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#### In the era of Post-Fordist capitalism neoliberalism has changed the operation of power. Resilience discourse turns objectification into a means of subjectification. It makes looking even more efficient and profitable than simple objectification could ever be. Recognizing and affirming the affective labor of the resilient performer, the spectator feeds the performer’s individual overcoming Into a second-order therapeutic narrative. This code interprets all modes of semiotic representation linking together affects to produce a “Resilient subject” that normalizes capitalist control of subjecthood.

**James 15**. Robin James is an Associate Professor of Philosophy @ UNC Charlotte. “Resilience & Melancholy: Pop Music, Feminism, Neoliberalism, Publisher: Zero Books p. 88-92

Resilience must be performed explicitly, legibly, and spectacularly. Overcoming is necessary but insufficient; to count and function as resilience, this overcoming must be accomplished in a visible or otherwise legible and consumable manner. Overcoming is a type of “affective labor” which, as Steven Shaviro puts it, “is productive only to the extent that it is a public performance. It cannot unfold in the hidden depths; it must be visible and audible” (PCA 49n33) In order to tune into feminine resilience and feed it back into its power supply, MRWaSP has to perceive it as such. “Look,! Overcame!” is the resilient subject’s maxim or mantra. Gender and race have always been “visible identities,” to use philosopher Linda Martin Alcoff’s term, identities strongly tied to one’s outward physical appearance. However, gendered/racialized resilience isn’t visible in the same way that conventional gender and racial identities are visible. To clarify these differences, it’s helpful to think of resilience in terms of a “Look, I overcame!” imperative. “Look, I Overcame!” Is easy to juxtapose to Frantz Fanon’s “Look a Negro!”, which is the touch stone for his analysis of gendered racialization in “The Fact of Blackness.” In both cases, looking is a means of crafting race/gender identities and distributing white patriarchal privilege. But, in the same way that resilience discourse “upgrades” traditional methods for crafting identities and distributing privilege, the “looking” in “Look, I Overcame’” is an upgrade on the “looking” in “Look, a Negro” According to Fanon, the exclamation “Look, a Negro!” racializes him as a black man. To be “a Negro” is to be objectified by the white supremacist gaze. This gaze fixes him as an object, rather than an ambiguous transcendence (which is a more nuanced way of describing the existentialist concept of subjectivity). “The black man,” as Fanon argues, “has no ontological resistance for the white man” (BSWM 110) because, as an object and not a mutually-recognized subject, he cannot return the white man’s gaze (“The Look” that is so important to Sartre’s theory of subjectivity in Being & Nothingness). The LIO narrative differs from Fanon’s account in the same way it differs from Iris Young’s account of feminine body comportment: in resilience discourse, objectification isn’t an end but a means, any impediment posed by the damage wrought by the white/male gaze Is a necessary prerequisite for subjectivity, agency, and mutual recognition. In other words, being looked at isn’t an impediment, but a resource. Resilience discourse turns objectification (being looked at) into a means of subjectificatlon (overcoming). It also makes looking even more efficient and profitable than simple objectification could ever be. Recognizing and affirming the affective labor of the resilient performer, the spectator feeds the performer’s individual overcoming Into a second-order therapeutic narrative: our approbation of her overcoming is evidence of our own overcoming of our past prejudices. This spectator wants to be seen by a wider audience as someone who answers the resilient feminine subject’s hail, “Look, I Overcame’. Just as individual feminine subjects use their resilience as proof of their own goodness, MRWaSP uses the resilience of its “good girls” as proof that they’re the “good guys” — that its social and ethical practices are truly just, and that we really mean it this time when we say everyone is equal. For example, the “resilience” of “our” women is often contrasted with the supposed “fragility” of Third-World women of color. Or, in domestic US race-gender politics, the resilience of some African-American women (their bootstraps-style class ascendance) is contrasted to the continued fragility of other African-American women, and thus used to reinforce class distinctions among blacks. There are a million different versions of this general story: “our” women are already liberated — they saved themselves —but, to riff on Gayatri Spivak, “brown women need saving from brown men.” Most mainstream conversations about Third-World women are versions of this story: discussions of “Muslim” veiling, female circumcision, sweatshops, poverty ‘development.” they’re all white-saviorist narratives meant to display MRWaSP’s own resilience. Look, I Overcame!” upgrades ‘Look, a Negro’ by (a) recycling objectification into overcoming and (b) compounding looking, so that one can profit from others’ resilience, treating their overcoming as one’s own overcoming. This upgrade in white supremacist patriarchy requires a concomitant upgrade in looking.” This shift in looking practices parallels developments in film and media aesthetics. As Steven Shaviro has argued, the values, techniques, and compositional strategies most common in contemporary mainstream Western cinema — like Michael Bay’s Transformers—are significantly different than the ones used in modernist and post-modernist cinema, and that these differences in media production correlate to broader shifts in the means of capitalist and ideological production. Neoliberalism’s aesthetic is, he argues, “post-cinematic.” This post-cinematic aesthetic applies not just to film and media, but to resilience discourse. Its performance practices and looking relations configured by the “Look. I Overcame!” imperative, resilience is, in a way, another type of post-cinematic medium. In the next section I use Shaviro’s theory of post-cinematic media to identify some specific ways in which traditional patriarchal tools are updated to work compatibly with MRWaSP resilience discourse. The looking in the “Look, I Overcame!” narrative is not the same kind of looking described by concepts like “the male gaze” or “controlling images” This looking is a type of deregulated MRWaSP visualization.

#### Affective investment in the maintenance of sentimental public spheres lubricates the wheels of liberalism, mobilizing fantasies of collective desires that undergird neoliberal regimes of governance

**Berlant 8** [Lauren Berlant, Professor of English at the University of Chicago, Introduction of *THE FEMALE COMPLAINT: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American Culture*, Duke University Press: Durham and London, 2008]

Sentimentality: Love, Then Repeat As the preface suggested, the intimate public of femininity has always conjoined the very act of consumption to a powerful hunger to know and adapt the ways other people survive being oppressed by life. The therapeutic intensity of this drive is so conventional to sentimentality it comprises a story that barely needs to be told, a promise of aesthetic recognition and redemption whose consumption is its own reward. Such an economy is an important part of the sense of belonging an intimate public provides: the cliché and the convention represent “insider knowledge.” It would be easy to dismiss the social productivity of this kind of reward, as it associates subjective confirmation with fundamental changes of the sort the privileged rarely want to risk. But the mechanism of sentimental saturation of the intimate sphere with materials and signs of consumer citizenship has been crucial to what Mark Seltzer has called the “pathological public sphere” of the contemporary United States, which Karen Halttunen locates in the sensationalism of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century.43 The Uncle Tom genealogy is notable precisely because its sensationalism was a politically powerful suturing device of a bourgeois revolutionary aesthetic. The contradictions evoked by that phrase will be played out variously throughout each chapter: what links them is the centrality of affective intensity and emotional bargaining amid structural inequity, and the elaboration and management of ambivalent attachments to the world as such, the as-suchness of the world.44 I have been speaking of conventions, of stereotypes, and forms, the diacritics of congealed feeling that characterize the cultural scene of sentimentality: behind this is a desire to see the sentimental itself as a form—a dynamic pattern—not just a content with scenic themes, like that of weeping, sacrifice, and sanctified death. As when a refrigerator is opened by a person hungry for something other than food, the turn to sentimental rhetoric at moments of social anxiety constitutes a generic wish for an unconflicted world, one wherein structural inequities, not emotions and intimacies, are epiphenomenal.45 In this imaginary world the sentimental subject is connected to others who share the same sense that the world is out of joint, without necessarily having the same view of the reasons or solutions: historically, the sentimental intervention has tended to involve mobilizing a fantasy scene of collective desire, instruction, and identification that endures within the contingencies of the everyday. The politico-sentimental therefore exists paradoxically: it seeks out the monumental time of emotional recognition, a sphere of dreaming and memory, and translates that sense into an imaginary realm of possible acting, where agency is somehow unconstrained by the normative conventions of the real as it presents itself; and it holds the real accountable to what affective justice fantasy has constructed. This is to say that where sentimental ideology is, so will there be a will to separate and compartmentalize fundamental psychically felt social ambivalences, so that a sense of potentiality can be experienced enduringly, motivatingly, and even utopianly. The downside is that, often, all of the forces in play can seem formally equivalent. For example, the critique of patriarchal familialism that sentimental texts constantly put forth can be used to argue against the normativity of the family; at the same time, the sacred discourse of family values also sustained within this domain works to preserve the fantasy of the family as a space of sociability in which flow, intimacy, and identification across difference can bridge life across generations and model intimate sociability for the social generally. Likewise, at the same time that bourgeois nationalism promotes a sentimental attachment among strangers that is routed through the form of the nation, it also abjures the sentimental when the idiom of certain claims is inconvenient. (Sentimentalists talk about the emotional costs of injustice, not the material ones; the personal impacts of not changing, not the structural benefits of continuity.) Arguments for rationality and individual affective and appetitive self-management in the everyday have also been used to build and to critique identity discourses associated with historically subordinated U.S. populations;46 at the same time sentimental rhetoric is mobilized to describe everything from the timeless psychic unity of citizens possessing a national identity to the fragility of normal culture itself when faced with challenges to it.47 Meanwhile, social progressives have for over a century represented the ordinary effects of structural suffering in tactically sentimental ways—modes of testimony, witnessing, visual documentation about the personal impact of structural subordination—to critique the racist/patriarchal/capitalist world; now that same world has assimilated those genres to describe the psychic effects of feminism/multiculturalism on those who once felt truly free, nationally speaking. What conclusions can we reach from this jumble of ambitions to use and refuse sentimentality in the political sphere? That politics, mediated by publics, demands expressive assurance, while political subjectivity is, nonetheless, incoherent; that ideological incoherence or attachment to contradictory ethics and ways of life is not a failure but a condition of mass belonging; that ambivalent critique produces domains (such as intimate publics) to one side of politics that flourish insofar as they can allow the circulation of the open secrets of insecurity and instability without those revelations and spectacles engendering transformative or strongly resistant action in the idiom of political agency as it is usually regarded. Tracking mass-mediated norms of belonging in the affective register and conventions of engendering emotional solidarities helps us to understand the reproduction of normative life amid serious doubts about the probability that anyone, except the lucky, will be able to forge durable relations of reciprocity among intimates or strangers; such fractures produce the complaint as a register not merely of a stuckness but of the conditions of bargaining that allow people to maintain both their critical knowledge and their attachments to what disappoints.

