
# 1NC

## **Theory**

**Interpretation: When the affirmative is new, the aff debater must disclose the advocacy text and framing text.**

**Violation: They don’t**

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**Standards:**

1. **Clash – I can’t think of nuanced arguments in limited prep so I need to resort to generics and sketchy strategies. That means we learn less because there’s less contestation over high-quality arguments.**
2. **Strat Skew – I resort to generics because I can’t think of a tailored NC strat in 3 minutes – that means they can predict the NC and frontline it so they have an advantage. They also have more unique and high-quality arguments so the debate is unfair.**
3. **Disincentives surprise tactics so people won’t read knowingly bad affs and get away with it because the neg can’t prep. That’s key to ensuring high quality education.**

**Fairness is a voter because**

1. **The only way a judge can determine who’s better is if we enter the debate on an even playing field.**
2. **People quit if they lose to unfair arguments so fairness is a prereq to debate’s existence.**

**Education is voter because:**

1. **It’s the only portable benefit of debate.**
2. **It’s the only reason we get funding.**

**Theory is drop the debater:**

1. **Only DTD enables theory to deter bad behavior and be a tool for norm setting. Drop the Arg just lets them dodge whatever they did wrong with barley any consequences.**
2. **Dropping the arg can’t rectify past abuse because the 1AC was uniquely bad, so there should be a consequence.**

**No RVI’s:**

1. **they’re illogical – it doesn’t make sense to reward someone for not doing anything bad. People need to do good things to win.**
2. **RVI’s chill legitimate theory, justifying even more abuse.**

**Competing Interps:**

1. **Reasonability usually lacks a brightline and favors unnecessary judge intervention.**
2. **Reasonability lets them arbitrarily choose a brightline that favors their arguments – skews fairness.**

**We solve any aff innovation arguments because advocacy/framing is more advantageous than open source so people still write new affs.**

## **K**

#### **The color line structures modernity – drawn discursively to separate classes/genders/races, it necessitates the political sacrifice of those who are not within our conception of human. Thus, the role of the ballot is to deconstruct the color line.**

Wynter 03 Sylvia Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation--An Argument,” CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 3, Number 3, Fall 2003, pp. 257-337, https://doi.org/10.1353/ncr.2004.0015

The Argument proposes that the new master code of the bourgeoisie and of its ethnoclass conception of the human—that is, the code of selected by Evolution/dysselected by Evolution—was now to be mapped and anchored on the only available “objective set of facts” that remained. This was the set of environmentally, climatically determined phenotypical dif- ferences between human hereditary variations as these had developed in the wake of the human diaspora both across and out of the continent of Africa; that is, as a set of (so to speak) totemic differences, which were now harnessed to the task of projecting the Color Line drawn institutionally and discursively between whites/nonwhites—and at its most extreme between the Caucasoid physiognomy (as symbolic life, the name of what is good, the idea that some humans can be selected by Evolution) and the Negroid phys- iognomy (as symbolic death, the “name of what is evil,” the idea that some humans can be dysselected by Evolution)—as the new extrahuman line, or projection of genetic nonhomogeneity that would now be made to function, analogically, as the status-ordering principle based upon ostensibly differential degrees of evolutionary selectedness/eugenicity and/or dysselected- ness/dysgenicity. Differential degrees, as between the classes (middle and lower and, by extrapolation, between capital and labor) as well as between men and women, and between the heterosexual and homosexual erotic preference—and, even more centrally, as between Breadwinner (job- holding middle and working classes) and the jobless and criminalized Poor, with this rearticulated at the global level as between Sartre’s “Men” and Natives (see his guide-quote), before the end of politico-military colonial- ism, then postcolonially as between the “developed” First World, on the one hand, and the “underdeveloped” Third and Fourth Worlds on the other. The Color Line was now projected as the new “space of Otherness” principle of nonhomogeneity, made to reoccupy the earlier places of the motion-filled heavens/non-moving Earth, rational humans/irrational animal lines, and to recode in new terms their ostensible extra-humanly determined differences of ontological substance. While, if the earlier two had been indispen- sable to the production and reproduction of their respective genres of being human, of their descriptive statements (i.e., as Christian and as Man1), and of the overall order in whose field of interrelationships, social hierarchies, system of role allocations, and divisions of labors each such genre of the human could alone realize itself—and with each such descriptive state- ment therefore being rigorously conserved by the “learning system” and order of knowledge as articulated in the institutional structure of each order—this was to be no less the case with respect to the projected “space of Otherness” of the Color Line. With respect, that is, to its indispensability to the production and reproduction of our present genre of the human Man2, together with the overall global/national bourgeois order of things and its specific mode of economic production, alone able to provide the material conditions of existence for the production and reproduction of the ethnoclass or Western-bourgeois answer that we now give to the question of the who and what we are. It is in this context that the Negro, the Native, the Colonial Questions, and postcolonially the “Underdeveloped” or Third/Fourth-Worlds Question can be clearly seen to be the issue, not of our present mode of economic pro- duction, but rather of the ongoing production and reproduction of this answer—that is, our present biocentric ethnoclass genre of the human, of which our present techno-industrial, capitalist mode of production is an indispensable and irreplaceable, but only a proximate function. With this genre of the human being one in the terms of whose dually biogenetic and economic notions of freedom both the peoples of African hereditary descent and the peoples who comprise the damned archipelagoes of the Poor, the jobless the homeless, the “underdeveloped” must lawlikely be sacrificed as a function of our continuing to project our collective authorship of our con- temporary order onto the imagined agency of Evolution and Natural Selection and, by extrapolation, onto the “Invisible Hand” of the “Free Market” (both being cultural and class-specific constructs).

