# Lex r3 AC

## Fwk – Syllogisms

## Syllogism

**The meta-ethic is non-naturalism – ethics are derived from a priori principles.**

**Prefer:**

**1] Empirical Uncertainty- Only internal knowledge can be trusted. Experience is corrupt – we could be dreaming, hallucinating, or being deceived by an evil demon. Infinitely outweighs because ethics would be escapable and therefore pointless.**

#### 2] Constitutivism- Only a priori knowledge exists across all subjects, empirics vary.

#### 3] Is/ought gap- Empirics tell us what is, not what ought to be. Descriptions can’t prove ought statements; only internal knowledge can prove oughts.

#### 4] Infinite regress – we can always ask “why should I follow this framework,” leading to infinite regress, but asking for a reason for reason concedes its authority, meaning only my framework solves for regress

#### 5] Only agency is inescapable – reasoning whether to engage in a practice is conducted external to that practice through intentional agency: this is exercising rationality. Even the assessment whether to be an agent is itself an instance of practical reasoning that is exclusively the role of agency.

#### Thus the standard is consistency with universalizable ethics

#### 1] Reason implies universalizability

Korsgaard 85

Korsgaard, Christine M. 1985. Kant's formula of universal law. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66, no. 1-2: 24-47. <http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3201869> //ACCS JM

A few lines later, Kant says that this is equivalent to acting as though your maxim were by your will to become a law of nature, and he uses this latter formulation in his examples of how the imperative is to be applied. Elsewhere, Kant specifies that the test is whether you could will the universalization for a system of nature "of which you yourself were a part" (C2 69/72); and in one place he characterizes the moral agent as asking "what sort of world he would create under the guidance of practical reason, . . . a world into which, moreover, he would place himself as a member." 2 But how do you determine whether or not you can will a given maxim as a law of nature? Since the will is practical reason, and since everyone must arrive at the same conclusions in matters of duty, it cannot be the case that what you are able to will is a matter of personal taste, or relative to your individual desires. Rather, the question of what you can will is a question of what you can will without contradiction.

#### 2] Non-contradiction – there is no world in which p and ~p are both true. Acting recognizes the validity of others to take the action, which makes universal maxims a logical side constraint to other frameworks.

#### 3] Absent universal ethics morality becomes arbitrary and fails to guide action, making ethics useless

#### Prefer Additionally

#### 1] Performativity – freedom is key to argumentation. Abiding by their ethical theory presupposes we own ourselves, making it incoherent to justify a standard without first willing ours.

#### 2] Other frameworks collapse – they contain conditional obligations which derive authority from the categorical imperative.

Korsgaard 96 Christine M. Korsgaard, professor of philosophy at Harvard University, introduction to “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,” 1996, Cambridge University Press, accessed 6 September 2021 pg. xvii-xviii, https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/blog.nus.edu.sg/dist/c/1868/files/2012/12/Kant-Groundwork-ng0pby.pdf AG recut

This is the sort of thing that makes even practiced readers of Kant gnash their teeth. A rough translation might go like this: the categorical imperative is a law, to which our maxims must conform. But the reason they must do so cannot be that there is some further condition they must meet, or some other law to which they must conform. For instance, **suppose someone proposed that one must keep one's promises because it is the will of God that one should do so - the law would then "contain the condition" that our maxims should conform to the will of God**. This would yield only a conditional requirement to keep one's promises — if you would obey the will of God, then you must keep your promises - whereas the categorical imperative must give us an unconditional requirement. Since there can be no such condition, all that remains is that the categorical imperative should tell us that our maxims themselves must be laws - that is, that they must be universal, that being the characteristic of laws. There is a simpler way to make this point. What could make it true that we must keep our promises because it is the will of God? **That would be true only if it were true that we must indeed obey the will of God, that is, if "obey the will of God" were itself a categorical imperative. Conditional requirements give rise to a regress; if there are unconditional requirements, we must at some point arrive at principles on which we are required to act, not because we are commanded to do so by some yet higher law, but because they are laws in themselves. The categorical imperative, in the most general sense, tells us to act on those principles**, principles which are themselves laws. Kant continues:

#### 3] Resource disparities – focus on evidence and statistics puts small school debaters without huge files at a disadvantage, but my framework can be won without prep, which means it’s theoretically preferable and controls the i/l to other voters because accessing the debate space is a prerequisite.

