# 1AC

### Framework

#### I affirm the resolution: Resolved; In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

#### I value democracy, defined by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 7-27-2006, "Democracy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy/>, //hzheng

“a method of collective decision making characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an essential stage of the decision-making process”

#### Prefer:

#### 1] The resolution asks about whether free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy within a democracy, which already assumes that the resolution is framed by what is best for democracy.

#### 2] Democracy is the best way to respect inherent equality. Any political system must be able to respect the fact that because we are all equally human, we all deserve equality, which means that democracy is the best system because it allows everybody to be equally represented via voting.

#### My criterion is Political Legitimacy, defined by Jorge Aragon from Saint Louis University as:

Jorge Aragon, xx-xx-xxxx, "Encyclopedia of Campaigns, Elections and Electoral Behavior," Sage Publications, <https://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/dccirp/pdfs/articlesforresourc/Article_-_Aragon_Trelles,_Jorge_2.pdf>, //hzheng

The stability and functioning of any kind of political regime—including democratic or representative ones—relies on the combination of the capacity of rulers and government officials to use coercion and the development of political legitimacy. Political legitimacy can be described as people’s recognition and acceptance of the validity of the rules of their entire political system and the decisions of their rulers. Accordingly, two things can be expected from political systems that have a considerable level of political legitimacy. First, these political systems will be more resilient to survive periods of crisis, and, second, rulers and authorities will enjoy a fundamental condition needed to formulate and implement policies in an effective manner (i.e., they will be able to make decisions and commit resources without needing to obtain approval from the ruled and without resorting to coercion for every decision). The issue of political legitimacy can therefore be considered to be of utmost importance in politics and political analysis.

#### Prefer, as the only way to ensure democracy is true democracy is through making sure the political system through which it operates is able to legitimately ensure the equality of the people and justify itself.

#### I reserve the right to define a word in a future speech if necessary.

### Definitions

#### A free press is the freedom of expression in media without limitations by others

Liberties.EU 21 [Civil Liberties Union for Europe, rights advocacy organization in Europe, 11-9-2021, "Free press: definition and role in democracy," Liberties.eu, https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/free-press/43809]/Kankee

What is free press? When we say a country has a free press, we mean that its news outlets and other publications, even individual citizens, have the right to communicate information without influence or fear of retribution from the state or other powerful entities or individuals. We often use the term “free press” and “independent journalism,” a subject we previously explored, more or less interchangeably. In modern history, a shared understanding of the principle of a free press was outlined by the United Nations in 1948. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights codifies it along with the right free speech: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference, and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.” Today, most democracies have some protection for a free press, whether this protection comes from a constitution or individual law. In Europe, a free press is protected under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and under Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. What is the purpose of a free press? The purpose of a free press is to ensure that the people are free to receive and impart information that is not manipulated or serving a particular person, entity or interest. Its duty, in fact, is often to investigate people of power, and especially the government, to ask the hard questions and to attempt to uncover what’s really happening, regardless of the political fallout. Why is freedom of the press so important?

#### Prioritize means to value something as more important than something else

Collins Dictionary No Date [Collins Dictionary, No Date, "Prioritize definition and meaning," Collins Dictionary, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/prioritize]/Kankee

Prioritize Word forms: prioritizes, prioritizing, prioritized 1. TRANSITIVE VERB If you prioritize something, you treat it as more important than other things. Prioritize your own wants rather than constantly thinking about others. 2. TRANSITIVE VERB If you prioritize the tasks that you have to do, you decide which are the most important and do them first. Make lists of what to do and prioritize your tasks.

