# Cutting Board

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/11/06/glenn-greenwald-and-bill-keller-are-wrong-about-objectivity-in-journalism-pub-53541>

<https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/journalism-essentials/bias-objectivity/lost-meaning-objectivity/>

<https://www.mediaethicsmagazine.com/index.php/browse-back-issues/179-fall-2013-vol-25-no-1/3999003-objectivity-and-advocacy-in-journalism>

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1077699012455385>

<https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/doing-good-science/the-ideal-of-objectivity/>

No Author, xx-xx-xxxx, "Crisis in Democracy: Renewing Trust in America," No Publication, https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Knight2019.pdf

#### The news media directly affects how we perceive the world – it’s the key medium through which we access information, and decides what story to tell. Klein 20

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The news is supposed to be a mirror held up to the world, but the world is far too vast to fit in our mirror. The fundamental thing the media does all day, every day, is decide what to cover — decide, that is, what is newsworthy.

Here’s the dilemma: to decide what to cover is to become the shaper of the news rather than a mirror held up to the news. It makes journalists actors rather than observers. It annihilates our fundamental conception of ourselves. And yet it’s the most important decision we make. If we [they] decide to give more coverage to Hillary Clinton’s emails than to her policy proposals — which is what we did — then we [they] make her emails more important to the public’s understanding of her character and potential presidency than her policy proposals. In doing so, we shape not just the news but the election, and thus the country.

While I’m critical of the specific decision my industry made in that case, this problem is inescapable. The news media isn’t just an actor in politics. It’s arguably the most powerful actor in politics. It’s the primary intermediary between what politicians do and what the public knows. The way we try to get around this is by conceptually outsourcing the decisions about what we cover to the idea of newsworthiness. If we simply cover what’s newsworthy, then we’re not the ones making those decisions — it’s the neutral, external judgment of news worthiness that bears responsibility. The problem is that no one, anywhere, has a rigorous definition of newsworthiness, much less a definition that they actually follow.

A simple example comes in the treatment of presidential and pre-presidential rhetoric. On some level, anything that the president says, or that a plausible candidate for president says, is newsworthy. Yet only a small minority of what is said by presidential candidates, or even presidents, gets covered as major news.

When President Obama gave a speech on manufacturing policy at an Ohio steel mill and when Sen. Marco Rubio held a town hall discussing higher education costs in New Hampshire, they struggled to get the press to take notice. Trump, meanwhile, routinely gets cable networks to air his rallies live by lying flagrantly, lobbing racist and sexist insults, and generally behaving outrageously. Whether this is strategy or intuition, the result is the same: Trump hacked the media’s true definition of newsworthiness, and it lets him control the agenda. This was true well before he won the presidency — indeed, it might be why he won the presidency.

In their book Identity Crisis, political scientists John Sides, Lynn Vavreck, and Michael Tesler find that “from May 1, 2015, to April 30, 2016, Trump’s median share of cable news mentions was 52 percent.” There were 17 Republican candidates running for president, so Trump was getting more than half of all the media coverage, with the other 16 candidates splitting the remainder.

It gets worse. “Trump received 78 percent of all coverage on CNN between Aug. 24 and Sept. 4, 2015,” and by November 2015, “Trump had received more evening network news coverage—234 minutes—than the entire Democratic field. By contrast, Ted Cruz had received seven minutes.” This was a choice the media made, and not for the best reasons. In February 2016, for instance, the chair of CBS said of Donald Trump’s candidacy, and the ratings it drew, “it may not be good for America, but it’s damn good for CBS. ... It’s a terrible thing to say, but bring it on, Donald. Keep going.”

Sides, Vavreck, and Tesler argue that in a chaotic, crowded primary, the media coverage Trump received was crucial to legitimizing his campaign: “Republican voters had received no clear signal about who the front-runner was or should be. The resulting uncertainty meant that this signal needed to come from somewhere else. It was news media coverage that would fill this void.” The coverage of Trump also made it impossible for his challengers to get their messages heard.

As president, his rambling monologues, which are unusually detached from both factual rigor and his administration’s policymaking decisions, are treated as worthier of airtime than the more careful, factual, and policy-predictive speeches of his predecessors.

“Journalism academics have always known that newsworthiness, as the American press defines it, isn’t a system with any coherence to it,” Jay Rosen, a journalism professor at New York University, told me. “It doesn’t make any sense. It’s just a list of factors that occasionally come together to produce news. There’s no real logic to it, other than it’s a list of things that can make something news. The advantage of it is that it leaves maximum leeway for editors to say, ‘This is news,’ and, ‘That’s not news,’ and so it’s news if a journalist decides it’s news.”

In practice, judgments of newsworthiness are often contagious; nothing obscures the fact that a decision is being made quite like everyone else making it, too. In the modern era, a shortcut to newsworthiness is social media virality; if people are already talking about a story or a tweet, that makes it newsworthy almost by definition.

This can lead the country into odd, angry cul-de-sacs. I remember returning from an offline vacation only to find the entire political media at war over a viral video in which students from Covington Catholic High School wearing MAGA hats appeared to harass Nathan Phillips, a Native American elder playing a drum. In the original video, which took place during a protest at the National Mall in Washington, DC, the teens were seemingly mocking, smirking, and making tomahawk chop motions at Phillips. A longer video muddied the waters, offering evidence that the teens were harassed by members of the fringe Black Israelites group beforehand. Soon enough, the media was filled with takes and counter-takes, and President Trump was weighing in. “Nick Sandmann and the students of Covington have become symbols of Fake News and how evil it can be,” he tweeted.

What was striking, walking into this debate without the (dis)advantage of being present for its initial escalation, was how angry everyone was over something that objectively didn’t matter. How was this newsworthy?

The answer was that it had been dominating social media all weekend, and that had made it newsworthy. And why had it dominated social media? Because it was a perfect collision of political identities: MAGA-hatted teenagers against a peaceful, drumming Native American elder. Liberal news outlets turning the country against conservative, Christian children from a religious school. It was an object lesson in how social media’s preference for identitarian conflict focuses the media on identitarian conflicts, even when those collisions are almost comically obscure.

These are dynamics that Trump exploits daily. He weaponizes outrageousness, offensiveness, and identity cues to capture a share of political coverage unknown in the modern era. He’s shown that in a competitive media environment — particularly one responsive to social platforms — you can dominate the media by lobbing grenades into our deepest social divides.

