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#### To have debates about outer space, we first have to understand how strategic weaponizations of space functions

Grondin 6, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, University of Quebec at MontrealAssistant Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, (David Grondin, “THE (POWER) POLITICS OF SPACE: THE US ASTROPOLITICAL DISCOURSE OF GLOBAL DOMINANCE IN THE WAR ON TERROR” March 25th, 2006 p. 13-14, ME)

From the outset, many may ask why is there, looming over our head, literally and figuratively, a possibility of seeing war and violence spreading to the cosmos? Outer Space, the “endless frontier”, the “last frontier”, John F. Kennedy’s “New Frontier”, is still largely seen as the “pristine frontier”. Who writes and produces Outer Space? The social construction and production of Outer Space means that it is people with agential power that enact and produce Outer Space, that invest it with meanings and produce it with power relations. If we wish to understand US strategy regarding Space and especially how its strategic analysts produce Outer Space as a (soon-to-be)-“weaponized space”, we must go back to Lacoste’s understanding of geography and that of state and military decisionmakers: Geography is first and foremost a strategic knowledge which is closely linked to a set of political and military practices; these practices demand that extremely different, at first sight heterogeneous pieces of information should be brought together. You cannot understand the grounds for existence nor the importance of such information if you confine yourself to the validity of knowledge for knowledge’s sake. These strategic practices make geography necessary, primarily for those who control the machinery of the state. Is this really a science? It does not really matter; the question is not fundamental insofar as one is aware that geography, being the structuring of knowledge relating to 13 space, is a strategic knowledge, a power (Lacoste 1982 [1976]: 7; quoted in Ó Tuathail 1996: 162). We therein need to reflect critically on spatialities of US space power and the discourse of US space power as space weaponization.

**This is a question of ontology current methods and frameworks for understanding securitization in spatiality represent humans and the world as standing reserve already defined and waiting to be sacrificed**

#### Geopolitical hegemony becomes utilized through ideologies of imaginative geographies that includes outer space. The geographical distinction between us and them feeds on cartographies of fear that need to be conquered.

**Smiles 20** Written By Deondre Smiles, October 26 2020 "The Settler Logics of (Outer) Space, https://www.societyandspace.org/articles/the-settler-logics-of-outer-space