#### Objectivity in journalism is fact-based, non-subjective reporting

McLaughlin 16 [Greg McLaughlin, senior lecturer in media and journalism at the University of Ulster, 2016, “Journalism, Objectivity and War,” The War Correspondent, https://sci-hub.se/https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt19qgf0x.7]/Kankee

objectivity under fire Objectivity in journalism has come under serious critique from academics (Glasgow University Media Group, 1976; Lichtenberg, 1996; Streckfuss, 1990; Parenti, 1993). They suggest in various ways that the news media do not simply report and reflect our social world but that they more or less play an active part in shaping, even constructing it; that they represent sectional interests rather than society as a whole.2 When these criticisms are leveled at journalists, their traditional defence is their practice of objectivity but what does it mean to be objective in journalism in the first place? According to Michael Schudson (1978), objectivity is based on the assumption that a series of ‘facts’ or truth claims about the world can be validated by the rules and procedures of a professional community. The distortions and biases, the subjective value judgements of the individual or of particular interest groups, are filtered out so that among journalists at any rate, ‘The belief in objectivity is a faith in “facts”, a distrust of “values”, and a commitment to their segregation’ (p. 6). Gaye Tuchman refers to this method as ‘a strategic ritual’, a method of newsgathering and reporting that protects the journalist from charges of bias or libel (1972, p. 661ff). Radical critiques measure journalistic claims to objectivity against analyses of how the news media produce and represent their version of reality according to sectional interests. Bias is not in the eye of the beholder but is structured within the entire news process; the news filters and constructs reality according to a dominant or institutional ideology (Glasgow University Media Group, 1976). ‘What passes for objectivity’, for American scholar Michael Parenti, ‘is the acceptance of a social reality shaped by the dominant forces of society – without any critical examination of that reality’s hidden agendas, its class interests, and its ideological biases’ (1993, p. 52). It is the difference respectively between the journalist as the professional, instutionalised reporter and the journalist as the partial eyewitness and writer. John Pilger points to the transparency of this ideology of professionalism, especially in a public service broadcaster like the BBC whose coverage of domestic and foreign crises has demonstrated its true agenda and its true allegiances: These people waffle on about objectivity as if by joining that institution or any institution they suddenly rise to this Nirvana where they can consider all points of view and produce something in five minutes. It’s nonsense and it’s made into nonsense because the moment there’s any kind of pressure on the establishment you find reporters coming clean, as they did after the Falklands. They were very truculent: ‘These were our people, our side. And now we’ll get back to being objective’. It’s the same with the term ‘balance’. I mean censorship for me always works by omission. That’s the most virulent censorship and what we have is an enormous imbalance one way, ...the accredited point of view, the sort of consensus point of view which has nothing to do with objectivity, nothing to do with impartiality and very little to do with the truth.3 The pressure to pursue objectivity in reporting has had serious consequences for journalism as a form of factual writing. James Cameron thought that ‘objectivity in some circumstances is both meaningless and impossible.’ He could not see ‘how a reporter attempting to define a situation involving some sort of ethical conflict can do it with sufficient demonstrable neutrality to fulfil some arbitrary concept of “objectivity”.’ This was not the acid test for Cameron who ‘always tended to argue that objectivity was of less importance than the truth, and that the reporter whose technique was informed by no opinion lacked a very serious dimension’ (1967, p. 72). There are, however, alternative forms of journalism that subvert the very notion of objectivity: the ‘New Journalism’ of the 1960s and what has been called ‘honest journalism’, described as a compromise between the blind assumption of impartiality and ideological commitment. War and alternative journalisms

#### Advocacy means to favor a specific viewpoint

Cambridge Dictionary No Date [Cambridge Dictionary, No Date, "advocacy," https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/advocacy]/Kankee

public support for an idea, plan, or way of doing something:

### Contention One is Inherent Good

#### Subpoint A: Objectivity is Inherently Good

#### First, any attempt to reject objectivity will necessarily be contradictory. In making the claim that “objectivity should be rejected,” my opponent also makes the claim that “it is objectively true that objectivity should be rejected,” because any statement is the same if the phrase “it is objectively true that” is added before it; otherwise, they wouldn’t be pointing to this statement as an example of truth. However, they rely on a notion of objectivity in order to reject objectivity; thus, rejecting objectivity always generates a performative contradiction. Because contradictions can’t generate truth – two plus two can’t equal both four and five – rejecting objectivity will always be incoherent.

