# 1AC

## OV

1. **I get 1AR theory. Otherwise, the 1NC can be infinitely abusive which outweighs on magnitude.** 
   1. **It’s drop the debater because the 1AR is already time-crunched so otherwise 1AR theory would be a strategic waste, which lets more abuse happen.**
   2. **No neg RVIs because the 2NR can dump on it for 6 minutes, making the 3 minute 2AR impossible**
   3. **1AR theory comes first because the NC has 7 minutes to be abusive and 6 minutes to leverage the abuse against 1AR theory in the 2NR, making checking abuse lexically impossible**
   4. **I get new 2AR weighing because the 1AR is too short to win a shell, weigh, and beat back the 1NC.**
2. **Interpretation: Debaters must check their drop the debater 1NC theory interpretations in cross-examination before reading them. To clarify, debaters must ask if their opponent wants to engage in a theory debate or strike the violating arguments from the flow.**
   1. **Violation: It’s pre-emptive, but you violate if you read a DTD shell without asking**
   2. **Standard: Substance education – checking in CX means we avoid theory debates that neither debater want, so we can spend more time on substance. Substance education is a voter and comes 1st because it’s the most exportable benefit of debate – we can always apply knowledge of the world around us.**

#### Fairness matters because Debate is a game with a winner and a loser – we all have different motives for debate but its fair. Educations matters because it’s the reason schools fund debate and it’s debate’s only external benefit.

* 1. **It’s drop the argument.**
  2. **No RVIs – i. illogical to win for doing nothing wrong ii. deters legitimate theory -> more abuse, iii. irreciprocal with a drop the argument shell**
  3. **Competing interps – reasonability lets them arbitrarily choose an unfair brightline that excludes some forms of abuse.**

**3. 1NC Theory is reasonability with a brightline of proving irreciprocal strategic skew – prevents them from giving a 6 minute 2NR on frivolous theory that the 2ar can’t recover from and that needlessly collapses the substance debate.**

1. **Interpretation: The negative must concede all affirmative framework arguments**

#### Violation: It’s preemptive, but you violate if you read a standard or role of the ballot other than truth testing in the 1NC

#### Standards:

#### Topic Ed: Every debate would just be a framework debate which crowds out our ability to have core debates about the topic – that outweighs on timeframe because we have 2 months to talk about strikes but our whole lives to discuss ethics

#### Prep skew- We can’t predict every single negative framework before round but they know the resolution coming into round which makes pre-tournament prep impossible. Especially true since there are tons of K’s and NC’s that could negate. Prep skew outweighs because prep determines how well we’re prepared for rounds and therefore controls the internal link to fairness.

* 1. **Same paradigm issues as the other shell**

## Framework

**Volition is defined by oxford dictionary as “the faculty or power of using one's will.”**

**Volition is the starting point of ethics:**

1. **We can only be ethical agents if we’re able to use our will to take actions, which means that under any framework, the ability to will what that theory regards as good has intrinsic value. Therefore, questions of ethical subject formation through volition come before normative ethics.**
2. **The structure of our will determines what we believe and what we desire, so it is the only aspect of the subject that can truly guide action. Having unrestricted volition is key to moral bindingness.**
3. **The ability to use the will is constitutive of humanity, because will creates our identities and actions, which define us.**

#### The moral content of our volition is traditionally determined either by external rules that restrict our volition or by weak forms of subjectivism that lack any ethical content. **This problem is solved with an ethic of genuine volition – desires and actions are ethical if they arise from unalienated or uninhibited volition. Independently of an alienation framework, we should respect people’s ability to determine what is ethical for themselves absent any coercion.**

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Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” 2014. Columbia University Press. <file:///Users/nlevinsky22/Downloads/Jaeggi%20-%20Alienation%20(1).pdf>

Rahel Jaeggi is Professor of Practical Philosophy with an emphasis on Social and Political Philosophy and director of the Center for Humanities and Social Change Berlin at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Her research focuses on social philosophy, political philosophy, ethics, philosophical anthropology, social ontology, and critical theory. // Park City NL

