### 1AR– T-Appropriation

#### Counterinterp: “Appropriation” means to take as property which includes mining

Leon 18 (Amanda M., Associate, Caplin & Drysdale, JD UVA Law) "Mining for Meaning: An Examination of the Legality of Property Rights in Space Resources." Virginia Law Review, vol. 104, no. 3, May 2018, p. 497-547. HeinOnline.

Appropriation. The term "appropriation" also remains ambiguous. Webster's defines the verb "appropriate" as "to take to oneself in exclusion of others; to claim or use as by an exclusive or pre-eminent right; as, let no man appropriate a common benefit."16 5 Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary describes "appropriate" as an act "[t]o make a thing one's own; to make a thing the subject of property; to exercise dominion over an object to the extent, and for the purpose, of making it subserve one's own proper use or pleasure."166 Oftentimes, appropriation refers to the setting aside of government funds, the taking of land for public purposes, or a tort of wrongfully taking another's property as one's own. The term appropriation is often used not only with respect to real property but also with water. According to U.S. case law, a person completes an appropriation of water by diversion of the water and an application of the water to beneficial use.167 This common use of the term "appropriation" with respect to water illustrates two key points: (1) the term applies to natural resources-e.g., water or minerals-not just real property, and (2) mining space resources and putting them to beneficial use-e.g., selling or manufacturing the mined resources could reasonably be interpreted as an "appropriation" of outer space. While the ordinary meaning of "appropriation" reasonably includes the taking of natural resources as well as land, whether the drafters and parties to the OST envisioned such a broad meaning of the term remains difficult to determine with any certainty. The prohibition against appropriation "by any other means" supports such a reading, though, by expanding the prohibition to other types not explicitly described.168

As illustrated by this analysis, considerable ambiguity remains after this ordinary-meaning analysis and thus, the question of Treaty obligations and property rights remains unresolved. In order to resolve these ambiguities, an analysis of preparatory materials, historical context, and state practice follows.

2. Preparatory Materials

A review of meeting reports of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its Legal Sub-Committee regarding the Treaty reveals little to clear up the ambiguities of Articles I and II of the OST. In fact, the reports indicate that, despite several negotiating states expressing concern about the lack of clarity with respect to the meaning of "use" and the scope of the non-appropriation principle, no meaningful discussion occurred and no consensus was reached.16 9 Some commentators still conclude that the preparatory work does in fact confirm the drafters' intent for "use" to include exploitation. 170 These commentators do admit, however, that discussions of the term "exploitation" supporting their conclusion focused on remote sensing and communications satellites rather than on resource extraction.17 1 Further skepticism about such an intent for "use" to include "exploitation" also arises given the uncertainty amongst negotiating states about the meaning of these terms. A mere few months before the Treaty opened for signature in January 1967, negotiators were still asking questions about the meaning of "use" during the last few Legal Sub-Committee meetings. For example, in July 1966, the representative of France inquired: "Did the latter term ["use"] imply use for exploration purposes, such as the launching of satellites, or did it mean use in the sense of exploitation, which would involve far more complex issues?" 172 The representative noted that while some activities such as extraction of minerals were difficult to imagine presently, "[i]t was important for all States, and not only those engaged in space exploration, to know exactly what was meant by the term 'use.'173 In the same meeting, the representative from the USSR offered an interesting response to the question posed by the representative of France:

[A]dequate clarification was to be found in article II of the USSR draft, which specified that outer space and celestial bodies should not be subject to national appropriation by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. In other words no human activity on the moon or any other celestial body could be taken as justification for national appropriation. 174

This response implies that Article II acts as a qualification on Article I's broad provision for free exploration and use of outer space by all. Activity such as resource extraction would be viewed as national appropriation and such activity cannot be justified given Article II's prohibition, not even by falling within the ordinary meaning of "use." Despite this clarification, uncertainty appears to have remained, as lingering concerns were communicated in subsequent meetings by several other states, including Australia, Austria, and France."' Nevertheless, the committee put the Treaty in front of the General Assembly two months later without final resolution of the ambiguities regarding property rights arising from Articles I and II176 The preparatory materials ultimately fail to fully clarify the ambiguities of the meanings of "use" and "appropriation." The statement of the representative of the Soviet Union, one of the two main drafting parties, does, however, help push back on the interpretation of some academics that the nonappropriation principle fails to overcome the presumption of freedom of use.7

3. Historical Context

Two interrelated, major historical events cannot be ignored when considering the meaning of the OST: (1) the Cold War and (2) the Space Race. The success of Sputnik I in 1957 showed space travel and exploration no longer to be a dream, but a reality.7 While exciting, this news also brought fear in light of the world's fragile balance of power and tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. 17 9 What if the Soviet Union managed to launch a nuclear weapon into space? What if the United States greedily claimed the Moon as the fifty-first state? To many, the combination of the Cold War and Space Race made the late 1950s and the 1960s a perilous time.so When viewed as a response to this perilous era, the OST begins to look much more like a nuclear arms treaty and an attempt to ease Cold War tensions than a treaty concerned with the issue of property rights in space."' The Treaty's emphasis on "peaceful purposes" supports this contextual interpretation. 1 82

On the one hand, as many suggest, this context leads to the conclusion that the vague nonappropriation principle of Article II does not prevent private property rights in space resources and the presumption of broad "use" prevails.1 83 Private property rights were simply not a concern of the Treaty drafters and therefore, the Treaty does not address-nor prohibit-such claims. On the other hand, the context surrounding the treaty's drafting does not necessarily lead to this conclusion. In fact, the emphasis on "peaceful purposes" and reducing international tension might instead suggest a stricter reading of Articles I and II. If things were so unstable and tense on Earth, the drafters may have instead intended Article II as a qualification on the general right to explore and use outer space in Article I, recognizing the simple fact that disputes over property, both land and minerals, have sparked some of history's bloodiest conflicts.

The Antarctic treaty experience evidences Cold War concern over potential resource rights disputes. Leading up to the finalization of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959,184 seven nations had already made official territorial claims over varying portions of the frozen landscape in hopes of laying claim to the plethora of resources thought to be located within the subsurface."' Although the Treaty itself did not directly address rights to mineral resources in the Antarctic,186 the treaty is interpreted to have frozen these claims in the interest of "[f]reedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end.""' In a manner notably similar to the terms of Articles XI and XII of the OST, the Treaty promotes scientific exploration by encouraging information sharing of scientific program plans, personnel, and observations' and inspection of stations on a reciprocal basis.189 This Treaty along with several later treaties and protocols constitute the "Antarctic Treaty System," which as a whole manages the governance of Antarctica.1 9 0 In 1991, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 91 ("Madrid Protocol") settled the question of property rights for the fifty years following the Protocol's entry into force. 192 The Madrid Protocol provides for "the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment ... [and] designate[s] Antarctica as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science."193 Article 7 explicitly-and simplystates "[a]ny activity relating to mineral resources, other than scientific research, shall be prohibited."1 94 Though Article 25 allows for the creation of a binding legal regime to determine whether and under what conditions mineral resource activity be allowed, no such international legal regime has been created to date. 195 The ban on mineral resource exploitation may only be amended by unanimous consent of the parties. 19 6 The United States signed and ratified both the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the Madrid Protocol. 197

The freezing of territorial claims in the Antarctic 98 by the Antarctica Treaty of 1959199 illustrates the existence of true concern over potential resource dispute and conflict during the Cold War, in addition to the major concerns posed by nuclear weapons.2 00 The drafting states also recognized the potential for conflict over property in outer space and drew on the language of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 to draft the OST.2 01 Given these driving concerns, Article II could be reasonably read as qualifying Article I's general rule. Under this reading, Article II serves the same qualifying purpose as Article IV regarding military and nuclear weapon use in space. Some might push back on this interpretation by claiming that the drafters could have used language such as that in the Madrid Protocol to explicitly prohibit mining in space. However, this argument is flawed. The Madrid Protocol was not written until well after both the original Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the OST. Furthermore, the timing of the Madrid Protocol perhaps provides further evidence that resources in space are not to be harvested until a subsequent agreement regarding rights over them can be agreed upon internationally. While the historical context does leave some ambiguity as to whether the OST permits property rights over space resources, the Antarctic experience provides a compelling analogy and suggests that the OST does not allow for property rights in space resources.

4. State Practice

In its Frequently Asked Questions released about the SREU Act, the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology forcefully asserted that the Act does not violate international law.20 2 in fact, according to the committee, the Act's provision of property rights "is affirmed by State practice and by the U.S. State Department in [c]ongressional testimony and written correspondence."2 03 Proponents of this view base their beliefs on several examples. One, "no serious objection" arose to the United States and the Soviet Union bringing samples of rocks and other materials from the Moon back by manned and robotic missions in the late 1960s, nor to Japan successfully collecting a small asteroid sample in 2010.204 Two, a practice of respecting ownership over such retrieved samples and a terrestrial market for such items exists, as illustrated by the fact that no one doubts that the American Museum of Natural History "owns" three asteroids found in Greenland by arctic explorer Robert E. Peary that are now part of the museum's Arthur Ross Hall of Meteorites. 205 Three, Congressmen also cite to a federal district court case, United States v. One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar Material,2 06 to illustrate state practice in favor of ownership over spaces resources. The case involved an Apollo lunar sample gifted to Honduras by the United States. The sample was stolen and sold to an individual in the United States.2 07 When caught during a sting operation intended to uncover illegal sales of imposter samples, the buyer was forced to forfeit the lunar sample after the court concluded the moon rocks had in fact been stolen, basing its decision in part on its recognition of Honduras having national property ownership over the sample. 208

These examples appear overwhelming, but they are not actually examples of activities of the same "form and content" that the SREU Act approves. 2 09 These examples all involve collection of samples in limited amounts and for scientific purposes, while the SREU Act approves large-scale collection and for commercial exploitation. The OST explicitly emphasizes a "freedom of scientific investigation in outer space," and the collection of scientific samples reasonably fall under this enumerated right. 2 10 Alternatively, the OST says nothing with respect to commercial exploitation, only discussing "benefits" of space in terms of sharing those benefits with all mankind.211 Furthermore, the American Museum of Natural History and Lucite Ball examples relied upon are misleading because they suggest that types of celestial artifacts found or gifted on Earth are subject to the same legal regime as resources mined or collected in space, which may not necessarily be true. The analogy of ownership over fish extracted from the high seas is also often cited in response to this pushback. Much like outer space, the high seas are open to all participants, yet the law of the seas still recognizes the right to title over fish extracted on the high seas by fishermen, who can then sell the fish.212 But again, this analogy has limited import because both the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS") explicitly recognize the right to fish, while the OST grants no such right to exploit space resources. 2 1 3

Furthermore, state practice relevant to the question of property rights under the OST goes beyond these examples and analogies of ownership of resources taken from commons. State practice regarding property rights in general must be considered. For example, Professor Fabio Tronchetti disagrees with the oft-cited notion that state practice affirms the SREU Act.2 14 According to the professor, "under international law, property rights require a superior authority, a State, entitled to attribute and enforce them." 2 15 By granting property rights in the SREU Act, the United States impliedly claims that it has the authority to confer property rights over space resources-an authority traditionally reserved for the owner of a resource. This notion clashes with the nonappropriation principles of the OST. Though there is no consensus regarding whether the nonappropriation principle prohibits claims of sovereignty over resources, a strong consensus at least exists that the principle prohibits states from claiming sovereignty over real property in space.216 In some traditional systems of mineral ownership, however, ownership over resources ran with ownership over land.217 For example, under Roman law, property rights over subsurface minerals belonged to the landowner. 2 18 Thus, if the United States cannot have title in space lands under the nonappropriation principle, it cannot have title to the space resources in those lands either. Without title to the resources, the United States cannot bestow such title to its citizens under traditional international property law; by claiming that it can bestow such title, the United States is abrogating Article II of the OST. One could also argue that the in situ resources the Act grants rights in are actually still part of the celestial bodies; thus, the resources are real property prior to their removal, and are off limits under the Treaty.2 19 Given the limited import of the cited examples of state practice (limited quantity and scientific versus large-scale and commercial), the traditional practice of property rights being conferred from a sovereign to a citizen become incredibly compelling and suggest the SREU Act may abrogate the United States' treaty obligations.

A final piece of evidence, however, again inserts ambiguity into the interpretation: the sweeping rejection of the Moon Agreement and its limitations on property rights by the international community discussed supra Part JJJ.A.2. On the one hand, the rejection may imply that the international community approved of property rights. On the other hand, however, there were other reasons for the sweeping rejection. For example, Professors Francis Lyall and Paul B. Larsen claim the "main area of controversy"2 2 0 actually surrounded the Agreement's proclamation of the Moon and celestial bodies and their natural resources as the "common heritage of mankind" in Article 11.1,221 rather than the Agreement's general property-right provisions. Many believed the invocation of the "common heritage of mankind" language would impart actual obligations upon parties to share extracted resources, whereas the "province of all mankind" and "for the benefit and interest of all" language of the OST did not.222 As with ordinary meaning, preparatory materials, and historical context, state practice leaves some ambiguities and state interpretations should also be considered.