#### Additionally, don’t let them try to argue that something is “subjectively true” – it’s incoherent, because two plus two can’t be true for me but not for you. There is objective truth and you can’t reject it.

#### Subpoint B: Constitutive Purpose

#### The point of journalism is to provide a news story; otherwise, journalism would not exist. It only exists in order to provide information. However, if journalism does not provide an unbiased news story, it is worthless insofar as it is not fulfilling its purpose – it’s a broken clock. Biased news stories are necessarily distortions of the truth, whether through exaggeration or omission; and thus, the press is not serving its purpose, and has no point in existence.

### Contention Two is Polarization

#### Partisan media is critical in the polarization of viewers – psychology proves. Levendusky 13 writes,

* Partisan Media = Polarization
  + 1st Warrant: Because subjects only see one side of the aisle, they move in that direction
  + 2nd Warrant: In partisan news, the lack of counterarguments to politically presented news causes their side to appear stronger
  + 3rd Warrant: Partisan news frames everything politically, strengthening the degree to which people view their political identities as more important
  + 4th Warrant: When subjects see partisan media on the other side of the aisle, they will attempt to counterargue it, but that requires knowing more about an issue, so they become more invested in politics on their own side to argue it more effectively
* It’s long-lasting
  + Psychology proves – citizens create positive or negative associations about certain issues, which are stored in long-term memory

Matthew S. Levendusky (University of Pennsylvania), 7-xx-2013, "Why Do Partisan Media Polarize Viewers?," Midwest Political Science Association, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23496642>, //hzheng How Partisan Media Polarize Viewers