#### Particularly, the 1AC’s over identification with the victimized narrative of victimization produces social relations from pathology enables ecologically destructive subjects in the name of human exceptionalism and allows for the victimizers to justify their actions

**Samuels 2015**[Dr. Robert Samuels is a Senior Lecturer of English at UCSB has doctorates in Psychology and English, and he is the President of UC-AFT. “A psychoanalytic intervention to fight climate change: Reading This Changes Everything”. Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society (2015) 20, 86–89.] VR

Our first psychoanalytic intervention into climate change then tells us that appeals to people’s self-interest may not be enough to persuade people to stop participating in a system that is projected to destroy our way of life. If people actually enjoy painful experiences, and they would rather repeat instead of changing destructive behaviors, our normal ways of doing politics will not work. As Žižek argues in relation to ideology, even if people know that what they are doing is destructive or delusional, they still do it anyway because it brings them so much enjoyment. This theory lines up with Freud’s notion that many psychoanalytic patients start to resist treatment when they begin to overcome their problems. Here Freud locates an unconscious drive for failure. The death drive and unconscious masochism undermine our desire to see politics on the level of rational self-interest. If people enjoy their self-destructive behaviors, they may not mind if they are participating in the devastation of our environment. Unfortunately, even a thinker like Naomi Klein cannot quite accept this view of human nature, and so she must maintain the illusion of perfect rationality as she continues to find political reasons for psychological problems. For instance, Klein follows the traditional liberal intellectual tradition of arguing that the political ideology of a relatively small group of wealthy elites is what prevents us from taking on climate change. Of course, on one level she is right, but on a deeper level, we have to look at what is driving this ideology, and why so many non-elites buy into it. Moreover, we have to ask why wealthy people are willing to sacrifice their prosperity and the prosperity of their children in order to fight against state-sponsored policies to protect the environment. Once again, short-term thinking can be blamed, but does this go far enough? A psychoanalytic reading tells us that ideologies are driven by fantasies, and these fantasies are focused on scenes of victimization. For example, many wealthy people feel that they are victims of high taxes and governmental regulations. They also feel that the poor, immigrants, and people of color victimize the wealthy by making the rich pay for costly, wasteful welfare programs. In this psychopathological structure, the wealthy are imagined to be victims, as the poor are seen as victimizers. Psychoanalysis tell us not only that people enjoy their fantasies of victimization, but also that victim identity and identification helps people to rationalize and justify their destructive behaviors. Since the victim is always justified, and you cannot blame the victim, imagining a scene of victimization gives power and innocence to the victimized. For instance, after 9/11, the US could justify its attacks on other countries because the most powerful nation in the world was now positioned to be a victim, and no one wanted to question the actions of the victimized. At the heart, then, of the neoliberal ideology, which Klein explores, is the shared fantasy of the wealthy being victimized by taxes, the government, the poor, the media, and liberal professors. This means that we are once again not dealing with a discourse that is rational or subject to rational change. Making matters worse, many liberals have their own version of victim identification that blocks them from taking on the fight against climate change and free-market capitalism. On one level, the liberal fantasy of victimization relies on blaming the evil conservatives for all of the world’s problems. Although we should not dismiss the real destructive effects of conservative policies and ideologies, the focus on conservatives as the cause for climate change and the failure of our political systems serves to let liberal citizens and politicians off the hook. Here the fantasy of abuse allows the victim to remain innocent and pure, as the perpetrator is the only one who has any role to play in the structure. One of the dangers of the analysis I am proposing here is that it can function to blame the victim. This issue has haunted psychoanalysis. At the start of his formulation of psychoanalysis, Freud thought that all of his female patients were actually abused by their fathers, and then he started to doubt this, and he came up with the idea that some people fantasized about being abused. For good reason, many people are bothered by this Freudian notion, and yet it gets to the heart of psychoanalysis, and a very uncomfortable truth, which is that it does not matter for the unconscious if an event is real or illusionary. What matters is how this event is interpreted and the role it plays in the individual’s mental life. Returning to politics, on a fundamental level it does not matter if conservatives are to blame for climate change or our failure to fight it; what matters is how we all participate in this system of self-destruction and whether we can give up the fantasies that prevent us from fixing the problem. However, since liberals want to see conservatives as the perpetrators of all of our problems, liberals do not have to deal with their own role, and so liberals remain innocent victims of climate change. It turns out that the central problem of psychoanalysis is also the central problem of global politics and the future of our world: how do you get people to give up the self-destructive fantasies that guide their perceptions and beliefs? Part of this problem concerns what allows people to move away from actions and thoughts that stabilize identity and bring unconscious enjoyment through suffering. As Lacan argued, psychoanalysis is centered on people discovering and then giving up their fundamental fantasies. As long as conservatives see themselves as victims of Big Government and liberals see themselves as victims of conservatives, nothing can change. We need a new investment in a shared system, and this may happen if people realize that our shared environment is becoming uninhabitable. Strangely, Klein’s great book may not help things because it feeds into the conservative sense of being victimized by liberal thinkers as it helps liberals blame conservatives for the problem. We need a political discourse that breaks this dance between two complementing fantasy structures.

