## 1 -New Affs Bad

#### Interpretation—the aff must disclose the plan text, framework, and advantage area 30 minutes before the round. To clarify, disclosure can occur on the wiki or over message.

#### Violation—they didn’t – screenshots.

#### Graphical user interface, text, application, chat or text message Description automatically generated

#### Standards:

#### 1] Neg prep—4 minutes of prep isn’t enough to put together a coherent 1nc or update generics—30 minutes is necessary to learn about the affirmative, piece together what 1nc positions apply, and research their applications to the affirmative.

#### 2] Aff quality—plan text disclosure discourages cheap shot affs. If the aff isn’t inherent or easily defeated by 20 minutes of research, it should lose—this will answer the 1ar’s claim about innovation—with 30 minutes of prep, there’s still an incentive to find a new strategic, well justified aff, but no incentive to cut a horrible, incoherent aff that the neg can’t check against the broader literature.

#### 3] Level playing field – I’m from a small school with 2 entries and no coaching – we have limited prep and disclosure is key to pre-round adaptation. Big schools can collect flows, and craft prep-outs while we’re left in the dark.

#### 4] Strategy – disclosure helps novices understand the context in which positions are read by good debaters and help with brainstorming potential args– helps compensate for lack of prep among small schools.

#### 5] Engagement – Having an idea of what the aff is going to go for means I can read an NC contextual to the round and incentivizes clash.

#### Voters:

#### Fairness – key to objective evaluation and a safe space for all. Debaters wouldn’t compete if the activity wasn’t fair – outweighs educations since debate participation controls the internal link to topic education.

#### Alienation – the neg is uniquely alienating to small-school debaters who will struggle to bid without disclosure which kills equity in the debate space.

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse, b] set better norms for debate and c] we indict the entire advocacy – dta makes no sense.

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices.

#### No 1ar theory –

#### 1] Time skew – Forces me to answer the shell, which distracts from substance – substantive clash is k2 education and 1ar theory distracts from it.

#### 2] Judge intervention – I only have 1 speech to answer it and no 3NR which means that the judge has to intervene and decide if my answers were good enough after taking into account to 2ars lies.

#### 3] Reciprocity – I only have once chance to respond after it is introduced while they have two chances

#### 4] Persuasive spin in the 2ar appeals to judges more ows on judge psychology bc they will always win that debate

**Theory Before K**

1. **Theory is a prerequisite before debaters can access the space and debate the K, it needs to be inclusive**
2. **Procedural Fairness comes first – it’s the only tangible out of round impact – it concerns the debate space itself.** 
   1. **It comes before structural fairness, debaters can’t change their geographic location, but we can change the norms within the space.**
   2. **It’s the only tangible out of round impact cuz affirming doesn’t actually impact the real world – fiat is illusory.**

**2 – Comic Sans Theory**

#### Interp: debaters must use comic sans as their font in their speech docs.

#### Violation – the doc is in calibri

#### Prefer -

#### Inclusion – comic sans is easiest to read for people with dyslexia.

**Hudgins 17** “Hating Comic Sans Is Ableist” Lauren Hudgins Feb 23, 2017 <https://medium.com/the-establishment/hating-comic-sans-is-ableist-bc4a4de87093> OHS-AT

The irregular shapes of the letters in Comic Sans allow her to focus on the individual parts of words. While many fonts use repeated shapes to create different letters, such as a “p” rotated to made a “q,” Comic Sans uses few repeated shapes, creating distinct letters (although it does have a mirrored “b” and “d”). Comic Sans is one of a few typefaces recommended by influential organizations like the British Dyslexia Association and the Dyslexia Association of Ireland. Using Comic Sans has made it possible for Jessica to complete a rigorous program in marine zoology at Bangor University in Wales.

#### To pre-empt the 1AR - the ability to change the font doesn’t solve – it’s ableist to expect them to do something for your aesthetic preference.

**Hudgins 17** “Hating Comic Sans Is Ableist” Lauren Hudgins Feb 23, 2017 <https://medium.com/the-establishment/hating-comic-sans-is-ableist-bc4a4de87093> OHS-AT

In addition, she cannot proofread in a font that’s difficult for her to read. “You cannot fix formatting errors you cannot see!” To her, asking her to change to a font she cannot adequately use “is the epitome of ableism.” Sometimes she can ask someone in her cohort to help her spot errors, but it’s a lot to ask. “I can and have had people in my class look over my work, but you need to understand that we’re not collaborators, they’re my peers. This is an encroachment on their time.”

