## 1

#### Interp: debaters must use comic sans as their font in their speech docs.

#### Violation – the doc is in calibri

#### Prefer -

#### Inclusion – comic sans is easiest to read for people with dyslexia.

**Hudgins 17** “Hating Comic Sans Is Ableist” Lauren Hudgins Feb 23, 2017 <https://medium.com/the-establishment/hating-comic-sans-is-ableist-bc4a4de87093> OHS-AT

The irregular shapes of the letters in Comic Sans allow her to focus on the individual parts of words. While many fonts use repeated shapes to create different letters, such as a “p” rotated to made a “q,” Comic Sans uses few repeated shapes, creating distinct letters (although it does have a mirrored “b” and “d”). Comic Sans is one of a few typefaces recommended by influential organizations like the British Dyslexia Association and the Dyslexia Association of Ireland. Using Comic Sans has made it possible for Jessica to complete a rigorous program in marine zoology at Bangor University in Wales.

#### To pre-empt the 1AR - the ability to change the font doesn’t solve – it’s ableist to expect them to do something for your aesthetic preference.

**Hudgins 17** “Hating Comic Sans Is Ableist” Lauren Hudgins Feb 23, 2017 <https://medium.com/the-establishment/hating-comic-sans-is-ableist-bc4a4de87093> OHS-AT

In addition, she cannot proofread in a font that’s difficult for her to read. “You cannot fix formatting errors you cannot see!” To her, asking her to change to a font she cannot adequately use “is the epitome of ableism.” Sometimes she can ask someone in her cohort to help her spot errors, but it’s a lot to ask. “I can and have had people in my class look over my work, but you need to understand that we’re not collaborators, they’re my peers. This is an encroachment on their time.”

Asking her to change her font is asking her to take a task that is already very difficult for someone with dyslexia and demanding that she take extra steps to please the aesthetic preferences of someone for whom reading is easy.

**Inclusion’s an independent voter – you have to be in debate to gain from it and it’s a gateway issue because it ensures everyone benefits from the activity since it’s how people get scholarships, make friends, and improve critical thinking skills**

**Drop the debater – a) they have a 7-6 rebuttal advantage and the 2ar to make args I can’t respond to, b) it deters future abuse and sets a positive norm.**

**Use competing interps – a) reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since we don’t know your bs meter, b) collapses to competing interps – we justify 2 brightlines under an offense defense paradigm just like 2 interps.**

**No RVIs – a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance, b) norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms, c) chilling effect – forces you to split your 2AR so you can’t collapse and misconstrue the 2NR, d) topic ed – prevents 1AR blipstorm scripts and allows us to get back to substance after resolving theory**

## 2

#### Strikes re-entrench capitalist power relations and don’t solve for the root cause of the issues of inequality

**Eidlin 20** Eidlin, Barry. “Why Unions Are Good - but Not Good Enough.” *Jacobin*, 1 June 2020, [https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/01/marxism-trade-unions-socialism-revolutionary-organizing. //](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/01/marxism-trade-unions-socialism-revolutionary-organizing.%20//) FC

Labor unions have long occupied a paradoxical position within Marxist theory. They are an essential expression of the working class taking shape as a collective actor and an essential vehicle for working-class action. When we speak of “the working class” or “working-class activity,” we are often analyzing the actions of workers either organized into unions or trying to organize themselves into unions.

At the same time, unions are an imperfect and incomplete vehicle for the working class to achieve one of Marxist theory’s central goals: overthrowing capitalism. Unions by their very existence affirm and reinforce capitalist class society. As organizations which primarily negotiate wages, benefits, and working conditions with employers, unions only exist in relation to capitalists. This makes them almost by definition reformist institutions, designed to mitigate and manage the employment relationship, not transform it.

#### The government’s recognition of strikes is a ploy to control them, taking away power from the workers

[Crépon](javascript:;) **and Bez 19** Crépon, Marc, and Micol Bez. “The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter Benjamin's ‘toward the Critique of Violence.’” *Critical Times*, vol. 2, no. 2, 2019, pp. 252–260., [https://doi.org/10.1215/26410478-7708331. //](https://doi.org/10.1215/26410478-7708331.%20//) FC

In other words, nothing would endanger the law more than the possibility of its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control. The function of the law would therefore be, first and foremost, to contain violence within its own boundaries. It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis, Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war.

Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within class struggle. To begin with, the very idea of such a struggle implies certain forms of violence. The strike could then be understood as one of the recognizable forms that this violence can take. However, this analytical framework is undermined as soon as this form of violence becomes regulated by a “right to strike,” such as the one recognized by law in France in 1864. What this recognition engages is, in fact, the will of the state to control the possible “violence” of the strike. Thus, the “right” of the right to strike appears as the best, if not the only, way for the state to circumscribe within (and via) the law the relative violence of class struggles. We might consider this to be the perfect illustration of the aforementioned hypothesis. Yet, there are two lines of questioning that destabilize this hypothesis that we would do well to consider.

