# 1NC – Yale R3

## 1 – Theory

**Interpretation: Debaters must not disclose arguments that aren’t in the 1ac**

**Violation – they disclosed a util advantage**

1. **strat skew – I was gonna read a shell about that – means my 1NC is hastily constructed, unfair**
2. **Clash – I had responses to that instead of case – less education**

**Fairness is a voter**

**Education is a voter**

**Competing interps**

**DTD**

**No RVI**

## 2 – Theory

**Interpretation: all affirmative pre-emptive theory arguments must be placed at the top of the 1AC.**

**Violation: They’re not at the top**

**Standards:**

1. **Prep Skew – spikes on the bottom force me to create my 1NC strategy while reading the doc pre-round then totally alter it once I see the spikes – destroys a huge portion of my prep time. Saying “spikes on bottom” at the top doesn’t solve because I don’t know if you’ll get through all the spikes, which forces me to form multiple 1NCs that each counter different spikes, further skewing prep. Fair prep time is k2 fairness because the aff will have an unfair advantage if I haven’t had sufficient time to prep out their case.**
2. **Substance education – spikes on top mean I can plan out a better 1NC strategy that has more clash, leading to increased education on the topic.**

**Voters:**

**Fairness is a voter because**

1. **The only way a judge can determine who’s better is if we enter the debate on an even playing field.**
2. **People quit if they lose to unfair arguments so fairness is a prereq to debate’s existence.**

**Education is voter because:**

1. **It’s the only portable benefit of debate.**
2. **It’s the only reason we get funding.**

**Theory is drop the debater:**

1. **Only DTD enables theory to deter bad behavior and be a tool for norm setting. Drop the Arg just lets them dodge whatever they did wrong with barley any consequences.**
2. **Dropping the arg can’t rectify past abuse because the 1AC was uniquely bad, so there should be a consequence.**

**No RVI’s:**

1. **they’re illogical – it doesn’t make sense to reward someone for not doing anything bad. People need to do good things to win.**
2. **RVI’s chill legitimate theory, justifying even more abuse.**

**Competing Interps:**

1. **Reasonability usually lacks a brightline and favors unnecessary judge intervention.**
2. **Reasonability lets them arbitrarily choose a brightline that favors their arguments – skews fairness.**

## 3 – Skep

#### Epistemic Skepticism is true, so we can’t know if anything is true. This includes frameworks and offense – 3 warrants

1. **Subjective points of view**

Duncan 02

Pritchard, Duncan. “Contemporary Skepticism.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2002, www.iep.utm.edu/skepcont/.

Before concluding, it is worthwhile to briefly dwell upon those influential figures in the recent epistemological debate who, in contrast to the current mood of optimism that can be found in epistemological discussion of the problem of radical skepticism, are deeply suspicious that any intellectually satisfactory solution could ever be given to this problem. The roots of this movement in the contemporary literature can be traced back to the work of three main figures – Unger (1971; 1975), Barry Stroud (1984; 1989) and Thomas Nagel (1986). We saw Unger’s infallibilist defence of skepticism earlier on, so here I will summarise Stroud’s and Nagel’s contribution, and highlight one way in which this variety of ‘meta-skepticism’ currently informs the skeptical debate, particularly as it figures in more recent work by Stroud (1994; 1996) and Richard Fumerton (1990; 1995). For both Nagel and Stroud, the thought seems to be that there is something in our philosophical quest for objectivity that inexorably leads us to skeptical conclusions. Nagel argues, for instance, that **objectivity involves attaining a completely impartial view of reality**, one that is not tainted by any particular perspective. **We must**, he argues, “**get outside of ourselves**”, **and** thereby **achieve the impossible task of being able to “view the world from nowhere from within it”** (Nagel 1986, 76). We realise that the initial appearances present to a viewpoint can be unreliable guides to reality and therefore seek to modify our ‘subjective’ view with a more ‘objective’ perspective that is tempered by reason and reflection. As Nagel points out, however, the trouble with this approach is that: […] **if initial appearances are not in themselves reliable guides to reality,** [then] **why should the products of detached reflection be any different?** Why aren’t they […] equally doubtful […]? […] The same ideas that make the pursuit of objectivity seem necessary for knowledge make both objectivity and knowledge seem, on reflection, unattainable. (Nagel 1986, 76) We can reconstruct the argument here as follows. We recognise that our initial unmodified ‘subjective’ experience of the world is unreliable and therefore should be adapted along ‘objective’ lines by eliminating the ‘subjective’ element. For instance, initial appearances tell us, falsely, **that straight sticks suddenly become ‘bent’ when placed in water**. Accordingly, **we modify our** initial ‘**subjective’ view with the testimony of ‘objective’ scientific investigation which tells us that** the stick in fact stays straight, **it is just the light** that is **bending. However**, and here is the crux of the matter as far as Nagel is concerned, **why do we regard this modified view as being any more reliable** than the completely ‘subjective’ perspective that it replaces? After all, **we cannot eliminate every trace of ‘subjectivity’** and thus the problematic component of our conception of reality that engendered the pursuit of objectivity in the first place remains. Consequently**, we are both aware of the need for objectivity whilst also recognising that such objectivity is impossible**. As a result, according to Nagel, we are condemned to the following pessimistic evaluation of our epistemic capacities: The search for objective knowledge, because of its commitment to a realist picture, is inescapably subject to skepticism and cannot refute it but must proceed under its shadow. […] Skepticism […] is a problem only because of the realist claims of objectivity. (Nagel 1986, 71) That is, the problem of skepticism […] has no solution, but to recognise that is to come as near as we can to living in the light of truth. (Nagel 1986, 231) Moreover, since these ‘realist’ truths concerning objectivity are meant to be inherent in our epistemic concepts, so it is held that this pessimism falls naturally out of any reflective analysis of our epistemic concepts.