Asking her to change her font is asking her to take a task that is already very difficult for someone with dyslexia and demanding that she take extra steps to please the aesthetic preferences of someone for whom reading is easy.

#### Inclusion’s an independent voter – you have to be in debate to gain from it and it’s a gateway issue because it ensures everyone benefits from the activity since it’s how people get scholarships, make friends, and improve critical thinking skills

**3 – DA**

#### IP protections motivate innovators to take risks – that triggers tech prolif in medicine and related fields – guarantees long-term development due to continuous incentives.

Bacchus '20 (James Bacchus; James Bacchus is a member of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, the Distinguished University Professor of Global Affairs and director of the Center for Global Economic and Environmental Opportunity at the University of Central Florida. He was a founding judge and was twice the chairman—the chief judge—of the highest court of world trade, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization in Geneva, Switzerland.; 12-16-2020; "An Unnecessary Proposal: A WTO Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights for COVID-19 Vaccines"; https://www.cato.org/free-trade-bulletin/unnecessary-proposal-wto-waiver-intellectual-property-rights-covid-19-vaccines#, Cato Institute, accessed 7-21-2021; JPark)

With the belief that medicines should be “public goods,” there is literally no support in some quarters for the application of the WTO TRIPS Agreement to IP rights in medicines. Any protection of the IP rights in such goods is viewed as a violation of human rights and of the overall public interest. This view, though, does not reflect the practical reality of a world in which many medicines would simply **not exist** if it were not for the existence of IP rights and the protections they are afforded. Technically, IP rights are exceptions to free trade. A long‐​standing general discussion in the WTO has been about when these exceptions to free trade should be allowed and how far they should be extended. The continuing debate over IP rights in medicines is only the most emotional part of this overall conversation. Because developed countries have, historically, been the principal sources of IP rights, this lengthy WTO dispute has largely been between developed countries trying to uphold IP rights and developing countries trying to limit them. The debate over the discovery and the distribution of vaccines for COVID-19 is but the latest global occasion for this ongoing discussion. The primary justification for granting and protecting IP rights is that they are incentives for innovation, which is the main source for long‐​term economic growth and enhancements in the quality of human life. IP rights **spark innovation** by “enabling innovators to capture enough of the benefits of their own innovative activity to justify taking considerable risks.”18 The knowledge from innovations inspired by IP rights spills over to inspire other innovations. The protection of IP rights promotes the diffusion, domestically and internationally, of innovative technologies and new know‐​how. Historically, the principal factors of production have been land, labor, and capital. In the new pandemic world, perhaps an even more vital factor is the creation of knowledge, which adds enormously to “the wealth of nations.” Digital and other economic growth in the 21st century is increasingly ideas‐​based and knowledge intensive. Without IP rights as incentives, there would be less new knowledge and thus less innovation. In the short term, undermining private IP rights may accelerate distribution of goods and services—where the novel knowledge that went into making them **already exists**. But in the **long term**, undermining private IP rights would **eliminate** the **incentives** that inspire innovation, thus preventing the discovery and development of knowledge for new goods and services that **the world needs**. This widespread dismissal of the link between private IP rights and innovation is perhaps best reflected in the fact that although the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 aspire to “foster innovation,” they make no mention of IP rights.19

#### Pharmaceutical innovation is key to protecting against future pandemics, bioterrorism, and antibiotic resistance.

Marjanovic and Fejiao ‘20 Marjanovic, Sonja, and Carolina Feijao. Sonja Marjanovic, Ph.D., Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. Carolina Feijao, Ph.D. in biochemistry, University of Cambridge; M.Sc. in quantitive biology, Imperial College London; B.Sc. in biology, University of Lisbon. "Pharmaceutical Innovation for Infectious Disease Management: From Troubleshooting to Sustainable Models of Engagement." (2020). [Quality Control]