In reaffirming our heritage as a free nation, we must always remember that America has always been a frontier nation. Now we must embrace the next frontier. America’s Manifest Destiny in the stars…The American nation was carved out of the vast frontier by the toughest, strongest, fiercest and most determined men and women ever to walk on the face of the Earth…Our ancestors braved the unknown, tamed the wilderness, settled the Wild West…This is our glorious and magnificent inheritance. We are Americans. We are pioneers. We are the pathfinders. We settled the New World. We built the modern world.” -President Donald J. Trump, 2020 State of the Union address. To most scholars, and certainly to the virtual majority of Indigenous peoples on Turtle Island, it is no secret that the country we call the United States of America was built upon the brutal subjugation of Indigenous people and Indigenous lands. Fueled by the American settler myths of terra nullius (no man’s land) and Manifest Destiny, the American settler state proceeded upon a project of cultural and physical genocide, with lasting effects that endure to the present day. The ‘settler myth’ permeates American culture. Words such as ‘pioneer’, the ‘West’, ‘Manifest Destiny’ grab the imagination as connected to the growth of the country in its early history. America sprang forth from a vast open ‘wilderness’. Of course, for Indigenous people, we know differently—these lands had complex cultural frameworks and political entities long before colonization. Words like ‘pioneer’ and ‘Manifest Destiny’, have deep meanings for us too, as they are indicative of the very real damage dealt against our cultures and nations, damage that we have had to work very hard to undo. Trump’s address raises key insights into the continuing logics of settler colonialism, as well as questions of its future trajectories. Trump’s invocation of ideas such as the ‘frontier’ and ‘taming the wilderness’ draws attention to the brutal violence that accompanied the building of the American state. Scholars such as Greg Grandin (2019) make the case that the frontier is part of what America is—whether it is the ‘Wild West’, or the U.S.-Mexican border, America is always contending with a frontier that must be defined.  Language surrounding ‘frontier’ is troubling because it perpetuates the rationale of why the American settler state even exists—it could make better use of the land than Native people would, after all, they lived in wilderness. This myth tells us that what we know as the modern world was built through the hard work of European settlers; Indigenous people had nothing to offer or contribute. For someone like Mr. Trump, whose misgivings and hostility towards Native people have been historically documented, this myth fits well with his narrative as President—he is building a ‘new’ America, one that will return to its place of power and influence. The fact that similar language is being used around the potential of American power being extended to space could reasonably be expected, given the economic and military potential that comes from such a move. Space represents yet another ‘unknown’ to be conquered and bent to America’s will. However, such interplanetary conquest does not exist solely in outer space. I wish to situate the very real colonial legacies and violence associated with the desire to explore space, tracing the ways that they are perpetuated and reified through their destructive engagements with Indigenous peoples. I argue that a scientific venture such as space exploration does not exist in a vacuum, but instead draws from settler colonialism and feeds back into it through the prioritization of ‘science’ over Indigenous epistemologies. I begin by exploring the ways that space exploration by the American settler state is situated within questions of hegemony, imperialism, and terra nullius, including a brief synopsis of the controversy surrounding the planned construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea. I conclude by exploring Indigenous engagement with ‘space’ in both its Earthbound and beyond-earth forms as it relates to outer space, and what implications this might have for the ways we think about our engagement with space as the American settler state begins to turn its gaze skyward once again. I position this essay alongside a growing body of academic work, as well as journalistic endeavors (Haskins, 2020; Koren, 2020) that demands that the American settler colonial state exercise self-reflexivity as to why it engages with outer space, and who is advantaged and disadvantaged here on Earth as a result of this engagement. Settler Colonialism and ‘Space’ A brief exploration of what settler colonialism is, and its engagement with ‘space’ here on Earth is necessary to start. Settler colonialism is commonly understood to be a form of colonialism that is based upon the permanent presence of colonists upon land. This is a distinction from forms of colonialism based upon resource extraction (Wolfe, 2006; Veracini, 2013). What this means is that the settler colony is intimately tied with the space within which it exists—it cannot exist or sustain itself without settler control over land and space. This permanent presence upon land by ‘settlers’ is usually at the expense of the Indigenous, or original people, in a given space or territory. To reiterate: control over space is paramount. As Wolfe states, “Land is life—or at least, land is necessary for life. Thus, contests for land can be—indeed, often are—contests for life” (2006: 387).  Without land, the settler state ‘dies’; conversely, deprivation of land from the indigenous population means that in settler logic, indigeneity dies (Povinelli, 2002; Wolfe, 2006.) The ultimate aims of settler colonialism is therefore the occupation and remaking of space. As Wolfe (2006) describes, the settler state seeks to make use of land and resources in order to continue on; whether that is through homesteading/residence, farming and agriculture, mining, or any number of activities that settler colonial logic deems necessary to its own survival. These activities are tied to a racist and hubristic logic that only settler society itself possesses the ability to make proper use of land and space (Wolfe, 2006). This is mated with a viewpoint of landscapes prior to European arrival as terra nullius, or empty land that was owned by no one, via European/Western conceptions of land ownership and tenure (Wolfe, 1994). Because of this overarching goal of space, there is an inherent anxiety in settler colonies about space, and how it can be occupied and subsequently rewritten to remove Indigenous presence. In Anglo settler colonies, this often takes place within a lens of conservation. Scholars such as Banivanua Mar (2010), Lannoy (2012), Wright (2014) and Tristan Ahtone (2019) have written extensively on the ways that settler reinscription of space can be extremely damaging to Indigenous people from a lens of ‘conservation’. However, dispossession of Indigenous space in favor of settler uses can also be tied to some of the most destructive forces of our time. For example, Aboriginal land in the Australian Outback was viewed as ‘empty’ land that was turned into weapons ranges where the British military tested nuclear weapons in the 1950s, which directly led to negative health effects upon Aboriginal communities downwind from the testing sites (Vincent, 2010). Indigenous nations in the United States have struggled with environmental damage related to military-industrial exploitation as well. But, what does this all look like in regard to outer space? In order to really understand the potential (settler) colonial logics of space exploration, we must go back and explore the ways in which space exploration became inextricably tied with questions of state hegemony and geopolitics during the Cold War. US and Soviet space programs were born partially out of military utility, and propaganda value—the ability to send a nuclear warhead across a great distance to strike the enemy via a ICBM and the accompanying geopolitical respect that came with such a capability was something that greatly appealed to the superpowers, and when the Soviets took an early lead in the ‘Space Race’ with Sputnik and their Luna probes, the United States poured money and resources into making up ground (Werth, 2004). The fear of not only falling behind the Soviets militarily as well as a perceived loss of prestige in the court of world opinion spurred the US onto a course of space exploration that led to the Apollo moon landings in the late 1960s and the early 70s (Werth, 2004; Cornish, 2019). I argue that this fits neatly into the American settler creation myth referenced by Trump—after ‘conquering’ a continent and bringing it under American dominion, why would the United States stop solely at ‘space’ on Earth? To return to Grandin (2019), space represented yet another frontier to be conquered and known by the settler colonial state; if not explicitly for the possibility of further settlement, then for the preservation of its existing spatial extent on Earth. However, scholars such as Alan Marshall (1995) have cautioned that newer logics of space exploration such as potential resource extraction tie in with existing military logics in a way that creates a new way of thinking about the ‘openness’ of outer space to the logics of empire, in what Marshall calls res nullius (1995: 51)[i]. But we cannot forget