#### 1 – ROB SPEC

#### A. Interpretation: The affirmative debater must articulate a distinct ROB in the form of a delineated text in the first affirmative speech.

#### B. Violation: they don’t

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Strat Skew – Absent a text in the 1AC, they can read multiple pieces of offense under different ROBs and then read a new one in the 1AR so they never substantively lose debates under the ROB, it just always becomes a 2NR debate about whether the ROB is good or not comparatively to the 1N’s which moots engagement. They can warrant things like condo logic, consequentialist policy-making offense for their aff, or kritikal impacts that deviate from their plan and then read an incredibly nuanced ROB in the 1AR that makes it so only the conceded or under-covered offense matters. Stable advocacies are key to fairness since otherwise you aren’t bound by anything you say, and is an independent voter cuz it justifies saying the N word then shifting out of your reps. The impact is infinite abuse – reading a new ROB in the 1AR makes it so all you have to do is dump on the 1N ROB and marginally extend your warrants in the 2AR and the neg can’t do anything about it since there is no 3NR to answer the 2AR weighing or extrapolations, you already have conceded offense, all you need is the ROB.

#### 2. Reciprocity – a) restarting the ROB debate in the 1AR puts you at a 7-6 advantage on the framing debate since I have to propose one in the 1NC since 2N arguments are new – including it in the aff makes it 13-13 b) you have one more speech to contest my ROB and weigh, I can only possibly answer your ROB in the 2N but you can do comparative weighing in the 2AR, and c) I can only read a ROB in the 1N so you should read it in your first speech as well – that’s definitionally an equal burden.

#### D. Voters:

#### Fairness is a voter – debate is a competitive activity that requires objective evaluation and otherwise debaters quit. No RVIs – a) good theory debaters will bait out theory and always win b) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair, and c) chilling effect – people are disincentivized from reading theory out of fear of losing on an RVI. Use competing interps – a) reasonability collapses because weighing between brightlines concedes the authority of an offense-defense paradigm b) reasonability requires judge intervention, and c) creates a race to the bottom where people read increasingly abusive practices that minimally fit the brightline. Drop the debater to deter future abuse and rectify time spent reading the shell.

#### 2 - All Equal Font

#### Interp: The text of all cards in a debater’s speech docs must be the same font size.

#### Violation – they shrunk the unhighlighted portion of the card.

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Evidence Ethics – Shrinking font decreases readability while emphasizing what you want, making miscutting easier to get away with. Even if no miscutting occurred it’s still dishonest to hide your evidence – you wouldn’t try to hide parts of quote you cite in a research paper. Evidence ethics is an independent voter: teaching debaters that being academically dishonest is ok encourages it in real life in which it’s heavily frowned upon. Academic honesty k2 education since you don’t learn anything by just making things up.

#### 3 - Comic Sans

#### Interp: debaters must use comic sans as their font in their speech docs.

#### Violation – the doc is in calibri

#### Prefer -

#### Inclusion – comic sans is easiest to read for people with dyslexia.

**Hudgins 17** “Hating Comic Sans Is Ableist” Lauren Hudgins Feb 23, 2017 <https://medium.com/the-establishment/hating-comic-sans-is-ableist-bc4a4de87093> OHS-AT

The irregular shapes of the letters in Comic Sans allow her to focus on the individual parts of words. While many fonts use repeated shapes to create different letters, such as a “p” rotated to made a “q,” Comic Sans uses few repeated shapes, creating distinct letters (although it does have a mirrored “b” and “d”). Comic Sans is one of a few typefaces recommended by influential organizations like the British Dyslexia Association and the Dyslexia Association of Ireland. Using Comic Sans has made it possible for Jessica to complete a rigorous program in marine zoology at Bangor University in Wales.

#### To pre-empt the 1AR - the ability to change the font doesn’t solve – it’s ableist to expect them to do something for your aesthetic preference.

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In addition, she cannot proofread in a font that’s difficult for her to read. “You cannot fix formatting errors you cannot see!” To her, asking her to change to a font she cannot adequately use “is the epitome of ableism.” Sometimes she can ask someone in her cohort to help her spot errors, but it’s a lot to ask. “I can and have had people in my class look over my work, but you need to understand that we’re not collaborators, they’re my peers. This is an encroachment on their time.” Asking her to change her font is asking her to take a task that is already very difficult for someone with dyslexia and demanding that she take extra steps to please the aesthetic preferences of someone for whom reading is easy. Inclusion’s an independent voter – you have to be in debate to gain from it and it’s a gateway issue because it ensures everyone benefits from the activity since it’s how people get scholarships, make friends, and improve critical thinking skills

#### 4 - AT: Kant

#### The inventor’s property rights must be legally enforced through IP protections.

Sonderholm 10 discusses [Jorn Sonderholm (Professor with Specific Responsibilities at Aalborg University, Denmark, PhD in Philosophy from the University of St Andrews, UK, director of the Centre for Philosophy and Public Policy (C3P)), “Ethical Issues Surrounding Intellectual Property Rights”, Philosophy Compass 5/12 (2010): 1107–1115] SG