The media is how most Americans get their information about politics and politicians, and if the media is tilting, or being tilted, toward certain kinds of political stories and figures, then the political system will tilt in that direction, too.

Trump is a product of the tilting, but he is not the first, and he will not be the last. The political media is biased, but not toward the left or right so much as toward loud, outrageous, colorful, inspirational, confrontational. It is biased toward the political stories and figures who activate our identities, because it is biased toward and dependent on the fraction of the country with the most intense political identities.

#### Berry 05 writes,

Stephen J. Berry (teaches investigative journalism at the University of Iowa. He was a newspaper journalist for more than 33 years, having worked most recently for the Los Angeles Times. He and a colleague won the 1993 Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting for the Orlando Sentinel), 6-15-2005, "Why Objectivity Still Matters," Nieman Reports, <https://niemanreports.org/articles/why-objectivity-still-matters/>, //hzheng

So much of news these days is all about throwing anything and everything out there—half-truths, distortions, opinion news, and the “tell-it-like-it-is” rantings of the contentious bullies who run the talk shows. More and more, reporters who still view objectivity as our guide and goal stand out like someone wearing a suit at a Metallica concert. Some journalism schools and textbooks don’t mention objectivity any longer, except as a topic in an editorial problems seminar. In 1996, the Society of Professional Journalists, without fanfare, dropped the term from its code of ethics.

The fact that some reporters permit superficial he-said/she-said reporting to define objectivity spawns much of today’s criticism. In 2003, Brent Cunningham, managing editor of Columbia Journalism Review, wrote in an Objectivity is a standard that requires journalists to try to put aside emotions and prejudices, including those implanted by the spinners and manipulators who meet them at every turn ….article, “Re-thinking Objectivity,” that “our devotion to what we call objectivity” played a role in our failure to cover some of the Bush administration’s shortcomings. While he didn’t suggest tossing it, Cunningham acknowledged that journalists let “the principle of objectivity make us passive recipients of the news, rather than aggressive analyzers and explainers of it.” Other critics subscribe to Overholser’s belief that objectivity “often produces a report bound in rigid orthodoxy, a deplorably narrow product of conventional thinking,” in which officialdom is given too much legitimacy and the voices of others given too little.

Objectivity has been on the ropes before. From the 1920’s through the press’s cowardly response to Senator Joseph McCarthy’s demagoguery in the 1950’s and into the Vietnam era, events and critics raised questions about objectivity. Yet the standard persisted. In 1978, Michael Schudson, author of “Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers,” marveled at its hold on journalism. Noting its problems as a journalistic standard, Schudson asked, “Why … should objectivity still be a serious issue? Why hasn’t it been given up altogether?”

So what is this shackle that roils our profession decade after decade and now seems to have reporters cowering in fear and passivity?

Objectivity is a standard that requires journalists to try to put aside emotions and prejudices, including those implanted by the spinners and manipulators who meet them at every turn, as they gather and present the facts. They recognize objectivity as an ideal, the pursuit of which never ends and never totally succeeds. Walter Lippmann, the two-time Pulitzer Prize-winner and the intellectual guru of journalistic objectivity in the 1920’s, viewed it as a discipline inculcating scientific principles that can guide one to “victories over superstitions of the mind.”

Lippmann would say Cunningham and Overholser are right about the failings of the press, but wrong to blame objectivity. Objectivity, as Lippmann wanted it practiced, does not exclude “aggressive analyzers and explainers.” Nor does it ban investigative journalism or interpretative reporting, as Overholser argues. Curtis D. MacDougall, the father of interpretative reporting and renowned textbook writer, made that point in every edition of “Interpretative Reporting,” starting with the first in 1938. In the fifth edition (1968), MacDougall invoked the “scientific method”—the essence of the search for objective fact—in teaching interpretative reporting. And in his seventh edition (1977), he wrote, “As is true of no other profession, his [a reporter’s] entire training is devoted to overcoming or sidestepping his prejudices. He is encouraged to be as open minded and objective as it is humanly possible to be and to be aware of any emotional obstacles that he may have to overcome.”

In investigative reporting, as in no other genre, is the effort to devise strategies and methods to deal with personal biases and external manipulation more crucial. The variety of strategies is infinite, depending on the demands of each inquiry and the creativity of the journalists. For example, they devise interview techniques to gain information, to help “unspin the spin,” and to determine whether sources know what they are talking about. They identify tangible criteria and evidence, such as documents, written policies or guidelines, the law, statistics or codes of ethics against which to measure or gauge the actions or practices they are investigating. They seek viewpoints and information from diverse sources. And they devote much reporting time to vetting and testing their findings.

The ultimate purpose of this method is to help the journalist see the facts as accurately as human frailty allows.

Some journalists and news organizations are more conscientious in the pursuit of objectivity. At times, even good journalists get off track, but not because objectivity failed as a standard. Consider the following:

When The New York Times proffered alleged facts about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction from unnamed sources with a stake in a U.S. invasion, it was not the standard of objectivity that failed. But the pursuit of it certainly did.

When CBS journalists aired bogus documents from “unimpeachable sources,” they let something—perhaps the scent of a hot story, their preconceived notions or fear of getting beat—blur their view of the evidence that would have helped them to determine whether the alleged documents were genuine and the source unimpeachable.

When political reporters allowed the presidential candidates to get away with lies and distortions, the culprit was not objectivity but the failure to challenge and verify, which are imperative in its pursuit.

Those of us who value objectivity as an essential standard of journalism approach its use by first recognizing our humanness—our subjectivity. Precisely because we understand our frailties, we insist upon maintaining the pursuit of objectivity. “As our minds become more deeply aware of their own subjectivism,” Lippmann wrote in 1922, “we find a zest in objective method that is not otherwise there.”

The pursuit of objectivity is what separates us from our audience and from pseudo-journalists. Rather than cower to those who would use objectivity as a cudgel against us, we should reclaim it, use it, and reveal how we pursue it. More importantly for the future, we should teach it.