#### State practices are consistently defined by a protection of ruling class interests – reforms lend legitimacy to a corrupt apparatus that has empirically refused any meaningful restraint on its power

Tigar 2014 (Michael, emeritus professor of the Duke Law School and American University, Washington College of Law, “The National Security State: The End of Separation of Powers,” *Monthly Review*, 66:3, July/August, <http://monthlyreview.org/2014/07/01/the-national-security-state/>)

No one could sensibly claim that these principles of transparency and accountability were uniformly applied in the decades after they were first formulated. These were promises that the new regime made to the people generally. As promises, they were hedged about with limitations and conditions at the outset, and then in practice proved to be difficult to enforce. These were promises fashioned as instruments of bourgeois state power, setting out an idea that the state would stand as neutral guardian of principle, when in fact it was prepared to act as an instrument of social control. But while the promises could never be wholly realized, keeping them gave state power its perceived legitimacy. That, in general terms, is the way of parliamentary democracy. Organs of state power remain open to influence; a set of declared rights is more or less guaranteed. It is not, therefore, surprising that Chief Justice Marshall himself wrote the Supreme Court opinions that denied judicial review to Native Americans and African slaves. After all, the Constitution itself accepted the institution of slavery and provided that: “Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.” That is, a slave was three‐fifths of a person for the purpose of allocating Congressional seats, though without a vote or any of the political rights defined in the Constitution. Native Americans did not exist for purposes of taxes and representation, although the Congress would certainly legislate as to their status. In the early nineteenth century, Native Americans sought to assert their rights. As I wrote in Law & the Rise of Capitalism: The Cherokee Nation of Georgia adopted a written constitution and asserted sovereignty over its land. The Georgia legislature responded by declaring Cherokee laws and customs void and opening Cherokee land to settlement. The federal Congress, at the urging of President Andrew Jackson, passed legislation seeking to compel Native Americans to give up and move westward. Georgia authorities arrested, tried, and hanged a Cherokee for an offense allegedly committed on Cherokee territory. The Cherokee Nation sought relief in the courts. They were, after all, a nation. They sought to restrain the enforcement of Georgia laws which “go directly to annihilate the Cherokees as a political society, and to seize, for the use of Georgia, the lands of the nation which have been assured to them by the United States in solemn treaties repeatedly made and still in force.” The Cherokees’ lawyer invoked the Supreme Court’s power, saying that the lawsuit was between a foreign nation—the Cherokee— and the state of Georgia. Under the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court could exercise its original jurisdiction over such a lawsuit without waiting for lower courts to decide it and then hearing the case on appeal. Chief Justice Marshall looked to the constitutional grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce with “foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” He found the Cherokee to be “a domestic, dependent nation” that was “in a state of pupilage,” like “that of a ward to his guardian.” It was not, he said, for the Court a true “foreign nation.” Thus, the Cherokee Nation had no legal existence. It could not even come to a federal court to vindicate its treaty rights. The Supreme Court decided Cherokee Nation v. Georgia in 1830, over the dissents of Justices Story and Thompson. Two years later, in Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall retreated a bit, and held that Georgia did not have the right to regulate activities on the Cherokee lands. He did not reach this result by recognizing the position of the Cherokee Nation, but by denying the right of a state such as Georgia to interfere in matters that are essentially federal. That is, the national government had the constitutional power to deal with Native Americans and the states had only a limited role to play. Marshall spoke for the Supreme Court on the issue of slavery in an 1825 case, The Antelope. The Constitution had forbidden Congress to regulate importation of “persons” until 1808. In a statute that took effect January 1, 1808, the Congress prohibited importation of slaves. Nonetheless, the slave trade continued, and in 1820, a U.S. coast guard vessel boarded and seized a ship, The Antelope, that was carrying 225 African slaves. The Antelope was taken into port on suspicion that the slaves were destined to be imported into the United States. Here was a chance for Marshall, who acknowledged that slavery was “contrary to the laws of nature,” to translate this sense of injustice into a judicial command. However, he noted that “Christian and civilized” nations still engaged in the slave trade and that it could not therefore be said to be unlawful; the slaves were not to be set free but rather returned to their owners. Marshall’s failure to find controlling international law is the more surprising because the United States had agreed in the 1814 Treaty of Ghent to seek an end to the international slave trade. For Marshall and his colleagues on the Supreme Court, Native Americans did not exist as holders or bearers of rights, and the status of slavery was not an issue that the law could address. To complete the story, one must note the Court’s 1841 decision in The Amistad. Between 1825 and 1841, treaties and customary international law had shifted the legal landscape. The Amistad was a Spanish ship carrying forty‐nine slaves. The slaves took command of the ship, which eventually anchored off Long Island. The legal proceedings eventually reached the Supreme Court. The Spanish and British governments tried to exercise influence on the case: the British said that the capture of the slaves in Africa violated a treaty between Britain and Spain. Spain said the slaves were property and should be returned. The Supreme Court argument, led by John Quincy Adams, stressed that judicial review and not executive branch concerns should be the guiding principle of decision. On March 9, 1841, Justice Story delivered the Supreme Court’s opinion holding that the slaves must be freed. Any hope that was kindled by the Amistad decision was extinguished by the Dred Scott decision in 1857. The Supreme Court’s decision that Dred Scott was not entitled to freedom from slavery despite having been taken into free territory was based upon an assertion that echoed the rationale of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. African slaves and their descendants could not be “citizens” of any state and were therefore not entitled to be heard in federal court. They were, the Court said, “beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations, and so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.” That is, it was not only the political institution of slavery that forbade judicial review, but a theory that those of African descent were inferior beings destined to be ruled without voice as to their condition. Chief Justice Taney, who wrote the majority opinion, and President James Buchanan, who was given advance notice of what the Court would do, thought that the Dred Scott decision would end the controversy about slavery. Of course, it did nothing of the kind, but rather made a military solution inevitable. Thus, in 1857, for white male citizens, judicial review of governmental action was presumptively available. However, judicial review stopped short when a litigant challenged a system of social relations. The conquest and subjugation of Native Americans was a fundamental tenet of British, French, Spanish, and then U.S. occupation of the Eastern seaboard and then of Westward expansion. By definition Native Americans were not to be considered as bearers of rights that could be enforced against the state. And Taney’s statement came at the end of a long pseudo‐historical analysis that justified the institution of slavery as a part of the social fabric. T h e S e p a r a t i o n o f P o w e r s A f t e r 1 8 5 7 The Civil War amendments to the Constitution abolished slavery and provided for equal protection of the laws. It would be nearly a century before the promise of those amendments began to be fulfilled by the Supreme Court. For African‐Americans, the Court’s ruling in Brown v. Board of Education recognized the promise that the 14th Amendment equal protection clause indisputably made. The Marbury‐Gilchrist‐Burr model, as limited in Cherokee Nation and Dred Scott, posits a right of access to review of governmental action. Presumptively, the courts will provide review. In a narrow class of cases, that review must be obtained through a political process. Nobody can rationally claim that either of these avenues of redress is efficient. Most of the significant cases about “rights” have been brought and litigated by labor, civil rights, and civil liberties organizations—the cost of what passes for justice is too great for most people. Of course, those who wind up in court testing their rights as criminal defendants will have counsel provided but the deficiencies of that system are well‐known. The electoral political process is dominated by money, and is in many ways impossibly corrupt. The point, however, is that the state has assiduously maintained the fiction that both of these avenues of redress are in fact viable. In order for this fiction to have any semblance of credibility, the institutions of redress must be seen to have some utility. The lawyer for the oppressed points to the promises and principles in the legal ideology of the dominant class, and argues for their application in ways that may contradict the interests of that class. Significant victories have been won for workers, women, people of color, political dissidents, and gay and lesbian people—in the judicial, executive, and legislative arenas. The courtroom battles for these rights produced significant victories in the 1950s, ‘60s, and ‘70s, and helped to empower movements for social change. In the midst of these battles, there were disturbing signs that Patrick Henry’s forebodings—a President at the head of an army, and therefore indisposed to heed the commands of a Chief Justice—would be realized. And what if a President’s refusal to “do what Mr. Chief Justice will order him” was a problem compounded by Mr. Chief Justice’s timidity and moral obliquity? That is, what if Mr. Chief Justice—in the pattern of Marshall in Cherokee Nation or Taney in Dred Scott—were to acquiesce in declaring a “no law” zone because of the character of a claim or of the claimant? In such a case, the structure of separation of powers might crumble, not by conquest—but by surrender. By way of example, the Supreme Court upheld the internment of Japanese‐Americans during the Second World War, yielding to an exercise of Presidential power that was later held to have been improper and based upon false assumptions. Some of the Court’s decisions on freedom of expression and association during the Cold War period failed to respect freedoms of speech and association. Yet, there were bright spots, as when the Supreme Court upheld the academic freedom of Monthly Review editor Paul Sweezy. The years since September 11, 2001, have witnessed a significant shift in the role of the executive and judicial branches. In the militarized national security state, the dismantling of the constitutional separation of powers has largely come to pass. We can see how this has happened, as a matter of state power and legal ideology. Two legal devices have been deployed to shut off accountability for governmental wrongdoing. The first of these is a judicially created doctrine of non‐decision—the “political question doctrine.” The second is the state secrets privilege, the invocation of which forestalls all accountability because the rationale and details of government conduct are hidden from public view. Let us examine these in turn.