I start from the premise that humans are motivated reasoners (Kunda 1990). Humans have two broad classes of goals: accuracy goals (the desire to reach the correct conclusion) and directional goals (the desire to reach the preferred conclusion, i.e., the conclusion that supports our existing beliefs). Human reasoning relies on both, but directional goals have an especially strong effect: we process information so that it fits with our existing beliefs. When citizens hear a news story about (say) President Obama, simply upon hearing his name, their attitudes and feelings toward him come to the fore, even without any conscious thought (a process known as "hot cognition"; see Lodge and Taber 2005; Morris et al. 2003). These thoughts and feelings about the president then shape how citizens interpret the evidence provided in the story. If the information suggests President Obama is ably handling his job, supporters of the president will uncritically accept the news, while his critics will counterargue and challenge it (a process known as disconfirmation bias; see Ditto and Lopez 1992). As a result, even balanced sets of arguments can generate attitudinal polarization (Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009; Taber and Lodge 2006). Partisan media programs intensify this motivated reasoning because of their slanted presentation of the news. Consider first how this process occurs when subjects watch like-minded media—that is, proattitudinal media that reinforce their existing beliefs, such as when a conservative Republican watches Fox News. Such programs heighten motivated reasoning for two reasons. First, these programs broadcast one-sided, proattitudinal messages to viewers, which they will uncritically accept (Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009; Taber and Lodge 2006). But absent any competing message, this general tendency to accept proattitudinal information becomes even stronger: because it lacks a counterargument of any sort, this information (implicitly) seems stronger and even more persuasive (Klayman and Ha 1987; Lodge and Taber 2001; Zaller 1996). Subjects will therefore move in the direction of the evidence and become more extreme (Moscovici and Zavalloni 1969). The type of "echo chamber" environment found in like-minded media will push viewers toward the ideological extremes, thereby polarizing their attitudes. But there is another reason why like-minded content will magnify the tendency toward attitudinal polarization. These shows present the day's news as a partisan struggle, with clear references to the political parties and their positions. This primes citizens' partisanship, strengthen[s]ing the degree to which they [citizens] see[ing] the world through partisan colored glasses (Campbell et al. [1960] 1980; Goren, Federico, and Kittleson 2009; Price 1989). Priming this sort of salient identity increases viewers' directional goals—it heightens their desire to reach a conclusion in line with their partisanship, thereby strengthening their biases toward attitudinally congenial information. Cueing partisanship increases its ability to slant how subjects see the world by strengthening the desire to engage in the motivated reasoning described above. This is consistent with work in social psychology demonstrating that priming relevant group identities, such as partisanship, increases attitudinal polarization (Abrams et al. 1990; Lee 2007). So while there is a general tendency toward attitudinal polarization in political settings simply because humans are motivated reasoners, the unique environment of like minded partisan media—with its one-sided content and partisan primes – should be especially likely to generate attitudinal polarization. This leads me to state my first hypothesis: H1: Exposure to like-minded partisan media will polarize attitudes (i.e., increase attitudinal extremity). But what happens when subjects watch cross-cutting media that presents them with counterattitudinal messages (i.e., when a Democrat watches Fox News)? Here, subjects' preferences are challenged rather than reinforced. When presented with information running counter to their prior beliefs, subjects will attempt to discredit and counterargue it (Ditto and Lopez I992; Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009; Taber and Lodge 2006). Sub- jects will therefore believe they have refuted this information, which makes the evidence supporting their own side even more persuasive, pushing them toward greater attitude extremity (Redlawsk 2002; Taber and Lodge 2006). Cross-cutting media therefore increase attitude extremity and polarization, a "boomerang" effect. H2: On average, cross-cutting media will polarize attitudes. While on average there should be a polarizing effect of cross-cutting media, that effect should be especially pronounced for a particular subset of the audience. Polarization here stems from counterarguing these cross-cutting messages, but not all viewers are equally equipped to do this-subjects need to be informed about the issue, and to care deeply about it, to effectively generate these counterarguments (Taber and Lodge 2006). The ability to do this comes from holding strong attitudes. Strong attitudes are ones where the subjects know more about the issue. and hence can more easily generate counterarguments, and the issue is more central and important to them, so they will be more motivated to generate counterarguments (Krosnick and Petty 1995). Strong attitudes therefore help subjects polarize in response to cross-cutting media (Pomerantz, Chaiken. and Tordesillas I995; Taber and Lodge 2006; Zaller 1992). H3: Exposure to cross-cutting media will especially increase attitude extremity for viewers with strong prior attitudes. How Long Do These Effects Last? One enduring concern with media persuasion studies is that such effects rapidly fade away (Druckman and Nelson 2003). But given the theoretical mechanism driving these partisan media effects, there is good reason to suspect that these effects endure, at least in the short term. While citizens use both memory-based and online processing to update their beliefs (Redlawsk 2001), online processing is more central when subjects are utilizing affect-laden motivated reasoning processes (Taber and Lodge 200]). So, for example, when citizens watch a partisan media program about gun control, they bring to mind their attitude toward gun control, update it on the spot using the new information in the segment, and then store this updated attitude in long-term memory (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh I991). Later on, viewers may not remember the specific arguments from the partisan media host that caused them to update their opinions, but they should remember their overall attitude-the details fade away, but the summary attitude remains (Lodge, Steenbcrgen, and Brau 1995). Attitudes updated in response to partisan media, then, should not immediately fade away.

#### Polarization is deeply damaging to democracy – there’s a laundry list of reasons: gridlock, intolerance, anti-activism, etc. Furthermore, it’s going to cause a self-repeating cycle where division breeds division, making the problem worse and worse. Carothers and O’Donohue 19 write,

* Polarization Bad
  + 1st Warrant: Polarization damages the three branches of government. In the judicial branch, politicians call them biased or pack the courts. In the legislative branch, it causes gridlock because the two sides can’t agree. In the executive branch, it causes presidents to think they’re only accountable to their supporters, and not those in the other party.
  + 2nd Warrant: Polarization attacks “norms of tolerance and moderation.” People hate cooperation and being tolerant of the other side, and this is exemplified in a refusal to accept the results of elections.
  + 3rd Warrant: Polarization causes those who fight for civil rights to be seen as “political,” harming their ability to make meaningful change to help minorities. The backlash to “political” activists also leads to an increase in hate crimes.
* Polarization Outweighs
  + 1st Warrant: It’s cyclical. Polarization causes polarization, as people see that the other side doesn’t like them, dislike them more, and it feeds back on itself.
  + 2nd Warrant: It can’t be solved otherwise. Politicians, the people meant to remedy problems, won’t do anything about polarization, because avid fanbases are the way they get elected, so they have no incentive to fix it.

