# 1AC

#### Linguistic studies regarding gender have proved that cis men speak different than cis women. There is a litany of approaches that determine how language operates and how it differentiates. Interjections, curse words, superfluous language and others are all examples.

#### Unconditional terms are not extended to all genders as governments often deny services to those that are non-men. Because states assign specific sets of being to a gender and prevent one from being conditional over static. Linguistics structures gender.

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(Phoenix Singer is a writer for LibCom. “Gender Nihilism: An Anti-Manifesto” <https://libcom.org/library/gender-nihilism-anti-manifesto> cVs)

Antihumanism is a cornerstone which holds gender nihilist analysis together. It is the point from which we begin to understand our present situation; it is crucial. By antihumanism, we mean a rejection of essentialism. There is no essential human. There is no human nature. There is no transcendent self. To be a subject is not to share in common a metaphysical state of being (ontology) with other subjects. The self, the subject is a product of power. The “I” in “I am a man” or “I am a woman” is not an “I” which transcends those statements. Those statements do not reveal a truth about the “I,” rather they constitute the “I.” Man and Woman do not exist as labels for certain metaphysical or essential categories of being, they are rather discursive, social, and linguistic symbols which are historically contingent. They evolve and change over time; their implications have always been determined by power. Who we are, the very core of our being, might perhaps not be found in the categorical realm of being at all. The self is a convergence of power and discourses. Every word you use to define yourself, every category of identity within which you find yourself place, is the result of a historical development of power. Gender, race, sexuality, and every other normative category is not referencing a truth about the body of the subject or about the soul of the subject. These categories construct the subject and the self. There is no static self, no consistent “I”, no history transcending subject. We can only refer to a self with the language given to us, and that language has radically fluctuated throughout history, and continues to fluctuate in our day to day life. We are nothing but the convergence of many different discourses and languages which are utterly beyond our control, yet we experience the sensation of agency. We navigate these discourses, occasionally subverting, always surviving. The ability to navigate does not indicate a metaphysical self which acts upon a sense of agency, it only indicates that there is symbolic and discursive looseness surrounding our constitution. We thus understand gender through these terms. We see gender as a specific set of discourses embodied in medicine, psychiatry, the social sciences, religion, and our daily interactions with others. We do not see gender as a feature of our “true selves,” but as a whole order of meaning and intelligibility which we find ourselves operating in. We do not look at gender as a thing which a stable self can be said to possess. On the contrary we say that gender is done and participated in, and that this doing is a creative act by which the self is constructed and given social significance and meaning. Our radicalism cannot stop here, we further state that historical evidence can be provided to show that gender operates in such a manner. The work of many decolonial feminists has been influential in demonstrating the ways that western gender categories were violently forced onto indigenous societies, and how this required a complete linguistic and discursive shift. Colonialism produced new gender categories, and with them new violent means of reinforcing a certain set of gendered norms. The visual and cultural aspects of masculinity and femininity have changed over the centuries. There is no static gender. There is a practical component to all of this. The question of humanism vs antihumanism is the question upon which the debate between liberal feminism and nihilist gender abolitionism will be based. The liberal feminist says “I am a woman” and by that means that they are spiritually, ontologically, metaphysically, genetically, or any other modes of “essentially” a woman. The gender nihilist says “I am a woman” and means that they are located within a certain position in a matrix of power which constitutes them as such. The liberal feminist is not aware of the ways power creates gender, and thus clings to gender as a means of legitimizing themselves in the eyes of power. They rely on trying to use various systems of knowledge (genetic sciences, metaphysical claims about the soul, kantian ontology) in order to prove to power they can operate within it. The gender nihilist, the gender abolitionist, looks at the system of gender itself and see’s the violence at its core. We say no to a positive embrace of gender. We want to see it gone. We know appealing to the current formulations of power is always a liberal trap. We refuse to legitimize ourselves. It is imperative that this be understood. Antihumanism does not deny the lived experience of many of our trans siblings who have had an experience of gender since a young age. Rather we acknowledge that such an experience of gender was always already determined through the terms of power. We look to our own childhood experiences. We see that even in the transgressive statement of “We are women” wherein we deny the category power has imposed onto our bodies, we speak the language of gender. We reference an idea of “woman” which does not exist within us as a stable truth, but references the discourses by which we are constituted. Thus we affirm that there is no true self that can be divined prior to discourse, prior to encounters with others, prior to the mediation of the symbolic. We are products of power, so what are we to do? So we end our exploration of antihumanism with a return to the words of Butler: “My agency does not consist in denying this condition of my constitution. If I have any agency, it is opened up by the fact that I am constituted by a social world I never chose. That my agency is riven with paradox does not mean it is impossible. It means only that paradox is the condition of its possibility.”

#### This proves that language is gendered and bracketed within a binary. One speaks like a man, or one speaks like a woman – there is not an in between. If a man spoke like a woman or vice-versa, they are deemed as irrational, mentally ill, and abnormal. A queerness.

#### Consider these two sayings “I want a pink dress says that girl” and “I want an action figure says the boy”. If these statements were said by the opposing gender, then it would be socially unacceptable. There is ALWAYS a fundamental policing of language that is uniquely situated in a binary that establishes logics of policing and violence through gender.

#### Within debate, we are given a resolution that establishes grounds for a debate. But all we are given is a resolution, so how do we approach it? The community writ large (dominated by men) has come together to determine that the resolution indicates a course of action. A fiated implementation. That MATERIAL ACTION comes first. But why is this the case? When I see the resolution, I see the theory that undergirds it. The fundamental value that structures the resolution. Isn’t this Lincoln-Douglas debate? Where we debate about philosophical ideas?

#### Community norms are inherently unpredictable. Why? Because community norms change over time. People of color weren’t allowed to debate. Non-men weren’t allowed to debate. The community constantly shifts in how it views arguments which is unpredictable and a terrible model of debate. I want to propose a model where we debate about the theory FIRST. Theory ALWAYS precedes materiality. EVERY SINGLE POLICY THAT IS PASSED HAS THEORY UNDERGIRDING IT. Usually, it’s a theory of liberalism, realism, legalism, Lockean, Kantian, Keynesian, etc. But I want to defend a different theory:

#### I defend the hypothetical implementation of a just government recognizing the unconditional right for workers to strike from understanding of a gendered lens.

#### A just gov should be one that recognizes my right to strike in every space that includes this one. As in the current debate space femineity is always excluded and only masculinized concepts of the rez is deemed as allowed. For an aff to be forced to be material rather than theorization, it would silence the very movement that it is based in.

#### Our retheorization allows us to engage in the world through a deeper understanding of how gender is embedded within all conflicts. We recognize the horizontal assemblage of problems because there is no way to separate any issues.

