# 1

#### The Affirmative is an investment in the academic project of cognitive labor. Their assumption that the ballot should go “the best idea or better debating” invests in the appropriation of scholarship into a system of symbolic labor that retteritorialzies the 1ac in favor of cognitive capitalism

Clarke 15 (Paul Clarke is Lecturer in Performance Studies @ The University of Bristol “The Impact Market: The complicity of practitioner-researchers in ‘the spread of the university beyond the university’” *Performance Research* 20, no. 4, pp. 115-120)//NotJacob

The university territorializes new knowledges, which can be taught and exploited as cultural or economic capital; to use Harney and Moten’s analogy, it ‘encircle[es them with] war wagons’ (2013:34) in order to capitalize on them. Looked at from this perspective, my 2003 paper played a role in the discursive enclosure of ‘expert practices’ (Melrose 2007) in the institution’s unfolding encyclopaedia of knowledge and power. Practical action and doing performance work, which once belonged to the sphere of praxis, have become part of the realm of knowledge and belong to the university as intellectual property. Practices that were felt to be ‘just intuitive’ (Melrose 2005) have been named properly, as ‘expert-performancepractitioner-centred modes of knowledge and models of intelligibility’ (Melrose 2007), embodied thinking or somatic knowing. With performance becoming valued as a subject, and with the legitimation of practice-as-research, comes the ability to regulate its unruly ways and imprecise languages – to bring those who make this object of study within the university, its disciplines and governance. In the 1980s and early 1990s it might have been possible to work in the academy and borrow its resources to create professional practice outside. But, since the admission of practical research outcomes in HEFCE’s 1996 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) and the embedding of practice-as-research in UK research culture, the field of performance has been territorialized and work presented professionally counts as university product. There are few socio-cultural spaces beyond the scope of the REF and its new impact agenda, and in order to be a practitioner in the university you must demonstrate the excellence of work produced outside, plus evidence of external recognition. While the intellectual ‘worthiness’ (Melrose 2002) of practice-as-research and the counting of impact has strengthened the position of practitioners in universities and their potential for progression or promotion, this inclusion has undoubtedly influenced their creative activities. The debt that the performancemaker ‘owes to the academy’ for their entry is to ‘incorporate[, in their work,] a scholarly apparatus that enables [their peers] to assess [its] value and significance … as the results of … research’ (Cooper 2005, np). The ‘obligation’ is to make art with a research imperative and to produce excellence within the frame of the REF, which values practice if ‘enhancements’ are produced ‘in knowledge and understanding in the discipline’ (ibid.). This transforms the aims and aspirations of university practitioners, their ways of practising performance and the form of artwork produced, the quality of which is assessed according to criteria for research and impact rather than aesthetic judgements. In spite of the above, in the hierarchy of knowledge, monographs and peer-reviewed articles, like this one, still rule. Performance can only pass as research when accompanied by framing discursive documents – 300 word statements and questions, which are admittedly often written retrospectively, after the practical research has concluded and its outcomes are known. As Conquergood (2002) wrote thirteen years ago in his article ‘Performance studies: Interventions and radical research’, ‘knowing how’ (146) remains a ‘subjugated knowledge’ (Foucault 1980:81), struggling for its place. As he said then, ‘promotion committees dominated by the more institutionally powerful scholars [… still] do not know how to appraise a record of artistic accomplishment commensurate with traditional criteria of scholarly research and publication’ (Conquergood 2002:153). Despite doing the necessary labour of teaching performance practice and producing impact, as a practitioner-researcher my position continues to feel weak and at risk, like an uninvited guest or imposter in the academy. In addition there is an ongoing fight to maintain the hours allocated for workshops, to justify the low staffstudent ratios necessary and the inefficiency of practice-based teaching, which fails to produce more student satisfaction in the National Student Survey (NSS) for less contact hours. Having internalized the precarity that even those of us on permanent contracts feel, I place an obligation on myself to fulfil all aspects of my role professionally and responsibly, perform self-assurance, compete effectively with other researchers (especially in UOA 35, Music, Drama, Dance and Performing Arts) and continue my professional development. I acknowledge the way that my subjectivity has been fabricated by the university and shaped by our precarious positions in it. Hence I cannot resist the desire to do well in the next REF, feeling driven to attempt to produce research excellence and be impactful. My subjectivity is one of the outputs of the institutional apparatus and I reproduce the university, HEFCE and Arts Council England’s values and ways of thinking as my own aspirations, putting myself into my work and wanting it to ‘influenc[e] civil society and quality of life’, to believe in this vision and the need to capture such contributions. For all this writing of subversion I may not have the autonomous agency or self-determination to resist, or be ‘disobedient’ in Virno’s terms (Virno 2004; see also Lazzarato 2010). As well as the good citizenship discussed above, the format of Bristol’s academic CV has a category for ‘Entrepreneurship’, a further academic responsibility to determine routes to market for research outputs and develop their competitiveness. Each institution’s environment statement for REF 2014 and impact case studies also accounted for academic enterprise, contribution ‘to economic prosperity’ (REF 2012) and scholars’ relationships with cultural and creative industries.6 I am an artistic director of Uninvited Guests and this company limited by guarantee was listed on the Environment Template along with its income. Here the professional world, ‘the industries of creativity’ 6 The REF 2014 Environment Template provides an account of the university department, or unit of assessment’s research strategy, people and staff development, income, statistical data, infrastructure and facilities, collaboration with other institutions or industries and contribution to the discipline or research base (see REF 2012). (Raunig 2013) and culture exterior to the university are encircled or brought inside its expanded walls. Uninvited Guests, its producers and those employed by it, become university workers by proxy, as they transfer practiceframed-as-research to wider audiences, whose number and diversity are measured. We may ask whether Uninvited Guests therefore reproduces the university and performs its social work in the private-public spheres beyond, whether its performers are unwitting agents or representatives of the university, marketing and distributing its knowledge, know-how and vision. The Department of Drama’s Environment Template measured the quality of Uninvited Guests’ performances by financial income, transformed audiences and reception into figures and capital, and quantified dissemination. It is worth noting that there is a double counting of Uninvited Guests’ output of impact and that Arts Council England (ACE), who fund the work, also use the neoliberal language of instrumentalization, social change and transformation. The company has received project funding from Grants for the arts and ACE for a number of research and development (R&D), production processes and national tours. The Arts Council’s website ‘talk[s] about the value of arts and culture to society’, how – in addition to art’s ‘intrinsic value’ – they ‘cherish’ the ways it ‘can illuminate our inner lives and enrich our emotional world’, along with producing ‘more measurable impact on our economy, health and wellbeing, society and culture’ (2014). ACE encourages the professionalization of artists as entrepreneurs, uses the terminology of the transformation economy (see Pine and