Thomas Carothers (is the senior vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is a leading authority on international support for democracy, human rights, governance, the rule of law, and civil society) and Andrew O’Donohue (was a nonresident research assistant in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, where his research focuses on political polarization and challenges facing democratic governance), 10-1-2019, "How to Understand the Global Spread of Political Polarization," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/01/how-to-understand-global-spread-of-political-polarization-pub-79893>, //hzheng

Severe polarization damages all institutions essential to democracy. It routinely undermines the independence of the judiciary, as politicians attack the courts as biased or pack them with loyalists. It reduces legislatures either to gridlock or to a rubberstamp function. In presidential systems, it frequently leads to the abuse of executive powers and promotes the toxic view that the president represents only his or her supporters, rather than the country as a whole. Perhaps most fundamentally, polarization shatters informal but crucial norms of tolerance and moderation—like conceding peacefully after an electoral defeat—that keep political competition within bounds. These consequences generate a vicious cycle of rising polarization. Attacks on the judiciary, for example, only diminish its capacity to arbitrate conflict and heighten distrust between the opposing sides. Polarization also reverberates throughout the society as whole, poisoning everyday interactions and relationships. Turkey is a particularly jarring example: almost eight out of ten people there would not want their daughter to marry someone who votes for the party they most dislike. Nearly three-quarters would not even want to do business with such a person. Partisan conflict takes a heavy toll on civil society as well, often lead[s]ing to the demonization of activists and human rights defenders. More seriously still, divisions can contribute to a spike in hate crimes and political violence: India, Poland, and the United States have all seen such increases in recent years. The more we looked at the experiences of other divided democracies, the more we realized that U.S. polarization stands out as unusual. It has several distinctive features, and unfortunately, all of them spell trouble for U.S. democracy. In the first place, polarization in the United States isn’t primarily the result of polarizing politicians stoking divisions, as in most other countries. It has deep societal roots and is the outcome of a profound sociocultural struggle between contending conservative and progressive visions of the country. Consequently, U.S. polarization is not something that political leaders can easily reverse, even if they want to. Intense partisanship has gripped the United States for an unusually long time and thus become ingrained in social and political life. Today’s divisions date back at least to the 1960s and have been steadily intensifying for over fifty years. Most other current cases of polarization are more recent in origin. A final distinctive and perhaps even unique feature of U.S. polarization is the powerful alignment of ethnicity, ideology, and religion on each side of the divide—what we call the “iron triangle” of U.S. polarization. In most other countries, just one or two of those three identity divisions is at the root of polarization; in the United States, all three are. As a result, America’s polarization is unusually encompassing and sharp. While partisan warfare hasn’t eroded democracy in the United States to the same extent that it has in, say, Bangladesh or Turkey, it is testing our democratic guardrails in serious ways. Once a society becomes deeply divided, it is very difficult to heal. Before talking about remedial actions, it’s crucial to understand why this problem is so thorny and difficult to overcome. Polarization tends to escalate at a dizzyingly fast pace, often in the span of just a few years. Just look at how rapidly the 2016 Brexit referendum has ripped the United Kingdom apart. Polarization then entrenches itself and becomes self-perpetuating. Polarizing actions and reactions feed on each other, dragging countries into a downward spiral of anger and division. And while the consequences of polarization are punishing, they don’t necessarily galvanize a government to respond, because the politicians who play the most significant role in exacerbating polarization mostly benefit from it and bear little of the cost.