In “The Ethics of Antiquity and Modernity” Tugendhat raises the problem of whether it is possible to reformulate antiquity’s inquiry into the nature of happiness (or the good life) under modern conditions. **A modern inquiry into the good life** must, on the one hand, do justice to the view that its answer **cannot “deny the** autonomy and thus the **interpretive sovereignty of those concerned**,” and its method must be such that it avoids committing itself to a “specific and unjustifiable picture of the human being.”3 On the other hand, if modern ethical theory is to recover the interpretive content of ancient ethics, **it must be able to identify** an objective criterion that allows us to say “**whether it is going well or badly for a person independently of their** actual **perceptions of** their present or future **well-being**.” What is needed, then, is a criterion that, on the one hand, is not identical with the desires or preferences a person actually has and that, on the other hand, does not call into question the interpretive sovereignty of the person and with it the modern ideal of self-determination. Tugendhat’s proposed solution is to develop a formal conception of psychological health. Starting from (what appears to him to be) an unproblematic definition of physical health in terms of “functional capacity,” he develops for psychological health a conception of the “functional capacity of willing” and its possible impairment.4 Tugendhat elaborates his criterion with the example of compulsive behavior: a volition that is compulsive in some sense would count as impaired and hence as being disturbed in its functional capacity. This provides a standpoint that is immanent to the subject’s will and, at the same time, not subjective in the sense in which contingent and unevaluated preferences are: “In this way we would attain precisely what is sought, a point of view that is independent of the respective subjective goals of our willing but that nevertheless derives its authority from the perspective of willing itself. As willing (freely choosing) beings, we always will to be unlimited in our free choosing.”5 With the standard of the “impairment of the functional capacity of willing,” which asks whether we have ourselves at our command in what we will, Tugendhat has achieved a middle ground between subjectivistic and objectivistic positions of the sort he was looking for. One could call such a position a “qualified subjectivism.”6 This provides us with a starting point for overcoming the opposition between modern antipaternalism and the paternalism of a more substantial ethical theory: **whether something is good for me** always **depends** (antipaternalistically) **on my personal view**, on whether I in fact want it. This view, however, **must be qualified in the sense that the volition it expresses must be** a “true volition” and therefore **not subject to internal constraints. I must be free in what I will**; I must have my will at my command if it is to count as my own. **This criterion** is, in the first place, formal: it **concerns the How, not the What, of willing.** That is, I need not will anything in particular; rather, I must be able to will what I will in a free or self-determined manner. It is not necessary, then, to identify a “true object of willing,” but only a certain way of relating, in one’s willing, to oneself and to what one wills. As Tugendhat puts it, “the question of what we truly will concerns not the goals of our willing but the How of willing.” Second, this criterion is immanent: the criterion is the functional capacity of willing itself, a claim posited by the act of willing itself. When I say, “I want to be able to do what I will,” I must also mean, “I want to be able—freely—to will.” My account of the problem of alienation can be linked up with this conception of willing in the following way: **instances of alienation can be understood as obstructions of volition and** thereby—formulated more generally—as **obstructions in the relations individuals have to themselves and the world**. With the help of Tugendhat’s conception of having oneself at one’s command, instances of alienation can be reconstructed in terms of disturbed ways of establishing relations to oneself and to the world. In this way the problem of alienation is tied to that of freedom. FREEDOM AND ALIENATION My thesis is that alienation can be understood as a particular form of the loss of freedom, as an obstruction of what could be called, following Isaiah Berlin, positive freedom. 8 Formulating the notoriously controversial distinction as briefly as possible, freedom in this sense refers not (merely negatively) to the absence of external coercion but (positively) to the capacity to realize valuable ends. In the sense described (and criticized) by Berlin, positive freedom has a variety of implications: The “positive” sense of the word “liberty” derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer—deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them. . . . I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realize that it is not. 9 As unsystematic and indeterminate the various dimensions of positive freedom might be, the important point is that conceptions of positive freedom always depict the free life as not alienated and vice versa.10 As Robert Pippin puts it, only those acts and intentions that I can “link . . . with me such that they count as due to me or count as mine” are “instances of freedom.”11 Being a human being rather than a thing means, according to this view, ascribing to oneself what one wills and does, taking responsibility for it and (therefore) being able to identify with it. Understood in this way, **the concept of alienation concerns itself with** the complex conditions of “**linking” one’s actions and desires** (or, more generally, one’s life) **with oneself**, “counting them as due to” oneself, or making them “one’s own.” It also concerns itself with the various obstructions and disturbances that can affect these relations. One is not always already “with oneself;” one’s actions and desires are not always one’s own from the start, and one’s relation to the surrounding natural and social world is equally constitutive and threatened. Positively formulated, clarifying the various dimensions of alienation enables us to specify the conditions for being able to understand one’s life as one’s own (and therefore to lead one’s life freely). An unalienated life, according to this view, is not one in which specific substantial values are realized but one that is lived in a specific—unalienated—manner. The belief that everyone should be able to live her own life no longer stands in opposition, then, to the project of alienation critique. Rather, the absence of alienating impediments and the possibility of appropriating self and world without such impediments is a condition of freedom and self-determination.