Gilmore 2001), and makes demands on publicly funded cultural labourers similar to those asked of academic researchers – that is, to account for and evidence how their work is applied as an instrument of personal and social change, its extrinsic use-value: excellence in impact translates into investment as much as intrinsic aesthetic quality, and the latter may only accrue cultural capital. It could also be argued that, as well as art experiences, the Arts Council and state’s ethos, ideology and policies are disseminated or reproduced through touring to new neighbourhoods and diversifying audiences. With Arts Council England and funded venues operating within the same neoliberal conditions and policies as the university, being required to evidence their efficiency and efficacy, they subject arts producers to related impact agendas and evaluative metrics – apparatuses for accounting for interactions and engagement. While ‘defection’ from the university to the professional or public context is an option, it does not ‘modify the conditions within which the struggle takes place’, constitute an ‘exit’ or afford further autonomy, as the professional practitioner remains in service to the production of impact, in order to justify investment, and also to art market forces (Virno 2004:70). Closely related dispositifs – management instruments, financialized languages and evaluative frameworks – determine artists' drive to innovate and the association of practices with capital, both within and beyond the university. The business or profession of performance- making was once resistant to the production of commodities or exchangeable objects. Rather than producing material or durable goods, the outputs of this cooperative labour were cultural products that became themselves through disappearance. For Marx (1990 [1976]), in the case of teaching and performing, the product was inseparable from the act of producing and the producer; they were activities-without-end- product, like personal services. Performance, as Virno (2004) writes, ‘is an activity which finds its own … purpose … in itself, without objectifying itself into … a “finished product,” or into an object which would survive the performance’ (52). For him, theatre or performance ‘requires the presence of others’ (52) and interactions, and is hence closely aligned to praxis, the vita activa and political action. As I have noted, work has appropriated the activities of praxis, the political and social interactions that took place in the territory of politics and leisure, turning these to the public good of the private company – or in this case the university – and its ethos. Our economic model has shifted from ‘general intellect’ (Marx 1993 [1972]: 706), in which the common mode of labour is cognitive, to ‘general performance’ (Lütticken 2012), in which the majority of workers across diverse fields and forms are expected to perform themselves publicly, improve their performance and produce immaterial goods, such as relationships with customers and colleagues, positive feelings and affects. As Hardt and Negri (2004) write, contemporary labour ‘from sales work to financial services, is fundamentally a performance: the product is the act itself’ (200). In our post-Fordist times, cultural industry, and specifically performance, has become the ‘industry of the means of production’ (Virno 2004: 61). ‘Performance has been put to work’ (Hardt and Negri 2004: 200) and it is ‘the special capabilities of [the] performing artist’ (Virno 2004: 52), their virtuosities, which are the contemporary tools, techniques and procedures of the means of production. If workers are generally expected to perform their labour, then performance abilities appreciate as embodied assets in people as ‘enterprises’ (Lazzarato 2012: 56). How does studying performance through practice resist the production of human capital and producing graduates as virtuosic ‘entrepreneurs of themselves’ (Foucault 2008: 226)? The language of theatre and performance is prevalent in business schools and management studies, with Pine and Gilmore (2001) writing of companies staging unique events – shopping and dining experiences – in which the work ‘perishes upon its performance’ but ‘the value of the experience lingers in the memories of individuals engaged by the event’ (80). This chimes with performance studies’ thinking around the way that performance both disappears and remains (see Phelan 1993 and Schneider 2011). What does this context of an economy of experience, affects and transformation mean for the politics or ethics of teaching practical performance – producing students well-trained in the means of production, for experiential approaches to research and for the radical potential of companies like Uninvited Guests, which stage experiences or market unique, participatory performance events? In conclusion I will return to Conquergood, whose 2002 article, subtitled ‘Interventions and radical research’, was a foundational text for the inclusion of practice and applied performance research in the academy. In it he proposed ‘braiding together disparate and stratified ways of knowing’ (152), crisscrossing between ‘activity and analysis, … thinking and doing, interpreting and making (153), in order to challenge the academy’s ‘deeply entrenched division of labor’, hierarchy of value and organization of knowledge. What I would ask now is whether his mission to triangulate ‘practical knowledge, … propositional knowledge and politic[al]’ action remains resistant, if these spheres are already hybridized as scholarly work and part of the university’s terrain. It is precisely these hybrid modes that the academic institution currently seeks to develop and capitalize upon, through enterprise and networking with creative industries, and through engaging with diverse publics in order to generate measurable impact. Conquergood writes optimistically of research projects that reach outside the academy, of performance studies’ workers engaging with ‘activism, outreach’ (152), making meaningful connections and social commitments to communities – of political praxis. In the context of the contemporary university we need to consider the territorializing as well as radical possibilities of such articulations. How can creative practice fulfil its transgressive promise when it is institutionalized, transformed into the university’s impact, enterprise and product mix? If these activities are in the university and part of the work that a professional academic is contracted for, they can be acquired, commodified, managed and marketed by the university. The academy has embraced different ways of knowing, but to what end and are these modes of knowledge any less subjugated? Under these late capitalist conditions, can performance practice still generate fugitivity escape capture as knowledge or unsettle the ‘encyclopedic circle of the [state] university’ (Harney and Moten 2013: 34)? As Isabell Lorey (2010) proposes, can socio-political affects, impacts and exchanges with others retain a ‘capacity for refusal’, resisting being entirely measured or ‘economicized’ (5)? Are there ‘surpluses’ that cannot be capitalized on, ‘absorbed’ or ‘wholly determined’ by the institution, which produce ‘potentialities of resistance’? Can subversive intellectuals save some autonomous time for inconvenient academic freedom, inefficient and unprofessional activities, including study in Harney and Moten’s terms, without ‘knowledge production’ (12), output, credit or end? Can the ‘refugee colony’ of practitioner researchers, of which I am one, retain the subversive potential ‘to be in but not of the university’ (26), to steal into the academy and poach its resources, to intervene, as Conquergood claimed? Or do we borrow from the university solely for the university’s benefit? As a virtue of being incorporated in the neoliberal institution, are our subjectivities produced and shaped, such that, whether we are practising inside or outside, we are of the university, embodying ways of thinking, desires and aspirations that mimic institutional drives, values and vision? Or, in Lazzarato’s terms, can immaterial and cognitive wage-labourers access non- exploitative temporalities, in which antagonistic subjectivities may form themselves or be created, politically, intellectually and imaginatively independent of the interests of university and state productivity: can our practices be dissociated from capital and returned to common sense or collective knowledge, as public goods? (See Lazzarato 2010 and Chukrov 2010.)

