# Lex r6 AC

## Fwk – Syllogisms

## Syllogism

**The meta-ethic is non-naturalism – ethics are derived from a priori principles.**

**Prefer:**

**1] Empirical Uncertainty- Only internal knowledge can be trusted. Experience is corrupt – we could be dreaming, hallucinating, or being deceived by an evil demon. Infinitely outweighs because ethics would be escapable and therefore pointless.**

#### 2] Constitutivism- Only a priori knowledge exists across all subjects, empirics vary.

#### 3] Is/ought gap- Empirics tell us what is, not what ought to be. Descriptions can’t prove ought statements; only internal knowledge can prove oughts.

#### 4] Infinite regress – we can always ask “why should I follow this framework,” leading to infinite regress, but asking for a reason for reason concedes its authority, meaning only my framework solves for regress

#### 5] Only agency is inescapable – reasoning whether to engage in a practice is conducted external to that practice through intentional agency: this is exercising rationality. Even the assessment whether to be an agent is itself an instance of practical reasoning that is exclusively the role of agency.

#### Thus the standard is consistency with universalizable ethics

#### 1] Reason implies universalizability

Korsgaard 85

Korsgaard, Christine M. 1985. Kant's formula of universal law. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66, no. 1-2: 24-47. <http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3201869> //ACCS JM

A few lines later, Kant says that this is equivalent to acting as though your maxim were by your will to become a law of nature, and he uses this latter formulation in his examples of how the imperative is to be applied. Elsewhere, Kant specifies that the test is whether you could will the universalization for a system of nature "of which you yourself were a part" (C2 69/72); and in one place he characterizes the moral agent as asking "what sort of world he would create under the guidance of practical reason, . . . a world into which, moreover, he would place himself as a member." 2 But how do you determine whether or not you can will a given maxim as a law of nature? Since the will is practical reason, and since everyone must arrive at the same conclusions in matters of duty, it cannot be the case that what you are able to will is a matter of personal taste, or relative to your individual desires. Rather, the question of what you can will is a question of what you can will without contradiction.

#### 2] Non-contradiction – there is no world in which p and ~p are both true. Acting recognizes the validity of others to take the action, which makes universal maxims a logical side constraint to other frameworks.

#### 3] Absent universal ethics morality becomes arbitrary and fails to guide action, making ethics useless

#### Prefer Additionally

#### 1] Performativity – freedom is key to argumentation. Abiding by their ethical theory presupposes we own ourselves, making it incoherent to justify a standard without first willing ours.

#### 2] Other frameworks collapse – they contain conditional obligations which derive authority from the categorical imperative.

Korsgaard 96 Christine M. Korsgaard, professor of philosophy at Harvard University, introduction to “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,” 1996, Cambridge University Press, accessed 6 September 2021 pg. xvii-xviii, https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/blog.nus.edu.sg/dist/c/1868/files/2012/12/Kant-Groundwork-ng0pby.pdf AG recut

This is the sort of thing that makes even practiced readers of Kant gnash their teeth. A rough translation might go like this: the categorical imperative is a law, to which our maxims must conform. But the reason they must do so cannot be that there is some further condition they must meet, or some other law to which they must conform. For instance, **suppose someone proposed that one must keep one's promises because it is the will of God that one should do so - the law would then "contain the condition" that our maxims should conform to the will of God**. This would yield only a conditional requirement to keep one's promises — if you would obey the will of God, then you must keep your promises - whereas the categorical imperative must give us an unconditional requirement. Since there can be no such condition, all that remains is that the categorical imperative should tell us that our maxims themselves must be laws - that is, that they must be universal, that being the characteristic of laws. There is a simpler way to make this point. What could make it true that we must keep our promises because it is the will of God? **That would be true only if it were true that we must indeed obey the will of God, that is, if "obey the will of God" were itself a categorical imperative. Conditional requirements give rise to a regress; if there are unconditional requirements, we must at some point arrive at principles on which we are required to act, not because we are commanded to do so by some yet higher law, but because they are laws in themselves. The categorical imperative, in the most general sense, tells us to act on those principles**, principles which are themselves laws. Kant continues:

#### 3] Resource disparities – focus on evidence and statistics puts small school debaters without huge files at a disadvantage, but my framework can be won without prep, which means it’s theoretically preferable and controls the i/l to other voters because accessing the debate space is a prerequisite.