#### The strictly deleuzian 1AC is an attempt to isolate affect theory within western philosophy – their complete refusal of subjectivity ignores the importance of identities based in race and gender. You should prefer my ROB.

Weheliye 14

Weheliye, Alexander. “Habeas Viscus.” Pg. 36-37. Duke University Press, 2014. I don’t have a link but I can send you the pdf.

Alexander Ghedi Weheliye is professor of African American Studies at Northwestern University where he teaches black literature and culture, critical theory, social technologies, and popular culture. He is the author of Phonographies: Grooves in Sonic Afro-Modernity (Duke UP, 2005), which was awarded The Modern Language Association’s William Sanders Scarborough Prize for Outstanding Scholarly Study of Black American Literature or Culture and Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human (Duke UP, 2014). // Park City NL

I insert a methodological breather here to observe that taking on ideas from the toolbox of Deleuze and Guattari runs the risk of a descent into the quagmire of orthodox **Deleuzianism**, which **insists on** transforming Deleuze into a great thinker by **reading him exclusively within the western European philosophical tradition** but also by an intense concentration on Deleuze as a master thinker at the cost of folding his collaborative writings with Guattari into Deleuzianism. Judging from of the writings of Deleuzians, then, it seems that once you go D&G you never go back. Though I've learned much from doctrinaire Deleuzians, I have found more generative the work of Rosi Braidotti, Brian Massumi, Kara Keeling, Jasbir Puar, Elizabeth Grosz, and Manuel DeLanda, whose sustained deployment of concepts from the Deleuze (and Guattari) archive eschews rendering this usage the primary aim of their critical inquiry.3 Rather, these thinkers productively rearticulate and reframe Deleuze and Guattari's thoughts, creating novel assemblages and insights that only become possible when these ideas are put to work in milieus (e.g., racialized minority discourse or queer theory as in the case of Puar) beyond the snowy masculinist precincts of European philosophy; these thinkers also heed Deleuze and Guattari's invitation to plunder their ideas in the service of producing new concepts and assemblages. In contrast to these heterodox Deleuzians**, strict Deleuzianism keeps in place segregated and colonial structures of knowledge by insisting on a proper form of being Deleuzian**, as can be gleaned from several chapters in the recent anthology Deleuze and the Postcolonial, which endeavor to prove erroneous Gayatri Spivak's discussion of Deleuze vis-à-vis subaltern subjectivity in “Can the Subaltern Speak?”; from the debate between Christopher Miller and Eugene Holland about Deleuze and Guattari's indiscriminate deployment of nomadology and other concepts from anthropology; or from the fraught relationship of orthodox Deleuzians to feminism.4 This is one of the reasons why I have found it necessary to create a conversation between theories of assemblage and articulation**.] We should remain cautious**, as Barbara Christian, Stuart Hall, and Gayatri Spivak urge us to do, **about the complete disavowal of subjectivity in theoretical discourse, because** within the context of the Anglo-American academy more often than not **an insistence on transcending limited notions of the subject or identity leads to the neglect of race as a critical category**, **as we have seen in** scholars such as Judith **Butler**, and as I show shortly in my discussion of **Foucault and Agamben**.5 In this context, Spivak's remarks concerning Deleuze and Guattari's refusal to contemplate the interactions between “desire, power and subjectivity” remain acutely relevant, because it “renders them incapable of articulating a theory of interests,” and Foucault's emphasis on “ ‘genealogical’ speculation...has created an unfortunate resistance...to ‘mere’ ideological critique.”6 The opposition to ideology as a metaterritorializing category on the part of Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari is understandable within the context of post-1960s French thought given the then–au courant disenchantment with Marxism and grand narratives. Nevertheless, **notions such as power, ideology, gender, coloniality, identity, and race** jinglingly **dawdle in the margins of Deleuze and Guattari's putatively asubjective and disinterested universes**, since otherwise, as Stuart Hall remarks, “there is no reason why anything is or isn't potentially articulatable with anything,” while the “critique of reductionism has apparently resulted in the notion of society as a totally open discursive field.”7 It should be noted that Hall and Spivak, two of the most significant contemporary Anglo-American theorists of cultural studies and deconstruction, are not simply rejecting post-structuralist tenets for their arbitrariness or relativism but are asking about the stakes of evacuating seemingly retrograde concepts such as identity, especially within the context of “societies structured in dominance.”

#### The 1AC’s legal recognition of workers rights focuses incompletely on one form of subjugation – their attempt at inclusion only reinforces the color line and defines workers as “Men” in contrast to those considered subhuman. This reifies continued violence against those not recognized as fully human by the state.

Weheliye 14

Weheliye, Alexander. “Habeas Viscus.” Pg. 59-60. Duke University Press, 2014. I don’t have a link but I can send you the pdf.