#### The aff’s performance of critique and different becomes the affective energy that greases the violent wheels of neoliberalism

Ferguson 2012 (Roderick A. Ferguson is the co-director of the Racialized Body research cluster @ UIC, “Reorder of Things : The University and Its Pedagogies of Minority Difference” 2012. Pgs. 11-14)//NotJacob

The student movements of the sixties and seventies represent both a por­tion and a disruption of this genealogy. They point to an academic moment that helped to rearticulate the nature of state and capital, a moment in which truth as the ideal of the university and the mediator of state and civil society was joined by difference in general, and minoritized difference in particular. Moreover, the academy became the “training ground” for state and capital’s engagement with minority difference as a site of representa­tion and meaning. A historical and theoretical reconsideration of the interdisciplinary fields means displacing the economic and its thesis that the academy is a mere reflection or derivation of political economy. In terms of this narrative of rejection and derivation, we are the inheritors of a philosopher’s deception, the children of a ruse. The extent to which we accept the academy and things academic as the designs of the economic is the measure of our dependence on this trick secured through a rhetoric of impotence and remove. The modern Western academy was created as the repository and guar­antor of national culture as well as a cultivator and innovator of political economy. As such, the academy is an archive of sorts, whose technologies— or so the theory goes— are constantly refined to acquire the latest innovation. As an archiving institution, the academy is— to use Derrida’s description of the archive—“ institutive and conservative. Revolutionary and traditional. An economic archive in this double sense: it keeps, it puts in reserve, it saves, but in an unnatural fashion, that is to say in making the law (nomos) or in making people respect the law.” 25 The academy has always been an economic domain; that is, it has simultaneously determined who gets admitted while establishing the rules for membership and participation. In the context of the post– World War II United States, the American academy can be read as a record of the shifts and contradictions of polit­ical economy. Indeed, with the admission of women and people of color into predominantly white academic settings, the economic character of the American academy did not simply vanish. The academy would begin to put, keep in reserve, and save minoritized subjects and knowledges in an archival fashion, that is, by devising ways to make those subjects and knowledges respect power and its “laws.” Put differently, the ethnic and women’s studies movements applied pressures on the archival conventions of the academy in an effort to stretch those conventions so that previously excluded subjects might enjoy membership. But it also meant that those subjects would fall under new and revised laws. As a distinct archival economy, the American academy would help inform the archival agendas of state and capital— how best to institute new peoples, new knowledges, and cultures and at the same time discipline and exclude those subjects according to a new order. This was the moment in which power would hone its own archival econ­omy, producing formulas for the incorporation rather than the absolute repudiation of difference, all the while refining and perfecting its practices of exclusion and regulation. This is the time when power would restyle its archival propensities by dreaming up ways to affirm difference and keep it in hand. Ethnic studies and women’s studies movements were the proto­typical resources of incorporative and archival systems of power that re­ invented themselves because of civil rights and liberation movements of the fifties, sixties, and seventies. Part of the signature achievements of these affirmative modes of power was to make the pursuit of recognition and legitimacy into formidable horizons of pleasure, insinuating themselves into radical politics, trying to convince insurgents that “your dreams are also mine.” By excavating the social movements, we may be able to chart the emer­gence of this new kind of archival economy that transformed academic, political, economic, and social life from the late sixties and beyond. More­ over, focusing on the social movements and the denominations of inter­disciplinary forms that emerged from them might allow us to produce a counterarchive detailing the ways in which power worked through the “recognition” of minoritized histories, cultures, and experiences and how power used that “recognition” to resecure its status. The histories of inter­disciplinary engagements with forms of difference represent a conflicted and contradictory negotiation with this horizon of power. Seen this way, we must entrust the interdisciplines with a new charge, that of assessing power’s archival techniques and maneuvers. As Self-Portrait 2000 suggests, the involution of marginal differences and the development of the interdisciplines, broadly conceived, denoted the elaboration of power rather than the confirmation that our “liberty” had been secured. We must make it our business to critically deploy those modes of difference that have become part of power’s trick and devise ways to use them otherwise. The influence that the student movements had on institutional life within the United States points to a need to assess the streams of the academy within political economy. If state and particularly capital needed the academy to reorient their sensibilities toward the affirmation of difference— that is, to complete the constitutional project of the United States and begin to resolve the contradictions of social exclusion— then it also meant that the academy became the laboratory for the revalorization of modes of difference. This changing set of representations, the institutions that organized themselves around that set, and the modes of power that were compelled by and productive of those transformations are what we are calling the interdisciplines. The interdisciplines were an ensemble of institutions and techniques that offered positivities to populations and constituencies that had been denied institutional claims to agency. Hence, the interdisciplines connoted a new form of biopower organized around the affirmation, recog­nition, and legitimacy of minoritized life. To offset their possibility for future ruptures, power made legitimacy and recognition into grand enticements. In doing so, they would become power’s newest techniques for the taking of difference. What the students often offered as radical critiques of insti­tutional belonging would be turned into various institutions’ confirmation.