#### Capitalism is a silent genocide-millions die every year but we never see it because we never look at structural conditions that cause violence

Heft 14 (Peter Heft has a B.A. in philosophy from Denison Unversity, May 2 2014, “Attempting the Impossible: Calculating Capitalism’s Death Toll”, Guerilla Ontologies, <http://guerrillaontologies.com/2014/05/attempting-the-impossible-calculating-capitalisms-death-toll/>, Accessed 7-7-18)

So now to the main point of this post – to try to create a list of the number of victims that have fallen prey to global capitalism. Before I continue however, an important note must be made: unlike the death tolls associated with Communism (which are caused by regimes themselves), the deaths caused by capitalism are usually the result of capitalist constructions, be they systemic poverty, imperialism, Atlantic and post-Atlantic slavery, etc. In order to head off any potential critiques of this post when I mention things like “Hurricane Katrina” or “Poverty in the US” for example, I will be explaining how each of the incidents in question can be attributed to capitalism (both in neo-liberal capitalism or strict corporate capitalism). Another thing I must note is that anarcho-Capitalists will be quick to say “well, it’s the fact that the government was involved – that’s the issue!”. However this is not true. The “for profit” logic of capitalism has both lead to the following atrocities and has been used by governments, overtly or not, to commit the following crimes. So yes, governments may have done the following, but the logic and justification behind capitalism has created the conditions for the following. And finally, as one last kick to anarcho-Capitalists, anarcho-Capitalism has never been implemented and thus there is no body count for that, but full Communism a la Marx hasn’t either. According to Marx, there will be an “end of history” wherein the state withers away and that is pure Communism, the rest is State Communism (much like State Capitalism) or Socialism. Two can play at the “it’s never been implemented, wahhhh!!1!” game. So, let’s begin. A fitting place to start would be the history of the United States from 2014 all the way back to 1776. Just to set up the framework, I will state a topic, in this case the United States, and then create bullet points with the issues in question and explaining them as needed. The United States 5 years of drone strikes used to maintain US military dominance in the Middle East for the purpose of securing trade routes and oil reserves – 2,400 dead [11][12] Syrian Civil War caused by the US’ funding of Syrian rebels as well as the terrorist organization Al Nusra in an attempt to overthrow the Syrian government [13][14][15][16] – at least 146,000 dead [17][18] US Funded and NAT:O Intervention in Libya for the sake of overthrowing the government and getting oil [19][20][21] – estimates range from 10,000 by the deniers, to 50,000 by the rebels. The commonly accepted number by the US is 30,000 dead [22][23] United States backed government of Sri Lanka for the sake of maintaining trade routes and neo-liberal foothold in southern Asia – 100,000 dead (some sources say 40,000 not including the huge numbers of civilians) [24][25] The War in Iraq which was for the sake of gaining oil controlling petroleum exports [26][27] and with the interest of advancing US imperialism [28] – most recent study indicates 500,000 dead Iraqis and 4,500 dead US soldiers [29][30][31] The War in Afghanistan – 2,000 dead US soldiers and 20,000 civilians [32][33] US bombing of Pakistan for the War on Terror and to maintain our imperial dominance abroad – 50,000 dead [34] US and Mexican War on Drugs to maintain a monopoly and to support military spending as well as drug cartel violence for profit – 47,000 dead [35] Operation Desert Storm (First Gulf War) which was for the sake of maintaining dominance in the Middle East as well as for imperialistic reasons [36][37][38][39] – 158,000 Iraqis [40] – 75,000 US Soldiers dead from the War and [Gulf War Syndrome](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War_syndrome) [41] US Sanctions against Iraq from 1990-2012 – 3,300,000 [42] Iran-Iraq War where the United States funded both sides in an attempt to have each wipe the other out – about 1,500,000 [43][44][45] The War in Vietnam to “beat Communism” and maintain an Asian sphere of influence – 3,800,000 Vietnamese between 1955-1984 [46] about 58,000 US soldiers [47] about 200,000 in Laos [48] about 300,000 in Cambodia [49] it’s hard to calculate Agent Orange deaths but up to 4,800,000 people were exposed [50] and 100,000 US soldiers killed themselves [51] Korean War to “beat Communism” and maintain dominance in Asia – 54,000 US soldiers[52] and about 5,000,000 Koreans died [53] The United States in Latin America and the Third World “El Bloqueo” AKA. The Cuban Embargo – one of the more insidious forms of siege warfare of modernity [54][55] – this is one of the more difficult numbers to come up with so I will give you what I have and then add a commentary – 47,000 children dead [56] and the Embargo has stifled medical technology and lead to the deaths of tons more. The numbers are uncalculatable [57]. Here are some statistics: As a