the concept of terra nullius and how our exploration of the stars has real effects on Indigenous landscapes here on Earth. We also cannot forget about forms of space exploration that may not be explicitly tied to military means. Doing so deprives us of another lens through which to view the tensions between settler and Indigenous views of space and to which end is useful. Indeed, even reinscribing of Indigenous space towards ‘peaceful’ settler space exploration have very real consequences for Indigenous sovereignty and Indigenous spaces. Perhaps the most prominent example of the fractures between settler space exploration and Indigenous peoples is the on-going controversy surrounding the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea, on the island of Hawaii. While an extremely detailed description of the processes of construction on the TMT and the opposition presented to it by Native Hawai’ians and their allies is beyond the scope of this essay, and in fact is already expertly done by a number of scholars[ii], the controversy surrounding TMT is a prime example of the logics presented towards ‘space’ in both Earth-bound and beyond-Earth contexts by the settler colonial state as well as the violence that these logics place upon Indigenous spaces, such as Mauna Kea, which in particular already plays host to a number of telescopes and observatories (Witze, 2020). In particular, astronomers such as Chanda Prescod-Weinstein, Lucianne Walkowicz, and others have taken decisive action to push back against the idea that settler scientific advancement via space exploration should take precedence over Indigenous sovereignty in Earth-space. Prescod-Weinstein and Walkowicz, alongside Sarah Tuttle, Brian Nord and Hilding Neilson (2020) make clear that settler scientific pursuits such as building the TMT are simply new footnotes in a long history of colonial disrespect of Indigenous people and Indigenous spaces in the name of science, and that astronomy is not innocent of this disrespect. In fact, Native Hawai’ian scholars such as Iokepa Casumbal-Salazar strike at the heart of the professed neutrality of sciences like astronomy: One scientist told me that astronomy is a “benign science” because it is based on observation, and that it is universally beneficial because it offers “basic human knowledge” that everyone should know “like human anatomy.” Such a statement underscores the cultural bias within conventional notions of what constitutes the “human” and “knowledge.” In the absence of a critical self-reflection on this inherent ethnocentrism, the tacit claim to universal truth reproduces the cultural supremacy of Western science as self-evident. Here, the needs of astronomers for tall peaks in remote locations supplant the needs of Indigenous communities on whose ancestral territories these observatories are built (2017: 8) As Casumbal-Salazar and other scholars who have written about the TMT and the violence that has been done to Native Hawai’ians (such as police actions designed to dislodge blockades that prevented construction) as well as the potential violence to come such as the construction of the telescope have skillfully said, when it comes to the infringement upon Indigenous space by settler scientific endeavors tied to space exploration, there is no neutrality to be had—dispossession and violence are dispossession and violence, no matter the potential ‘good for humanity’ that might come about through these things. Such contestations over outer space and ethical engagement with previously unknown spaces will continue to happen. Outer space is not the first ‘final frontier’ (apologies to Gene Roddenberry) that has been discussed in settler logics and academic spaces. In terms of settler colonialism, scholars have written about how Antarctica was initially thought of as the ‘perfect’ settler colony—land that could be had without the messy business of pushing Indigenous people off of it (see Howkins 2010). Of course, we know now that engagement with Antarctica should be constrained by ecological concern—who is to say that these concerns will be heeded in ‘unpopulated’ space? What can be done to push back against these settler logics? Indigenous Engagement with ‘Space I want to now turn our attention towards the possibilities that exist regarding Indigenous engagement with outer space.  After all, the timing could not be more urgent to do so—we are now at a point where after generations and generations of building the myth that America was built out of nothing, we are now ready to resume the project of extending the reach of American military and economic might in space. To be fair, there are plenty of advances that can be made scientifically with a renewed focus on space exploration. However, history shows us that space exploration has been historically tied to military hegemony, and there is nothing in Mr. Trump’s temperament or attitude towards a re-engagement with space that suggest that his push toward the stars will be anything different. A sustained conversation needs to be had—will this exploration be ethical and beneficial to all Americans? One potential avenue of Indigenous involvement comes through the active involvement of Indigenous peoples and Indigenous perspectives in space exploration, of course. This involvement can be possible through viewing outer space through a ‘decolonial’ lens, for instance. Astronomers such as Prescod-Weinstein and Walkowicz have spoken about the need to avoid replicating colonial frameworks of occupation and use of space when exploring places such as Mars, for example (Mandelbaum, 2018). The rise of logics of resource extraction in outer-space bodies have led to engagements by other academics such as Alice Gorman on the agency and personhood of the Moon. Collaborations between Indigenous people and space agencies such as NASA help provide the Indigenous perspective inside space exploration and the information that is gleaned from it, with implications both in space and on a Earth that is dealing with climate crisis (Bean, 2018; Bartels, 2019). Another potential avenue of engagement with Indigenous methodologies and epistemologies related to space comes with engaging with Indigenous thinkers who are already deeply immersed into explorations of Indigenous ‘space’ here on Earth—the recent works of Indigenous thinkers such as Waziyatawin (2008) Leanne Betasamosake Simpson (2017), Natchee Blu Barnd (2018) and others provide a unique viewpoint into the ways that Indigenous peoples make and remake space—perhaps this can provide another blueprint for how we might engage with space beyond Earth. And that is just the work that exists within the academic canon. Indigenous people have always been engaged with the worlds beyond the Earth, in ways that often stood counter to accepted ‘settler’ conventions of space exploration (Young, 1987). In one example, when asked about the Moon landings, several Inuit said, "We didn't know this was the first time you white people had been to the moon. Our shamans have been going for years. They go all the time...We do go to visit the moon and moon people all the time. The issue is not whether we go to visit our relatives, but how we treat them and their homeland when we go (Young, 1987: 272).” In another example, turning to my own people, the Ojibwe, we have long standing cultural connections to the stars that influence storytelling, governance, and religious tenets (CHIN, 2003). This engagement continues through to the present day, and points to a promising future. A new generation of Indigenous artists, filmmakers, and writers are beginning to create works that place the Indigenous individual themselves into narratives of space travel and futurity, unsettling existing settler notions of what our future in space might look like. As Leo Cornum (2015) writes, “Outer space, perhaps because of its appeal to our sense of endless possibility, has become the imaginative site for re-envisioning how black, indigenous and other oppressed people can relate to each other outside of and despite the colonial gaze.” These previous examples should serve as a reminder that the historical underpinnings of our great national myth are built upon shaky intellectual ground—we need to be honest about this. America did not just spring forth out of nothing; it came from the brutal occupation and control of Native lands. Despite the best efforts of the settler state, Native people are still here, we still exist and make vital contributions to both our tribal communities and science. We cannot expect Donald Trump to turn his back on the national myth of what made the United States the United States—in his mind, this is the glorious history of what made America great in the past. And it should serve as no surprise that Trump and others wish to extend this history into outer space. Even when Trump’s days in the White House are over, the settler colonial logics that underpin our engagement with land on Earth will still loom large over the ways that we may potentially engage with outer space. But for those of us who do work in Indigenous geographies and Indigenous studies, it becomes even more vital that we heed the calls of Indigenous thinkers inside and outside formal academic structures, validate Indigenous histories, and push to deconstruct the American settler myth and to provide a new way of looking at the stars, especially at a crucial moment where the settler state turns its gaze towards the same.