Traditionally, two distinct lines of thought have been fielded for the suggestion that IPRs are ethically justifiable. **One line of thought appeals to a natural right of an inventor to control the use of her innovation. This is the libertarian defense of IPRs** which has its historical roots in the writings of John Locke (Locke 1690). Robert Nozick has in more modern times been an advocate for this line of thought (Nozick 1974). **The libertarian view endows individuals with a natural right of appropriation.** This is the idea that **any innovator ⁄ worker who mixes her labor with a previously unowned object or natural resource comes to own this object or resource in full and can legitimately deny that other people use ⁄ appropriate this object or resource.** The natural right of appropriation central to libertarianism has an important proviso (famously formulated by Locke) which is an ‘enough and as good’ clause on original appropriation. The proviso states that one can only appropriate unowned resources if one leaves enough and as good for others. Where resources are scarce, one cannot legitimately stake a claim to something by annexing one’s labor to it. Neither can one come to own the scarce resource by enhancing its value. If the resource is necessary for the continued well-being of others, then the fact that x was the one who developed or improved the resource does not give x exclusive rights over it. x’s entitlement to reward for her labor is overridden by the entitlement of others to that which is necessary for their survival. **On the libertarian view, there is no morally relevant difference between, say, a farmer who mixes her labor with the land and thereby come to own the results of this interaction (the timber, the harvest, the fruits, etc.) and a medical researcher who mixes her labor with certain chemicals and thereby come to own the results of the interaction (physical objects and an intellectual idea ⁄ formula for an useful drug).** Provided that the farmer and the medical researcher pay heed to the Lockean proviso, they both come to enjoy a strong property right on the objects that result from their mixing their labor with unowned natural resources. **This natural property right is**, moreover, to be **written into the legal framework and enforced by the proper authorities** (police and courts of law). **Libertarians can therefore see trade agreements such as TRIPS as a legitimate legal enforcement of a pre-existing natural ⁄ moral right.**

#### Moral and economic rights go hand-in-hand – authors deserve compensation if others benefit from their work.

Pozzo 06 [Riccardo Pozzo (Professor of History of Philosophy at University of Verona, PhD from Saarland University), “Immanuel Kant on Intellectual Property”, Trans/Form/Ação, v.29(2), 2006, p.11-18] SG \*brackets for gendered language

**The peculiarity of intellectual property consists thus first in being indeed a property, but property of an action; and second in being indeed inalienable, but also transferable in commission and license to a publisher. The bond the author has on [their] his work confers [them]** him **a moral right that is indeed a personal right. It is also a right to exploit economically [their] his work in all possible ways, a right of economic use**, which is a patrimonial right. Kant and Fichte argued that **moral right and the right of economic use are strictly connected**, and that the **offense to one implies inevitably offense to the other.** In eighteenth-century Germany, the free use came into discussion among the presuppositions of a democratic renewal of state and society. In his Supplement to the Consideration of Publishing and Its Rights, Reimarus asked writers “instead of writing for the aristocracy, to write for the tiers état of the reader’s world.” (Reimarus, 1791b, p.595). He saluted with enthusiasm the claim of disenfranchising from the monopoly of English publishers expressed in the American Act for the Encouragement of Learning of May 31, 1790. **Kant**, however, **was firm in embracing intellectual property.** Referring himself to Roman Law, he asked for its legislative formulation not only as patrimonial right, but also as a personal right. In Of the Illegitimity of Pirate Publishing, **he considered the moral faculties related to intellectual property as an “inalienable right** (ius personalissimum) always himself to speak through anyone else, the right, that is, that no one may deliver the same speech to the public other than in his (the author’s) name” (Kant, 1902, t.8, p.85). Fichte went farther in the Demonstration of the Illegitimity of Pirate Publishing. He saw intellectual property as a part of his metaphysical construction of intellectual activity, which was based on the principle that thoughts “are not transmitted hand to hand, they are not paid with shining cash, neither are they transmitted to us if we take home the book that contains them and put it into our library. In order to make those thoughts our own an action is still missing: we must read the book, meditate – provided it is not completely trivial – on its content, consider it under different aspects and eventually accept it within our connections of ideas” (Fichte, 1964, t.I/1, p.411). At the center of the discussion was the practice of reprinting books in a pirate edition after having them reset word after words after an exemplar of the original edition. Given Germany’s division in a myriad of small states, the imperial privilege was ineffective against pirate publishing. **Kant** and Fichte **spoke for the acceptance of the right to defend the work of an author by the usurpations of others so that [they] he may receive a patrimonial advantage from those who utilize the work acquiring new knowledge and/or an aesthetic experience.** In particular, Fichte declared the absolute primacy of the moral faculties within the corpus mysticum. He divided the latter into a formal and a material part. “This intellectual element must be divided anew into what is material, the content of the book, the thoughts it presents; and the form of these thoughts, the manner in which, the connection in which, the formulations and the words by means of which the book presents them” (Fichte, 1964, t.I/1, p.411). Fichte’s underlining the author’s exclusive right to the intellectual content of his book – “the appropriation of which through another is physically impossible” (ibid.) – brought him to the extreme of prohibiting any form of copy that is not meant for personal use.