Wadley ‘9– PhD candidate at the University of Florida. His research focuses on sexual politics and European identity (Jonathan D., “Gendering the state Performativity and protection in international security,” https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/16855619/Sjoberg.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1547821158&Signature=qRPq46RxVNhbURDOhuek34APNIQ%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DGender\_and\_International\_Security.pdf)//geo

For anyone who wishes to bring a more thorough consideration of gender into the study of International Relations, this should set oﬀ alarm bells. Feminists have shown that it is problematic to study actors as if they are genderless things. Ignoring gender too often means elevating the masculine subject to universal status, leading to the production of theories that not only are partial, but that mask their partiality through claims to universality. In IR, ignoring gender means not recognizing the ways in which key actors are deﬁned and diﬀerentiated by their relationship to norms of masculinity and femininity. Leaders, states, international organizations—all of these act in accordance with gender norms, albeit in diﬀerent ways at diﬀerent times. Additionally, by ignoring gender, the analyst remains blind to processes through which these gendered identities are produced—processes that are in many ways central to the operation of world politics. The arenas in which the actors engage each other are saturated with gendered meaning and it is this fact that enables, for example, a state to “act like a man” or “act like a woman.” Thus, gender, which was deﬁned earlier in this volume as “a system of symbolic meaning that creates social hierarchies based on perceived associations with masculine and feminine characteristics,”3 is not simply an attribute possessed by certain actors, but a system through which those actors are constituted and positioned relative to each other. One great contribution of feminist IR has been to draw the attention of other IR scholars to these arguments, despite the reluctance of “conventional” theorists to incorporate gender into the processes they are attempting to explain. Given the work that has been done to demonstrate the dangers of theorizing without gender, it is highly questionable for the bulk of IR scholars to write about the state as if it is not gendered, especially when it is understood, conceptually, to exist and act as if it were a person. Failing to consider the role of gender does not make one’s theory gender-neutral, and conceptualizing the state as ageneric, non-gendered actor does not make it so. Nowhere is the silence toward gender more deafening than in the ﬁeld of International Security. The study of war, anarchy, alliances—all observably gendered processes—stands to beneﬁt the most from the recognition that the key actors do not act without, or outside of, gender. Yet, the ﬁeld has been slow to incorporate the study of gender, even though almost twenty years have passed since Ann Tickner criticized its dominant paradigm for projecting the “values associated with hegemonic masculinity” onto the international behavior of states. Within realism, she argued, **the state has been conceptualized through an historical worldview that privileges the experiences of men.** Other approaches can be, and have been, criticized on the same grounds, oﬀering similarly partial theories owing to their common reliance upon “the Western political and philosophical tradition,” which has produced “a foundation of political concepts” that assumes the political actor is a man. The proliferation of constructivist and post-structuralist scholarship over the past twenty years has, despite much promise, brought little help, largely sidestepping questions of gender. Nonetheless, the epistemological pluralism of Security Studies today means that the ﬁeld is much more amenable to approaches that incorporate gender, and that incorporate it in new ways, than it was at the time when feminists within IR ﬁrst raised these concerns. The argument that states are produced within, and not outside of, their environment is no longer esoteric. Security and insecurity are understood by many to be interpretations made within an intersubjective realm of interaction among states, rather than the absence or presence of objective threats.4 And the role of representation, speech acts, and discursive structures in outlining the parameters of security practices and giving them meaning is better appreciated, as well.5 As a result of these developments, the ﬁeld of feminist Security Studies is well positioned to theorize the role of gender in innovative ways. Speciﬁcally, there is more room now to apply post-positivist insights into how gender works onto the ﬁeld of Security Studies.

#### FRAMEWORK AS A GENERAL ARGUMENT DOESN’T MAKE SENSE – WE STILL DEFEND THE RESOLUTION, BUT IN A THEORETICAL WAY, NOT A MATERIAL WAY. The idea that only certain bodies are able to argue in a certain way is too limiting. Men are allowed to exist within a litany of tropes while non-men are given a static position in which only some tropes are acceptable. For instance, when striking for women’s rights, it is only acceptable for women to do so when the state says they are allowed to do so. When the silent sentinels were striking for the right to vote, the state deemed the women as political prisoners because it questioned the state’s authority in a time of “vulnerability”.

#### These actions happen even if women are often in the front lines of war. This shows that women are assimilated into discussions rather than being their own person.