1. **Brain in a vat**

Duncan 02

Pritchard, Duncan. “Contemporary Skepticism.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2002, www.iep.utm.edu/skepcont/.

Contemporary discussion of the problem of the radical skepticism has tended to focus on a formulation of that problem in terms of a *paradox* consisting of the joint incompatibility of three claims, each of which appears, on the surface of things and taken individually, to be perfectly in order. Roughly, they are as follows.

First, that we are unable to know that any one of a number of skeptical hypotheses are false, where a skeptical hypothesis is understood as a scenario that is subjectively indistinguishable from what one takes normal circumstances to be but which, if true, would undermine most of the knowledge that one ascribes to oneself. A standard example of a skeptical hypothesis is **the** so-called **‘brain-in-a-vat’** (BIV) **hypothesis that one is being ‘fed’ one’s experiences by computers. If this were true, then most of what one believes about the world would be false** (or, at the very least, true in a different way from how one would expect), **and thus one would lack knowledge**. Moreover, this scenario is characterised such that **there would be no perceptible difference between being a BIV and** having the **non-BIV experiences** one currently takes oneself to be experiencing and thus, plausibly, **it does not seem to be a scenario that we could ever know to be false.** We thus get our first ‘intuitive’ element of the skeptical paradox: I**. I am unable to know the denials of skeptical hypotheses**. The second ‘intuitive’ claim about knowledge that the skeptic employs is the following: II. **If I do not know the denials of skeptical hypotheses, then I do not know very much.** What motivates this claim is the compelling thought that **unless one can rule-out the kind of error-possibilities at issue in skeptical hypotheses** by knowing them to be false, then **this suffices to undermine most** (if not all) of the **knowledge** that one traditionally ascribes to oneself. After all, if I were a BIV, then I wouldn’t be sitting here now. Hence, if, for all I know, I could be a BIV, surely it must follow that I do not know that I am sitting here now (and much more besides)? Finally, there is the third element of the skeptical paradox that creates the required overall philosophical tension. This is the highly plausible claim that we do know a great deal of what we think we know: III. A lot of what I believe, I know. Of course, there may be lots of abstract and technical kinds of knowledge which I think I have but actually lack, but the point of this intuition is that many of the ‘ordinary’ propositions that I believe (such as that I am sitting here now) do seem to be the kinds of propositions that I could not plausibly be wrong about in a wholesale fashion. With these three claims in place, however, the puzzle becomes obvious. For if I cannot know the denials of skeptical hypotheses, and if this lack of knowledge entails that **I lack knowledge of most of what I believe**, it follows that I must lack knowledge of most of what I believe. Hence, one cannot accept all of these three claims; one of them must go. The skeptic offers a very simple way out of this puzzle, which is to deny, on the basis of I and II, that we ever have knowledge of the kind of ordinary propositions at issue in III. That is, the skeptic argues as follows: (S1) I am unable to know the denials of skeptical hypotheses. (S2) If I do not know the denials of skeptical hypotheses, then I do not know very much. Hence: (SC) I do not know very much. For example, a skeptical argument which employed the BIV skeptical hypothesis might well run as follows: (S1\*) I am unable to know that I am not a BIV. (S2\*) If I do not know that I am not a BIV, then I do not know very much. Hence: (SC\*) I do not know very much, Clearly, however, this radical skeptical suggestion regarding how we should respond to these three incompatible claims is less of a proposal than a *reductio* of epistemological theorising. This conclusion is, after all, intellectually devastating, consigning our cognitive activities to, at best, a kind of bad faith. We would thus be wise to look closely at the anti-skeptical alternatives before we accept this (paradoxical) response to the skeptical paradox. If we are to evade skepticism, we are thus going to have to motivate one (or more) of the following three claims. First, that, despite appearances, we do (or at least *can*) know the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses after all. Second, that, despite appearances, it does not follow from the fact that we lack knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses that we thereby lack knowledge of ordinary propositions as well. Third, that, despite appearances, these three claims are consistent after all.

