for AI regulation in April, and has lobbied hard for its vision for ethical artificial intelligence that would offer an alternative to the American and Chinese approaches to the technology. The EU’s new law will set strict rules for AI applications that are considered “high risk” and the bloc is mulling who to hold accountable when AI goes awry. Though Europe is not actually home to any of the world's largest technology companies, the continent nevertheless celebrates its role as a regulatory powerhouse. The strict privacy rules it implemented in 2018, known as the General Data Protection Regulation, have been broadly adopted by U.S. companies and become a blueprint for similar laws in California and countries around the world. European lawmakers and consumer advocacy groups don’t want to relinquish that role. But EU digital czar Margrethe Vestager told POLITICO that “the rest of the world is catching up” with the need to regulate technologies like artificial intelligence. She pointed to the international effort to develop an AI policy framework at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as a potential starting point. “There’s an understanding that we want to make the most of artificial intelligence, but we want people to trust the technology, too,” she said. Congress as partner Luis Viegas Cardoso, a technology adviser to European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen, hasdescribed Europe’s approach to AI regulation as a “third way” between the U.S. and China. But Europe forging its own path toward digital sovereignty doesn’t diminish potential partnerships, [he said in January.](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/geotech-cues/event-recap-the-global-quest-for-digital-sovereignty-report-launch/) Indeed, the Commission sees the Biden administration as being open to the bloc’s message about AI rules that respect human rights, inclusion and data protection, and wants to establish a “transatlantic accord” on artificial intelligence. “We cannot ignore the simple fact that we have each other. The U.S. and the EU are big global like-minded actors,” said Dragoș Tudorache, a liberal member of the European Parliament and chair of its Special Committee on AI in the Digital Age. EU officials are likely to find willing partners in Congress, particularly among the new Democratic majority, whose members have pushed in recent years to curtail the use of AI by government agencies and law enforcement. Reps. Jerry McNerney (D-Calif.) and Anthony Gonzalez (R-Ohio), leaders of the House AI Caucus, met with Tudorache and Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, the first vice chair of the European Parliament’s AI committee, in December. McNerney told POLITICO he came away from the talks bullish that both governing bodies can find common ground. He added that the Biden administration must find room for AI regulation among its competing priorities as the rest of the world hammers out its own approach. “For the U.S. to be a world leader on AI, we need to give this area of policy the significant attention it deserves,” McNerney said. Congress took its boldest step yet in January when it passed legislation, [H.R. 6395 (116),](https://legislation.politicopro.com/bill/US_116_HR_6395) that instructed the National Institute of Standards and Technology, a federal agency known for its technology expertise, to develop guidelines for companies that reduce risks associated with AI. The law also establishes a National AI Initiative Office to develop and implement the U.S. approach to the technology.It also sets upan AI advisory committee composed of academics and industry officials who can suggest areas where the U.S. should collaborate with allies. U.S. technology companies are optimistic on the framework, seeing it as an opportunity for the American government to offer guidance without imposing onerous rules that could hamper future uses of AI. It could also help to avoid a repeat of ceding ground on data privacy rules, wherethe U.S. severely lags Europe in shaping global standards. “If the United States can avoid being flat-footed the way it was on privacy while Europe moves forward, and if it can lean more in, I think that creates a better political environment between the U.S. and Europe,” said Craig Albright, the vice president of legislative strategy for BSA | The Software Alliance, a trade group with footprints in Washington and Brussels. That’s becoming increasingly important as the U.S. and Europe are not running the technology race alone. Ultimately, concerns about China’s growing technological ambitions, as well as reports of its government using AI for mass surveillance and human rights abuses, could push the U.S. and EU closer together. “China is trying to steer countries in a direction that is different than what the United States and Europe are trying to go towards,” Albright said. When it comes to EU-U.S. relations, he added, “I think you'll have a new administration that wants to leverage that point and wants to build on that point in a way that the [Trump] administration just didn't really care about.”

#### Consultation over Afghanistan ensured partial unity, but more political alignment is key

Barigazzi 9/11 [Jacopo Barigazzi is Senior EU Reporter, covering mainly migration, foreign policy and Italian politics. Prior to joining POLITICO he wrote for six years for Newsweek covering Italian politics and economy and interviewing, twice, Prime Ministers Silvio Berlusconi and Romano Prodi. He also wrote for Abu Dhabi’s The National and for the financial daily Il Sole 24 Ore. At the beginning of his career he worked for Reuters in Milan where he covered the Parmalat crack, the largest financial scandal in Italy, breaking several news scoops including the indictment of then almighty banker Cesare Geronzi. But his first steps in journalism were at CNBC in London, after an internship at the Financial Times. He studied International journalism at London’s City University and graduated with an MA *cum laude* in Philosophy from Milan University. In Italy he also co-founded award winning Linkiesta, where he served as editor-in-chief. September 11, 2021. “Stoltenberg: European allies were consulted over Afghanistan” <https://www.politico.eu/article/afghanistan-europe-nato-stoltenberg-allies-consulted/> Accessed 9/15 //gord0]

NATO’s Secretary-General pushed back against European complaints that the U.S. administration had not consulted allies over the decision to pull out from Afghanistan.

