
# 1NC Lex r4

## 1

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive speech docs open source with highlighting on the NDCA LD wiki within an hour after debating.

#### Violation – you didn’t – I have screenshots. To clarify I’m not saying you have to opensource all analytics or narratives. Just cards with highlighting and tags.



#### A. Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs.

#### B. Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify before round that cards aren’t miscut – otherwise you could have highlighted unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat

#### C. Depth of clash – open source allows debaters to come up with more nuanced researched objections to their opponents evidence before the round at a much faster rate, which leads to the highest quality evidence comparison instead of guessing what was highlighted

#### Drop the debater – a) they have a 7-6 rebuttal advantage and the 2ar to make args I can’t respond to, b) it deters future abuse and sets a positive norm.

#### Use competing interps – a) reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since we don’t know your bs meter, b) collapses to competing interps – we justify 2 brightlines under an offense defense paradigm just like 2 interps.

#### No RVIs – a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance, b) norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms, c) chilling effect – forces you to split your 2AR so you can’t collapse and misconstrue the 2NR, d) topic ed – prevents 1AR blipstorm scripts and allows us to get back to substance after resolving theory

## 2

#### Interpretation: The affirmative debater must articulate a distinct ROB in the form of a delineated text in the first affirmative speech.

#### B. Violation: They don’t

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Strat Skew – Absent a text in the 1AC, they can read multiple pieces of offense under different ROBs and then read a new one in the 1AR that moots 7 minutes of case and allows them to auto-win with specific offense. Reading a new 1ar rob is a voter for shiftiness o/ws since it creates an irreversible skew for the negative that can’t be changed.

#### CX checks fails- A] Not flowed B] skews 6 min of prep during the aff C] They can proactively lie and there’s no way to check D] debaters can be intentionally shady.

#### This spec shell isn’t regressive- it literally determines what the affirmatives framing mechanism is

## 3

#### Interp: debaters must use comic sans as their font in their speech docs.

#### Violation – the doc is in calibri

#### Inclusion – comic sans is easiest to read for people with dyslexia.

**Hudgins 17** “Hating Comic Sans Is Ableist” Lauren Hudgins Feb 23, 2017 <https://medium.com/the-establishment/hating-comic-sans-is-ableist-bc4a4de87093> OHS-AT

The irregular shapes of the letters in Comic Sans allow her to focus on the individual parts of words. While many fonts use repeated shapes to create different letters, such as a “p” rotated to made a “q,” Comic Sans uses few repeated shapes, creating distinct letters (although it does have a mirrored “b” and “d”). Comic Sans is one of a few typefaces recommended by influential organizations like the British Dyslexia Association and the Dyslexia Association of Ireland. Using Comic Sans has made it possible for Jessica to complete a rigorous program in marine zoology at Bangor University in Wales.

#### To pre-empt the 1AR - the ability to change the font doesn’t solve – it’s ableist to expect them to do something for your aesthetic preference.

**Hudgins 17** “Hating Comic Sans Is Ableist” Lauren Hudgins Feb 23, 2017 <https://medium.com/the-establishment/hating-comic-sans-is-ableist-bc4a4de87093> OHS-AT


In addition, she cannot proofread in a font that’s difficult for her to read. “You cannot fix formatting errors you cannot see!” To her, asking her to change to a font she cannot adequately use “is the epitome of ableism.” Sometimes she can ask someone in her cohort to help her spot errors, but it’s a lot to ask. “I can and have had people in my class look over my work, but you need to understand that we’re not collaborators, they’re my peers. This is an encroachment on their time.”

Asking her to change her font is asking her to take a task that is already very difficult for someone with dyslexia and demanding that she take extra steps to please the aesthetic preferences of someone for whom reading is easy.

#### Inclusion’s an independent voter – you have to be in debate to gain from it and it’s a gateway issue because it ensures everyone benefits from the activity since it’s how people get scholarships, make friends, and improve critical thinking skills.

