
# 1NC

## 1 – Theory

**Interpretation: When the affirmative is new, the aff debater must disclose the advocacy text and framing text.**

**Violation: They don’t**

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**Standards:**

1. **Clash – I can’t think of nuanced arguments in limited prep so I need to resort to generics and sketchy strategies. That means we learn less because there’s less contestation over high-quality arguments.**
2. **Strat Skew – I resort to generics because I can’t think of a tailored NC strat in 3 minutes – that means they can predict the NC and frontline it so they have an advantage. They also have more unique and high-quality arguments so the debate is unfair.**
3. **Disincentives surprise tactics so people won’t read knowingly bad affs and get away with it because the neg can’t prep. That’s key to ensuring high quality education.**

**Fairness is a voter because**

1. **The only way a judge can determine who’s better is if we enter the debate on an even playing field.**
2. **People quit if they lose to unfair arguments so fairness is a prereq to debate’s existence.**

**Education is voter because:**

1. **It’s the only portable benefit of debate.**
2. **It’s the only reason we get funding.**

**Theory is drop the debater:**

1. **Only DTD enables theory to deter bad behavior and be a tool for norm setting. Drop the Arg just lets them dodge whatever they did wrong with barley any consequences.**
2. **Dropping the arg can’t rectify past abuse because the 1AC was uniquely bad, so there should be a consequence.**

**No RVI’s:**

1. **they’re illogical – it doesn’t make sense to reward someone for not doing anything bad. People need to do good things to win.**
2. **RVI’s chill legitimate theory, justifying even more abuse.**

**Competing Interps:**

1. **Reasonability usually lacks a brightline and favors unnecessary judge intervention.**
2. **Reasonability lets them arbitrarily choose a brightline that favors their arguments – skews fairness.**

**We solve any aff innovation arguments because advocacy/framing is more advantageous than open source so people still write new affs.**

## 2 – Hobbes

#### The meta-ethic is constructivism: the idea that there is no moral truth independent of human concepts.

#### 1. Truth values are based on language and social norms, not reality. We don’t call cars “cars” because of external truth, but rather because of social constructs like language. That means there’s no epistemically reliable way to find moral truth.

Parrish 04 [Parrish, Rick, [Rick Parrish teaches at Loyola University New Orleans. His current research is focused on the play of violence and respect within justice.] "Derrida’S Economy Of Violence In Hobbes’ Social Contract" Theory &amp; Event, Vol. 7 No. 4, 2005, 2005, http://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119#back, DOA:6-30-2018 // WWBW]

“For Hobbes **truth is a function of logic and language, not of the relation between language and some extralinguistic reality,**"25 **so the "connections between names and objects are not natural**."26 **They are artificially constructed by persons, based on individual psychologies and desires**. These individual desires are for Hobbes the only measure of good and bad, because value terms "are never used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves."27 **Since "there are no authentic**al **doctrines concerning right and wrong,** good and evil," **these labels are placed upon things by humans in acts of creation rather than discovered as extrinsic facts.** Elaborating on this, Hobbes writes that "the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker, such as are the names of virtues and vices; for one man calleth wisdom, what another calleth fear; and one cruelty what another justice."29 A more simplistic understanding of the brutality of the state of nature, which David Gauthier calls the "simple rationality account,"30 has it that mere materialistic competition for goods is the cause of the war of all against all, but such rivalry is a secondary manifestation of the more fundamental competition among all persons to be the dominant creator of meaning. Certainly, Hobbes writes that persons most frequently "desire to hurt each other" because "many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword."31 But this competition for goods only arises as the result of the more primary struggle that is inherent in the nature of persons of meaning creators. In the state of nature, "where every [person] is [their] own judge," persons will "mete good and evil by diverse measures," creat[e]ing labels for things as they see fit, based on individual appetites. One of the most significant objects that receives diverse labels in the state of nature is 'threat'. Even if most people happen to construe threat similarly, there will be serious disagreement regarding whether or not a specific situation fits a commonly-held definition.

#### 2. Externalism fails – any thing we find morally valuable is the result of a combination of social constructions and biological processes – neither have any connection to ethics.

#### 3. “Truth” can only be arrived at subjectively because we always have internal biases when observing the world. It’s impossible to find pure moral truth.

Duncan 02

Pritchard, Duncan. “Contemporary Skepticism.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2002, www.iep.utm.edu/skepcont/.