#### Hegemony is maintained through genocide and colonialism.

Kosasa 4 (Eiko Kosasa, University of Hawai’i at Manoa, “Predatory Politics: US Imperialism, Settler Hegemony, and The Japanese in Hawai’i”, pg 41-46, 2004) CJun

Similarly, if we look at colonialism in terms of settler hegemony, one can easily see that the United States is constituted by the “dictatorship of the settler” where the state is democratic for settlers and dictatorial for Natives. The social, economic, legal and political structures are created for settler interests and benefits. American history is filled with examples of settler hegemony that continue into the present. The undemocratic colonial structure of the United States makes Native assertions for their lands and human, civil and political rights difficult to realize because Native peoples battle a structure that is hegemonic – a settler system with inter-locking public and private institutions that support and inscribe settler supremacy. For example, settlers develop Native areas for settler use and profit even if these are on sacred indigenous lands. The Lakota nation continues to challenge the U.S. government over the use and abuse of its Black Hills. Thousands of settler tourists travel each year to see the images of their colonial government’s presidents carved into the sacred Lakota mountains. Within a capitalist economy, the American settler citizenry handsomely profits from this vulgar symbol of U.S. imperialist power through its trade in tourism. The United States commits the same brutality as all conquerors throughout world history by defacing that which is sacred to the colonized peoples. In Hawai'i, a similarly disrespectful, anti-Native situation is ever present. A military highway, the H-3 interstate, paved over significant heiau (Native Hawaiian sacred temples) such as Kukui-o-Käne and Hale o Papa and was routed through sacred valleys. In spite of protests by Native Hawaiians and other supporters, the H-3 freeway was constructed to secure American imperialist interests (economic and military) in the Pacific and Asia by linking the Kane'ohe Marine Corps Air Station to Pearl Harbor for the purpose of "rapid ground transportation." In this case, coloniaI governments, both federal and state, destroyed Native Hawaiian cultural and religious sites by placing a symbol of imperialist power a military highway over places sacred to the colonized people. Meanwhile, local Japanese settlers, particularly U.S. Senator Daniel K. Inouye, were active participants in the completion of this colonial project. Inouye was the freeway's staunchest and most ferocious supporter-he funneled over a billion dollars of federal monies to build the fifteen-mile American military highway, often referred to as "Danny's highway." It is not surprising that Inouye and the local Japanese community support American colonial presence in Hawai'i. As a settler community, the Japanese have always cast their lot with the settler colonial system rather than supported Native resistance to it. The following chapters will explore the tremendous force and resources that the United States uses to ensure that all settler groups particularly the local Japanese community-support American imperialism. Although white racism was a factor in shaping the Japanese settler community, I will argue that this racism must be understood as a domestic issue within settler colonial America. The larger and more important issue here located at an international level) is settler racism that is, the oppression of Native peoples by the imposition of a foreign, American system. The presence of US. colonial structures serves to maintain and enforce the distinction between settlers and Natives. It gives advantages to settlers, including the local Japanese in Hawai'i. Hence, one does not need to be white to practice settler racism. The issue of settler racism will be discussed in more depth in a later chapter

#### The discursive construction of China as a security threat is a product of hypermasculine whiteness – the affirmatives naïve faith in the US ability to assert international order only results in colonial-patriarchal interventions and extinction.

#### The 1AC’s fear-driven discourse of Asian instability is based in gendered theories of state behavior that reinforces insecurity and violence that cause war

Maass 14 (Matthias, Associate Professor of International Relations Ph.D., The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, USA, “Towards Gendering Northeast Asian Traditional Security: The Cases of the USS Pueblo and Juche Policy,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 2, June 2014, 243–262, CMR