## 4

#### Interp: Debaters must disclose tournaments on the 2021-2022 NDCA LD wiki under the actual name of the tournament on tabroom for every round at said tournament. To clarify- when you look up the tournament name from the wiki on tab, the exact entry must pop up



#### The standard is inclusion - they make debate inaccessible to novices or small schools who compete on the circuit but don’t have access to resources Two internal links to accessibility - 1) lets debaters see if you won or lost on tab going for specific strategies or hitting specific strategies, letting debaters adapt around that and b) lets debaters see what speaks judges gave to help them see how good you were at going for x argument. Independently links into reciprocity since if I disclosed one way and you didnt’ you had the advantage in this round. Outweighs - none of their standards matter if debaters can’t access them and means reasonability is uniquely wrong since even a 1% risk of exclusion is bad, you obviously don’t say some level of exclusion is justified

## Case

#### The concept of bare life is politically dangerous and neutralizes resistance.

Negri and Casarino 04 –Italian Moral and Political Philosopher and Associate Professor Of Cultural Studies And Comparative Literature At The University Of Minnesota (Antonio and Cesare, "It’s a Powerful Life: A Conversation on Contemporary Philosophy," Cultural Critique, No. 57, Spring, Project Muse)

AN: I believe Giorgio is writing a sequel to Homo Sacer, and I feel that this new work will be resolutive for his thought—in the sense that he will be forced in it to resolve and find a way out of the ambiguity that has qualified his understanding of naked life so far. He already attempted something of the sort in his recent book on Saint Paul, but I think this attempt largely failed: as usual, this book is extremely learned and elegant; it remains, however, somewhat trapped within Pauline exegesis, rather than constituting a full-fledged attempt to reconstruct naked life as a potentiality for exodus, to rethink naked life fundamentally in terms of exodus. I believe that the concept of naked life is not an impossible, unfeasible one. I believe it is possible to push the image of power to the point at which a defenseless human being [un povero Cristo] is crushed, to conceive of that extreme point at which power tries to [End Page 173] eliminate that ultimate resistance that is the sheer attempt to keep oneself alive. From a logical standpoint, it is possible to think all this: the naked bodies of the people in the camps, for example, can lead one precisely in this direction. But this is also the point at which this concept turns into ideology: to conceive of the relation between power and life in such a way actually ends up bolstering and reinforcing ideology. Agamben, in effect, is saying that such is the nature of power: in the final instance, power reduces each and every human being to such a state of powerlessness. But this is absolutely not true! On the contrary: the historical process takes place and is produced thanks to a continuous constitution and construction, which undoubtedly confronts the limit over and over again—but this is an extraordinarily rich limit, in which desires expand, and in which life becomes increasingly fuller. Of course it is possible to conceive of the limit as absolute pow-erlessness, especially when it has been actually enacted and enforced in such a way so many times. And yet, isn't such a conception of the limit precisely what the limit looks like from the standpoint of constituted power as well as from the standpoint of those who have already been totally annihilated by such a power—which is, of course, one and the same standpoint? Isn't this the story about power that power itself would like us to believe in and reiterate? Isn't it far more politically useful to conceive of this limit from the standpoint of those who are not yet or not completely crushed by power, from the standpoint of those still struggling to overcome such a limit, from the standpoint of the process of constitution, from the standpoint of power [potenza]? I am worried about the fact that the concept of naked life as it is conceived by Agamben might be taken up by political movements and in political debates: I find this prospect quite troubling, which is why I felt the need to attack this concept in my recent essay. Ultimately, I feel that nowadays the logic of traditional eugenics is attempting to saturate and capture the whole of human reality—even at the level of its materiality, that is, through genetic engineering—and the ultimate result of such a process of saturation and capture is a capsized production of subjectivity within which ideological undercurrents continuously try to subtract or neutralize our resistance**.** CC: And I suppose you are suggesting that the concept of naked life is part and parcel of such undercurrents. But have you discussed all this with Agamben? What does he think about your critiques? AN: Whenever I tell him what I have just finished telling you, he gets quite irritated, even angry. I still maintain, nonetheless, that the conclusions he draws in Homo Sacer lead to dangerous political outcomes and that the burden of finding a way out of this mess rests entirely on him. And the type of problems he runs into in this book recur throughout many of his other works. I found his essay on Bartleby, for example, absolutely infuriating. This essay was published originally as a little book that also contained Deleuze's essay on Bartleby: well, it turns out that what Deleuze says in his essay is exactly the contrary of what Giorgio says in his! I suppose one could say that they decided to publish their essays together precisely so as to attempt to figure this limit— that is, to find a figure for it, to give it a form—by some sort of paradoxical juxtaposition, but I don't think that this attempt was really successful in the end. In any case, all this incessant talk about the limit bores me and tires me out after a little while. The point is that, inasmuch as it is death, the limit is not creative. The limit is creative to the extent to which you have been able to overcome it qua death: the limit is creative because you have overcome death.