### Contention Three is Distrust of Media

#### Bias in media leads to perceived inadequacy, where citizens don’t trust media that advocates because they simply don’t think it’ll tell the full story. Sands 20 writes,

John Sands (is director for learning and impact at Knight Foundation. Follow him on Twitter at @iohnsands), 11-9-2020, "Americans are losing faith in an objective media. A new Gallup/Knight study explores why," Knight Foundation, <https://knightfoundation.org/articles/americans-are-losing-faith-in-an-objective-media-a-new-gallup-knight-study-explores-why/>, //hzheng

Americans have high aspirations for the news media to be a trusted, independent watchdog that holds the powerful to account. But in a new Gallup/Knight study, we’ve found the gap is growing between what Americans expect from the news and what they think they are getting. Perceptions of bias are increasing too, which further erodes the media’s ability to deliver on its promise to our democracy. The landmark poll of 20,000 people found that Americans’ hope for an objective media is all but lost. Instead, they see an increasing partisan slant in the news, and a media eager to push an agenda. As a result, the media’s ability to hold leaders accountable is diminished in the public’s eye. The study also explores the connections between political affiliation and attitudes toward the media, as well the public’s view on diversity in newsrooms and the connection between local news consumption, civic engagement and community attachment. A hallmark of Knight Foundation’s Trust, Media and Democracy initiative, “American Views 2020: Trust, Media and Democracy” is a biennial report based on a poll that took place over last winter. It is one of the most comprehensive surveys of public opinion on the media, and holds important implications for the future of journalism and our democracy. You can read more below, or join a discussion of the findings in partnership with the Paley Center at 2 p.m. Thursday, Aug. 6. Here are 10 findings that stood out to us: 1) Americans see increasing bias in the news media: One of the primary reasons Americans don’t think the media works for them is because of the bias they perceive in coverage. Many feel the media’s traditional roles, such as holding leaders accountable, is [are] compromised by bias, with nearly 7 in 10 Americans (68%) who say they see too much bias in the reporting of news that is supposed to be objective as “a major problem,” up from 65% in the 2017 Knight/Gallup study. They see it in their own news sources (57%), and more than 6 in 10 are concerned about bias in the news other people are getting, the survey finds. Some 7 in 10 Americans worry that owners of media companies are influencing coverage. 2) Americans think the media is pushing an agenda. Eight in 10 Americans say that when they suspect an inaccuracy in a story, they worry it was intentional —because the reporter was misrepresenting the facts (52%) or making them up (28%). Only 18% say they think the inaccuracies were innocent mistakes. And when it comes to news sources they distrust, nearly three-quarters of Americans (or 74%) say those outlets are trying to persuade people to adopt a certain opinion. 3) Distrust in the media cuts along partisan lines: Views on the media vary widely by party, though overall, Americans view the media more negatively than positively. The breakdown: Nearly 7 in 10 Republicans (67%) have a very or somewhat unfavorable opinion of the news media, versus 1 in 5 Democrats (20%) and about half of independents (48%). 4) A majority of Americans say the media are under political attack – but are divided by party on whether it’s warranted: While people from all political persuasions agree that the media is being politically attacked, 66% of Democrats say those attacks are not justified, while 58% of Republicans say they are. 5) Opinions on the media also vary widely by age. Young Americans, for example, tend to have more negative views on the media. One in 5 American adults under 30 (20%) say they have a “very” or “somewhat” favorable opinion of the news media, versus almost half of those aged 65 and older (43%). 6) Americans blame the media for political divisions, but they also see the potential for the media to heal these divides. Forty-seven percent of Americans say the media bears “a great deal” of blame for political division in this country, and 36% say they bear “a moderate amount.” At the same time, 8 in 10 Americans believe the media can bring people together and heal the nation’s political divides. 7) Americans want more newsroom diversity, but they differ on what kind. This breakdown is along party and racial lines. Democrats (47%) and Blacks (56%) prioritize racial/ethnic diversity in hiring, while Republicans (48%) and Whites (34%) prioritize ideological diversity in journalists’ political views. 8) Americans feel overwhelmed by the volume and speed of news, and the internet is making it worse. The most cited reason for information overload? The mix of news interspersed with non-news on the web, including social media (61%). How Americans cope varies. Some people (39%) turn to one or two trusted news sources, others (30%) consult a variety, and 18% stop paying attention all together. 9) Local news is closely linked to civic engagement. Here’s one of the reasons why the future of journalism matters to our democracy: People who read and watch local news are more likely to take part in important community issues, and 73% are more likely to participate in local elections. 10) Despite the findings, Americans think the media is vital for democracy. The vast majority of Americans (81%) say that the news media is “critical” (42%) or “very important” (39%) to democracy.