#### The impact is an unbound nihilism that causes resentment. Resisting the conditions of constantly reproduced violence legitimizes the coherence of that system itself causes colonial

Evans and Reid 14. Brad Evans, professor of international relations at the University of Lapland, Finland and Julian Reid, senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Bristol, Resilient Life, 2014, pg. 110

Anybody who has experienced immunization will appreciate the violence of the encounter. The whole process begins with the awareness of some vaguely looming threat which promises in the worst case an extremely violent ending. To pre-empt this happening, the subject is physically penetrated by the alien body with a controlled level of the lethal substance which, although producing violent sickness, is a fate less than death. Such violence unto oneself offers to counter violence with violence such that life may carry on living in spite of the dangers we are incapable of securing ourselves against. It is to give over to a form of self-harm albeit in a way that is actively desired and positively conceived. How else may we live otherwise? Resilience follows a similar logic. It encourages that we partake in the violence of the world to keep death at bay. For in the process of learning to live through the insecurity of the times, the subject is asked to incorporate the catastrophic intellectually, viscerally and affectively, thereby providing certain immunization against a more endangering fate. Indeed, since the ultimate litmus test is to bring to question the worst case scenario, the future cannot appear to us as anything other than completely monstrous. What, however, is actually slain as the future is wagered by the violence of the present may only become revealed with the passage of time. None of this operates outside of the realm of power politics. We only have to consider here (a) the moral judgements and political stakes associated with HIV as a pandemic that is more than simply biological, and (b) the development of viral analogies to explain more generally the problems ‘infecting’ societies from terror to criminality to evidence the point. Immunization is precisely about exposing oneself to something that is potentially lethal, thereby raising the thresh- old level for existence such that violence is normalized on account of our vulnerabilities to that which may be tempered but remains undefeatable. We are drawn here to Stellan Rye’s (1913) silent horror movie The Student from Prague (Der Student von Prag) which has inspired a number of compelling literary and cinematic classics. In this tragic tale of poverty and vio- lence, the impoverished student, Balduin, makes a bargain with the Devil as he exchanges the reflection of image for more immediate compensations. Upon eventually seeing himself, however, the student is avenged by an angry double that begins to wreak havoc as it seeks out revenge in light of its betrayal. Following an eventual violent con- frontation the student has with his double, Balduin shat- ters the mirror that is central to the plot, and invariably destroys the fantasy of endangerment which also became the source of his afflicted curse. Inevitably, however, since the double was an essential element of this Faustian agree- ment, in killing the violent double, so the student kills himself. Otto Rank famously related this to the narcissistic self whose very sense of loneliness and alienation is caused by an anguish of a fear of death; even though it is precisely the violence of the pact which pushes the subject further towards the precipice. Whilst it is tempting to read this in familiar dialectical terms, there is a more sophisticated double move at work here, as the violence is already encoded within the initial act of demonic violation before the tragic encounter. For the double merely highlights the self-propelling tendency, from the fantasy of endangerment to the reality of the catastrophic. There is also a semantic interchange at work in Rye’s Doppelganger as it stakes out the choice between a violated/violent life and eventual death. Since reason or logic prove utterly incapable of explaining the condition of Balduin’s existence, let alone offering any promise of salvation from the oppressive situ- ation to which he is fatefully bound, the double serves as an important metaphor for the narcissism of the times, as the subject wilfully accepts a violation and all the violence this entails in exchange for an illusion or fantasy of secu- rity which proves in the end to have been imbued with the catastrophic from the outset. Our understanding of the fundamental tenets of violence is invariably transformed such that we are forced to think about forms of violation/ intervention prior to any sense of dialectical enmity. Premetic Violence René Girard’s thesis Violence and the Sacred offers a theory of violence that is exclusively bound to the desire to ‘over- come’ tragedy. To develop this theory, Girard specifically relates to the classic Greek play by Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, which he uses to illustrate the relationship between tragic dispossession and violence. It is through the tale of Oedipus and his return to reclaim the realm from which he was abandoned that we uncover a genesis of sacrificial violence that is linked to some ‘past tragedy’.39 Oedipus thus epitomizes the motif of the lost prince whose modes of contestation can be understood through competing claims to the ‘same object of desire’. The story follows that when two uncompromising entities vie over the same object of desire, violence necessarily erupts. Through Gir- ard’s decoding of the Oedipus myth, what we therefore find is any attempt to re-possess the object of desire neces- sarily requires the guilt of those currently in possession – a sacrificial victim. Thus, to overcome tragedy one must come from the ‘outside’ – a violently destined return that can only be justified by making a claim to the original sin, or what Girard terms a return to the ‘original scene’. However, as Sophocles tells it, such violence is more than simply a reclamation of that which has been taken. The violence of the already dispossessed desires to re-establish the authentic order which has been falsely appropriated – the paradise lost. Importantly, for Girard, such violence is not a relation of difference but is more defined by the logic of mimesis: ‘At first, each of the protagonists believes that he can quell the violence; at the end each succumbs to it. All are drawn unwittingly into a violent reciprocity – which they always think they are outside of, because they all initially came from outside and mistake this positional and temporary advantage for a permanent and funda- mental superiority’.40 Plunging into an opposition which ‘reduces the protagonists into a uniform condition of vio- lence’, all claims to ‘difference’ are effectively ‘eclipsed’ by ‘a resurgence of reciprocity’.41 It has been common to read Rye’s doubling as a clear example of mimetic behaviour. This has found clear applications from Hegelian-inspired revolutionary accounts of dialectical reasoning, to Frantz Fanon’s theory of (post) colonial brutality, onto the exceptional violence of Schmitt’s sovereign decisionism. While accepting how this logic has played a structural role in the demarcation of certain regimes of violence which came to hallmark distinct marks of separation, we need to depart from this logic if we are to make sense of the violence of the catastrophic imaginary. What, in other words, becomes of violence once we reconceptualize the idea of the original scene and its logics of exposure such that violence itself becomes virtually ordained? That is to say, what becomes of violence once it begins to precede any dialectical arrangement? Mimetic violence, we have noted, is objectifiable. Based upon establishing various forms of mystical foundations, it has a distinct materiality to it that permits clear lines of demarcation and embodiment. These work both spatially and temporally. The object for violence is locatable, while the time of its occurrence offers clear (if sometimes contested) conceptions as to its beginning and ending. It benefits, then, from the guarantees of identification and the ability to represent that which must be vanquished at a given moment ‘in time’. The virtual nature of the violence endured by the resilient subject offers no such guarantees. Collapsing the space-time continuum of mimetic rivalry, it is merely projected into the future without the prospect of bounce-back. Internalized, however, into the very living conditions of the subject now permanently under siege, the violence is no less real. As any author of horror fiction will tell, the mind can be a terrifying place to inhabit. Once the source of endangerment becomes unknowable by definition, everything becomes the potential source of a violent encounter. Resilience challenges the logic of mimetic violence, therefore, in two fundamental ways. Firstly, it shows us that our only way of dealing with endangerment is to absorb its lethal tendencies. That which has the potential to destroy must become part of society’s make-up and its epistemic fabric. We too, in the process, become more lethally endowed as a result. Invariably, the more lethal we become, the more we end up embracing the biophysical conditions of our potential undoing as a principle form of human conditioning. The body accepts the lethality on account of preparedness. Secondly, there is an outward projection against that which could potentially threaten our existence. But this projection doesn’t connect to any mimetic rival. We have no clear sense of what it is that so endangers in its particular guise, only a generalizable indication that something which is part of the integral whole will eventually bring about our final demise. Deprived, then, of the potential to ‘at last stand’ upon a terrain whose forms of endangerment were known in advance, we continue to walk through a veritable minefield of potential disasters of a multi-dimensional nature, not knowing when the explosion will happen, with little comfort provided by the intellectual comforts of the past, and with no fence on the horizon beyond which relative security may be achieved and freedom from endangerment realized. The only solution, we are told, remains to expose oneself to all its disastrous permutations so that we may be better prepared against those already charged and yet to detonate, along with those yet to even be inserted into this catastrophic topography. But what does it mean to say that violence is now beyond representation? And what type of reality are we producing if we are calling into question the depths of field that once gave qualitative and quantitative meaning to our relations to violence? For Paul Virilio, whose work we may connect to the premetic, this inaugurates ‘the futurism of the instant’ whose kairos shatters all metaphysical meaning: This spells disorientation in knowledge acquired over the course of millennia regarding the spatial environment and the cycle of seasons; an integral accident in knowledge of history as well as of the usual concrete geography that goes with it, the unity of place and time of a secular history. No doubt this is the fatal novelty of the historic tragedy befalling humanity and a progress that will no longer be exclusively technologistical and extra-planetary, but merely human, ‘all too human’. Masochism vis-à-vis an abhorred past that no longer passes muster is now symmetrically doubled with a masochism in relation to a future where, for want of fear, we will, this time, have space, all the space of a miniscule planet reduced to nothing, or as good as, by the progress of our discoveries.42 Nihilism Unbound Writing in the nineteenth century, Nietzsche argued that nothing was more deeply characteristic of the modern world than the power of nihilism.43 Nietzsche’s intervention here allowed us to move beyond the well-rehearsed attack upon Platonic reason or Christian faith, to focus instead upon ‘the radical repudiation of value, meaning and desirability’.44 Nihilism, thus understood, referred to the triumph of reactive thinking. It was all about the negation of life as it appeared to be incapable of affirming that which is properly and creatively different to human existence. Hence, for Nietzsche, nihilism was not simply reduc- ible to some historical event in time, i.e. an exceptional moment in history which could be shamefully written into annals of human suffering. Nihilism was the recurring motor of history as the operation of power leads to a will to nothingness that strips life of any purposeful meaning. Crucially, as Nietzsche understood, this repudiation of the affirmative realm of experience is something we create for ourselves.45 Nihilism, in other words, is to be understood through a sophisticated manipulation of desires such that the individual subject depreciates itself to such an extent that it actively participates in a custom of political self-annihilation. Central to Nietzsche’s thinking on the perpetuation of nihilism is the notion of ressentiment. In his On the Gene- alogy of Morality, Nietzsche explains this in terms of the slave mentality. This produces a feeling of impotence which not only translates into vengefulness, but more problematic still, teaches the slave that the only way it can become free is to give over to the prevailing reason mastery has set in place. Sloterdijk equates this ressentiment with rage, the basis of all great theisms.46 Such a condition, as Nietzsche understood, was ‘paralysing’ insomuch as it annuls the possibility of thinking and acting otherwise, and it was ‘exhausting’ insomuch as life was forced to compromise with the very lethality that put its condition originally into question. Through a ‘spirit of revenge’ what is lacking is therefore produced in a double movement, for lack is not some original gesture, it derives out of the ressentiment to deny us the opportunity to bring something different into the world. This raises a number of pressing questions: Could it be that not only have we become slaves to our biological existence, but in claiming false mastery of the earth we have given to ourselves an illu- sionary sovereignty? For how can we have mastery if that which we claim to be able to dominate as the principle force makes us increasingly vulnerable with each passing moment? Have we not, then, become slaves to ourselves and slaves to the earth, and resentful of them as a result? Nihilism has never been alien to liberal biopolitics. It is arguably its most potent expression. Its early development can be traced to Kant’s Copernican revolution of the mind. Placing life at the centre of its universe, Kant forced us to look for meaning beyond the realms of theological destiny. Whilst this moved us beyond the suffering and lament of the Christian subject which so irked Nietzsche, Kant’s universal substitute proved to be no substitute at all. The universal was actually denied to us due to the limits of our reason and our imperfections as finite beings – imperfections that significantly proved incapable of moving us beyond the reductionism of metaphysical idealism and its crude representations, towards a more affirmative form of metaphysics that worked in practice. As Drucilla Cornell writes, ‘Martin Heidegger famously wrote that Kant takes us to the limit of the very notion of critique and ultimately raises, but does not fully address, the question of ‘who’ is this finite being that must think through the transcendental imagination’.47 In a remarkably potent yet tragic stroke, Kant wrote the death of the omnipotent God and the types of docile subjects it produced who were rendered immobile due to its vengeance and fury, while putting in its place a fallen subject that was fated to be forever incomplete because of the burdens of its own actions. While Kant’s thinking paved the way for new eschatological forms of power to emerge that took leave of traditional sovereign moorings, the fallen subject was compelled to become resentful of its biological existence. Bios were to remain forever imperfect by design and fated to be judged accordingly. With life fated to live a biologically endowed existence, it is stripped of its capacity to have a meaningful existence beyond the limits of its bodily formations, while political strategies operate by governing through the problem of finitude, even though the finite inevitably became a philosophical problem too difficult to comprehend. As a result, forced to endure a growing resentment of its unfolding drama, liberalism slowly became morally equipped to continually intervene upon the souls of the living simply by offering to prolong the subject’s existence better than any other political rationality. Such was the realization of our finite entrapment in the bodily form that the ability to philosophically transgress the injunction between life and death became increasingly impossible. Indeed, as we shall point out later, while liberal societies have a particular relationship to the question of dying as our existence is continually put into question, such that with each passing second we learn to survive until we become truly meaningless in the end, the idea of death remains incommensurable to the liberal subject. No longer does the resilient subject solely project its resentfulness onto the souls of ‘Others’. It resents the living world, for it too is radically endangering. It is here that catastrophic imaginaries begin to truly thrive. The resilient subject is shaped and anxiously mobilized by the prospect of the coming catastrophe. It fears the transformation of the subject, just as it fears the transformation of the ecosystem that gives sustenance to life. Our rage as such, to borrow from Sloterdijk, has become truly limitless. As everything becomes the source of our endangerment, we internalize the ressentiment and proliferate our impotence with unrivalled intensity and absolute necessity. Hence this produces a form of nihilism which is ‘unbounded’. For no longer do we simply resent the teleological unfolding of history as we phase shift from masters to slaves to masters; there is no mastery to speak of and as a result all our lament filters into a politics of ressentiment as we are left to simply govern through our continually unfolding state of unending emergency.