#### Reducing IP protections arbitrarily coerces pharmaceutical firms and it’s not their obligation to solve the AC’s harms.

Sonderholm 09 [Jorn Sonderholm (Professor with Specific Responsibilities at Aalborg University, Denmark, PhD in Philosophy from the University of St Andrews, UK, director of the Centre for Philosophy and Public Policy (C3P)), “Paying a high price for low costs: why there should be no legal constraints on the profits that can be made on drugs for tropical diseases”, Journal of Medical Ethics, 2009; 35: 315–319, https://jme.bmj.com/content/medethics/35/5/315.full.pdf?casa\_token=b8TNX5kGB\_wAAAAA:zRKPmCqJ-kr3DVtwY2o0SLrIkohVq871eo2UO6mHs3pxLy\_kODqFnzdfqUI3XUnjnXjWKP0vmQj-] SG

It is, however, difficult to see why these people are supposed to take an economic loss. **By allocating resources into the research and development of a treatment for malaria** (an enterprise that is likely to involve high economic risk), **the people with an economic interest in the company responded to a health crisis that existed independently of them. However, the moment the research has proved successful, a special obligation is laid on these people in the sense that they have to take an economic loss whereas the rest of us** (wealthy individuals, governments of developed and/or developing countries and international organisations) **do not have to incur a similar loss. Such a way of distributing the economic burden related to making the treatment available to those who would benefit from it is unfair in itself.** The unfairness of the proposal becomes even more startling when one considers that, **in addition to legally forcing the producer of the malaria treatment** (or, at a more abstract level, the producer of D) to lower the price on the treatment, **there are at least two other ways of fulfilling the victims of malaria’s right to the treatment being available to them** (or, at a more abstract level, the victims of T’s right to D being available to them). **One solution** consists in **creating a fund that buys the expensive drugs from the producers and thereafter distributes it to those who need it.** The resources of this fund will come from contributions made by individuals, governments, charities and international organisations. **Another solution** consists in **letting the governments of those countries that are affected by tropical diseases pay for the drugs.**

#### Coercion isn’t universalisable – willing one’s freedom while violating others’ is a conceptual contradiction.

Engstrom [Stephen Engstrom, (Professor of Philosophy @ the University of Pittsburgh) "Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge" http://www.academia.edu/4512762/Universal\_Legislation\_As\_the\_Form\_of\_Practical\_Knowledge]

Given the preceding considerations, it’s a straightforward matter to see how **a maxim of action that assaults the freedom of others with a view to furthering one’s own ends results in a contradiction when we attempt to will it as a universal law** in accordance with the foregoing account of the formula of universal law. **Such a maxim would lie in a practical judgment that deems it good on the whole to act to limit others’ outer freedom, and hence their self-sufficiency, their capacity to realize their ends**, where doing so augments, or extends, one’s own outer freedom **and** so also **one’s own self-sufficiency**.  Now on the interpretation we’ve been entertaining, applying the formula of universal law involves considering whether it’s possible for every person—every subject capable of practical judgment—to share the practical judgment asserting the goodness of every person’s acting according to the maxim in question. Thus in the present case the application of the formula involves considering whether it’s possible for every person to deem good every person’s acting to limit others’ freedom, where practicable, with a view to augmenting their own freedom. Since here **all persons are on the one hand deeming good both the limitation of others’ freedom and the extension of their own freedom, while on the other hand, insofar as they agree with the similar judgments of others, also deeming good the limitation of their own freedom and the extension of others’ freedom, they are all deeming good both the extension and the limitation of both their own and others’ freedom. These judgments are inconsistent insofar as the extension of a person’s outer freedom is incompatible with the limitation of that same freedom.**

**5 - On their Underview**

1. **The 3 Point - Destroys layering, it doesn’t make sense because they could win the lowest layer in the round, and then real world abuse doesn’t matter.**
2. **The 4 Point – ruins my ability to check abuse, with the 5 point rvi’s on another rvi doesn’t make sense**
3. **The 6-d point: Literally prevents from answering any point in the Underview – its effectively a nib, and it means they can read analytics but I can’t**
4. **The 8 Point – infinite abuse, can read objectively untrue interps that create horrible norms, or untrue definitions that skew the round.**

**Permissability and Presumption**

1. **No its why we don’t believe conspiracy theories, if I told you racism was good, you wouldn’t believe me**
2. **Proactive justif to drink water, presuming things true leads to morally abhorrent conclusions.**