#### 4] Actor specificity—societies are just conglomerates of reasoners.

**Laurence 11** Ben Laurence 2011 (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago) “An Anscombean Approach to Collective Action” in Ford and Hornsby, Eds. Essays on Anscombe's Intention (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) 293-294

“It is enough that the same order displayed in collective actionexplanation can also be represented as a set of rational transitions justifying the actions undertaken by members of a group in light of a shared objective. In this way, whether or not there is strictly speaking a unitary knowing subject of the whole action, we can still see the actions in question as recommended by reasoning. This reasoning will not, of course, occur through the exercise of a separate practical reason possessed by the group, but rather through the reasoning of the individual members as the execute their shared objective. We might sum this up by saying that just as a collective agent can only act through the actions of its individual members, it can only know through their knowing, and reason through their reasoning.**”**

#### 5] Real world education: an understanding of Kantianism is key to understanding the law in the real world because most states abide by inviolable side-constraints in their constitutions—Germany proves.

**Ripstein 09** Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 2009

Strictly speaking, the right to dignity is not an enumerated right in the German Basic Law [says], but the organizing principle under which all enumerated rights—ranging from life and security of the person through freedom of expression, movement, association, and employment and the right to a fair trial to equality before the law—are organized. It appears as Art. I.1: **“Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”** Art. I.3 explains that the enumerated rights follow: “**The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary as directly applicable law.”** Other, enumerated rights are subject to proportionality analysis, through which they can be restricted in light of each other so as to give effect to a consistent system of rights. The right to dignity is the basis of the state’s power to legislate **and so is not subject to any limitation,** even in light of the enumerated rights falling under it, **because—**to put it in explicitly Kantian terms—citizens could not give themselves a law that turned them into mere objects.

## Advocacy

#### I affirm – appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. CPS and Pics affirm because they don’t disprove my general thesis. I’ll defend neg preferences on specification as long as it doesn’t change the principle of my aff - check spec in CX.

## Offense

#### 1] Private entities are incapable of making omnilateral decisions as privatization entails that they withhold information which limits deliberation over making maxims.

Chiara Cordelli 2016, University of Chicago, Political Science & the College [cordelli@uchicago.edu](mailto:cordelli@uchicago.edu) https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/What-is-Wrong-With-Privatization\_UCB.pdf

The intrinsic wrong of privatization, I will suggest, rather consists in the creation of an institutional arrangement that, by its very constitution, denies those who are subject to it equal freedom. I understand freedom as an interpersonal relationship of reciprocal independence. To be free is not to be subordinated to another person’s unilateral will. By building on an analytical reconstruction of Kant’s Doctrine of Right, I will argue that current forms of privatization reproduce (to a different degree) within a civil condition the very same defects that Kant attributes to the state of nature, or to a pre-civil condition, thereby making a rightful condition of reciprocal independence impossible. Importantly, this is so even if private actors are publicly authorized through contract and subject to regulations, and even if they are committed to reason in accordance with the public good. The reason for this, as I will explain, derives from the fact that private agents are constitutionally incapable of acting omnilaterally, even if their actions are omnilaterally authorized by government through some delegation mechanism, e.g. a voluntary contract. Omnilateralness, I will suggest, must be understood as a function of 1) rightful judgment and 2) unity. By rightful judgment I mean the capacity to reason publicly and to make universal rules that are valid for everyone, according to a juridical ideal of right, as necessary to solve the problem of the unilateral imposition of private wills on others. By unity I mean the capacity to make rules and decisions that change the normative situation of others, as a part of a unified system of decision-making. The condition of unity is crucial, as I shall later explain, insofar as there might be multiple interpretations compatible with rightful judgment, which would still problematically leave the definition of people’s rightful entitlements indeterminate. Further, the practical realization of the juridical idea of an omnilateral will, I will contend, requires embeddedness within a shared collective practice of decision-making. In practice, rightful judgment can only obtain when certain shared background frameworks that structure practical reasoning and confer unity to that reasoning are in place. The rules of public administration and the authority structure of bureaucracy should be understood as playing this essential function of giving empirical and practical reality to the omnilateral will, as far as the execution of rules and the concrete definition of entitlements are concerned. Together, these two requirements are necessary, (whether they are also sufficient is a different question), to make an action the omnilateral action of a state, which has the moral power to change the normative situation of citizens, by fixing the content of their rights and duties in accordance with the equal freedom of all. The phenomenon of privatization thus raises the fundamental questions of why we need political institutions to begin with, and what makes an action an action of the state. Insofar as private agents make decisions that fundamentally alter the normative situation (the rights and duties) of citizens, and insofar as, by definition, private agents are not public officials embedded in that shared collective practice, their decisions, even if well intentioned and authorized through contract, cannot count as omnilateral acts of the state. They rather and necessarily remain unilateral acts of men. Hence, I will conclude, for the very same reasons that we have, following Kant, a duty to exit the state of nature so as to solve the twofold problems of the unilateral imposition of will on others and the indeterminacy of rights, we also have a duty to limit privatization and to support, on normative grounds, a case for the re-bureaucratization of certain functions. Therefore, my paper provides foundational reasons to agree with Richard Rorty’s nonfoundational defense of bureaucracy as stated in the opening epigraph, since only agents who are appropriately embedded within a bureaucratic structure, properly understood, are, in many cases, capable of acting omnilaterally. The “bosses” I am here concerned with are not primarily those who 5 can unilaterally impose their will on us in their capacity as private employers, but rather any private actor who acts unilaterally while in the garb of the state.