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Paradoxically, the particular biological material in question remains the property, at least nominally, of all humanity and is not proper to Moore the individual person: “Lymphokines, unlike a name or a face, have the same molecular structure in every human being and the same, important functions in every human being's immune system. Moreover, the particular genetic material which is responsible for the natural production of lymphokines, and which defendants use to manufacture lymphokines in the laboratory, is also the same in every person; it is no more unique to Moore than the number of vertebrae in the spine or the chemical formula of hemoglobin.”20 So, while the court grants personhood to human subjects in an individualized fashion that is based on comparatively distinguishing between different humans, when biological material clashes with the interests of capital, the court appeals to the indivisible biological sameness of the Homo sapiens species. Since the court's ruling does not place this slice of human flesh in the commons for all humans to share, it tacitly grants corporations the capability of legally possessing this material with the express aim of generating monetary profit. Considering that corporations enjoy the benefits of limited personhood and the ability to live forever under U.S. law, corporate entities are entrusted with securing the immortal life of biological matter, while human persons are denied ownership of their supposed essence.21 My interest here lies not in claiming inalienable ownership rights for cells derived from human bodies such as Lacks's and Moore's but to draw attention to how thoroughly the very core of pure biological matter is framed by neoliberal market logics and by liberal ideas of personhood as property. We are in dire need of alternatives to the legal conception of personhood that dominates our world, and, in addition, to not lose sight of what remains outside the law, what the law cannot capture, what it cannot magically transform into the fantastic form of property ownership. Writing about the connections between transgender politics and other forms of identity-based activism that respond to structural inequalities, legal scholar Dean Spade shows how **the focus on** inclusion, **recognition**, and equality **based on a** narrow **legal framework** (especially as it pertains to antidiscrimination and hate crime laws) not only **hinders the eradication of violence against** trans people and other **vulnerable populations** but actually creates the condition of possibility for the continued unequal “distribution of life chances.”22 If demanding recognition and **inclusion** remains at the center of minority **politics**, it **will lead only to** a delimited notion of **personhood as property that zeroes in comparatively on only one form of subjugation at the expense of others, thus allowing for the continued existence of hierarchical differences between full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans.** **This can be gleaned from the “successes” of** the **mainstream** feminist, **civil rights**, and lesbian-gay rights **movements**, **which facilitate the incorporation of a privileged minority into the ethnoclass of Man at the cost of the** still and/or newly criminalized and **disposable populations** (women of color, the black poor, trans people, the incarcerated, etc.).23 **To make claims for inclusion and humanity via the U.S. juridical assemblage removes from view that the law itself has been thoroughly violent** in its endorsement of racial slavery, indigenous genocide, Jim Crow, the prison-industrial complex, domestic and international warfare, and so on, **and** that it **continues to be one of the chief instruments in creating and maintaining the racializing assemblages in the world of Man**. Instead of appealing to legal recognition, Julia Oparah suggests counteracting the “racialized (trans)gender entrapment” within the prison-industrial complex and beyond with practices of “maroon abolition” (in reference to the long history of escaped slave contraband settlements in the Americas) to “foreground the ways in which often overlooked African diasporic cultural and political legacies inform and undergird anti-prison work,” while also providing strategies and life worlds not exclusively centered on reforming the law.24 Relatedly, Spade calls for a radical politics articulated from the “ ‘impossible’ worldview of trans political existence,” which redefines “the insistence of government agencies, social service providers, media, and many nontrans activists and nonprofiteers that the existence of trans people is impossible.”25 A relational maroon abolitionism beholden to the practices of black radicalism and that arises from the incompatibility of black trans existence with the world of Man serves as one example of how putatively abject modes of being need not be redeployed within hegemonic frameworks but can be operationalized as variable liminal territories or articulated assemblages in movements to abolish the grounds upon which all forms of subjugation are administered.

#### The 1AC’s assertion that workers deserve rights because of their struggles makes suffering a precondition to legal humanity – forces people to degrade themselves for rights and leads to counterproductive infighting among the oppressed.

Weheliye 14

Weheliye, Alexander. “Habeas Viscus.” Pg. 56-57. Duke University Press, 2014. I don’t have a link but I can send you the pdf.

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Even though it would be fairly easy to dismiss one position, either the traditionally humanist (suffering is human) or the racially particularistic (suffering is experienced only by those groups upon which it is inflicted), in favor of the other, both these stances rely on the same logic that deems one incompatible with the other, since the humanist brand would erase particularities in favor of a universalist sweep and the particularistic variant insists on its irreducibility by excluding all nonmembers from the group's affliction. Rather than urging us to choose sides, Farah's juxtaposition of these viewpoints draws attention to the ways racialized and gendered suffering at the hands of political brutalization are always already imbricated in the construction of modern humanity. Suffering, especially when caused by political violence, has long functioned as the hallmark of both humane sentience and of inhuman brutality. Frequently, **suffering becomes the defining feature of those subjects excluded from the law**, the national community, humanity, and so on due to the political violence inflicted upon them **even as it**, paradoxically, **grants them access to inclusion and equality**. In western human rights discourse, for instance, the physical and psychic residues of political violence enable victims to be recognized as belonging to the “brotherhood of Man.” Too often, **this tendency not only leaves intact** hegemonic **ideas of humanity as indistinguishable from western Man but demands comparing different forms of subjugation in order to adjudicate who warrants recognition** and belonging. As W. E. B. Du Bois asked in 1944, if the Universal Declaration of Human Rights did not offer provisions for ending world colonialism or legal segregation in the United States, “Why then call it the Declaration of Human Rights?”2 Wendy Brown maintains, “politicized identity” operates “only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics; it can hold out no future...that triumphs over this pain.”3 Brown suggests replacing the identitarian declaration “I am,” which merely confirms and solidifies what already exists, with the desiring proclamation “I want,” which offers a Nietzschean politics of overcoming pain instead of clinging to suffering as an immutable feature of identity politics. While I recognize Brown's effort to formulate a form of minority politics not beholden to the aura of wounded attachments and fixated almost fetishistically on the state as the site of change, we do well to recall that many of the political agendas based on identity (the suffragette movement, the movement for the equality of same-sex marriages, or the various movements for the full civil rights of racialized minority subjects, for instance) are less concerned with claiming their suffering per se (I am) than they are with using wounding as a stepping stone in the quest (I want) for rights equal to those of full citizens. **Liberal governing bodies**, whether in the form of nation-states or supranational entities **such as the U**nited **N**ations **or** the **I**nternational **C**riminal **C**ourt **make** particular forms of **wounding the precondition for** entry into the hallowed halls of full **personhood**, only acknowledging certain types of physical violence. For instance, while the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees passed a resolution in 2008 that includes rape and other forms of sexual violence in the category of war crimes, there are many forms of sexual violence that do not fall into this purview, and thus bar victims from claiming legal injury and/or personhood.4