result, in a few years the effects on consumption by the general population were in evidence: daily caloric consumption, for example, dropped 34 percent, and protein intake plummeted 40 percent between 1989 and the worst year of the crisis, 1993. [58] What’s worse, the Embargo is NOT aimed at the elites, but at the civilians of Cuba. The elites are isolated from the effects and so the poorest of the poor see the impacts. [55][58][59] To me, El Bloqueo is one of most heinous crimes the United States has engaged in. Former CIA Station Chief in Angola in 1976, covert agent, and the highest level CIA officer to testify to Congress, John Stockwell, tells a grisly tale of US involvement in foreign countries for the sake of money and geopolitics. He cites covert operations in Nicaragua, Panama, Guatemala, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba, to name a few. Over the course of his testimony and lecture he extensively researched the actions he was involved in and figured out that given the bombings of water supplies and other essential infrastructure, the invasions, the coups, etc. in third world countries, the United States, on its quest for empire, has been responsible for 6,000,000 deaths. Just let that soak in. According to the official story of the Holocaust, that’s how many Jews were killed. This is an unheard genocide against the third world FOR PROFIT and FOR POWER.[60] If you read nothing else or watch nothing else, [read/watch his lecture.](http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article4068.htm) Genocides and Other Mass Deaths Poverty. One of the most overlooked causes of death today is something called “structural violence” – that is, violence against the bottom rungs of society in order to make a profit. Structural violence can occur due to lack of medical care, slashing of wages, gentrification, etc. But without a doubt, structural violence is the largest killer WORLDWIDE. Studies performed by Canadian researches Gernot Kohler and Norman Alcock published under the title “An Empirical Table of Structural Violence” found that 18,000,000 people die each year due to systemic poverty [61][62]. To put this into perspective, allow me to quote professor of Psychiatry [James Gilligan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Gilligan) (emphasis is my own): Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths, including those by genocide—or about eight million per year, 1939-1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-66 (perhaps 575,000) deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (232 million), it was clear that even war cannot begin to compare with structural violence, which continues year after year. In other words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide, perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. [62] This is recurring violence that happens year after year after year, the scale of which is unprecedented. Hell, if one takes Rummel’s and The Black Book of Communism’s claims seriously, structural violence has killed more people in JUST the 21st century, than Communism. The Genocide of the Native Americans – according to professor of ethics [Ward Churchill](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ward_Churchill), over 10,000,000 Native Americans were slaughtered [63] and other studies by historian and professor [David Stannard](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Stannard) indicate that the number is closer to 100,000,000 if one includes South America (Churchill only looks at North America). \*To avoid any conflict, I will split the difference in my final calculation and use 50,000,000 [64] Slavery (not just White slavery) – over 1200 years of Arab slave trading and then 500 years of European slave trading amounts to over 100,000,000 people enslaved and killed(there were about 80,000,000 that would just be slaves)[65] Children Killed by Preventable Diseases yearly – 5,000,000 [66] Children Killed by Hunger daily – 17,000 (multiplying to get a year so 17,000\*365=6,205,000) [67] And I have left off a thousand tiny events like factories collapsing due to unsafe regulations, Hurricane Katrina, the rape of women in Maquiladoras, and I even left off the two World Wars so there will be no debate about whether those were capitalism vs. communism. But the fact of the matter is, the sheer number of people that have died due to unseen violence and structural violence over the years is obscene. But all one has to do is look at the data and look at the world around you. Ignoring other big wars due to capitalism and only focusing on US action and only including one year for things that are systemic (ie. poverty), which is being really damn conservative because Japan engaged in brutal imperialism, we get a total of 205,000,000 killed directly or indirectly because of capitalism. So please, before you go waving Rummel around or you throw around “look how many people Communism killed!!”, think for a second and look at the data. Note: This is by no means a complete list and I, just like everyone else, am prone to errors. But I feel like the fact that every number is sourced at least once and easily verifiable speaks for itself. If you have an issue, please let me know.