#### Agamben’s framework is too simplistic and ultimately incoherent – the sovereign is not the condition for political exclusion.

Rabinow 6 [Paul, Anthropology, UC-Berkeley, and Nikolas Rose, Sociology, LSE, 2006, BioSocieties 1 (2): 195–217 "Biopower Today" <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1745855206040014>]

Giorgio **Agamben**, in a series of haunting books**, identifies the Holocaust as the ultimate exemplar of biopower**, and biopower as the hidden meaning of all forms of power from the ancient world to the present. In particular he explores the moments that he terms, after Carl Schmitt, ‘states of exception’, when a sovereign state declares a time or a place where the rule of law can be suspended in the name of self-defence or national security (Agamben, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2005). There is much to be learned from these studies of the profound traumas that mark European histories: we agree that Holocaust is not an exceptional moment of throwback to a singular barbarianism, but an enduring possibility intrinsic to the very project of civilization and the law. However, **Agamben grounds his ana- lysis in a particular way** that **we find problematic**. **He argues that all power rests ultimately on the ability of one to take the life of another**—it is a power over life grounded in the pos- sibility of enforcing death. He characterizes this power by reference to the obscure metaphor of homo sacer—the enigmatic figure in Roman law whose crimes made his sacrifice impos- sible but who could be killed with impunity. Like this figure, who is reduced from bios— crudely, the way of life proper to an individual or group in a polity—to zo¨ e—‘bare life’**— he suggests that the birth of biopower in modernity marks the point at which the biological life of subjects enters politics and belongs entirely to the State.** The ultimate grasp of the Sovereign or the State over the lives of subjects is exemplified, for him, in the concentration camps, labour camps and death camps of the Nazis: sovereign States depend on their capa- city to create states of exception. Such states may be exceptional, but are nonetheless imma- nent in modernity itself—a fourth space added to that of state, nation and land, in which inhabitants are stripped of everything but their bare life, which is placed without recourse in the hands of power. Indeed they are the ‘nomos’ of modernity: ‘This is why the camp is the very paradigm of political space at the point at which politics becomes biopolitics and homo sacer is virtually confused with the citizen’ (Agamben, 1998: 171). Agamben takes seriously Adorno’s challenge—how is it possible to think after Ausch- witz (Mesnard and Kahan, 2001)? But, for that very reason**, it is to trivialize Auschwitz to see it as the hidden possibility in every instance where living beings enter the scope of reg- ulation**, control and government. The power to command under threat of death is exercised by States and their surrogates in multiple instances, in micro forms and in geopolitical rela- tions. But **this does not demonstrate that this form of power**—commands backed up by the ultimate threat of death—**is the guarantee or underpinning principle of all forms of biopower** in contemporary liberal societies. **Nor is it useful to use this single diagram to ana- lyse every contemporary instance of thanatopolitics**—from Rwanda to the epidemic of Aids deaths across Africa. Surely **the essence of critical thought must be its capacity to make dis- tinctions that can facilitate judgement and action.**8 Holocaust is undoubtedly one configuration that modern biopower can take. Racism allows power to subdivide a population into subspecies, to designate these in terms of in terms of a biological substrate, and to initiate and sustain an array of dynamic relations in which the exclusion, incarceration or death of those who are inferior can be seen as some- thing that will make life in general healthier and purer. As Foucault put it in 1976, ‘racism justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population’ (2002: 258). It is true that in this lecture he suggests that it is ‘the emer- gence of biopower that inscribes [racism] in the mechanisms of the State . . . as the basic mechanism of power, as it is exercised in modern States’ (2002: 254). But **the Nazi regime was, in** **his view, exceptional**—‘a paroxysmal development’: We have, then, in Nazi society something that is really quite extraordinary: this is a society which has generalized biopower in an absolute sense, but which has also gen- eralized the sovereign right to kill . . . to kill anyone, meaning not only other people but also its own people . . . a coincidence between a generalized biopower and a dicta- torship that was at once absolute and retransmitted throughout the entire social body. (2002: 260**) Biopower, in the form it took under National Socialism, was a complex mix of the politics of life and the politics of death**—as Robert Proctor (1999) points out, **Nazi doctors and health activists waged war on tobacco, sought to curb exposure to asbestos, worried about the over-use of medication and X-rays**, stressed the importance of a diet free of petrochem- ical dyes and preservatives, campaigned for whole-grain bread and foods high in vitamins and fibre, and many were vegetarians. But, **within this complex, the path to the death camps was dependent upon a host of other historical, moral, political and technical conditions. Holocaust is neither exemplary of thanatopolitics, nor the hidden dark truth of biopower.**