#### Legal recognition of rights and personhood exclude those outside legal definitions of humanity and erase those who become human. Just as limited and genocidal court recognition of indigenous sovereignty justified the Dred Scott decision, the 1AC recreates violence against vulnerable flesh and divides the oppressed into distinct groups. Legal personhood and *Habeas Corpus* are constructed in relation to “Man,” a white, male, propertied, liberal subject who reinforces the color line.

Weheliye 14

Weheliye, Alexander. “Habeas Viscus.” Pg. 57-58. Duke University Press, 2014. I don’t have a link but I can send you the pdf.

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Du Bois asked in 1944, if the Universal Declaration of Human Rights did not offer provisions for ending world colonialism or legal segregation in the United States, “Why then call it the Declaration of Human Rights?”2 Wendy Brown maintains, “politicized identity” operates “only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics; it can hold out no future...that triumphs over this pain.”3 Brown suggests replacing the identitarian declaration “I am,” which merely confirms and solidifies what already exists, with the desiring proclamation “I want,” which offers a Nietzschean politics of overcoming pain instead of clinging to suffering as an immutable feature of identity politics. While I recognize Brown's effort to formulate a form of minority politics not beholden to the aura of wounded attachments and fixated almost fetishistically on the state as the site of change, we do well to recall that many of the political agendas based on identity (the suffragette movement, the movement for the equality of same-sex marriages, or the various movements for the full civil rights of racialized minority subjects, for instance) are less concerned with claiming their suffering per se (I am) than they are with using wounding as a stepping stone in the quest (I want) for rights equal to those of full citizens. Liberal governing bodies, whether in the form of nation-states or supranational entities such as the United Nations or the International Criminal Court make particular forms of wounding the precondition for entry into the hallowed halls of full personhood, only acknowledging certain types of physical violence. For instance, while the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees passed a resolution in 2008 that includes rape and other forms of sexual violence in the category of war crimes, there are many forms of sexual violence that do not fall into this purview, and thus bar victims from claiming legal injury and/or personhood.4Even more generally, the acknowledgment and granting of full personhood of those excluded from its precincts requires the overcoming of physical violence, while epistemic and economic brutalities remain outside the scope of the law. Congruently, much of the politics constructed around the effects of political violence, especially within the context of international human rights but also with regard to minority politics in the United States, is constructed from the shaky foundation of surmounting or desiring to leave behind physical suffering so as to take on the ghostly semblance of possessing one's personhood. Then and only then will previously minoritized subjects be granted their humanity as a legal status. Hence, the glitch Brown diagnoses in identity politics is less a product of the minority subject's desire to desperately cling to his or her pain but a consequence of the state's dogged insistence on suffering as the only price of entry to proper personhood, what Samera Esmeir has referred to as a “juridical humanity” that bestows and rescinds humanity as an individualized legal status in the vein of property.5 **Apportioning personhood** in this way **maintains the world of Man and its** attendant **racializing assemblages**, which means in essence that **the entry fee for legal recognition is the acceptance of categories based on white supremacy and colonialism, as well as normative genders and sexualities.** We need only to consult the history of habeas corpus, the “great” writ of liberty, which is anchored in the U.S. Constitution (Article 1, Section 9), to see that this type of reasoning leads to reducing inclusion and personhood to ownership.6 The Latin phrase habeas corpus means “You shall have the body,” and a writ thereof requires the government to present prisoners before a judge so as to provide a lawful justification for their continued imprisonment. This writ has been considered a pivotal safeguard against the misuse of political power in the modern west. Even though the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which denied habeas corpus to “unlawful enemy combatants” imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay, remains noteworthy and alarming, habeas corpus has been used both by and frequently against racialized groups throughout U.S. history, as was the case when habeas corpus was suspended during World War II, allowing for the internment of Japanese Americans. The writ has also led to gains for minoritized subjects as, for instance, in the well-known Amistad case (1839), in which abolitionists used a habeas corpus petition to free the “illegally” captured Africans who had staged a mutiny against their abductors. Likewise, when