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## 1

#### The Global Economy is stabilizing and set for increases in 2021 but is still vulnerable to shocks

World Bank 6-8 6-8-2021 "The Global Economy: on Track for Strong but Uneven Growth as COVID-19 Still Weighs" <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/06/08/the-global-economy-on-track-for-strong-but-uneven-growth-as-covid-19-still-weighs>

A year and a half since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the global economy is poised to stage its most robust post-recession recovery in 80 years in 2021. But the rebound is expected to be uneven across countries, as major economies look set to register strong growth even as many developing economies lag. Global growth is expected to accelerate to 5.6% this year, largely on the strength in major economies such as the United States and China. And while growth for almost every region of the world has been revised upward for 2021, many continue to grapple with COVID-19 and what is likely to be its long shadow. Despite this year’s pickup, the level of global GDP in 2021 is expected to be 3.2% below pre-pandemic projections, and per capita GDP among many emerging market and developing economies is anticipated to remain below pre-COVID-19 peaks for an extended period. As the pandemic continues to flare, it will shape the path of global economic activity.

#### Strikes hurt the Economy – two warrants:

#### 1] They hurt critical core industries that is necessary for economic growth

McElroy 19 John McElroy 10-25-2019 "Strikes Hurt Everybody" <https://www.wardsauto.com/ideaxchange/strikes-hurt-everybody> (MPA at McCombs school of Business)

This creates a poisonous relationship between the company and its workforce. Many GM hourly workers don’t identify as GM employees. They identify as UAW members. And they see the union as the source of their jobs, not the company. It’s an unhealthy dynamic that puts GM at a disadvantage to non-union automakers in the U.S. like Honda and Toyota, where workers take pride in the company they work for and the products they make. Attacking the company in the media also drives away customers. Who wants to buy a shiny new car from a company that’s accused of underpaying its workers and treating them unfairly? Data from the Center for Automotive Research (CAR) in Ann Arbor, MI, show that GM loses market share during strikes and never gets it back. GM lost two percentage points during the 1998 strike, which in today’s market would represent a loss of 340,000 sales. Because GM reports sales on a quarterly basis we’ll only find out at the end of December if it lost market share from this strike. UAW members say one of their greatest concerns is job security. But causing a company to lose market share is a sure-fire path to more plant closings and layoffs. Even so, unions are incredibly important for boosting wages and benefits for working-class people. GM’s UAW-represented workers earn considerably more than their non-union counterparts, about $26,000 more per worker, per year, in total compensation. Without a union they never would have achieved that. Strikes are a powerful weapon for unions. They usually are the only way they can get management to accede to their demands. If not for the power of collective bargaining and the threat of a strike, management would largely ignore union demands. If you took away that threat, management would pay its workers peanuts. Just ask the Mexican line workers who are paid $1.50 an hour to make $50,000 BMWs. But strikes don’t just hurt the people walking the picket lines or the company they’re striking against. They hurt suppliers, car dealers and the communities located near the plants. The Anderson Economic Group estimates that 75,000 workers at supplier companies were temporarily laid off because of the GM strike. Unlike UAW picketers, those supplier workers won’t get any strike pay or an $11,000 contract signing bonus. No, most of them lost close to a month’s worth of wages, which must be financially devastating for them. GM’s suppliers also lost a lot of money. So now they’re cutting budgets and delaying capital investments to make up for the lost revenue, which is a further drag on the economy. According to CAR, the communities and states where GM’s plants are located collectively lost a couple of hundred million dollars in payroll and tax revenue. Some economists warn that if the strike were prolonged it could knock the state of Michigan – home to GM and the UAW – into a recession. That prompted the governor of Michigan, Gretchen Whitmer, to call GM CEO Mary Barra and UAW leaders and urge them to settle as fast as possible. So, while the UAW managed to get a nice raise for its members, the strike left a path of destruction in its wake. That’s not fair to the innocent bystanders who will never regain what they lost. John McElroyI’m not sure how this will ever be resolved. I understand the need for collective bargaining and the threat of a strike. But there’s got to be a better way to get workers a raise without torching the countryside.