#### The newest studies prove – there is causation between time spent on polarized news and distrust. Huber 21 writes,

* Study Details
  + 1551 participants were taken from YouGov (international research data and analytics group). A third of them set their browser homepage to HuffPost (left-leaning), another third set their browser homepage to Fox News (right-leaning), and a third had the default browser homepage. The study found that those who spent more time on news sites had less trust in the media, and this effect continues more than a year later.

B. Rose Huber (Princeton School of Public and International Affairs), 3-29-2021, "Consuming online partisan news leads to distrust in the media," Princeton University, <https://www.princeton.edu/news/2021/03/29/consuming-online-partisan-news-leads-distrust-media>, //hzheng, bracketed for clarity

Internet users were asked to change[d] their default browser homepages to either the Huffington Post, a left-leaning news site, or Fox News, a more conservative outlet, during the 2018 U.S. midterm elections. As participants went about their daily activities, they allowed the researchers to survey them multiple times as well as to collect data on millions of web visits and their posts on Twitter. After eight weeks, the participants’ trust in the media appeared to decrease[d] and this effect remained detectable nearly a year later for visitors to both partisan news sites. Increased exposure to partisan news led to an immediate — though short-lived — boost in the number of visits to both sites, as well as improved knowledge of recent events. However, these effects did not appear to translate to changes in political attitudes, opinions or behaviors. The findings, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, illustrate a powerful new approach for studying the effects of exposure to partisan news. The results also expose a subtle, long-term effect that has eluded the attention of prior research: skepticism of the media after prolonged news exposure. “Past studies have shown links between exposure to partisan news and polarization, but the driver behind this has been up for debate,” said study co-author Andy Guess, assistant professor of politics and public affairs at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs. “Our work adds a piece to this puzzle, showing that it’s difficult for people to be persuaded by competing media outlets during an election campaign. That said, longer time spent on these sites does lead[s] to a growing distrust in the news.” Guess conducted the study with Pablo Barberá of the University of Southern California; Simon Munzert of the Hertie School; and JungHwan Yang of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The researchers partnered with the online polling firm YouGov, an international research data and analytics group. They initially recruited 1,551 respondents from YouGov’s “Pulse” panel, which included users who had previously installed passive metering software on their desktop and mobile devices. This software collects in-depth data about online behaviors.

#### Trust in media is instrumental to democracy – absent it, we get ignorant citizens which seriously threatens the legitimacy of political participation. Elrod 03 writes,

Jennifer Elrod (B.A., cum laude, Queens College; J.D., City University of New York Law School; LL.M., Columbia Law School; Doctoral Candidate, Columbia Law School), “PROTECTING JOURNALISTS FROM COMPELLED DISCLOSURE: A PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL STATUTE,” Legislation And Public Policy, Vol. 7:115, 2003, //recut hzheng

The goal of protecting journalists and the institutional press is straightforward. Government by the people and for the people is the heart of our system of governance; the people are sovereign. Indeed, the design of our governmental structure was premised, in large measure, upon an educated citizenry that could exercise reasoned and reasonable judgments about matters of governance.157 James Madison recognized this salient point when he stated: “Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power that knowledge gives.”158

What was true in Madison’s day still has currency today. Information about a wide range of matters is necessary so that citizens can be afforded the opportunity to make decisions based upon a relatively broad information base. The function of the institutional press is to ensure the free flow of information to the public. As an independent institution, the press is in a position to oversee, criticize, report, expose, and inform citizens with regard to a wide variety of matters that affect their lives and livelihoods.159 At the same time, both public and private entities and institutions are made aware of the press’s functions, including oversight and exposure of wrongdoing.

#### Thus, I urge an affirmative ballot.