#### Thus, the role of the ballot is to break down capitalist structures of power.

#### The alternative is communist organizing. The question is not about degrees of shared concern, but the direction of our political energies.

Thomas 13 (Peter, Lectures in the History of Political Thought at Brunel University, London “The Communist Hypothesis and the Question of Organization” *Theory & Event* 16, no. 4 muse.jhu.edu/article/530491)

The Communist Hypothesis The debate on the 'Idea of Communism' that emerged in 2008 following Alain Badiou's analysis of the electoral victory of Sarkozy, drawing upon a longer history of vindications of communism over the last 30 years, was quickly greeted with enthusiasm by prominent theorists from a wide range of leftist political traditions.1 This discussion also seems to have stimulated a renewal of the energy and engagement that had marked the most creative dimensions of the alternative globalization and anti-war movements straddling the millennium. After the impasses those movements confronted in what was sometimes seen as an 'interregnum' at the beginning of the global economic crisis,2 the affirmation of the 'Idea of Communism' – or perhaps even more so, the more precise notion of a 'Communist Hypothesis' – offered the possibility of a renewed collective research project into the viable forms of contemporary political struggle.3 Unexpectedly and audaciously, the positive programme of communism, and not simply negative resistance to capitalist crisis, became the horizon within which we could comprehend and meet the challenges of the present.4 As an ideological intervention, the merits of this discussion are remarkable: it has given rise to a wide ranging international discussion of the notion of communism that did not occur even at the height of the alternative globalization and anti-war movements, still struggling against the overdeteminations of the new world order rhetoric of the 1990s.5 What still remains more difficult to ascertain**, however,** is the nature of these discussions' relationship to the organizational debates that have emerged in the wake of Occupy, international anti-austerity protests and the 'actually existing' revolutionary movements of our times. Some important contemporary theorists have argued that the discussion of the idea of communism should keep a distance from immediate organizational questions. In particular, Badiou has strongly resisted the notion that the affirmation of communism should necessarily be accompanied by a renewed consideration of the role of the political party, as decisive agent of that idea's realization, which he instead regards as an historically superseded instantiation of 'communist invariants' that are today searching for a new mode of historical existence.6 By far the most widespread response, however, has been the proposal that a coherent investigation of the meaning of communism today necessarily requires a reconsideration of the nature of political power, of political organization, and, above all, of the party-form.7 Žižek, for instance, has long argued that a politics without the party is nothing more than a form of 'politics without politics.' More recently, Jodi Dean has emphasized that the reproposition of the party-form is the horizon within which the debate on communism can become intelligible to itself. Far from the caricature of homogenous or 'totalitarian' unity, Dean argues that the party – and the Leninist party in particular – should be understood as constituting a 'vehicle for maintaining a specific gap of desire, the collective desire for collectivity' (Dean 2012, 207). She further argues that such a dynamic has already been evident in the achievements of Occupy, whatever the 'anti-verticalist' claims sometimes made on its behalf. In a related vein, Jan Rehmann (2013) has argued that the nascent counter-hegemonic dimensions of Occupy, alongside regroupment processes on the European left, have prepared the ground for a serious reproposal of the question of the mass political party. In particular, Rehmann argues that a renewal of the party will involve experimentation in new party forms, including notions such as those of a 'mosaic left' (Urban 2009) or a 'connective party' (Porcaro 2012). These are positions close to those advocated by one of the original proponents of the debate on communism, the sadly departed Daniel Bensaïd, who repeatedly argued over many years that the concept of the party remains central to any coherent reflection on the nature and form of politics in the contemporary world, whether or not the word 'party' itself is used to describe those processes of unification, coordination and decision. For Bensaïd, it is the specificity of the overdetermined field of political relations and its irreducibility to the social that continually reproposes the question of the party-form – not as a solution, but as a problem that each upsurge of social and political struggle involving diverging and sometimes conflicting component elements inevitably confronts. This constitutive tension generates the need for continuous interpretative and analytical labor, in the attempt to discover the party-form adequate to the specificity of the social movements to which it gives expression, at the same time as it transforms them by translating their demands into the distinctive register of politics (Bensaïd 2002, 112 et sq). Above all, however, it has been practical experience of the contradictory processes of left regroupment on an international scale – from reconfigurations over the last decade on the Latin American left, to the varying success of coalition parties in Europe such as Die Linke in Germany, Izquierda Unida in Spain, Syriza in Greece and the Front de Gauche in France, to the tentative emergence of new political formations across North Africa and the Arab world – that has firmly placed the question of the party back on the contemporary agenda. The communist horizon thus now confronts its own horizon of intelligibility not simply in a discussion of the party-form, but in the dialectical relation between such theoretical debates and the organizational innovations of the real movements of today**, to paraphrase the now oft-quoted words of the German Ideology,** that aim to abolish the present state of affairs (MECW 5, 49). The Horizon of the Party-Form In this text, I want to explore some of the consequences of the notion of a communist hypothesis in relation to these organizational debates, and in particular, to the emerging debate regarding the adequate party-form for radical politics today. First, I will argue that the sometimes obscure organizational implications of the generic affirmation of communism become clearer when we situate this discussion historically, as a transposition and continuation 'by philosophical means' of some of the central debates of the alternative globalization movement. For despite the exaggerated claims to novelty of both friend and foe alike, the debate on communism did not emerge from nowhere. Rather, I argue that it should be understood as representing the displacement into a theoretical register of central themes of the previous sequences of struggles against the 'new world order' in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In the same way, the new movements that have fortuitously coincided with the debate on communism – student movements across North America and Europe from 2009 onwards, the global wave of Occupy, the ongoing Arab revolutions and growing anti-austerity movements around the world throughout 2012 – represent not a return or rebirth of history, but its revenge.8 They should be understood as expressions of the accumulation, displacement and transformation of tendencies from the previous cycle of mass struggles that that have been surreptitiously burrowing away, like Marx's old mole, under the surface of what we can now see was only an apparent and decidedly temporary pacification of the 'interregnum' of the middle years of the last decade. The 'spontaneous rediscovery' by the moment of Occupy of the aporiai that plagued the alternative globalization and anti-war movements, however, indicate a substantial continuity of unresolved problems across the different conjunctures of the ebbs and floods of the social and political movements of the last 15 years. As a formalized response and proposed resolution to some of these themes, the discussion of communism can help to clarify both the strengths and limits of these debates, particularly those that are still strongly operative in the post-Occupy conjuncture. Second, I then aim to explore some significant models of organization that emerged in previous periods in which the renewal of communist politics was closely linked to attempts to rethink the party-form. For from the Manifesto of the Communist Party onwards, communism, as word, idea and hypothesis, has always been inseparably tied to the forms of political organization necessary for its realization: in the terms of the classical Marxist debates, the 'question of organization' [die Organisationsfrage]. The models that I will consider are, first, the notion of the 'compositional party' derived from the experience of Italian operaismo, recently – and perhaps surprisingly – reproposed in Hardt and Negri's Commonwealth; second, the conceptualization of the party as a 'laboratory' in which a unitary 'political subject' could be forged, theorized most coherently in the work of the early Lukács; and third, Gramsci's call for the formation of a 'modern Prince' as a harnessing of the inherent conflictuality of political modernity in a constituent party-form. Each of these models can be regarded as a mirror in which we can see reflected some of the challenges of the organizational questions that have marked both the alternative globalization movement and the rebellions and revolts of today. Hardt and Negri's notion of a compositional party composed of 'insurrectional intersections' of irreducible singularities responds to the problem of thinking the party-form in a period of the proliferation of demands and movements grounded in diverse experiences of capitalist exploitation and oppression. Lukács's proposal of the party as a laboratory for the forging of a totalizing political subject poses the question of the party-form as one of the unification and coordination of political initiatives. Both of these models, I will argue, ultimately confront the limitations of a political formalism, which runs the risk of invoking a political party-form as the resolution of the contradictions of the social practices that are thereby interpellated as its subaltern content. Gramsci's modern Prince, on the other hand, integrates both compositional and totalizing dimensions, while avoiding the temptation of a formalistic resolution of the contradictions that are the necessary preconditions – and enduring challenge – of political organization. Rather than the elimination of difference, the assertion of identity or the dominance of political form over social content, the modern Prince represents the outlines of a party-form that would be capable of valorizing contradiction and conflict, harnessing them as the motor of its totalizing development. In these sense, the modern Prince can be understood as a proposal for a type of 'expansive' party-form that might be able to respond productively to the challenges of contemporary movements.