As key actors in the healthcare innovation landscape, pharmaceutical and life sci-ences companies have been called on to develop medicines, vaccines and diagnostics for pressing public health challenges. The COVID-19 crisis is one such challenge, but there are many others. For example, MERS, SARS, Ebola, Zika and avian and swine flu are also infectious diseases that represent public health threats. Infectious agents such as anthrax, smallpox and tularemia could present threats in a **bioterrorism con-text**.1 The general threat to public health that is posed by **antimicrobial resistance** is also **well-recognised** as an area **in need of pharmaceutical innovation**. Innovating in response to these challenges does not always align well with pharmaceutical industry commercial models, shareholder expectations and compe-tition within the industry. However, the expertise, networks and infrastructure that industry has within its reach, as well as public expectations and the moral imperative, make pharmaceutical companies and the wider life sciences sector an **indispensable** partner in the search for solutions that save lives. This perspective argues for the need to establish more sustainable and scalable ways of incentivising pharmaceu-tical innovation in response to infectious disease threats to public health. It considers both past and current examples of efforts to mobilise pharmaceutical innovation in high commercial risk areas, including in the context of current efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. In global pandemic crises like COVID-19, the urgency and scale of the crisis – as well as the spotlight placed on pharmaceutical companies – mean that contributing to the search for effective medicines, vaccines or diagnostics is **essential** for socially responsible companies in the sec-tor.2 It is therefore unsurprising that we are seeing indus-try-wide efforts unfold at unprecedented scale and pace. Whereas there is always scope for more activity, industry is currently contributing in a variety of ways. Examples include pharmaceutical companies donating existing com-pounds to assess their utility in the fight against COVID-19; screening existing compound libraries in-house or with partners to see if they can be repurposed; accelerating tri-als for potentially effective medicine or vaccine candidates; and in some cases rapidly accelerating in-house research and development to discover new treatments or vaccine agents and develop diagnostics tests.3,4 Pharmaceutical companies are collaborating with each other in some of these efforts and participating in global R&D partnerships (such as the Innovative Medicines Initiative effort to accel-erate the development of potential therapies for COVID-19) and supporting national efforts to expand diagnosis and testing capacity and ensure affordable and ready access to potential solutions.3,5,6 The primary purpose of such innovation is to **benefit patients** and wider **population health**. Although there are also reputational benefits from involvement that can be realised across the industry, there are likely to be rela-tively few companies that are ‘commercial’ winners. Those who might gain substantial revenues will be under pres-sure not to be seen as profiting from the pandemic. In the United Kingdom for example, GSK has stated that it does not expect to profit from its COVID-19 related activities and that any gains will be invested in supporting research and long-term pandemic preparedness, as well as in developing products that would be affordable in the world’s poorest countries.7 Similarly, in the United States AbbVie has waived intellectual property rights for an existing com-bination product that is being tested for therapeutic poten-tial against COVID-19, which would support affordability and allow for a supply of generics.8,9 Johnson & Johnson has stated that its potential vaccine – which is expected to begin trials – will be available on a not-for-profit basis during the pandemic.10 Pharma is mobilising substantial efforts to rise to the COVID-19 challenge at hand. However, we need to consider how pharmaceutical innovation for responding to emerging infectious diseases can best be enabled beyond the current crisis. Many public health threats (including those associated with other **infectious diseases**, **bioterror-ism** agents **and antimicrobial resistance**) are **urgently in need of pharmaceutical innovation**, **even if their impacts are not as visible** to society **as COVID**-19 is in the imme-diate term. The pharmaceutical industry has responded to previous public health emergencies associated with infec-tious disease in recent times – for example those associated with Ebola and Zika outbreaks.11 However, it has done so to a lesser scale than for COVID-19 and with contribu-tions from fewer companies. Similarly, levels of activity in response to the threat of antimicrobial resistance are still **low**.12 There are important policy questions as to whether – and how – industry could engage with such public health threats to an even greater extent under improved innova-tion conditions.