5. State Interpretations

Much like the preparatory materials discussed supra Part IV.A.1, subsequent state interpretation of the OST fails to fully address the question of the legality of property rights in space resources. On the one hand, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations found that the drafters intended Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty to be general in nature when reviewing the Treaty,223 which perhaps suggests Article II's nonappropriation principle does not qualify Article I's general right to use or act as an exception. Yet, the committee also found the Treaty to be in response to the "potential for international competition and conflict in outer space." 2 24 To the committee, Articles I, II, and III stressed the importance of free scientific investigation, guaranteed free access to all areas of celestial bodies, and prohibited claims of sovereignty.225 Not only would property rights in natural resources potentially ignite and exacerbate conflict in space, but they also seemed somewhat incompatible with scientific investigation, free access, and the prohibition on sovereignty. During its hearing on the Treaty, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations focused a majority of its discussion of Article I on whether or not the language "province of all mankind" imparted strict obligations, while devoting little to no time to the issue of the meaning of "use." 22 6 Former Justice Arthur Goldberg, then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, did note the goal of the article was to "cnot subject space to exclusive appropriation by any particular power." 227 Nevertheless, this statement fails to resolve whether natural resources may be exploited, as such exploitation could be carried out in an inclusive manner.

The committee's review of Article II consumes only eight lines of the hearing transcript, merely adding that the Article is complementary to Article I and that space cannot be claimed for the country (likely referring to land rather than resources).2 28 A different exchange between Ambassador Goldberg, Senator Lausche, and the Chairman leaves further ambiguity regarding the use of natural resources in space: Mr. Goldberg: We wanted to establish our right to explore and use outer space. Senator Lausche: Yes. That is, any one of the signatory nations shall have the right to the use of whatever might be found in one of the space bodies. Mr. Goldberg: No, no. It doesn't mean that. It means that they shall be free on their own to explore outer space. The Chairman: Or to use it. Mr. Goldberg: To use it. The Chairman: But not on an exclusive basis. Mr. Goldberg: Everyone is free.229

At first, Ambassador Goldberg appears to have refuted the notion that a signatory could simply "use" anything found in one of the space bodies, such as a mineral, implying Senator Lausche's example exceeded the scope of Article I. He then went on to emphasize exploratory activities. But then, Ambassador Goldberg backtracked and reasserted the right to use without clarifying his initial qualification.

This sense of ambiguity remains today despite Congress signing off on the SREU Act. While sponsors of the bill and statements from resource extraction companies emphasized the broad scope of the right to "use" outer space and state practice in support of the legality of 230 property rights, several expert witnesses expressed genuine concern that obligations under the Treaty remain unclear and require additional analysis.231

B. Compatibility

Employing the treaty interpretation tools of ordinary meaning, preparatory materials, historical context, state practice, and state interpretation offers many possible understandings of the obligations imparted by Articles I and II of the OST. For example, while the ordinary meaning of "use" could reasonably include the exploitation of materials, the meeting summaries of the Fifth Session of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Legal Sub-Committee make clear that no consensus was ever reached regarding whether "use" includes large-scale exploitation of space resources, let alone fee-simple ownership and the ability to sell commercially. State practice dealing with extraterrestrial samples also sheds little light on the confusion, as the examples cited all deal instead with scientific samples of limited quantity. The international community's rejection of the Moon Agreement also fails to bring clarity. While on the one hand the rejection could be read as a rejection of the idea that the OST prohibits private property rights, it could also be read as a rejection of the common heritage of mankind doctrine. Finally, the prospect of privateventure space mining and extraterrestrial resource extraction remained far off and futuristic at the time of the Treaty's negotiation, making drawing legal conclusions about the legality of these revolutionary activities extremely difficult.

Overall, however, the Treaty's structure and its purposes (preserving peace and avoiding international conflict in outer space) ultimately indicate that private property rights in space resources are prohibited by Article II's non-appropriation principle, at least until future international delegation determines otherwise (like in the Antarctic). The Treaty's structure confirms this interpretation. Article I lays down a general rule for activity in space. Subsequent articles of the Treaty then lay out more specific requirements of and qualifications to this general rule. Much like Article IV restricts the use of nuclear weapons in space, Article II restricts the use of space in ways that might result in potentially controversial property claims. Historically, claims to mineral rights have resulted in just as contentious conflict as those over sovereign lands. Treaty efforts to avoid conflicts in Antarctica and the high seas reflect similar sentiments. The Soviet Union's representative even hinted at this structural relationship between Articles I and II during Treaty S1 232 negotiations.22 In light of the imminent need to ease Cold War tensions, the potential for conflict over property, and the final structure of the Treaty, this Note concludes that the large-scale extraction of space resources is incompatible with the non-appropriation principle of Article II of the OST.23 3 As a result, the United States' provision of property rights to its citizens to possess, own, transport, use, and sell space and asteroid resources extracted through the SREU Act contravenes its international obligations established by the OST.

\*\*READ NEBEL CI/STANDARDS IF THEIR INTERP SAYS SPEC BAD\*\*

#### This definition is 100x better than any neg evidence – it’s contextual to space mining and the OST. It also conducts a common-use analysis of the word and a historical analysis of the OST’s writing and concludes that both support that appropriation includes mining

#### Standards:

#### 1 -- Clash —allows us to go in-depth on the topic which is largely about mining – the only other aff is space col which INVOLVES mining – literature and controversy should come first—in the context of literature right now, this topic would be useless if mining weren’t T since that’s what private entities are interested in.

#### Their interp:

1. **No limits explosion—including space mining doesn’t substantially increase the research burden since it’s a core part of private entities**
2. **Functional limits—advantage areas check cuz small affs lose to risk of a DA or Ks**

#### Reasonability—good is good enough and key to avoid substance crowdout—err towards overinclusion since this is the TOC topic

### 1AR – Case

### The aff bans private entities from asteroid mining – that prevents political disputes on space access and escalating tensions such as perception gaps which cause space war that goes nuclear and leads to extinction

Impact turns o/w on timeframe – percpetions rising

### 1AR – Reid-Brinkley

Spec is infinitely regressive – there’s no brightline for when we stop spec-ing things which causes substance crowdout, prevents decisionmaking, and means you should reject the interp

### 1AR – General Principle

### 1AR – Baudrillard K

#### 1. Plan-focus is good – a] clash - anything else is arbitrary, self serving, and moots 6 minutes of 1AC offense which outweighs on fairness. b] movement-building – all movements must compare strategies and evaluate tradeoffs. Our interp provides the best model of debate to compare and refine tactics for resistance

#### 2. Case outweighs—extinction forecloses possibility of future improvement and causes mass suffering and death to every person on the planet—even if they think life isn’t valuable, they shouldn’t get to make that choice for billions who find value in the world.

#### 3. Perm do both

#### 4. Their obsession with constantly putting truth on trial leads to nihilist violence

Sanbonmatsu, Associate Professor, Humanities & Arts, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, ‘15

(John, “Postmodernism and the Corruption of the Critical Intelligentsia,” in *Radical Intellectuals and the Subversion of Progressive Politics*, ed. Gregory Smulewicz-Zucker and Michael J. Thompson, Chapter 3)

The destruction of truth is now so advanced in capitalist culture that it perhaps comes as no surprise that even in the halls of Critical Theory, imagined sanctum sanctorum of independent consciousness and conscience, **truth is now openly profaned and condescended** to by those once charged with sheltering its sacred flame—the intellectuals.1 If, as the Yiddish proverb goes, “the truth never dies, but is made to live as a beggar,” let us note that no intellectual movement of recent memory has so beggared the truth as thoroughly as post-structuralism has.2 With the postmodernist turn, truth became a dirty word, and affirmation of truth came to be seen as a sign not of resistance to power, but of one’s pitiable naivete.

The theoretical tide began to turn against truth in the 1970s, when French historian and philosopher Michel Fou**cault boldly put truth in scare quotes.** “‘Truth,’” he declared, “is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements . . . ‘Truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it.”3 No longer would “the true” be colloquially understood, as it had for millennia, as that which accords with fact or reality. For an increasingly influential sector of the intelligentsia, truth would now be construed as a problem to be solved. What discourses give rise to the appearance of “truth”? How does “truth,” as a form of power, a system of “constraints,” function and manifest itself? How does knowledge, as power, disguise itself as “truth,” in order to achieve its effects?

Such questions are not uninteresting. The trouble is that poststructuralists have told us that we are entitled to ask only such questions, having conflated the idea of truth with “truth,” (i.e., “truth” **as a discourse**). The origins of this fateful move can be traced to Friedrich Nietzsche, the intellectual forefather of post-structuralism. “There is no pre-established harmony between the furtherance of truth and the well-being of mankind,” Nietzsche wrote.4 Nietzsche identified the preoccupation with truth in Western philosophy with nihilism and the “slave morality” of JudeoChristianity: “Truth” was merely a psychological projection of the thwarted ambitions of the powerless, who had mistaken their own failed “will to power” for universal moral principles or ideals.5 Foucault, who shared Nietzsche’s skepticism toward the possibility or even desirability of universal norms or principles, applied the German philosopher’s genealogical method to his studies of history and humanist thought, radically reshaping the terrain of post-existentialist critical thought in the process. After Foucault’s death in 1984, truth was to be continuously put on trial, interrogated, and found guilty by countless postmodernist academics of being “truth”—i.e., a mere epiphenomenon of power, an artifact of discourse. The effect of this curious repetition compulsion **by a leading segment of the critical intelligentsia** was to gravely damage the critical instruments of not one but several classes of intellectuals, **blunting the critical imagination and eroding the Left’s capacity for truth-telling** **at humanity’s hour of greatest need.** Ironically, **Nietzsche’s thought succumbed at the end of the twentieth century** to the very nihilism he despised, **becoming** institutionalized **by the very bureaucratic, pedantic types he abhorred**.

#### 5. Simulation isn’t absolute and people’s opinions can be changed in spite of media influence

Robinson, political theorist and activist, ‘04

(Andrew, “Baudrillard, Zizek and Laclau on "common sense" - a critique,” http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/baudrillard-zizek-and-laclau-on-common.html)

Baudrillard tends to conflate existing dominant beliefs with thought and meaning per se. As a result, he leaves it impossible to critique dominant ideas in a meaningful way. For instance, he poses political problems in terms of "resistance to the social", **with the social in general being conflated with the EXISTING social system** (SSM 41); **ditto on the existing sign system**, which Baudrillard identifies with meaning per se. In such cases, Baudrillard misses the whole question of countercultural practices and the creation of alternative hegemonies.

Baudrillard's conflation of meaning per se with dominant beliefs leads to a refusal to countenance the possibility of transforming mass beliefs. Raising the cultural level of the masses, Baudrillard claims, is "Nonsense" because the masses, who want spectacle rather than meaning, are resistant to "rational communication" (SSM 10). An "autonomous change in consciousness" by the masses, Baudrillard tells us, is a "glaring impossibility" (SSM 30) - **though he never tells us how he deduces this.** Furthermore, he also claims that people who try to raise consciousness, liberate the unconscious or promote subjectivity "are acting in accordance with the system" (SSM 109). **This anathematisation is a result of Baudrillard's strange claim that the system's logic is based on total inclusion and speech!** It is on this basis that Baudrillard rejects argument based on empirical claims and locates truth outside such claims (SSM 121-2).

From the second pole of his contradictory argument about the masses, which portrays them as de facto agents engaging in resistance, defiance and so on, Baudrillard wants to draw a politics starting from the refusal of meaning (SSM 15), and from the contradictory combination of the two he draws his model of hyperconformity as annulling control (SSM 30-3). **He can't deal with the contradiction, especially since he uses terms which imply consciousness** - such as ruse and offensive practice - **when he admits the object of such terms is acting unknowingly** (SSM 43). Indeed, **he actually writes as if one can UNKNOWINGLY carry out a CONSCIOUS act** (SSM 42). This is sinister, reproducing the Stalinist idea of objective alignment - especially when used against Baudrillard's theoretical rivals (SSM 123).

Further, it is not clear from where he is deducing his idea **that one can destroy a system by pushing its logic to the extreme** (SSM 46), which he sees as a resistance to demands to participate (SSM 106-8). There are a few cases of the letter of the law being used to subvert its implementation, such as go-slows at work; these, however, are rooted in concrete practices elsewhere. There are also a few cases of hyperconformity disrupting official projects - for instance, the disastrous effects of Chinese peasants' literal reading of Maoist imperatives to (eg.) kill all birds. **These, however,** did not actually LIBERATE anyone or DESTROY the system; and most hyperconformity **simply produces a** more oppressive variant **on the system** - for instance, hyperconformist racism produces genocide. He also never sets out the stakes of the conflict between the masses and society or the effects of the masses' victories, though he vaguely links these to the (unspecified) goals of radical critics (SSM 49). Indeed, he uses the opt-out that our present epistemology prevents us knowing what possibilities would be offered by the system's destruction (SSM 52). Furthermore, **to be a resistance, there would have to be an** AGENT CHOOSING to be an object.

Baudrillard's sectarianism is clearly shown by his belief that popular rethinking of ideas is always a "misappropriation" or "radical distortion" rather than an improvement (SSM 8). He also engages in a highly essentialist attack on popular ethics, representing the stress on real practices and small images in popular religion as "degraded", banal and profane, a way of "refusing the categorical imperative of morality and faith", as well as of meaning, because it stresses immediacy in the world (SSM 7-8). Popular ethics, as Hoggart, Scott and others show, is far more than a mere refusal, and its rejection of the transcendentalism of the intellectual allies of dominant strata is hardly evidence that they are degraded, banal or anti-ethical. Furthermore, on an empirical level, fatalism DOES occur in popular ethics, contrary to Baudrillard's claims.