#### 4] Actor specificity—societies are just conglomerates of reasoners.

**Laurence 11** Ben Laurence 2011 (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago) “An Anscombean Approach to Collective Action” in Ford and Hornsby, Eds. Essays on Anscombe's Intention (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) 293-294

“It is enough that the same order displayed in collective actionexplanation can also be represented as a set of rational transitions justifying the actions undertaken by members of a group in light of a shared objective. In this way, whether or not there is strictly speaking a unitary knowing subject of the whole action, we can still see the actions in question as recommended by reasoning. This reasoning will not, of course, occur through the exercise of a separate practical reason possessed by the group, but rather through the reasoning of the individual members as the execute their shared objective. We might sum this up by saying that just as a collective agent can only act through the actions of its individual members, it can only know through their knowing, and reason through their reasoning.**”**

#### 5] Real world education: an understanding of Kantianism is key to understanding the law in the real world because most states abide by inviolable side-constraints in their constitutions—Germany proves.

**Ripstein 09** Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 2009

Strictly speaking, the right to dignity is not an enumerated right in the German Basic Law [says], but the organizing principle under which all enumerated rights—ranging from life and security of the person through freedom of expression, movement, association, and employment and the right to a fair trial to equality before the law—are organized. It appears as Art. I.1: **“Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”** Art. I.3 explains that the enumerated rights follow: “**The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary as directly applicable law.”** Other, enumerated rights are subject to proportionality analysis, through which they can be restricted in light of each other so as to give effect to a consistent system of rights. The right to dignity is the basis of the state’s power to legislate **and so is not subject to any limitation,** even in light of the enumerated rights falling under it, **because—**to put it in explicitly Kantian terms—citizens could not give themselves a law that turned them into mere objects.

## Advocacy

#### I affirm – appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. CPS and Pics affirm because they don’t disprove my general thesis. I’ll defend neg preferences on specification as long as it doesn’t change the principle of my aff - check spec in CX.

## Offense

#### 1] Private entities are incapable of making omnilateral decisions as privatization entails that they withhold information which limits deliberation over making maxims.

Chiara Cordelli 2016, University of Chicago, Political Science & the College [cordelli@uchicago.edu](mailto:cordelli@uchicago.edu) https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/What-is-Wrong-With-Privatization\_UCB.pdf

The intrinsic wrong of privatization, I will suggest, rather consists in the creation of an institutional arrangement that, by its very constitution, denies those who are subject to it equal freedom. I understand freedom as an interpersonal relationship of reciprocal independence. To be free is not to be subordinated to another person’s unilateral will. By building on an analytical reconstruction of Kant’s Doctrine of Right, I will argue that current forms of privatization reproduce (to a different degree) within a civil condition the very same defects that Kant attributes to the state of nature, or to a pre-civil condition, thereby making a rightful condition of reciprocal independence impossible. Importantly, this is so even if private actors are publicly authorized through contract and subject to regulations, and even if they are committed to reason in accordance with the public good. The reason for this, as I will explain, derives from the fact that private agents are constitutionally incapable of acting omnilaterally, even if their actions are omnilaterally authorized by government through some delegation mechanism, e.g. a voluntary contract. Omnilateralness, I will suggest, must be understood as a function of 1) rightful judgment and 2) unity. By rightful judgment I mean the capacity to reason publicly and to make universal rules that are valid for everyone, according to a juridical ideal of right, as necessary to solve the problem of the unilateral imposition of private wills on others. By unity I mean the capacity to make rules and decisions that change the normative situation of others, as a part of a unified system of decision-making. The condition of unity is crucial, as I shall later explain, insofar as there might be multiple interpretations compatible with rightful judgment, which would still problematically leave the definition of people’s rightful entitlements indeterminate. Further, the practical realization of the juridical idea of an omnilateral will, I will contend, requires embeddedness within a shared collective practice of decision-making. In practice, rightful judgment can only obtain when certain shared background frameworks that structure practical reasoning and confer unity to that reasoning are in place. The rules of public administration and the authority structure of bureaucracy should be understood as playing this essential function of giving empirical and practical reality to the omnilateral will, as far as the execution of rules and the concrete definition of entitlements are concerned. Together, these two requirements are necessary, (whether they are also sufficient is a different question), to make an action the omnilateral action of a state, which has the moral power to change the normative situation of citizens, by fixing the content of their rights and duties in accordance with the equal freedom of all. The phenomenon of privatization thus raises the fundamental questions of why we need political institutions to begin with, and what makes an action an action of the state. Insofar as private agents make decisions that fundamentally alter the normative situation (the rights and duties) of citizens, and insofar as, by definition, private agents are not public officials embedded in that shared collective practice, their decisions, even if well intentioned and authorized through contract, cannot count as omnilateral acts of the state. They rather and necessarily remain unilateral acts of men. Hence, I will conclude, for the very same reasons that we have, following Kant, a duty to exit the state of nature so as to solve the twofold problems of the unilateral imposition of will on others and the indeterminacy of rights, we also have a duty to limit privatization and to support, on normative grounds, a case for the re-bureaucratization of certain functions. Therefore, my paper provides foundational reasons to agree with Richard Rorty’s nonfoundational defense of bureaucracy as stated in the opening epigraph, since only agents who are appropriately embedded within a bureaucratic structure, properly understood, are, in many cases, capable of acting omnilaterally. The “bosses” I am here concerned with are not primarily those who 5 can unilaterally impose their will on us in their capacity as private employers, but rather any private actor who acts unilaterally while in the garb of the state.