#### The rejection of rights is a strategic loss for present political struggles – Agamben’s totalizing form of critical theory increases oppression.

Deranty 4 [Jean-Philippe: Associate Lecturer in Philosophy at Macquarie University (Australia) “Agamben’s challenge to normative theories of modern rights,” *borderlands e-journal*, Volume 3, Number 1, http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1\_2004/deranty\_agambnschall.htm]

11. In the case of empirical examples, the erasure of difference between phenomena seems particularly counter-intuitive in the case of dissimilar modes of internment. From a practical point of view, it seems counter-productive to claim that there is no substantial difference between archaic communities and modern communities provided with the language of rights, between the lawlessness of war times and democratic discourse. There must be a way of problematising the ideological mantra of Western freedom, of modernity’s moral superiority, that does not simply equate it with Nazi propaganda (Ogilvie 2001). Habermas and Honneth probably have a point when they highlight the advances made by modernity in the entrenchment of rights. If the ethical task is that of testimony, then our testimony should go also to all the individual lives that were freed from alienation by the establishment of legal barriers against arbitrariness and exclusion. We should heed Honneth’s reminder that struggles for social and political emancipation have often privileged the language of rights over any other discourse (Fraser, Honneth 2003). To reject the language of human rights altogether could be a costly gesture in understanding past political struggles in their relevance for future ones, and a serious strategic, political loss for accompanying present struggles. We want to criticise the ideology of human rights, but not at the cost of renouncing the resources that rights provide. Otherwise, critical theory would be in the odd position of casting aspersions upon the very people it purports to speak for, and of depriving itself of a major weapon in the struggle against oppression.

#### Agamben is reductionist – he misrepresents the law as monolithic and unreformable.

Brännström 08 [Leila, Lund University Law Faculty, How I learned to stop worrying and use the legal argument A critique of Giorgio Agamben’s conception of law, NoFo 5 [April 2008]