#### 2] Strikes create a stigmatization effect over labor and consumption that devastates the Economy

Tenza 20, Mlungisi. "The effects of violent strikes on the economy of a developing country: a case of South Africa." Obiter 41.3 (2020): 519-537. (Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-Natal)

When South Africa obtained democracy in 1994, there was a dream of a better country with a new vision for industrial relations.5 However, the number of violent strikes that have bedevilled this country in recent years seems to have shattered-down the aspirations of a better South Africa. South Africa recorded 114 strikes in 2013 and 88 strikes in 2014, which cost the country about R6.1 billion according to the Department of Labour.6 The impact of these strikes has been hugely felt by the mining sector, particularly the platinum industry. The biggest strike took place in the platinum sector where about 70 000 mineworkers’ downed tools for better wages. Three major platinum producers (Impala, Anglo American and Lonmin Platinum Mines) were affected. The strike started on 23 January 2014 and ended on 25 June 2014. Business Day reported that “the five-month-long strike in the platinum sector pushed the economy to the brink of recession”. 7 This strike was closely followed by a four-week strike in the metal and engineering sector. All these strikes (and those not mentioned here) were characterised with violence accompanied by damage to property, intimidation, assault and sometimes the killing of people. Statistics from the metal and engineering sector showed that about 246 cases of intimidation were reported, 50 violent incidents occurred, and 85 cases of vandalism were recorded.8 Large-scale unemployment, soaring poverty levels and the dramatic income inequality that characterise the South African labour market provide a broad explanation for strike violence.9 While participating in a strike, workers’ stress levels leave them feeling frustrated at their seeming powerlessness, which in turn provokes further violent behaviour.10 These strikes are not only violent but take long to resolve. Generally, a lengthy strike has a negative effect on employment, reduces business confidence and increases the risk of economic stagflation. In addition, such strikes have a major setback on the growth of the economy and investment opportunities. It is common knowledge that consumer spending is directly linked to economic growth. At the same time, if the economy is not showing signs of growth, employment opportunities are shed, and poverty becomes the end result. The economy of South Africa is in need of rapid growth to enable it to deal with the high levels of unemployment and resultant poverty. One of the measures that may boost the country’s economic growth is by attracting potential investors to invest in the country. However, this might be difficult as investors would want to invest in a country where there is a likelihood of getting returns for their investments. The wish of getting returns for investment may not materialise if the labour environment is not fertile for such investments as a result of, for example, unstable labour relations. Therefore, investors may be reluctant to invest where there is an unstable or fragile labour relations environment. 3 THE COMMISSION OF VIOLENCE DURING A STRIKE AND CONSEQUENCES The Constitution guarantees every worker the right to join a trade union, participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union, and to strike. 11 The Constitution grants these rights to a “worker” as an individual.12 However, the right to strike and any other conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike such as a picket13 can only be exercised by workers acting collectively.14 The right to strike and participation in the activities of a trade union were given more effect through the enactment of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 199515 (LRA). The main purpose of the LRA is to “advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace”. 16 The advancement of social justice means that the exercise of the right to strike must advance the interests of workers and at the same time workers must refrain from any conduct that can affect those who are not on strike as well members of society. Even though the right to strike and the right to participate in the activities of a trade union that often flow from a strike17 are guaranteed in the Constitution and specifically regulated by the LRA, it sometimes happens that the right to strike is exercised for purposes not intended by the Constitution and the LRA, generally. 18 For example, it was not the intention of the Constitutional Assembly and the legislature that violence should be used during strikes or pickets. As the Constitution provides, pickets are meant to be peaceful. 19 Contrary to section 17 of the Constitution, the conduct of workers participating in a strike or picket has changed in recent years with workers trying to emphasise their grievances by causing disharmony and chaos in public. A media report by the South African Institute of Race Relations pointed out that between the years 1999 and 2012 there were 181 strike-related deaths, 313 injuries and 3,058 people were arrested for public violence associated with strikes.20 The question is whether employers succumb easily to workers’ demands if a strike is accompanied by violence? In response to this question, one worker remarked as follows: “[T]here is no sweet strike, there is no Christian strike … A strike is a strike. [Y]ou want to get back what belongs to you ... you won’t win a strike with a Bible. You do not wear high heels and carry an umbrella and say ‘1992 was under apartheid, 2007 is under ANC’. You won’t win a strike like that.” 21 The use of violence during industrial action affects not only the strikers or picketers, the employer and his or her business but it also affects innocent members of the public, non-striking employees, the environment and the economy at large. In addition, striking workers visit non-striking workers’ homes, often at night, threaten them and in some cases, assault or even murder workers who are acting as replacement labour. 22 This points to the fact that for many workers and their families’ living conditions remain unsafe and vulnerable to damage due to violence. In Security Services Employers Organisation v SA Transport & Allied Workers Union (SATAWU),23 it was reported that about 20 people were thrown out of moving trains in the Gauteng province; most of them were security guards who were not on strike and who were believed to be targeted by their striking colleagues. Two of them died, while others were admitted to hospitals with serious injuries.24 In SA Chemical Catering & Allied Workers Union v Check One (Pty) Ltd,25 striking employees were carrying various weapons ranging from sticks, pipes, planks and bottles. One of the strikers Mr Nqoko was alleged to have threatened to cut the throats of those employees who had been brought from other branches of the employer’s business to help in the branch where employees were on strike. Such conduct was held not to be in line with good conduct of striking.26 These examples from case law show that South Africa is facing a problem that is affecting not only the industrial relations’ sector but also the economy at large. For example, in 2012, during a strike by workers employed by Lonmin in Marikana, the then-new union Association of Mine & Construction Workers Union (AMCU) wanted to exert its presence after it appeared that many workers were not happy with the way the majority union, National Union of Mine Workers (NUM), handled negotiations with the employer (Lonmin Mine). AMCU went on an unprotected strike which was violent and resulted in the loss of lives, damage to property and negative economic consequences including a weakened currency, reduced global investment, declining productivity, and increase unemployment in the affected sectors.27 Further, the unreasonably long time it takes for strikes to get resolved in the Republic has a negative effect on the business of the employer, the economy and employment. 3 1 Effects of violent and long strikes on the economy Generally, South Africa’s economy is on a downward scale. First, it fails to create employment opportunities for its people. The recent statistics on unemployment levels indicate that unemployment has increased from 26.5% to 27.2%. 28 The most prominent strike which nearly brought the platinum industries to its knees was the strike convened by AMCU in 2014. The strike started on 23 January 2014 and ended on 24 June 2014. It affected the three big platinum producers in the Republic, which are the Anglo American Platinum, Lonmin Plc and Impala Platinum. It was the longest strike since the dawn of democracy in 1994. As a result of this strike, the platinum industries lost billions of rands.29 According to the report by Economic Research Southern Africa, the platinum group metals industry is South Africa’s second-largest export earner behind gold and contributes just over 2% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).30 The overall metal ores in the mining industry which include platinum sells about 70% of its output to the export market while sales to local manufacturers of basic metals, fabricated metal products and various other metal equipment and machinery make up to 20%. 31 The research indicates that the overall impact of the strike in 2014 was driven by a reduction in productive capital in the mining sector, accompanied by a decrease in labour available to the economy. This resulted in a sharp increase in the price of the output by 5.8% with a GDP declined by 0.72 and 0.78%.32