#### 2] Space Exploration is non universalizable - Entails that everyone leaves Earth which means that no one would be around to create the means to leave earth

#### 3] Space is not subject to property rights – a). It has no physical manifestation as space is by definition the absence of matter which means it cannot be measured, bordered, or divided, thus it cannot be owned b). Owning unexplored planets/space is incoherent – there could be other agents there, and it can’t be deemed an agents property lest agents have a rational conception of it.

#### 4] In outer space, there is no governing authority and thus claiming property imposes your will over others.

Stilz, 9 (Anna Stilz, Anna Stilz is Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. , 2009, accessed on 12-18-2021, Muse.jhu, "Project MUSE - Liberal Loyalty", https://muse.jhu.edu/book/30179)//phs st

It might seem, then, that Kant, like Simmons, would hold that although our acquired rights are initially indefinite, our private acts of appropria- tion in a state of nature can function to more clearly delimit their contours. Once I appropriate an external object—for example, my piece of land in the state of nature—the boundaries of my right to external freedom might simply be equivalent to those of the things and spaces that I have appropriated. If this were so, then individuals could succeed in more precisely defining property without the help of the state, and simply by coordinating expectations based on their private acts. In order to respect and acknowledge my external freedom, on this view, you would just have to cede me the spot I have rightfully occupied and to refrain from infringing on my choices within that sphere. Yet Kant does not take this position: he argues that the rights made possible by the postulate of practical reason are problematic. Whatever rights our private acts of appropriation outside the state confer upon us can only be understood as provisional rights, that is, they are not conclusive and settled (peremp- torische): indeed, for him, “It is possible to have something external as one’s own only in a rightful condition, giving laws publicly, that is, a civil condition” (MM, 6:255). What is the problem with these private methods of defining our rights to property? Why are they so unsatisfactory, from Kant’s perspective? The essential problem with acquiring property rights in a state of nature, for Kant, seems to be that we cannot unilaterally—through private will— impose a new obligation on other persons to respect our property that they would not otherwise have had.30 “By my unilateral choice I cannot bind another to refrain from using a thing, an obligation he would not otherwise have; hence I can do this only through the united choice of all who possess it in common” (MM, 6:261).31 Even claiming to interpret the a priori general will on another person’s behalf, says Kant, is at- tempting to impose a law on them on my own private authority, since every act of appropriation is “the giving of a law that holds for everyone” (MM, 6:253).32 And he worries that this claim to private authority over others is a potential source of injustice: “Now when someone makes ar- rangements about another, it is always possible for him to do the other wrong; but he can never do wrong in what he decides upon with regard to himself (for volenti non fit inuria)” (MM, 6:314). My will to appro- priate, in the belief that my appropriation is justifiable to others, cannot yet serve as a (coercive) law for everyone else, because it cannot put them under an obligation. Kant suggests, in other words, that figuring out how to carve up shares of the external world consistently with everyone’s freedom does not ex- haust the entire problem of justice involved in acquiring rights to prop- erty. We might appeal to criteria of salience or convention to help coordi- nate our expectations on which of the many possible property distributions to choose. But we face an additional difficulty: how do we impose one of these distributions without at the same time arrogating to ourselves the private authority to lay down the law for an equally free being, one who has an innate right not to be constrained by our private will? In coercing someone to respect our view of our property rights, we are also necessarily claiming the right to impose our private will upon that person. If it is to really respect everyone’s