“You see different voices in Europe, and some are talking about the lack of consultation, but I was present in those meetings,” NATO’s Jens Stoltenberg said in an interview with the New York Times [published](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/europe/afghanistan-europe-stoltenberg.html?smtyp=cur&smid=tw-nytimes) on Friday. “Of course the United States consulted with European allies, but at the end of the day, every nation has to make their own decision on deploying forces.”

Several diplomats and EU leaders have complained about a lack of consultations, as the decision to pull out has ignited fears of a terrorist attack on European soil and of a new possible wave of asylum seekers knocking at the EU door, after the 2015 migration crisis.

“When the United States decided to negotiate with the Taliban under the Trump administration, and then to confirm their withdrawal, they made very few — if any — consultations with their European partners,” Charles Michel, the president of the European Council, said in [an interview](https://geopolitique.eu/en/2021/09/08/charles-michel/) published on Wednesday.

Stoltenberg, a former prime minister of Norway, recognized however that the consultation was somewhat artificial, because once the White House decided to withdraw, “it was hard for other allies to continue without the United States. It was not a realistic option,” he said.

And he argued that “for European allies to go to their parliaments and ask for more money and more soldiers to send into harm’s way in Afghanistan in a mission launched to protect the United States” would have been very hard, once U.S President Joe Biden decided to leave.

EU diplomats have mixed views on what went wrong. In general, they tend to agree that it would have been impossible to ask parliaments to send more soldiers and spend more money once the U.S. decided to leave. But some also say that discussions at NATO were not frank enough.

“There is a real problem of dialogue in NATO,” Portuguese Defense Minister João Gomes Cravinho [told](https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/brussels-playbook/brussels-playbook-eu-must-grow-up-afghanistan-on-the-agenda-defeated-by-belgian-weather/?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=54c9e8306b-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2021_08_30_03_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-54c9e8306b-189693537) POLITICO last month. Although he also agreed that Biden was right when he said “there were no significant protests against [his decision to withdraw U.S. troops], either in the NATO summit in Brussels, or in the ministerial meetings of defense and foreign ministers in April, where this matter was discussed.”

Stoltenberg also warned against the risk of duplication in talks to set up a European military force.

The debacle in Afghanistan has relaunched a [debate](https://www.politico.eu/article/afghanistan-revamps-debate-on-eu-army-nato-defense/) among EU member states to boost collective defense, an in particular to set up a rapid entry force of 5,000 soldiers. The project is led by France, but Eastern and Baltic countries have doubts because it could duplicate NATO efforts and weaken the alliance.

Stoltenberg reiterated his view that “we’ve been pushing for more European allies to do more on defense, but not as an alternative but as part of NATO.” And “any attempt to establish parallel structures, to duplicate the command structure, will weaken our joint capability to work together because with scarce resources we need to prevent duplication,” he said.

#### Our internal link is verified by disagreement over covid response –

#### 1] There is a US-EU split over an IP waiver for vaccines – EU leadership needs to signal a move away from more of the same

Johnson 6/22 [Jake Johnson is a staff writer for Common Dreams. June 22,2021. “Biden Urged to Pressure EU to End 'Outrageous' Opposition to Vaccine Patent Waiver” <https://www.commondreams.org/news/2021/06/22/biden-urged-pressure-eu-end-outrageous-opposition-vaccine-patent-waiver> //gord0]