## 3

#### The role of the ballot is to determine the truth or falsity of the resolution.

#### [1] Isomorphism: ROBs that aren’t phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms necessitate that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem. Truth testing solves since it’s solely a question of if something is true or false, there isn’t a closest estimate.

#### [2] Bindingness: a) Answering TT proves it true---By trying to answer TT as a framing mechanism you attempt to prove it false which concedes into evaluating the truth or falsity of arguments thus any answer only proves the framework in a different way b) All arguments collapses to TT since in order to use X ROB we must first prove true the statement---X ROB is an effective strategy to challenge Y, this means the judge still uses TT to evaluate between different ROB’s so its inescapable.

#### [3] Constitutivism: The ballot asks you to either vote aff or neg based on the given resolution a) Five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means its intrinsic to the nature of the activity b) the purpose of debate is the acquisition of knowledge in pursuit of truth – a resolutional focus is key to depth of exploration which o/w on specificity. It’s a jurisdictional issue since it questions whether the judge should go outside the scope of the game.

#### [4] Normativity: Truth testing is the only ROB that encourages moral action guiding in every situation through an ethical fwk. Other ROBs pinpoint a problem, yet fail to apply in other ethical circumstances besides the one at hand. Proves that other ROBs trigger permissibility since they don’t condemn things that fall outside the scope of discussion.