#### Err Negative – over-estimate the effect on Strikes on the economy since traditional economic measures underestimate the damage.

Babb No Date Katrina Babb "Chapter 11: The Economic Impact of Unions" <http://isu.indstate.edu/conant/ecn351/ch11/chapter11.htm> (Professor of Economic at Indiana State)

Strikes ­ Simple statistics on strike activity suggest that strikes are relatively rare and the associated aggregate economic losses are relatively minimal. Table 11-3 provides data on major work stoppages, defined as those involving 1000 or more workers and lasting at least one full day or one work shift. But these data can be misleading as a measure of the costliness of a strike.On the one hand, employers in the struck industry may have anticipated the strike and worked their labor force overtime to accumulate inventories to supply customers during the strike period, so that the work lost data overstates the actual loss. On the other hand, the amount lost can be understated by the data if production in associated industries ( those that buy inputs from the struck industry or sell products to it) is disrupted. As a broad generalization, the adverse effects of a strike on nonstriking firms and customers are likely to be greater when services are involved and less when products are involved. Remember, that strikes are the result of the failure of both parties to the negotiation, so it is inaccurate to attribute all of the costs associated with a strike to labor alone.

#### Economic Collapse goes Nuclear.

Tønnesson 15, Stein. "Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace." International Area Studies Review 18.3 (2015): 297-311. (the Department of Peace and Conflict, Uppsala University, Sweden, and Peace research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway)

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

## 2

#### Legitimizing the right to strike enables the state to have a monopoly on violence shutting down any possibility of change.

Crépon, 19 (Marc Crépon, Marc Crépon (born 30 March 1962) is a French philosopher and academic who writes on the subject of languages and communities in the French and German philosophies and contemporary political and moral philosophy.[1] He has also translated works by philosophers such as Nietzsche, Franz Rosenzweig and Leibniz., August 2019, accessed on 6-28-2021, Google Docs, "The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter Benjamin's "Toward the Critique of Violence"", DOI 10.1215/26410478-7708331)//st