**A diverse coalition of** more than 130 labor, public health, and human rights organizations sent a letter Tuesday calling on U.S. President Joe Biden to pressure European nations to end their opposition to a temporary patent waiver for Covid-19 vaccines as the deadly virus ravages [South America](https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-america-is-now-covid-19-hot-spot-witheighttimes-the-worlds-death-rate-11624299176), [Africa](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57501127), and other regions that have struggled to obtain shots. While applauding Biden for [throwing his support](https://www.commondreams.org/news/2021/05/05/transformative-hopeful-event-under-pressure-biden-backs-covid-19-vaccine-patent) behind the proposed patent waiver last month, the coalition argued that the head of the world's most powerful nation has a responsibility to do much more than passively endorse such a crucial measure, which is backed by more than 100 World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries. Because the WTO operates by consensus, a handful of wealthy nations in Europe—including Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom—have been able to prevent approval of the patent waiver, which would help clear the way for [manufacturers around the world](https://theintercept.com/2021/04/29/covid-vaccine-factory-production-ip/) to produce generic vaccines. Bucking other European Union member nations and the European Commission, [France](https://www.france24.com/en/france/20210506-france-expands-vaccine-program-as-macron-voices-support-for-patent-waiver) and [Spain](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/spain-says-vaccine-patent-waiver-is-way-forward-not-enough-poor-countries-2021-05-06/) have joined the U.S. in supporting the waiver. "It is outrageous that the European Union and a very few other WTO members continue to oppose a TRIPS waiver even as more transmissible variants are fueling new waves of death and devastation raging through India, Brazil, Nepal, Vietnam, and additional countries," reads the letter, whose signatories include the Citizens Trade Campaign, Amnesty International, and Doctors Without Borders. "We respectfully request that the U.S. government engage all possible efforts to persuade waiver-opposing WTO member countries to engage in the text-based negotiations in good faith and agree on a timely and effective waiver," the letter continues. "As citizens of the world, we cannot sit and watch a repeat of the horror during the AIDS pandemic, when millions of people died while countries and companies refused to share life-saving antiretrovirals. We are morally obliged to make the TRIPS waiver happen as soon as possible." The coalition's letter came a day after the E.U. leadership reiterated its opposition to waiving patents for coronavirus vaccines and argued that WTO member nations should continue operating under the existing legal framework, which critics [say](https://www.commondreams.org/news/2021/06/08/health-campaigners-rage-against-eu-effort-undermine-wto-patent-waiver-covid-vaccines) is artificially limiting global vaccine supply. At the G7 summit in the U.K. earlier this month, rich nations pledged to donate more than 600 million coronavirus vaccine doses to poor countries over the next year—a far cry from the 11 billion doses that the World Health Organization [says](https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-g7-summit---12-june-2021) will be needed to vaccinate 70% of the global population. On Thursday, public health campaigners are planning to rally at the E.U. delegation's U.S. headquarters in Washington, D.C. to demand that the remaining European holdouts stop obstructing the patent waiver. "The European Commission's support for 'more-of-the-same' reliance on Big Pharma to somehow close the massive gap between supply and the 10-15 billion doses needed has proved to be a failure," the consumer advocacy group Public Citizen, which helped organize the rally, said in a press release Tuesday. "That's why Germany, the European Commission, and the U.K. are isolated as the emergency Covid WTO waiver gains ever more support," added Public Citizen, a signatory to the progressive coalition's letter to Biden.

#### 2] Covid response and vaccine distribution has consistently been a point of tension – delta variant incites urgency to come together, but split responses ensure dis-unity.

Financial Times 9/3 [The Financial Times, September 3, 2021. “The Great Divide over living with the virus” [https://www.ft.com/content/cdde7321-f760-4cdc-ae9d-62857fc4d188 Accessed 9/16](https://www.ft.com/content/cdde7321-f760-4cdc-ae9d-62857fc4d188%20Accessed%209/16) //gord0]

As Europe and the US stride on with coronavirus vaccinations, global divides are opening. One, as dozens of signatories highlighted in a letter to the Financial Times this week, is with lower-income countries where a dangerous shortage of vaccines persists. Another is within the more developed world: between western countries that are reopening and living with coronavirus, and many Asia-Pacific nations that are still focused on suppressing it. Their strategies, and the strict travel and border controls they necessitate, are becoming ever harder to sustain. The Delta variant is still disrupting travel in the west. The EU has recommended reinstating restrictions on unvaccinated US travellers because of rising American infections. Some EU politicians are also frustrated that, while infections and deaths remain lower in Europe, the Biden administration has maintained a ban on foreigners entering the US from the Schengen zone, as well as Ireland and the UK. Within the EU, however, which reached a goal of double vaccinating 70 per cent of its adult population overall this week, a digital Covid vaccination certificate is easing travel, and the bloc has reopened borders to a list of “epidemiologically safe” countries. By contrast Japan, China, Australia, New Zealand and several other Asia-Pacific countries remain largely closed to travel. Their vigilant approach was praised in the pandemic’s early days, and saved countless lives. The Delta variant has altered the equation by showing that the virus can still circulate when much of the population are vaccinated — though jabs, as long as their effects persist, offer strong protection against serious illness. That is raising questions over the exit strategy from tight restrictions that are still holding up Asia-Pacific’s reopening to business and travel. Some states are maintaining travel controls despite advancing vaccination programmes. With just over half its total population double-jabbed, Hong Kong businesses are complaining that super-strict quarantine requirements are damaging the city’s status as a global financial hub. Japan, where vaccination rates are slowly catching up with Europe, has found that vaccine passports intended to exempt Japanese travellers from restrictions abroad have achieved only limited acceptance — as Tokyo has been slow to offer similar rights to visitors from elsewhere. Travel corridors must work both ways. Countries such as Australia and New Zealand that closed borders and followed zero-Covid strategies tended to be more relaxed about vaccinations, which has left them with a particular dilemma. A single locally-acquired coronavirus case in New Zealand triggered a full national lockdown last month, and Auckland remains under the highest-level restrictions. But the Delta variant, far more contagious than the original coronavirus strain, is even trickier to contain through lockdowns, and with only a quarter of the total population doubled-jabbed New Zealand is highly vulnerable to an outbreak. Tourism and international education, mainstays of its economy, continue to be hit hard by its tight border controls. With Australia preparing to shift from its zero-Covid policy to relying on jabs and accepting rising case numbers, some New Zealand officials concede a rethink may be needed there, too. Entry restrictions are unlikely to be lifted until vaccination rates are much higher; Singapore is cautiously reopening to foreign travel after announcing this week it had fully jabbed 80 per cent of its population. But even for Asia-Pacific countries that strove hardest to stamp it out, the future seems likely to look more like that in Europe and the US: learning to live with Covid.