freedom, Kant thinks, a property distribution cannot be unilaterally imposed in this way. This additional dimension of the problem of justly acquiring rights— the problem of unilateral imposition—is rooted in each person’s basic “right to do what seems right and good to him and not to be dependent upon another’s opinion about this” (MM, 6:312). This right to do what seems right and good to him derives from the moral equality of persons: no one has an innate right to decide in another person’s behalf. And be- cause each person is an equally authoritative judge, it is therefore impossi- ble—in a state of nature—to put [them] under an obligation of justice that [they] himself does not recognize. The will of all others except for himself, which proposes to put him under obligation to give up a certain possession, is merely unilateral, and hence has as little lawful force in denying him possession as he has in asserting it (since this can be found only in a general will). (MM, 6:257) In conditions of equal authority—such as those that exist in any state of nature—one is obligated only by what one recognizes, by one’s own lights, as an objectively valid requirement of justice. For that reason, no other person’s merely unilateral will can bind one in the face of one’s own disagreement. Kant concludes from this that “no particular will can be legislative for the commonwealth” (TP, 8:295), since no private person’s will can effec- tively claim to impose an obligation on others. Instead, Kant says that “all right,” that is to say all claims that impose binding duties on others, “depends on laws” (TP, 8:294). Law overcomes the problem of unilater- alism inherent in imposing new obligations on others on one’s own au- thority, by substituting an omnilateral will in place of a unilateral one: “Only the concurring and united will of all, insofar as each decides the same thing for all, and all for each, and so only the general united will of the people, can be legislative” (MM, 6:314). But why is law—imposed from a public perspective—consistent with everyone’s freedom in a way that particular wills—based on our private judgments—are not? Fundamentally, Kant argues that defining and enforcing both our rights over our bodies and our rights to external objects through public and nonarbitrary laws is the only way to secure ourselves against the coercive interference of other private persons in our affairs. For Kant, then, the only sort of property distribution to which we could all hypothetically consent must necessarily be one that is defined and enforced by the state, since all privately enforced distributions have the inevitable side-effect of subjecting us to the wills of others. To show this in more detail, Kant points out two different ways that unilateral private enforcement under- mines our right to independence: first, through unilateral interpretation— a particularly pervasive problem in the enforcement of property rights, since these rights are fully conventional in a way our rights over our bod- ies are not; and second, through unilateral coercion, which threatens in- terference by others in all our rights, both our rights over our bodies and our rights over external things.

## Underview

#### The role of the ballot is to determine the truth or falsity of the resolution.

#### [1] Linguistics – five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true. That outweighs – a) Controls the internal link to predictability and prep which is key for clash and substantive education b) Key to jurisdiction since the judge can only endorse what is within their burden c) Even if another role of the ballot is better for debate, that is not a reason it ought to be the role of the ballot, just a reason we ought to discuss it.

#### [2] Every statement is a question of truth – for example, saying “the res is false” is the same as saying, “it is true that the res is false.” That means other ROTBs collapse to truth testing.

#### [3] Inclusion – their ROTB excludes all strategies but theirs, which is bad for inclusive debates because people without comprehensive debate knowledge are shut out of your scholarship which turns their ROTB.

#### [4] Isomorphism – ROTBs that aren’t phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms necessitate that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem. Truth testing is a binary of truth or falsity – there isn’t a closest estimate.