If we wish to understand how the question of the right to strike arises for Walter Benjamin in the seventh paragraph of his essay “Zur Kritik der Gewalt,” it is important to first analyze the previous paragraph, which concerns the state’s monopoly on violence. It is here that Benjamin questions the argument that such a monopoly derives from the impossibility of a system of legal ends to preserve itself as long as the pursuit of natural ends through violent means remains. Benjamin responds to this dogmatic thesis with the following hypothesis, arguably one of his most important reflections: “To counter it, one would perhaps have to consider the surprising possibility that law’s interest in monopolizing violence vis-à-vis the individual is explained by the intention not of preserving legal ends, but rather of preserving law itself. [This is the possibility] that **violence, when it does not lie in the hands of law, poses a danger to law, not by virtue of the ends that it may pursue but by virtue of its mere existence outside of law.**”1 In other words, **nothing would endanger the law more than** the possibility of **its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control**. The function of **the law would therefore** be, first and foremost, to **contain violence within its own boundaries.** It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis, Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war. Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within **class struggle.** To begin with, the very idea of such a struggle **implies certain forms of violence. The strike** could then be understood as one of the recognizable forms that this violence can take. However, this analytical framework **is undermined as soon as this form of violence becomes regulated by a “right to strike,” such as the one recognized by law** in France in 1864. What **this recognition engages is**, in fact, **the will of the state to control the possible “violence” of the strike.** Thus, **the “right” of the right to strike appears as the best,** if not the only, **way for the state to circumscribe within (and via) the law the relative violence of class struggles.** We might consider this to be the perfect illustration of the aforementioned hypothesis. Yet, there are two lines of questioning that destabilize this hypothesis that we would do well to consider. First, is it legitimate to present the strike as a form of violence? Who has a vested interest in such a representation? In other words, how can we trace a clear and unequivocal demarcation between violence and nonviolence? Are we not always bound to find residues of violence, even in those actions that we would be tempted to consider nonviolent? The second line of questioning is just as important and is rooted in the distinction established by Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, between the “political strike” and the “proletarian general strike,” to which Benjamin dedicates a set of complementary analyses in §13 of his essay. Here, again, we are faced with a question of limits. What is at stake is the possibility for a certain type of strike (**the proletarian general strike**) to **exceed the limits of the right to strike**— turning, in other words, the right to strike against the law itself. The phenomenon is that of an autoimmune process, in which **the right to strike that is meant to protect the law against** the possible violence of **class struggles is transformed into a means for the destruction of the law.** The difference between the two types of strikes is nevertheless introduced with a condition: “The validity of this statement, however, is not unrestricted because it is not unconditional,” notes Benjamin in §7. We would be mistaken in believing that **the right to strike** is granted and guaranteed unconditionally. Rather, it **is structurally subjected to a conflict of interpretations, those of the workers,** on the one hand, **and of the state** on the other. **From the** point of view of the **state, the partial strike cannot** under any circumstance **be understood as a right to exercise violence, but rather as the right to extract oneself from a preexisting** (and verifiable) **violence: that of the employer.** In this sense, **the partial strike should be considered a nonviolent action**, what Benjamin named a “pure means.” The interpretations diverge on two main points. The first clearly depends on the alleged “violence of the employer,” a predicate that begs the question: Who might have the authority to recognize such violence? Evidently it is not the employer. The danger is that the state would similarly lack the incentive to make such a judgment call. It is nearly impossible, in fact, to find a single instance of a strike in which this recognition of violence was not subject to considerable controversy. The political game is thus the following: **the state legislated the right to strike in order to contain class struggles, with the condition that workers must have “good reason”** to strike. However, **it is unlikely that a state systematically allied with** (and accomplice to) **employers will ever recognize reasons as good, and, as a consequence, it will deem any invocation of the right to strike as illegitimate. Workers will** therefore **be seen as abusing a right** granted by the state, and in so doing **transforming it into a violent means.** On this point, Benjamin’s analyses remain extremely pertinent and profoundly contemporary. They unveil the enduring strategy of **governments confronted with a strike** (in education, transportation, or healthcare, for example) who, afer claiming to understand the reasons for the protest and the grievances of the workers, **deny that the arguments constitute suf­fi­cient reason for a strike** **that will likely paralyze this or that sector of the economy. They deny,** in other words, **that the conditions denounced by the workers display an intrinsic violence that justifies the strike.** Let us note here a point that Benjamin does not mention, but that is part of Sorel’s reflections: this denial inevitably contaminates the (socialist) left once it gains power. What might previously have seemed a good reason to strike when it was the opposition is deemed an insuf­fi­cient one once it is the ruling party. In the face of popular protest, it always invokes a lack of suf­fi­cient rationale, allowing it to avoid recognizing the intrinsic violence of a given social or economic situation, or of a new policy. And it is because it refuses to see this violence and to take responsibility for it that the left regularly loses workers’ support.

#### Unions are limited to defending against the system instead of overthrowing it, reinforcing capitalism by making it easier for workers to be productive.