Ponca tribal leader Standing Bear was jailed as a result of protesting the forcible removal of his people to Indian Territory in 1879, the writ of habeas corpus affected his release from incarceration as well as the judge's recognition that, as a general rule, Indians were persons before U.S. law, even though Native Americans were not considered full U.S. citizens until 1924.7Nevertheless, the benefits accrued through the **juridical acknowledgment** of racialized subjects **as** fully **human** often exacts a steep entry price, because inclusion **hinges on accepting the codification of personhood as property**, which is, in turn, **based on** the comparative **distinction between groups**, as in one of the best-known court cases in U.S. history: the Dred Scott case. In 1857, the Supreme Court invalidated Dred Scott's habeas corpus, since, as an escaped slave, Scott could not be a legal person. According to Chief Justice Taney: “Dred Scott is not a citizen of the State of Missouri, as alleged in his declaration, because he is a ~~negro~~ [black] of African descent; his ancestors were of pure African blood, and were brought into this country and sold as negro slaves.”8 In order to justify withdrawing Dred Scott's legal right to ownership of self, Chief Justice Taney's opinion in the decision contrasts the status of black subjects with the legal position of Native Americans vis-à-vis the possibility of U.S. citizenship and personhood: “The situation of [the ~~negro~~ {black} ] population was altogether unlike that of the Indian race. These Indian Governments were regarded and treated as foreign Governments.... [Indians] may, without doubt, like the subjects of any other foreign Government, be naturalized...and become citizens of a State, and of the United States; and if an individual should leave his nation or tribe, and take up his abode among the white population, he would be entitled to all the rights and privileges which would belong to an emigrant from any other foreign people.”9 While slaves were not accorded the status of being humans that belonged to a different nation, Indians could theoretically overcome their lawful foreignness, but only if they renounced previous forms of personhood and citizenship. Hence, the tabula rasa of **whiteness**—which all groups but blacks can access—**serves as the prerequisite for the law's** magical **transubstantiation** **of a thing** to be possessed **into a** property-owning **subject**.10The judge's comparison underscores the dangers of ceding definitions of personhood to the law and of comparing different forms of political subjugation, since **hypothetical** ~~Indian~~ **[indigenous] personhood in the law rests on attaining whiteness and the violent denial of said status to black subjects.** Additionally, while the court conceded limited capabilities of personhood to indigenous subjects if they chose to convert to whiteness, it did not prevent the U.S. government from instituting various genocidal measures to ensure that American Indians would become white and therefore no longer exist as Indians. In other words, the legal conception of personhood comes with a steep price, as in this instance where being seemingly granted rights laid the groundwork for the U.S. government's genocidal policies against Native Americans, since the “racialization of indigenous peoples, especially through the use of blood quantum classification, in particular follows...‘genocidal logic,’ rather than simply a logic of subordination or discrimination,” and as a result “**whiteness constitutes a project of disappearance for Native peoples** rather than signifying privilege.”11 Beginning in the nineteenth century the U.S. government instituted a program in which Native American children were forcibly removed from their families and placed in Christian day and boarding schools, and which sought to civilize children by “killing the Indian to save the man,” representing one of the most significant examples of the violent and legal enforced assimilation of Native Americans into U.S. whiteness.12 Though there is no clear causal relationship between Taney's arguments in the Scott decision and the boarding school initiative, both establish that **legal personhood is available to indigenous subjects only if the Indian can be killed**—either literally or figuratively—**in order to save the world of Man** (in this case settler colonialism and white supremacy). Furthermore, the denial of personhood qua whiteness to African American subjects does not stand in opposition to the genocidal wages of whiteness bequeathed to indigenous subjects but rather represents different properties of the same racializing juridical assemblage that differentially produces both black and native subjects as aberrations from Man and thus not-quite-human. The writ of **habeas corpus**—**and the law** more generally—anoints those individualized subjects who are deemed deserving with bodies even while this assemblage continually enlists new and/or different groups to exclude, banish, or exterminate from the world of Man. In the end, the law, whether bound by national borders or spanning the globe, **establish**es **an international division of humanity, which grants previously excluded subjects limited access to personhood as property at the same time as it fortifies the supremacy of Man**.13