6. How Agamben creates a terrifying object called law In Agamben’s writings law is represented as a uniplanar surface, even if a sophistication is present as the surface is twisted to the form of a Möbius strip (cf. Agamben 1998, 15, 37). Despite the twist, law is still represented as a homogeneous entity with a single border. The twist in the surface represents that, in Agamben’s wording, ‘law is outside itself’ (Agamben 1998, 15). A state of affairs he claims instantiates itself in paradoxes like the im/possibility of legal creation ex nihilo and the im/possibility of the legal regulation of legally banned situations – for example legal codification of self-defense or the right of resistance against unlawful law. The paradoxical structure of law is, in turn, claimed to explain how life, violence, and sovereignty are simultaneously inside and outside the legal order. The paradoxes that Agamben enumerates are however engendered in the first place by his understanding of law as a mystic, monolithic, unilaterally productive, and ahistorical entity. As Agamben’s reasoning suppresses temporality and depopulates the legal field, paradoxes arise as a result of treating law as an object rather than a practice that is performed. Behind the fear of law that Agamben shows when he says that an ‘unprecedented biopolitical catastrophe’ is awaiting us if we do not break with the current politico-legal rationality, is a representation of law as an object – as a machine – standing outside history and affecting the course of events. Foucault has argued that if the state is abstracted and hypostatized – as a cold-blooded monster or the instrument of class repression – it appears to be the driving force behind all sorts of effects, which leads to the overvaluation of the ‘state-problem’ and causes inflationary effects such as statophobia. He reminds us that the state is nothing more than a flexible bundle of juxtaposed practices (Foucault 2006, 112–115). Similarly, law is not all too powerful or all too powerless; it is a protean combination of law-producing and reproducing practices and does not have an existence outside of that. Agamben’s way of treating law as a point of departure rather than as a the result of complicated social processes and as the origin of historical power relations rather than their effects is somewhat ironic since the crux of his argument seems to be that law does not have an independent life. His point, after all, is that the hold that law has over life can be broken and what is ultimately at stake in the state of exception, in legal production and decision-making and in biopolitical matters, is extrajudicial (cf. Agamben 2005, 11, 87–88). NoFo 5 [April 2008] 43 41 Another example of such overestimation of the legal point of view in Agamben’s work would be the overstatement of the differences between incarcerated aliens and incarcerated citizens. Agamben’s black and white image of law has its counterpart in his notion of bio-power as the controlling of the (increasingly blurred) borderline between life and death. Bio-power is here reduced to a question of either/or, eradicating all differentiation in the administration and management of life. It is all the more problematic as the control of the borderline is construed as a legal matter which is particularly troubling as law is equaled to repression and the state is the sole legal agent mentioned. The transposition of law and repression obscure the fact that some legal norms, rather than immediately directing and appraising behavior, distribute competences or legal powers which allow legal subjects to introduce changes in legal status through contract or other arrangements. Think for instance of the biopolitical effects of patenting human genome or the markets for surrogacy motherhood or for human organs. Neither is bio-power necessarily exercised by the state or even through legal action. As Lemke appropriately points out, it is ‘more and more the scientific consultants, economic interest groups, and civil societal mediators that define the beginning, the end and the value of life, in consensus conferences, expert commissions, and ethical counsels’ (Lemke 2005, 11). Since Agamben seems to equate power and repression it comes as no surprise that he cannot see that bio-power can be exercised in ways radically different from those of the Nazi-regime. It is not wholly accidental that the biopolitical decisions of market actors scenting investment opportunities and those of us who quit smoking because we are acting in a biopolitically responsible way, go unnoticed in Agamben’s story. Agamben overestimates here, as elsewhere, the role of law in a story where the (narrow and distorted) legal point of view tends to substitute reality.

#### Their K oversimplifies – biopower is not a one-way street – it produces equivalent resistances that check the impacts.