#### Pressman 18

Matthew Pressman, 11-5-2018, "Journalistic Objectivity Evolved the Way It Did for a Reason," Time Magazine, <https://time.com/5443351/journalism-objectivity-history/>, //hzheng

But even as Agnew and others attacked the news media for failing to be objective, many within the profession called for scrapping objectivity altogether. Rolling Stone’s “gonzo” journalist Hunter S. Thompson derided the phrase “objective journalism” as “a pompous contradiction in terms”; New York Times columnist and associate editor Tom Wicker called objectivity the press’s “biggest weakness,” arguing that it privileged the perspectives of the powerful and caused journalists to withhold their knowledge from readers.

Countless journalists, especially younger reporters who had been influenced by the New Left, felt the same way. “More young reporters reflect the philosophy of their age group and times—personal engagement, militancy, and radicalism,” wrote New York Times editor Abe Rosenthal to a senior colleague in 1968. He lamented that they “question or challenge the duty of the reporter, once taken for granted, to be above the battle.” Editors throughout the country expressed similar concerns. “Attack on Objectivity Increases from Within,” read a 1970 headline in the trade journal Editor & Publisher.

Instead, as I discovered while researching the history of the news media, being criticized simultaneously by people with opposing ideological viewpoints convinced the people in charge of the country’s leading news organizations to stay the course — to remain committed to impartial, balanced reporting and to keep opinions out of news stories. As one Los Angeles Times editor put it, “If both sides equally think you’re doing a crappy job, maybe you’re not. Maybe you’re doing what you’re supposed to do.”

Regardless of their personal views, editors and executives at top news organizations wanted their coverage to appear centrist — after all, that was presumably the way to appeal to the broadest possible audience. So while journalists continued to debate the pros and cons of objectivity in the decades after 1970, there was little doubt that it would remain the profession’s guiding principle — that is, until recently.

First, the economic rationale for objectivity vanished. With print media declining and Facebook and Google taking the lion’s share of online ad revenue, news outlets must focus on getting paying customers — or failing that, loyal, engaged customers. That’s difficult, when people can find a seemingly endless amount of free news online, and when “negative partisanship” (the loathing of those who hold opposing political beliefs) reigns supreme. Trying to attract a mass audience with objective coverage, as newspapers did in the mid-20th century, is a fool’s errand — especially in a social-media age when provocative articles get shared more widely than studiously objective ones.

Then, along came Donald Trump. His rise has caused some journalists to question objectivity’s usefulness as a professional ideal more insistently than at any time since the 1970s. They say that the brazenness with which President Trump and his surrogates either lie or mislead people, and the challenge they present to the very notion of objective truth, call for a different approach to reporting. In their view, a commitment not to take sides leads journalists to merely parrot obfuscations and allows Trump to set the news agenda, thus “normalizing” a situation that is anything but.

Objectivity certainly has its pitfalls — and just because a news outlet has a viewpoint, that doesn’t make its coverage inferior. But those who see objectivity as a barrier to truth-telling are misunderstanding its requirements. It does not prevent journalists from making judgments about the news; it simply asks that those judgments be based on dispassionate analysis.

After studying the evolution of objectivity in American journalism, I’m rooting for it to survive. Fifty years ago, facing a similar crisis, the press adjusted but didn’t abandon its fundamental principles, and it led to what, in retrospect, was a golden age of journalism. The odds may be against it, but the same thing could happen today.

# 1AC

### Framework

#### I affirm the resolution: Resolved; In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

#### I value democracy, defined by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 7-27-2006, "Democracy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy/>, //hzheng

“a method of collective decision making characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an essential stage of the decision-making process”

#### Prefer:

#### 1] The resolution asks about whether free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy within a democracy, which already assumes that the resolution is framed by what is best for democracy.

#### 2] Democracy is the best way to respect inherent equality. Any political system must be able to respect the fact that because we are all equally human, we all deserve equality, which means that democracy is the best system because it allows everybody to be equally represented via voting.

#### My criterion is Political Legitimacy, defined by Jorge Aragon from Saint Louis University as:

Jorge Aragon, xx-xx-xxxx, "Encyclopedia of Campaigns, Elections and Electoral Behavior," Sage Publications, <https://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/dccirp/pdfs/articlesforresourc/Article_-_Aragon_Trelles,_Jorge_2.pdf>, //hzheng

The stability and functioning of any kind of political regime—including democratic or representative ones—relies on the combination of the capacity of rulers and government officials to use coercion and the development of political legitimacy. Political legitimacy can be described as people’s recognition and acceptance of the validity of the rules of their entire political system and the decisions of their rulers. Accordingly, two things can be expected from political systems that have a considerable level of political legitimacy. First, these political systems will be more resilient to survive periods of crisis, and, second, rulers and authorities will enjoy a fundamental condition needed to formulate and implement policies in an effective manner (i.e., they will be able to make decisions and commit resources without needing to obtain approval from the ruled and without resorting to coercion for every decision). The issue of political legitimacy can therefore be considered to be of utmost importance in politics and political analysis.

#### Prefer, as the only way to ensure democracy is true democracy is through making sure the political system through which it operates is able to legitimately ensure the equality of the people and justify itself.

#### I reserve the right to define a word in a future speech if necessary.

### Definitions

#### A free press is the freedom of expression in media without limitations by others

Liberties.EU 21 [Civil Liberties Union for Europe, rights advocacy organization in Europe, 11-9-2021, "Free press: definition and role in democracy," Liberties.eu, https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/free-press/43809]/Kankee

What is free press? When we say a country has a free press, we mean that its news outlets and other publications, even individual citizens, have the right to communicate information without influence or fear of retribution from the state or other powerful entities or individuals. We often use the term “free press” and “independent journalism,” a subject we previously explored, more or less interchangeably. In modern history, a shared understanding of the principle of a free press was outlined by the United Nations in 1948. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights codifies it along with the right free speech: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference, and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.” Today, most democracies have some protection for a free press, whether this protection comes from a constitution or individual law. In Europe, a free press is protected under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and under Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. What is the purpose of a free press? The purpose of a free press is to ensure that the people are free to receive and impart information that is not manipulated or serving a particular person, entity or interest. Its duty, in fact, is often to investigate people of power, and especially the government, to ask the hard questions and to attempt to uncover what’s really happening, regardless of the political fallout. Why is freedom of the press so important?