The problem is further complicated by Baudrillard's vague claim that something passes between the masses and terrorism (SSM 52-3), which seems to imply that isolated terrorist acts can somehow transform overnight the entire structure of meaning by rendering representation impossible and meanings reversible (SSM 54, 116), and which is also based on a definition of terrorism which is so restricted that it rules out virtually all actual "terrorists" and which Baudrillard admits (116) does not fit the identities of the Baader-Meinhof group, the one example he gives. His politics results directly from the artificial grimness of his analysis of popular beliefs, since it involves a radical subjectlessness and a random blow against victims who are punished for being nothing (SSM 56-7). Like Zizek, **he calls for the suicidal destruction of one's own perspective** (SSM 69-70), and denounces everything short of this as strengthening the system (SSM 72). Furthermore, his model of social change, which rests on the inevitability of implosive catastrophe (SSM 61), **has no room for any human intervention.** It simply assumes that another reality lies beyond our own perspective which can be reached in this way, but which is presently blocked by our way of thinking (SSM 104). Baudrillard substitutes "logical exacerbation" and "catastrophic revolution" for alternatives (SSM 106), and locates the frontier of struggle at the level of "production of truth" (SSM 123). The progressive side of this struggle seems to involve unknowability and fascination.

**The lack of alternatives seriously blunts Baudrillard's critical force, and can even lead to conservative positions, such as** portraying manipulation **of the media** as better than pursuing truth (GW 46).

#### 6. No one cares about their alt, but their focus on esoteric language theory makes us worse subjects unable to understand why violence happens or how to respond

Norris, PhD, Distinguished Research Professor in the Cardiff School of English, Communication & Philosophy, fellowships and visiting appointments at a number of institutions, including the University of California, Berkeley, the City University of New York, Aarhus University, and Dartmouth College, ‘92

(Christopher, *Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals and the Gulf War*, pg. 27-31)

On Baudrillard's reckoning **it is the** merest of illusions - just a washed-up relic of the old 'Enlightenment' myth - **to suppose that such arguments could possibly** make any difference, or that public opinion might have been turned around if a sufficient number of people could be brought to perceive the extent of mass-media disinformation, the propaganda lies, statistical enormities, grossly under-estimated casualty figures and so forth. Perhaps there was a time (say two centuries back, or during subsequent periods of pre-revolutionary ferment) when oppositional discourses possessed **at least a measure of rhetorical or 'performative' force**, and when it still made sense for progressive intellectuals to adopt a standard-bearing role, as critics of consensus belief or purveyors of a truth hitherto concealed through the workings of ideological illusion. But that time has now passed, Baudrillard argues, since we are living in an epoch of dcpthless 'simulacra' or signs without referential content, a realm of performative reality-effects where such truth-claims lack any semblance of critical force. In which case the Gulf War would surely figure as the ultimate postmodern or hyperreal event.

The apparent inability of much of what currently passes for critical theory **to take any principled oppositional stand** on issues of local or world politics **must surely be cause for concern**. It therefore seems to me that it is time for a thorough-going critique of the whole line of thought which discovers its inaugural moment in Saussure and then runs down to the various schools of present-day post-structuralist, neo-pragmatist or textualist fashion. The main problem with all these movements is their uncritical acceptance of Saussure's basic precepts -**in particular the bracketting of referential functions and the treatment of language** as a network of differential elements 'without positive terms' - as if such doctrines could be simply transferred from the specialized field of structural-synchronic linguistics to other disciplines like literary theory, cultural criticism, historiography or the analysis of media representation.21 And along with this levelling pan-textualist view of the relation between different 'discourses' **goes a** widespread ignorance **of other developments in the realm of modern analytical and linguistic philosophy**, **an ignorance sustained** - one is tempted to conclude - by the entrenched dogmatism of current post-structuralist theory and its sheer unwillingness to entertain arguments that would constitute a challenge to its own grounding suppositions.

There is room here only for the briefest indication of the **paths not taken** by the arbiters of recent (post-1960) Francophile theoretical debate. They would include - for instance - Frege's account of the sense/reference distinction, an account altogether more cogent and precise than the standard post-structuralist wisdom;'\* the work of philosophers like Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam and Ian Hacking, adopting a variety of positions on the issue of language, meaning and representation, but doing so at a level of informed and rigorous argument far removed from the modish idées recues of recent textualist theory;\*-' the debate around issues of historical knowledge in relation to the structures of narrative understanding carried on by thinkers in the broadly 'analytical' camp, but with relevant lessons for literary theorists over-impressed by the sceptical conclusions of Foucault, Hayden White or the New Historicists;14 the sophisticated defence of a realist outlook in the philosophy and history of science advanced by Roy Bhaskar;" the tradition of German (mainly Frankfurt) Critical Theory, drawing upon the work of thinkers like Adorno and Habermas, and confronting post-structuralism not only with a full-scale genealogy of its own formative - though unacknowledged -prehistory, but also with a full-scale argued critique of its various demonstrable errors and confusions;26 and even from within the post-structuralist camp, according to current perceptions, those numerous cautionary passages in Derrida's work where he comes out explicitly against any form of the wholesale 'textualist' persuasion, or any such pseudo-deconstructive approach that would treat, for example, poetry, philosophy and history as so many optional "discourses' or 'kinds of writing', indistinguishable in point of truth, method, or protocols of valid reasoning.-'7 That it has displayed such a steadfast indifference to these and other such (by its own lights) irrelevant or obsolete modes of thought may help to explain why post-structuralism has drifted into a largely uncontested entente cordiale with Baudrillard's stance of last-ditch cognitive scepticism.

**One could start to clear away some of the sources of confusion by pointing out that post-structuralism rests on highly questionable premises**; **that there exist alternative,** more cogent **ways of treating the same basic issues**;18 **and that Baudrillard's theses** cannot hold up **when subjected to any kind of reasoned critical scrutiny.** Of course I am not suggesting that the best thing to do in these present bad times **is to sit around endlessly debating such specialized matters of truth**, language and representation. Much better leave off these discussions for now **and devote all one's time and energy to protesting the massive injustice of a war** whose causes were inextricably tied up with the history of US and British regional policy; whose high-sounding justificatory rhetoric was a cover for crude economic self-interest; whose conduct involved unprecedented levels of coercive propaganda and mass-media distortion; and whose cost in terms of civilian casualties and environmental impact will most likely never be known, since any details coming back are subject to the tightest 'security' restrictions.

In such circumstances it might seem frivolous or worse to make the Gulf War into a pretext for yet further arcane disputes about the 'politics of theory' or the wider implications of current post-structuralist thought. But the connection will perhaps not seem so remote to anyone who has carried on teaching over these past few months and attempted to convince students of the 'relevance' of theory in matters of real-world moral and political conscience, or the idea that such theories should provide at least a starting-point for argued and principled anti-war protest. After all, these latest notions fall in very readily with a 'postmodern' mood of widespread cynical acquiescence, a feeling that the war was indeed so utterly unreal - so completely removed from our competence to judge as informed readers, viewers or members of a specialized 'interpretive community' - that nothing we could possibly think or do would have any worthwhile impact as a means of contesting the official (media-sponsored) version of events. One is forced to entertain the suspicion that much of what is currently taught in the name of 'radical' literary and cultural theory is in fact little more than a pedagogic line of least resistance, a self-deceiving ruse that comes up with all manner of alibis, pretexts and sophistical arguments for avoiding any knowledge of its own involvement in the work of ideological mystification.

Of course I am not suggesting - absurdly - that this trahision des clercs is a direct result of over-exposure to post-structuralist ideas, or that a better understanding of the philosophic issues would automatically produce the desired change of attitude. **Still, it should be cause for some rueful reflection on the part of left** - wing intellectuals that 'theory' (or so much of what nowadays passes for advanced theoretical wisdom) has shown itself not only ill-equipped to mount any kind of effective critical resistance, but also quite capable of lending support to neo-pragmatist or consensus-based doctrines which would **render such resistance strictly unthinkable**. Nor is this in any way surprising, given its pervasive anti-realist drift**, its rejection of truth-claims or validity** conditions of whatever kind, and its attitude of thoroughgoing Nietzschean contempt for the values of 'liberal-humanist" thought. Merely to use concepts such as conscience, good faith, responsibility, or ethical judgment in the presence of right-thinking orthodox post-structuralists is to find oneself treated with pitying fondness as a relic of that old 'Enlightenment' discourse. For if - as their argument standardly goes - the autonomous subject has now been dispersed into a range of plural, polymorphous 'subject-positions' inscribed within language or existing solely as figments of this or that constitutive discourse, then of course there is no question of those values surviving as anything but a species of chronic self-delusion, a form of 'imaginary' specular investment whose claims have long since been deconstructed through the insights of psychoanalysis, structural linguistics, Foucauldian discourse-theory etc." Thus the so-called 'postmodern condition' applies just as much to issues of ethics and politics as to matters of an epistemological import. That is to say, there is no getting outside the 'discourse' - or the existing range of discursive subject-positions - whose limits are inescapably (in Wittgenstein's phrase) 'the limits of our world", and which therefore set the terms for any meaningful debate about truth, reality, or ethical values. Least of all can we hang on to the Enlightenment (more specifically, the Kantian) project of adjudicating questions in these various domains by appealing to a critical 'doctrine of the faculties', one that would seek to establish the legitimate reach of cognitive (theoretical) understanding on the one hand, and practical (ethical) reason on the other. For this would appear nothing more than an instance of retrograde wishful thinking, an attempt to restore the flagging self-esteem of those old-style 'universal intellectuals' whose representative role — or whose entitlement to speak on behalf of other, less enlightened individuals – was always (as Foucault maintains) a self-aggrandizing myth of their own invention.30

Of course (here are important distinctions to be marked along this path toward the current fashion for attacking Enlightenment reason and all its works. I should not wish to deny that, in Foucault s case the scaled-down role of 'specific intellectual' went along with a genuine practical commitment to various projects of social and political reform notably in the fields of psychiatric medicine, penal institutions, and the structures of oppressive power/knowledge bound up with issues of gender-role identity. And the same applies to thinkers of a kindred persuasion - Edward Said pre-eminent among them - who have argued convincingly for a 'micro-politics' of localized engagement and resistance, a practice based on the close reading of textual or archival sources, and the critique of those deep-laid racial and cultural stereotypes that constitute the discourse of Western Orientalism.\*1 Clearly it would be wrong to lump these thinkers together with Baudrillard. But it is a different matter when such arguments are recycled in pre-packaged form by theorists who possess nothing like the same degree of scholarly or ethico-political commitment. **For what often results is a** half-baked mixture of ideas **picked up from the latest fashionable sources, or a series of slogans** **to the general effect that 'truth\* and 'reality' are obsolete ideas,** that knowledge is always and everywhere a function of the epistemic will-to-power, and that history is nothing but a fictive construct out of the various 'discourses' that jostle for supremacy from one period to the next. And so it has come about that a thinker like Baudrillard can proffer his ridiculous 'theses' on the Gulf War with every confidence that they will gain wide attention among watchers of the postmodern cultural scene.

### 1AC - Plan

#### Plan: The appropriation of outer space through asteroid mining by private entities should be banned.

#### We’ll defend normal means as the signatories of the OST adding an optional protocol under Article II.

Tronchetii 7[Fabio Tronchetti is a professor at the International Institute of Air and Space Law, Leiden University, The Netherlands, 2007, <https://iislweb.org/docs/Diederiks2007.pdf>, 12-15-2021 amrita]

ARTICLE II OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY: A MATTER OF DEBATE The legal content of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty is one of the most debated and analysed topic in the field of space law. Indeed, several interpretations have been put forward to explain the meaning of its provisions. Article II states that: “Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”. **The text of Article II represents** the final point of a process, formally initiated with Resolution 1721, aimed at conferring to outer space the status of res communis omnium, namely a thing open for the **free exploration** and use by all States **without the possibility of being appropriated**. By prohibiting the possibility of making territorial claims over outer space or any part thereof based on use or occupation, Article II **makes clear that** the customary procedures of **i**nternational **law allowing** subjects to obtain **sovereignty rights over un-owed lands**, namely discovery, occupatio and effective possession, **do not apply to** outer **space.** This prohibition was considered by the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty the best guarantee for preserving outer space for peaceful activities only and for stimulating the exploration and use of the space environment in the name of all mankind. What has been the object of controversy among legal scholars is the question of whether both States and private individuals are subjected to the provisions of Article II. Indeed, **while Article II forbids** expressis verbis the national **appropriation by** claims of **sovereignty**, by means of use and occupation or other means of outer space, **it does not** make **a**ny explicit **mention** **to** its **private** appropriation. Relying on this consideration, some authors have argued that the private appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies is allowed. For instance, in 1968 Gorove wrote: “Thus, at present an individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or private association or an international organisation could lawfully appropriate any parts of outer space…”6 . The same argument is used today by the enterprises selling extraterrestrial acres. They base their claim to the Moon and other celestial bodies on the consideration that Article II does not explicitly forbid private individuals and enterprises to claim, exploit or appropriate the celestial bodies for profit7 . However, it must be said, that nowadays there is a general consensus on the fact that **both national appropriation and private** property rights **are denied** under the Outer Space Treaty. Several way of reasoning have been advanced to support this view. Sters and Tennen affirm that the argument that Article II does not apply to private entities since they are not expressly mentioned fails for the reason that they do not need to be explicitly listed in Article II to be fully subject to the non-appropriation principle8 . **Private entities are allowed to carry out** space **activities but**, according to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, they **must be authorized** to conduct such activities **by the** appropriate **State** of nationality. But if the State is prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, then it lacks the authority to license its nationals or other entities subject to its jurisdiction to engage in that prohibited activity. Jenks argues that “States bear international responsibility for national activities in space; it follows that what is forbidden to a State is not permitted to a chartered company created by a State or to one of its nationals acting as a private adventurer”9 . It has been also suggested that **the prohibition of national** appropriation **implies prohibition of private** appropriation because the latter cannot exist independently from the former10. In order to exist, indeed, private property requires a superior authority to enforce it, be in the form of a State or some other recognised entity. In outer space, however, this practice of State endorsement is forbidden. Should a State recognise or protect the territorial acquisitions of any of its subjects, this would constitute a form of national appropriation in violation of Article II. Moreover, it is possible to use some historical elements to support the argument that both the acquisition of State sovereignty and the creation of private property rights are forbidden by the words of Article II. During the negotiations of the Outer Space Treaty, the Delegate of Belgium affirmed that his delegation “had taken note of the interpretation of the non-appropriation advanced by several delegations-apparently without contradiction-as covering both the establishment of sovereignty and the creation of titles to property in private law”11. The French Delegate stated that: “…there was reason to be satisfied that three basic principles were affirmed, namely: the prohibition of any claim of sovereignty or property rights in space…”12. The fact that the accessions to the Outer Space Treaty were not accompanied by reservations or interpretations of the meaning of Article II, it is an evidence of the fact that this issue was considered to be settled during the negotiation phase. Thus, summing up, we may say that **prohibition of appropriation of outer space** and its parts is a rule which **is valid for both private and public entity**. The theory that private operators are not subject to this rule represents a myth that is not supported by any valid legal argument. Moreover, it can be also added that if any subject was allowed to appropriate parts of outer space, the basic aim of the drafters of the Treaty, namely to prevent a colonial competition in outer space and to create the conditions and premises for an exploration and use of outer space carried out for the benefit of all States, would be betrayed. Therefore, **the need to protect the non-appropriative nature o**f outer **space emerges** in all its relevance.