#### Interpretation: The negative must concede to the affirmative’s framework if the standard is consistency with universalizable ethics.

#### B. Violation: It’s pre-emptive

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Time skew – Shifting the burden structure in the 1N nullifies 6 minutes of the AC which creates a 7-13 skew. It’s impossible to recover because neg speeches are on balance longer than the next aff speech. Infinite abuse since they’ll just spread me out and blow up whatever im forced to drop.

#### 2. Prep Skew – I can’t cut offense under their framework in 4 minutes of prep, whereas they can engage since the aff is disclosed 30 minutes before the round and you have access to unique positions like T, NIBs, and CPs.

### Theory

#### 1] Aff gets 1AR theory because otherwise the neg can engage in infinite abuse, making debate impossible. It’s DTD and no RVIs, and Competing Interps– the 1AR is too short for theory and substance so ballot implications are key to check abuse and they can dump 6 minutes of answers to a short argument and make the 2AR impossible, and 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time.

#### 2] Aff theory highest layer of the round – they get thirteen minutes on theory vs our seven minutes – they’ll say we can read 1AC theory but we can’t preempt every possible abuse story and don’t allow new 2NR theory or paradigm issues – makes the aff always lose since there’s no way to cover everything in the 2AR, and paradigm issues can be contested in the 1NC.

#### 3] Aff fairness comes prior to NC arguments cuz its key to compensate structural skew – proves affirming is harder – neg side bias is statistically significant

#### Shah 21 [Sachin Shah, 2021 “A Statistical Analysis of Side-Bias on the 2021 January-February Lincoln Douglas Debate Topic”, NSD Update, <http://nsdupdate.com/2021/a-statistical-study-of-side-bias-on-the-2021-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic-by-sachin-shah/>] Last Accessed 12/8/21 @9:34 p.m. - //OHS BO]

Relevancy This analysis is statistically rigorous and relevant in several aspects: (A) The data is on the current 2021 January-February topic, meaning it’s relevant to rounds these months [4]. (B) The data represents a diverse set of debating and judging styles across the country. (C) This analysis accounts for disparities in debating skill level. (D) Multiple tests validate the results. **Side Bias Trends** It is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. Of the 243 bid distributing tournaments from August 2015 to present, the negative won 52.30% of rounds (p-value < 10^-34, 99% confidence interval [51.82%, 52.78%]). Of elimination rounds, the negative won 55.85% of rounds (p-value < 10^-18, 99% confidence interval [54.16%, 57.54%]). Additionally, after fitting logistical regression to the entire dataset, the offset was found to be 12.57. That translates to 9% of rounds for the negative where the debater predicted to win changed as a result of the bias. This continues to suggest the negative side bias might be structural and not topic specific as this analysis now includes 18 topics. Although debaters commonly use theoretical arguments that negating is harder in rounds i.e., judge psychology, affirmatives speak first and last, etc., these arguments are superseded by the empirical evidence. Even if these arguments correctly point out an advantage for the affirmative, the data shows that after accounting for all advantages and disadvantages (for both sides), negating is still easier. Given a structural advantage for the negative, the affirmative may be justified in being granted a substantive advantage to compensate for the structural skew. This could take various forms such as granting the affirmative presumption ground, tiny plans, or framework choice. Whatever form chosen should be tested to ensure the skew is not unintentionally reversed.

**If the round ends up equal, it’s more likely than you think that the aff is true due to structural side bias.**

#### Permissibility and Presumption:

#### They affirm:

#### 1] If not, we’d have to have a proactive justification to do things like drinking water.

#### 2] Linguistics:

#### University of Missouri no date University of Missouri, "Ethical Theory," no date, University of Missouri School of Medicine, accessed 6 September 2021, [https://medicine.missouri.edu/centers-institutes-labs/health-ethics/faq/theory //](https://medicine.missouri.edu/centers-institutes-labs/health-ethics/faq/theory%20//) OHS BO]

Expanding the category of “morally right” to include three different subcategories better captures the distinctions we want:

1. morally wrong
2. morally right
   1. morally neutral
   2. morally obligatory
   3. morally supererogatory

#### 3] Logically safer since it’s better to be supererogatory than to fail to meet an obligation.

#### 4] If I told you my name was Bryce, you’d believe me until it was proven otherwise.

#### 5] We wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason.

#### 6] Time skew – the neg gets 7 minutes to respond to the AC and 6 minutes to respond to the 1AR, o/w cuz it controls access to the ballot.