#### The belief in the power of voting aff fails to subvert authority and locks in the university’s mastery over [their project]

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Without a doubt, one cannot, indeed one should not, think that our moral responsibilities as university teachers today without the concept of power which grounds itself in the ‘truth’ of a capitalist, patriarchal, materialist, and colonialist account of the world—to do so would surely mean to fall prey to neo-liberal moralism. But paradoxically, the argument that thinks itself as opposing this neo-liberalisation falls prey to such a moralism, too. The assumption in the argument of the original university with solid theoretical grounds as well as in my Singapore ethics class is surely that an objective theory of power will lead to a subversion of authority and to revolutionary action ‘from below.’ Yet, the students in my ethics class become even more upwardly mobile through scoring marks by learning to question their own relative positions of privilege. So in essence, my ethics class does precisely what the university presidents would want me to do: to provide these students with the creative and critical thinking abilities, with the ‘development of character’ that the new cosmopolitan kinetic elite needs for their entrepreneurial, ambassadorial, and researchoriented travels, endeavours, and connections. The spectre of a philosophy of praxis is problematically and productively haunting my Singapore ethics class as well as the efforts to rethink the role of humanities education in the Dutch context, making ethical thought possible within the organising principles of a historically Greek homo-erotic and ‘European’ understanding of teaching. How revolutionary can any such an implicit repetition of the homo-erotic and humanist mark on the politics of teaching and the function of the academic community at large then really be? How much of an ethics class, as would be an optimism about the ‘elimination of noise’ via the implementation of clear methods or theories, is an unlearning versus a consolidation of privilege, for student and teacher? Derrida remarks in “The Future of the Profession” while faithfully performing the assumptions and imperatives that underlie the teaching profession: “while many say that performativity creates the event, one should rather say that through performativity ‘nothing worthy of the name ‘event’ can really ever take place’” (2002, 54). But obviously, this cannot be the final word on performativity, as there would be little motive for Derrida to lay bare the grounding assumptions of (his) pedagogy if it were a simple repetition—the objective seems rather to simultaneously render the performance unstable by offering a (re)reading. As in the case of hospitality, one ideally ought to hand over ownership of one’s structure (or place of dwelling) to the possible arrival of any other, yet one must first claim ownership of and make seemingly stable one’s structure before one can receive the other at all. Ortega y Gasset for one ultimately misses to acknowledge the ‘dark’ side of the university when grandiosely proclaiming in the fi nal chapter of the Mission that “Europe is intelligence. A wonderful power: it is the only power which perceives its own limitations—and thereby proves how intelligent it is!” without really realising that the institutional violence on the social (by way of leaving the rise and consolidation of industrial capitalism unquestioned) consists also of setting up of such a fake stability and of being proud of ‘intelligently’ shedding light on its own limitations (1944, 87). My critical pedagogy, as indeed this critical analysis of its merits and demerits, really also argues for a self-reflexivity that borders on the self-indulgence so typical of a certain ‘Europeanness,’ a self-indulgence which somehow has become the sales pitch of neo-liberalism, celebrated in the UN Declaration of Human Rights as the ‘right to communication’ about which more in Chap. 4 . So again, one should not speak of a necessary retreat of politics from the curriculum, but of an acceleration and intensification of politics in the neo-liberal university—opening up unexpected spaces for critique in the face of its neo-liberalisation, which in turn points to the fundamental instability of its enterprise. The Asian and Dutch universities’ ‘responsible complicities’ in previous colonialism and current neo-liberalisation mark precisely the moment where the promise of philosophy gets magnifi ed as its sites of tension and confusion multiply for teachers as well as students. This intensification of politics is however no ground for celebration, since it remains also the hallmark of the neo-liberal mode of production of knowledge through the new tele-technologies as ‘excellent,’ regardless its critical content. It might be worth noting here that not many staff working in NUS (as far as I could gather in the years that I worked there) actually conceived of the 2002 shift to a ‘global knowledge enterprise’ as the demise of the ‘original’ university and its pursuit of ‘true knowledge for social justice’—after all, in this university and its predecessors, the ideas of ‘truth and knowledge’ always already worked for Empire more overtly, while European universities, and hence the Dutch ones as well, can and could bathe in the illusion of fostering ‘authentic’ progress and democracy by way of its ‘objective’ methods or dominant theories. The university’s instability mirrors the volatility of a capitalism marked by nonsustainability, a growing feminisation of poverty, the rise of a new global upper class, and highly mediated illusions of cybernetic mastery. Derrida hints at this, but also at ‘the’ university’s elusiveness, in “Mochlos, or: the Confl ict of the Faculties,” when he claims that he “would almost call [the university] the child of an inseparable couple, metaphysics and technology” (1993, 15, emphasis mine). Both universities are typical examples of that university of metaphysics and technology, and yet they can never be completely that—they cannot fi nalise their authority towards a perfect utopia, just as I cannot fi nalise mine in my Singaporean and Dutch modules and curriculum reforms. As Derrida illustrates—pedagogue that he is—through his generous readings of Levinas, taking the humanist myth of pure ethics and complete duty to ‘the’ students to its logical extreme paradoxically shows its structural limitations. It is at this impossible intersection of myth and its limitation that the particular moral imperative of thought and questioning, in all its complicity in contemporary violence, becomes once again possible in my classrooms. What happens beyond that is out of my ‘European’ hands and into the hands of the emergent Asian and Dutch speed elite. At the end of each teaching block or semester then, this teacher’s agony problematically sublimates into her hoping that her students, as they come to embody philosophy’s promise, may change things for the better.

#### Changing how we research or rethinking thought is simply neoliberalism’s attempt at auto-immunity – while the content of their argument may be radical, its form reveals their conservative nature