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Often, the qualities of gender norms are structured as dichotomous pairs. **As signiﬁers of identity, they establish hierarchy among the actors upon which they are “written**.” They include, among other things: rationality/irrationality, civilized/barbaric, autonomous/dependent, active/passive, and powerful/ weak—all of which map onto the dominant signiﬁer pair of masculine/feminine.47 The examination of gender dichotomies such as these has been helpful in accounting for how unequal, relational identities have been maintained and how they have privileged some actors and marginalized others. However, there are limits to this kind of analysis. By viewing relational gender identities in dichotomous terms, one risks neglecting the variation that exists within those categories.48 Simply put, there are diﬀerent and unequal types of masculinity and femininity. Within the range of masculinities, there are dominant and subordinate types. A hegemonic masculinity is an idealized, relational, and historical model of masculinity—one to which other forms of masculinity are subordinate. Although the qualities associated with it characterize a small percentage of masculine actors, its idealization and cultural pervasiveness require other actors to position themselves in relation to it.49 And while it is continually evolving, incorporating other forms of masculinity even as it subordinates them, it remains identiﬁable.50 By performing in accordance with a dominant model of masculinity, states can constitute (and thus, position) themselves relationally as powerful subjects. For Connell, this kind of positioning is at the heart of the concept of masculinity, to such a degree that the term “represents not a certain type of man but, rather, a way that men position themselves through discursive practices.”51 Cynthia Enloe argues similarly that patriarchy is perpetuated by “men who are recognized and claim a certain form of masculinity, for the sake of being more valued, more ‘serious,’ and ‘the protectors of/and controllers of those people who are less masculine.’”52 A comparable process occurs among states. As with men, the more that states are able to constitute themselves in alliance with the norms of the hegemonic masculinity, the more they will improve their position and boost their credibility.53 Thus, states have constant incentives to perform in ways that not only are masculine, but that constitute them as a certain form of masculine actor, one who embodies the elements of the hegemonic masculinity. Performances that masculinize states by positioning them closer to the ideal of the hegemonic masculinity are likely to be most eﬀective in the realm of security. This is because security performances are central to the production of the state as a unitary subject and because, so often, security performances are rendered intelligible by highly pronounced ideas about masculinity and femininity. War, in particular, demonstrates this claim. Long ago, Kenneth Waltz observed that in times of war the state is united (and, therefore, a single entity) to a greater degree than at any other time.54 Tickner makes a similar observation but concludes that gender plays a big role in producing state unity: the state becomes a citizen-warrior in times of war.55 Jean Bethke Elshtain and Susan Jeﬀords go one step further, arguing that collective identities are constructed through the types of men and women that war creates or brings out. But absent war, security performances are still crucial for state production and reproduction.56 By taking dangers, threats, and other signs of insecurity to be their objects, security performances reproduce the boundaries between a secure self and a dangerous other. Boundary reproduction is central to processes of statecraft, and security performances occur where the integrity of the state’s boundaries are discursively challenged, often in an explicit manner. Whether such threats are internal or external, the eﬀect is the same. Indeed, the distinction often collapses. One eﬀect of successful security performances, then, is the appearance of the state as a unitary, continuous actor, and one who can claim legitimacy over those “internal” to it. An additional eﬀect of successful security performances is the constitution of the state as an actor who is hierarchically dominant to certain other international actors, frequently states. Both of these can be accomplished by performing security in accord with the norms of the hegemonic masculinity. The relational quality of gender ensures that any performances that give the state the appearance of personhood will necessarily position its personhood in relation to other states. Any gendered construction of the state, even if it does not live up to masculine ideals, will be “socially deﬁned in contradistinction from some model (whether real or imaginary) of femininity;”57 thus, the gender norms that make a state intelligible as a subject also situate it relationally to other actors. This argument may be operationalized by ﬁrst determining the dominant form of masculinity that operates among states, and then observing states’ eﬀorts to perform security in ways that align with it. For the ﬁrst step, **there is good reason to believe that a model of masculinity centered on protection has achieved dominant, if not hegemonic, status.** While the question of its hegemonic status will have to be settled empirically, protection appears to be both clearly masculine and suﬃciently widespread. And although studies of the idea of protection are dwarfed by studies of the idea of security within IR, there is enough work that has been done on its normative force, evolving meaning, and the growing range of performances that it regulates to merit consideration. Work on these diﬀerent aspects of protection could be usefully combined to reveal an overarching process—one through which feminist Security Studies can study the gendering of the state that takes place at a systemic level. Over the past few decades, only a few feminist scholars have theorized protection as a masculinizing performance. Judith Hicks Stiehm and Iris Marion Young, in particular, have oﬀered important formulations of its logic and eﬀects.58 From these works, protection emerges as a pervasive model of masculinity. Although they are not cast in the language of performativity, these works take performances that embody this ideal (i.e. the giving of protection) to be constitutive of relational identities that privilege masculine subjects and subordinate feminine subjects. Stiehm focuses principally on protection at the hands of male-dominated militaries, and her conceptualization of the protector and the protected remains mostly at the level of individuals (oﬃcials, soldiers, and so on). Her central argument is that men have reserved the role of protector for themselves, relegating women to the status of dependents—a move that not only subordinates women but leaves them vulnerable to the dangers posed by masculine protectors. Building upon Stiehm’s analysis, Young uses the same logic to characterize the security state as the protector and the citizenry as the protected. Importantly, she maintains that these roles are naturalized through their connection to the protector/protected relationship that deﬁnes the patriarchal household. In her words: An exposition of the gendered logic of the masculine role of protector in relation to women and children illuminates the meaning and eﬀective appeal of a security state that wages war abroad and expects obedience and loyalty at home. In this patriarchal logic, **the role of the masculine protector puts those protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience.** To the extent that citizens of a democratic state allow their leaders to adopt a stance of protectors toward them, these citizens come to occupy a subordinate status like that of women in the patriarchal household. **We are to accept a more authoritarian and paternalistic state power, which gets its support partly from the unity a threat produces and our gratitude for protection**.59 The strength of both these models is that they allow for an analysis of protection that transverses conventional levels of analysis and highlights the variety of arenas in which protection is performed. Moreover, they capture performances that occur in myriad sites throughout the world, yet are united by a common logic. As Young claims, every state is at least partially **a security state**, and the legitimacy it **derives from performances of protection** canbeexplainedbythefactthatthesamelogiclegitimatesunequalrelationships in the personal lives of men and women everywhere. In this formulation, protection does not have any essential meaning. In fact, both authors emphasize that the protection oﬀered, while beneﬁcial in speciﬁc instances, is a bad arrangement for the protected. Protection is, therefore, less about what is provided than it is about the eﬀects of the performances undertaken in its name. This is evident today as states form policies for the protection of traﬃcked women. On that issue, **protection may entail practices as divergent as temporary asylum, abolitionist policies toward sex work, educational campaigns, operations targeting transnational** organized criminal networks, border control, and deportation. A signiﬁcant eﬀect of the performances, regardless of what forms they take, is the production of unequal, gendered identities in the form of protector and protected.60 With protection stripped of its essentialized meaning, it follows that the identities of protector and protected do not describe accurately any traits possessed by the state or the citizens. Instead, the identities are relational, established by the performances of protection even though they appear to precede those performances. “What matters,” Young explains, “is the gendered meaning of the positions and the association of familial caring they carry for people.”61 Protection does not have an essential meaning, but it does have a political rationality, a plan that provides overall coherence to the various forms that protection takes and the meanings that it acquires. Didier Bigo’s work has sought to understand this rationality, as well as the diﬀerent meanings of protection and the technologies of governance that are guided by it.62 To accomplish this, he proposes studying protection at the point of application, namely within the ﬁeld of security professionals. In so doing, he ﬁnds three etymologies of protection to be informing the technologies in use, each of which serves as an ideal-type and, though Bigo fails to observe it, each of which gathers its meaning (at least partially) through a connection to gender. The ﬁrst of these etymologies, tegere, represents a non-passive form of protection, one in which the protected both desires protection and maintains her/his sovereignty as an active subject. The protector acts out of a “sacred duty;” the subject is grateful for the protection she/he receives. Within the other etymologies, praesidere and tutore, the asymmetry is more pronounced. Praesidere invokes the guaranteeing of security and survival by someone else. This is a meaning of protection that is familiar to security scholars in IR, as it is often reﬂected in understandings of sovereignty, security, and borders. It is also the kind of protection that the military provides within Stiehm’s framework. Tutore is a form of protection that is carried out through proﬁling: monitoring and surveillance, the identiﬁcation of risks, the obedience of the protected. The protector operates not out of obligation, as in tegere, but out of love. Young, in observing the internal surveillance that characterizes the protection oﬀered by the security state, references this etymology of protection. It merits mention that each of these meanings that protection can acquire is dependent upon an asymmetric relationship between the protector and the protected. Among these, tegere characterizes those performances of protection that are the least constitutive of unequal relations—the best case scenario for protection. Within Bigo’s analysis, however,tegere appears also as the least relevant for the contemporary forms that protection takes. Instead, protection tends to take on less desirable forms, where “**the protected has diﬃculty overcoming the relation to regain voice and the capacity of acting politically**.”63 Bigo does not consider that the rationalityof protection may be better understood if it is posited in relation to gender norms. Following Young’s argument, one could deduce that rationality to be the reproduction of gendered identities through the unequal relations that produce them. Bigo’s silence on gender is a missed opportunity. If his work explored how technologies of security, reﬂecting the diﬀerent meanings that protection can take, establish gendered identities in the form of protector and protected, Bigo’s analysis would have a more complete picture of the systemic incentives that perpetuate these performances, as well as the identities that are at stake in the outcome.

#### Masculinity FAILS to recognize that theory precedes materiality. Rather than thinking before acting, masculinity operates in a violent way, taking all, sacrificing nothing. Prioritizing materiality is masculinized.