#### Volition is developed by social roles: the authentic subject realizes they’re an active moral agent only when they engage socially with others. In order to express one’s volition, they must first exist in a wide variety of social roles.

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The positions of both authors can be reduced to the following common denominator**: roles are less alienating than constitutive for the development of persons** and personality. They are constitutive in the sense that they are directly bound up with a person’s development and, so, “productive.” At first glance this position might seem to come down on one side of the two alternatives—an unconditional affirmation of roles—but after giving a brief account of the position, I will make use of it to move beyond the two alternatives. Once the “productivity thesis” has been articulated, it will be possible to distinguish between alienating and non-alienating aspects of role behavior. THE HUMAN BEING AS DOPPELGÄNGER Roles are productive. **In and through them we first become ourselves**. This is the essence of Helmuth Plessner’s conception of the positive significance of roles (which he developed as a direct response to critiques of them as alienating). “The human being is always himself only in ‘doubling’ in relation to a role figure he can experience. Also, all that he sees as comprising his authenticity is but the role he plays before himself and others.22 **Roles** on this view **are not only necessary in order to make social interaction possible,** whether this be a “being together” of individuals or a benign “passing each other by;” **interaction mediated by roles is also constitutive of an individual’s relation to herself**. When Plessner speaks of a “doubling in relation to a role figure,” he means that **one depends on roles** not only **to become a “figure**” of experience **for others but also** in order to become such **a figure for oneself**. Plessner’s thesis that the human being is a Doppelgänger is grounded in a comprehensive theory of human nature that, beginning from the fundamental concept of “eccentric positionality,” is critical of every idea of immediacy or spontaneity.23 According to Plessner: The distance that the role creates in family life, as well as in one’s profession, work, or public offices, is the human being’s characteristic detour to his fellow human being; it is the means of his immediacy. Whoever wants to see in this an instance of selfalienation misunderstands the human essence and foists on it a possibility of existence such as animals have on the level of life or angels have on the spiritual level. . . . Only the human being appears as a Doppelgänger, on the outside in the figure of his role and on the inside, privately, as himself. 24 Although at first glance the talk of a Doppelgänger raises the suspicion that Plessner, too, is trapped in a model of doubling that relies on an opposition between authenticity and role behavior—between the inner and the outer—this suspicion turns out to be unwarranted: the Doppelgänger character of human beings is illusory because there are not two real entities there; our character as a “double” is a construct. **There is not an internal division here to be overcome; rather, doubling is constitutive of the human self.** “The human being cannot abolish his status as a Doppelgänger without negating his humanity. He cannot complain of this doubling and play it off against the ideal of an original oneness, for I can be one only with something, with someone, even if it is only myself. The human being gets a hold of himself in others. He encounters these others on a detour via roles, exactly as the others encounter him.”25 If the other “gets a hold of himself” in the other, and if these two can encounter each other only through roles, then a self that is prior to or outside roles is a fiction. When Plessner says that “I can be one only with something, with someone, even if it is only myself,”26 he is referring to a constitutive internal division that precedes all possible unity—it points to the fact that one’s relation to oneself must also be conceived of as a certain kind of relation, namely, one mediated by a relation to the outside or to others. Thus I am not “someone” already at the outset; I can become someone only in relation to others and hence only via the roles in which we reciprocally encounter one another: “The human being gets a hold of himself in others.” Behind all roles, then, there is nothing or, in any case, there is no “authentic being” there. No matter where we look, behind roles we find nothing we can grab hold of except for more roles that one “plays before oneself and others.” We could call this an onion conception of the self: there are various layers but no inner core.