#### Strong alliance creates a unified West

Whineray 20 [David Whineray was a nonresident fellow in the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. January 16, 2020. “5 Reasons Why U.S.-Europe Tensions Will Grow in the 2020s—and How to Stop It” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/16/5-reasons-why-u.s.-europe-tensions-will-grow-in-2020s-and-how-to-stop-it-pub-80831> //gord0]

The United States’s strike on an Iranian commander opened another rift with its European allies. Transatlantic relations are at a low. From Iran to trade with China to climate change, the two sides of the Atlantic disagree: the West is split. Many in Europe blame President Trump for the situation — and, indeed, the Trump administration clearly bears some responsibility. But transatlantic tensions run much deeper than America's 45th president. Without corrective action, the U.S. and Europe will drift further apart over the 2020s, regardless of who sits in the Oval Office. U.S. tensions with Europe are not new. The Iraq War famously divided the Atlantic partners. But previous fallouts have been over policy. Today, the very concept and value of the transatlantic alliance is questioned. Donald Trump is the first modern U.S. president to undermine, rather than encourage, European integration; to view the European Union as a threat instead of an ally; to inject conditionality and uncertainty into NATO. Many Europeans think their disagreements with Washington will disappear once Mr. Trump leaves office. It is certainly true that a new president could ease tensions. He or she are likely to recommit the U.S. to NATO, share European concerns on climate change or Russia, and — when there were disagreements — handle those privately instead of over Twitter. Yet, after an initial honeymoon period, Europeans are likely to be disappointed as they discover that many of their disagreements with the U.S. are still there and reflect a longer-term divergence of U.S. and European interests. Five issues in particular risk driving apart the U.S. and the EU over the 2020s, regardless of the person sitting in the Oval Office. First, tensions over defense spending. Nestled under the U.S. security blanket, Europeans are likely to continue to spend less than Washington wants. U.S. frustrations with low European defense spending didn’t start with the Trump administration, and will outlast him too. Indeed, tensions could increase if a future president were to decide to cut U.S. defense spending and demand that Europeans fill the gap. Similarly, trade tensions will not necessarily decrease under a new administration, either. Second are tensions with China. While Republican and Democratic attitudes to Beijing have hardened, Europeans — mindful of their growing economic equities — will remain reluctant to choose between their security relations with the U.S. and growing trade and investment relations with China, aggravating Washington. Third, U.S. interest in Europe — a product of the dominance of the Cold War in U.S. foreign policy — will continue to decline this decade. As others have argued, the new Cold War is with China. The focus of U.S. foreign policy of any future administration will be the Pacific, not the Atlantic. Fourth, as other powers rise, the United States’s ability to police the world will ebb, and will be constrained by a weary America public. As French President Emmanuel Macron has started to do, Europeans will reach out to others — including Russia and China — in response. Finally, whether on Iran or climate change, Europeans have gotten accustomed to disagreeing with the U.S. over the last few years in a way that would have been unthinkable under previous administrations. This genie won’t just go back in the bottle. Even if the next president recommits to the EU, Europeans now know a future U.S. president could always revert back again to a Trumpian approach; they will hedge accordingly. A strong transatlantic relationship is in the interests of both the U.S. and Europe. As we enter a new decade, one likely to be defined by a fading of the rules-based international order and the rise of a new era of great-power rivalry, a unified West is essential in confronting a rising China and a revanchist Russia. The good news is that a downward trajectory is not inevitable. Yet, to change it, the EU and the U.S. will need to renew their vows. What could they do? Economically, a new EU-U.S. trade deal would help the United States to pull Europe away from China and better enable both to set new global standards and new international "rules of the road." Politically, the U.S. and the EU could commit to joint approaches to Iran, Russia, China, Syria and other challenges. Militarily, the U.S. and Europeans could each re-commit to NATO and re-shape NATO as a political, not just a military, forum. Unfortunately, few of these steps currently look likely. Until that changes, Europeans should stop deluding themselves that transatlantic tensions will just magically disappear after Trump. Without action, the Atlantic may get wider, not smaller, over the next decade — whatever the electoral outcome in November.