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This book argues that what we see emerge in the above confusion between ‘true’ academic aspirations and ‘perverted’ economic incentives through what some may fi nd a muddled play on words that is marginal to the discussion on higher education is in fact essential to understanding how the seemingly oppositional narratives of the ‘demise’ or ‘revival’ of academic quality actually fi nd their origin in a conceptualisation of the ideals of the university and its role in society that neo-liberals as well as those resistant to neo-liberalisation share. The odd case is therefore that the university ‘succumbs’ to those neo-liberal theories, techniques, and technologies that it itself has produced or brought forth; the university today, one could say, suffers from a peculiar auto-immune disease. And I would suggest that this disease has been lingering in its core principles and aims for a long time now. This book claims by way of some prominent thinkers of such an auto-immunity or ‘self-deconstruction’ that the university has always suffered from this curious affl iction, but also that particularly today, the technological acceleration of the neo-liberal economy brings such an auto-immunity ever more to the foreground, which in turn leads to an aggravation of fundamental tensions and blatant incompatibilities within its dominion. So there is a historical continuity of auto-immunity in the university project all the way from its aspirational beginnings up until today that still persists, even if that continuous element has been slowly but steadily displaced towards the imperatives of productivity, ‘freemarket’ ideals, and effi ciency. This book then hopes to illustrate by way of combining a plethora of ‘auto-immune’ examples of academic practice with a perhaps unexpected theoretical perspective that this displacement is possible because the utopian goals of emancipation, truth, and freedom which express themselves in research and teaching, have themselves from the very beginning already been tainted by the demons of oppression, falsehood, and exclusion. Bizarrely then, the fact or the insistence that the university is not like any other industry will turn out to be precisely its problem. This is because the fundamental tension in its project—what Dittrich in “From Ivory Tower to Glass House” calls its “immanent contradiction” (in Dutch “ingebouwde tegenspraak,” 2014, 160)—that has historically led to (the illusion of) progress through the scientifi c and philosophical discussion and production of knowledge has indeed become ‘productive’ in the economic sense. Eventually, we will therefore fi nd that at the heart of the university lies a fundamental aporia that expresses itself exceedingly today, in a curious reversal of its humanist values and stakes, as a more obvious pretence or hypocrisy. This leads so-called knowledge workers at many contemporary universities today to fi nd themselves confronted with contradictory feelings and schizoid situations: like, for instance, teaching students the ills of social hierarchisation through education, while also sorting them in hierarchical (alpha) numerical slots according to academic performance. The university is therefore the one location in the current economy where the basic confl icting duplicity following the exacerbation of this aporia of Western Enlightenment thinking is most keenly felt, though often suppressed or internalised by many such ‘workers’ and students as either personal failure or a general incompatibility with its institutional demands. So to reiterate, the radical proposition of this book is that the prime mission or ideals of the university—namely those of total emancipation, freedom, and the goals of knowledge accumulation—are precisely what currently produce exceedingly unjust practices ‘outside’ and ‘within’ academia. These unjust practices that it produces on its ‘outside’ concern those of the ongoing social stratifi cation via so-called meritocratic education and those of sociological, computational, and psychological objectifi cation of ever more cultures and groups, while the unjust practices on its ‘inside’ concern those of internal hierarchies, rankings, divisions, gatekeeping mechanisms, and exclusions of all kinds. And because the reproduction of its practices at base involve modern techniques and technologies of knowing, this book suggests that rather than arguing for a return to the supposedly ‘walled’ university, however sympathetic, gaining a better understanding of the intersection of this problematic with especially modern technologies of communication, visibility, or calculation is crucial to really thinking the modern university project differently. The book therefore argues that the central problem of the university today consists of the acceleration of academia’s unfi nishable ideals by way of an enmeshment with techniques and technologies of communication, calculation, and prediction. The quest for transcendence through technologically aided omniscience and universal connection—after all, the term ‘university’ comes from the Latin universitas or the ‘totality’ or ‘total community’—has resulted in the quest to render everything and everyone transparent and understandable. As I will discuss more in depth through the work of techno-pundit Paul Virilio, the current university and its new forms of violence are therefore an outfl ow or intensifi cation of ‘outdated’ humanist ideals and techniques, whose internal contradictions have become usurped and constantly remobilised by neo-liberal capitalism and its machinery of acceleration. We see the auto-immune aspect returning here as well, since that contemporary machinery of the acceleration of omniscience in many of its aspects—one need only to think of early cybernetic research, innovations like the Arpanet, and engineeringoriented models of communication as noise cancellation—has again also been carried out at least in large part by universities (disturbingly often with the help of military monies and establishments, about the signifi cance of which more later). In other words, the hopeful academic project of ‘exposing the world and humanity to the light of truth and emancipation,’ together with its damaging ‘evil twins’ of oppressive universalism, social submission, surveillance, and colonialism, has caved in onto themselves and become a near-pervasive technologically ‘exposing-itself’ of a fundamentally Janus-faced academia. This is also to stress that the ways in which academic research has historically been part of Western imperialism should be considered more closely when critically examining the faux-nostalgic calls in many contemporary European universities for a ‘return’ to presumed ‘research autonomy,’ as well as when analysing the kinds of seemingly perverse ‘knowledge-as- capital’ arguments made by contemporary universities in the post-colonies. I will provide divergent examples from the Netherlands and Singapore of such tendencies in Chaps. 2 , 3 , and 4 . In light of the above, this book therefore also wants to discuss the relationship or interaction between academia and modern technology as consisting of a more fundamentally entangled apparatus than most critics of the neo-liberalisation of higher education, who see such technology as merely applied onto academia from the ‘outside’ or as mere tools for use on the ‘inside’ consider it to be. As an example, Ward in Neoliberalism and the Global Restructuring of Knowledge and Education certainly rightly claims that the digital knowledge economy, due to the translation of information into bits and bytes, has forced a quantifi cation of performance indicators in academia, leading to the erasure and transformation of certain kinds of knowledge in the ‘hard’ as well as the ‘soft’ sciences (2012, 126). Especially the humanities, says Ward, with their forms and media of knowledge (like the monograph) that cannot be reduced to sheer numbers, be disaggregated into sellable pieces, or be made to follow the impetus of fast-paced output, suffer from this quantifi cation (2012, 127). While I agree with Ward on this aspect of digitalisation, he does not seem to consider the fact that the origins of these technologies as such, as I mentioned earlier, not only stem from university research, but also that the supposedly empowering qualities of technologies of communication and visualisation have in fact always been part of the university setup from its inception in the late Medieval era and the early Enlightenment in Europe—one may here think, for example, of René Descartes’ mechanistic view of the material world, the crucial importance of inventions like the telescope and microscope, or the ways in which the dissemination of scientifi c ideas relied on book printing technology. It appears then that the basic imbrication of academia with media technologies is one of a continuous and ever-growing constitutional yet dialectical relationship, in which these technologies eventually turn out to be much more than simply a means through which research and teaching are carried out. Instead, due to their constitutive enmeshment with academia’s auto-immunity, they paradoxically expose themselves as facilitators as well as thwarters of the academic ideal of total knowledge. Rather, the ideal of exposition and omniscience, and the ways it is today carried out through modern datadriven technologies and visual media aids, is, this book argues, itself just as ambiguous and fi nally ungraspable (as their borders likewise cannot be pinned down) as the nature of academia as such.