#### This subject formation finally leads to approprtiation – the act of viewing oneself as an active moral agent capable of interacting with the world in a way that affects others and the appropriator. Appropriation is a prerequisite to any concept of ethics because we must be able to act before we can be moral.

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What does it mean to appropriate something?12 If the concept of appropriation refers to a specific relation between self and world, between individuals and objects (whether spiritual or material), what precisely does this relation look like, what are its particular character and its specific structure? Various aspects come together here, and together they account for the concept’s appeal and potential. As opposed to the mere learning of certain contents, talk of appropriation emphasizes that something is not merely passively taken up but actively worked through and independently assimilated. In contrast to merely theoretical insight into some issue, appropriation—comparable to the psychoanalytic process of “working through”—means that one can “deal with” what one knows, that it stands at one’s disposal as knowledge and that one really and practically has command over it. And appropriating a role means more than being able to fill it: one is, we could say, identified with it. Something that we appropriate does not remain external to ourselves. In making something our own, it becomes a part of ourselves in a certain respect. This suggests a kind of introjection and a mixing of oneself with the objects of appropriation. It also evokes the idea of productively and formatively interacting with what one makes one’s own. Appropriation does not leave what is appropriated unchanged. This is why the appropriation of public spaces, for example, means more than that one uses them. We make them our own by making a mark on them through what we do in and with them, by transforming them through appropriative use such that they first acquire a specific form through this use (though not necessarily in a material sense). Although it has one of its roots in an account of property relations, the concept of appropriation, in contrast to mere possession, emphasizes the particular quality of a process that first constitutes a real act of taking possession of something. Accordingly, appropriation is a particular mode of seizing possession.13 **Someone who appropriates something puts her individual mark on it**, inserts her own ends and qualities into it. This means that sometimes we must still make something that we already possess our own. Relations of appropriation, then, are characterized by several features: **appropriation is a** form of praxis, a **way of relating practically to the world**. **It refers to a relation of penetration, assimilation, and internalization in which what is appropriated is at the same time altered, structured, and formed**. The crucial point of this model (also of great importance for Marx) is a consequence of this structure of penetration and assimilation: appropriation always means a transformation of both poles of the relation. **In a process of appropriation both what is appropriated and the appropriator are transformed**. In the process of incorporation (appropriative assimilation) the incorporator does not remain the same. This point can be given a constructivist turn: what is appropriated is itself constituted in the process of appropriation; by the same token, what is appropriated does not exist in the absence of appropriation. (In some cases this is obvious: there is no public space as such without its being publicly appropriated; but even social roles exist only insofar as they are constantly reappropriated.) One now sees the potential and the peculiar character of the concept**: the possibility of appropriating something refers**, on the one hand, **to a subject’s power to act** and form and to impose its own meaningful mark on the world it appropriates. (A successful appropriation of social roles or activities and, by extension, the appropriating relation one can take to one’s life in general constitute something like self-determination and being the author of one’s own life.) On the other hand, a process of appropriation is always bound to a given, previously existing content and thereby also to an independent meaning and dynamic over which one does not have complete command. (Thus a role, for example, in order to be appropriated, must always be “found” as an already existing model and complex of rules; it can be reinterpreted but not invented from scratch. Skills that we appropriate are constrained by success conditions; leading our own life depends on circumstances over which we do not have complete command.) There is, then, an interesting tension in the idea of appropriation between what is previously given and what is formable, between taking over and creating, between the subject’s sovereignty and its dependence. The crucial relation here is that between something’s being alien and its accessibility: objects of appropriation are neither exclusively alien nor exclusively one’s own. As Michael Theunissen puts it, “I do not need to appropriate what is exclusively my own, and what is exclusively alien I am unable to appropriate.”14 In contrast to Marx, then, for whom appropriation is conceived of according to a model of reappropriation, the account of the dynamic of appropriation and alienation that I am proposing reconceives the very concept of appropriation. This involves rehabilitating what is alien in the model of appropriation and radicalizing that model in the direction of a nonessentialist conception of appropriation. Appropriation would then be a permanent process of transformation in which what is appropriated first comes to be through its appropriation, without one needing to fall back into the myth of a creation ex nihilo. Understanding appropriation as a relation in which we are simultaneously bound to something and separated from it, and in which what is appropriated always remains both alien and our own, has important implications for the ideas of emancipation and alienation bound up with the concept of appropriation. The aspiration of a successful appropriation of self and world would be, then, to make the world one’s own without it having been already one’s own and in wanting to give structure to the world and to one’s own life without beginning from a position of already having complete command over them.