#### Otherwise, revisionism ensures China rise

Jagannath P. Panda, Research Fellow and Coordinator of the East Asia Centre at MP-IDSA, New Delhi, 5-19-20, ‘“China as a Revisionist Power in Indo-Pacific and India’s Perception: A Power-Partner Contention” JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA2020, AHEAD-OF-PRINT, 1-17https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epub/10.1080/10670564.2020.1766906?needAccess=true //recut gord0

The evolving international order has mostly been divided into two categories of powers: status quo and revisionist. The latter, as the term signifies, are powers who aim to revise the existing global systems or order by altering it gradually or overthrowing it completely through new measures or initiatives. A gradual change would indicate the rise of an evolutionary revisionist power, while a sudden or rapid change indicates a revolutionary revisionist power. Essentially, a revisionist power aims to enhance its power, status and authority in global decision-making process, seeking to remodel the international system, and eventually the order, in its favor. A revolutionary revisionist power views such an endeavor through the lenses of realism. 13 Alternatively, an evolutionary revisionist power follows the idealist school of thought, or a gradualist path: it would not necessarily confront the established great powers in seeking to change the existing international systems and order. 14

Scholars, such as John Mearsheimer and Suisheng Zhao, argue that rising powers such as China and India, with the potential to emerge as major (or great) powers, would continue to pose challenges for the existing international system and order. 15 The intensity to compete, perhaps to challenge the existing system or order, is more noticeable in China than in other powers, highlighting that China is more ‘revisionist’ than a normal ‘status quo’ power. 16 The reasons behind China’s perception as a revisionist power in Indo-Pacific are appositely clear. These include authoritarian and unilateral initiatives to bring out fast-track infrastructure development along with connectivity through the flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and assertive claims in the maritime domains, such as the South China Sea and East China Sea disputes. Further, mounting claims over land territories and attempts to create a distinct order through the creation of international institutions or forums that are evidently linked to China’s national interests are also important factors. 17 On account of this, the tag of revisionism on Beijing appears today to be justified. 18

Defining a status quo power is fairly simple: they are powers that are primarily content with the fundamental characteristics of the prevailing global order and power distribution. 19 Accepting globalization and international organizations by willingly participating or being a part of them is a key trait of a status quo power. Despite the reservations that it holds on a range of subjects pertaining to the established institutions or organizations, Beijing has been an active member, participant and beneficiary of the international liberal order or the Bretton Woods institutions and other existing international or regional multilateral organizations. Long has China reaped the benefits of the Bretton Woods institutions, even though it has always expressed its displeasure, stating that these institutions are not developing society friendly mannerisms and are primarily dominated by the Western influence. Equally, China established the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO); has been an active partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); is a founding member of the United Nations (UN); and holds a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to enhance its international interest. 20

In contrast, a revisionist power is one that is dissatisfied with the global order and wants to change the existing norms that have been created by the status quo powers. As explained by political scientist Randall Schweller, a revisionist state wants to ‘undermine’ the existing order so as to increase its own power in the system. 21 In the case of China, an article by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the creation of ‘two China’s’ in the United Nations highlights the country’s dissatisfaction with the established order, and mainly the US. 22 Such dissatisfaction is no more a secret phenomenon in the Chinese public discourse. Most domestic debates in China are centered around the dialogue on how Beijing’s rise must bring revisions to the existing international systems or create new systems. Nevertheless, the emerging ‘great’ power does not seem to fall clearly under either category. It has recently started advocating for a far more active role in the UN; and since assuming a permanent seat in the UNSC in 1971, used its veto power only 14 times, the lowest of the permanent five. 23 At the same time, it has become an increasingly assertive regional power that has, since the launch of its BRI in 2013, factored greatly on the US watch as a ‘threat that is greater than terrorism’. 24

Revisionism also draws greatly from the power transition theory of international relations. 25 It was A.F.K. Organski who in his book World Politics first propagated the power transition theory while simultaneously predicting the possible rise of China and the effect it would have on international power politics. 26 Power transition theory has two major premises: (1) internal growth or development is the source of power for a country and (2) the existing international order during the time of another power’s ‘rise’ is shaped by a hegemon. 27 China’s economic growth in the past decade has been nothing short of a miracle; from a primarily agrarian economy, China has developed into an industrial dynamo, more importantly emerging as a donor country. 28 It is this very remarkable growth that has marked China, in the eyes of the US, as a revisionist power—in 2014, China overtook, although briefly, the US as the largest economy of the world, in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). 29