#### 3. Truth values are based on language and social norms, not reality. We don’t call cars “cars” because of external truth, but rather because of social constructs like language. That means there’s no epistemically reliable way to find moral truth.

Parrish 04 [Parrish, Rick, [Rick Parrish teaches at Loyola University New Orleans. His current research is focused on the play of violence and respect within justice.] "Derrida’S Economy Of Violence In Hobbes’ Social Contract" Theory &amp; Event, Vol. 7 No. 4, 2005, 2005, http://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119#back, DOA:6-30-2018 // WWBW]

“For Hobbes **truth is a function of logic and language, not of the relation between language and some extralinguistic reality,**"25 **so the "connections between names and objects are not natural**."26 **They are artificially constructed by persons, based on individual psychologies and desires**. These individual desires are for Hobbes the only measure of good and bad, because value terms "are never used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves."27 **Since "there are no authentic**al **doctrines concerning right and wrong,** good and evil," **these labels are placed upon things by humans in acts of creation rather than discovered as extrinsic facts.** Elaborating on this, Hobbes writes that "the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker, such as are the names of virtues and vices; for one man calleth wisdom, what another calleth fear; and one cruelty what another justice."29 A more simplistic understanding of the brutality of the state of nature, which David Gauthier calls the "simple rationality account,"30 has it that mere materialistic competition for goods is the cause of the war of all against all, but such rivalry is a secondary manifestation of the more fundamental competition among all persons to be the dominant creator of meaning. Certainly, Hobbes writes that persons most frequently "desire to hurt each other" because "many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword."31 But this competition for goods only arises as the result of the more primary struggle that is inherent in the nature of persons of meaning creators. In the state of nature, "where every [person] is [their] own judge," persons will "mete good and evil by diverse measures," creat[e]ing labels for things as they see fit, based on individual appetites. One of the most significant objects that receives diverse labels in the state of nature is 'threat'. Even if most people happen to construe threat similarly, there will be serious disagreement regarding whether or not a specific situation fits a commonly-held definition.

**Moral skep is also true, so they can’t generate an obligation to affirm:**

1. **Wittgenstein’s paradox: If absolute good existed, either everyone would follow it, or people would be evil (or ignorant) and ethics would be incoherent. However, people act differently and do things considered immoral by some frameworks, so either absolute good must not exist or people must be incapable of acting morally.**
2. **Historical progress: ethical norms change throughout history. Just as slavery is now considered objectively unethical, eating meat might be considered unethical in 20 years. Moral norms always change so we can’t know if our current ones are right.**
3. **Philosophical disagreement: really smart academics disagree on which moral framework is right, so it’s impossible for high school debaters to prove one framework true. Therefore, we can’t evaluate morality in debates.**

**All of that triggers permissibility, which negates:**

#### a. Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation by Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two.

#### b. Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.

#### c. Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about.

## Case

### Framework

**A2 realism: these arguments all presuppose that morality exists in the 1st place. On the c point – moral debates don’t always end in agreement – historically proven.**

**A2 aretaic ethics:**

1. **Ought means a moral obligation, so deontic ethics are necessary to prove the resolution true. We must have a deontic obligation to pursue aretaic ethics, which means deontology is a prerequisite to your framework.**
2. **We can’t know what good character is without understanding what good actions are because peoples actions define if they are good or bad.**
3. **Epistemically inaccessib**