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative in favor of a radical exodus from neoliberal capital. Only through a collective refusal to invest psychic and physical energy into capitalisms restructuring of society can alternative modes of organizing and social life emerge in the excess of wage relations. The ROB is to evaluate the resiliency of the 1AC project

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The collective assertion of refusal might be productively considered in the terms of exodus, in which resistant communities cease ‘to rethink education from inside globalization and commodification’ (Lewis 2012, 846). If we understand crisis– recovery–crisis as a purgatorial loop, the conceptual apparatus of exodus, which invokes a Deleuzian lexicon of exit and lines of flight, might contribute to more imaginative renderings of refusal politics. Hardt and Negri (2009) invoke this concept to elaborate their theorization of class struggle within the current neoliberal mode of immaterial production in a way that also has relevance to the discussion of recovery. For Hardt and Negri, exodus is ‘a process of subtraction from the relationship with capital by means of actualizing the potential autonomy of labor-power’ (152). In the context of crisis and recovery, refusing to invest in or capitulate to recovery would constitute a debilitating withdrawal of productive energies and capacities that are absolutely necessary to the continued dominance of neoliberal capital. The autonomous and affirmative refusal to play the role of recovering subjects and communities ‘is an expression of the productive capacities that exceed the relationship with capital achieved by stepping through the opening in the social relation of capital and across the threshold’ (Hardt and Negri 2009, 152; emphasis added). Exodus has also played an important conceptual role in the black radical tradition (Kelley 2002; Robinson 1983; for an example from a progressive educational perspective, see Ladson-Billings 2001). As Kelley (2002) explains, ‘Exodus provided black people with a language to critique America’s racist state and build a new nation, for its central theme wasn’t simply escape but a new beginning’ (16–17). Central goals in the black radical visions of exodus were ‘to build autonomous black institutions, improving community life, and in some cases establishing a homeland that will enable African Americans to develop a political economy geared more toward collective needs than toward accumulation’ (114). Thus, while the post-Marxist theories of exodus offered by Hardt and Negri are important, thinking of exodus in the context of US social and educational politics without attending to the historical legacies of black resistance to political, economic, and subjective assault by power would be an incomplete analysis. As Brown and De Lissovoy (2011) explain, the theorizations of Black radical scholars ‘offer conceptualizations a complexity to class and capital that are indispensable to radical theory and practice, and which, while sometimes echoed even in theory that does not take account of race, also give these complex conceptualizations a concrete (and strategic) content’ (606). Lipman (2011) asserts that ‘[t]he conjunction of capitalist crisis and emergent alternatives represents an historic opportunity to uproot the fundamental causes of so much misery that has lasted for so long, and to work toward a new day’ (147). Furthermore, in denouncing recovery, we should not assume that communities have not already begun to resist the pittances offered by neoliberal reforms. Many communities have regularly asserted their autonomy for decades by refusing the offensive cycle of crisis–recovery–crisis. Means (2011), for example, cites the case of the Little Village hunger strike in Chicago in 2001 as an example of the collective production of a ‘semi-autonomous zone outside the empty consensual orders of the market’ (1099). Against two decades of neoliberalization and educational disinvestment in communities of color, thirteen Little Village community members engaged in an affective and corporeal politics of refusal, in which they fasted for nineteen days and ‘staged a series of events such as theater performances, rallies, and prayer vigils … to maximize their message, voice, and political visibility’ (Means 2011, 1094). This movement provides a compelling glimpse of how refusal politics might be capable of breaking the cycle of recovery. In the face of neoliberal disinvestment resulting in increased educational inequality, community segregation and gentrification, and food deserts, the Little Village hunger strike can be read as a refusal of neoliberal recovery through a performative theatricalization of those very dispossessive assaults (Butler and Athanasiou 2013), flaunting their ability to use neoliberalism’s best attempts at subjugation as a means to autonomously rearticulate ‘what counts as education policy’ (Anyon 2005) and reform in the neoliberal wasteland.