#### 2] Space Exploration is non universalizable - Entails that everyone leaves Earth which means that no one would be around to create the means to leave earth

#### 3] Space is not subject to property rights – a). It has no physical manifestation as space is by definition the absence of matter which means it cannot be measured, bordered, or divided, thus it cannot be owned b). Owning unexplored planets/space is incoherent – there could be other agents there, and it can’t be deemed an agents property lest agents have a rational conception of it.

#### 4] In outer space, there is no governing authority and thus claiming property imposes your will over others.

Stilz, 9 (Anna Stilz, Anna Stilz is Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. , 2009, accessed on 12-18-2021, Muse.jhu, "Project MUSE - Liberal Loyalty", https://muse.jhu.edu/book/30179)//phs st

It might seem, then, that Kant, like Simmons, would hold that although our acquired rights are initially indefinite, our private acts of appropria- tion in a state of nature can function to more clearly delimit their contours. Once I appropriate an external object—for example, my piece of land in the state of nature—the boundaries of my right to external freedom might simply be equivalent to those of the things and spaces that I have appropriated. If this were so, then individuals could succeed in more precisely defining property without the help of the state, and simply by coordinating expectations based on their private acts. In order to respect and acknowledge my external freedom, on this view, you would just have to cede me the spot I have rightfully occupied and to refrain from infringing on my choices within that sphere. Yet Kant does not take this position: he argues that the rights made possible by the postulate of practical reason are problematic. Whatever rights our private acts of appropriation outside the state confer upon us can only be understood as provisional rights, that is, they are not conclusive and settled (peremp- torische): indeed, for him, “It is possible to have something external as one’s own only in a rightful condition, giving laws publicly, that is, a civil condition” (MM, 6:255). What is the problem with these private methods of defining our rights to property? Why are they so unsatisfactory, from Kant’s perspective? The essential problem with acquiring property rights in a state of nature, for Kant, seems to be that we cannot unilaterally—through private will— impose a new obligation on other persons to respect our property that they would not otherwise have had.30 “By my unilateral choice I cannot bind another to refrain from using a thing, an obligation he would not otherwise have; hence I can do this only through the united choice of all who possess it in common” (MM, 6:261).31 Even claiming to interpret the a priori general will on another person’s behalf, says Kant, is at- tempting to impose a law on them on my own private authority, since every act of appropriation is “the giving of a law that holds for everyone” (MM, 6:253).32 And he worries that this claim to private authority over others is a potential source of injustice: “Now when someone makes ar- rangements about another, it is always possible for him to do the other wrong; but he can never do wrong in what he decides upon with regard to himself (for volenti non fit inuria)” (MM, 6:314). My will to appro- priate, in the belief that my appropriation is justifiable to others, cannot yet serve as a (coercive) law for everyone else, because it cannot put them under an obligation. Kant suggests, in other words, that figuring out how to carve up shares of the external world consistently with everyone’s freedom does not ex- haust the entire problem of justice involved in acquiring rights to prop- erty. We might appeal to criteria of salience or convention to help coordi- nate our expectations on which of the many possible property distributions to choose. But we face an additional difficulty: how do we impose one of these distributions without at the same time arrogating to ourselves the private authority to lay down the law for an equally free being, one who has an innate right not to be constrained by our private will? In coercing someone to respect our view of our property rights, we are also necessarily claiming the right to impose our private will upon that person. If it is to really respect everyone’s freedom, Kant thinks, a property distribution cannot be unilaterally imposed in this way. This additional dimension of the problem of justly acquiring rights— the problem of unilateral imposition—is rooted in each person’s basic “right to do what seems right and good to him and not to be dependent upon another’s opinion about this” (MM, 6:312). This right to do what seems right and good to him derives from the moral equality of persons: no one has an innate right to decide in another person’s behalf. And be- cause each person is an equally authoritative judge, it is therefore impossi- ble—in a state of nature—to put [them] under an obligation of justice that [they] himself does not recognize. The will of all others except for himself, which proposes to put him under obligation to give up a certain possession, is merely unilateral, and hence has as little lawful force in denying him possession as he has in asserting it (since this can be found only in a general will). (MM, 6:257) In conditions of equal authority—such as those that exist in any state of nature—one is obligated only by what one recognizes, by one’s own lights, as an objectively valid requirement of justice. For that reason, no other person’s merely unilateral will can bind one in the face of one’s own disagreement. Kant concludes from this that “no particular will can be legislative for the commonwealth” (TP, 8:295), since no private person’s will can effec- tively claim to impose an obligation on others. Instead, Kant says that “all right,” that is to say all claims that impose binding duties on others, “depends on laws” (TP, 8:294). Law overcomes the problem of unilater- alism inherent in imposing new obligations on others on one’s own au- thority, by substituting an omnilateral will in place of a unilateral one: “Only the concurring and united will of all, insofar as each decides the same thing for all, and all for each, and so only the general united will of the people, can be legislative” (MM, 6:314). But why is law—imposed from a public perspective—consistent with everyone’s freedom in a way that particular wills—based on our private judgments—are not? Fundamentally, Kant argues that defining and enforcing both our rights over our bodies and our rights to external objects through public and nonarbitrary laws is the only way to secure ourselves against the coercive interference of other private persons in our affairs. For Kant, then, the only sort of property distribution to which we could all hypothetically consent must necessarily be one that is defined and enforced by the state, since all privately enforced distributions have the inevitable side-effect of subjecting us to the wills of others. To show this in more detail, Kant points out two different ways that unilateral private enforcement under- mines our right to independence: first, through unilateral interpretation— a particularly pervasive problem in the enforcement of property rights, since these rights are fully conventional in a way our rights over our bod- ies are not; and second, through unilateral coercion, which threatens in- terference by others in all our rights, both our rights over our bodies and our rights over external things.