It is important to note that efforts by the reigning dominant power to allay the concerns of the challenging powers can lower the possibility of a power transition conflict. However, that did not happen in the case of the US vis-à-vis China. The election of Donald Trump as president in 2016 marked a major turning point in the US approach towards China. 30 Unlike the previous US administration, Trump’s hostility to Chinese advances, from bilateral to regional dealings, has been vocal, direct and critical. 31 Fortunately, until the time China’s military strength is able to match that of the US, major war between the two competing powers in not really foreseen. As Schweller argues, a key characteristic of a revisionist power is that it will ‘employ military force’ in order to disrupt the status quo; this has not been the case with China in respect to the US. 32 While Chinese military assertiveness in the South China Sea and within its own borders has been open, it has not engaged in a military conflict with the US, the dominant power. The trade war between the US and China, however, represented a geo-economic conflict between both the powers. The trade war intensified in 2019, although the finalizing of a ‘phase one’ deal at the beginning of 2020 marks an optimistic sign. 33 The inking of the deal allayed fears that the US–China relations were deteriorating faster than they could be mended.

#### China – US arms race is quickening now, next gen aircrafts on both sides

Chan 8/19 [Minnie Chan is an award-winning journalist, specialising in reporting on defence and diplomacy in China. Her coverage of the US EP-3 spy plane crash with a PLA J-8 in 2001 near the South China Sea opened her door to the military world. Since then, she has had several scoops relating to China's military development. She has been at the Post since 2005 and has a master's in international public affairs from The University of Hong Kong. Aug 19, 2021. “China-US arms race set to quicken as American air force chief ups ante” [https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3145687/china-us-arms-race-set-quicken-american-air-force-chief-ups Accessed 9/9](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3145687/china-us-arms-race-set-quicken-american-air-force-chief-ups%20Accessed%209/9) //gord0]

The race between Beijing and Washington to develop advanced weapons is set to intensify with the American air force pledging to seek more funding for technologies that could threaten adversaries including China. Frank Kendall, the new secretary of the United States Air Force, told Defence News Weekly in an interview published on Thursday that he would seek more spending in his budget to develop the next-generation technologies. “The air force has been overly constrained … I think we’ve not been allowed to do things we really need to do to free up resources for things that are a higher priority,” said Kendall, a former Pentagon acquisitions chief who is well acquainted with military technology. He said intelligence had proved that Chinese military modernisation was “moving faster than I might have anticipated”. “I’ve been obsessed, if you will, with China for quite a long time now, and its military modernisation, what that implies for the US and for security,” Kendall said. Discussing what types of technologies had the potential to threaten adversaries, Kendall pointed to programmes such as an F-35 upgrade that will increase its computing power and add new weapons and sensors, as well as the B-21 bomber, Defence News Weekly reported. “And there are a few others like that that are coming down the pipeline,” he said. “But I think we have to be continuously thinking about other things that will be intimidating to our future enemies.” With US advances in mind, China has kept upgrading its most advanced stealth fighter jet, the J-20, said Zhou Chenming, a researcher from the Yuan Wang military science and technology institute in Beijing. “The Chinese military is looking forward to seeing what new toys American counterparts will develop – there is no motivation without pressure,” Zhou said. “The US wants to keep its air superiority, while China just needs to accelerate mass production of the J-20 for self-defence.” Beijing started mass production of the J-20 in June. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) needs at least 200 “Mighty Dragons” in the next few years to counter an estimated 300 F-35s being deployed by the US to Japan and South Korea by 2025, according to Zhou. Lu Li-shih, a former instructor at Taiwan’s Naval Academy, said the US Air Force’s upcoming Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter jet programme, which will replace the F-22 Raptor stealth fighter jet as a multi-role warplane, should also be included among the “intimidating” US technologies. “The US Air Force realised that its F-22 will be surpassed by Chinese and Russian next-generation aircraft,” Lu said. As part of its modernisation to seek to maintain air dominance, the US announced two next-generation programs: NGAD for the air force, and F/A-XX for the navy, a long-term plan to develop next-generation ship-borne aircraft to complement and eventually replace its F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters. Macau-based military expert Antony Wong Tong said Kendall’s remarks indicated that the gap between the PLA and the US in aircraft technology was wider than previously realised, given that China had yet to deliver its next-generation H-20 stealth strategic bomber. “Even China’s H-20 fails to compare with the US’ active B-2 bomber,” he said.