#### Bioterror is the largest medical threat—it outweighs natural pandemics

Bakerlee ‘21 Chris Bakerlee is a Ph.D. candidate studying evolutionary genetics at Harvard University and a fellow in the Council on Strategic Risks’s Fellowship for Ending Bioweapons Programs. "Mother Nature is not 'the ultimate bioterrorist' - STAT." STAT, 8 Jan. 2021, www.statnews.com/2021/01/08/mother-nature-is-not-the-ultimate-bioterrorist. [Quality Control]

Taken together, these examples show that this meme no longer serves us well. It is undoubtedly a **mistake** to underestimate the **threats from natural pathogens**. At the same time, it is equally unwise to wield this 19-year-old expression like a magic wand, intending to briskly banish concerns about people causing harm with biology. We can’t afford to blind ourselves or others to the uncomfortable truth that, with each passing day, humans grow more capable of outdoing nature and harnessing biotechnology **to cause harm on a staggering scale**, by either cruelty or carelessness. Nature has no interests, motives, or political goals. To the extent it can be said to “want” anything, it is to perpetually enhance populations’ differential reproductive success, which only rarely aligns with causing greater harm to humans. Notably, the trillions of bacteria living in the average human’s colon appear to have adapted toward a peaceful and often mutually beneficial coexistence with their host. And even deadly pathogens may theoretically evolve toward making humans less sick if doing so opens up more opportunities for transmission between hosts. The process of natural selection, for all its power, is highly constrained in its ability to generate “superbugs” possessing a diabolical suite of traits. Like human bioengineers, natural selection must work around stubborn physiological trade-offs between traits, such as genome replication rate and mutation rate. But natural selection is also handicapped by near-sightedness, driving improvements in traits that enhance a population’s fitness in its current environment with **no attention to** maintaining or improving **traits that enhance fitness in other environments**. If creating an especially deadly pathogen were like winning a soccer match against a formidable opponent, natural selection would be competing with all the cunning of **a**n especially persistent **horde of 5-year-olds**, glued to the ball and only ever capable of playing offense, defense, or goalie at any one time. By contrast, modern **biologists are gaining the ability to see the whole field**, develop an intuition about where the ball will be next, and play multiple positions simultaneously. Through a combination of rational design, directed evolution, breeding, and brute force trial and error, they can increasingly engineer organisms that excel in multiple desired functions at once, such as the ability to grow quickly in a massive industrial fermenter while churning out commercially valuable biomolecules. This growing capability promises tremendous benefits for agriculture, industry, and human health, but its potential application to the creation of pathogens **poses serious concerns**. It is worth emphasizing that trained biologists — let alone terrorists — still have difficulty one-upping natural selection’s creative output. Our understanding of biology is very much in its infancy. Yet our knowledge and capabilities are maturing rapidly, as evidenced by Twist’s prolific gene synthesis capabilities, along with recent feats in predicting protein structure, gene editing, and genome assembly. We are much closer to this exciting but frightening horizon today than we were in 2001, and this trend will likely persist. It’s also worth noting that, when it comes to weapons-grade biotechnology, states likely pose a greater risk than non-state terrorists. States have vastly more resources to support the development of biological weapons, and about **23 are known or suspected to have** maintained **biological weapons** programs in the 20th century. Some programs, like North Korea’s, likely persist to this day. As countries jockey for advantage, state biological weapons programs remain an ever-present danger, despite the treaties and export controls designed to rein them in. Covid-19, which has exposed countries’ **vulnerability to biological threats**, has done little to mitigate this danger. **Accidental releases pose** an **additional** source of **anthropogenic biorisk.** Thanks to the U.S. government’s monitoring program, we know that **dozens of agents** and toxins with the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and agriculture **are** reported **accidentally lost or released** from U.S. labs **every year**. We also know that accidental releases around the world have already caused significant harm. Such risks increase as biotechnology expands across the world and gains in strength. Biotechnology, with all its promise and peril, is moving fast. It’s irresponsible of us to shrug off current and emerging biotechnological threats by reciting “Nature is the ultimate bioterrorist” like some article of faith. As with global warming, the cost of willful ignorance and inaction is high — and increasing. Our health security requires that we engage cautiously but honestly with the full spectrum of evolving biological risks, striving toward solutions with open eyes and moral courage.

#### Bioterrorism leads to extinction – modern technologies can be used to isolate deadly pathogens and target vast populations.