Before concluding, it is worthwhile to briefly dwell upon those influential figures in the recent epistemological debate who, in contrast to the current mood of optimism that can be found in epistemological discussion of the problem of radical skepticism, are deeply suspicious that any intellectually satisfactory solution could ever be given to this problem. The roots of this movement in the contemporary literature can be traced back to the work of three main figures – Unger (1971; 1975), Barry Stroud (1984; 1989) and Thomas Nagel (1986). We saw Unger’s infallibilist defence of skepticism earlier on, so here I will summarise Stroud’s and Nagel’s contribution, and highlight one way in which this variety of ‘meta-skepticism’ currently informs the skeptical debate, particularly as it figures in more recent work by Stroud (1994; 1996) and Richard Fumerton (1990; 1995). For both Nagel and Stroud, the thought seems to be that there is something in our philosophical quest for objectivity that inexorably leads us to skeptical conclusions. Nagel argues, for instance, that **objectivity involves attaining a completely impartial view of reality**, one that is not tainted by any particular perspective. **We must**, he argues, “**get outside of ourselves**”, **and** thereby **achieve the impossible task of being able to “view the world from nowhere from within it”** (Nagel 1986, 76). We realise that the initial appearances present to a viewpoint can be unreliable guides to reality and therefore seek to modify our ‘subjective’ view with a more ‘objective’ perspective that is tempered by reason and reflection. As Nagel points out, however, the trouble with this approach is that: […] **if initial appearances are not in themselves reliable guides to reality,** [then] **why should the products of detached reflection be any different?** Why aren’t they […] equally doubtful […]? […] The same ideas that make the pursuit of objectivity seem necessary for knowledge make both objectivity and knowledge seem, on reflection, unattainable. (Nagel 1986, 76) We can reconstruct the argument here as follows. We recognise that our initial unmodified ‘subjective’ experience of the world is unreliable and therefore should be adapted along ‘objective’ lines by eliminating the ‘subjective’ element. For instance, initial appearances tell us, falsely, **that straight sticks suddenly become ‘bent’ when placed in water**. Accordingly, **we modify our** initial ‘**subjective’ view with the testimony of ‘objective’ scientific investigation which tells us that** the stick in fact stays straight, **it is just the light** that is **bending. However**, and here is the crux of the matter as far as Nagel is concerned, **why do we regard this modified view as being any more reliable** than the completely ‘subjective’ perspective that it replaces? After all, **we cannot eliminate every trace of ‘subjectivity’** and thus the problematic component of our conception of reality that engendered the pursuit of objectivity in the first place remains. Consequently**, we are both aware of the need for objectivity whilst also recognising that such objectivity is impossible**. As a result, according to Nagel, we are condemned to the following pessimistic evaluation of our epistemic capacities: The search for objective knowledge, because of its commitment to a realist picture, is inescapably subject to skepticism and cannot refute it but must proceed under its shadow. […] Skepticism […] is a problem only because of the realist claims of objectivity. (Nagel 1986, 71) That is, the problem of skepticism […] has no solution, but to recognise that is to come as near as we can to living in the light of truth. (Nagel 1986, 231) Moreover, since these ‘realist’ truths concerning objectivity are meant to be inherent in our epistemic concepts, so it is held that this pessimism falls naturally out of any reflective analysis of our epistemic concepts.

#### This lack of moral truth leads to conflict when there is no authority to mediate disputes. In this state of nature, people view different things as moral, so there are major fights over what should be done absent any authority.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 20

Lloyd, Sharon A. and Susanne Sreedhar, "Hobbes’s Moral and Political Philosophy", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/hobbes-moral/>. // Park City NL

Taken together, these plausible descriptive and normative assumptions yield a **[the] state of nature [is] potentially fraught with divisive struggle.** The right of each to all things invites serious conflict, especially if there is competition for resources, as there will surely be over at least scarce goods such as the most desirable lands, spouses, etc. People will quite naturally fear that others may (citing the right of nature) invade them, and may rationally plan to strike first as an anticipatory defense. Moreover, that minority of prideful or “vain-glorious” persons who take pleasure in exercising power over others will naturally elicit preemptive defensive responses from others. **Conflict will be further fueled by disagreement in** **religious views,** in **moral judgments,** and over matters as mundane as **what goods one actually needs, and what respect one properly merits. Hobbes imagines a state of nature in which each person is free to decide** for herself **what she needs,** **what she’s owed, what’s respectful, right, pious, prudent, and also free to decide all of these questions for the behavior of everyone else as well, and to act on her judgments as she thinks best, enforcing her views where she can. In this situation where there is no common authority to resolve these many and serious disputes, we can easily imagine with Hobbes that the state of nature would become a “state of war”**, even worse, a war of “all against all”.

#### Therefore people must enter into a social contract in which a sovereign authority, like the government, mediates disputes and creates ethical rules.