#### Alienation is the worst impact under the framework – it inhibits genuine volition which is the only way to act ethically.

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Second, if alienation is a form of powerlessness and impotence, then the theory of alienation concerns itself with both more and something other than straightforward relations of domination. What we are alienated from is always at once alien and our own. In alienated relations we appear to be, in a complicated manner, both victims and perpetrators. Someone who becomes alienated in or through a role at the same time plays this role herself; someone who is led by alien desires at the same time has those desires—and we would fail to recognize the complexity of the situation if we were to speak here simply of internalized compulsion or psychological manipulation. Social institutions that confront us as rigid and alien are at the same time created by us. In such a case we are not—and this is what is specific to the diagnosis of alienation—master over what we (collectively) do. As Erich Fromm vividly puts it: [The bourgeois human being] produces a world of the greatest and most wonderful things; but these, his own creations, confront him as alien and threatening; although they have been created, he no longer feels himself to be their master but their servant. **The** whole material **world becomes** the monstrosity of **a giant machine that prescribes the direction and tempo of** his **life**. **The work of his hands**, intended to serve him and make him happy, **becomes a world he is alienated from, a world he humbly and impotently obeys**.1 In relations of alienation the feeling of impotence does not necessarily imply the existence of an actual power—an agent—that creates a condition of impotence. Typically **the theory of alienation**— whether in the form of Heidegger’s “They” or Marx’s analysis of capitalism—**concerns itself with subtle forms of structural heteronomy** or with the anonymous, dominating character of objectified relationships that appear to take on a life of their own **over and against individual agents**. Formulated differently, the concept of alienation posits a connection between indifference and domination that calls for interpretation. The things, situations, facts, to which we have no relation when alienated do not seem indifferent to us without consequence. They dominate us in and through this relation of indifference.

#### Thus, the standard is preventing alienation

**Impact calc:**

1. **The standard is not a question of preserving peoples’ surface level freedom, but their ability to have un-alienated concepts of themselves as agents .**
2. **The standard isn’t consequentialist because we can’t know the state of agents in the future.**

**Prefer:**

1. **Hijacks all other frameworks because with alienation, our volition is illegitimate, so we can’t freely determine if action is ethical.**
2. **Regress – every other moral theory makes us ask “why do we follow this norm?” but we don’t need to ask that question un-alienated because we follow our own desires.**
3. **Performativity – engaging in a debate in which you advocate for your own moral values proves you’re an un-alienated agent – that’s a prerequisite to debateability.**

#### Action theory – only viewing an agent as an active body capable of generating intentful aspirations, rather than a passive body that can only wish, can motivate action.