Sjoberg 13 (Laura, associate professor of Political Science @ University of Florida, University of Chicago; Ph.D., University of Southern California School of International Relations; J.D. Boston College Law School, “Relations International and War(s),” Gendered Lenses Look at War(s), online book, CMR)

Rationality in Interaction This skew is particularly evident in the assumption of rationality." The rationality assumption implies that the knower/actor can separate himself/herself from the “other” in interactions with that other. Feminists have argued that knowledge is always perspectival and political; therefore, states and their leaders’ decisions about how to interact with others are not rational, but informed by their situational and political biases. In this view, the rationality assumption may be seen as at once itself a political bias and obscuring other political biases. As Naomi Scheman argues, perceived rational cost-beneﬁt analysis about war-making and war-fighting should “always be seen as especially problematical when... constructed only by those in positions of privilege... [which provide] only distorted views about the world.”78 In this view, rational calculation is not an objective, attainable, and desirable end, but a partial representation of both interest and actors’ representation of those interests. In this way, through gender lenses, rationality has been seen as importantly incomplete, leaving out signiﬁcant (if not the most significant) factors that go into decision-making.79 In addition to understanding the rationality assumption as partial (and therefore unrepresentative), feminist research has pointed out links between rationality and mascuIinism.8° As Karen Jones notes, advocates of rationality as a guide for interstate interactions“ assume: 1. Available... conceptions of rationality and reason represent genuinely human norms and ideals; 2. The list of norms and ideals contained within available conceptions of rationality and reason are sufficiently complete; and 3. The external normative functions assigned to reason and rationality are unproblematic.82 Looking through gender lenses shows problems with each of these assumptions. Feminists have argued that “the identity of the modern subject-in models of human nature, citizenship, the rational actor, the knowing subject, economic man, and political agency-is not gender-neutral but masculine (and typically European and heterosexua|).”83 This impacts not only how we see the rational subject, but how we predict and understand his decisions, at the state level as well as at the individual level. According to Margaret Atherton, the possibility of rationality has “been used in a disturbing fashion to mark a gender distinction. We have, for example, on the one hand, the man of reason, and, on the other, the woman of passion.”84 In rationality assumptions, traits associated with masculinity are normalized and traits associated with femininity are excluded. The impact is compounded because (masculinized) rationality and its (feminized) alternatives are not on equal playing ﬁelds. As a result, Karen Jones notes that “women’s assumed deficiency in rationality” has been used to exclude both women and knowledge associated with femininity from accepted views of the world.85 The alleged gender neutrality of rationality, then, “is often a covert form of privileging maleness”85 and omission of “what has traditionally counted as ‘feminine.’”87 Still, adding women and values associated with femininity to current concepts of rationality is unlikely to create a gender-neutral concept of rationality.88 This is because, epistemologically, the sovereign rational subject constructs artificial gendered boundaries between rationality and emotion, male and female, and knower and known.89 Among states, those boundaries are not benign. Instead, they breed competition and domination that inspire and foster war(s) and conﬂict(s).90 This competition frequently relies on contrasting the state’s own masculinity to the enemy’s (actual or perceived) femininity. This cycle of genderings is not a series of events but a social continuum. In these gendered relationships, as Zillah Eisenstein argues, “gender differentiation will be mobilized for war and peace,” especially moving forward into the age of an American empire focused on manliness.9‘ Feminists have long argued that competitions between hegemonic masculinities and subordinate masculinities play a role in causing war(s).92 Hidden beneath the assumed independence, rationality, and unity of state interaction leading to war are gendered interstate interactions that cause, constitute, and relate to war and wars. Feminist scholars have recognized the extent to which the preeminence of masculine values dominates (particularly conﬂictual) accounts of interstate interactions, wherein “rational” interactions often become “a self-reproducing discourse of fear, suspicion, anticipated violence, and violence” in which “force is used to checkmate force.”93 Interstate interactions leading to wars often show the gendered nature of war narratives, war logics, and war languages, which produce (and reproduce) gendered cycles of violence.

#### In LD, non-men constantly fight to stay in the activity. Many are discontented because of comments such as “you speak too loud for a girl”, “you’re too aggressive”, or “stop being emotional”. Non-men can never break out of binaries without facing massive backlash, which shows that non-men are assimilated into discussions rather being their own person.

#### This topic, read in a masculinized way, demonizes non-men’s strikes. The strikes are coopted or deemed “not enough”

**Boris and Orleck 11** Eileen Boris and Annelise Orleck, , "FEMINISM AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT: A Century of Collaboration and Conflict," New Labor Forum, https://newlaborforum.cuny.edu/2011/01/03/feminism-and-the-labor-movement-a-century-of-collaboration-and-conflict/