#### 5] In the state of nature, everyone is an equal arbitrator of justice – that makes rights violations impossible to resolve.

Stilz 2 (Anna Stilz, Anna Stilz is Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. , 2009, accessed on 12-18-2021, Muse.jhu, "Project MUSE - Liberal Loyalty", https://muse.jhu.edu/book/30179)//phs st

The Problem of Unilateral Interpretation Kant centrally appeals to the idea that to conclusively possess a right, it must be an objective right, rather than a subjective right based on one individual’s private interpretation of what justice requires. A subjective right is an individual’s good-faith belief about his rights: this belief gives him title to coerce others to keep off his property or to allow him bodily inviolability. But it does not yet place other people under a correlative duty. That would be so only if all individuals shared [their] interpretation of justice. But since individuals are equally authoritative judges in the state of nature, whenever they do not share another person’s belief about jus- tice, his belief imposes no duty on them at all. Instead, they are obliged only by the duties imposed by their own good-faith interpretation of jus- tice, which may not be concordant with his. It might be said, by someone of a more Lockean persuasion, that one of these competing interpreta- tions is the one that simply is valid as a matter of moral fact. That may be so. But as long as we remain in a state of nature, even this true view of right must remain unrealized, since each person, being an equally au- thoritative judge, has a right to enforce [their] own interpretation of justice, which means the true view of right places the person under no duties when it does not correspond with the person’s own. So as long as we remain our own judges and self-enforcers, there is no means by which we might establish which interpretation of right is morally valid without claiming the authority to serve as judge in another person’s behalf and forcibly subject the person to our will. And to claim that authority over someone else, Kant thinks, is refuse to recognize a person’s independence as an equally free being. For this reason, Kant thinks a procedure for the determination of objec- tive rights is a constitutive feature of justice, since a common process of adjudication is logically necessary if anyone’s rights are to impose any objective duties on other people.33 Objective rights are rights that are de- termined through such a process of adjudication, and that impose recog- nizable duties on us even when we disagree about what justice requires. If each person is threatened with violence every time another person’s private interpretation of justice disagrees with her own, [they] cannot possi- bly enjoy a secure sphere of freedom, since this other person is able to interfere with it whenever he sees fit. Instead, it is a constitutive part of justice that there be one univocal interpretation of the rights and duties to which everyone is subject, because only then can people securely enjoy independence from each other. Part of what justice demands, then, is a mechanism by which people can have their rights guaranteed in the exter- nal world without depending on the concordance of other people’s beliefs. Justice cannot be attained in the absence of such a procedure: only once it is in place are we fully independent of interference by other people, as we have an innate claim to be. To see how the unilateralism of interpretation undermines indepen- dence, imagine for a moment that you and I are state-of-nature neighbors. Say we have managed to resolve the indeterminacy of our property rights somewhat, perhaps by appropriating only in accordance with our inter- pretation of Kant’s a priori general will, or by coordinating our expecta- tions based on the most salient just system. So we have hit on some right- ful boundary that sets off your property from mine, such that if I desire to live side by side with you in peace, simply by respecting your basic rights, I ought to be able to do so. Let’s call our initial “property-owning” equilibrium E1. Now suppose some dispute arises between us over whether your prop- erty right has in fact been infringed. Perhaps I have built a huge garage in my