#### Prioritize means to value something as more important than something else

Collins Dictionary No Date [Collins Dictionary, No Date, "Prioritize definition and meaning," Collins Dictionary, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/prioritize]/Kankee

Prioritize Word forms: prioritizes, prioritizing, prioritized 1. TRANSITIVE VERB If you prioritize something, you treat it as more important than other things. Prioritize your own wants rather than constantly thinking about others. 2. TRANSITIVE VERB If you prioritize the tasks that you have to do, you decide which are the most important and do them first. Make lists of what to do and prioritize your tasks.

#### Objectivity in journalism is fact-based, non-subjective reporting

McLaughlin 16 [Greg McLaughlin, senior lecturer in media and journalism at the University of Ulster, 2016, “Journalism, Objectivity and War,” The War Correspondent, https://sci-hub.se/https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt19qgf0x.7]/Kankee

objectivity under fire Objectivity in journalism has come under serious critique from academics (Glasgow University Media Group, 1976; Lichtenberg, 1996; Streckfuss, 1990; Parenti, 1993). They suggest in various ways that the news media do not simply report and reflect our social world but that they more or less play an active part in shaping, even constructing it; that they represent sectional interests rather than society as a whole.2 When these criticisms are leveled at journalists, their traditional defence is their practice of objectivity but what does it mean to be objective in journalism in the first place? According to Michael Schudson (1978), objectivity is based on the assumption that a series of ‘facts’ or truth claims about the world can be validated by the rules and procedures of a professional community. The distortions and biases, the subjective value judgements of the individual or of particular interest groups, are filtered out so that among journalists at any rate, ‘The belief in objectivity is a faith in “facts”, a distrust of “values”, and a commitment to their segregation’ (p. 6). Gaye Tuchman refers to this method as ‘a strategic ritual’, a method of newsgathering and reporting that protects the journalist from charges of bias or libel (1972, p. 661ff). Radical critiques measure journalistic claims to objectivity against analyses of how the news media produce and represent their version of reality according to sectional interests. Bias is not in the eye of the beholder but is structured within the entire news process; the news filters and constructs reality according to a dominant or institutional ideology (Glasgow University Media Group, 1976). ‘What passes for objectivity’, for American scholar Michael Parenti, ‘is the acceptance of a social reality shaped by the dominant forces of society – without any critical examination of that reality’s hidden agendas, its class interests, and its ideological biases’ (1993, p. 52). It is the difference respectively between the journalist as the professional, instutionalised reporter and the journalist as the partial eyewitness and writer. John Pilger points to the transparency of this ideology of professionalism, especially in a public service broadcaster like the BBC whose coverage of domestic and foreign crises has demonstrated its true agenda and its true allegiances: These people waffle on about objectivity as if by joining that institution or any institution they suddenly rise to this Nirvana where they can consider all points of view and produce something in five minutes. It’s nonsense and it’s made into nonsense because the moment there’s any kind of pressure on the establishment you find reporters coming clean, as they did after the Falklands. They were very truculent: ‘These were our people, our side. And now we’ll get back to being objective’. It’s the same with the term ‘balance’. I mean censorship for me always works by omission. That’s the most virulent censorship and what we have is an enormous imbalance one way, ...the accredited point of view, the sort of consensus point of view which has nothing to do with objectivity, nothing to do with impartiality and very little to do with the truth.3 The pressure to pursue objectivity in reporting has had serious consequences for journalism as a form of factual writing. James Cameron thought that ‘objectivity in some circumstances is both meaningless and impossible.’ He could not see ‘how a reporter attempting to define a situation involving some sort of ethical conflict can do it with sufficient demonstrable neutrality to fulfil some arbitrary concept of “objectivity”.’ This was not the acid test for Cameron who ‘always tended to argue that objectivity was of less importance than the truth, and that the reporter whose technique was informed by no opinion lacked a very serious dimension’ (1967, p. 72). There are, however, alternative forms of journalism that subvert the very notion of objectivity: the ‘New Journalism’ of the 1960s and what has been called ‘honest journalism’, described as a compromise between the blind assumption of impartiality and ideological commitment. War and alternative journalisms

#### Advocacy means to favor a specific viewpoint

Cambridge Dictionary No Date [Cambridge Dictionary, No Date, "advocacy," https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/advocacy]/Kankee

public support for an idea, plan, or way of doing something:

### Contention One is Inherent Good

#### Subpoint A: Objectivity is Inherently Good

#### First, any attempt to reject objectivity will necessarily be contradictory. In making the claim that “objectivity should be rejected,” my opponent also makes the claim that “it is objectively true that objectivity should be rejected,” because any statement is the same if the phrase “it is objectively true that” is added before it; otherwise, they wouldn’t be pointing to this statement as an example of truth. However, they rely on a notion of objectivity in order to reject objectivity; thus, rejecting objectivity always generates a performative contradiction. Because contradictions can’t generate truth – two plus two can’t equal both four and five – rejecting objectivity will always be incoherent.

#### Additionally, don’t let them try to argue that something is “subjectively true” – it’s incoherent, because two plus two can’t be true for me but not for you. There is objective truth and you can’t reject it.

#### Subpoint B: Constitutive Purpose

#### The point of journalism is to provide a news story; otherwise, journalism would not exist. It only exists in order to provide information. However, if journalism does not provide an unbiased news story, it is worthless insofar as it is not fulfilling its purpose – it’s a broken clock. Biased news stories are necessarily distortions of the truth, whether through exaggeration or omission; and thus, the press is not serving its purpose, and has no point in existence.