### Advantage – Asteroid Mining

#### Countries and their companies are making their own rules through patchwork Countries and their companies are making their own rules through patchwork which creates conflict—an international body is key

Foster 16 – Craig, J.D., University of Illinois College of Law, “EXCUSE ME, YOU’RE MINING MY ASTEROID: SPACE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE U.S. SPACE RESOURCE EXPLORATION AND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2015”, *JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & POLICY*, No. 2, page 428-430, http://illinoisjltp.com/journal/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Foster.pdf

There are many reasons to be excited about the prospect of mining resources from space. Hopes are high that these mining efforts will provide an economic boon by producing jobs and injecting more money into the economy. 214 Additionally, the negative impact of mining natural resources on Earth is widely reported215 and might be mitigated by space mining. If mining precious resources from space can minimize the burden on Earth, then this would lend even greater support for asteroid mining. Finally, little enchants the human mind and propels innovation more than sending people and manmade objects into space. For good reason, there is much enthusiasm about the prospect of space mining. On the other hand, it is troublesome to some that private, commercial entities will be paving the way and making up many of the rules as they go. Might this lead to repeating many of the mistakes humans have made on Earth? Might there be unforeseen problems that could spell trouble if mining efforts are not properly regulated? The answer to these questions is likely “yes” as well. It will be important in the coming years to balance the former excitement against the latter caution. Space might seem limitless and impossible to affect in any significant fashion; but, history must be a major voice for the spacemining industry.216 It must be remembered that humans can make an impact that will be felt for generations to come. Thus, it will be important that lawmakers and the international community be as proactive as possible—both in outlining property rights and protecting the final frontier from being harmed by an industry that might become overzealous if left unchecked. Specifically, it will be vital for countries to enter into some sort of international agreement. One option is to create an agreement similar to UNCLOS, which would regulate how individual states and their citizens interact with resources mined from space.217 Such an agreement should recognize not only the property rights of the extracting commercial entities but also the rights of non-spacefaring countries to benefit from the minerals as well. This might include the creation of an international body, much like the ISA, that will ensure that the interests of all nations are maintained by distributing funds and technology to less wealthy or non-spacefaring nations. The U.S. would do well to help create and ratify such an agreement— something they have failed to do with UNCLOS. If the U.S. and other countries are uneasy about entering into such a restrictive agreement, they might also consider an international regulatory body and scheme much like the one used for satellites. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is a United Nations agency that, among other services, provides the international community with uniform satellite orbit oversight and regulatory guidance.218 Currently, 193 countries follow the ITU regulations and utilize their services, which have been likened to domain name registration.219 In the same way, spacefaring countries could form an international body that helps create and maintain a uniform space-mining legal framework.220 Without some sort of international framework as described above, the U.S. and other space-mining countries leave themselves open to great conflict and will be required to patch together a multitude of treaties between themselves as problems inevitably arise.221 V. CONCLUSION The idea of mining resources from celestial bodies is something that has always been relegated to video games and sci-fi movies. But as technology continues to progress at an exponential rate, such mining is starting to come within the realm of possibility. A number of companies are currently creating prospecting technologies that will allow them to determine exactly what an individual asteroid holds. They hope to eventually harvest these resources and sell them for lucrative profits. Fortunately for these companies, the current legal regime governing property rights to space resources is undergoing rapid change at the national level. The U.S. recently passed the Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015, which explicitly entitles U.S. citizens to property rights over any space resources they obtain. This is certain to induce confidence in U.S. investors. The situation at the international level is different. Current international space agreements are vague, lacking in consensus, and provide little precedent for ownership of space resources. This has led the international community to move in the direction of creating a better regulatory framework, but this movement is still in discussion stages and is likely to take a while to come to fruition.

#### Current space treaties have zero authority and lack clarity—which creates ineffective regulations

MacWhorter 16 – Kevin, J.D from William and Mary College and Contributor to the William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, “Sustainable Mining: Incentivizing Asteroid Mining in the Name of Environmentalism”, *William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review,* 2016, <https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1653&context=wmelpr>

Although an academic debate at this point, the legal status of property in space is necessary for any future exploration and exploitation of natural resources in space. Until then, private exploration is severely disincentivized. Further, the technology behind asteroid mining is fast becoming a reality.108 The law must respond. In order to evaluate what the international community needs to accomplish to ensure future exploration, one must explore the international agreements already in place that speak to the issue of property rights. To begin, the United Nations (UN) established the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) in 1958 109 to promote international cooperation in space and promote its peaceful use.110 UNOOSA oversees the UN’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and implements its decisions.111 The UN founded COPUOS to avoid international rivalries in space.112 The OST, the Liability Convention,113 and the Moon Agreement114 are all within the jurisdiction of COPUOS. There are five international agreements that lay a framework of space law and, more importantly, ownership of objects and celestial bodies in space: • The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (OST); 115 • The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Space Objects Launched into Outer Space(ARRA); 116 • The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention); 117 • TheConvention on RegistrationofObjectsLaunched intoOuterSpace (Registration Convention); 118 and • The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty). 119 As with all international law, however, the actual authority of these treaties is debatable, because countries often ignore their precepts or disagree on the meaning of their substance.120 International custom, therefore, is the major indication of what international law exactly is.121 The Law of the Sea is an instructive analogy on that point, and as Lyall and Larsen explain, The practice need not be wholly uniform, but must be undertaken in the belief it is binding and required by law as opposed to being merely convenient or mutually beneficial. 122 Further, international law in general was conceived to deal with relations between States, not to deal with private claims of property. 123 International.

#### Disputes and misperceptions create cascading effects towards space weaponization and an arms race—an international framework solves BUT unilateral action causes escalating space wars