## 2

#### We agree with the 1AC. Vote negative.

#### It solves the aff better

Sara K. Straub et al 12. Jeremie L. Beller, & Tim W. H. PhD candidate in comm at U of O, PhD candidate in comm at U of O, and grad student in comm. “I Concur, You Are Absolutely Correct that I am Correct: Agreement as an Argumentative Strategy.” *Contemporary Argumentation & Debate.* 2012. Emory Libraries.

Expression of bi-partisanship. A second form of agreement used in the 2008 debates is bi-partisanship. McCain claimed several times that he was willing to reach across the aisle and rebel against his own party if it meant a successful policy-making compromise could be reached. Obama provided an example of an instance in which he agreed with McCain to provide empirical evidence of successful bi-partisanship on his part. He mentioned “the financial rescue plan that Senator McCain and I supported” (Commission, 2008c, p. 3), indicating he was open to the idea of bi-partisanship and encouraged it with his own actions. The bi-partisan form follows a structure of compromise and problem-solving. A agrees with B that plan XY was the right solution for both A and B. In this way, both A and B are given positive attributes, and neither party is shown to be superior to the other. Both candidates relied on the form of bi-partisan expression to argue for their abilities to negotiate on a bi-partisan level. Touting differs from disassociation in that when a speaker employs touting, he/she explicitly highlights his/ her own positive attributes instead of simply distancing him/herself from a negative implication made by an opponent. The debater agrees with his/her opponent about a topic and then touts that particular topic to sell his/her position. When used this way, agreement in the form of touting becomes a type of positive argument. Technically ends? For example, in the first debate, Obama agreed with McCain and then used the agreement to put himself in a positive light by claiming he had done just what McCain said was the right action. He stated, “Senator McCain is absolutely right that the earmarks process has been abused” (Commission, 2008a, p. 7). He then turned this to his advantage by highlighting how his record proves he has not only avoided the negative implications of McCain’s claim but also moved against the negative concept. He further explained that is “why I suspended any requests for my home state, whether it was for senior centers or what have you, until we cleaned it up” (Commission, 2008a, p. 7). Obama agreed with McCain that dirty politics should be stopped and then provided evidence that showed he is not the proper target for McCain’s complaints and accusations. In fact, Obama used McCain’s arguments to his advantage to highlight the positive actions he had taken against the negative occurrences he and McCain agreed existed. Argument as agreement touting takes the form of A agrees with X and X is associated with A. The touting technique thus highlights the positive attributes of the arguer through agreement with the opponent.

#### Anything else destroys solvency---vote neg on presumption even if we don’t solve the aff.

Jarrod Atchison and Edward Panetta 9. Director of Debate at Trinity University; Director of Debate at the University of GA. “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Historical Developments and Issues for the Future” in *The SAGE Handbook of Rhetorical Studies*. 2009. *Sage*. Emory Libraries.

The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community. If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

#### Don’t reward the aff just because it was their idea---that demotivates people to make change---intrinsic motivation solves the aff better.

Kohn, 94 – specialist in the field of education, has written 13 books in the field, M.A. in the social sciences from the University of Chicago (Alfie, “The Risks of Rewards,” December, http://www.alfiekohn.org/article/risks-rewards/)//eek

Of those teachers and parents who make a point of not punishing children, a significant proportion turn instead to the use of rewards. The ways in which rewards are used, as well as the values that are considered important, differ among (and within) cultures. This digest, however, deals with typical practices in classrooms in the United States, where stickers and stars, A’s and praise, awards and privileges, are routinely used to induce children to learn or comply with an adult’s demands (Fantuzzo et al., 1991). As with punishments, the offer of rewards can elicit temporary compliance in many cases. Unfortunately, carrots turn out to be no more effective than sticks at helping children to become caring, responsible people or lifelong, self-directed learners. REWARDS VS. GOOD VALUES Studies over many years have found that behavior modification programs are rarely successful at producing lasting changes in attitudes or even behavior. When the rewards stop, people usually return to the way they acted before the program began. More disturbingly, researchers have recently discovered that children whose parents make frequent use of rewards tend to be less generous than their peers (Fabes et al., 1989; Grusec, 1991; Kohn 1990). Indeed, extrinsic motivators do not alter the emotional or cognitive commitments that underlie behavior–at least not in a desirable direction. A child promised a treat for learning or acting responsibly has been given every reason to stop doing so when there is no longer a reward to be gained. Research and logic suggest that punishment and rewards are not really opposites, but two sides of the same coin. Both strategies amount to ways of trying to manipulate someone’s behavior–in one case, prompting the question, “What do they want me to do, and what happens to me if I don’t do it?”, and in the other instance, leading a child to ask, “What do they want me to do, and what do I get for doing it?” Neither strategy helps children to grapple with the question, “What kind of person do I want to be?” REWARDS VS. ACHIEVEMENT Rewards are no more helpful at enhancing achievement than they are at fostering good values. At least two dozen studies have shown that people expecting to receive a reward for completing a task (or for doing it successfully) simply do not perform as well as those who expect nothing (Kohn, 1993). This effect is robust for young children, older children, and adults; for males and females; for rewards of all kinds; and for tasks ranging from memorizing facts to designing collages to solving problems. In general, the more cognitive sophistication and open-ended thinking that is required for a task, the worse people tend to do when they have been led to perform that task for a reward. There are several plausible explanations for this puzzling but remarkably consistent finding. The most compelling of these is that rewards cause people to lose interest in whatever they were rewarded for doing. This phenomenon, which has been demonstrated in scores of studies (Kohn, 1993), makes sense given that “motivation” is not a single characteristic that an individual possesses to a greater or lesser degree. Rather, intrinsic motivation (an interest in the task for its own sake) is qualitatively different from extrinsic motivation (in which completion of the task is seen chiefly as a prerequisite for obtaining something else) (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Therefore, the question educators need to ask is not how motivated their students are, but how their students are motivated. In one representative study, young children were introduced to an unfamiliar beverage called kefir. Some were just asked to drink it; others were praised lavishly for doing so; a third group was promised treats if they drank enough. Those children who received either verbal or tangible rewards consumed more of the beverage than other children, as one might predict. But a week later these children found it significantly less appealing than they did before, whereas children who were offered no rewards liked it just as much as, if not more than, they had earlier (Birch et al., 1984). If we substitute reading or doing math or acting generously for drinking kefir, we begin to glimpse the destructive power of rewards. The data suggest that the more we want children to want to do something, the more counterproductive it will be to reward them for doing it. Deci and Ryan (1985) describe the use of rewards as “control through seduction.” Control, whether by threats or bribes, amounts to doing things to children rather than working with them. This ultimately frays relationships, both among students (leading to reduced interest in working with peers) and between students and adults (insofar as asking for help may reduce the probability of receiving a reward). Moreover, students who are encouraged to think about grades, stickers, or other “goodies” become less inclined to explore ideas, think creatively, and take chances. At least ten studies have shown that people offered a reward generally choose the easiest possible task (Kohn, 1993). In the absence of rewards, by contrast, children are inclined to pick tasks that are just beyond their current level of ability. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FAILURE OF REWARDS The implications of this analysis and these data are troubling. If the question is “Do rewards motivate students?”, the answer is, “Absolutely: they motivate students to get rewards.” Unfortunately, that sort of motivation often comes at the expense of interest in, and excellence at, whatever they are doing. What is required, then, is nothing short of a transformation of our schools. First, classroom management programs that rely on rewards and consequences ought to be avoided by any educator who wants students to take responsibility for their own (and others’) behavior–and by any educator who places internalization of positive values ahead of mindless obedience. The alternative to bribes and threats is to work toward creating a caring community whose members solve problems collaboratively and decide together how they want their classroom to be (DeVries & Zan, 1994; Solomon et al., 1992). Second, grades in particular have been found to have a detrimental effect on creative thinking, long-term retention, interest in learning, and preference for challenging tasks (Butler & Nisan, 1986; Grolnick & Ryan, 1987). These detrimental effects are not the result of too many bad grades, too many good grades, or the wrong formula for calculating grades. Rather, they result from the practice of grading itself, and the extrinsic orientation it promotes. Parental use of rewards or consequences to induce children to do well in school has a similarly negative effect on enjoyment of learning and, ultimately, on achievement (Gottfried et al., 1994). Avoiding these effects requires assessment practices geared toward helping students experience success and failure not as reward and punishment, but as information. Finally, this distinction between reward and information might be applied to positive feedback as well. While it can be useful to hear about one’s successes, and highly desirable to receive support and encouragement from adults, most praise is tantamount to verbal reward. Rather than helping children to develop their own criteria for successful learning or desirable behavior, praise can create a growing dependence on securing someone else’s approval. Rather than offering unconditional support, praise makes a positive response conditional on doing what the adult demands. Rather than heightening interest in a task, the learning is devalued insofar as it comes to be seen as a prerequisite for receiving the teacher’s approval (Kohn, 1993). CONCLUSION In short, good values have to be grown from the inside out. Attempts to short-circuit this process by dangling rewards in front of children are at best ineffective, and at worst counterproductive. Children are likely to become enthusiastic, lifelong learners as a result of being provided with an engaging curriculum; a safe, caring community in which to discover and create; and a significant degree of choice about what (and how and why) they are learning. Rewards–like punishments–are unnecessary when these things are present, and are ultimately destructive in any case.