Eidlin, 20 (Barry Eidlin, Barry Eidlin is an assistant professor of sociology at McGill University and the author of Labor and the Class Idea in the United States and Canada., 1-6-2020, accessed on 6-28-2021, Jacobinmag, "Why Unions Are Good — But Not Good Enough", <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/01/marxism-trade-unions-socialism-revolutionary-organizing)//st>

Labor unions have long occupied a paradoxical position within Marxist theory. They are an essential expression of the working class taking shape as a collective actor and an essential vehicle for working-class action. When we speak of “the working class” or “working-class activity,” we are often analyzing the actions of workers either organized into unions or trying to organize themselves into unions. At the same time, unions are an imperfect and incomplete vehicle for the working class to achieve one of Marxist theory’s central goals: overthrowing capitalism. **Unions by their very existence affirm and reinforce capitalist class society. As organizations which primarily negotiate wages, benefits, and working conditions with employers, unions only exist in relation to capitalists. This makes them** almost by definition **reformist institutions, designed to mitigate and manage the employment relationship, not transform it.** Many unions have adapted to this conservative, managerial role. Others have played key roles in challenging capital’s power. Some have even played insurgent roles at one moment and managerial roles at others. When unions have organized workplace insurgencies, this has sometimes translated into political pressure that expanded democracy and led to large-scale policy reforms. In the few revolutionary historical moments that we can identify, worker organization, whether called unions or something else, has been essential. Thus, labor unions and movements have long been a central focus of Marxist debate. At its core, the debate centers around the role of unions in class formation, the creation of the revolutionary working-class agent. The debate focuses on four key questions. First, **to what degree do unions simply reflect existing relations of production and class struggle,** or actively shape those relations? Second, **if unions actively shape class struggle, why and under what conditions do they enhance or inhibit it?** Third, **how do unions shape class identities,** and how does this affect unions’ scope of action? Fourth, **what is the relation between unions and politics?** This question is comprised of two sub-questions: to what degree do unions help or hinder struggles in the workplace becoming broader political struggles? And how should unions relate to political parties, the more conventional vehicle for advancing political demands? The following is a chapter from The Oxford Handbook of Karl Marx (Oxford University Press, 2019). It assesses Marxist debates surrounding trade unions, oriented by the four questions mentioned previously. It proceeds historically, first examining how Marx and Engels conceived of the roles and limitations of trade unions, then tracing how others within Marxism have pursued these debates as class relations and politics have changed over time. While the chapter includes some history of labor unions and movements themselves, the central focus is on how Marxist theorists thought of and related to those movements. Marx and Engels wrote extensively about the unions of their time, although never systematically. The majority of their writings on unions responded to concrete labor struggles of their time. From their earliest works, they grasped unions’ necessity and limitations in creating a working-class agent capable of advancing class struggle against the bourgeoisie. This departed from previous variants of socialism, often based in idealized views of rebuilding a rapidly eroding community of artisanal producers, which did not emphasize class organization or class struggle. Writing in The Condition of the Working Class in England about emerging forms of unionism, Engels observed that even though workers’ primary struggles were over material issues such as wages, they pointed to a deeper social and political conflict: What gives these Unions and the strikes arising from them their real importance is this, that they are the first attempt of the workers to abolish competition. They im­ ply the recognition of the fact that **the supremacy of the bourgeoisie is based wholly upon the competition of the workers among themselves**; i.e., upon their want of cohesion. And precisely because the **Unions** direct themselves against the vital nerve of the present social order, however one-sidedly, in however narrow a way, are they so dangerous to this social order. At the same time, Engels saw that, even as union struggles “[kept alive] the opposition of the workers to the … omnipotence of the bourgeoisie,” so too did they “**[compel] the admission that something more is needed than** Trades Unions and **strikes to break the power of the ruling class.”** Here Engels articulates the crux of the problem. First, **unions** are essential for working-class formation, creating a collective actor both opposed to the bourgeoisie and capable of challenging it for power. Second, they **are an insufficient vehicle for creating and mobilizing that collective actor.** Marx and Engels understood that unions are essential to working-class formation because, under capitalism, the system of “free labor,” where individual workers sell their labor power to an employer for a wage, fragments relations between workers and makes them compete with each other. As described in the Communist Manifesto, the bourgeoisie “has left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash payment,’” leaving workers “exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market.” While workers organized based on other collective identities, such as race, ethnicity, or religion, only unions could unite them as workers against the source of their exploitation — the bourgeoisie. Unions serve “as organized agencies for superseding the very system of wage labor and capital rule.” But just as unions could allow the proletariat to take shape and challenge the bourgeoisie for power, Marx and Engels also saw that they were a partial, imperfect vehicle for doing so for two reasons. First, **unions’ fundamentally defensive role, protecting workers against employers’ efforts to drive a competitive race to the bottom, meant that they limited themselves “to a guerrilla war against the effects of the existing system, instead of simultaneously trying to change it.”** Thus, **even militant trade unions found themselves struggling** for “a fair day’s work for a fair day’s wage” **without challenging the bourgeoisie’s fundamental power**, particularly the wage labor system. And some layers of the trade union officialdom were content to fight for privileges for their small segment of the working class, leaving most workers behind. Second, **unions’ focus on wages and workplace issues tended to reinforce a division between economic and political struggles.** This division was explicit with the more conservative “old” unions in Britain, which “bar[red] all political action on principle and in their charters.” But even with more progressive formations, such as the early nineteenth century’s Chartists, or the late nineteenth century’s “new” unions, Marx and Engels saw that the transition from workplace struggles to politics was not automatic.