### Contention Two is Polarization

#### Partisan media is critical in the polarization of viewers – psychology proves. Levendusky 13 writes,

* Partisan Media = Polarization
  + 1st Warrant: Because subjects only see one side of the aisle, they move in that direction
  + 2nd Warrant: In partisan news, the lack of counterarguments to politically presented news causes their side to appear stronger
  + 3rd Warrant: Partisan news frames everything politically, strengthening the degree to which people view their political identities as more important
  + 4th Warrant: When subjects see partisan media on the other side of the aisle, they will attempt to counterargue it, but that requires knowing more about an issue, so they become more invested in politics on their own side to argue it more effectively
* It’s long-lasting
  + Psychology proves – citizens create positive or negative associations about certain issues, which are stored in long-term memory

Matthew S. Levendusky (University of Pennsylvania), 7-xx-2013, "Why Do Partisan Media Polarize Viewers?," Midwest Political Science Association, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23496642>, //hzheng How Partisan Media Polarize Viewers

I start from the premise that humans are motivated reasoners (Kunda 1990). Humans have two broad classes of goals: accuracy goals (the desire to reach the correct conclusion) and directional goals (the desire to reach the preferred conclusion, i.e., the conclusion that supports our existing beliefs). Human reasoning relies on both, but directional goals have an especially strong effect: we process information so that it fits with our existing beliefs. When citizens hear a news story about (say) President Obama, simply upon hearing his name, their attitudes and feelings toward him come to the fore, even without any conscious thought (a process known as "hot cognition"; see Lodge and Taber 2005; Morris et al. 2003). These thoughts and feelings about the president then shape how citizens interpret the evidence provided in the story. If the information suggests President Obama is ably handling his job, supporters of the president will uncritically accept the news, while his critics will counterargue and challenge it (a process known as disconfirmation bias; see Ditto and Lopez 1992). As a result, even balanced sets of arguments can generate attitudinal polarization (Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009; Taber and Lodge 2006). Partisan media programs intensify this motivated reasoning because of their slanted presentation of the news. Consider first how this process occurs when subjects watch like-minded media—that is, proattitudinal media that reinforce their existing beliefs, such as when a conservative Republican watches Fox News. Such programs heighten motivated reasoning for two reasons. First, these programs broadcast one-sided, proattitudinal messages to viewers, which they will uncritically accept (Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009; Taber and Lodge 2006). But absent any competing message, this general tendency to accept proattitudinal information becomes even stronger: because it lacks a counterargument of any sort, this information (implicitly) seems stronger and even more persuasive (Klayman and Ha 1987; Lodge and Taber 2001; Zaller 1996). Subjects will therefore move in the direction of the evidence and become more extreme (Moscovici and Zavalloni 1969). The type of "echo chamber" environment found in like-minded media will push viewers toward the ideological extremes, thereby polarizing their attitudes. But there is another reason why like-minded content will magnify the tendency toward attitudinal polarization. These shows present the day's news as a partisan struggle, with clear references to the political parties and their positions. This primes citizens' partisanship, strengthen[s]ing the degree to which they [citizens] see[ing] the world through partisan colored glasses (Campbell et al. [1960] 1980; Goren, Federico, and Kittleson 2009; Price 1989). Priming this sort of salient identity increases viewers' directional goals—it heightens their desire to reach a conclusion in line with their partisanship, thereby strengthening their biases toward attitudinally congenial information. Cueing partisanship increases its ability to slant how subjects see the world by strengthening the desire to engage in the motivated reasoning described above. This is consistent with work in social psychology demonstrating that priming relevant group identities, such as partisanship, increases attitudinal polarization (Abrams et al. 1990; Lee 2007). So while there is a general tendency toward attitudinal polarization in political settings simply because humans are motivated reasoners, the unique environment of like minded partisan media—with its one-sided content and partisan primes – should be especially likely to generate attitudinal polarization. This leads me to state my first hypothesis: H1: Exposure to like-minded partisan media will polarize attitudes (i.e., increase attitudinal extremity). But what happens when subjects watch cross-cutting media that presents them with counterattitudinal messages (i.e., when a Democrat watches Fox News)? Here, subjects' preferences are challenged rather than reinforced. When presented with information running counter to their prior beliefs, subjects will attempt to discredit and counterargue it (Ditto and Lopez I992; Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009; Taber and Lodge 2006). Sub- jects will therefore believe they have refuted this information, which makes the evidence supporting their own side even more persuasive, pushing them toward greater attitude extremity (Redlawsk 2002; Taber and Lodge 2006). Cross-cutting media therefore increase attitude extremity and polarization, a "boomerang" effect. H2: On average, cross-cutting media will polarize attitudes. While on average there should be a polarizing effect of cross-cutting media, that effect should be especially pronounced for a particular subset of the audience. Polarization here stems from counterarguing these cross-cutting messages, but not all viewers are equally equipped to do this-subjects need to be informed about the issue, and to care deeply about it, to effectively generate these counterarguments (Taber and Lodge 2006). The ability to do this comes from holding strong attitudes. Strong attitudes are ones where the subjects know more about the issue. and hence can more easily generate counterarguments, and the issue is more central and important to them, so they will be more motivated to generate counterarguments (Krosnick and Petty 1995). Strong attitudes therefore help subjects polarize in response to cross-cutting media (Pomerantz, Chaiken. and Tordesillas I995; Taber and Lodge 2006; Zaller 1992). H3: Exposure to cross-cutting media will especially increase attitude extremity for viewers with strong prior attitudes. How Long Do These Effects Last? One enduring concern with media persuasion studies is that such effects rapidly fade away (Druckman and Nelson 2003). But given the theoretical mechanism driving these partisan media effects, there is good reason to suspect that these effects endure, at least in the short term. While citizens use both memory-based and online processing to update their beliefs (Redlawsk 2001), online processing is more central when subjects are utilizing affect-laden motivated reasoning processes (Taber and Lodge 200]). So, for example, when citizens watch a partisan media program about gun control, they bring to mind their attitude toward gun control, update it on the spot using the new information in the segment, and then store this updated attitude in long-term memory (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh I991). Later on, viewers may not remember the specific arguments from the partisan media host that caused them to update their opinions, but they should remember their overall attitude-the details fade away, but the summary attitude remains (Lodge, Steenbcrgen, and Brau 1995). Attitudes updated in response to partisan media, then, should not immediately fade away.

#### Polarization is deeply damaging to democracy – there’s a laundry list of reasons: gridlock, intolerance, anti-activism, etc. Furthermore, it’s going to cause a self-repeating cycle where division breeds division, making the problem worse and worse. Carothers and O’Donohue 19 write,

* Polarization Bad
  + 1st Warrant: Polarization damages the three branches of government. In the judicial branch, politicians call them biased or pack the courts. In the legislative branch, it causes gridlock because the two sides can’t agree. In the executive branch, it causes presidents to think they’re only accountable to their supporters, and not those in the other party.
  + 2nd Warrant: Polarization attacks “norms of tolerance and moderation.” People hate cooperation and being tolerant of the other side, and this is exemplified in a refusal to accept the results of elections.
  + 3rd Warrant: Polarization causes those who fight for civil rights to be seen as “political,” harming their ability to make meaningful change to help minorities. The backlash to “political” activists also leads to an increase in hate crimes.
* Polarization Outweighs
  + 1st Warrant: It’s cyclical. Polarization causes polarization, as people see that the other side doesn’t like them, dislike them more, and it feeds back on itself.
  + 2nd Warrant: It can’t be solved otherwise. Politicians, the people meant to remedy problems, won’t do anything about polarization, because avid fanbases are the way they get elected, so they have no incentive to fix it.