# Case

## FW

#### We still have to care about consequences to an extent of your methodology.

#### Categorical imperative is vague – No one can decide what an unconditional moral obligation is.

## Case

#### The segobetso card talks in relation to neolib and cap policies in space which means the alt solves better because we tackled the entire being of cap

#### Non-unique: it’s not a surprise that private entities opts out of agreements. No solvency for the AFF cause you can’t prevent actors from appropriating then

## Method

#### Line by line

#### This is bs – debate is not a livable space for black debaters who get cops called on them for playing their music to loud at the harvard tournament or how every single K teams gets read FW on. The attempt for you to carve out this space is evident of the K .

#### They say to use performance but it just becomes fungible in the debate space and becomes a commodification

#### False optimism: you can’t save the debate space. You say your just a moment which means that you can’t retool rhotiric of debate. Just because of you illuminate doesn’t mean that there is a suddent counter force to anti Asian violence

#### Presumption – their aff doesn’t do anything. The debate space will continuously be like this. One moment is not enough and it’s just way for the aff to get an easy ballot by utilizing violence as. Away of appeasement.

#### Perfcons are bad it allows debaters to read cap bad and then a an innovation DA and then screw over rounds

#### Self serving roles of ballot should be rejected. This proves the link to the K. You will only victimized naratives for your profit

#### Particular demands are revolution without a revolution- single issue movements lack concrete universality, allowing them to be absorbed and made to reinforce capitalism

Zizek 09, Slavoj Zizek, professor of sociology, Revolution at the Gates, pg 296-302, TCT