**Permissibility and Presumption Negate – 1. Ought is defined as expressing obligation[[3]](#footnote-3) which means ought not necessitates prohibition 2. It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent 3. Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both the “P” and “~P” are true.**

#### Vote neg-

#### 1] Merrian websters defines to as

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/to

to preposition Save Word To save this word, you'll need to log in. Log In \ tə, tu̇, ˈtü \ Definition of to (Entry 1 of 3) 1a—used as a function word to **indicate movement** or an action or condition suggestive of movement toward a place, person, or thing reached

#### But just governments can’t move to an obligations so rez is incoherent

#### 2] Merrian Websters defines right as

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/right

**having** the **axis perpendicular to** the **base**

#### But there is no base for strikes to be perpendicular to, so the rez does nothing

**3] Merrian websters defines Strike as** **to delete something**

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strike

#### 4] Merrian Websters defines workers as

any of the sexually underdeveloped and usually **sterile members of a colony of social ants**, bees, wasps, or termites that perform most of the labor and protective duties of the colony

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/worker

#### **1] We’re in a hologram**

Stromberg 15[Joseph Stromberg- “Some physicists believe we're living in a giant hologram — and it's not that far-fetched” <https://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8847863/holographic-principle-universe-theory-physics> Vox. June 29th 2015] War Room Debate AI

Some physicists actually believe that the universe we live in might be a hologram. The idea isn't that the universe is some sort of fake simulation out of The Matrix, but rather that even though we appear to live in a three-dimensional universe, it might only have two dimensions. It's called the holographic principle. The thinking goes like this: Some distant two-dimensional surface contains all the data needed to fully describe our world — and much like in a hologram, this data is projected to appear in three dimensions. Like the characters on a TV screen, we live on a flat surface that happens to look like it has depth. It might sound absurd. But when physicists assume it's true in their calculations, all sorts of big physics problems — such as the nature of black holes and the reconciling of gravity and quantum mechanics — become much simpler to solve. In short, the laws of physics seem to make more sense when written in two dimensions than in three. "It's not considered some wild speculation among most theoretical physicists," says Leonard Susskind, the Stanford physicist who first formally defined the idea decades ago. "It's become a working, everyday tool to solve problems in physics." But there's an important distinction to be made here. There's no direct evidence that our universe actually is a two-dimensional hologram. These calculations aren't the same as a mathematical proof. Rather, they're intriguing suggestions that our universe could be a hologram. And as of yet, not all physicists believe we have a good way of testing the idea experimentally.

#### 2] Paradox of tolerance- to be completely open to the aff we must exclude perspectives that wouldn’t be open to it which makes complete tolerance impossible.

#### 3] Decision Making Paradox- We need a decision-making procedure to enact the aff, but to choose a procedure requires another meta level decision-making procedure and so forth leading to infinite regress.

#### 4] The Place Paradox- if everything exists in a place, that place must have a place that it exists in and so forth. Therefore, identifying ought statements is impossible since it assumes the space-time continuum.

#### 5] Grain Paradox- One grain falling makes no sound, but a thousand grains make a sound. A thousand nothings cannot make something which means the physical world is paradoxical.

#### 6] Arrows Paradox- If time is divided into 0-duration slices, no motion is happening in each of them, so taking them all as a whole, motion is impossible.

## 4

#### Interp – The aff may not read indexicals.

#### Violation – You do, it’s the 2 point in the impact calc section

#### Standards –

#### 1. Strat skew – A) It creates an infinite burden skewed in your favor since you don’t have to win the framework debate and you can stack the aff with multiple frameworks with pieces of offense and I have to answer all of them B) You can be sketchy and shift the implication of it in the 1ar in infinite different ways like saying theory is different indexes, you are an index which auto affirms, etc which skews my strategy cause I only responded to it in the context of the framework. Also Independent voter for inclusion – that justifies atrocious things since you can simple say “I think racism is good” and you can’t contest it.

#### 2. Phil Ed – it kills phil ed since having a framework debate becomes pointless when disproving your framework doesn’t win me the round. That o/w all other education since it’s unique to LD.

## Voter: Fairness is a voter since if the rounds been skewed its impossible to determine who the better debater was. Education- constitutive purpose ie why schools fund. Competing interps: 1. Reasonability causes a race to the bottom where we read increasingly unfair practices that minimally fit the brightline 2. Necessitates judge intervention to see if we meet th brightline and 3 collapses because we use offense defense paradigm. Drop the debater on theory: 1. Its key to deterring future abuse. 2. Theres an accessibility standard so elevates burden. No RVIs: 1. Chilling effect- abusive debaters will get really good at the rvi debate and bait theory meaning we can never check back abuse. 2. Illogical you don’t win for being fair.

## Case

UV

1] grant new 2n theory arguments otherwise inf aff abuse because they can read a new shell in the 1ar and we can’t answer it and then auto lose every round to 1ar theory

2] aff fairness doesn’t come prior – you should eval theory based on norms creation and the abuse story – it shouldn’t matter what side runs it.

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)