Generally speaking, the gendered approach in IR “interrogates how masculine values and worldviews have shaped diplomacy.”5 Introducing a larger study, Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland present the broad claim of GS in IR: The exclusion of women’s experience from the conceptualization of international relations has had negative consequences both for the discipline and for male and female inhabitants of the real world. A central hypothesis is that this exclusion has resulted in an academic field excessively focused on conflict and anarchy, and a way of practising statecraft and formulating strategy that is excessively focused on competition and fear.6 In the paper, the claim is made that when it comes to Northeast Asian security, both statecraft and scholarship are indeed “excessively focused on competition and fear.” Hence, in the following investigation, “gender lenses” will be used to look at security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula. The project’s starting assumption is that the major Northeast Asian security discourses are gender-biased and that the theoretical paradigm most often used in investigations of this region’s security issues, Realism, keeps channeling the relevant discourses toward a gender-biased understanding of Northeast Asian security matters. In response, and in order to probe alternative explanations, “gender glasses” will be put on. The hope is that the investigation below will contribute to “more robust thinking”7 on security matters in Northeast Asia generally and on the Korean Peninsula specifically. The hope rests on the impressive scholarship on “gendered dimensions of war, peace, and security”8 which has already been generated by scholars and students of GS in IR. The Wider Context: Northeast Asian Security In the twenty-first century, Northeast Asia remains a security hotspot. A dependable and stable Northeast Asian security arrangement remains elusive. For decades, statesmen and stateswomen, diplomats, and politicians have been confronted with a multitude of dangerous and destabilizing developments in Northeast Asia, from North Korean “military-diplomatic campaigns,”9 and nuclear and missile tests conducted by Pyongyang, to the rise of China and a corresponding American “pivot to Asia,”10 and a possible expansion of Japan’s military posture in the Asia-Pacific.11 IR theory has been used to describe the situation and explain state behavior. Theory has also been used to guide state action in Northeast Asia. A plethora of perspectives has been applied, from Constructivist Theory, Foreign Policy Analysis, Institutionalism, to non-traditional Security Studies, to name just a few.12 However, Realism has been the dominant IR theory in the discourses on Northeast Asia. The broad Realist paradigm presents the world as anarchical and power-based, resulting in fear, hostility, and the security dilemma. However, the Realist paradigm tends to privilege “masculine” behavior, such as demonstrations of power, over alternative actions that are seen as weak and “female” behavior. Thus, it is proposed to apply GS’s theoretical and conceptual paradigms and work towards a fresh investigation of Northeast Asian security from a gendered perspective. The hope is that by challenging the Realist discourse on Northeast Asian security, new insights and policy options can be generated.

#### Specifically the aff’s construction of China as a security threat reaffirms a nationalistic discourse that makes war inevitable

Wilcox ’10 - PhD candidate at the University of Minnesota, where she works on issues of gender and technology in war. Lauren has presented her work at the Annual Meetings of the International Studies Association and the Northeast Political Science Association, as well as at the Institute for Qualitative Research Methods (IQRM), the “Gender and Security” Workshop, and the Methodology Workshop at the International Studies Association-Northeast (Laura, Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives, “Gendering the cult of the oﬀensive,” http://spmehazem.yolasite.com/resources/ebooksclub.org\_\_Gender\_and\_International\_Security\_\_Feminist\_Perspectives\_\_Routledge\_Critical\_Security\_Studies\_.pdf)//geo