So the struggle ahead has no guaranteed outcome – it will confront us with an unprecedented need to act, since it will concern not only a new mode of production, but a radical rupture in what it means to be a human being.'85 Today, we can already discern the signs of a kind of general unease – **recall the series of protests usually listed under the name "Seattle**". The ten-year honeymoon of triumphant global capitalism is over; the long-overdue "seven-year itch" is here – witness the panicky reactions of the mass media, which, from Time magazine to CNN, started all of a sudden to warn us about the Marxists manipulating the crowd of "honest" protesters. The problem now is the strictly Leninist one: how do we actualize the media's accusations? **How do we invent the organizational structure which will confer on this unrest the form of the universal political demand? Otherwise, the momentum will be lost, and all that will remain will be marginal disturbances**, perhaps organized like a new Greenpeace, **with** a certain efficiency, but also **strictly limited goals**, marketing strategy, and so on. In short, without the form of the Party, the movement remains caught in the vicious cycle of "resistance", one of the big catchwords of "postmodern" politics, which likes to oppose "good" resistance to power to a "bad" revolutionary takeover of power – **the last thing we want is the domestication of anti-globalization into just another "site of resistance" against capitalism.**¶ As a result, the key "Leninist" lesson today is: politics without the organizational form of the Party is politics without politics, so the answer to those who want just the (quite adequately named) "**New Social Movements**" is the same as the Jacobins' answer to the Girondin compromisers: "You **want revolution without a revolution**!" Today's dilemma is that there are two ways open for sociopolitical engagement: either play the game of the system, engage in the "long march through the institutions", or become active in new social movements, **from feminism through ecology to anti-racism**. And, again, **the limit of these movements** is that they **are not political in the sense of the Universal Singular: they are "single-issue movements" which lack the dimension of universality – that is to say, they do not relate to the social totality.**¶ Against Post-politics¶ In "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", Marx deploys something like the logic of hegemony: at the climax of revolutionary enthusiasm, a "universal class" emerges, that is, some particular class imposes itself as universal, and thereby engenders global enthusiasm, since it stands for society as such against the ancien regime, antisocial crime as such (like the bourgeoisie in the French Revolution). What then follows is the disillusion so sarcastically described by Marx: the day after, the gap between the Universal and the Particular becomes visible again; capitalist vulgar profit emerges as the actuality of universal freedom, and so on.'86¶ For Marx, of course, the only universal class whose singularity (exclusion from the society of property) guarantees its actual universality is the proletariat. This is what Ernesto Laclau rejects in his version of the logic of hegemony: for Laclau, the short circuit between the Universal and the Particular is always illusory, temporary, a kind of "transcendental paralogism".'87 However, is Marx's proletariat really the negative of positive full essential humanity, or "only" the gap of universality as such, irrecoverable in any positivity?188 In Alain Badiou's terms, the proletariat is not another particular class, but a singularity of the social structure and, as such, the universal class, the non-class among the classes.¶ What is crucial here is the properly temporal-dialectical tension between the Universal and the Particular. When Marx says that in Germany, because of the compromised pettiness of the bourgeoisie, it is too late for partial bourgeois emancipation, and that for this reason, in Germany, the condition of every particular emancipation is universal emancipation, one way to read this is to see in it the assertion of the universal "normal" paradigm and its exception: in the "normal" case, partial (false) bourgeois emancipation will be followed by universal emancipation through the proletarian revolution; while in Germany, the "normal" order gets mixed up. There is, however, another, much more radical way to read it: the very German exception, the German bourgeoisie's inability to achieve partial emancipation, opens up the space for a possible universal emancipation.¶ **The dimension of universality- thus emerges (only) where the "normal" order that links the succession of particulars is disrupted. For this reason, there is no "normal" revolution; each revolutionary explosion is grounded in an exception, in a short circuit of "too late" and "too early".** The French Revolution occurred because France was not able to follow the "normal" English path of capitalist development; the very "normal" English path resulted in the "unnatural" division of labour between the capitalists, who held socioeconomic power, and the aristocracy, which was left with political power. And, according to Marx, this was how Germany produced the ultimate revolution in thought (German Idealism as the philosophical counterpart of the French Revolution): precisely because it lacked a political revolution.¶ The structural necessity of this non-contemporaneity, of this discrepancy, is what gets lost in Habermas: the basic point of his notion of "modernity as an unfinished project" is that the project of modernity contained two facets: the development of "instrumental reason" ¶ (scientific-technological manipulation and domination of nature) and the emergence of intersubjective communication free of constraints; hitherto, only the first facet has been fully deployed, and our task is to bring the project of modernity to completion by actualizing the potential of the second facet. What, however, if this discrepancy is structural? What if we cannot simply supplement instrumental Reason with communicational Reason, since the primacy of instrumental Reason is constitutive of modern Reason as such? Habermas is fully consistent in applying the same logic to today's globalization – his thesis is that of "globalization as an unfinished project":¶ The discrepancy between progressive economic integration and the political integration which lags behind can be overcome only through a politics which aims at constructing a higher-level capacity of political acting which would be able to keep pace with deregulated markets.'89¶ In short, there is no need to fight capitalist globalization directly – we need only to supplement it with an adequate political globalization (a stronger central political body in Strasbourg; the imposition of pan-European social legislation, etc.). However, what if, again, modern capitalism, which generates economic globalization, cannot simply be supplemented by political globalization? What if such an extension of globalization to the political project forced us radically to redefine the contours of economic globalization itself?19')¶ In short, Habermas's basic attitude is nothing less than a disavowal of the twentieth-century – he acts as if the twentieth century, in its specific dimension, did not take place: as if what happened in it were basically just contingent detours, so that the underlying conceptual narrative – that of enlightened democratic liberalism, with its indefinite progress – can be told without them.191 Along the same lines, in order to characterize the demise of the Socialist regimes in 1990, Habermas coined the term "catch-up revolution":192 the West (Western liberal democracy) has nothing to learn from the Eastern European Communist experience, since in 1990, these countries simply caught up with the social development of the Western liberal-democratic regimes. Habermas thereby writes off this experience as simply accidental, denying any fundamental structural relationship between Western democracy and the rise of "totalitarianism" – any notion that "totalitarianism" is a symptom of the inner tensions of the democratic project itself.¶ The same goes for Habermas's treatment of Fascism: against Adorno's and Horkheimer's notion of Fascist "barbarism" as the ineluctable outcome of the "dialectic of Enlightenment", the Fascist regimes are for him a contingent detour (delay, regression) which does not affect the basic logic of modernization and Enlightenment. The task is thus simply to abolish this detour, not to rethink the Enlightenment project itself. This victory over "totalitarianism", however, is a Pyrrhic one: what Habermas needs here is a Hitchcockian lesson (remember Hitchcock's claim that a film is only as interesting as its main evil character). Dismissing the "totalitarian" deadlock as a mere contingent detour leaves us with a comfortable, but ultimately impotent, position of someone who, unperturbed by the catastrophes around him, clings to the basic rationality of the universe.¶ The promise of the "Seattle" movement lies in the fact that it is the very opposite of its usual media designation (the "anti-globalization protest"): it is the first kernel of a new global movement, global with regard to its content (it aims at a global confrontation with today's capitalism) as well as its form (it is a global movement, a mobile international network ready to intervene anywhere from Seattle to Prague). It is more global than "global capitalism", since it brings into the game its victims – that is, those who are excluded from capitalist globalization, as well as those who are included in a way which reduces them to proletarian misery.'93 Perhaps I should take the risk here of applying Hegel's old distinction between "abstract" and "concrete" universality: capitalist globalization is "abstract", focused on the speculative movement of Capital; whereas the "Seattle" movement stands for "concrete universality", both for the totality of global capitalism and for its excluded dark side. The reality of capitalist globalization is best exemplified by the victory in June 2001 of the Russian nuclear lobby, which forced the parliament's decision that Russia would import nuclear waste from developed Western countries.¶ Here, Lenin's reproach to **liberals** is crucial: they **merely exploit the working classes' discontent to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the conservatives**, instead of identifying with it to the end.'" Is this not also true of today's Left liberals? **They like to evoke racism, ecology, workers' grievances, and so on, to score points over the conservatives – without endangering the system. Remember** how, **in Seattle**, Bill **Clinton himself** deftly referred to the protesters on the streets outside, **reminding the** assembled **leaders** inside the guarded palaces that **they should listen to the demonstrators' message** (the message which, of course, Clinton interpreted, **depriving it of its subversive sting**, which he attributed to the dangerous extremists introducing chaos and violence into the majority of peaceful protesters). This Clintonesque stance later developed into an elaborate "carrot-and stick" strategy of containment: on the one hand, paranoia (the notion that there is a dark Marxist plot lurking behind it); on the other hand, in Genoa, none other than Berlusconi provided food and shelter for the anti-globalization demonstrators – on condition that they "behaved properly", and did not disturb the official event. **It is the same with all New Social Movements**, up to the Zapatistas in Chiapas: **establishment is always ready to "listen to their demands**", depriving them of their proper political sting. The system is by definition ecumenical, open, tolerant, ready to "listen" to all – **even if you insist on your demands, they are deprived of their universal political sting by the very form of negotiation**. The true Third Way we have to look for is this third way between institutionalized parliamentary politics and the New Social Movements.¶ As a sign of this emerging uneasiness and need for a true Third Way, it is interesting to see how, in a recent interview, even a conservative liberal like John le Carre had to admit that, as a consequence of the "love affair between Thatcher and Reagan" in most of the developed Western countries, and especially in the United Kingdom, "the social infrastructure has practically stopped working"; this then leads him to make a direct plea for, at least, "re-nationalizing the railways and water.”95 We are in fact approaching a state in which (selective) private affluence is accompanied by a global (ecological, infrastructural) degradation which will soon start to affect us all: the quality of water is not a problem confined to the UK – a recent survey showed that the entire reservoir from which the Los Angeles area gets its water is already so polluted by man-made toxic chemicals that it will soon be impossible to make it drinkable even through the use of the most advanced filters. Le Carre expressed his fury at Blair for accepting the basic Thatcherite co-ordinates in very precise terms: "I thought last time, in 1997, that he was lying when he denied he was a socialist. The worst thing I can say about him is that he was telling the truth." "More precisely, even if, in 1997, Blair was "subjectively" lying, even if his secret agenda was to save whatever can be salvaged of the socialist agenda he was "objectively" telling the truth: his (eventual) subjective socialist conviction was a self-deception, an illusion which enabled him to fulfill his "objective" role, that of completing the Thatcherite "revolution".¶ How, then, are we to respond to the eternal dilemma of the radical Left: should we strategically support centre-Left figures like Bill Clinton against the conservatives, or should we adopt the stance of "It doesn't matter, we shouldn't get involved in these fights – in a way, it's even better if the Right is directly in power, since, in this way, it will be easier for the people to see the truth of the situation"? The answer is a variation on Stalin's answer to the question: "Which deviation is worse, the Rightist or the Leftist one?": they are both worse. What we should do is adopt the stance of the proper dialectical paradox: in principle, of course, one should be indifferent to the struggle between the liberal and conservative poles of today's official politics – however, one can only afford to be indifferent if the liberal option is in power. Otherwise, the price may appear much too high – consider the catastrophic consequences of the German Communist Party's decision in the early 1930s not to focus on the struggle against the Nazis, with the justification that the Nazi dictatorship was the last desperate stage of capitalist domination, which would open the eyes of the working class, shattering their belief in "bourgeois" democratic institutions.¶ Along these lines, even Claude Lefort, whom no one can accuse of Communist sympathies, recently made a crucial point in his answer to Francois Furet: today's liberal consensus is the result of a hundred and fifty years of Leftist workers' struggle and pressure upon the State; it incorporated demands which were dismissed by liberals with horror a hundred years ago – even less.'97 If we need proof, we should simply look at the list of the demands at the end of the Communist Manifesto: apart from two or three of them (which, of course, are the crucial ones), all the others are today part of the consensus (at least the disintegrating Welfare State consensus): universal franchise; free education; universal healthcare and care for the elderly; a limitation on child labour.... In short, today's "bourgeois democracy" is the result not of liberalism's intrinsic development, but of the proletarian class struggle.¶ **It is true that, today, it is the radical populist Right which usually breaks the (still) prevailing liberal-democratic consensus, gradually making acceptable hitherto excluded ideas** (the partial justification of Fascism, the need to constrain abstract citizenship on grounds of ethnic identity, etc.). However, **the hegemonic liberal democracy is using this fact to blackmail the Left radicals: "We shouldn't play with fire: against the new Rightist onslaught, we should insist more than ever on the democratic consensus – any criticism of it, wittingly or unwittingly, helps the New Right!" This is the key line of separation: we should reject this blackmail, taking the risk of disturbing the liberal consensus, even up to questioning the very notion of democracy.**¶ The ultimate answer to the criticism that radical Left proposals are utopian should thus be that, today, **the true utopia is the belief that the present liberal-democratic capitalist consensus can go on indefinitely,** with- out radical change. We are therefore back with the old '68 slogan "Soyons realistes, demandons l'impossible!": **in order to be a true "realist", we must consider breaking out of the constraints of what appears "possible"** (or, as we usually put it, "feasible").