#### Impact is violence abroad

Ferguson 2012 (Roderick A. Ferguson is the co-director of the Racialized Body research cluster @ UIC, “Reorder of Things : The University and Its Pedagogies of Minority Difference” 2012. Pgs. 19-22)//NotJacob

If we think of the archive not simply as an institution but as a social formation, we might say that the United States is the archival nation par excellence. In Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, Derrida argues that the word archive is derived from the Greek arkheion, which was under­ stood to be the residence of “those who commanded.” 1 The archive was the house where official documents— no matter their heterogeneity— were filed and entrusted to speak and impose the law. 2 As archives provided homes for those documents, they placed them under certain jurisdictions, not only consigning them to prescribed areas but also gathering them under certain sets of meanings. Thus, in the archive a diverse assemblage of documents were coordinated so that they might articulate an ideal unity. Whatever diversity those documents possessed, whatever secrets they might contain would have to be managed so that the ideal of the archive would be preserved rather than ruined; 3 archives represented the places to put those documents and the regimes that would discipline them. As an archival entity, the United States is simultaneously the fabled home that promises to put different peoples in their rightful places and the infamous regime that disciplines in the name of freedom. As such, it em­bodies the quintessential properties of all archives. Indeed, the motto “e pluribus unum” (one out of many) expresses, as literary scholar W. C. Har­ris observes, both the identity and the experiment of the U.S. nation-state, an experiment that harks back to Greek philosophical thought, one that attempts to resolve the imperative of unity with the reality of heterogeneity. For Harris, this experiment finds unprecedented momentum in the social, cultural, and political contexts of the nineteenth-century United States, a momentum that gains footing and speed in those documents that first made “the problem of unity and multiplicity” into the American preoccupation— the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, the Con­stitution, and the Federalist Papers. 4 The motto and imperative “e pluribus unum” represents a logic that sits at the core of American government. In the national debates of the time, race provided the overwhelming conditions by which the principle was tested and adjusted. Indeed, the American Civil War symbolized a vio­lent struggle over how to resolve a nation heterogeneous in terms of race, region, and ideology. In the context of the nineteenth-century United States, the motto captures the fact that the American ethos was not simply defined in terms of the abolition and expulsion of difference through slavery, geno­cidal wars, lynching, and rape. The American spirit was also secured in the question of how best to represent social differences and the communi­ties and people that presumably symbolized those differences. As a motto and an edict, “e pluribus unum” connoted a national struggle with differ­ence in general and racial difference in particular. As Harris goes on to say, nineteenth-century literature was the cultural form that addressed that motto directly and the racial conditions that con­tradicted it. It was the job of nineteenth-century literature— and the work of writers like Edgar Allan Poe, Walt Whitman, Herman Melville, Mark Twain, and Henry James— to “reconcile the opposing interests of the one and the many.” 5 Put simply, American literature was supposed to finish writing the American nation-state by helping it resolve the paradox of the many and the one. In doing so, literature attempted to identify the nationstate as a “writerly” formation, that is, one whose aim is to inscribe “the many” into the national body. As such, literature worked to promote the archival functions of the American nation-state. In this regard, Ameri­can culture would help to turn American social institutions into archival economies. The nation’s reputation as a domain of resolution would only grow internationally. As Eqbal Ahmad argues in “Political Culture and Foreign Policy,” the idea of the United States as a former colony that threw off the yoke of its oppressors was so powerful in the Third World that “America served as an inspiration and an example.” 6 The image as a place that re­solved ideological and social differences persisted for national liberation movements in Africa and Asia despite “more than a century of counter­ revolutionary American interventions in the Third World.” 7 The significance of the United States’ reputation for settling conflicts over social and ideo­logical diversity would promote the emergence of neocolonial power relations in the post– World War II moment and the rise of a mode of power built around minority recognition and legitimacy. To this end, we may think of the 1950s and afterwards as historic moments in which power began to assume a new archival significance. This was a period in which revolu­tions and liberation struggles throughout the world would test power’s archival flexibility. As peoples in North America, Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean were trying to secure a place, power would work to place them. We get a glimpse at the archival tactics of power in Kwame Nkrumah’s description of the rise of neocolonial formations. In Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, he writes, “Faced with the militant peoples of the ex-colonial territories in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin Amer­ica, imperialism simply switches tactics.” 8 As Nkrumah argues, the colonial apparatus would dispense with its paraphernalia and its representatives, ostensibly “‘giving’ independence to its former subjects, to be followed by ‘aid’ for their development” (ibid.). But with flags and officials gone, the colonial apparatus would begin to “[devise] innumerable ways to accom­plish objectives formerly achieved by naked colonialism” (ibid.). Hence, neocolonialism— or, as he puts it, the very “modern [attempt] to perpetu­ate colonialism while at the same time talking about ‘freedom’”—was born (ibid.). As former colonial modes of power transitioned into neocolonial ones, they achieved archival heights, admitting recently held colonies into the domain of independence. The former colonies were thus like documents gathered together into the library of modern nations. As such, these newly minted nations were consigned to the location of sovereignty and coordi­nated according to the ideal of freedom. Yet archiving those former colonies was also a kind of house arrest in which freedom signified genres of sub­jugation and domiciliation. One of the ways in which this archontic power began to domesticate demands for independence was through invitation rather than wholesale rejection. In the context of neocolonialism, such invitations and acts of inclusion represented the mutation rather than the annihilation of prior forms of power. As Nkrumah argues, “The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside” (ix). Neocolo­nialism would persuade by presumably conceding to the efforts of selfdetermination by minoritized nations and peoples, by placing them within a presumably horizontal and modern terrain. Hence, neocolonialism was the moment in which the manifold strategies of conquest, management, and regulation would take place within and through the outward appear­ance of anticolonial independence and freedom. This was a form of power that had cultivated a solicitous rather than a primarily dismissive manner. As the legendary nation that would admit new people under the banner of independence while subjecting them to a new law whose borders would increase with every admittance, the United States would become— in Nkru­mah’s words—“foremost among the neo-colonialists” (239). The history and theorization of neocolonialism is important inasmuch as it is one seg­ment in a larger transformation of power— that is, power’s ability to incor­porate formerly marginalized and excluded subjects and societies, an ability signified through the extension of recognition and sovereignty for people who spent much of their histories under colonial yokes. The specific cir­cumstances of neocolonialism are thus only a piece of a more general mode of power that was developing in the days of independence. This mode would derive its international character from its ability to select from insurgent practices what it needed to carry out its own hegemonic author­ity. A mode of power was forming that would ingest various revolutionary formations and, in fact, build its strategies around their dissection.