The process of dehumanizing or “feminizing” enemies is such a means of understanding this misperception. David Campbell, for example, argues that state identity is secured by discourses about the threats others pose: “for the state, identity can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the ‘inside’ are linked through a discourse of ‘danger’ with threats identiﬁed and located on the ‘outside.’”55 **These outside threats are constructed in terms historically associated with the feminine, such as irrational, dirty, chaotic, and evil**. As others are constructed as inferior through a feminizing discourse, their abilities are underestimated, while somewhat paradoxically, the threat they pose is overestimated. For example, the United States and Britain underestimated the military capabilities of the Japanese during World War II because of beliefs in the inferiority of Japanese. The Japanese were considered “subhuman” and “illogical,” and their military capabilities were downgraded prior to the outbreak of war.56 Military oﬃcials in both the United States and Britain ignored evidence of Japanese military successes and the potential threat they posed on the assumption that the Japanese simply could not be capable of such achievements.57 Thus, the belief that wars will be quick and easy because “our men” are superior in strength, resolve and technological capability has its roots in a process of “othering” in which one’s own identity is buttressed by the distancing from and disparagement of a diﬀerent national or racial group. **The feminization of enemies is a reﬂection of masculinized nationalism**—states tell stories about their valorized masculinity in relation to their opponents’ devalued femininity, or subordinate masculinity. The subordinate masculinity that encouraged Britain, France and the US into the war was that of Germany’s barbarism. The discourse of “barbarism” which was applied to the Germans in World Wars I and II, and to the Japanese in World War II as well, has had a double meaning in the West: it is considered the opposite of “civilization,” while can be either a good thing or a bad thing. “Barbarism” is good when it involves a rejection of the feminized “civilization” of commerce, industry, and domesticity for the more strenuous pursuits of hunting and war. However, it is considered negative, a lower form of masculinity when it refers to racial others. This subordinate masculinity is associated with uncontrolled aggression, a “hypermasculinity” that is to be feared and tamed. In British discourse, Germans were “huns” who stood for despotism and militarism as opposed to British individualism and civilized values and accomplishments. While denigrating the Germans, this construction also entails a fear that the Germans were a more vital people who might succeed in overtaking the British Empire, a fear which led some to call for British men to emulate what was seen as a more “virile race.”58 The role of this sort of national “myth-making” in increasing the likelihood of war plays a prominent role in Van Evera’s list of results of perceived oﬀensive dominance. However, Van Evera denies the centrality of mythmaking to the concept of nationalism: [M]yth is not an essential ingredient of nationalism: nationalism can also rest on a group solidarity based on truth, and the eﬀects of nationalism are largely governed by the degree of truthfulness of the beliefs that a given nationalism adopts; as truthfulness diminishes, the risks posed by the nationalism increase.59 Here, Van Evera mistakenly equates “myth-making” with “falsity.” It is these “myths” that create the nation though the hope of a common future, and despite the relatively recent invention of nationalism, the ﬁguration of the nation with a common, distant, origin.60 **These myths about national greatness may be argued to be constitutive of aggressive wars, as such myths play a crucial role in the “othering” and dehumanization of the enemy along gendered lines such that the extreme violence of war becomes fathomable, and a viable policy option.** Feminist scholars have examined these myths and their causes and consequences in terms of gendered ideologies and found them to be inﬂuential in remaking gender roles. Rather than seeing the relationship between nationalism and the entrenchment of certain gender identities as a matter of coincidence, feminists have theorized the ways in which national identity is produced though the use of gender discourses. Nationalism, which was at a high point in the build-up to World War I, is a set of discourses about who “we” are and who belongs in the political community. As such, it reproduces the inside/outside logic of the state system, in which those “inside” the state or nation are superior to those “outside.” Nationalism therefore depends upon “national chauvinism,” such that members of other nations, or racial, sexual, or ideological “others” inside the nation are constructed in terms of femininity or subordinate masculinity. They are weak and inferior, or they are hyper-masculine: beast-like in brutality and sexuality. Feminist have argued that the boundaries between the “self” and “other” are produced by discourses of gender and sexuality.61 Feminists have demonstrated that **nationalist discourses that constitute the identity of the nation are dependent upon discourses of gender that reproduce traditional gender roles**. Feminists argue that nationalists need gendered ideologies to gain support for their cause.62 For example, Anne McClintock writes, “All too often in male nationalism, gender diﬀerence between women and men serves to symbolically deﬁne the limits of national diﬀerence and power between men.”63 The “imagined community” of the nation **depends upon the homosocial relations of men to protect the nation-as-women’s-body against foreign incursion.**64 Symbolic gender imagery serves not only to construct the boundaries of national identities, but reproduces gender identity as well. Propaganda and recruitment campaigns frequently held up the volunteer soldier as the only acceptable man—those who did not volunteer were seen as weak, eﬀete and cowardly.65 The war also dampened the feminist movement in Britain, as many feminists as well as non-feminists supported traditional gender roles for men and women despite women working outside the home in large numbers during the war.66 As an example of how nationalist passions frequently prevail over attempts to reform traditional gender roles, the feminist magazine The Suﬀragette changed its name to Britannia to symbolize patriotic unity and its support of the war eﬀort despite its critiques of the political and legal order.67 As gender is a relational concept, hegemonic deﬁnitions of masculinity necessarily entail hegemonic deﬁnitions of femininity. Nira Yuval-Davis has categorized several ways in which women function in nationalist ideologies, symbolically or in their actions.68 Women are constructed as the biological reproducers of the nation, as well as the cultural reproducers. After all, “group reproduction—both biological and social—is fundamental to nationalist practice, process, and politics.”69 Under nationalist regimes, women are often expected to bear and raise young men who will ﬁght on behalf of the nation. The nation is therefore dependent upon women in traditional roles as mothers and caretakers to reproduce itself. The entire nation maybe symbolized by a woman who must be fought and died for. Indeed, nationalist discourses often present the nation as a woman, a guardian and symbol of the nation’s values, such as Germania, Britannia, or France’s Marianne, or the cult of Queen Louise of Prussia. These symbolic women were Madonna-like in their image as chaste mothers of the nation.70 Rape, then, becomes a metaphor for national humiliation, as in “the rape of Belgium” or “the rape of Kuwait” as well as a tactic of war used to symbolically prove the superiority of one’s national group. Not only do nationalist projects construct gender identities that prescribe diﬀerent spheres for men and women, but this **production of gender identities has been a necessary condition of nationalism** as women have symbolically ﬁgured as the markers of the nation who must be protected by the men who run the state (or are trying to create one). **Nationalism is naturalized, or legitimated, though gender discourses that naturalized the domination of one group over another through the disparagement of the feminine and the constitution of separate and unequal spheres for men and women.** Gender is constitutive of nationalism, which is factor in the promotion of oﬀensive military doctrines and the cult of the oﬀensive. Nationalism in terms of the assertion of the superiority of our men over their men often legitimates war in terms of a “protection racket,” in which oﬀensive wars are fought in order to defend “women and children” from potential or actual threats. This “protection racket” extends the logic of nationalism to allow for oﬀensive policies to be legitimated as defensive.The discursive construction of China as a security threat is a product of hypermasculine whiteness – the affirmatives naïve faith in the US ability to assert international order only results in colonial-patriarchal interventions and extinction.

#### Insecurity is used as a project of policing who is deserving an who is not – space competition is an example of this racialized security logic

**Mason 13** [Corinne, Associate Professor of Gender and Women’s Studies & Sociology at Brandon University, “Global Violence Against Women as a National Security ‘Emergency’”, <https://www-jstor-org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/stable/pdf/43860686.pdf?ab_segments=0%252Fdefault-2%252Fcontrol&refreqid=excelsior%3A797bd12b76542bcdedf56bdf2cb74573>] JKast

Development and in/security as biopolitical and necropolitical manage- ment is a project of maintaining and policing the division between those who are deserving and those who are not. Reminiscent of James Ferguson's (2005) notion of decomposed modernity, the third world is not asked to catch up to the first world nor join its membership, but instead is shunned from its borders and denied economic, political, and social inclusion into the modern world. The excess of development, or the risks associated with underdevelopment that cannot be recuperated, is understood as a security threat.9 For example, in the 2010 QDDR, poverty is conceptualized as security threat; where poverty is rampant, states are understood to be fragile and prone to conflict. The QDDR maintains that development issues are indispensable to secure interests both abroad and at home.