Thomas Carothers (is the senior vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is a leading authority on international support for democracy, human rights, governance, the rule of law, and civil society) and Andrew O’Donohue (was a nonresident research assistant in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, where his research focuses on political polarization and challenges facing democratic governance), 10-1-2019, "How to Understand the Global Spread of Political Polarization," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/01/how-to-understand-global-spread-of-political-polarization-pub-79893>, //hzheng

Severe polarization damages all institutions essential to democracy. It routinely undermines the independence of the judiciary, as politicians attack the courts as biased or pack them with loyalists. It reduces legislatures either to gridlock or to a rubberstamp function. In presidential systems, it frequently leads to the abuse of executive powers and promotes the toxic view that the president represents only his or her supporters, rather than the country as a whole. Perhaps most fundamentally, polarization shatters informal but crucial norms of tolerance and moderation—like conceding peacefully after an electoral defeat—that keep political competition within bounds. These consequences generate a vicious cycle of rising polarization. Attacks on the judiciary, for example, only diminish its capacity to arbitrate conflict and heighten distrust between the opposing sides. Polarization also reverberates throughout the society as whole, poisoning everyday interactions and relationships. Turkey is a particularly jarring example: almost eight out of ten people there would not want their daughter to marry someone who votes for the party they most dislike. Nearly three-quarters would not even want to do business with such a person. Partisan conflict takes a heavy toll on civil society as well, often lead[s]ing to the demonization of activists and human rights defenders. More seriously still, divisions can contribute to a spike in hate crimes and political violence: India, Poland, and the United States have all seen such increases in recent years. The more we looked at the experiences of other divided democracies, the more we realized that U.S. polarization stands out as unusual. It has several distinctive features, and unfortunately, all of them spell trouble for U.S. democracy. In the first place, polarization in the United States isn’t primarily the result of polarizing politicians stoking divisions, as in most other countries. It has deep societal roots and is the outcome of a profound sociocultural struggle between contending conservative and progressive visions of the country. Consequently, U.S. polarization is not something that political leaders can easily reverse, even if they want to. Intense partisanship has gripped the United States for an unusually long time and thus become ingrained in social and political life. Today’s divisions date back at least to the 1960s and have been steadily intensifying for over fifty years. Most other current cases of polarization are more recent in origin. A final distinctive and perhaps even unique feature of U.S. polarization is the powerful alignment of ethnicity, ideology, and religion on each side of the divide—what we call the “iron triangle” of U.S. polarization. In most other countries, just one or two of those three identity divisions is at the root of polarization; in the United States, all three are. As a result, America’s polarization is unusually encompassing and sharp. While partisan warfare hasn’t eroded democracy in the United States to the same extent that it has in, say, Bangladesh or Turkey, it is testing our democratic guardrails in serious ways. Once a society becomes deeply divided, it is very difficult to heal. Before talking about remedial actions, it’s crucial to understand why this problem is so thorny and difficult to overcome. Polarization tends to escalate at a dizzyingly fast pace, often in the span of just a few years. Just look at how rapidly the 2016 Brexit referendum has ripped the United Kingdom apart. Polarization then entrenches itself and becomes self-perpetuating. Polarizing actions and reactions feed on each other, dragging countries into a downward spiral of anger and division. And while the consequences of polarization are punishing, they don’t necessarily galvanize a government to respond, because the politicians who play the most significant role in exacerbating polarization mostly benefit from it and bear little of the cost.

### Contention Three is Distrust of Media

#### Bias in media leads to perceived inadequacy, where citizens don’t trust media that advocates because they simply don’t think it’ll tell the full story. Sands 20 writes,

John Sands (is director for learning and impact at Knight Foundation. Follow him on Twitter at @iohnsands), 11-9-2020, "Americans are losing faith in an objective media. A new Gallup/Knight study explores why," Knight Foundation, <https://knightfoundation.org/articles/americans-are-losing-faith-in-an-objective-media-a-new-gallup-knight-study-explores-why/>, //hzheng