A century after the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire, women have become nearly half of the unionized labor force. They work in the growing service and public employment sectors as nurses, home attendants, teachers, and clerks. Previously labeled women’s issues—maternity leave, equal pay, sexual harassment, and work-family balance—have become union issues. Women hold leadership positions in the AFL-CIO and Change to Win. With the disappearance of manufacturing and the growth of service labor, women of color—both immigrant- and U.S.- born—have become the driving force in the labor movement for safe jobs, living wages, and dignity at work, leading women-dominated unions and worker associations. It is not an overstatement to say that the future of the labor movement appears up to the women. It hasn’t always been this way. For at least a century, labor feminists have fought for the interests of wage-earning women and workingclass housewives, both within the feminist and the labor movements. Still, the priorities of the women’s movement for sex-based rights and those of the labor movement for class solidarity often diverged during the twentieth century. Working-class feminists struggled against middle-class feminists who focused primarily on achieving equality with male professionals and executives. They also battled men who sought to exclude women from unionized jobs and who denied organized women workers a full share of power in the labor movement. Highlighting key moments when feminists and unionists came together over the last century, this essay offers a usable past drawn from the fraught—but often productive—relationship between feminism and labor. An examination of the contact between organized women’s groups and organized labor, women’s organizations within the labor movement, and feminist labor organizing shows that when feminists and unions worked together, both benefited. Labor gained when it understood women’s issues as crucial for the advancement of the working class. The women’s movement was at its strongest when its membership and agenda crossed class lines. Recognition of this history may help to revitalize feminism as much as organized labor. **Labor Feminism Before the 1960s: The Women’s Trade Union League** The years surrounding 1911’s Triangle Shirtwaist Fire saw significant and broad-based collaboration between labor activists and middle- to upper-class feminists in the United States. That period began with the creation of the Women’s Trade Union League (WTUL) in 1903. The League, as it was known by its members, drew together educated women reformers (mostly white, Protestant, and native-born) and young women workers (many of them immigrant Jews, Italians, and Irish) to improve factory wages, working conditions, and hours. The WTUL embodied both an unusual degree of collaboration between feminists and the labor movement, and the many tensions that arose from longstanding attempts to build lasting and productive relationships.2 This cross-class women’s network deepened with the uprisings of young women garment workers that began in New York in 1909 and then spread over the next few years into other Eastern and Midwestern cities. Middle-class and affluent supporters of woman suffrage—including League activists, college students, and even wealthy socialites—saw these strikes as an opportunity to win working women to the cause. Forming what the press dubbed “mink brigades,” affluent supporters marched alongside young immigrant women on picket lines in a largely successful attempt to reduce high rates of police brutality. After they bailed arrested strikers out of jail, they spoke (alongside the released strikers) for woman suffrage on the steps of jails and courthouses. Affluent feminists brought working women into existing suffrage organizations, as well as offering financial support for the establishment of working-class suffrage groups. Working women understood, as Polish Jewish cap maker Rose Schneiderman explained in 1907, that they “must . . . secure political power to shape their own labor conditions.”3 Women factory and manufacturing workers knew they needed the political and financial support of these more affluent “allies.” Nonetheless, imbalances in social power and financial resources generated much conflict in the first two decades of the century, when working-class members felt bullied, condescended to, or generally misunderstood. While many working-class women embraced socialism and anarchism, their better-off allies mostly shied away from revolutionary politics, preferring to reform the existing system. The refusal of working women to eschew more radical approaches moved affluent women to withdraw financial support from independent working women’s groups, prompting angry responses. “It is up to the working people to save themselves,” Schneiderman tongue-lashed a theater full of affluent New Yorkers after the Triangle Fire.4 In the aftermath of the fire, women labor activists and reformers redoubled efforts to win the vote, and industrial feminists (the self-name of labor feminists of that day) like Schneiderman began to focus as much on passing laws to regulate wages and labor conditions as they did on union organizing. Frances Perkins (the future U.S. Secretary of Labor under Franklin Roosevelt) of the National Consumers League and Pauline Newman (a former Triangle employee and WTUL activist) were appointed as investigators for the New York State Factory Investigating Commission (FIC), positions they used to educate powerful politicians about the conditions under which working women labored. Over the next three years, the New York FIC, and sister organizations in the other industrial states, pushed through a dramatically expanded regulatory structure for factory labor—including laws that empowered state commissioners of labor, banned the labor of children under the age of fourteen, and required inspection of elevators and fireproof devices.5 During World War I, this collaboration between middle-class feminists, women labor activists, and Democratic Party politicians resulted in the founding of a Women in Industry Service to monitor conditions of women working on defense contracts. After the war, President Wilson established a permanent Women’s Bureau in the U.S. Department of Labor to investigate women’s working conditions. Its creation marked the ascension of “industrial” and “social” feminists to federal government positions of authority, a significant move toward remaking the state as a force sympathetic to at least some of the goals of the labor movement. By the 1920s, when the WTUL came to be run by labor union women—such as Schneiderman and Newman—it was genuinely a cross-class, multi-ethnic organization. Still, once U.S. women won the right to vote, relations between the self-described feminists of the National Women’s Party (NWP) and women in the labor movement frayed. In the early 1920s, NWP leaders began lobbying for an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the Constitution, which declared it unconstitutional to discriminate on the basis of sex. The labor movement rejected the ERA out of fear that it would negate hard-won legislation protecting women workers. Ignoring industrial feminists’ pleas to adopt a more piecemeal approach to gender equality, the NWP introduced the ERA into every session of Congress from 1921 into the early 1970s, driving a deep and lasting wedge between the labor movement and feminist activists. Labor opponents of the ERA gained the upper hand with the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932. He was, along with his wife Eleanor, a key ally of the New York WTUL. With the appointment of League leaders like Perkins and Schneiderman to key government positions, FDR signaled support for the goals of the labor-feminist alliance. Perkins oversaw the extension of wage-and-hour and safety protections for all workers, regardless of gender, through the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938. These laws marked a turning point for union men who had long been ambivalent toward the idea of legislating labor conditions. No longer were strategies for improving the lives of workers so starkly divided by sex. Still, race continued to divide the working class. The new legislation intentionally denied coverage to agricultural and domestic workers—the fields in which most women of color were employed. Many within the labor-feminist coalition pushed to expand federal laws, including the Social Security Act of 1935, to extend coverage to these occupations. They also expanded the reach of the labor movement, by supporting organizing drives among service workers, many of whom were women of color. In reaching out to black and immigrant organizers like Maida Springer Kemp, Dolly Robinson, and Charlotte Adelman, the mid-1930s WTUL brought laundry workers, waitresses, and hotel maids—who had been largely ignored by white male unionists—into the labor movement. This same period saw the mass organizing of Caribbean immigrants and Puerto Ricans in the East, and Mexican-Americans in the West. These populations had long been ignored by the male-led unions. With the coming of World War II, largescale employment of women in defense plants moved feminist labor issues into the center of public discussion. Early in the war years, manufacturers attempted to label any new jobs in defense production as “female” work, enabling them to pay women workers less than the prevailing union wage. Labor leaders’ longstanding attempts to keep the best-paid jobs for white male union members had to be rethought, given the labor shortages resulting from the wartime draft. Reluctantly at first, more enthusiastically later, some unions—most notably the United Electrical Workers (UE)— began to resist sex-based pay differentials. Even leaders with little concern for women’s salaries worried that, if they allowed manufacturers to pay women less during the war, when men came home afterwards, it would be difficult to bring wages back up. Other unions retained sex-based pay differentials in their contracts, but in 1942 the National War Labor Board—responding to years of lobbying by labor-feminist groups like the WTUL—established a policy of equal pay for men and women performing the same jobs. The 1963 Equal Pay Act, the first time the federal government put its power behind equal pay for equal work, was the fruit of continuing labor-feminist agitation on this issue. With wage-earning mothers constituting 36 percent of the labor force by the war’s end, work and family balance inevitably became an urgent labor issue. Joint efforts between feminists and male unionists mitigated the “double day” with publicly supported child care, flexible hours, and more convenient shopping options. Industrial unions recognized womanpower through special women’s committees; the United Automobile Workers (UAW) committee carried forward the labor-feminist agenda into the early postwar years, in collaboration with the U.S. Women’s Bureau.7 Labor Feminism Since 1960 The 1960s and 1970s saw an explosion of interactions between feminists and trade unionists, and an energetic feminism within the labor movement. As women’s liberation activists discovered the working class—with help from World War II-era trade unionists and leftists—feminist caucuses sprung up within existing unions. At its first convention in 1974, thirty-five thousand women gathered together not “to swap recipes,” as Myra Wolfgang of HERE taunted George Meany and the rest of labor’s male leadership, but to organize the Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW). Along with explicitly feminist groups like the Union Women’s Alliance to Gain Equality (Union WAGE) and 9to5, CLUW declared women’s issues to be union issues.8 In honoring WTUL stalwart Pauline Newman at its founding meeting, CLUW recognized generational continuities among labor feminists. Its stated priorities explicitly echoed those of the WTUL: strengthening the role of women in unions; organizing unorganized women; achieving pay equity; and increasing the involvement of women in the