Using the example of post-9/11 security agendas in Canada, Sherene Razack (2008) agues that there is a racial logic to processes of securitization; that is, the assumption that violence is likely to erupt in poor and fragile states or underdeveloped spaces relies upon a racial grammar that distinguishes between "Us" and those who are not like us - "Others." According to V. Spike Peterson Corinne L. Mason • 6i (2007), wars depend on both raced and gendered logics. Postcolonial scholars like Anne McClintock (1995), Edward W. Said (1979), and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988) demonstrate the ways in which such logics were foundational to colonial ideologies, which represented the colonies as weak, passive, disorderly, hyper-sexual, irrational, politically and economically incompetent, and lacking in self-control. In current imperialist wars and interventions, the rationality of the West is posited against unruly, feminized, sexualized, and primitive Others. Distinguishing between Us and Others relies upon racial logics and beliefs that the security of those deserving (Us) outweighs those that are undeserv- ing (Others), thus further entrenching the functioning of necropower in the development and security nexus.

#### The impact is the recreation of the cycle of war and violence

Sjoberg 13 (Laura, associate professor of Political Science @ University of Florida, University of Chicago; Ph.D., University of Southern California School of International Relations; J.D. Boston College Law School, “Relations International and War(s),” Gendered Lenses Look at War(s), online book, CMR)

Rationality in Interaction This skew is particularly evident in the assumption of rationality." The rationality assumption implies that the knower/actor can separate himself/herself from the “other” in interactions with that other. Feminists have argued that knowledge is always perspectival and political; therefore, states and their leaders’ decisions about how to interact with others are not rational, but informed by their situational and political biases. In this view, the rationality assumption may be seen as at once itself a political bias and obscuring other political biases. As Naomi Scheman argues, perceived rational cost-beneﬁt analysis about war-making and war-fighting should “always be seen as especially problematical when... constructed only by those in positions of privilege... [which provide] only distorted views about the world.”78 In this view, rational calculation is not an objective, attainable, and desirable end, but a partial representation of both interest and actors’ representation of those interests. In this way, through gender lenses, rationality has been seen as importantly incomplete, leaving out signiﬁcant (if not the most significant) factors that go into decision-making.79 In addition to understanding the rationality assumption as partial (and therefore unrepresentative), feminist research has pointed out links between rationality and mascuIinism.8° As Karen Jones notes, advocates of rationality as a guide for interstate interactions“ assume: 1. Available... conceptions of rationality and reason represent genuinely human norms and ideals; 2. The list of norms and ideals contained within available conceptions of rationality and reason are sufficiently complete; and 3. The external normative functions assigned to reason and rationality are unproblematic.82 Looking through gender lenses shows problems with each of these assumptions. Feminists have argued that “the identity of the modern subject-in models of human nature, citizenship, the rational actor, the knowing subject, economic man, and political agency-is not gender-neutral but masculine (and typically European and heterosexua|).”83 This impacts not only how we see the rational subject, but how we predict and understand his decisions, at the state level as well as at the individual level. According to Margaret Atherton, the possibility of rationality has “been used in a disturbing fashion to mark a gender distinction. We have, for example, on the one hand, the man of reason, and, on the other, the woman of passion.”84 In rationality assumptions, traits associated with masculinity are normalized and traits associated with femininity are excluded. The impact is compounded because (masculinized) rationality and its (feminized) alternatives are not on equal playing ﬁelds. As a result, Karen Jones notes that “women’s assumed deficiency in rationality” has been used to exclude both women and knowledge associated with femininity from accepted views of the world.85 The alleged gender neutrality of rationality, then, “is often a covert form of privileging maleness”85 and omission of “what has traditionally counted as ‘feminine.’”87 Still, adding women and values associated with femininity to current concepts of rationality is unlikely to create a gender-neutral concept of rationality.88 This is because, epistemologically, the sovereign rational subject constructs artificial gendered boundaries between rationality and emotion, male and female, and knower and known.89 Among states, those boundaries are not benign. Instead, they breed competition and domination that inspire and foster war(s) and conﬂict(s).90 This competition frequently relies on contrasting the state’s own masculinity to the enemy’s (actual or perceived) femininity. This cycle of genderings is not a series of events but a social continuum. In these gendered relationships, as Zillah Eisenstein argues, “gender differentiation will be mobilized for war and peace,” especially moving forward into the age of an American empire focused on manliness.9‘ Feminists have long argued that competitions between hegemonic masculinities and subordinate masculinities play a role in causing war(s).92 Hidden beneath the assumed independence, rationality, and unity of state interaction leading to war are gendered interstate interactions that cause, constitute, and relate to war and wars. Feminist scholars have recognized the extent to which the preeminence of masculine values dominates (particularly conﬂictual) accounts of interstate interactions, wherein “rational” interactions often become “a self-reproducing discourse of fear, suspicion, anticipated violence, and violence” in which “force is used to checkmate force.”93 Interstate interactions leading to wars often show the gendered nature of war narratives, war logics, and war languages, which produce (and reproduce) gendered cycles of violence.