#### Even if just in this debate, rather than white-washing the liberal curriculum’s own complicity with endless death on a global scale, you should prefer an injection of death and negatively as the only ethical act possible within the Enlightened university premised on forgetting the systemic death-making necessary for its very existence – this is an independent reason to vote NEG.

www.AnarchistNews.org 10. “The University, Social Death, and the Inside Joke,” http://anarchistnews.org/content/university-social-death-and-inside-joke

Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls. Furthermore, they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world. Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.”[43] Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy. Baudrillard writes that “The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death.”[44] By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other.  
Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.”[45] The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization.”[47]  
Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations.  
Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise.[50]  
In reality, “Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude, an inclusive mass of political subjects, seeking to consume brains. Yet brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “the power of knowledge, objectified.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw:  
"at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death."[53]  
In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence. If we are to continue to use this conception, we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about semiotic insurrectionaries might suffice:  
"They blasted their way out however, so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse. Invincible due to their own poverty, they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything."[56]

#### Reject the aff and call for the destruction of the university – voting negative proves the absurdity of the activity we’re all playing

Hoofd 2017. Ingrid. Assistant Professor Department of Media and Culture Studies, Higher Education and Technological Acceleration. <http://www.palgrave.com/it/book/9781137517517>

The fundamental instability of the university via its ‘self-deconstruction’ therefore also opens up new forms of thought and imaginative opportunities, if only for now appearing as disastrous yet perhaps fortuitous ‘accidents.’ Derrida in fact hints at this, but also at the university’s elusiveness, in “Mochlos, or: the Confl ict of the Faculties,” when he claims that he “would almost call [the university] the child of an inseparable couple, metaphysics and technology” (1993, 5; emphasis mine). Almost, but never quite—here then emerges the possibility of truly subversive change—in the paradoxical gap prised open between the machinery of transparency and its exceedingly stealthy theoretical, administrative, and methodological operations. This change however will then not be brought about by the mere content of the critique, but by the way it disastrously pushes acceleration to the point of systemic disintegration or implosion. In Fatal Strategies , Baudrillard calls this the “fatal strategy” that contemporary theory must adopt: a sort of conceptual suicide attack which aims at pulling the rug out under the speed-elitist mobilisation of a host of problematic semiotic oppositions, which also will illustrate the fundamental paradox behind any attempt at structural predictions. In another one of his ‘fatal’ book-chapters titled “The Final Solution,” Baudrillard relates this intensification of the humanist obsession with dialectics, mastery, and transparency—the quest for immortality that is at the basis of technoscientific research—to destruction and the death drive through the metaphor of and actual research around cloning, which strangely resonates well with Derrida’s investigation of the tele-technological archive in Archive Fever . I read Baudrillard’s “Final Solution” at this stage also as a metaphor for the duplication (cloning) of thought into virtual spaces outside the university walls proper, without such a cloning ever succeeding to force its compulsory optimism on everyone and everything. If contemporary research seeks to make possible human cloning, argues Baudrillard, then this endeavour is equivalent to cancer: after all, cancer is simply automatic cloning, a deadly form of multiplication. It is of interest here to note that the possibility of creating an army of clones has likewise garnered much military interest, just as academia today more and more serves military ends. As the logic of cloning as automatic multiplication is typical of all current technological and humanist advancements, the exacerbation of this logic can only mean more promise and death, or perhaps even promise through death. Techno-scientific progress entails a regress into immortality, epitomised by a nostalgia typical of the current sociotechnical situation, for when we were “undivided” (2000, 6). At this point such an argument in fact problematically mirrors the apocalyptic tone of, for instance, the activist-research projects as well as of Heidegger’s arguments. But I contend that Baudrillard refers not only to the lifeless stage before humans became sexed life forms, but also makes an allusion to psychoanalytic readings of the ‘subject divided in language’ and its nostalgia for wholeness and transparent communication. The desire for immortality, like archive fever, is therefore the same as the Freudian death drive, and we ourselves ultimately become the object of our technologies of scrutiny and nostalgia. The humanist quest for total transparency of oneself and of the world to oneself that grounds the idea of the modern techno-scientific university is therefore ultimately an attempt at (self-)destruction, or in any case an attempted destruction of (one’s) radical difference that needs to run its course. The urgent political question which Bernard Stiegler, for instance, as I showed in a previous chapter, problematically avoided in Disorientation , then becomes: which selves are and will become caught up in the delusion of total self-transparency and self-justifi cation, and which selves will be destroyed? And how may we conceive of an “ethic of intellectual inquiry or aesthetic contemplation” that “resists the imperatives of speed,” as Jon Cook likewise wonders in “The Techno-University and the Future of Knowledge” (1999, 323)? It is of particular importance to note here that the very inception of this question and its possible analysis, like the conception of the speed-elite mounted by this book, is itself again a performative repetition of the grounding myth of the university of independent truth, justice, and reason. Therefore, in carrying forward the humanist promise, this analysis is itself bound up in the intensifi cation of the logic of acceleration and destruction, but is then also equally tenuous. This complicity of thought in the violence of acceleration itself in turn quickens the machine of the humanist promise, and can only manifest itself in the prediction of a coming apocalypse—whether it concerns anarrative of the death of thought and the university, or of a technological acceleration engendering the Freudian death drive. We academics are then simply the next target in the technological realisation of complete γνωθι σαυτον (‘know thyself’)—or so it seems . Because after all, a clone is never an exact copy, as Baudrillard very well knows; and therefore, the extent to which all the teaching and research projects discussed in this book hopefully invite alterity can thankfully not yet be thought. The work of Virilio is therefore helpful because it abandons the ‘compulsory optimism’ of standard academic rhetoric for a more fragile optimism that seeks to affi rm the fundamental unknowability or sacredness that makes knowledge possible in the fi rst place. In