#### 7] Reciprocity – aff proving obligation means it’s reciprocal for the neg to prove negative obligation.

### FW

#### [1] Aggregation fails – a) there’s no brightline for impact weighing – 10 headaches don’t make a migraine b) perceptions of pain and pleasure differ, which is why masochists exist, which disproves motivation and pleasure’s intrinsic goodness.

#### [2] Prediction fails – util relies on predicting the future, but policymakers are worse than monkeys, which takes out all their impacts insofar as they are reliant on predictions.

**Menand 05** Louis Menand, professor of English at Harvard University, “Everybody’s An Expert” 27 November 2005, The New Yorker, accessed 7 September 2021, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert//> FSU SS recut

Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, [e.g.] economic growth), or less of something (repression, [e.g.] recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

#### [3] We don’t know if an action is bad until after it happens, which means obligations can’t be formed

#### [4] Infinite consequences – every consequence causes another consequence – when do we evaluate “the consequence?”

#### [5] Induction fails –we know induction works because it has in the past – that relies on induction and is circular.

#### [6] Calculative regress – util requires us to calculate the morality and time spent on calculation, leading to infinite regress and halting action.

# 1AR

## K v Short

#### The safety of the space is prima facie – we don’t know who’s winning if people can’t engage. Anything that doesn’t immediately denounce atrocities excludes people who have and can experience them.

**Teehan** Ryan Teehan [NSD staffer and competitor from the Delbarton School] – NSD Update comment on the student protests at the TOC in 2014. //Massa

Honestly, I don't think that 99% of what has been said in this thread so far actually matters. It doesn't matter whether you think that these types of assumptions should be questioned. It doesn't matter what accepting this intuition could potentially do or not do. It doesn't matter if you see fit to make, incredibly trivializing and misplaced I might add, links between this and the Holocaust. **All** of the **arguments that talk about how** debate isa **unique** space for questioning assumptions **make** an assumption of safety. They say that this is a space where one is safe to question assumptions and try new perspectives. **That is not true** for everyone. When we allow arguments that question the wrongness of racism, sexism, homophobia**, rape**, lynching, etc., we make debate unsafe for certain people. The idea that debate is a safe space to question all assumptions is the definition of privilege, it begins with an idea of a debater that can question every assumption. People who face the actual effects of the aforementioned things cannot question those assumptions, and making debate a space built around the idea that they can is hostile. So, you really have a choice. Either 1) say that you do not want these people to debate so that you can let people question the wrongness of everything I listed before, 2) say that you care more about letting debaters question those things than making debate safe for everyone, or 3) make it so that saying things that make debate unsafe has actual repercussions. On "**debate is not the real world**". **Only for people who can separate their existence in "the real world" from their existence in debate.** That means privileged, white, heterosexual males like myself. I don't understand how you can make this sweeping claim when some people are clearly harmed by these arguments. **At the end of the day, you have to figure out whether you care about debate being safe for everyone** involved. I don't think anyone has contested that these arguments make debate unsafe for certain people. If you care at all about the people involved in debate then **don't vote on these arguments**. If you care about the safety and wellbeing of competitors, then don't vote on these arguments. If you don't, then I honestly don't understand why you give up your time to coach and/or judge. The pay can't be that good. I don't believe that you're just in it for the money, which is why I ask you to ask yourselves whether you can justify making debate unsafe for certain people.