political and legislative process. But CLUW added goals that reflected changing times—promoting affirmative action for women in the workplace, addressing the concerns of aging women workers, and tackling substance abuse. In 1980, CLUW president Joyce Miller became the first woman on the AFL-CIO’s executive board—a modest and long-overdue recognition of the significance of women in the labor movement. Trade union feminists helped launch a revitalized women’s movement that sparked new demands for women’s rights at home, on the job, and within unions. Clericals, flight attendants, and domestic workers contested the dominant assumption within the AFL-CIO that women workers were unorganizable. Collective action hit pink-collar occupations. This trend was exemplified by the formation of Stewardesses for Women’s Rights, the Willmar Bank Employees’ Association strike in 1977, and the highly creative and flexible campaign to organize Harvard’s clerical and technical workers. Independent women’s associations, like Chicago’s Women Employed, were far more likely to initiate such efforts than were traditional labor unions. At a time when most unions still concentrated on manufacturing, feminists argued for both the economic value of women’s unpaid labor in the home and the worth of women’s work in service industries. They anticipated the strategies needed to organize the future economy.9At the same time, trade union women shaped the new feminism in two ways. First, they complicated the meaning of equality by bringing to the feminist agenda issues like child care and flextime that women needed to balance wage-earning with family life. By the 1970s, labor feminists went beyond an anti-discrimination program to insist that women’s rights at work included pregnancy leave and other labor standards, and that these issues mattered to the labor movement even if they did not apply to men. The World War II efforts of the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (IUE) laid the basis for feminist organizing in the 1970s that culminated in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. In 1982, twenty thousand Chinese-immigrant garment workers forced union-sponsored day care onto the agenda of the labor movement by leaving their babies on the desk of previously unresponsive garment union president Jay Mazur. Second, they had an institutional impact. Not only would longtime union activists, like Stella Nowicki from Chicago’s stockyards, become involved with women’s liberation— they also helped birth its most national manifestation. In 1966, Caroline Davis and Dorothy Haener from the UAW’s Women’s Department became key founders of the National Organization for Women (NOW), providing office space and clerical services to that fledging organization. NOW’s co-founder and most famous leader, Betty Friedan, had learned to organize in the UE.11 UAW women were in the forefront of shifting labor’s stand toward the ERA. Like other women in male-dominated or mixedsex industries—and unlike allies in the U.S. Women’s Bureau—they viewed women’s labor laws not as protective devices but as tools of both management and hostile male workers who sought to limit women’s opportunities and pay. They applauded the striking down of sex-based labor restrictions under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, achieved through the cooperation of labor and feminist legislators.12 In the years that followed, many local groups bridged the gaps between trade unionism and the women’s movement.13 In California’s Bay Area, two activists rooted in the old left—Jean Maddox of the militant Local 29 of the Office and Professional Employees International Union and Ann Draper of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union— established Union WAGE in 1971. They aimed to counter NOW’s neglect of working women and support organizing through rank-and-file movements and independent associations. The larger women’s movement, in turn, influenced WAGE, which fought for reproductive rights, struggled against sexual harassment and racism, and condemned discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, age, and disability.14 Citywide clerical associations, along with workplace-based women’s caucuses, more typically represented the collective action inspired by feminist and other radical insurgencies against the AFL-CIO.15 In the early 1970s, 9to5 expanded from a consciousness-raising group among Harvard clerical workers to become (first) an organization of Boston clerical workers, then part of the National Association of Working Women. In 1975, it created a companion union—Local 9to5—that was affiliated with the SEIU. Under the banner “Raises not Roses,” clerical women petitioned, picketed, sued, and engaged in creative street actions. In the 1990s, founder Karen Nussbaum brought a feminist perspective to her tenure as director of the U.S. Women’s Bureau and, in 1996, as the head of the AFL-CIO’s new Working Women’s Department.16 Feminists also established caucuses within established unions. Among the most effective, the District 31 (based in Northwest Indiana’s Calumet Region) Women’s Caucus of the United Steelworkers mobilized “burly” men to march for the ERA in Illinois, a major industrial state resisting ratification. It joined with a multiracial coalition of Chicago-area women’s groups to fight against job discrimination and violence against women and for abortion rights. It also defended women’s jobs during layoffs.17 In the early 1970s, black feminist leaders Shirley Chisholm and Eleanor Holmes Norton sought to jointly mobilize the civil rights, labor, and women’s movements to improve the conditions of domestic service. While the AFL-CIO still could not imagine organizing such workers, its members joined a cross-class and multiracial mix of feminists in supporting the 1974 expansion of the Fair Labor Standards Act to cover domestic workers. With the support of the National Committee on Household Employment, a black feminist organization initially founded by labor feminists, domestic workers themselves mobilized as the Household Technicians of America (HTA) in 1972. Given the stigma associated with domestic service, local groups across the nation sought not only traditional bread-and-butter improvements but also respect for their work and humanity through written contracts, public recognition ceremonies, and training and education programs.18 Las Vegas became a surprising base for labor feminism when a multiracial workforce of hotel maids turned the city’s Hotel and Culinary Workers Union Local 226 into the largest private union local in the United States in the 1990s. Beginning in the 1940s, AfricanAmerican women assumed leadership roles. In the 1950s, under pioneering business agent Sara Hughes, black women who labored as “back of the house” workers in the city’s hotels and casinos became organized. But, twenty years later, African-American workers contested the union’s collaboration with hotel management to segregate them into the lowest wage positions in the hotel workforce. A series of protests and court challenges yielded a federal consent decree forcing the union and Las Vegas hotels to train and place women and workers of color into higher-paid jobs. In the late 1980s, the union’s multiracial membership ratified some of the best contracts in the nation for service workers. This period of success for unionized women of color culminated in 1990 when Hattie Canty—a black migrant mother of ten—became president of the Culinary Union.1**Toward the Future** The relationship between the women’s movement and organized labor has shifted over the last twenty-five years. The AFL-CIO has incorporated major concerns of wage-earning women into its formal agenda, calling for: equal pay, work and family balance, and prevention of violence against women in the workplace. Middle-class feminists played a role in pushing unions to recognize these concerns, but too often they ignored how class structures the outcome of gender inequality, as in questions of remuneration, time flexibility, and the double day. While feminists of all classes easily embraced equal pay, middleclass people are less active in seeking redress for underpaid caregivers. Jamaican immigrant Evelyn Coke—the Long Island home care worker whose exclusion from the minimum wage law the SEIU litigated—garnered meager feminist support for her plight. On the other hand, feminists gave crucial support to new formations—like Domestic Workers United in New York City and other ethnically-based associations—that seek dignity and recognition as well as better working conditions. These efforts culminated in September 2010 when New York became the first state to adopt a Domestic Worker Bill of Rights.20 Most significantly, women have become the new face of labor, composing the majority of union recruits. As manufacturing declined and the service economy exploded, immigrant women in low-wage jobs brought a new vitality and militancy to unionization. The numbers of jobs in teaching, nursing, and clerical work that employed more women than men continued to grow right up to the beginnings of the current recession, increasing women’s percentage of the unionized workforce. In service industries, women now make up half of all unionists. Their numbers have begun to close the overall membership gap.21 While unions once saw women as unorganizable, today they count on them. Examples range across the labor force, but concentrate in the health care sector. Most of the seventy-four thousand Los Angeles home aides who voted to join the SEIU in 1999 were women. The 150,000-strong National Nurses United, formed in 2009 from three nurses groups, became the nation’s largest union of medical professionals.22 Though the numbers of women in leadership positions are nowhere near parity, Mary Kay Henry replaced Andy Stern as the head of the SEIU in 2010. Linda Chavez-Thompson served as executive vice-president of the AFL-CIO for over a decade, and then was replaced by another AFSCME (American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees) leader, Arlene Holt Baker. And, in 2009, Liz Shuler of the IUE became the first woman elected as the federation’s secretary-treasurer. Women of color—many of them immigrants—have spearheaded fights against today’s sweatshops in the fields and in homes, and have organized workers in food processing and garment production. They have revived hotel worker militancy, as evidenced by HERE’s ongoing Hotel Workers Rising initiative and Boston chambermaids’ protest against the Hyatt chain.23 Joined by middle-class feminist allies—some of whom were from the same ethnic group (as with Asian Immigrant Women Advocates)—they are addressing workplace conditions and occupational safety issues that represent today’s equivalent to the hazards of a century ago, including carpel tunnel injuries and industrial fires. In the 1990s, Mexicana farm workers of Líderes Campesinas investigated the impact of pesticides on pregnancy and highlighted sexual harassment as well as the continued low wages paid for work in California’s fields.24 Worker centers—like the Garment Worker Center in Los Angeles and many others—are linking feminism, immigrant rights, and worker justice on a daily basis in working-class communities.25 A century ago, the Triangle Fire horrified New York City and the nation as a whole, forcing the labor movement, feminists, and political reformers to more systematically address the murderous conditions facing American workers. Over the years, feminists and trade unionists came together in numerous ways, engaging in vibrant coalitions that enabled them to transcend their differences. Today’s labor movement has become, in large measure, a women’s movement. Whether it will stay that way remains to be seen. Is the feminization of the labor movement yet another indicator of its decline? Or is it a harbinger of labor’s renewal? One hundred years after Triangle that question remains unresolved. One thing is certain: the future strength of the labor movement depends on its women, and the future of feminism will continue to be shaped by labor.