#### Capitalism’s successes necessitate human extinction and destroy the value to life – it’s try or die for alternative organizing

Duzgun 20 Eren Duzgun (teaches Historical Sociology and International Relations at Leiden University, Netherlands), 4-5-2020, "Capitalism, Coronavirus and the Road to Extinction," Socialist Project, https://socialistproject.ca/2020/04/capitalism-coronavirus-and-road-to-extinction/, SJBE

**Covid-19, by contrast, has begun its journey and taken its biggest toll thus far in the most advanced and affluent parts of the world**. This is to say, the contagion is no longer limited to the persistently undernourished, underdeveloped, and war-torn parts of the world; its impact is no longer restricted to a distant wet market or a third world country alone. **Instead, it has emerged and expanded in the very heart of the capitalist world order at a time when capitalism has not only been already firmly established across the globe but has been testing the eco-biological limits of the entire planet. Should things remain the same, Covid-19 and its future cousins are likely to claim the lives of not just ‘some’ people as they did in the past, but of humanity as a whole. In this sense, perhaps for the first time in modern history, the biological blitzkrieg activated by** the coronavirus has thrown into sharp relief the immediately existential and undeniably global contradictions and consequences generated by capitalism.Contradictions on a Global Scale Critical biologists and epidemiologists have put the blame on industrial agriculture as the root cause of the emergence of new pathogens since the 1990s. [According to Rob Wallace](https://climateandcapitalism.com/2020/03/11/capitalist-agriculture-and-covid-19-a-deadly-combination/), giant agribusiness and resource extraction firms have now reached the last virgin forests and smallholder-held farmlands in the world, subordinating them to the logic of capitalist markets. **The loss of the ecological diversity and complexity of these huge tracts of land has increasingly forced wild food operators to hunt in previously untouched parts of the jungle, which, in turn, has increased “the interaction with, and spillover of, previously boxed-in pathogens, including Covid-19.”** Likewise, global warming has forced or allowed pathogens to escape their natural habitat. As a result, new viruses against which we have no immunity “are being sprung free, threatening the whole world.” In short, [as John Vidal writes](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/mar/18/tip-of-the-iceberg-is-our-destruction-of-nature-responsible-for-covid-19-aoe), “we disrupt ecosystems, and we shake viruses loose from their natural hosts. When that happens, they need a new host. Often, we are it.” **That some agribusiness firms have been blatantly risking lives for profit would not come as a surprise to the critical reader**. Even [Bill Gates has been sounding the alarm](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Af6b_wyiwI) about the potentially deadly consequences of irresponsible business practices and new viruses. **Yet, what tends to remain underemphasized in these debates is that the blame belongs neither solely to ‘greedy’ firms that have driven viruses out of their natural habitat, nor to ‘short-sighted’ politicians who have not invested enough in vaccine technology or national health systems. Instead, the problem is rooted in the very structure and rationality of the system as a whole. That is,** we may go extinct as a result of the ‘successes’ of the very system ‘we’ created in the first place, i.e., capitalism. **How did we end up losing control of an ‘economic’ system of our own making?** This is indeed an anomaly in human history. The conception of the ‘economy’ as an autonomous sphere dictating its own rules over society did not exist in non-capitalist societies. As the economic anthropologist [Karl Polanyi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Polanyi#Works) put it, “neither under tribal, nor feudal, nor mercantile conditions was there… a separate economic system in society.” The economy either “remained nameless” or had “no obvious meaning,” for the economic process and prices were instituted through non-market means, such as kinship, marriage, age-groups, status, political patronage, etc. Even “where markets were most highly developed, as under the mercantile system,” the economic system, as a rule, “[was absorbed in the social system](https://books.google.ca/books?id=SgHuxQEACAAJ)” and showed “no tendency to expand at the expense of the rest.” In this sense, the market with a distinctive logic, autonomy, and dynamic of its own was completely unknown to our ancestors, and indeed, the emergence of the idea of ‘self-regulating’ markets represented a complete reversal of the way in which past economies functioned. **In order** for ‘self-regulating’ markets to ‘self-regulate’, a variety of political and institutional arrangements had to be initiated to progressively eliminate the non-market survival strategies that **humans previously relied upon.** Most notably, the age-old communal systems of social and moral regulation needed to be eradicated, a process that systematically subordinated the ‘natural and human substance of society’, i.e., land and labour, to market relations for the first time in history. Rise of Capitalism At the heart of the rise of capitalism, therefore, rested a ‘political’, legal, and violent process that led to the historically unprecedented characterization of land and labour as commodities. Without commodifying land and labour, i.e., without treating the planet’s living substance as commodities, it would have been impossible to view the ‘economy’ as an institutionally and motivationally self-regulating sphere of life, an almost robotic creature functioning at the expense of human lives and livelihoods. Capitalism presupposed from the very beginning a radical transformation in the human use of nature as well as in the provision of life’s essential requirements. In this sense, the danger of global extinction which we have been going through is not a temporary hiccup in an otherwise smoothly operating capitalist ecosystem but has always been a possibility built into the very structure of market society**.