Americans have high aspirations for the news media to be a trusted, independent watchdog that holds the powerful to account. But in a new Gallup/Knight study, we’ve found the gap is growing between what Americans expect from the news and what they think they are getting. Perceptions of bias are increasing too, which further erodes the media’s ability to deliver on its promise to our democracy. The landmark poll of 20,000 people found that Americans’ hope for an objective media is all but lost. Instead, they see an increasing partisan slant in the news, and a media eager to push an agenda. As a result, the media’s ability to hold leaders accountable is diminished in the public’s eye. The study also explores the connections between political affiliation and attitudes toward the media, as well the public’s view on diversity in newsrooms and the connection between local news consumption, civic engagement and community attachment. A hallmark of Knight Foundation’s Trust, Media and Democracy initiative, “American Views 2020: Trust, Media and Democracy” is a biennial report based on a poll that took place over last winter. It is one of the most comprehensive surveys of public opinion on the media, and holds important implications for the future of journalism and our democracy. You can read more below, or join a discussion of the findings in partnership with the Paley Center at 2 p.m. Thursday, Aug. 6. Here are 10 findings that stood out to us: 1) Americans see increasing bias in the news media: One of the primary reasons Americans don’t think the media works for them is because of the bias they perceive in coverage. Many feel the media’s traditional roles, such as holding leaders accountable, is [are] compromised by bias, with nearly 7 in 10 Americans (68%) who say they see too much bias in the reporting of news that is supposed to be objective as “a major problem,” up from 65% in the 2017 Knight/Gallup study. They see it in their own news sources (57%), and more than 6 in 10 are concerned about bias in the news other people are getting, the survey finds. Some 7 in 10 Americans worry that owners of media companies are influencing coverage. 2) Americans think the media is pushing an agenda. Eight in 10 Americans say that when they suspect an inaccuracy in a story, they worry it was intentional —because the reporter was misrepresenting the facts (52%) or making them up (28%). Only 18% say they think the inaccuracies were innocent mistakes. And when it comes to news sources they distrust, nearly three-quarters of Americans (or 74%) say those outlets are trying to persuade people to adopt a certain opinion. 3) Distrust in the media cuts along partisan lines: Views on the media vary widely by party, though overall, Americans view the media more negatively than positively. The breakdown: Nearly 7 in 10 Republicans (67%) have a very or somewhat unfavorable opinion of the news media, versus 1 in 5 Democrats (20%) and about half of independents (48%). 4) A majority of Americans say the media are under political attack – but are divided by party on whether it’s warranted: While people from all political persuasions agree that the media is being politically attacked, 66% of Democrats say those attacks are not justified, while 58% of Republicans say they are. 5) Opinions on the media also vary widely by age. Young Americans, for example, tend to have more negative views on the media. One in 5 American adults under 30 (20%) say they have a “very” or “somewhat” favorable opinion of the news media, versus almost half of those aged 65 and older (43%). 6) Americans blame the media for political divisions, but they also see the potential for the media to heal these divides. Forty-seven percent of Americans say the media bears “a great deal” of blame for political division in this country, and 36% say they bear “a moderate amount.” At the same time, 8 in 10 Americans believe the media can bring people together and heal the nation’s political divides. 7) Americans want more newsroom diversity, but they differ on what kind. This breakdown is along party and racial lines. Democrats (47%) and Blacks (56%) prioritize racial/ethnic diversity in hiring, while Republicans (48%) and Whites (34%) prioritize ideological diversity in journalists’ political views. 8) Americans feel overwhelmed by the volume and speed of news, and the internet is making it worse. The most cited reason for information overload? The mix of news interspersed with non-news on the web, including social media (61%). How Americans cope varies. Some people (39%) turn to one or two trusted news sources, others (30%) consult a variety, and 18% stop paying attention all together. 9) Local news is closely linked to civic engagement. Here’s one of the reasons why the future of journalism matters to our democracy: People who read and watch local news are more likely to take part in important community issues, and 73% are more likely to participate in local elections. 10) Despite the findings, Americans think the media is vital for democracy. The vast majority of Americans (81%) say that the news media is “critical” (42%) or “very important” (39%) to democracy.

#### The newest studies prove – there is causation between time spent on polarized news and distrust. Huber 21 writes,

* Study Details
  + 1551 participants were taken from YouGov (international research data and analytics group). A third of them set their browser homepage to HuffPost (left-leaning), another third set their browser homepage to Fox News (right-leaning), and a third had the default browser homepage. The study found that those who spent more time on news sites had less trust in the media, and this effect continues more than a year later.

B. Rose Huber (Princeton School of Public and International Affairs), 3-29-2021, "Consuming online partisan news leads to distrust in the media," Princeton University, <https://www.princeton.edu/news/2021/03/29/consuming-online-partisan-news-leads-distrust-media>, //hzheng, bracketed for clarity

Internet users were asked to change[d] their default browser homepages to either the Huffington Post, a left-leaning news site, or Fox News, a more conservative outlet, during the 2018 U.S. midterm elections. As participants went about their daily activities, they allowed the researchers to survey them multiple times as well as to collect data on millions of web visits and their posts on Twitter. After eight weeks, the participants’ trust in the media appeared to decrease[d] and this effect remained detectable nearly a year later for visitors to both partisan news sites. Increased exposure to partisan news led to an immediate — though short-lived — boost in the number of visits to both sites, as well as improved knowledge of recent events. However, these effects did not appear to translate to changes in political attitudes, opinions or behaviors. The findings, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, illustrate a powerful new approach for studying the effects of exposure to partisan news. The results also expose a subtle, long-term effect that has eluded the attention of prior research: skepticism of the media after prolonged news exposure. “Past studies have shown links between exposure to partisan news and polarization, but the driver behind this has been up for debate,” said study co-author Andy Guess, assistant professor of politics and public affairs at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs. “Our work adds a piece to this puzzle, showing that it’s difficult for people to be persuaded by competing media outlets during an election campaign. That said, longer time spent on these sites does lead[s] to a growing distrust in the news.” Guess conducted the study with Pablo Barberá of the University of Southern California; Simon Munzert of the Hertie School; and JungHwan Yang of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The researchers partnered with the online polling firm YouGov, an international research data and analytics group. They initially recruited 1,551 respondents from YouGov’s “Pulse” panel, which included users who had previously installed passive metering software on their desktop and mobile devices. This software collects in-depth data about online behaviors.

#### Trust in media is instrumental to democracy – absent it, we get ignorant citizens which seriously threatens the legitimacy of political participation. Elrod 03 writes,

Jennifer Elrod (B.A., cum laude, Queens College; J.D., City University of New York Law School; LL.M., Columbia Law School; Doctoral Candidate, Columbia Law School), “PROTECTING JOURNALISTS FROM COMPELLED DISCLOSURE: A PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL STATUTE,” Legislation And Public Policy, Vol. 7:115, 2003, //recut hzheng

The goal of protecting journalists and the institutional press is straightforward. Government by the people and for the people is the heart of our system of governance; the people are sovereign. Indeed, the design of our governmental structure was premised, in large measure, upon an educated citizenry that could exercise reasoned and reasonable judgments about matters of governance.157 James Madison recognized this salient point when he stated: “Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power that knowledge gives.”158

What was true in Madison’s day still has currency today. Information about a wide range of matters is necessary so that citizens can be afforded the opportunity to make decisions based upon a relatively broad information base. The function of the institutional press is to ensure the free flow of information to the public. As an independent institution, the press is in a position to oversee, criticize, report, expose, and inform citizens with regard to a wide variety of matters that affect their lives and livelihoods.159 At the same time, both public and private entities and institutions are made aware of the press’s functions, including oversight and exposure of wrongdoing.

#### Thus, I urge an affirmative ballot.

# 1AC – Accessibility Formatting

#### I affirm the resolution: Resolved; In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

#### I value democracy, defined by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as

“a method of collective decision making characterized by equality among the participants at an essential stage of the decision-making process”

#### Prefer:

#### 1] The resolution asks about whether free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy within a democracy, which already assumes that the resolution is framed by what is best for democracy.