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The first concern is establishing clear regulations regarding asteroid mining. With an intent to establish clear regulations with respect to asteroid mining and to legalise material extraction from the moon and other celestial bodies by private companies in the US, the US government legalised space mining in 2015 by introducing the US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, 2015.[xxvii] This move was heartily welcomed by the private companies as it provided legitimacy to their planned activities. Subsequently in 2017, Luxembourg followed suit.[xxviii] While the US has been a spacefaring nation for many decades now, Luxembourg aspires to become a global leader in the nascent race to mine resources in outer space. In the 1980s the tiny European nation arose out of almost nowhere to become a leader in the satellite communications industry; today it is looking to the skies again, hoping to be the Silicon Valley of asteroid mining.[xxix] In the backdrop of a thriving steel industry that faced trade recession during the oil crisis of 1973, Luxembourg is trying to capitalise on the potential of space mining. As Prime Minister Xavier Bettel put it, “We realized it wouldn't be forever, the steel, so we decided to do other things.”[xxx] Similarly, looking beyond oil, the UAE is framing its policy approaches to make advances in two key areas: human space exploration, and commercial activities of resource extraction through mining.[xxxi] The two formal pieces of legislation (passed by the US and Luxembourg) provide an answer to the complex question of ownership in outer space; the two-word answer appears to be, “finders, keepers”. The US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, 2015 states: “A US citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a space resource shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained.”[xxxii] This legislation gives US space firms the right to own, keep, use, and sell the spoils of the cosmos as they deem fit. Luxembourg’s legislation is fairly analogous to the US Act, giving mining companies the right to keep their plunder. However, unlike the US law, Luxembourg’s does not require a company’s major stakeholders to be based in the country to enjoy its safeguards; the only requirement is for that company to have an office in the country.[xxxiii] In 2017, Japan entered into a five-year agreement with Luxembourg for mining operations in celestial bodies. Japan today appears a step closer to realising its objective of asteroid mining with two Japanese rovers, Minerva II-1, of JAXA landing on the surface of the asteroid named Ryugu in September 2018.[xxxiv] Earlier, Portugal and the UAE signed similar cooperation agreements with Luxembourg.[xxxv] Meanwhile, a few other countries—which have been critical of the US and Luxembourg, at the forefront of the space mining efforts**—**have also decided to join the field. The increasingly competitive and contested nature of outer space activities is spurring major spacefaring nations to push the boundaries in their space exploration. Asteroid mining could possibly become the next big thing and is already seeing a race among the space powers. The US and Luxembourg are at the forefront in space resource extraction in terms of the policy frameworks and funding.[xxxvi] Even as the US has clarified that the US Space Act 2015 is being misunderstood and that there is no change in the US policy towards national appropriation of space, the reality is that it has already spurred a major debate**.[xxxvii]** China and Russia are among those countries that are following on the path of the US and Luxembourg in undertaking mining missions in space. According to media reports, Ye Peijian, chief commander and designer of China’s lunar exploration programme has stated that China would send the first batch of asteroid exploration spacecraft around 2020.[xxxviii] Speaking to China’s Ministry of Science and Technology-run newspaper, Science and Technology Daily, Ye said that these asteroids have a high concentration of precious metals, which could rationalise the huge cost and risks involved in these activities as their economic value could run into the trillions of US dollars. Therefore, extraction, mining and transporting them back to Earth through robotic equipment will be a significant activity. Chinese scientists are working on missions to “bring back a whole asteroid weighing several hundred tonnes, which could turn asteroids with a potential threat to Earth into usable resources**.**”[xxxix] Ye was also quoted as saying that China has plans of “using an asteroid as the base for a permanent space station.”**[xl]** Helium mining on the moon is also part of China’s goals.[xli] Russia, for its part, is also responding to the space-mining developments of the last decade. For one, it plans to have a permanent lunar base somewhere between 2015 and 2020 for possible extraction of Helium.[xlii] Even as Russia’s official position on asteroid mining is that it is forbidden under the 1967 OST—which states that space is the “province of mankind”—the Russian industry players are of the view that they must follow the lead taken by the US and Luxembourg.[xliii] In early 2018, the director of the Scientific-Educational Center for Innovative Mining Technologies of the Moscow-based National University of Science and Technology MISIS (NUST MISIS), Pavel Ananyev, spoke about the Russian ambitions and proposed activities including space drilling rigs, water extraction on the Moon and 3D printers at space stations.[xliv] Russia’s private space companies including Dauria Aerospace, one of the first Russian private space companies, also hold the opinion that they must go forward in the same direction and call for a larger space to private sector to engage in extracting space resources.[xlv] Moscow may not have yet actively pursued space mining and resource extraction, but it is likely to pick up pace in the coming years alongside global efforts. Moscow clearly has a capacity gap in terms of funding because its earlier plans to have a permanent base in the Moon by 2015 is yet to happen. India, too, has ambitions in extraterrestrial resource extraction. In fact, a year after the US legislation, Prabhat Ranjan, executive director of Technology Information, Forecasting and Assessment Council (TIFAC), a policy organisation within the Department of Science and Technology, made a case for India to push ahead with lunar and asteroid mining. He said, “Moon is already being seen as a mineral wealth and further one can go up to the asteroids and start exploiting this. This can be a big game changer and if India doesn’t do this, we will lag behind.”[xlvi] More recently, Dr. K Sivan, Chairman of the country’s civil space organisation, Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), talked about ISRO’s plans for helium-3 extraction and said, “the countries which have the capacity to bring that source from the moon to Earth will dictate the process. I don’t want to be just a part of them, I want to lead them.”[xlvii] However, gaining proficiency in such missions is not easy – the NASA and ESA (the European Space Agency) have been discussing these possibilities for a longer time, albeit quietly. The ISRO Chairman’s response was characterised by an Indian commentator as “aspirational” and “emotional”, clearly conceding that the country’s technological wherewithal is yet to be adequate.[xlviii] Importantly, it is not clear how the legal and regulatory aspects of space mining operations are being dealt with. There was one instance, though, when Luxembourg and Japan in a joint press statement said, “The exchange of information may cover all the issues of the exploration and commercial utilization of space resources, including legal, regulatory, technological, economic, and other aspects.”[xlix] Whether such legalisation is truly legal is arguable. Space Mining: Legal or Not? The Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, considered the global foundation of the outer space legal regime, along with the other four associated international instruments have provided the fundamental basis for outer space activities by prohibiting certain activities and emphasising aspects such as the “common heritage of mankind”. These agreements have been useful in highlighting the global common nature of outer space. At the same time, however, they have been insufficient and ambiguous in providing clear regulations to newer space activities such as asteroid mining. Based on the premise of ‘res communis’, the magna carta of space law, the OST, illustrates outer space as “the province of all mankind”.[l] Under Article I, States are free to explore and use outer space and to access all celestial bodies “on the basis of equality and in accordance with international law.”[li] Although the OST does not explicitly mention “mining” activities, under Article II, outer space including the Moon and other celestial bodies are “not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty” through use, occupation or any other means.[lii] Furthermore, the Moon Agreement, 1979, not only defines outer space as “common heritage of mankind” but also proscribes commercial exploitation of planets and asteroids by States unless an international regime is established to govern such activities for “rational management,” “equitable sharing” and “expansion of opportunities” in the use of these resources.[liii] Slipping conveniently through the loophole in the OST, both the US and Luxembourg have authorised companies to claim exclusive ownership over extracted resources (but not of the asteroid itself). Proponents argue that since no sovereign nation is actually asserting rights over an area of outer space, instead, it is only a private unit claiming rights over singular resources, the treaty norm, “national appropriation by claim of sovereignty”, is not being violated. In the words of renowned space lawyer, Frans von der Dunk, “In terms of the law, yes it’s true that no country can claim any part of outer space as national territory — but that doesn’t mean private industry can’t mine resources.”[liv] Quoting reference from maritime law, Luxembourg regards space resources as appropriable akin to fish and shellfish, but celestial bodies and asteroids are not, just like the high sea. It is noteworthy that out of the only 18 nations that have ratified the Moon Agreement,[lv] none are major spacefaring nations, thereby giving themselves a convenient leeway to not abide by the same. These unilateral initiatives have set off a critical response from the international community. Applying literal interpretation of the OST, there is certainly room to construe that space mining may be legal, compared to the Moon Agreement whose prohibition is absolute. However, taking into consideration the letter and spirit of the OST, strengthened by the Moon Agreement, the argument that “national appropriation” only extends to appropriation of territory and not appropriation of resources is a far reach. That resource extraction is contemplated, albeit implicitly, in the OST, is nothing but logical. Not only have such claims of possessory rights not been recognised in the past, there is also global consensus regarding its illegality.[lvi] It therefore forms a part of customary international law, despite the Moon Agreement not having been widely ratified. In this light, the legalisation of space mining is a sheer violation of the elemental principles of international space law. Yet, there is no clarity on what activity is allowed and what is prohibited in outer space under the existing law.[lvii] There is ambiguity around most issues—from “who would license and regulate asteroid mining operations” to the legality of these activities as per the existing international space law.[lviii] When comparing it to the law of the seas, resource appropriation in the high seas and deep seabed is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, and that in Antarctica, as per the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 1991. While the former is strictly regulated under Part XI of UNCLOS, the latter is completely forbidden but for scientific purposes. The law of the sea argument—“owning the fish, not the sea”—cannot be applied to outer space primarily because fish are living resources that can reproduce and therefore are renewable. Outer space resources, on the other hand, are depletable: once harvested, they cannot be replenished. The analogy with fish and seas, therefore, is not a fair one and its transposition to outer space and celestial bodies would be inaccurate. Perhaps a more comparable regime is the deep seabed, which contemplates property rights over mineral extraction. The utilisation and ownership of the deep seabed’s resources are exclusively structured around the International Seabed Authority (ISA), which is responsible for organising, carrying out and controlling all activities in the seabed.[lix] Not only must State parties seek sanction from the ISA before beginning resource exploitation, but the fiscal benefits from seabed mining must also be shared among all.[lx] Evidently, even the UNCLOS upholds State ownership and fair distribution over individual ownership and self-centred gains.[lxi] By allowing private ownership, the US and Luxembourg are once again in contravention of the very same law they are relying on. The touchstone principle, “province of all mankind” is also being defeated. Therefore, to even reap the limited benefits as under UNCLOS, at least the derivation must be made alike. This argument too falls flat. The Way Ahead Undoubtedly, growing technological adeptness has made space mining inevitable and, therefore, the question is no longer “if” but “when”. Nevertheless, a scenario where companies can, solely based on domestic laws, steadily exploit mineral resources in outer space, would be universally unacceptable. Minus regulations, the realisation of space exploitation will create great disparity between nations and disrupt dynamics of the world economy. Regulations are particularly important in the context of the space debris problem. We definitely do not wish for a future, befittingly described by renowned engineer and inventor Graham Hawkes, thus: “Space exploration promised us alien life, lucrative planetary mining, and fabulous lunar colonies. News flash, ladies and gents: Space is nearly empty. It’s a sterile vacuum, filled mostly with the junk we put up there.”[lxii] Therefore, it is extremely important that resource appropriation is carried out in an ethical manner, without interrupting safe and secure access to outer space, simultaneously allowing all countries a share in the proceeds. Technological advances and financial readiness are pushing both, states and non-state players towards new ventures in outer space. Yet, the rules of engagement especially dealing with the new commercial activities are far from ideal. There is a clear and urgent need to debate and come up with either a new regulation or accommodate the space mining activities within the existing international legal measures. Experts have articulated that these could possibly be addressed under the existing property law principles or old mining law principles.[lxiii] However, given the scale of activities that states and non-state parties will engage in, the ability of the existing regime to address space mining could be highly inadequate. The second option would be to develop a new instrument including an institutional architecture that would set out the parameters for activities related to resource extraction and space mining. Since there are a good number of commercial players playing a formidable role in asteroid mining, there has to be space for commercial players in the new gig, which might be a big departure from the earlier era institutions that saw states being the sole authority in regulating activities in outer space. A clear role for commercial players has been articulated for some time but the global space community has yet to reach a consensus in how they can be incorporated into the global governance debates. The apprehension on the part of a number of states is driven by the fact that private sector participation is still largely a western phenomenon. This trend may be undergoing change in other parts of the world but until there is a sizeable private sector community in other major spacefaring powers, there is a fear that the western bloc of countries may stand to gain from the industry being represented in the global governance debates. A third possible option is to get a larger global endorsement of the Moon Treaty, which highlights the common heritage of mankind. The Moon Treaty is important as it addresses a “loophole” of the OST “by banning any ownership of any extraterrestrial property by any organization or private person, unless that organization is international and governmental.”[lxiv] But the fact that it has been endorsed only by a handful of countries makes it a “failure” from the international law perspective.[lxv] Nevertheless, efforts must be made to strengthen the support base for the Moon Agreement given the potential pitfalls of resource extraction and space mining activities in outer space. Signatories to the Moon Treaty can take the lead within multilateral platforms such as the UN to debate the usefulness of the treaty in the changed context of technological advancements and new geopolitical dynamics, and potentially find compromises where there are disagreements. Pursuing a collective approach is ideal. An example is UNCLOS, which demonstrates that the international society possesses the capability of regulating mining quarters deemed to be the “province of mankind”. However, a sui generis legal framework must be crafted because the difference between the marines and outer space and their resources is wide, and the regulations are too region-specific to permit a superimposition of the oceanic regime to outer space. A sound legal environment will protect both the company performing operations and its beneficiaries, while ensuring even-handed resource allocation. In addition, regulations spelling out safety standards and identifying safety zones around mining operations could be useful in ensuring safe and secure operations in outer space. It would be wrong, however, to say that the international community has not debated over this. In fact, one of the main agenda points of the fifty-seventh session of UNCOPUS Legal Committee held in April 2018, was especially devoted to “general exchange of views on potential legal models for activities in the exploration, exploitation and utilization of space resources.”[lxvi] Upon evaluation, it is clear that countries are not against space mining as such; rather the contentious points are vis-à-vis authorisation, regulation, and where to place responsibility. There also appears to be concurrence regarding the need for international coordination efforts of some sort. Over the last two years, The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group,[lxvii] established with the purpose of “assess[ing] the need for a regulatory framework for space resource activities, has identified 19 “building blocks”,[lxviii] encompassing subject matters that could be included in such a regulatory framework. Although this leaves a lot of hope for the legitimate mining of space resources, its status is still pending. Also, several questions need to be agreed upon by the global space policy community before the establishment of a framework. First, there must be an agreement among all the space powers on the need for a global governance framework for the use of space resources. This must be followed by detailed deliberations on the scope, mandate and objectives of such a framework. Can and should there be safety zones and exclusive rights be recognised under such a framework and how one can ensure equitable sharing of the resources, and lastly, the role of industries and how the interests of the industry as pioneers in this area can be secured. These are all pertinent questions that need to be considered and debated before an international regime for extraction and use of space resources can be established.[lxix] Even legal space mining activity could have serious impacts in two ways. For instance, any technological spinoffs that a country might have could add to the space weaponisation debate. Two, the erosion of norms with regard to space mining could have a cascading effect on other norms in the same issue area such as weaponisation of space. It is imperative for nations to actively combine their efforts to ensure that this activity transpires in the most globally acceptable manner and not one which stirs anarchism. The ancient Roman maxim, ‘Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbatur’ (What touches all must be approved by all) gains due traction in this kind of a scenario. Therefore, a universal activity like space exploration mandates an international guideline; or else, the first haul from mining, instead of earning admiration and exultation, will only be enmeshed in litigation.

#### Inevitable market expansion guarantees wars over property rights—governments get quickly involved

Funnell 18 – Anthony, Writer for Future Tense News Citing Dean of Law at University of Adelaide, “War in space 'inevitable' because there's so much money to be made, expert warns”, ABC News, 8/23/2018, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-24/conflict-in-space-is-inevitable-expert-warns/10146314

A leading Australian space law expert has warned conflict over space assets is "inevitable", and more needs to be done now to avert the potential for hostility. Professor Melissa de Zwart, the Dean of Law at the University of Adelaide, says growing commercial interest in the mining of precious minerals on asteroids and planets has heightened the danger. "I think you have to be a realist about that," she said. "Where you have resources, where you have competition for those resources, where you have investment of money in the extraction of those resources ... there will be an expectation of security around that investment." While full-scale mining is yet to be tried, there is significant international interest. Japanese aerospace agency Jaxa has already successfully landed a robotic craft on an asteroid and taken samples. It currently has another probe hovering over an asteroid named Ryugu. Artist's impression of Hayabusa 2 PHOTO: Artist's impression of Jaxa's robotic craft flying above Ryugu. (Source: JAXA) Two American companies — Deep Space Industries and Planetary Resources — are thought to be the leaders in the field, but in May this year a UK firm called Asteroid Mining Corporation also entered the race. "Those corporations will be looking to the nation-state to say, well, are you going to protect our investment in this business?" Professor de Zwart said. A very crowded space The US Government and American firms continue to play a dominant role in more traditional space technology development and deployment. SpaceX, for example, is a major private supplier of rockets, while the US Air Force currently coordinates international satellite traffic, providing advanced warnings about potentially dangerous space debris. Listen to the episode Are we moving away from the notion that space is for all humankind? And is conflict in space inevitable? But the number of players is rapidly increasing. The OECD's Space Forum says more than 80 countries now have some form of space program, mostly concentrated on rockets, satellites and satellite-related services and technology. They estimate the global industry is worth somewhere around $US400 billion and growing quickly. And that figure could skyrocket if, and when, asteroid mining kicks off. Eric Stallmer, the president of the US-based Commercial Spaceflight Federation, a consortium of 85 space-related organisations and businesses, believes that moment is fast approaching. "I think we are looking at a five to 10-year timetable for developing that technology. It makes for an exciting time," he said

#### Asteroid mining furthers tensions between the US, China and Russia and escalates

Jamasmie 21 Cecilia Jamasmie [Cecilia has covered mining for more than a decade. She is particularly interested in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Diamonds and Latin America. Cecilia has been interviewed by BBC News and CBC among others and has been a guest speaker at mining conventions, including MINExpo 2016 and the World’s Copper Conference 2018. She is also member of the expert panel on Social License to Operate (SLO) at the European project MIREU (Mining and Metallurgic Regions EU). She holds a Master of Journalism from the University of British Columbia, and is based in Nova Scotia.], 2-2-2021, "Experts warn of brewing space mining war among US, China and Russia," MINING, <https://www.mining.com/experts-warn-of-brewing-space-mining-war-among-us-china-and-russia/> DD AG

A brewing war to set a mining base in space is likely to see China and Russia joining forces to keep the US increasing attempts to dominate extra-terrestrial commerce at bay, experts warn. The Trump Administration took an active interest in space, announcing that America would return astronauts to the moon by 2024 and creating the Space Force as the newest branch of the US military.It also proposed global legal framework for mining on the moon, called the Artemis Accords, encouraging citizens to mine the Earth’s natural satellite and other celestial bodies with commercial purposes. The directive classified outer space as a “legally and physically unique domain of human activity” instead of a “global commons,” paving the way for mining the moon without any sort of international treaty. Spearheaded by the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Artemis Accords were signed in October by Australia, Canada, England, Japan, Luxembourg, Italy and the United Emirates “Unfortunately, the Trump Administration exacerbated a national security threat and risked the economic opportunity it hoped to secure in outer space by failing to engage Russia or China as potential partners,” says Elya Taichman, former legislative director for then-Republican Michelle Lujan Grisham. “Instead, the Artemis Accords have driven China and Russia toward increased cooperation in space out of fear and necessity,” he writes.Russia’s space agency Roscosmos was the first to speak up, likening the policy to colonialism. “There have already been examples in history when one country decided to start seizing territories in its interest — everyone remembers what came of it,” Roscosmos’ deputy general director for international cooperation, Sergey Saveliev, said at the time.China, which made history in 2019 by becoming the first country to land a probe on the far side of the Moon, chose a different approach. Since the Artemis Accords were first announced, Beijing has approached Russia to jointly build a lunar research base. President Xi Jinping has also he made sure China planted its flag on the Moon, which happened in December 2020, more than 50 years after the US reached the lunar surface.