#### The focus on identity too much becomes an alibi for acquiescence of class struggles – they obscure the logic of capital and ensure repetition of oppression

**Zavarzadeh 94** (Mas'Ud, The Stupidity That Consumption Is Just as Productive as Production": In the Shopping Mall of the Post-al Left," College Literature, Vol. 21, No. 3, The Politics of Teaching Literature 2 (Oct., 1994),pp. 92-114)

Post-al logic is marked above all by its erasure of "production" as the determining force in organizing human societies and their institutions, and its insistence on "consumption" and "distribution" as the driving force of the social.5 The argument of the post-al left (briefly) is that "labor," in advanced industrial "democracies," is superseded by "information," and consequently "knowledge" (not class struggle over the rate of surplus labor) has become the driving force of history. The task of the post-al left is to deconstruct the "metaphysics of labor" and consequently to announce the end of socialism and with it the "outdatedness" of the praxis of abolishing private property (that is, congealed alienated labor) in the post-al moment. Instead of abolishing private property, an enlightened radical democracy which is to supplant socialism (as Laclau, Mouffe, Aronowitz, Butler, and others have advised) should make property holders of each citizen. The post-al left rejects the global objective conditions of production for the local subjective circumstances of consumption, and its master trope is what R-4 [France] so clearly foregrounds: the (shopping) "mall"?the ultimate site of consumption "with all latest high-tech textwares" deployed to pleasure the "body." In fact, the post-al left has "invented" a whole new interdiscipline called "cultural studies" that provides the new alibi for the regime of profit by shifting social analytics from "production" to "consumption." (On the political economy of "invention" in ludic theory, see Transformation 2 on "The Invention of the Queer.") To prove its "progressiveness," the post-al left devotes most of its energies (see the writings of John Fiske, Constance Penley, Michael Berube, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Andrew Ross, Susan Willis, Stuart Hall, Fredric Jameson), to demonstrate how "consumption" is in fact an act of production and resistance to capitalism and a practice in which a Utopian vision for a society of equality is performed! The shift from "production" to "consumption" manifests itself in post-al left theories through the focus on "superstructural" cultural analysis and the preoccupation not with the "political economy" ("base") but with "representation"? for instance, of race, sexuality, environment, ethnicity, nationality, and identity. This is, for example, one reason for [Hill's] ridiculing the "base" and "superstructure" analytical model of classical Marxism (Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy) with an anecdote (the privileged mode of "argument" for the post-al left) that the base is really not all that "basic." To adhere to the base/superstructure model for [him] is to be thrown into an "epistemological gulag." For the post-al left a good society is, therefore, one in which, as [France] puts it, class antagonism is bracketed and the "surplus value" is distributed more evenly among men and women, whites and persons of color, the lesbian and the straight. It is not a society in which "surplus value"?the exploitative appropriation of the other's labor-is itself eliminated by revolutionary praxis. The post-al left's good society is not one in which private ownership is obsolete and the social division of labor (class) is abolished. Rather it is a society in which the fruit of exploitation of the proletariat (surplus labor) is more evenly distributed and a near-equality of consumption is established. This distributionist/consumptionist theory that underwrites the economic interests of the (upper)middle classes is the foundation for all the texts in this exchange and their pedagogies. A good pedagogy in these texts therefore is one in which power is distributed evenly in the classroom: a pedagogy that constructs a classroom of consensus not antagonism (thus opposition to "politicizing the classroom" in OR-1 [Hogan]) and in which knowledge (concept) is turned through the process that OR-3 [McCormick] calls "translation"?into "consumable" EXPERIENCES. The more "intense" the experience, as the anecdotes of [McCormick] show, the more successful the pedagogy. In short, it is a pedagogy that removes the student from his/her position in the social relations of production and places her/him in the personal relation of consumption: specifically, EXPERIENCE of/as the consumption of pleasure. The post-al logic **obscures** the laws of motion of capital by very specific assumptions and moves-many of which are rehearsed in the texts here. I will discuss some of these, mention others in passing, and hint at several more. (I have provided a full account of all these moves in my "Post-ality" in Transformation 1.) I begin by outlining the post-al assumptions that "democracy" is a never-ending, open "dialogue" and "conversation" among multicultural citizens; that the source of social inequities is "power"; that a post-class hegemonic "coalition," as OR-5 [Williams] calls it-and not class struggle-is the dynamics of social change; that truth (as R-l [Hill] writes) is an "epistemological gulag"? a construct of power and thus any form of "ideology critique" that raises questions of "falsehood" and "truth" ("false consciousness") does so through a violent exclusion of the "other" truths by, in [Williams'] words, "staking sole legitimate claim" to the truth in question. Given the injunction of the post-al logic against binaries (truth/falsehood), the project of "epistemology" is displaced in the ludic academy by "rhetoric." The question, consequently, becomes not so much what is the "truth" of a practice but whether it "works." (Rhetoric has always served as an alibi for pragmatism.) Therefore, [France] is not interested in whether my practices are truthful but in what effects they might have: if College Literature publishes my texts would such an act (regardless of the "truth" of my texts) end up "cutting our funding?" [he] asks. A post-al leftist like [France], in short, "resists" the state only in so far as the state does not cut [his] "funding." Similarly, it is enough for a cynical pragmatist like [Williams] to conclude that my argument "has little prospect of effectual force" in order to disregard its truthfulness. The post-al dismantling of "epistemology" and the erasure of the question of "truth," it must be pointed out, is undertaken to protect the economic interests of the ruling class. If the "truth question" is made to seem outdated and an example of an orthodox binarism ([Hill]), any conclusions about the truth of ruling class practices are excluded from the scene of social contestation as a violent logocentric (positivistic) totalization that disregards the "difference" of the ruling class. This is why a defender of the ruling class such as [Hill] sees an ideology critique aimed at unveiling false consciousness and the production of class consciousness as a form of "epistemological spanking." It is this structure of assumptions that enables [France] to answer my question, "What is wrong with being dogmatic?" not in terms of its truth but by reference to its pragmatics (rhetoric): what is "wrong" with dogmatism, [he] says, is that it is violent rhetoric ("textual Chernobyl") and thus Stalinist. If I ask what is wrong with Stalinism, again (in terms of the logic of [his] text) I will not get a political or philosophical argument but a tropological description.6 The post-al left is a New Age Left: the "new new left" privileged by [Hill] and [Williams]- the laid-back, "sensitive," listening, and dialogic left of coalitions, voluntary work, and neighborhood activism (more on these later). It is, as I will show, anti-intellectual and populist; its theory is "bite size" (mystifying, of course, who determines the "size" of the "bite"), and its model of social change is anti-conceptual "spontaneity": May 68, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and, in [Hill's] text, Chiapas. In the classroom, the New Age post-al pedagogy inhibits any critique of the truth of students' statements and instead offers, as [McCormick] makes clear, a "counseling," through anecdotes, concerning feelings. The rejection of "truth" (as "epistemological gulag"?[Hill]), is accompanied by the rejection of what the post-al left calls "economism." Furthermore, the post-al logic relativizes subjectivities, critiques functionalist explanation, opposes "determinism," and instead of closural readings, offers supplementary ones. It also celebrates eclecticism; puts great emphasis on the social as discourse and on discourse as always inexhaustible by any single interpretation? discourse (the social) always "outruns" and "exceeds" its explanation. Post-al logic is, in fact, opposed to any form of "explanation" and in favor of mimetic description: it regards "explanation" to be the intrusion of a violent outside and "description" to be a respectful, caring attention to the immanent laws of signification (inside). This notion of description which has by now become a new dogma in ludic feminist theory under the concept of "mimesis" (D. Cornell, Beyond Accommodation)?regards politics to be always immanent to practices: thus the banalities about not politicizing the classroom in [Hogan's] "anarchist" response to my text7 and the repeated opposition to binaries in all nine texts. The opposition to binaries is, in fact, an **ideological alibi for erasing class struggle**, as is quite clear in [France's] rejection of the model of a society "divided by two antagonistic classes" (see my Theory and its Other).