area, which blocks the sunlight to your property and makes your gar- den unusable. Any number of examples are possible; what unites them all is that they represent new contingencies, the disposition of which is going to be indefinite enough according to whatever original criterion of appro- priation we are working with to make it likely parties acting in good faith might disagree. In our state-of-nature system, however, the interpretation of what right actually requires in this contingency is left up to you, along with the choice of whether or not to exercise your coercive rights to re- dress any (perceived) violation. So let’s say that you decide my garage is a violation of your acquired rights, since it makes your entire garden unusable, and so you cross our boundary in order to prevent me from blocking the light and to exact compensation from me. If I do not agree with your interpretation of your rights, I am under no obligation to submit to you: I am an equally authori- tative interpreter of justice. I may object to the rightfulness of your bound- ary-crossing in this case, or, even if I concede that you had a right to exact punishment, I may (in all good faith) think that you have exceeded the bounds of the compensation you are entitled to. So I may struggle against you, and regard myself as doing so rightfully. In this situation we both regard ourselves as having a claim of justice, and since we both act in good faith, we act with full subjective right. But in our state of nature, the only thing that can decide the matter between us is a contest of strength, since both sides are equally right from their point of view. As Jeremy Waldron puts it: there is an affront to the idea of justice when force is used by opposing sides, confrontationally and contradictorily, in justice’s name. The point of using force in the name of justice is to assure people of that to which they are entitled. But if force is being used to further contradic- tory ends, then its connection with assurance is ruptured.3 Let’s say that in this case you are the stronger, and that you succeed in demolishing my garage and in exacting what you regard as rightful com- pensation for my supposed infringement—say, one-quarter of my prop- erty. Now we have a new property-owning equilibrium, E2, in which you possess 125 percent of our combined share and I possess only 75 percent. And keeping with our initial assumption that both parties were acting in good faith, with full subjective right, this new equilibrium would not have come about unrightfully. Yet there is a real sense in which I retain a claim here, since the only reason you now possess more of the total is that you were stronger, not that I was convinced by your interpretation of justice. But the bounds of our sphere of control in the external world ought not to depend on the contingencies of who is stronger, and our innate independence ought not to be subject to continual interference by others who may coerce us at any moment in accordance with their private views. For this reason, Kant thinks it is a constitutive feature of justice that it be administered by an authoritative legal system, which can impose one set of objective rules about what constitutes an infringement of property—rules we must re- spect even when we disagree about what justice requires—and adjudicate our conflicting claims in a way that is consistent with our continued inde- pendence from each other. The idea is that if we want to possess claims that, as objective rights, are actually respected by others in the external world, we will need to recognize one and only one common set of rules about rights, not a variety of competing private interpretations that coer- cively struggle for the upper hand.

## Underview

#### Interpretation: The negative must concede to the affirmative’s framework if the standard is consistency with universalizable ethics.

#### B. Violation: It’s pre-emptive

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Time skew – Shifting the burden structure in the 1N nullifies 6 minutes of the AC which creates a 7-13 skew. It’s impossible to recover because neg speeches are on balance longer than the next aff speech. Infinite abuse since they’ll just spread me out and blow up whatever im forced to drop.