#### Competition -- Resources in space explodes geopolitical tensions, escalates through satellite use and posturing, and detracts from public interest

Skibba, 18, Nautilus, “Mining in Space Could Lead to Conflicts on Earth”, Ramin Skibba is a science writer and astrophysicist based in Santa Cruz and San Diego. URL: <https://nautil.us/mining-in-space-could-lead-to-conflicts-on-earth-2-7300/>, KR

Major space-faring nations are not among the 16 countries party to the treaty, but they should arguably come to some equitable agreement, since international competition over natural resources in space may very well transform into conflict. Take platinum-group metals. Mining companies have found about 100,000 metric tons of the stuff in deposits worldwide, mostly in South Africa and Russia, amounting to $10 billion worth of production per year, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. These supplies should last several decades if demand for them doesn’t rise dramatically. (According to Bloomberg, supply for platinum-group metals is constrained while demand is increasing.)

Palladium, for example, valued for its conductive properties and chemical stability, is used in hundreds of millions of electronic devices sold annually for electrodes and connector platings, but it’s relatively scarce on Earth. A single giant, platinum-rich asteroid could contain as much platinum-group metals as all reserves on Earth, the Google-backed Planetary Resources claims. That’s a massive bounty. As Planetary Resources and other U.S. and foreign companies scramble for control over these valuable space minerals, competing “land grabs” by armed satellites may come next. Platinum-group metals in space may serve the same role as oil has on Earth, threatening to extend geopolitical struggles into astropolitical ones, something Trump is keen on preparing for. Yesterday he said he’s seriously weighing the idea of a “Space Force” military branch.

NASA’s increasing collaboration with space mining companies could distort and divert efforts previously focused on space exploration.

Moreover, the technology that might enable this free-for-all—versatile “nanosatellites,” no larger than a loaf of bread—is relatively inexpensive. While reporting for a story about these tiny satellites, also known as CubeSats, I came across some missions applicable to mining asteroids. In November, NASA will launch a satellite for a mission called Near-Earth Asteroid Scout, for example. It will deploy a solar sail, propel itself with sunlight, and journey to the asteroid belt, where it will scope out a particular asteroid and analyze its properties. NASA has also awarded grants to Planetary Resources to advance the designs of spectral imagers and propulsion systems for CubeSats, and other missions will develop the satellites’ abilities to communicate and network with each other. NASA also awarded Deep Space Industries contracts to assess commercial approaches for NASA’s asteroid goals, which may involve hosting DSI’s asteroid-prospecting equipment on its missions.

Like all forms of mining, it will be dangerous. If space-mining activities break up asteroids, the resulting debris could be hazardous for satellites, other spacecraft, and astronauts nearby. On the other hand, in a best-case scenario, space mining could be environmentally safe, capture only necessary minerals and water, and, in the more distant future even lead to the construction of a far-flung space station led by NASA and other space agencies, orbiting 200 million miles from Earth and serving as both a mining depot and a pit-stop for passing spacecraft.

But it’s not clear that a pact between the commercial space mining industry and NASA would align with the public’s interest. NASA’s increasing collaboration with space mining companies could distort and divert efforts previously focused on space exploration and basic research, and discourage public interest and engagement in astronomy.

For example, Seager advocated for space mining at a science writing conference I attended in 2015. She’s part of a motley group of advisors for Planetary Resources, including the movie director James Cameron, a lawyer for a prominent Washington D.C. firm, and Dante Lauretta, another astronomer whom I respect. Seager seems to believe that encouraging private space mining will lead to more investments and technological innovation that would enable more scientific research. In a 2012 interview with The Atlantic, for instance, she said, “The bottom line is that NASA is not working the best that it could for space science right now, and so in order for people like me to succeed with my own research goals, the commercial space industry needs to be able to succeed independently of government contracts.”

But if the U.S. and U.S.-based companies lay claim to the richest and most easily accessible prospecting sites, not allowing other companies and nations to share in the wealth, economic and political relations could be damaged. That’s why this seems to be a dangerous path for space explorers. Once you’re on board with the commercial space industry, then you as a researcher must accept, if not support, everything that comes with it. Seager and a few other researchers may be willing to take this risk, but what about the rest of the space science community? Moreover, to succeed, these businesses will seek profitable missions, while science, exploration, and discovery—goals that stimulate public interest—will inevitably have lower priority. (Other commercial spaceflight companies, like Elon Musk’s SpaceX, do generate public interest, but they’re not directly involved in mining asteroids.) NASA may have its shortcomings, but at least its missions and research goals answer to the public. It’s not exactly a welcome thought to imagine more and more of our presence and activity in space being ceded, with NASA’s help, to private industry.

#### Independently, that checks any of their mining good offense

Yan 18 [Laura Yan is a writer in Brooklyn. Her writing has appeared in Wired, GQ, The Cut, Pacific Standard, Longreads, The Outline, and elsewhere. Should We Really Be Mining in Space? May 5, 2018. https://www.popularmechanics.com/space/a20195040/should-we-be-really-be-mining-in-space/]

Imagine, for instance, an asteroid that contains as many platinum-group metals as all reserves on Earth. Businesses will compete for the precious resource, and the competing may soon turn into battle by armed satellites, which can lead back to conflicts on Earth. The act of mining itself could also be dangerous: if space-mining break up asteroids, it could harm other satellites, spacecrafts and astronauts.

Commerical space mining could lead to conflicts between profitability and public interest. "Once you’re on board with the commercial space industry, then you as a researcher must accept, if not support, everything that comes with it," Skibba writes. "To succeed, these businesses will seek profitable missions, while science, exploration, and discovery—goals that stimulate public interest—will inevitably have lower priority,"

#### Space wars go nuclear

Grego 18 – Laura, Senior Scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, PhD in Experimental Physics at the California Institute of Technology, Space and Crisis Stability, Union of Concerned Scientists, 3-19-18, <https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7804-grego-space-and-crisis-stabilitypdf>

Why space is a particular problem for crisis stability For a number of reasons, space poses particular challenges in preventing a crisis from starting or from being managed well. Some of these are to do with the physical nature of space, such as the short timelines and difficulty of attribution inherent in space operations. Some are due to the way space is used, such as the entanglement of strategic and tactical missions and the prevalence of dual-use technologies. Some are due to the history of space, such the absence of a shared understanding of appropriate behaviors and consequences, and a dearth of stabilizing personal and institutional relationships. While some of these have terrestrial equivalents, taken together, they present a special challenge. The vulnerability of satellites and first strike incentives Satellites are inherently fragile and difficult to protect; in the language of strategic planners, space is an “offense-dominant” regime. This can lead to a number of pressures to strike first that don‘t exist for other, better-protected domains. Satellites travel on predictable orbits, and many pass repeatedly over all of the earth‘s nations. Low-earth orbiting satellites are reachable by missiles much less capable than those needed to launch satellites into orbit, as well as by directed energy which can interfere with sensors or with communications channels. Because launch mass is at a premium, satellite armor is impractical. Maneuvers on orbit need costly amounts of fuel, which has to be brought along on launch, limiting satellites‘ ability to move away from threats. And so, these very valuable satellites are also inherently vulnerable and may present as attractive targets. Thus, an actor with substantial dependence on space has an incentive to strike first if hostilities look probable, to ensure these valuable assets are not lost. Even if both (or all) sides in a conflict prefer not to engage in war, this weakness may provide an incentive to approach it closely anyway. A RAND Corporation monograph commissioned by the Air Force15 described the issue this way: First-strike stability is a concept that Glenn Kent and David Thaler developed in 1989 to examine the structural dynamics of mutual deterrence between two or more nuclear states.16 It is similar to crisis stability, which Charles Glaser described as ―a measure of the countries‘ incentives not to preempt in a crisis, that is, not to attack first in order to beat the attack of the enemy,‖17 except that it does not delve into the psychological factors present in specific crises. Rather, first strike stability focuses on each side‘s force posture and the balance of capabilities and vulnerabilities that could make a crisis unstable should a confrontation occur. For example, in the case of the United States, the fact that conventional weapons are so heavily dependent on vulnerable satellites may create incentives for the US to strike first terrestrially in the lead up to a confrontation, before its space-derived advantages are eroded by anti-satellite attacks.18 Indeed, any actor for which satellites or space-based weapons are an important part of its military posture, whether for support missions or on-orbit weapons, will feel “use it or lose it” pressure because of the inherent vulnerability of satellites. Short timelines and difficulty of attribution The compressed timelines characteristic of crises combine with these “use it or lose it” pressures to shrink timelines. This dynamic couples dangerously with the inherent difficulty of determining the causes of satellite degradation, whether malicious or from natural causes, in a timely way. Space is a difficult environment in which to operate. Satellites orbit amidst increasing amounts of debris. A collision with a debris object the size of a marble could be catastrophic for a satellite, but objects of that size cannot be reliably tracked. So a failure due to a collision with a small piece of untracked debris may be left open to other interpretations. Satellite electronics are also subject to high levels of damaging radiation. Because of their remoteness, satellites as a rule cannot be repaired or maintained. While on-board diagnostics and space surveillance can help the user understand what went wrong, it is difficult to have a complete picture on short timescales. Satellite failure on-orbit is a regular occurrence19 (indeed, many satellites are kept in service long past their intended lifetimes). In the past, when fewer actors had access to satellite-disrupting technologies, satellite failures were usually ascribed to “natural” causes. But increasingly, even during times of peace operators may assume malicious intent. More to the point, in a crisis when the costs of inaction may be perceived to be costly, there is an incentive to choose the worst-case interpretation of events even if the information is incomplete or inconclusive. Entanglement of strategic and tactical missions During the Cold War, nuclear and conventional arms were well separated, and escalation pathways were relatively clear. While space-based assets performed critical strategic missions, including early warning of ballistic missile launch and secure communications in a crisis, there was a relatively clear sense that these targets were off limits, as attacks could undermine nuclear deterrence. In the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the US and Soviet Union pledged not to interfere with each other‘s ―national technical means‖ of verifying compliance with the agreement, yet another recognition that attacking strategically important satellites could be destabilizing.20 There was also restraint in building the hardware that could hold these assets at risk. However, where the lines between strategic satellite missions and other missions are blurred, these norms can be weakened. For example, the satellites that provide early warning of ballistic missile launch are associated with nuclear deterrent posture, but also are critical sensors for missile defenses. Strategic surveillance and missile warning satellites also support efforts to locate and destroy mobile conventional missile launchers. Interfering with an early warning sensor satellite might be intended to dissuade an adversary from using nuclear weapons first by degrading their missile defenses and thus hindering their first-strike posture. However, for a state that uses early warning satellites to enable a “hair trigger” or launch-on-attack posture, the interference with such a satellite might instead be interpreted as a precursor to a nuclear attack. It may accelerate the use of nuclear weapons rather than inhibit it. Misperception and dual-use technologies Some space technologies and activities can be used both for relatively benign purposes but also for hostile ones. It may be difficult for an actor to understand the intent behind the development, testing, use, and stockpiling of these technologies, and see threats where there are none. (Or miss a threat until it is too late.) This may start a cycle of action and reaction based on misperception. For example, relatively low-mass satellites can now maneuver autonomously and closely approach other satellites without their cooperation; this may be for peaceful purposes such as satellite maintenance or the building of complex space structures, or for more controversial reasons such as intelligence-gathering or anti-satellite attacks. Ground-based lasers can be used to dazzle the sensors of an adversary‘s remote sensing satellites, and with sufficient power, they may damage those sensors. The power needed to dazzle a satellite is low, achievable with commercially available lasers coupled to a mirror which can track the satellite. Laser ranging networks use low-powered lasers to track satellites and to monitor precisely the Earth‘s shape and gravitational field, and use similar technologies. 21 Higher-powered lasers coupled with satellite-tracking optics have fewer legitimate uses. Because midcourse missile defense systems are intended to destroy long-range ballistic missile warheads, which travel at speeds and altitudes comparable to those of satellites, such defense systems also have inherent ASAT capabilities. In fact, while the technologies being developed for long-range missile defenses might not prove very effective against ballistic missiles—for example, because of the countermeasure problems associated with midcourse missile defense— they could be far more effective against satellites. This capacity is not just theoretical. In 2007, China demonstrated a direct-ascent anti-satellite capability which could be used both in an ASAT and missile defense role, and in 2009, the United States used a ship-based missile defense interceptor to destroy a satellite, as well. US plans indicated a projected inventory of missile defense interceptors with capability to reach all low earth orbiting satellites in the dozens in the 2020s, and in the hundreds by 2030.22 Discrimination The consequences of interfering with a satellite may be vastly different depending on who is affected and how, and whether the satellite represents a legitimate military objective. However, it will not always be clear who the owners and operators of a satellite are, and users of a satellite‘s services may be numerous and not public. Registration of satellites is incomplete23 and current ownership is not necessarily updated in a readily available repository. The identification of a satellite as military or civilian may be deliberately obscured. Or its value as a military asset may change over time; for example, the share of capacity of a commercial satellite used by military customers may wax and wane. A potential adversary‘s satellite may have different or additional missions that are more vital to that adversary than an outsider may perceive. An ASAT attack that creates persistent debris could result in significant collateral damage to a wide range of other actors; unlike terrestrial attacks, these consequences are not limited geographically, and could harm other users unpredictably. In 2015, the Pentagon‘s annual wargame**,** or simulated conflict, involving space assets focused on a future regional conflict. The official report out24warnedthatit was hard to keep the conflict contained geographically when using anti-satellite weapons: As the wargame unfolded, a regional crisis quickly escalated, partly because of the interconnectedness of a multi-domain fight involving a capable adversary. The wargame participants emphasized the challenges in containing horizontal escalation once space control capabilities are employedto achieve limited national objectives. Lack of shared understanding of consequences/proportionalityStates havefairly similar understandings of the implications of military actions on the ground, in the air, and at sea,built over decades of experience. The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have built some shared understanding of each other‘s strategic thinking on nuclear weapons, though this is less true for other states with nuclear weapons. But in the context of nuclear weapons, there is an arguable understanding about the crisis escalation based on the type of weapon (strategic or tactical) and the target (counterforce—against other nuclear targets, or countervalue—against civilian targets). Because of a lack of experience in hostilities that target space-based capabilities, it is not entirely clear what the proper response to a space activity is and where the escalation thresholds or “red lines” lie. Exacerbating this is the asymmetry in space investments; not all actors will assign the same value to a given target or same escalatory nature to different weapons.