Small 12Will Small, *Practical Knowledge and the Structure of Action,* UChicago//Scopa

Aspiring to do something differs from merely wishing for some state of affairs or event to obtain or transpire. As Anscombe notes, “[a] chief mark of an idle wish is that a man does nothing—whether he could or no—towards the fulfilment of the wish” (63, §36). Even though **a** mere or **idle wish represents its object as** in some sense **good, it does not amount to practical thought because it has no inner tendency towards action**, which is what practical thought is ultimately for.³² By contrast, just as an intention has the inner tendency to further articulate and re-articulate itself in action, so an **aspiration has the inner tendency to articulate itself such that it becomes an intention**. This articulation too is the work of practical reasoning: an agent’s aspiration can become an intention, by his coming up with a plan—by reasoning from the end which is at a distance, to an immediate means that he can take. **This inner tendency towards such articulation**—an inner tendency towards perfecting itself in action and practical knowledge—is what **marks practical thought** out **as rationally efficacious**; that is, as practical. It is in the nature of the thought ‘I want (aspire, intend) doing A’ and realizes that articulation in action and practical knowledge: ‘I am doing D by doing C by doing B by doing A’. Such inner efficacy is absent in mere wish”

1. **Epistemology – Abstract concepts discovered a priori or from the empirical world have no practical meaning until we assign them a purpose in our will. That means we can’t know anything if we’re alienated from our volition.**
2. **Consequentialism fails:**
   1. **Culpability: Either 1) we can’t judge the morality of an action until the consequences have occurred, making consequentialism non-action binding, or 2) people can use a subjective prediction that their action would benefit the greater good as an excuse to take an immoral action. Either consequentialism can’t guide moral action or can’t enforce morality – either way it fails.**
   2. **Induction fails: Consequentialism relies on interpreting the past to predict the future. That doesn’t work because the only justification for such logic is that it has worked in the past. The argument is circular.**

## Contention

#### 1. Alienation is common in the workplace in the status quo

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**We can identify two dimensions of the deficit in the relation to self and world that Marx theorizes as alienation: first, the inability** meaningfully **to identify with what one does** and with those with whom one does it; **second, the inabil- ity to exert control over what one does**—that is, the inability to be, individually or collectively, the subject of one’s actions. **Alienation** from the object—**from the product of one’s own activity**—**means** atonce **loss of control** and dispos- session: **the alienated worker** (as the seller of her labor power) **no longer has at her disposal what she herself has produced**; it does not belong to her. **Her product is exchanged on a market she does not control and under conditions she does not control**. Alienation also means that the object must appear to her as fragmented: laboring under conditions of specialization and the division of labor, the worker has no relation to the product of her work as a whole. **As someone who is involved in one of the many specialized acts that make up the production** of Adam Smith’s famous pin, **she has no relation to the pin as a finished product**, as small as the pin might be. Put differently, the prod- uct of her specific labor—**her specific contribution to the production of the pin—does not fit for her into a meaningful whole, a unity with significance**. The same pairing of powerlessness and loss of meaning (or impoverish- ment) marks the worker’s alienation from her own activity. **Alienated labor is**, on the one hand, **unfree activity, labor in which and into which one is forced. In her labor the alienated worker is not the master of what she does.** Standing under foreign command, **her labor is determined by an other**, or heteronomous. “If he relates to his own activity as to an unfree activity, then he relates to it as an activity performed in the service, under the domination, the coercion, and the yoke of another human being.”5 And, being powerless, **the worker can neither comprehend nor control the process as a whole of which she is a part but that remains untransparent to her**. At the same time, **alienated labor is also characterized by**—as a counterpart to the product’s fragmenta- tion—**the fragmentation and impoverishment of laboring activity**. Thus Marx also regards as alienated **the** dullness and **limited character of the labor** itself, “**which make the human being into as abstract a being as possible,** a lathe, etc., and transforms her into a spiritual and physical monstrosity” (as he says in his “Comments on James Mill”). Alienation from others, from the world of social relations of cooperation, also reflects these two dimensions: in alienated labor the worker has no control over what she, together with others, does. And **in alienated labor others are for her, one could say, “structurally indifferent**.”6 It is interesting and of great importance for his theory that **Marx denounces not only the instrumentalization of the worker by the owner of her labor power but also the instrumental relation to herself that the worker acquires through it.** From Marx’s perspective, the instrumental relation that the worker develops (or is forced to develop) to herself and to her labor under condi- tions of alienation also appears problematic—or, more forcefully, “inhuman.” What is alienating about **alienated labor** is that it **has no intrinsic purpose, that it is not (at least also) performed for its own sake.** Activities performed in an alienated way are understood by those who carry them out not as ends but only as means. In the same way, one regards the capacities one acquires from or brings to the activity—and therefore also oneself—as means rather than ends. In other words, one does not identify with what one does. Instrumental- ization, in turn, intensifies into utter meaninglessness: When Marx says that **under conditions of alienation life itself becomes a means** (“life itself appears only as a means to life”)7—**what should be an end takes on the character of a means**—he is describing a completely meaningless event, or, as one could say, the structure of meaninglessness itself. Formulated differently, for Marx the infinite regress of ends is meaninglessness. In this respect Marx is an Aris- totelian: there must be an end that is not itself in turn a means.8 Here we see the concept’s many layers: as alienated one does not possess what one has oneself produced (and is therefore exploited and dispossessed);9 one has no control over, or power to determine, what one does and is therefore powerless and unfree; at the same time, **one is unable to realize oneself in one’s own activities and is therefore exposed to meaningless, impoverished, and instrumental relations with which one cannot identify and in which one experiences oneself as internally divided.** Conversely, the “real appropriation” that Marx contrasts with this type of alienation represents a form of wealth that goes beyond the mere distribution of property.10 **Appropriation in this sense includes taking possession of, gaining power over, and finding meaning in something.** **Thus theb content of what could one could call Marx’s conception of the good life is an idea of self-realization understood as an identificatory, appropriative relation to oneself and to the world.**11