#### 2] Democracy is the best way to respect inherent equality. Any political system must be able to respect the fact that because we are all equally human, we all deserve equality, which means that democracy is the best system because it allows everybody to be equally represented via voting.

#### My criterion is Political Legitimacy, defined by Jorge Aragon from Saint Louis University as:

people’s recognition and acceptance of the validity of the rules and the decisions of their rulers.

#### Prefer, as the only way to ensure democracy is true democracy is through making sure the political system through which it operates is able to legitimately ensure the equality of the people and justify itself.

#### I reserve the right to define a word in a future speech if necessary.

### Contention One is Inherent Good

#### Subpoint A: Objectivity is Inherently Good

#### First, any attempt to reject objectivity will necessarily be contradictory. In making the claim that “objectivity should be rejected,” my opponent also makes the claim that “it is objectively true that objectivity should be rejected,” because any statement is the same if the phrase “it is objectively true that” is added before it; otherwise, they wouldn’t be pointing to this statement as an example of truth. However, they rely on a notion of objectivity in order to reject objectivity; thus, rejecting objectivity always generates a performative contradiction. Because contradictions can’t generate truth – two plus two can’t equal both four and five – rejecting objectivity will always be incoherent.

#### Additionally, don’t let them try to argue that something is “subjectively true” – it’s incoherent, because two plus two can’t be true for me but not for you. There is objective truth and you can’t reject it.

#### Subpoint B: Constitutive Purpose

#### The point of journalism is to provide a news story; otherwise, journalism would not exist. It only exists in order to provide information. However, if journalism does not provide an unbiased news story, it is worthless insofar as it is not fulfilling its purpose – it’s a broken clock. Biased news stories are necessarily distortions of the truth, whether through exaggeration or omission; and thus, the press is not serving its purpose, and has no point in existence.

### Contention Two is Polarization

#### Partisan media is critical in the polarization of viewers – psychology proves. Levendusky 13 writes,

Humans have the desire to reach the conclusion that supports existing beliefs. Partisan programs intensify this because of slanted presentation of news. these programs broadcast one-sided messages, which they accept. because it lacks a counterargument, this seems more persuasive. Subjects therefore become more extreme, polarizing their attitudes. shows present news as partisan. This strengthen[s] [citizens] see[ing] the world through partisan Glasses. when subjects watch media that presents them with counterattitudinal messages, subjects attempt to counterargue it. to do this, subjects need to be informed and care deeply about it. Strong attitudes help subjects polarize. these effects endure. when citizens watch partisan media, they bring to mind their attitude, update it on the spot, and store this in long-term memory.

#### Polarization is deeply damaging to democracy – there’s a laundry list of reasons: gridlock, intolerance, anti-activism, etc. Furthermore, it’s going to cause a self-repeating cycle where division breeds division, making the problem worse and worse. Carothers and O’Donohue 19 write,

polarization damages democracy. politicians attack courts or pack them with loyalists. It reduces legislatures to gridlock. it promotes the view that the president represents only supporters, rather than the country. polarization shatters norms of tolerance and moderation that keep political competition within bounds. Partisan conflict lead[s] to the demonization of activists. divisions contribute to a spike in hate crimes and political violence. it is difficult to heal. Polarization tends to escalate and becomes self-perpetuating. Polarizing reactions feed on each other. the consequences don’t galvanize a government to respond, because politicians benefit from it.

### Contention Three is Distrust of Media

#### Bias in media leads to perceived inadequacy, where citizens don’t trust media that advocates because they simply don’t think it’ll tell the full story. Sands 20 writes,

Americans have high aspirations for news to be independent. But Americans’ hope for objective media is lost. they see an increasing partisan slant. the media’s ability is diminished in the public’s eye. Americans see increasing bias. Americans don’t think the media works for them. Many feel the media’s roles [are] compromised by bias. three-quarters of Americans say outlets are trying to persuade people to adopt a certain opinion.

#### The newest studies prove – there is causation between time spent on polarized news and distrust. Huber 21 writes,

Internet users change[d] browser homepages to Huff Post, a left-leaning site, or Fox News, a more conservative outlet. participants’ trust in media decrease[d]. this remained detectable a year later. The results expose skepticism of media after prolonged news exposure. longer time spent lead[s] to growing distrust.

#### Trust in media is instrumental to democracy – absent it, we get ignorant citizens which seriously threatens the legitimacy of political participation. Elrod 03 writes,

The goal of the press is straightforward. the government was premised on an educated citizenry that could exercise reasonable judgments. Information about matters is necessary so citizens can make decisions. The function of the press is to ensure the free flow of information to the public. the press is in a position to report and inform citizens.

# 1AR – Case

## Extensions

## Frontlines

### Contention 1

### Contention 2

### Contention 3

# 1AR – Phil

## Values

### Democracy Good

#### We’re definitively winning that democracy is going to be the highest value in this round. The resolution specifically asks whether, quote, “In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy,” which already assumes that democracies are our starting point for determining the resolution. Thus, a value of democracy is going to outweigh on resolutional specifity.

### AT: Justice

### AT: Morality

## Phil

### AT: Kant

#### [AT: Framework]

#### 1] Tailoring Objection – I could tailor my maxims to be specific enough that they don’t create contradictions, for example, only lying at 3 AM on a Friday morning in Baltimore

#### 2] Conflicts – Kantian ethics can't weigh between competing perfect duties – i.e., if I'm running late for work, I either break a promise by not showing up on time, or speed which is civil disobedience. Either way, my maxim is non-universalizable.

#### 3] Empirically, people of color were not seen as reasoners since others didn't see them as part of the Kantian community, just because we don't know empirically if we are reasoners as there is no stable metric. Reason is not contained in the empirical world, just based on reason alone, which means the NC has no metric and fails. It is racist – to Kant only Europeans count as fully human.

#### 4] No intentionality – it's impossible to weigh and compare intents absent intervention of our own intuition. Proves their offense is just self-serving and doesn't guide to action.

#### [Kant Affirms]

#### 1]

# 1AR – Offs

### AT: Competing Perspectives k2 Democracy

### AT: Minority Representation