this sense, Virilio and Baudrillard urge us, as Derrida described it, to ‘take a more originary responsibility’ in light of the current negative fallout of the aporetic ideals of the academic institution. And as I hinted at in Chap. 1 , every form of idealism indeed eventually will be or needs to be subjected to its own critique, and perhaps eventually even needs to succumb to it. As much as the practices of these theories, centres, organisations, and left-wing academics are the outflow of a logic of increased visibility and transparency, they also render into visible form the perverse logic of ‘incorporating’ and ‘connecting’ everything and everyone, which, for instance, some of the theorists that argue for ‘bottom-up learning’ outlined as a virtue, in an exceedingly staged visual profusion of relative otherness. Since academic productivity and activism fi nd themselves wholly aligned with the perverse ideals of the university, raising its stakes would therefore not lie in the familiar recanting of ‘freedom,’ ‘empowerment,’ or ‘democracy,’ but in the reinsertion of the (inter-)subjective and ‘noisy’ element in all its teaching and research practices. This would entail an emphasis on the necessary respect for that ‘unknown quantity’ that is inherent in all meaningful learning and interaction, a newfound acknowledgement of the magical aspects of the universe as foundational for all appreciation of it. As Virilio stresses in his second chapter of The Vision Machine , “the presupposition of not-knowing and especially not-seeing … restores to every research project its fundamental context of prime ignorance ” so that we “need to admit that for the human eye the essential is invisible” (1994, 23). Baudrillard echoes Virilio’s insight in “The Theorem of the Accursed Share” by emphasising that indeed “Anything that purges the accursed share signs its own death warrant” (1990, 121). Perhaps the biggest mistake in the modern founding of the university then was the denial and attempted erasure of the religious or spiritual aspect of the university, so that, instead of being avision machine, a ‘more originary responsibility’ would consist of letting it become a ‘humility machine’ in the spirit of its pre-Enlightenment ethics? In any case, the acknowledgement of the profound tension at the basis of the university and the ways it has intensifi ed itself to such an extent today that more and more academics are starting to become disillusioned or confused about their calling, perhaps provides us usefully with the return of that “fatalism” and “magic worldview” that especially Freire so eagerly sought to eradicate. We may therefore want to welcome the upsetting force of such a fatal attitude towards the ideal of ‘communication as community’ as the true antidote, or perhaps even the quintessential shadow, which has always secretly accompanied the university’s quest for total communication and transparency. The possibility of radicality via communication and its functionalist theories may then fi nally and surprisingly lie in its unexpected outcomes, both positive and negative. I will be ‘keeping the faith’ together with all these projects and academics then, since also owing to all these theories and projects, the future may be more radically open than ever before, as long as we seriously entertain the possibility that in moving beyond the attempted erasure of fatality and unknowability by the compulsorily optimistic academic performance lies the potential of that ‘more originary’ responsibility. One of the consequences of bringing back fatality and fatalism means to acknowledge that the representational ideal of scientific and philosophical theory—the fantasy that it not only must ‘describe’ reality as closely as possible, but also that such a description is possible or desirable at all— must be abandoned in favour of a speculative poetics. Likewise critical theory, which tradition this book has productively mobilised, after all falls, according to Baudrillard, in The Perfect Crime victim to the thwarted ideals of omniscience and transparent communication. As I noted in Chap. 3 , it is for this reason that Genosko in “The Drama of Theory” rightly parallels the problem of theory with the problem of political theatre, suggesting that what Baudrillard proposes is not replicating the impotent attempts of a theatre seeking to convince by way of documentary realism, but of a ‘reversed’ theatre in which “the object will have its revenge on Western metaphysics” (1994, 295). Genosko in turn helpfully refers to Baudrillard’s usage of the metaphor of the ‘crystal,’ which I concur can be read as an idealisation of the perfectly transparent object and the ideal crystalline universe seemingly represented in scientifi c description, but just as much as a ‘crystal ball’ into which one “gazes in order to arouse a myriad of sensations”—not the least that sensation of uncertainty as wellas an ambivalence concerning the fact that one is being seduced by that object (1994, 296). William Bogard usefully points out in “Baudrillard, Time, and the End,” that seduction indeed precisely consists of “the overcoming of defences (of ‘immunity’)” (1994, 333). Baudrillard also follows this logic of a ‘revenge of the crystal’ when he stresses in an interview with Nicholas Zurbrugg in Baudrillard Live on the possibilities of a renewed theoretical radicalism, that Perhaps the only thing one can do is to destabilize and provoke the world around us. We shouldn’t presume to produce positive solutions … one needs to make a kind of detour through the strategy of the worst scenario. It’s not a question of ideas—there are already too many ideas! (1993, 170–171; italics in original) To conclude then, to let the auto-immune disease run its course therefore would entail firstly seeing the university, from its very inception, for the ridiculous scam that it is: a marvellously absurd outgrowth of the delusional ideals of Enlightenment humanism. However, this also means that any representational theoretical critique like this one is just as much a scam of the authority of theoretical analysis, in which possibly, as Lyotard suggested, truth and technique have collapsed into one another. So this book, by partaking in the same ideals of visibility while exposing the problem of the contemporary university to scrutiny and visibility, suggests that we follow a strategy of ‘fatal’ consciousness-raising in order to hopefully plant the seeds of future radical events regarding academia. An example here might be a staff and student exodus from the university’s current imperative, which would signify a notable collapse of its prime beliefs towards a more mystical thinking in the hard sciences and in the humanities. Perhaps we should simply let the university bleed to death for now. Only such an apparent ‘solution’ that seeks not solve anything at all or make any predictions, while seemingly absurd, may mean the hope for death of the contemporary university and its revival as a radically different entity. This book must therefore fi nally remain speculative and opaque, and mount this fi nal chapter as a polemical provocation that does not seek to pre-programme what the next stage of the university should look like or which ideals need to be chanted, as doing so would itself fall prey to the problematic and ultimately managerialist claim of transparent (fore)knowledge and true emancipation. This book, in all its philosophical and analytical exposition, after all cannot even with certainty claim that it has represented the reality of the contemporary university in any kind of self-assured manner, or that it does not sneakily mix up the ‘observed pattern’ and the ‘pattern of observation.’ So is this book itself not simply just as much partaking in the delusion that the university always has been? To paraphrase Derrida once again: the university, truly, what an idea! Time perhaps to lay that cursed institution to rest for now and put down that alluring crystal ball, so that we all may rest too.