#### Nuclear war causes extinction.

Starr ’17 (Steven; director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility, Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, expert in the environmental consequences of nuclear war; 1/9/17; “Turning a Blind Eye Towards Armageddon — U.S. Leaders Reject Nuclear Winter Studies”; <https://fas.org/2017/01/turning-a-blind-eye-towards-armageddon-u-s-leaders-reject-nuclear-winter-studies/>; Federation of American Scientists; accessed 11/24/18; TV) [AV]

The detonation of an atomic bomb with this explosive power will **instantly ignite fires** over a surface area of three to five square miles. In the recent studies, the scientists calculated that the **blast**, **fire**, and **radiation** from a war fought with 100 atomic bombs could produce **direct fatalities** comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for a “**counterforce**” **nuclear war** between the superpowers. However, the **long-term environmental effects** of the war **could** significantly disrupt the global weather for at least a decade, which would likely **result in** a vast **global famine**. The scientists predicted that **nuclear firestorms** in the burning cities would cause at least five million tons of **black carbon smoke** to quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where it could not be rained out. The smoke would circle the Earth in **less than two weeks** and would form **a** global **stratospheric smoke layer** that **would remain for** more than **a decade**. The smoke would absorb warming sunlight, which would **heat the smoke** to temperatures near the boiling point of water, producing **ozone losses of** 20 to **50 percent** over populated areas. This would almost double the amount of UV-B reaching the most populated regions of the mid-latitudes, and it would create UV-B indices unprecedented in human history. In North America and Central Europe, the time required to get a painful sunburn at mid-day in June could decrease to as little as six minutes for fair-skinned individuals. As the smoke layer blocked warming sunlight from reaching the Earth’s surface, it would produce the **coldest** average **surface temperatures** in the last 1,000 years. The scientists calculated that global **food production would decrease** by 20 to **40 percent** during a five-year period following such a war. Medical experts have predicted that the shortening of growing seasons and corresponding decreases in agricultural production could cause up to **two billion** people to perish from **famine**. The climatologists also investigated the effects of a nuclear war fought with the vastly more powerful modern **thermonuclear** weapons possessed by the United States, Russia, China, France, and England. Some of the thermonuclear weapons constructed during the 1950s and 1960s were 1,000 times more powerful than an atomic bomb. During the last 30 years, the average size of thermonuclear or “strategic” nuclear weapons has decreased. Yet today, each of the approximately 3,540 strategic weapons deployed by the United States and Russia is seven to **80 times** more powerful than the atomic bombs modeled in the India-Pakistan study. The smallest strategic nuclear weapon has an explosive power of **100,000 tons of TNT**, compared to an atomic bomb with an average explosive power of 15,000 tons of TNT. Strategic nuclear weapons produce much larger nuclear firestorms than do atomic bombs. For example, a standard Russian 800-kiloton warhead, on an average day, will ignite fires covering a surface area of 90 to 152 square miles. A **war** fought with hundreds or thousands of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons would **ignite immense** **nuclear firestorms** covering land surface areas of many thousands or **tens of thousands** of square miles. The scientists calculated that these fires would produce up to **180 million tons** of black carbon soot and **smoke**, which would form a dense, **global stratospheric smoke layer**. The smoke would remain in the stratosphere for 10 to **20 years**, and it **would block** as much as **70 percent of sunlight** from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35 percent from the Southern Hemisphere. So much sunlight would be blocked by the smoke that the noonday sun would resemble a full moon at midnight. Under such conditions, it would only require a matter of days or weeks for daily minimum **temperatures** to **fall below freezing** in the largest agricultural areas of the Northern Hemisphere, where freezing temperatures would occur every day for a period of between one to more than two years. Average surface temperatures would become colder than those experienced 18,000 years ago at the height of the last Ice Age, and the prolonged cold would cause average rainfall to decrease by up to 90%. Growing seasons would be completely eliminated for more than a decade; it would be **too cold and dark** to grow food crops, **which would doom the** majority of the **human population.** NUCLEAR WINTER IN BRIEF The profound cold and darkness following nuclear war became known as nuclear winter and was first predicted in 1983 by a group of NASA scientists led by Carl Sagan. During the mid-1980s, a large body of research was done by such groups as the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE), the World Meteorological Organization, and the U.S. National Research Council of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences; their work essentially supported the initial findings of the 1983 studies. The idea of nuclear winter, published and supported by prominent scientists, generated extensive public alarm and put political pressure on the United States and Soviet Union to reverse a runaway nuclear arms race, which, by 1986, had created a global nuclear arsenal of more than 65,000 nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, this created a backlash among many powerful military and industrial interests, who undertook an extensive media campaign to brand nuclear winter as “bad science” and the scientists who discovered it as “irresponsible.” Critics used various uncertainties in the studies and the first climate models (which are primitive by today’s standards) as a basis to criticize and reject the concept of nuclear winter. In 1986, the Council on Foreign Relations published an article by scientists from the National Center for Atmospheric Research, who predicted drops in global cooling about half as large as those first predicted by the 1983 studies and described this as a “nuclear autumn.”

### 1AC - Framework

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being. Prefer –

**1 -- Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable.** **On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have.** “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 **The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so**, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but **for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” **If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.**3 As Aristotle observes**: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.**”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

**2 -- Lexical pre-req: Threats to bodily security and life preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively utilize and act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibit the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose**

#### 3 -- Actor-specificity -

#### a. Aggregation – every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.

#### b. No act-omission distinction – choosing to omit is an act itself – governments decide not to act which means being presented with the aff creates a choice between two actions, neither of which is an omission

#### c. No intent-foresight distinction – If we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen

#### 4 -- Degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first. Intuitions outweigh—they’re the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions are most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why.

#### 5 -- Reject calc indicts and util triggers permissibility arguments:

#### a. Empirically denied—both individuals and policymakers carry out effective cost-benefit analysis which means even if decisions aren’t always perfect it’s still better than not acting at all

#### b. They prove utilizing util is hard, not impossible

**6 -- Use epistemic modesty: that means compare the probability of the framework times the magnitude of the impact under a framework. Prefer:**

**a. Substantively true: it maximizes the probability of achieving net most moral value—beating a framework acts as mitigation to their impacts but the strength of that mitigation is contingent.**

**b. Clash: we don’t know if our frameworks are true, but we can debate the topical question. That incentivizes debating both layers instead of solely focusing on framework.**

#### 7 -- Extinction comes first!

**Pummer 15** [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### 8 -- Science proves non util ethics are impossible

Greene 10 – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University

(The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf)

**What turn-of-the-millennium science** **is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise**, that our **moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural**. **Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions**. Moreover, **anyone who claims to have such a theory**, or even part of one, **almost certainly doesn't**. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that **rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here**. Instead, I suspect, **they** **will insist that I have simply misunderstood what** Kant and like-minded **deontologists are all about**. **Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition**. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. **Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously**. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). **This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view**, as I've suggested, **may be misleading**. **The problem**, more specifically, **is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological**, though they may appear to be from the inside. **Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love**, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." **This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things**. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of **the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics**. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that **consequentialists**, as much as anyone else, **have respect for persons**, **are against treating people as mere objects,** **wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc**. **A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process**. **Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial**. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. **If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get** characteristically deontological **answers**. Some **will be tautological**: **"Because it's murder!"** **Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means**." "You have to respect people's rights." **But**, as we know, **these answers don't really explain anything**, because **if you give the same people** (on different occasions) **the trolley case** or the loop case (See above), **they'll make the opposite judgment**, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. **Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism**. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, **there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions**. **But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question**.

### 1AC – Underview

#### 1 -- Debating political solutions is an iterative process that uses the academy as a site of movement building that creates a bulwark against Trump’s fascism.

Keeanga-Yamahtta **Taylor 17**, assistant professor of African American studies at Princeton University [“Home Is the Crucible of Struggle,” *American Quarterly*, Vol. 69, No. 2, June 2017, p. 229-233, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