#### The alternative is to embrace habeas viscus, a definition of human based on the flesh rather than constructs of the body defined in relation to whiteness. Habeas viscus opens avenues for guerrilla warfare as it removes politics from the realm of the Man, instead opting for a collective consciousness of the oppressed.

Weheliye 14

Weheliye, Alexander. “Habeas Viscus.” Pg. 95-96. Duke University Press, 2014. I don’t have a link but I can send you the pdf.

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**The** poetics and **politics** that I have been discussing under the heading **of habeas viscus** or the flesh **are concerned** not **with** inclusion in reigning precincts of the status quo but, in Cedric Robinson's apt phrasing, “**the** continuing **development of a collective consciousness informed by the historical struggles for liberation and motivated by the shared sense of obligation to preserve [and** I would add also to **reimagine] the collective being**, the ontological totality.”31 Though the laws of Man place the flesh outside the ferocious and ravenous perimeters of the legal body, habeas viscus defies domestication both on the basis of particularized personhood as a result of suffering, as in human rights discourse, and on the grounds of the universalized version of western Man. Rather, **habeas viscus points to the terrain of humanity as a relational assemblage exterior to the jurisdiction of law** given **that** the law can bequeath or rescind ownership of the body so that it becomes the property of proper persons but **does not possess the authority to nullify the politics and poetics of the flesh found in the traditions of the oppressed**. As a way of conceptualizing politics, then, habeas viscus diverges from the discourses and institutions that yoke the flesh to political violence in the modus of deviance. Instead, it translates the hieroglyphics of the flesh into a potentiality in any and all things, an originating leap in the imagining of future anterior freedoms and new genres of humanity. To envisage habeas viscus as a forceful assemblage of humanity entails leaving behind the world of Man and some of its attendant humanist pieties. As opposed to depositing the flesh outside politics, the normal, the human, and so on, we need a better understanding of its varied workings in order to disrobe the cloak of Man, which gives the human a long-overdue extreme makeover; or, in the words of Sylvia Wynter, “the struggle of our new millennium will be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e. western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves.”32 Claiming and **dwelling in the** monstrosity of **the flesh present** some of the **weapons in** the **guerrilla warfare to “secure the full** cognitive and behavioral **autonomy of the human species,” since these liberate from captivity assemblages of life, thought, and politics from the tradition of the oppressed and, as a result, disfigure the centrality of Man as the sign for the human.** As an assemblage of humanity, **habeas viscus** animates the elsewheres of Man and **emancipates the true potentiality that rests in those subjects who live behind the veil of the permanent state of exception**: freedom**; assemblages of freedom** that **sway to the** temporality of new syncopated **beginnings for the human beyond the world** and continent **of Man.**

## Case

**I’ll concede framework but the ROB comes first**

1. **It’s a question of how we debate and think about the reolution, which is prior to interpreting the resolution**
2. **It’s more important on a pre-fiat level because it provides startegies for engaging in activism vs. abstract policymaking**

#### Labor movements’ focus on job security is a stabilizing force that tries to re-territorialize the relationship between workers and their labor - affirmative demands for stable jobs present a stable worker-subject defined solely by their labor – that’s the worst form of standardization.