Kellman ‘08 (Barry, Professor of Law, Director, International Weapons Control Center, International Human Rights Law Institute @ DePaul U., Futurist, May 2008, “Bioviolence: A Growing Threat,” http://www.britannica.com/bps/additionalcontent/18/31535413/Bioviolence-A-Growing-Threat)

According to the National Academies of Science, "The threat spectrum is broad and evolving – in some ways predictably, in other ways unexpectedly. In the future, genetic engineering and other technologies may lead to the development of pathogenic organisms with unique, unpredictable characteristics." For as far into the future as we can possibly see, every passing day it be- comes slightly easier to commit a vio lent catastrophe than it was the day before. Indeed, the rapid pace of advancing science helps explain why policies to prevent such a catastrophe are so complicated. Bioviolence Jihad? Some experts argue that terrorists and fanatics are not interested in bio- violence and that the danger might therefore be overblown. Since there have been no catastrophic bioviolence attacks, these experts argue, terrorists lack the intention to make bioweapons. Hopefully, they are correct. But an enormous amount of evidence suggests they are wrong**. From the dawn of biology's ability to isolate pathogens, people have pursued hostile applications** of biological agents. It is perilous to ignore this extensive history by presuming that today's villains are not fervent about weaponizing disease. Not a single state admits to having a bioweapons program, but U.S. intelligence officials assert that as many as **10 states** might have active programs, including North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Moreover, many **terrorist organizations have expressed interest** in acquiring biological weapons. Whatever weight the taboo against inflicting disease might have for nation-states, it is obviously irrelevant to terrorists, criminals, and lunatics. Deterrence by threat of retaliation is essentially meaningless for groups with suicidal inclinations who are likely to intermingle with innocent civilians. Al-Qaeda and affiliated Islamic fundamentalist organizations have abling them to spread in regions where there is no natural immunity. The **polio** virus **has been synthesized from scratch**; its creators called it an "animate chemical." Soon, it may be resynthesized into a form that is contagious even **among vaccinated populations**. Recreation of long-eradicated livestock diseases could **ravage herds** severely lacking in genetic diversity, **damage food supplies, and cause devastating economic losses**. Perhaps the greatest biothreat is the manipulation of the flu and other highly contagious viruses, such as Ebola. Today, scientists can change parts of a virus's genetic material so that it can perform specific functions. The genomic sequence of the Spanish flu virus that killed upwards of 40 million people nearly a century ago has been widely published; **any** savvy **scientist could reconstruct it**. The avian flu is even more lethal, albeit not readily contagious via casual aerosol delivery. A malevolent bio- scientist might augment its contagiousness. The Ebola virus might be manipulated so that it kills more slowly, allowing it to be spread farther before its debilitating effects al- together consume its carrier. A bit further off is genetic manipulation of the measles virus--one of the great killers in human history--rendering useless the immunizations that most of us receive in early childhood. Soon, laboratory resynthesis of smallpox may be possible. Advanced drug delivery systems can be used to **disseminate lethal agents to broad populations**. Bio- regulators--small organic compounds that modify body systems-- could enhance targeted delivery technologies. Some experts are concerned that new weapons could be aimed at the immune, neurological, and neuroendocrine systems. Nanotechnology that lends itself to mechanisms for advanced disease detection and drug delivery--such as gold nanotubes that can administer drugs directly into a tumor--could also de- liver weaponized agents deep into the body, substantially raising the weapon's effectiveness. Altogether, techniques that were on the frontiers of science only a dec- ade or two ago are rapidly mutating A looming danger confronts the world--the threat of bioviolence. It is a danger that will only grow in the future, yet we are increasingly failing to confront it. With every passing day, committing a biocatastrophe becomes a bit easier, and this condition will perpetuate for as long as science progresses. Biological warfare is as old as conflict, of course, but in terms of the objectives of traditional warfare-- gaining territory or resources, compelling the surrender of an opposing army--biological weapons weren't very effective. If the objective is to inflict mass death and panic on a mixed population, however, emerg- ing bioweapons offer remarkable potential. We would be irresponsible to presume that radical jihadists like al- Qaeda have ignored said potential.

Prioritizing critique in the face of the death is the least ethical option

**Isaac 02** – Professor of political science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, phd from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of “aggression” but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime—the Taliban—that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most “peace” activists would prefer not to ask: what should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddamn Hussein or a Milosevic or a Taliban regime—the Taliban—that rose to power through brutality and repression. What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminal to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important: they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility/ here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality.

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught. An unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) it fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing, but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters: (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness: it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion- pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect: and (3) it fai

ls to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions: it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, this is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism on the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic: it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

**4 – the K**

**Theory of Power is wrong – extemp**

**Alt fails**

**Perm Alt**