**Creating home**, or what may also be described as a struggle to belong, **has always been political in the U**nited **S**tates. **In a country founded on** the **extermination** of its indigenous population, **whose wealth was derived from** the forced labor of **the enslaved**, and for whom that wealth was multiplied a trillion times over through the violent expropriation of waves upon waves of immigrant labor—**to stay or belong has been brutally contested** and valiantly fought to achieve. In other words, **we share a history of repression and resistance in the** elemental, human **struggle** to belong, **to be home. Those various battles over land rights and citizenship; the right to work and housing; the right to vote, speak, and organize have all been in an effort to reshape** or reform **the** injustice and **oppression that shapes the** daily **lives of most people** in this country. In this persistent quest, **we now enter into a period of** both certainty and **uncertainty**. We can be certain that the administration of Donald **Trump will pursue policies that will make the lives of** ordinary **people substantially harder**. We can be certain that **his administration will attack immigrants. He has promised** to restore **law and order, which appears to be an invitation for the police to continue their assaults on Black and Brown communities. Trump has bragged about sexually assaulting women while decrying** their rights to **reproductive freedom**. Trump and **his cohort have all but declared war on Muslims** in the United States and beyond. **We have seen a revival of the white supremacist Right** and an unleashing of open racial animus. In the month after the election of Trump, over one thousand hate crimes across the country were reported. Since he has taken office, Jewish cemeteries have been desecrated; mosques have been burned; and swastikas have been brandished in acts of vandalism and intimidation. **What is uncertain is the extent to which Trump will be able to follow through on his threats** against a variety of communities. **This uncertainty is not with Trump's intention** to inflict as much pain and harm on the most vulnerable people in the United States; **rather, it is based on a calculation that our ability to organize and build movements will complicate, blunt, and**, in some cases, **thwart the Trump agenda**. [End Page 229] **The challenge is** in **using the spaces we occupy in the academy to approach this task**. There will be many different kinds of organizing spaces developed in the coming years, but **there is a particular role we can play** in this moment. **This organizing possibility exists only when we recognize the academy**, itself, **as a site of politics and struggle. Those who ignore that reality do so because they have the luxury to** or because they are so constrained by compartmentalization that they ignore the very world they are living in. **In the last two years we have seen the flowering of campus struggles against racism, rape, and sexual violence, amid campaigns for union recognition and the right of faculty to control** the atmosphere of **their classrooms. Whether or not we on campus see them as political spaces, the right wing certainly does. They have raged against "safe spaces"** and what they refer to as "political correctness." **While reasonable people may debate** the merits and meaning of **concepts like safe spaces, we should not confuse those discussions with an attack from the right** that is intended **to create "unsafe spaces" where racial antagonism, sexual predation, and homophobia are considered rites of passage** or, as the new president describes as it, "locker room" behavior. **These**, unfortunately, **are only smaller battles happening within the larger transformation of colleges and universities into the leading edge of various neoliberal practices**, from the growing use of "contingent labor" to the proliferation of online education, to certificate and master's programs that are only intended to increase the coffers while adding little to nothing to the intellect or critical thinking capacities of its participants. Robin Kelley reminds us that **universities will "never be engines for social transformation," but they are places that often reflect, and** in some situations **magnify, the tensions that exist in society** more generally. There is a relationship between the two. The struggles for academic units in Black and Chicano studies in the 1960s were born of the political insurgencies that captivated those communities while shaking the entire country to its core. Robert Warrior reminds us that in Native studies there is a commitment to crash through the firewall that is often intended to silo scholarship from the communities it is often derived from. He writes that a "clear predominance exists in Native studies of scholarship that obligates itself in clear ways to being connected to the real lives of real peoples living in real time. More than just connected, a hallmark of Native studies scholarship is a preoccupation with how the work of scholars and scholarship translates itself into the process of making the Indigenous world a better, more just, and more equitable place to live, thrive, and provide for future generations." **Scholarship alone is not politics, but the study of history, theory, and politics can imbue our political practice with depth and confidence. Today there is a** [End Page 230] **need to connect the legacy of resistance, struggle, and transformation with a new generation of students and activists who are desperately looking for hope that their world is not coming to an end**. To be sure, there is deep malaise and fear about the meaning of a Trump presidency. It is not to be underestimated. Anyone who is so open about his antipathy and disgust with entire populations of people should be believed when he promises to amplify the suffering in this society. And **we should not underestimate the obstacles that confront a political Left that is deeply fractured and politically divided. But we should also remember that the future is not already written. It has yet to be cast in stone. The stories of our demise have been predicted over and over again**. The marches that erupted in the immediate aftermath of the Trump victory give a sense of the resistance to come. Who could have predicted that the day after Trump's inauguration between three and four million people in the United States would take to the streets to defiantly resist and oppose the new president? In fact, **we have already seen in the last decade the eruption of mass struggle embodied in** the **Occupy** movement **and** most recently the rise of **Black Lives Matter**. **The challenge to Trump**, however, **will demand more than moral outrage. It requires a strategy, and strategy can be developed only when we have political clarity on the nature of Trumpism**. The queer theorist Lisa Duggan made an important observation at the association's annual meeting last November in Denver. In an emergency session assessing the US presidential election, there was a sense of urgency that we have talked enough and now is the time to act. But Duggan made the important observation that **while action is always necessary, we must also create the political and intellectual spaces necessary for debate, argument, and discussion. We cannot act in intelligent ways without understanding why we are acting and what we are acting against**. In other words, **politics and ideas matter as much as the action necessary to transform conditions we abhor**. This may seem like a minor or even self-evident point, but **there is a constant critique that we are often "preaching to the choir"** or a question about the usefulness of sitting in yet "another" meeting. But **this most recent electoral season has also shown that the choir has different pitches and cadences. The choir can be off-key. This is not to suggest that we should all agree or mute the areas of disagreement and tension, but we should be clear about those differences. Just as we should be clear on what is agreed on and what are the bases on which we can overcome differences and unite. These various position s cannot be intuited; they are discovered through patient debate**. **Beyond the culture of respectful** internal **debate** and discussion, **academics** also **have something to contribute. The confidence necessary to effectively** [End Page 231] engage in **struggle is not easily attained in an atmosphere of defeat** and defensiveness. **Those are the moments to draw on the history of resistance** in the movements of the oppressed. Often the political establishment better understands the power of this history than those who are its rightful inheritors. There is a reason that the federal government invested so heavily in the repression of the Black liberation movement of the 1960s. The point was not only to defeat the struggle; it was intended to snuff out its legacy. In significant ways the repression has carried on until this very day. There is a reason sixty-nine-year-old Assata Shakur remains a political exile in Cuba and our government continues to keep a $2 million bounty on her head while shamefully including her on the misnamed terrorist watch list. It is the same reason that the Angola Three—Robert King, Albert Woodfox, and Herman Wallace, Black Panther members held in the infamous prison in Louisiana—collectively spent 113 years in solitary confinement as political punishment for their ideas. It is the same reason 45 years after the Attica Prison Rebellion in 1971, federal and state officials continue to hide the truth of its brutal repression. The most important, and thus damning, archives that the historian Heather Ann Thompson used to write her book on Attica have, once again, disappeared from public scrutiny. **Not only does the political establishment want to punish and demonize the voices for Black liberation, but** more important, **they want to bury the legacy, the history, and politics of the movement itself**. **It is clear to understand why. It is not irrational hatred of African Americans; it is quite simply because when Black people go into struggle, it unravels the dominant narrative, or the fabrications at the heart of American mythology—that we are a democratic and just society**. Only a cursory knowledge of Black history—and the history of indigenous people in this land—shatters the United States' obsession with its own self-idealization as an "exceptional" society. In doing so, **Black struggles are examples of how the "margins" can upend and destabilize the supposed center**. And **perhaps even more important is how those struggles within the various iterations of the Black Freedom movement become a platform for other liberation struggles to emerge. This was the legacy of the Black insurgency of the 1960s. As a result, the political establishment distorts this history and distorts its radical content**, its radical leaders, and their voices. This is not just a lesson of who gets to tell history; this legacy of repression affects the movements of today. The attempt to distort and bury the struggles from a previous period of Black rebellion deprives the current generation of the politics, strategy, and tactics of our movement historically. It diminishes the analyses and the political tools necessary to help forge a way forward in [End Page 232] this political moment. But perhaps, most perniciously, the efforts to disconnect people, especially young people, moving into struggle from their radical roots and history, are to dramatically limit our political imaginations so that we believe that the best we can hope for in this life is a Black president or a more responsive and less inept Democratic Party: the establishment wants us to believe that life as it currently is, is the best we can hope for. This is why, for example, the scholar and activist Angela Davis is so important because she is a connection to our radical history. She is the living legacy of a political movement that put liberation at its center. And you can see her political and intellectual fingerprints all over our movement today—from the politics of Black feminism and the concept of intersectionality to the demand of abolition and the rejection of the very normative idea that humans should be surveilled, caged, or killed by the state. It is no wonder that her politics and activism have deeply influenced many of the Black queer women at the heart of the Black Lives Matter movement. She compels us to think more deeply, to get to the root of the matter, to be radical in our analysis, and to struggle harder—not just in the world as it is but for the world as we want it to be. Davis is but a single example. There are many other examples where those from a previous era of struggle whom we respect and honor connect our searching present with a previous moment of insurgency and struggle. In our lifetimes, **we have never been more in need of the inspiration, the lessons, and the strength of those who have bequeathed to us the certainties and uncertainties of home today. The challenge continues to lie in our abilities to transcend, through argument, debate, and struggle, the many paths that crisscross and potentially divide our resistance to hatred, bigotry, and oppression. This is a call for solidarity, but not on the basis of papering over the different experiences that create different levels of consciousness within our society. Solidarity is most palpable when there is recognition that our fates are connected and that an injury to one is an injury to all. Another world is truly possible, but only if we are willing to struggle for it**.

#### 2 -- Extinction isn’t white paranoia and apocalyptic reps are good

**Thompson 18** [Nicole Akoukou. Chicago-based creative writer. 4-6-2018. "Why I will not allow the fear of a nuclear attack to be white-washed." RaceBaitR. http://racebaitr.com/2018/04/06/2087/#]

**I couldn’t spare empathy for a white** woman **whose biggest fear was something that hadn’t happened yet and might not. Meanwhile, my most significant fears were in motion**: **women and men dying in cells** after being wrongly imprisoned, **choked out for peddling cigarettes, or shot to death** during ‘routine’ traffic stops. I twitch when my partner is late, worried that a cantankerous cop has brutalized or shot him because he wouldn’t prostrate himself. **As a woman of color, I am aware of** the **multiple types of violence that threaten me currently—not theoretically. Street harassment**, excessively affecting me as a Black woman, has blindsided me since I was eleven. A premature body meant **being** **catcalled** before I’d discussed the birds and the bees. It meant being **followed, whistled at, or groped**. As an adult, while navigating through neighborhoods with extinguished street lights, I noticed the correlation between women’s safety and street lighting—as well as the fact that Black and brown neighborhoods were never as brightly lit as those with a more significant white population. I move quickly through those unlit spaces, never comforted by the inevitable whirl of red and blue sirens. In fact, it’s always been the contrary. Ever so often, cops approach me in their vehicle’s encouraging me to “Hurry along,” “Stay on the sidewalk,” or “Have a good night.” My spine stiffening, I never believed they endorsed my safety. Instead, I worried that I’d be accused of an unnamed accusation, corned by a cop who preys on Black women, or worse. A majority of my 50-minute bus ride from the southside of Chicago to the north to join these women for the birthday celebration was spent reading articles about citywide shootings. I began with a Chicago Tribute piece titled “33 people shot, seven fatally, in 13 hours,” then toppled into a barrage of RIP posts on Facebook and ended with angry posts about police brutality on Tumblr. You might guess, by the time I arrived to dinner I wasn’t in the mood for the “I can’t believe we’re all going to die because Trump is an idiot” shit. I shook my head, willing the meal to be over, and was grateful when the check arrived just as someone was asking me about my hair. My thinking wasn’t all too different from Michael Harriot’s ‘Why Black America Isn’t Worried About the Upcoming Nuclear Holocaust.” While the meal was partly pleasant, **I departed thinking, “fear of nuclear demolition is just some white shit**.” Sadly, that thought would not last long. **I still vibe with Harriot’s statement, “Black people have lived under the specter of having our existence erased on a white man’s whim since we stepped on**to the **shore** at Jamestown Landing.” **However**, a friend—a Black friend—ignited my nuclear paranoia by sharing theories about when it might happen and who faced the greatest threat. In an attempt to ease my friend’s fear, I leaned in to listen but accidentally toppled down the rabbit hole too. I forked through curated news feeds. I sifted through “fake news,” “actual news,” and foreign news sources. Suddenly, an idea took root: **nuclear strike would disproportionately impact Black people, brown people, and low-income individuals. North Korea won’t target the plain sight racists of Portland**, Oregon, **the violently microaggressive liberals of the rural Northwest, or the white-hooded klansmen** **of** Diamondhead, **Mississippi. No, under the instruction of the supreme leader Kim Jong-un, North Korea will likely strike densely populated urban areas**, such as Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington D.C., and New York City. **These locations stand-out as targets for a nuclear strike because they are densely populated** U.S. population centers. **Attacking the heart of the nation or populous cities would translate to more casualties**. With that in mind, it’s not lost on me that **the most populous cities in the United States boast sizeable diverse populations, or more plainly put: Black populations.** This shit stresses me out! There’s a creeping chill that follows me, a silent alarm that rings each time my Google alert chimes letting me know that Donald Trump has yet again provoked Kim Jong-Un, a man who allegedly killed his very own uncle. I’ve grown so pressed by the idea of nuclear holocaust that my partner and I started gathering non-perishables, candlesticks, a hand-crank radio, and other must-buy items that can be banked in a shopping cart. **The practice of preparing for a nuclear holocaust sometimes feels comical, particularly when acknowledging that there has long been a war on Black people in this country**. Blackness is bittersweet in flavor. We are blessed with the melanized skin, the MacGyver-like inventiveness of our foremothers, and our blinding brightness—but the anti-blackness that we experience is also blinding as well as stifling. We are stuck by rigged systems, punished with the prison industrial complex, housing discrimination, pay discrimination, and worse. We get side-eyes from strangers when we’re “loitering,” and the police will pull us over for driving “too fast” in a residential neighborhood. We get murdered for holding cell phones while standing in our grandmother’s backyard. The racism that strung up our ancestors, kept them sequestered to the back of the bus and kept them in separate and unequal schools still lives. It lives, and it’s more palpable than dormant. To me, this means one thing: Trump’s America isn’t an unfortunate circumstance, it’s a homecoming event that’s hundreds of years in the making, no matter how many times my white friends’ say, “He’s not my president.” **In light of this homecoming, we now flirt with a new, larger fear of a Black genocide**. **America has always worked towards Black eradication through a steady stream of life-threatening inequality, but nuclear war on American soil would be swift**. And **for this reason I’ve grown tired of whiteness** **being at the center of the nuclear conversation. The race-neutral approach to the dialogue, and a tendency to continue to promote the idea that missiles will land in suburban and rural backyards, instead of inner-city playgrounds, is false.** “The Day After,” the iconic, highest-rated television film in history, aired November 20, 1983. More than 100 million people tuned in to watch a film postulating a war between the Soviet Union and the United States. The film, which would go on to affect President Ronald Reagan and policymakers’ nuclear intentions, shows the “true effects of nuclear war on average American citizens.” The Soviet-targeted areas featured in the film include Higginsville, Kansas City, Sedalia, Missouri, as well as El Dorado Springs, Missouri. They depict the destruction of the central United States, and viewers watch as full-scale nuclear war transforms middle America into a burned wasteland. Yet unsurprisingly, the **devastation from the attack is completely white-washed, leaving out the more likely victims which are the more densely populated (Black) areas**. **Death tolls would be high for white populations, yes, but large-scale losses of Black and brown folks would outpace that number, due to placement and poverty. That number would be pushed higher by limited access to premium health care, wealth, and resources. The effects of radiation sickness, burns, compounded injuries, and malnutrition would throttle Black and brown communities and would mark us for generations. It’s for that reason that we have to do more to foster** disaster **preparedness among Black people where we can. Black people deserve the space to explore nuclear unease, even if we have competing threats, anxieties**, and worries. Jacqui Patterson, Director of the Environmental and Climate Justice Initiative, once stated: African American communities are disproportionately vulnerable to and impacted by natural (and unnatural) catastrophes. Our socio-economic vulnerability is based on multiple factors including our lack of wealth to cushion us, our disproportionate representation in lower quality housing stock, and our relative lack of mobility, etc.

#### 3 -- Methodological pluralism is a necessary aspect of critique.

**Bleiker ’14** [Roland, professor of international relations at the university of Queensland. “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2. June 17, 2014]

This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement. For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (**IR**) scholarship **is** what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and **dangerous** process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, **because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues**, **from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can** thus **have far-reaching consequences**. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. **Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique**. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates **multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena**. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, **a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should**, in a **way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot** (p. 102). **In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods** even when—**or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to** the tools pioneered and championed by **positivist social sciences**. **The benefit of** such a **methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives**. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how **reification may be “checked at the source”** and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.