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As info-labor becomes the dominant mode of production, the workerexperiences an increase in precarity. For Bifo, ‘Precariousness is no longer amarginal and provisional characteristic, but it is the general form of the laborrelation in a productive, digitalized sphere, reticular and recombinative’ (2009,p. 51). This is not to say that all workers experience precarity equally, or that Walker 6 r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1755-6341 Subjectivity Vol. 0, 0, 1–18 U N C O R R E C T E D P R O O F precaritization is the dominant trend in all workplaces, but that becomingprecarious is the emergent future of the global labor market, taken as a whole. Just as Hardt and Negri argued that immaterial labor represents the ‘cuttingedge’ of capitalist restructuring even if many jobs are not yet immaterial,a similar argument could be made about precaritization. But as previouslynoted, info-labor is not confined to computer technicians or employees of technology firms. Increasingly, the primary site of info-labor is not thehigh-tech workplace, but the Internet itself, where websites draw upon‘micro-labor’, which generates surplus value primarily through advertisingrevenue. But faced with increasing precarity and insecurity, the labor movement can do nothing but look backward. **The** rallying **call of the labor movement** in the face of the segmentation and disruption of continuous labor time **has been ‘We Want Job Security!’** This is a grave mistake. Unlike much of the Left, Bifo iscrystal clear on one point: those who oppose the worst effects of precarityshould not demand its opposite. Reflecting briefly on new political forms, he asks rhetorically, ‘ y what would our proposed objective be? That of a stablejob, guaranteed for life? Naturally no, this would be a cultural regression y ’(2009, p. 31). Capital has reneged on its end of the social contract; to wish itback is futile at best, reactionary at worst.Nonetheless, the response of the labor movement, in all too many cases, hasbeen to cling to what is left of the social guarantee. As Bifo argues, the demand for job security is a conservative demand, in both the political sense and in thesense that it is inherently backward looking. **To demand security is to demand the reterritorialization of the employment relation.** At the same time, it wouldbe a mistake to assume that job security has everywhere disappeared. Jobsecurity persists, and not only for the most privileged workers in theprofessional strata. Indeed, the demand for job security persists preciselybecause it remains – at least for some workers – winnable. But there is ageneralized slippage toward precarity, even for the most privileged of workers.As Guattari and Negri (1996) predict, in the near future ‘the guaranteedworkers will be placed under the same regime as the non-guaranteed, andeverything will be nuances, minute non-empirical transitions’. For many, jobsecurity seems to be the last remaining hope for avoiding this nightmarishendgame.The turn toward job security has at least two deleterious effects on the labormovement. First**, job security is often a de facto replacement for wage, hour and benefit demands**. Unions that might otherwise win tangible improvements fortheir members instead find themselves clinging to the life raft of employmentstability during moments of economic crisis. Second, the ‘threat’ of layoffscauses unions to negotiate abnormally long contracts. Speaking to the AmericanCouncil on Education in 1995, no sharper a social critic than former FederalReserve Chairman Alan Greenspan noted ‘**workers have increasingly forgone wage hikes for job security**. Moreover, labor contracts y are now sometimes going out five and six years, as people try to lock in job security y ’ (quoted inCutler, 2004). Most labor specialists agree that long contracts severelyundermine labor’s power by eliminating the possibility of job actions duringthe interim. (In the United States, most collective bargaining agreementsinclude a no strike clause for the duration of the contract.) Job security isnothing more than an anti-concessionary demand, since by definition a union’smembers already have jobs. At best, job security is a purely defensive demand.At worst, it is the precursor to givebacks, since job security is often tied toconcessionary bargaining.Precarity also operates at the subconscious level. Even workers who do notexperience precarity directly often feel threatened by the specter of precarity,and fear they may soon become precarious themselves. Even when the economiccycle turns in workers’ favor, the perceived threat of layoffs leads to decreasedmilitancy. Whether this fear has any relationship bearing on the ‘actual’stabilityof the workers is irrelevant; it is the fear itself that is productive for capital. The calculus is simple: the precarious worker is less likely to rebel or unionizefor fear of retribution and if unionized is less likely to make aggressive demands.The ideal worker believes each working day may be his last. From thestandpoint of capital, it matters little whether precarity is real or imagined – infact, an imagined precarity is usually preferable because high turnover incurssignificant retraining expenses.S till, the demand for job security is rooted in the collective imagination,which has a notoriously long phase cycle. For a period of about 30 years(roughly, from the end of World War II through the oil crisis of the 1970s), jobsecurity was a reality for many workers in the highly industrialized countriesof the Western world. In the United States, this took the form of a de facto agreement under which capital would grant steady if modest wage increases inexchange for relative labor peace. This arrangement, often called the post-warsocial contract, substantially improved the quality of life for significantsegments of the working class, to the point that by the 1960s it was possibleto speak of a post-scarcity society in parts of Western Europe. But this is ahistorically and spatially unique phenomenon; precarity has been the livedreality for vast majority of workers since the advent of capitalism. Even thepost-war deal was extended only to a privileged sector of the working class;workers outside of major factories and portions of the managerial/professionalstrata typically endured precarity. (Incidentally, pre-capitalist and primitiveaccumulation economies typically offered some degree of job security.) As Bifowrites, ‘Only for a short period at the heart of the twentieth century, under thepolitical pressures of unions and workers, in conditions of (almost) fullemployment and thanks to a more or less strongly regulatory role of the state inthe economy, some limits to the natural violence of capitalist dynamics could belegally established’ (2009, p. 32). With the decline of the labor movement globally by the 1980s, the violence of capital could no longer be held in check,and the guarantee was replaced – perhaps permanently – by precarity.But this 30-year exception looms large in the memories and collectiveimagination of the contemporary workforce. The baby-boom generation isthe last to have experienced relative security. What Bifo calls the video-electronic generation (born after the late 1970s) and the connective generation(born in the 1990s) have no direct knowledge of secure employment, even if they desire it for themselves. Even workers born as early as the 1960s knowsecurity only vicariously, through their parents. Yet workers and their unionscontinue to relive the collective memory of an experience they have neverknown. The reaction of French unions to the threat of precarity is instructivehere. In 2006, French workers and students revolted against a law that would have allowed firms to fire young workers without reason during the first 2 yearsof employment. This anti-CPE ( Contrat Premie`re Embauche or ‘First Employ-ment Contract’) movement involved a broad cross-section of society andrepresented one of the largest and most militant demonstrations in Francesince 1968. In typical fashion, unions resisted precaritization by resurrecting the ghosts of job security. Unions led the chant ‘CPE, no, no, no’, and ‘CDI,yes, yes, yes’. (CDI is the Contrat a`Dure ´e Inde ´termine ´e or ‘UndeterminedDuration Contract’, the typical mode of employment in France.) **For** these **unions, the reterritorialization of the employment relation was the only possible response to precarity**. But others had a different slogan. A bannerabove the occupied College of France read ‘CPE or CDI, it’s all just forced labor (STO)’ ( Service du Travail Obligatoire or ‘Obligatory Labor Service’).A communique ´from the occupation committee declared **the union’s slogan was ‘an expression of the servile desire to be exploited for 8 hours every daylike everybody else’**, and the occupiers slogan ‘a refusal to let work defineus, a refusal to let it penetrate to ever further depths of our being’(Anonymous, 2006). Caught between the Scylla of an uncertain future andthe Charybdis of unending labor, the occupation committee demanded athird option. As this example shows, the labor movement may find it necessary to develop a new subjectivity beyond work. But **unions**, like most large bureaucracies, **are** often **characterized by** outright **resistance to change**. As Maurizio Lazzaratoobserves, French unions actively opposed including unskilled workers amongtheir ranks as late as the 1980s (2006, p. 187). In the United States, no union hasmounted a real campaign to organize Wal-Mart, even as numerous studies haveshown the company has a disproportionate downward influence on wagesacross multiple sectors of the economy (Kelber, 2011). According to Lazzarato(2006, p. 190), ‘**the labor movement can’t imagine a process of constitution of the world and self which is not centered around work’**. But this is the crucialcondition for labor’s reinvention