** On the one hand, by treating land and labour as commodities, by subjecting people’s utilization of land and enjoyment of life to their ability to continuously increase market competitiveness and productivity, capitalism has enabled massive technological advancements in all spheres of life. This, in turn, has generated, above all, an unprecedented potential to feed, clothe, and accommodate an ever-increasing world population. **On the other hand, however,** [**as Ellen Wood argues**](https://monthlyreview.org/1998/07/01/the-agrarian-origins-of-capitalism/)**, by subordinating all other considerations to the imperatives of market competition,** capitalism has also created poverty, homelessness, environmental destruction and pandemics. Billions of people who could be fed and housed are subjected to immense doses of insecurity, living their lives under the constant threat of joblessness, homelessness, loss of status and starvation. **In a similar fashion, the environment that could be protected is systematically destroyed for profit, and killer viruses that could be contained are unleashed.** Undoubtedly, Covid-19 has become the archetypal example that lays bare “the destructive impulses of a system in which the very fundamentals of existence are subjected to the requirements of profit.” **Can the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ outcomes of capitalism be somewhat reconciled? Indeed, for a brief period in the Global North, it seemed they could be**. During the so-called [Golden Age of Capitalism](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-golden-age-of-capitalism-9780198287414) (1945-70), massive productivity increases (alongside working-class struggles) allowed for steady increases in wages, job security, expansion of welfare state, improvements in the living conditions of the majority of the labouring masses as well as the expansion of civil and political liberties. **Yet, this brief period of generalized prosperity and stability also facilitated the incorporation of the western working classes into the dominant capitalist ideology, causing them to turn a blind eye to the economically destabilizing, environmentally destructive, and socially degrading impact of global capitalism in the Global South.** The main ‘problem’ with the Global South has been, by and large, a question of ‘timing’. **Once capitalism was established and consolidated in the Global North, it has not only led to the birth of new and more effective forms** of imperialist control and neocolonial expansion but has also irrevocably undermined the potentially positive outcomes of capitalist development elsew**here.** For example, the [MIT political economist Alice Amsden](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-rise-of-the-rest-9780195170597), a large chunk of whose work in the 1970s and 1980s sought to explain the success of the ‘Asian Tigers’, more recently concluded that the massive technological and infrastructural gap between the North and the South has literally made impossible capitalist ‘development’ of any sort in the vast majority of southern economies since the 1990s. The economic situation in the Global North has gotten progressively worse too. Under the conditions of increased global economic competition wages have been stagnating or declining since the 1970s, while decades of fiscal austerity wiping out most of the economic and social gains of the earlier period. The new reality of high unemployment, stagnant wages, long work hours and precarious jobs has been masked for a while by a debt-driven growth, the unsustainability of which has been bitterly testified by millions of people since the 2008 financial crisis. All in all, market imperatives have been regulating social reproduction almost worldwide for a long time but with no prospect of capitalist ‘development’ for an overwhelming majority of the world’s population in the South and the North alike. **Furthermore, the ecologically disastrous and socially inhumane consequences of capitalism have long outweighed the prospects of material gain in the Global South.** In this respect, what is being painfully realized in the current conjuncture is that the North is no longer able to externalize the worst consequences of such an unsustainable mode of life. The North isn’t and won’t be spared the existential threats posed by global capitalism. **The implication is that any meaningful attempt at solving the present, and future crises needs to take the bull by the horn**. There is literally no choice to be made between ‘capitalism’ and ‘capitalism with a human face’. **As long as the underlying dynamics of our lives remain the same,** as long as we keep treating nature and human beings as commodities, no [cosmetic surgery](https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/why-growth-cant-be-green/) will do. To the contrary, historical experience suggests that such minimal interventions will sooner or later backfire, re-legitimizing capitalism pure and simple. The only way to ‘re-embed’ our economies and save our lives from ecological collapse is by intervening in the very heart of the beast: land and human beings need to be taken out of the market. The beast is not tameable; it needs to be [killed](https://monthlyreview.org/product/what_every_environmentalist_needs_to_know_about_capitalism/)**.**

#### Vote neg for dual power organizing – only by refusing the 1ac’s opportunistic politics can we produce actual change.