#### Discourses of state security *render* entire categories of life disposable and *reifies* ongoing structural violence

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Here, feminist reflexivity and a willingness to constantly rethink one’s engagements and prejudices are explicitly foregrounded – as is a commitment to thinking about how scholarship is always already political (see Åhäll, 2016; Baker et al., 2016; Enloe, 2016). In my contribution to the roundtable, I agreed with Enloe and noted the distinctiveness of feminist security studies: while many critical security scholars have been sympathetic to feminist concerns and might embrace an emancipatory agenda, they ‘tend not to ask feminist research questions … and do not base their research on women’s experiences. As a result, they find themselves with strikingly different research agendas, findings, and policy recommendations’ (Wibben, 2011: 112). In paying detailed attention to the ways in which everyday experiences of differently located subjects (not just those identified as women!) are gendered, but also raced, classed, sexualized, and more, critical feminists have developed an impressive and innovative body of work, especially also concerning militarism and militarization.4 ‘Militarisation as a security puzzle forms part of sensemaking in the everyday’, proposes Åhäll, and consequently ‘feminist contributions to security studies have a different “entry-point” … a focus on the everyday as the site where the political Wibben 139 puzzle is found’ (Åhäll, 2016: 155, emphasis in original). This contrasts sharply with international relations, where, since ‘one can concentrate exclusively on states and their “behavior,” questions of human agency and identity fall to the wayside. No children are ever born, and nobody ever dies, in this constructed world. There are states, and they are what is’ (Elshtain, 1987: 91). Feminist scholarship on security as a concept (e.g. Detraz, 2012; Sjoberg, 2013; Stern, 2005; Tickner, 1992, 2001; Wibben, 2011) reveals how security is profoundly gendered and how the parameters of traditional, and even critical, security narratives make the inclusion of (women’s) everyday experience difficult. Feminist security studies hence provides complex and fruitful analyses of some of the core issues of security studies – by eschewing this work, security studies impoverishes itself.5 Paying close attention to the impact of security policies on the everyday lives of people during peace- and wartime and questioning the purportedly neat separation of pre- and postwar spheres, feminist scholars poignantly identify a continuum of violence that spans these spatial and temporal locales (e.g. Cockburn, 1998, 2004, 2007; Reardon, 1993). They map how (in)securities shift and slide along with subjectivities on axes of oppression, particularly when gender, race, or class are foregrounded. Maria Stern’s work on Guatemala, for example, reveals complex formations of Mayan women’s identity, which are tied to their gender, their relation to the dominant Ladino society, and to class. Further, their identification as campesina highlights ‘the spiritual and cultural connection to the land’ (Stern, 2005: 115). Taken together, this means that any ‘in/security configuration that was formed in tandem with these identity constellations could neither be partitioned off into separate “security” needs, nor for that matter, specific threats’ (Stern, 2005: 115). By focusing on everyday (in)securities, feminist scholars challenge static understandings of security (see e.g. Kinsella, 2007; Sjoberg, 2013; Stern, 2005; Tickner, 1992) and provide ample evidence that state or national security frameworks not only fail to deliver security, especially for marginalized members of society, but are themselves significantly implicated in producing insecurities. Studying militarism, as ideology but also in terms of how its logics are actualized in the lives of civilians and service members as well as in society in general through processes of militarization, has long allowed feminist researchers to take a closer look at a range of security policies and their effects. At the same time, traditional security studies has remained largely static in its approach to security. While critical scholarship on security has deepened and broadened the agenda to explore a wider scope of security issues, as long as security studies aims to identify threats and develop means to counter or contain them, therewith treating security as an achievable condition or thing, it continuously fails to grasp the shifting (in)security configurations feminist scholars point to. What is more, security as currently imagined and exemplified in (state) practices remains thoroughly dependent on militarist logics (i.e. militarized). Consequently, critical and feminist scholars who study non-military security issues still need to be cognizant of militarism and its effects. Otherwise their scholarship risks contributing to the militarization of ever more areas in the process of securitizing new issues, as many critics have pointed out (e.g. Deudney, 1990, Mabee and Vucetic, this issue). Let us unpack these claims: if security is indeed a self-referential practice, as critical scholars propose, then it establishes a security situation through a process of securitization rather than referring to an external ‘reality’ – and this is an intensely political move (Wibben, 2016b). Indeed, ‘“security” is not a universal need nor a universal concept, but a function of discourse, a function within a specific and modern discursive economy of the political’ (Dillon, 1990: 110). Security orders social relations, it positions people, and it has effects on life and death. Responding to Ole Wæver’s (1995) introduction of the idea of securitization, Jef Huysmans proposes that we think in terms of logics of security, ‘an ensemble of rules that is immanent to a security practice and that defines that practice in its particularity’ (Huysmans, 1998: 232; see also Huysmans, 2006). Crucially, this description of security as a self-referential practice is based on an attempt to make sense of the concept of security as states employ it, as Buzan et al. (1998) explicitly acknowledge in their classic statement on securitization. These state practices, however, depend on a close alignment of security and militarism.6 This alignment exists not least because the concept of ‘security’ developed from ‘military strategy’, alongside the move from War Departments to Defense Departments, without a corresponding process of demilitarization. For the US context, Bradley Klein (1997: 362) has described this shift from strategic studies to security studies as a deliberately political move: The postwar shift in the United States from the War Department to the Defense Department suggests that the manipulation of force must find politically acceptable guises for itself…. [S]ecurity studies was entirely a product of the post-World War II environment, when liberal societies uendertook projects of both decolonizing and maintaining global order under Western protection and coordination. Consequently, more often than not, securitization does not just ring the alarm bell of security (Glasius, 2008) and provide much-needed attention to important issues, but potentially militarizes ever more areas of life. This is notable in the way in which the UN’s Women, Peace and Security Agenda, despite its emergence from an anti-militarist feminist activist tradition, has become increasingly narrowly focused on gender mainstreaming in militaries (Shepherd, 2016; Wright, 2016), as well as in the deployment of militaries in response to disasters (Parashar, this issue). To go beyond the self-referential logic of security, it is necessary therefore to tackle the militarist logics embedded in conceptions of security as they are currently employed in security studies. Meanwhile, military power in various guises remains one of the primary means by which key states like the USA seek security. This militarist mindset is not just reflected in the use of militaries to achieve policy aims, but also entails the subscription to militarist logics that value hierarchical orders and the promotion of limited violence to ensure peace. Importantly, while large areas of life are militarized in this manner, militarism itself is also changing. As Andrew Bacevich argues in The New American Militarism, the rise of US militarism that finds its expression in the ongoing war on terror ‘has deep roots in the American past [and] represents a bipartisan project’ (Bacevich, 2013: 5). The current developments, he proposes, started in the aftermath of the Vietnam War when the officer corps of the US military attempted to achieve a professional revival by reimagining war itself – and in the process eroded the heretofore-assumed distinction between military and civilian arenas. This finds expression in the now well-established figures of the soldier-diplomat and, more recently, the soldier-scholar (Khalili, 2010). ‘With the events of the 1990s [Desert Storm in Kuwait, Operation Allied Force in Kosovo] blurring the distinction between war and politics, field commanders began to fancy themselves clever enough to straddle both worlds and master the art of “coercive diplomacy”’ (Bacevich, 2013: 58)