#### 2. Prep Skew – I can’t cut offense under their framework in 4 minutes of prep, whereas they can engage since the aff is disclosed 30 minutes before the round and you have access to unique positions like T, NIBs, and CPs.

### Theory

#### 1] Aff gets 1AR theory because otherwise the neg can engage in infinite abuse, making debate impossible. It’s DTD and no RVIs, and Competing Interps– the 1AR is too short for theory and substance so ballot implications are key to check abuse and they can dump 6 minutes of answers to a short argument and make the 2AR impossible, and 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time.

#### 2] Aff theory highest layer of the round – they get thirteen minutes on theory vs our seven minutes – they’ll say we can read 1AC theory but we can’t preempt every possible abuse story and don’t allow new 2NR theory or paradigm issues – makes the aff always lose since there’s no way to cover everything in the 2AR, and paradigm issues can be contested in the 1NC.

#### Permissibility and Presumption:

#### They affirm:

#### 1] If not, we’d have to have a proactive justification to do things like drinking water.

#### 2] Linguistics:

#### University of Missouri no date University of Missouri, "Ethical Theory," no date, University of Missouri School of Medicine, accessed 6 September 2021, [https://medicine.missouri.edu/centers-institutes-labs/health-ethics/faq/theory //](https://medicine.missouri.edu/centers-institutes-labs/health-ethics/faq/theory%20//) OHS BO]

Expanding the category of “morally right” to include three different subcategories better captures the distinctions we want:

1. morally wrong
2. morally right
   1. morally neutral
   2. morally obligatory
   3. morally supererogatory

#### 3] Logically safer since it’s better to be supererogatory than to fail to meet an obligation.

#### 4] If I told you my name was Bryce, you’d believe me until it was proven otherwise.

#### 5] We wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason.

#### 6] Reciprocity – aff proving obligation means it’s reciprocal for the neg to prove negative obligation.

### FW

#### [1] Aggregation fails – a) there’s no brightline for impact weighing – 10 headaches don’t make a migraine b) perceptions of pain and pleasure differ, which is why masochists exist, which disproves motivation and pleasure’s intrinsic goodness.

#### [2] Prediction fails – util relies on predicting the future, but policymakers are worse than monkeys, which takes out all their impacts insofar as they are reliant on predictions.

**Menand 05** Louis Menand, professor of English at Harvard University, “Everybody’s An Expert” 27 November 2005, The New Yorker, accessed 7 September 2021, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert//> FSU SS recut

Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, [e.g.] economic growth), or less of something (repression, [e.g.] recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

#### [3] We don’t know if an action is bad until after it happens, which means obligations can’t be formed

#### [4] Infinite consequences – every consequence causes another consequence – when do we evaluate “the consequence?”

#### [5] Induction fails –we know induction works because it has in the past – that relies on induction and is circular.

#### [6] Calculative regress – util requires us to calculate the morality and time spent on calculation, leading to infinite regress and halting action.

#### The role of the ballot is to determine the truth or falsity of the resolution.

#### [1] Every statement is a question of truth – for example, saying “the res is false” is the same as saying, “it is true that the res is false.” That means other ROTBs collapse to truth testing.

#### [2] Inclusion – their ROTB excludes all strategies but theirs, which is bad for inclusive debates because people without comprehensive debate knowledge are shut out of your scholarship which turns their ROTB.

#### [3] Inclusion – their ROTB excludes all strategies but theirs, which is bad for inclusive debates because people without comprehensive debate knowledge are shut out of your scholarship which turns their ROTB.

#### [4] Isomorphism – ROTBs that aren’t phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms necessitate that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem. Truth testing is a binary of truth or falsity – there isn’t a closest estimate.

# 1AR

#### A. Interpretation: Debaters must only read ONE theory or T shell that is independently sufficient to win them the round

#### B. Violation: They read multiple.

#### The standard is norming – a) we can’t accurately test the validity of norms cuz I’m spread too thin, and b) more less means less true means – their model incentivizes spamming no-risk shells and collapsing to whatever we inevitably undercover.

#### Norming is a voter and outweighs – a) sequencing – it’s the only way to uphold other voters, and b) all voters beg the question of what norms or interpretations are consistent with their impacts.

#### Read the interps as a combo shell – it’s easy to win which solves and link turns the counterinterp.

**Reject answers – you can just read the interps as a combo shell.**

#### This shell outweighs since it constraints whether you can evaluate the initial shells and serves as a counter-interp to their shell and it’s a meta-constraint to all their shells because it indicts the practice.