Campbell 98 professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle - 1998 (David, “Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity,” pg. 204-205) – blue if you have time

The political possibilities enabled by this permanent provocation of power and freedom can be specified in more detail by thinking in terms of the predominance of the “bio-power” discussed above. In this sense, because the governmental practices of biopolitics in West­ern nations have been increasingly directed toward modes of being and forms of life — such that sexual conduct has become an object of concern, individual health has been figured as a domain of discipline, and the family has been transformed into an instrument of govern­ment— the ongoing agonism between those practices and the free­dom they seek to contain means that individuals have articulated a series of counterdemands drawn from those new fields of concern. For example, as the state continues to prosecute people according to sexual orientation, human rights activists have proclaimed the right of gays to enter into formal marriages, adopt children, and receive the same health and insurance benefits granted to their straight coun­terparts. These claims are a consequence of the permanent provoca­tion of power and freedom in biopolitics, and stand as testament to the “strategic reversibility” of power relations: if the terms of governmental practices can be made into focal points for resistances, then the “history of government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ is interwoven with the history of dissenting ‘counterconducts.”’39 Indeed, the emer­gence of the state as the major articulation of “the political” has in­volved an unceasing agonism between those in office and those they rule. State intervention in everyday life has long incited popular col­lective action, the result of which has been both resistance to the state and new claims upon the state. In particular, “the core of what we now call ‘citizenship’ consists of multiple bargains hammered out by rulers and ruled in the course of their struggles over the means of state action, especially the making of war.” In more recent times, constituencies associated with women’s, youth, ecological, and peace movements (among others) have also issued claims on society. These resistances are evidence that the break with the discursive/nondiscursive dichotomy central to the logic of interpretation undergirding this analysis is (to put it in conventional terms) not only theoretically licensed; it is empirically warranted. Indeed, expanding the interpretive imagination so as to enlarge the categories through which we understand the constitution of “the political” has been a necessary precondition for making sense of Foreign Policy’s concern for the ethical borders of identity in America. Accordingly, there are manifest political implications that flow from theorizing identity. As Judith Butler concluded: “The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated.”

#### Agamben’s totalizing critique papers over the diverse set of groups and individuals who use discourses of rights and state protection in order to mitigate against structural exclusion—providing healthcare is a good type of state intervention.

Susan J. SHAW 12. Associate Professor of Anthropology at the University of Arizona. *Governing How We Care: Contesting Community and Defining Difference in U.S. Public Health Programs*. Temple University Press. 29-31.

These local and dispersed struggles over community health offer several paths by which we may explore the diverse meanings of governance, citizenship, and identity formation. Actors as varied as community-based organizations and hospital administrators draw on discourses of rights and responsibilities in their efforts to determine whether and how to provide health care within terms set by state policies addressing access and citizenship. Concepts of health and illness both mediate and facilitate claims on the state for benefits, entitlements, and recognition (Petryna 2002; Rose 2006; Fairchild, Bayer, and Colgrove 2007, ch. 5), serving as universal values (Laclau 1995) that help produce new forms of community and sociality.

Anthropologists have used the concept of biocitizenship to variously describe the obligations around health promotion assigned to active citizens, the transfer of responsibility for health from the state to citizen-subjects (Briggs and Hallin 2007), and the use of bodily affliction to facilitate claims on the state (Petryna 2002). Certain populations inhabiting the margins of U.S. society are among those whose attenuated claims on the state are mediated by demonstrable embodied harm (see Biehl 2005). Outlining the ways in which liberal conceptions of citizenship are fragmenting among migrant and stateless populations in transnational economies, Aihwa Ong (2006) offers a critique of Giorgio Agamben's concept of "bare life" that seeks to overcome the opposition between the excluded and the included in political discourse. Ong writes, "A strict adherence to Agamben's universal division of humanity into those with rights and those without would miss the rich complexity and the possibilities of multiple ethical systems at play" (23). Instead, Ong seeks to discover the ways in which humanity and citizenship are contested and constructed depending on local conditions, economies, and identity formations. Ong continues, "Agamben's fundamental reference of bare life in a state of permanent exception thus ignores the possibility of complex negotiations of claims for those without territorialized citizenship" (23). The case studies discussed here represent a series of complex negotiations of claims using the vehicle of community health knowledge and practices. In diverse domains, citizenship is produced and contested as marginalized groups bump up against various state apparatuses bent on simultaneously ignoring and managing their existence. [END PAGE 29]