Parrish 04 [Parrish, Rick, [Rick Parrish teaches at Loyola University New Orleans. His current research is focused on the play of violence and respect within justice.] "Derrida’S Economy Of Violence In Hobbes’ Social Contract" Theory &amp; Event, Vol. 7 No. 4, 2005, 2005, http://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119#back, DOA:6-30-2018 // WWBW]

All of the foregoing points to the conclusion that in the commonwealth the sovereign's first and most fundamental job is to be the ultimate definer. Several other commentators have also reached this conclusion. By way of elaborating upon the importance of the moderation of individuality in Hobbes' theory of government, Richard Flathman claims that peace "is possible only if the ambiguity and disagreement that pervade general thinking and acting are eliminated by the stipulations of a sovereign."57 Pursuant to debunking the perennial misinterpretation of Hobbes' mention of people as wolves, Paul Johnson argues that "one of the primary functions of the sovereign is to provide the necessary unity of meaning and reference for the primary terms in which men try to conduct their social lives."58 "**The whole [reason for]** raison d'être of **sovereign helmsmanship lies squarely in the chronic defusing of interpretive clashes,**"59 **without which humans would "fly off in all directions" and fall inevitably into the violence of the natural condition.** 26. It is not surprising that so many noted students of Hobbes have reached this conclusion, given how prominently he himself makes this claim. According to Hobbes, "in the state of nature, where every man is his own judge, and differeth from others concerning the names and appellations of things, and from those differences arise quarrels and breach of peace, it was necessary there should be a common measure of all things, that might fall in controversy."61 The main categories of the sovereign's tasks are "to make and abrogate laws, to determine war and peace, [and] to know and judge of all controversies,"62 but each of these duties is a subspecies of its ultimate duty to be the sole and ultimate definer in matters of public importance. **It is only through the sovereign's effective continued [exercise of authority]** accomplishment of this duty **that the people of a commonwealth avoid the definitional problems that typify the state of nature**. 27. Judging controversies, which Hobbes lists as the third main task of the sovereign, is the duty most obviously about being the ultimate definer. In fact, Hobbes declares it a law of nature that "in every controversy, the parties thereto ought mutually to agree upon an arbitrator, whom they both trust; and mutually to covenant to stand to the sentence he shall give therein."63 As I repeatedly alluded to above, this agreement to abide by the decision of a third party arbitrator, a sovereign in the commonwealth, is necessary because of the fundamentally perspectival and relative nature of persons' imputations of meaning and value into the situations they construct. Hobbes understands this problem, as evidenced by his claim that "seeing right reason is not existent, the reason of some man or men must supply the place thereof; and that man or men, is he or they, that have the sovereign power"64 to dictate meanings that will be followed by all. The sovereign is even protected from potential democratic impulses, by which a 'true' meaning would be that agreed upon by the greatest number of people. Because "no one man's reason, nor the reason of any one number of men, makes the certainty," they will still "come to blows . . . for want of a right reason constituted by nature"65 unless both the majority and the minority agree to abide by the meanings promulgated by the sovereign. 28. These meanings are usually created and promulgated by the sovereign in the form of laws, another of the tasks with which Hobbes charges it. In one of his clearest explanations of the law, Hobbes writes that "it belongs to the same chief power to make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what another's, what just, what unjust, what ho nest, what dishonest, what good, what evil; that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoided in our common course of life."66 The civil law is the set of the sovereign's definitions for ownership, justice, good, evil, and all other concepts that are important for the maintenance of peace in the commonwealth. **When everyone follows the law (that is, when everyone follows the sovereign's definitions) there are far fewer conflicts among persons because everyone appeals to the same meanings**. This means that people know what meanings others will use to evaluate the actions of themselves and others, so the state of nature's security dilemmas and attempts to force one's own meanings upon others are overcome. 29. There is to be no question of the truth or falsity of the sovereign's definitions because "there are no authentical doctrines concerning right and wrong, good and evil, besides the constituted laws in each realm and government."67 In fact, Hobbes specifically says that one of the "diseases of a commonwealth" is that "every private man is judge of good and evil actions."68 Only when individual persons agree to follow the meanings promulgated by the sovereign, which of course includes refraining from trying to impose their own meanings on others, can persons live together in peace -- when they take it upon themselves to impose meaning on situations of public import, they descend into violence again.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the will of the sovereign.

**Prefer:**

**1. Moral Discourse - outside of the state there is no regulative authority to ensure that individuals are capable of engaging in the same moral language. For example, parties could have different definitions of what is good. The state clarifies this dispute by declaring what is good and bad. That’s key to debateability because we need to understand ethical conversations to engage in LD. Outweighs because debate-ability pre-reqs any benefit of the activity.**

**2. Infinite Regress - other normative moral theories inevitably fail because individuals can question why they follow them, but state based morality escapes this because individuals follow the state because it’s the only possible conception of ethics.**

**3. Specificity – the resolution is a question of what a “just government” ought to do, not what is generally moral, so frameworks must describe how states should define morality. That means political frameworks are better overall.**

## Contention

#### I negate resolved: A just government ought to recognize workers’ unconditional right to strike.

1. **The state has no absolute moral obligations because it is completely sovereign. Therefore, it has no obligation to affirm and you negate on permissibility.**
2. **The state recognizing a universal right of workers means it gives up its sovereign power to control labor disputes, so they will no longer be solved by the will of the sovereign.**
3. **Strikers frequently contest sovereign power during encounters with the police and military. Recognizing a right to strike gives them more power to undermine the state.**

## Underview

#### 1. Permissibility Negates

#### a. Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation by Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two.

#### b. Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.

#### c. Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about.