#### And, strikes are necessary: employers treat people as property when employers aren’t given a say, thus alienating them

**Industrial global union**:

16 February, 2015**The fundamental right to strike is under attack from employers and governments at the International Labour Organization** (ILO), which sets global standards on labour rights. **Eliminating this human right would have serious repercussions** on us all. Here are five key reasons why we need the right to strike: **Striking is a** last resort but sometimes the only **tool for workers to protect themselves. To avoid being at the complete mercy of employers. To give more of a balance** between worker and employer power. **Without it, more and more governments will ban industrial action and punish people who dare to strike**. **Most strikes are over pay and better working conditions**. **Without the threat of strike** action, corporations will be able to make bigger profits, while **working conditions will get worse**. Making a stand On 18 February, ahead of a key ILO meeting on the right to strike from 23-25 February, unions and workers around the world will be protesting to safeguard this fundamental right. Employers’ groups and certain governments are challenging the long-accepted belief that ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association, which is ratified by 153 countries, up-holds the right to strike. The workers’ group and unions worldwide want the matter referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) but there are several government members that oppose it. They are: Algeria Iran Angola Kenya Cambodia Russia China Sudan Korea UAE Ghana USA India Zimbabwe There are also deputy government members that oppose referring the issue to the ICJ. They don’t have a vote but do exercise influence: Bahrain Lesotho Bangladesh Mali Botswana Mauritania Brunei Pakistan Ethiopia Tanzania Indonesia Chad Jordan Thailand

“[5 reasons why we need the right to strike | IndustriALL (industriall-union.org)](http://www.industriall-union.org/5-reasons-why-we-need-the-right-to-strike)” Industrial, global union, 2015

**2. Strike restrictions deny workers the possibility of striking, even though they may choose to out of their own volition. This is a form of alienation.**

**3. Strikes enable workers to create real change in workplace conditions, which is a form of appropriation.**

**4. Strikes enable workers to fulfill social roles on the picket line, which develops a strong sense of volition.**