When community organizations in the United States offer resources and services to injection drug users "at risk" for HIV, for example, what Ong refers to as "the nonstate administration of excluded humanity" (2006, 24) flourishes. Like the radiation victims described by Adriana Petryna (2002) or the people living with AIDS portrayed by Joao Biehl (2004), community health and advocacy groups for the minority poor in the United States seek rights and entitlements based on health status, creating forms of biocitizenship that mitigate against the structural exclusion of minority and low-income populations most at risk for HIV infection and other negative health outcomes. Illicit drug users are among those most likely to be excluded from the rights and benefits of citizenship; once convicted of a felony, they lose federal housing and education benefits for which they might otherwise be income-eligible, as well as, often, lifetime suffrage (Mauer and Chesney-Lind 2002).17 Part II of this book explores the complex modes of governing that help construct and manage this excluded population, including publicly funded public health research and HIV prevention programs.

And yet marginalized groups are also engaged in developing programs for themselves, such as the outreach worker program described in Chapters 2 and 3, or the syringe exchange program described in Chapter 6, as part of the process of instantiating themselves as political subjects as well as the objects of intervention. Biosociality posits that new forms of social relations and identities emerge as people integrate health information into their understandings of themselves and their relations with others (e.g., Ong and Collier 2005; Rabinow 1996; Rose and Novas 2005). This project extends the concept of biosociality from the level of individual biology (e.g., Taussig, Heath, and Rapp 2003) into new domains such as access to health care populated by low-income and marginalized members of U.S. society. As groups organize around issues of importance to them gender discrimination, AIDS, or poverty, for example-their collective action provides the spark that leads to the emergence of new identities such as feminist or AIDS activist (D'Emilio 2003; Morgen 2002; Mercer 1994; Klawiter 2008). At the same time, collective action around community health also develops as the result of transformations in individual [END PAGE 30] and collective identity (Klawiter 2008; see also Escobar, Rocheleau, and Kothari 2002).18

#### Unflinching rejection of sovereignty exacerbates inequalities and prevents emancipation.

McCormack 10 Tara McCormack, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, PhD in IR from the University of Westminster, “Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory Approaches,” p139, google books

Critics of critical and emancipatory theory have raised pertinent problems in terms both of the idealism of critical approaches and their problematic relationship to contemporary liberal intervention. Critical theorists themselves are aware that their prescriptions seem to be hard to separate from contemporary discourses and practices of power, yet critical theorists do not seem to be able to offer any understanding of why this might be. However, the limitations to critical and emancipatory approaches cannot be overcome by distinguishing themselves from liberal internationalist policy. In fact a closer engagement with contemporary security policies and discourse would show the similarities with critical theory and that both suffer from the same limitations. The limitations of critical and emancipatory approaches are to be found in critical prescriptions in the contemporary political context. Jahn is right to argue that critical theory is idealistic, but this needs to be explained why. Douzinas is right to argue that critical theory becomes a justification for power and this needs to be explained why. The reasons for this remain undertheorised. I argue here that critical and emancipatory approaches lack a fundamental understanding of what is at stake in the political realm. For critical theorists the state and sovereignty represent oppressive structures that work against human freedom. There is much merit to this critique of the inequities of the state system. However, the problem is that freedom or emancipation are not simply words that can breathe life into international affairs but in the material circumstances of the contemporary world must be linked to political constituencies, that is men and women who can give content to that freedom and make freedom a reality. Critical and emancipatory theorists fail to understand that there must be a political content to emancipation and new forms of social organisation. Critical theorists seek emancipation and argue for new forms of political community above and beyond the state, yet there is nothing at the moment beyond the state that can give real content to those wishes. There is no democratic world government and it is simply nonsensical to argue that the UN, for example, is a step towards global democracy. Major international institutions are essentially controlled by powerful states. To welcome challenges to sovereignty in the present political context cannot hasten any kind of more just world order in which people really matter (to paraphrase Lynch). Whatever the limitations of the state, and there are many, at the moment the state represents the only framework in which people might have a chance to have some meaningful control over their lives.