#### The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of an ontological revisionism that deconstructs the myth of the masculine western subject

Youngs 4 (Gillian, Professor of Digital Economy at the University of Brighton, “Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’ live in”, International Affairs, 80, pgs 77-80)

This discussion will demonstrate, in the ways outlined above, the depth and range of feminist perspectives on power—a prime concern of International Relations and indeed of the whole study of politics. It will illustrate the varied ways in which scholars using these perspectives study power in relation to gender, a nexus largely disregarded in mainstream approaches. From feminist positions, this lacuna marks out mainstream analyses as trapped in a narrow and superficial ontological and epistemological framework. A major part of the problem is the way in which the mainstream takes the appearance of a pre- dominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning and end of investigation and knowledge-building. Feminism requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations that form that reality. ¶ While it may be empirically accurate to observe that historically and contemporaneously men have dominated the realms of international politics and ¶ economics, feminists argue that a full understanding of the nature of those realms must include understanding the intricate patterns of (gendered) inequalities that shape them. Mainstream International Relations, in accepting that because these realms appear to be predominantly man-made, there is no reason to ask how or why that is the case, stop short of taking account of gender. As long as those who adhere to this position continue to accept the sufficiency of the appearances and probe no further, then the ontological and epistemological limitations will continue to be reproduced. ¶ Early work in feminist International Relations in the 1980s had to address this problem directly by peeling back the masculinist surface of world politics to reveal its more complex gendered (and racialized) dynamics. Key scholars such as Cynthia Enloe focused on core International Relations issues of war, militarism and security, highlighting the dependence of these concepts on gender structures—e.g. dominant forms of the masculine (warrior) subject as protector/conqueror/exploiter of the feminine/feminized object/other—and thus the fundamental importance of subjecting them to gender analysis. In a series of works, including the early Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (1989), Enloe has addressed different aspects of the most overtly masculine realms of international relations, conflict and defence, to reveal their deeper gendered realities.3 This body of work has launched a powerful critique of the taboo that made women and gender most invisible, in theory and practice, where masculinity had its most extreme, defining (and violent) expression. Enloe’s research has provided one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence for the ontological revisionism required of mainstream International Relations, especially in relation to its core concerns. ¶ When Enloe claimed that ‘gender makes the world go round’,4 she was in fact turning the abstract logic of malestream International Relations inside out. This abstract logic saw little need to take theoretical and analytical account of gender as a social force because in practical terms only one gender, the male, appeared to define International Relations. Ann Tickner has recently offered the reminder that this situation persists: ‘During the 1990s, women were admitted to most combat positions in the U.S. military, and the U.S. president appointed ¶ the first female secretary of state, but occupations in foreign and military policy- making in most states remain overwhelmingly male, and usually elite male.’5 ¶ Nearly a decade earlier, in her groundbreaking work Gender in International Relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security,6 she had asked the kinds of questions that were foundational to early feminist International Relations: ‘Why is the subject matter of my discipline so distant from women’s lived experiences? Why have women been conspicuous only by their absence in the worlds of diplomacy and military and foreign policy-making?’ Tickner, like Enloe, has interrogated core issues in mainstream International Relations, such as security and peace, providing feminist bases for gendered understanding of issues that have defined it. Her reflection on what has happened since Gender in International Relations was published indicates the prominence of tensions between theory and practice. ‘We may have provided some answers to my questions as to why IR and foreign policymaking remain male-dominated; but breaking down the unequal gender hierarchies that perpetuate these androcentric biases remains a challenge.’7 ¶ The persistence of the overriding maleness of international relations in practice is part of the reason for the continued resistance and lack of responsiveness to the analytical relevance feminist International Relations claims. In other words, it is to some extent not surprising that feminist International Relations stands largely outside mainstream International Relations, because the concerns of the former, gender and women, continue to appear to be subsidiary to high politics and diplomacy. One has only to recall the limited attention to gender and women in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq crises to illustrate this point.8 So how have feminists tackled this problem? Necessarily, but problematically, by calling for a deeper level of ontological revisionism. I say problematically because, bearing in mind the limited success of the first kind discussed above, it can be anticipated that this deeper kind is likely to be even more challeng- ing for those in the mainstream camp. ¶ The second level of ontological revisionism required relates to critical understanding of why the appearance of international relations as predominantly a sphere of male influence and action continues to seem unproblematic from mainstream perspectives. This entails investigating masculinity itself: the nature of its subject position—including as reflected in the collective realm of politics— and the frameworks and hierarchies that structure its social relations, not only in relation to women but also in relation to men configured as (feminized) ‘others’ ¶ because of racial, colonial and other factors, including sexuality. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart directly captured such an approach as ‘the “man” question in international relations’.9 I would like to suggest that for those sceptical about feminist International Relations, Zalewski’s introductory chapter, ‘From the “woman” question to the “man” question in International Relations’, offers an impressively transparent way in to its substantive terrain.10 Reflecting critically on the editors’ learning process in preparing the volume and working with its contributors, both men and women, Zalewski discusses the various modifications through which the title of the work had moved. These included at different stages the terms ‘women’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘feminism’, finally ending with ‘the “man” question’—signalling once again, I suggest, tensions between theory and practice, the difficulty of escaping the concrete dominance of the male subject position in the realm of international relations. ¶ The project’s starting point revealed a faith in the modernist commitment to the political importance of bringing women into the position of subjecthood. We implicitly accepted that women’s subjecthood could be exposed and revealed in the study and practice of international relations, hoping that this would also reveal the nature of male dominance and power. Posing the ‘man’ question instead reflects our diminishing belief that the exclusion of women can be remedied by converting them into subjects.11 ¶ Adding women appeared to have failed to ‘destabilize’ the field; so perhaps critically addressing its prime subject ‘man’ head-on could help to do so. ‘This leads us to ask questions about the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and to question the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in the theory and practice of international relations’ (emphasis added).12 ¶ The deeper level of ontological revisionism called for by feminist Inter- national Relations in this regard is as follows. Not only does it press beyond the appearance of international relations as a predominantly masculine terrain by including women in its analysis, it goes further to question the predominant masculinity itself and the accepted naturalness of its power and influence in collective (most significantly state) and individual forms.