#### Utilitarian calculus fails to account for moral atrocities.

Jeffrey **Gold**, Utilitarian and Deontological Approaches to Criminal Justice Ethics //Massa

According to utilitarianism, an action is moral when it produces the great-est amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. A problem arises, however, when the greatest happiness is achieved at the expense of a few. For example, if a large group were to enslave a very small group, the large group would gain **certain comforts and** luxuries (and **the** pleasure **that accompanies those comforts) as a result of the servitude of the few**. If we were to follow the utilitarian calculus strictly, the suffering of a few **(even intense suffering)** would be outweighed by the pleasure of a large enough majority. A thousand people’s modest pleasure would outweigh the suffer-ing of 10 others. Hence, utilitarianism would seem to endorse slavery when it produces the greatest total amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. This is obviously a problem for utilitarianism. Slavery and oppression are wrong regardless **of the amount of pleasure accumulated by the oppressing class.** In fact, when one person’s pleasure results from **the** suffering **of another,** the pleasure seems all the more abhorrent. The preceding case points to a weakness in utilitarianism, namely, the weak-ness in dealing with certain cases of injustice. Sometimes it is simply unjust to treat people in a certain way regardless of the pleasurable consequences for others. A gang rape is wrong even if 50 people enjoy it and only one suffers. It is wrong because it is unjust. To use Kant’s formulation, it is always wrong to treat anyone as a mere means to one’s own ends. When we enslave, rape, and oppress, we are always treating the victim as a means to our own ends.

#### Util justifies horrific conclusions, since no state of affairs could be intrinsically bad from its standpoint – it also literally doesn’t believe in rights.

**Vallentyne**, Peter. *Against Maximizing Act-Consequentialism*. **2006**, mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10355/10174/AgainstMaximizingActConsequentialism.pdf?sequence=1. //Massa

If core consequentialism is true, then any action with maximally good consequences (in a given choice situation) is permissible. The main argument in favor of this claim is the following: P1: An action is **morally** permissible if **it is best** supported by insistent moral reasons for action. P2: The value of consequences is always an insistent moral reason **for action.** P3: The value of consequences is the only insistent moral reason **for action. C:** Thus, an action is **morally** permissible if it maximizes **the value of** consequences**.** This is the same argument given in the previous section for the impermissibility of actions that do not have maximally good consequences, except that (1) the appeal to insistent reasons has been made explicit, (2) the necessary conditions of the original P1 and C have been converted to sufficient conditions, and (3) the qualification in P3 that allowed the possibility of some prior constraints has been dropped. P1 is highly plausible. An action that is best supported by insistent moral reasons is surely permissible. P2 can be challenged, as I did earlier, on the ground that beyond some point the value of consequences ceases to be an insistent moral reason (once consequences are good enough, their value may only be a non-insistent reason). For the present purposes, however, we can grant this claim. The crucial claim is P3. It is implausible, because there are insistent moral reasons other than the value of consequences. There are also deontological insistent reasons, and these, or at least some of these, are lexical prior to the value of consequences. In particular**,** individuals have certain rights that may not be infringed **simply because the consequences are better.** Unlike prudential rationality, morality involves many distinct centers of will (choice) or 15 interests**, and these** cannot simply be lumped together and traded off **against each other.**16 **The basic problem with standard versions of core consequentialism is that** they fail to recognize **adequately** the normative separateness of persons**.** Psychological autonomous beings (as well, perhaps, as other beings with moral standing) are not merely means for the promotion of value. They must be respected and honored, and this means that at least sometimes certain things may not be done to them, even though this promotes value overall. An innocent person may not be killed against her will, for example, in order to make a million happy people slightly happier. This would be sacrificing her for the benefit of others.

#### The alt is to vote neg – it’s as simple as not to vibe with oppression – as an educator it’s your job to dismiss racist, sexist, homophobic, and ableist discourse that kills the spirit of marginalized debaters.

1. <http://dictionary.com/browse/negate> (Dictionary.com, accessed 11 September 2021)

   <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate> (Merriam-Webster, accessed 11 September 2021)

   <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate> (The Free Dictionary, accessed 11 September 2021)

   <https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate> (Vocabulary.com, accessed 11 September 2021)

   <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> (Oxford Dictionaries, accessed 11 September 2021) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/affirm> (Dictionary.com, accessed 11 September 2021)

   <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/affirm> (Merriam-Webster, accessed 11 September 2021)

   <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/affirm> (The Free Dictionary, accessed 11 September 2021)

   <https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/affirm> (Vocabulary.com, accessed 11 September 2021)

   <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/affirm> (Oxford Dictionaries, accessed 11 September 2021) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)