#### Negate to outright refuse worker identity provided by unions and strikes – withdrawal is a form of passive sabotage that more effectively creates social autonomy and affective becoming. Refusal is a better form of appropriation.

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**This emergent movement will** not **be** a new form of activism, but **a strategy of radical passivity**. In the first instance, the strategy is **predicated on the abandonment of pre assigned subject-positions: the rejection of work by the worker, the rank-and-file’s withdrawal from the trade unions**, and the rebel’s escape from the role of ascetic militant – in short, a strategy of desubjectivation. As Bifo writes, ‘**the path towards the autonomy of the social from economic** and military **mobilization [is] only possible through a withdrawal into** inactivity, silence and **passive sabotage’** (2009, p. 127). This will draw upon what I might call Frederick Taylor’s Fourth Law of Thermodynamics: the general tendency of workers to perform as little work as possible, in a closed system, in the absence of an external force. **While unions seek to cement workers’ identities as workers , most workers identify with a non-worker subjectivity**, which is ironically far more compatible with the contemporary mode of production (Of course, some unions recast their members as citizen-consumers or embrace identity politics in the name of diversity, but ultimately seek to realign difference in the service of worker-identity.) (Schwartz-Weinstein, 2010). Thus, if the refusal of work was the cause of precaritization, it also represents a path forward. Elements of knowledge, already the province of the General Intellect,can be reassembled for uses that undermine the capitalist profit-generatingprerogative. For Bifo, the primary tactic of the labor movement of the futurewill be a form of sabotage that he calls the recombinant function : ‘The problemof our time is the creation of a recombinant function y Recombining does notmean to subvert or to overthrow y but rather means assembling elements of knowledge according to criteria other than those of profit and the accumulationof value’ (2009, p. 66). **The** conventional **mode of struggle**, **where capital and labor constituted themselves as frontal opponents, is no longer possible, because the enemy has become more totalizing**. The recombinant function is guerrilla warfare for labor, hearkening back to the refusal of work, sabotage, stealing time and other tactics of Italian autonomist left. The immediate objective is notto seize the means of production, but to carve out a space for freedom fromwithin through a radical re-purposing.Bifo suggests that this political subjectivation will occur at the boundary of cyberspace and cybertime, which exhibit different and fundamentally incompa-tible characteristics: ‘cyberspace is conceptually infinite, cybertime is not infiniteat all. I call cybertime the ability of the conscious organism to actually process(cyber-spatial) information. This ability cannot be indefinitely expanded,because it has limits that are physical, emotional, affective. Time becomes theprimary battlefield, as it is the space of the mind: mind-time, cybertime’. Forthe labor movement, the ‘battlefield of time’ has traditionally taken the formof the shorter hours movement, which by the mid-twentieth century hadlargely succeeded in reducing a virtually limitless workday to 7 or 8 hours in Walker 10 r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1755-6341 Subjectivity Vol. 0, 0, 1–18 U N C O R R E C T E D P R O O F North America and Europe. But this movement achieved its greatest success inthe manufacturing sector, where the employment relations remained relativelystable and the labor theory of value appeared unshakable. In the servicesector, where employment relations have always been more tenuous, thehours question is rarely broached. For cognitive and high-tech workers, for allintents and purposes, there is no hours question. Yet the beauty of the shorterhours movement is that its internal logic is not dependent on the labor theory of value (Cutler and Aronowitz, 1998). Tech workers need not be able to calculatethe portion of their working day that is converted into relative surplus value toreduce the amount of time they spend doing their jobs.But importantly, the objective of the recombinant function is not ‘to bring tothe surface a hidden social authenticity’ lurking beneath the oppressiveconditions of the modern workplace (Berardi, 2009, p. 66). As far as Bifo isconcerned, there is no essential authenticity to be uncovered. In contrast, theearly shorter hours movement was often justified on Neo-Luddite grounds – byfreeing himself [sic] from the emasculating roar of the factory, the worker couldreclaim his ‘essential humanness’ and achieve complete human development.At certain moments, Bifo’s writing appears as a faint echo of the early shorterhours movement: ‘It is only by freeing the cognitariat from the subordinationto its virtual dimension, it is only by reactivating a dynamic of slow affectivity,of freedom from work, that the collective organism will be able to regain itssensibility and rationality, its ability to live in peace’ (2009, p. 71). But Bifo iscareful to note that he is not seeking to recapture the purely erotic a`la Marcuseand the Marxist humanists. The molar/corporeal/individual subject cannot be‘reclaimed’ outside of and in opposition to technology. As Bifo has argued,not only is this path undesirable, but it may well be impossible. Humanity hasalready been so deeply transformed by and through technology that the‘authentically human’ can no longer be neatly separated from the ‘purelytechnological’.Instead, Bifo outlines three possible responses to capitalist restructuring: deceleration, upgrading and subtraction. Deceleration would involve areduction of complexity, perhaps for the purpose of reclaiming the ‘authenti-cally human’. As already indicated, Bifo believes this is not a viable option.Upgrading, or ‘mechanical adjustment of the human body and brain to ahyperfast info-sphere’ through use of computer prostheses and drugs istechnically possible, though not necessarily desirable (2009, p. 43). This leavessubtraction – ‘distancing from the vortex’, or what Bifo calls suicide. At times,this refers to actual suicide, at other points, it operates at the level of metaphor.Bifo explains, ‘Since September 11th, 2001 suicide is the decisive politicalact of our times. When human life is worthless, humiliation grows until itbecome intolerable and explosive. Perhaps hope can only come from suicides’(2009, p. 55). It is important to distinguish this strategy from deceleration, for if the former represents a weary retreat, the later represents a purposeful Labor of recombination 11 r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1755-6341 Subjectivity Vol. 0, 0, 1–18 U N C O R R E C T E D P R O O F withdrawal. The difference is subtle but critical. Arguably, **the recombinant function is a form of suicide, for by killing off his worker-identity, the employee-cum-saboteur invites an indeterminate future of collective becomings**. Although the valorization of work and the cultivation of worker-identity has been the lifeblood of the twentieth-century unions, it may soon be possible to speak of alabor movement without workers. But this desubjectivation can never be a purenegativity, a mere not -subject, for it is accompanied by an unpredictableand always contingent subjectivation (even if only becoming-autonomous). Thisresurgent subjectivation is asymptotic, never settling into a new subject-identity,but constantly remaking itself through continual experimentation.However, under late capitalism it is no longer possible to propose a mode of resistance that exists outside of capital. One of the dominant features of controlsociety is its resiliency. If disciplinary society was able to contain dissent byforcing it to the margins, control society embraces and consumes its opposition.For Lazzarato, in olden days, the goal was confinement of the outside and thedisciplining of whatever subjectivities now they can be seized only throughmodulation. Even the politics of anti-identity, which at one point seemed deeplythreatening, have been wrapped in plastic and sold in the supermarket, toborrow liberally from Hardt and Negri. The paradox here is that as capitalismconstantly reinvents itself to include whatever subjectivities, exploitation onlybecomes more intense. Or as Deleuze writes (here with Guattari), ‘ y capitalismis always capable of adding to its axiomatic in terms of an enlargement of itslimits: let’s create the New Deal; let’s cultivate and recognize strong unions; let’spromote participation, the single class; let’s take a step toward Russia y ’(2004, p. 137). The limits of capitalist innovation are bounded only by thepretensions of labor.

Standardization 1st – it takes out social roles because we can’t switch and we can’t tell when we appropriate as individuals.

A2 objectification: ppl can make change just not through unions – nq

A2 standardization – ppl still have the option to strike just not legally

A2 appropriation – chg nq

A2 over id – strikes result in a new form of it