#### Goes Nuclear – use-it-or-lose-it pressures

Logan 20 David Logan 9-18-2020 “The Dangerous Myths About China’s Nuclear Weapons” <https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/the-dangerous-myths-about-chinas-nuclear-weapons/> (PhD Candidate on International Affairs at Princeton)//Elmer

Misplaced Attention: The Real Risks of Beijing’s Nukes Although there is little evidence to support claims that China possesses a vast covert nuclear arsenal, that its no-first-use policy is a sham, or that it has developed an extensive array of tactical nuclear weapons, there are still several reasons to be concerned about China’s nuclear forces. Unlike the above myths, which often focus on China’s force modernization and potential arms racing dynamics, these legitimate concerns often relate to actual nuclear use. First, China’s nuclear expansion and modernization, though modest in comparison to the much larger and sophisticated arsenals of the United States and Russia, ease the technical constraints that have influenced its nuclear policies, making it easier for Beijing to shift to a more alerted posture if the country’s leadership ever decides to do so. China is deploying more and increasingly sophisticated solid-fueled and road-mobile land-based missiles, fielding a fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and has reassigned a nuclear role to its air force. The development of more accurate, mobile, and survivable missiles, and the realization of a complete nuclear triad of land-, air-, and sea-based delivery systems will expand Beijing’s nuclear policy options. More accurate missiles improve the potential value of using nuclear weapons on the battlefield against opposing military units. Calls by some within China’s military to raise the alert status of its nuclear forces raise questions about the long-term trajectory of China’s nuclear policies. China is reportedly working on a space-based early warning system which could support a move to a launch-on-warning posture, if such a decision were made in the future. Last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that his country would assist China in developing an early warning capability. In fact, the 2020 Department of Defense report on the Chinese military claims that “China intends to increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear forces by moving to a launch-on-warning posture with an expanded silo-based force.” Some developments, like the deployment of a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine fleet, may create new pressures for mating warheads in peacetime or pre-delegating launch authority in certain situations. China’s expanding fissile material production capabilities, though intended for commercial purposes, could be used to support a larger expansion of its nuclear weapons arsenal. Recent reports have suggested increased activity at China’s nuclear weapons labs and testing site. Together, these developments either create new opportunities for China to use its nuclear forces or introduce new pressures on longstanding nuclear weapons policies and practices. They also, in part, drive American skepticism of Chinese nuclear policies. In the past, the operational and technical characteristics of China’s nuclear arsenal lent inherent credibility to Beijing’s claims of maintaining only a retaliatory capability. China may have pursued these new capabilities primarily to ensure the survivability of its nuclear deterrent. But today, thanks to those modernization efforts, China’s nuclear forces may nonetheless be capable of more than simply retaliation. This has occurred against the backdrop of growing U.S.-Chinese strategic competition and mutual suspicion, further heightening threat perceptions. Second, experts have increasingly warned that the possible entanglement **of China’s conventional and nuclear forces could introduce dangerous escalation risks** in a crisis or conflict. China fields the world’s largest and most sophisticated array of conventional and nuclear ground-based ballistic missiles. All of these missiles are under the control of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force. Some of these missiles, such as the DF-21, feature both conventional- and nuclear-armed variants. One missile system, the DF-26, appears technologically capable of switching between either a conventional or nuclear payload and Chinese military reporting describes DF-26 units rapidly transitioning from conventional strikes to nuclear ones. The mobility of these systems increases the possibility of nuclear and conventional units operating far from home garrisons and within proximity of one another. This organizational, technological, and geographic overlap may make it difficult for the United States to determine which systems are nuclear and which are conventional. In a crisis or a conflict, U.S. strikes against China’s conventional capabilities might inadvertently degrade Beijing’s nuclear deterrent, introducing dangerous escalation pressures. U.S. efforts to locate and track Chinese conventional missiles could be misinterpreted in Beijing as preparations for a disarming first strike against its nuclear forces. Similarly, the United States might mistake the launch of a conventional Chinese missile as a nuclear attack. These risks stemming from entanglement are more pronounced given evidence that the United States misperceives the drivers of Chinese entanglement. Several American analysts have suggested that Beijing may have deliberately entangled its conventional and nuclear forces in order to increase the risks of nuclear use and deter the United States. While the logic is compelling and some Chinese strategists may have come to appreciate the potential deterrent benefits of entanglement, the evidence suggests that Chinese entanglement, to the degree it exists, developed from more parochial organizational dynamics (i.e., saving costs by using similar systems), not a desire to manipulate risk. This mismatch between what Americans and Chinese analysts perceive to be the drivers of entanglement could exacerbate escalation dynamics, with U.S. officials falsely believing that China is well prepared for the risks of entanglement and Chinese officials falsely believing that U.S. actions (inadvertently) targeting China’s nuclear weapons are part of a campaign to erode China’s nuclear deterrent. Together, this entanglement could increase pressures on China to use its nuclear weapons or for the United States to target them, raising the likelihood of a dangerous escalation spiral. Third, China’s longstanding **opacity about its nuclear forces** and policies is risky, especially given the evidence of misperceptions and misunderstandings between Beijing and Washington. China and the United States appear to have dangerously different views of escalation dynamics and the ability of countries to control the scope and intensity of a conflict. For one, while American experts frequently highlight potential escalation pathways in a crisis or conflict, Chinese strategists appear overly sanguine about the escalatory potential of steps China might take with its nuclear forces to signal resolve. This mismatch in perceptions could lead each side to misjudge the actions or intentions of the other. For example, Chinese military texts describe potentially escalatory signaling practices for demonstrating resolve in a crisis, including broadcasting operations involving its strategic forces and even launching an intercontinental ballistic missile armed with a conventional warhead against an adversary’s territory. Though there is no indication that China ever deployed conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, such future actions could be easily mistaken for preparations of an actual nuclear strike. American skepticism about China’s nuclear policies, including its no-first-use pledge, exacerbates these risks. Similarly, although skepticism about China’s no-first-use policy may be overblown, it would be dangerous to assume that it is inviolable in all possible circumstances. In a crisis or a conflict, plans can change. There are occasional reports of Chinese strategists and military officers debating the merits of the no-first-use policy, including expressing concerns about potential adversary efforts to exploit China’s no-first-use policy by mounting a conventional first strike against China’s nuclear forces. Versions of this debate have been going on for decades and there is no hard evidence that China’s no-first-use policy has changed (indeed, the existence of the debate is itself evidence that the policy is still in place). But that should not lead U.S. military planners to assume that there is no risk in non-nuclear operations intended to degrade Chinese warfighting capabilities or impose costs on China.