#### We should frame our debate by recognizing how any current governments are not a just government, rather they are using discourse as a way to rationalize acts of violence.

Currah 14 (Paisley Currah teaches political science at Brooklyn College. “The State” via Academia.edu, accessed 10 February 2016, cVs)

States do many things. They test students, imprison individuals, make roads, adjudicate property disputes, track the health of populations, issue identity documents, provide benefits to those deemed deserving, safeguard markets, regulate the poor, drop bombs, and patrol borders. Imaging ‘‘the state’’ as an entity, an institution, a unitary thing gives an intelligible shape to the countless activities carried out under the force of law. The idea of the state smuggles within it certain expectations: an ordered hierarchy, a comprehensive rationality, a unity of purpose and execution. Conceptions of the state differ depending on their particular historical or theoretical genealogies, and each one calls forth its commensurate form of political contestation or critical analysis. Those differences are visible in the range of political positions represented by trans movements. Examining the issue of sex classification can help illustrate them. In the classical liberal tradition, the state is thought to be a neutral umpire, meting out judgment according to the rule of law, which Locke described as ‘‘settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties.’’ Governments brought into being by this social compact should not treat people differently because of arbitrary particularities of identity. According to this tradition’s contemporary script, that governments have denied rights based on distinctions of race and gender, among others, in the past is an unfortunate historical contingency, one that betrayed the principle of equality and that has now been, or soon will be, rectified. Because individuals exist before and outside the political community they decide to form or join, the characteristics they brought into the social state should not become the basis for treating them differently. In the United States, this view of the state is enshrined in constitutional jurisprudence and legal doctrine and provides the backdrop for most legal challenges to state-sponsored discrimination against trans people. For example, in framing arguments to jurists and policy makers, trans rights advocates are often forced to argue that it is not birth sex that is immutable but gender identity. The goal of what might be called the mainstream trans rights movement is to install gender identity as the basis for sex re-classification, rather than the sex assigned at birth or on the surgically modified body. This would do much to improve the day-to-day lives of transgender people. For the Left, however, the liberal state and the principles of political equality it celebrates conceal the maldistribution of equality. A certain domesticated form of selfhood is reproduced when individuals petition the government for recognition of their particular selves and, in turn, recognize themselves when they are hailed by various state apparatuses—interpolation is the term of art used to describe this relationship. From this more radical perspective, then, the transgender rights movement is merely insisting that the hailing be more accurate. A transgender man will now have anMon his driver’s license, and the police officer who stops him on the street may call him ‘‘sir’’ rather than ‘‘ma’am.’’ But the power of the state to surveil individuals and to regulate gender remains intact.While the political approach of many trans legal advocates requires them to naturalize gender identity, the more radical trans Left recognizes that ‘‘sex’’ cannot be made to fit into a rigid presocial biological schema of male and female. On the question of sex classification, the goal should not be to install the ‘‘right’’ definition of sex in the regulatory architecture to make the legal recognition of transition possible but to get the state out of the business of defining sex in the first place. Both the classical liberal theory of the state and the Left’s critical rejoinder, however, lack the capacity or perhaps the flexibility to account for contradictions in policies for sex reclassification. Perhaps what underlies the inability to account for contradictions in sex classification is the belief that the state actions should manifest an underlying coherence. In fact, the hope—or fear—that we are governed by a single, rational legal structure is belied by the existence of a virtually uncountable number of state institutions, processes, offices, and political jurisdictions. In the United States, for example, when some individuals cross borders, walk into a government office to apply for benefits, get a driver’s license, go to jail or prison, sign up for selective service, try to get married, or have any interaction with any state actor, the sex classification of some people can and often does switch. Even within a single jurisdiction, almost every particular state agency—from federal to municipal—has the authority to decide its own rules for sex classification. To complicate matters even more, both state and federal judges have found that one’s sex classification for one social function may not hold for others. These include legislatures, courts, departments, agencies, elected officials, political appointees, public servants, constitutions, laws, regulations, administrative rules, and informal norms and practices. These intertwined and sprawling apparatuses all rest, sometimes uneasily, on diachronous layers of sedimented yet still active historical state formations. Given this disarray, it is not surprising that different state entities might sometimes advance different, even incommensurate, projects. Indeed, how could they not? According to Gilles Deleuze, a concept ‘‘should express an event rather than an essence’’ (1995: 14). Molar, large-scale accounts of sex and the state have assumed a sameness to sex and a singular rationality to state actors, decisions, and projects. If the state is not unitary, coordinated, and hierarchically organized in an ultimately rational way—if, as Michel Foucault suggests, ‘‘the state is only a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction whose importance is much less than we think’’ (1991: 103)—then it should come as no surprise that state definitions of sex are also plural. A contradiction is something that does not make sense, a position that is logically inconsistent. To begin by letting go of the assumption that there is any ‘‘there there,’’ any whatness, to (legal) sex apart from what an agency says it is, the contradiction evaporates. The official sex designation— or, more precisely, the M or the F—stamped on documents or coded in records becomes the starting point. Then an analysis can focus not on what sex is, or what it should be, but on what it does, what it accomplishes, what it produces. Indeed, if the only thing we know for sure about sex is what any of these many state actors say it is in any particular instance, sex will turn out to be as messy and diffuse a concept as the state. Entering into the analysis without a firm sense of what sex is or what the state is—as a priori facts, as edifices—makes the processes through which they come into being more visible. It might be better to defer attempts to resolve—theoretically or politically—the messiness in order to understand what a particular system of sex designation does for a particular state project such as recognition or redistribution (Currah, forthcoming).