#### Nuke war causes extinction – famine and ag decline

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf> //Re-cut by Elmer

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about **20 percent** for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.

### Framing

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being – prefer:

**1] *Only* pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable.**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable.** **On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have.** “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 **The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so**, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but **for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” **If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.**3 As Aristotle observes**: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.**”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

#### 2] Actor specificity

#### A] Governments must aggregate since every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.

#### B] States lack wills or intentions since policies are collective actions. Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Link turns calc indites because the alt would be *no* action.

#### 3] **No act-omission distinction—governments are responsible for everything in the public sphere so inaction is implicit authorization of action: they have to yes/no bills, which means everything collapse to aggregation.**

#### 4] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital via intuitions. Intuitions outweigh—they’re the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions are most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why.

#### 5] Focus on large scale catastrophes is good and they outweigh – appeals to social costs, moral rules, and securitization play into cognitive bias and flawed risk calculus – 2020 is living proof

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We are living in a time of crisis. From the immediate challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic to the looming existential threat of climate change, the world is grappling with massive global dangers—to say nothing of countless problems within countries, such as inequality, cyberattacks, unemployment, systemic racism, and obesity. In any given crisis, the right response is often clear. Wear a mask and keep away from other people. Burn less fossil fuel. Redistribute income. Protect digital infrastructure. The answers are out there. What’s lacking are governments that can translate them into actual policy. As a result, the crises continue. The death toll from the pandemic skyrockets, and the world makes dangerously slow progress on climate change, and so on.

It’s no secret how governments should react in times of crisis. First, they need to be nimble. Nimble means moving quickly, because problems often grow at exponential rates: a contagious virus, for example, or greenhouse gas emissions. That makes early action crucial and procrastination disastrous. Nimble also means adaptive. Policymakers need to continuously adjust their responses to crises as they learn from their own experience and from the work of scientists. Second, governments need to act wisely. That means incorporating the full range of scientific knowledge available about the problem at hand. It means embracing uncertainty, rather than willfully ignoring it. And it means thinking in terms of a long time horizon, rather than merely until the next election. But so often, policymakers are anything but nimble and wise. They are slow, inflexible, uninformed, overconfident, and myopic.

Why is everyone doing so badly? Part of the explanation lies in the inherent qualities of crises. Crises typically require navigating between risks. In the COVID-19 pandemic, policymakers want to save lives and jobs. With climate change, they seek a balance between avoiding extreme weather and allowing economic growth. Such tradeoffs are hard as it is, and they are further complicated by the fact that costs and benefits are not evenly distributed among stakeholders, making conflict a seemingly unavoidable part of any policy choice. Vested interests attempt to forestall needed action, using their money to influence decision-makers and the media. To make matters worse, policymakers must pay sustained attention to multiple issues and multiple constituencies over time. They must accept large amounts of uncertainty. Often, then, the easiest response is to stick with the status quo. But that can be a singularly dangerous response to many new hazards. After all, with the pandemic, business as usual would mean no social distancing. With climate change, it would mean continuing to burn fossil fuels.

But the explanation for humanity’s woeful response to crises goes beyond politics and incentives. To truly understand the failure to act, one must turn to human psychology. It is there that one can grasp the full impediments to proper decision-making—the cognitive biases, emotional reactions, and suboptimal shortcuts that hold policymakers back.