Escalante 18 Alyson Escalante (Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist), 8-24-2018, "Against Electoralism, For Dual Power!," Forge News, https://theforgenews.org/2018/08/24/against-electoralism-for-dual-power/, pat recut sjbe

If we, as socialists, truly fight for a classless world, we must smash the mechanisms which ensure class domination. **We must smash the bourgeois state. This realization led the Bolsheviks to reject the opportunism of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Menshiviks in the Soviets and they chose to overthrow the provisional government themselves. Shockingly, their revolution was successful**. After months of compromise, the workers had grown tired of the opportunist bourgeois socialists. They had seen that the dual power of the soviets and the provisional government was not tenable. One side had to take unitary power. Most importantly, the workers saw that the bourgeois government had done nothing for them: it had smashed their printing presses, it had crushed their demonstrations, it had broken their strikes. Of course, it could do nothing else, the bourgeois state is designed to do precisely this. The events of October, 1917 ought to have concretely proven that the strategy of infiltrating the bourgeois government is untenable. **Lenin and the Bolsheviks proved that the workers are willing to throw the bourgeois state away in favor of a dictatorship of the proletariat. And yet, here we are 111 years later and large factions of the largest socialist organization in the United States echo the cowardly and worthless drivelings of the Menshiviks and Socialist Revolutionaries.** Dual Power Today **I am sure that at this point, the opportunists reading this have already begun to type out their typical objection: the world is different than it was in 1917, and the conditions of the United States in no way echo the conditions which enabled the Bolsheviks to achieve revolutionary success. To this tried and true objection, there is one simple answer: you are entirely correct, and that is** why we need to abandon electoralism and working within the bourgeois state. What were the conditions which allowed the Bolsheviks to successfully revolt? The conditions were that of Dual Power. Alongside the capitalist state, there existed a whole set of institutions and councils which met the needs of the workers**.** The soviets, a parallel socialist government made up of individual councils, successfully took over many governmental responsibilities in some parts of Petrograd. In the radical Viborg district, the Bolshevik controlled soviets provided government services like mail, alongside programs that could meet the needs of workers. **When a far right coup was attempted against the provisional government, it was troops loyal to the Bolshevik factions within the soviet who repelled the coup plotters,** proving concretely to the workers of Petrograd that the socialists could not only provide for their needs, but also for their defense. In short: the Bolsheviks recognized that instead of integrating into the bourgeois state, they could operate outside of it to build dual power. They could establish programs of elected representatives who would serve the workers. They would not bolster the capitalist state in the name of socialism, they would offer an alternative to it. **And so, when the time came for revolt, the masses were already to loyal to** the Bolsheviks. The only party who had never compromised, who had denounced the unpopular imperialist wars, who had rejected the provisional government entirely, was the party who successfully gained the support of the workers. And so, many of us on the more radical fringes of the socialist movement wonder why it is the the DSA and other socialist opportunists seem to think that we can win by bolstering the capitalist state? **We wonder, given this powerful historical precedent, why they devote their energy to getting more Ocasios elected**; what good does one more left democrat who will abandon the workers do f**or us?** The answer we receive in return is always the same: we want to win small changes that will make life for the workers easier; we want to protect food stamps and healthcare. And do this, we reply: what makes you think reformism is the only way to do this. **When the bourgeois state in California was happy to let black children go to school unfed,** the Black Panthers didn’t rally around democratic candidates, they became militant and fed the children themselves. In the 40s and 50s, socialists in New York saw people going without healthcare and instead of rallying behind democratic candidates, they built the IWO to provide healthcare **directly. Both these groups took up our pressing revolutionary task: building dual power.** Imagine if all those hours the DSA poured into electing Ocasio were instead used to feed the people of New York, to provide them with medical care, to ensure their needs were met. **Imagine the masses seeing socialism not as a pipe dream we might achieve through electing more imperialists, but as a concrete movement which is currently meeting their needs?** The fact is, we are not nearly ready for revolution. Socialists in the United States have failed to meet the needs of the people, and as long as their only concrete interaction with the masses is handing them a voter registration form, they will continue to fail the people. Our task now is not to elect representatives to advocate for the people; it is much more gruelingly laborious than that. Our task is to serve the people. Our task is to build dual power. The movement to do this is underway. Members of the DSA refoundation caucus have begun to move the left of the DSA in this direct, socialist groups like Philly Socialists have begun to build dual power through GED programs and tenants unions, many branches of the Party For Socialism and Liberation have begun to feed the people and provide for their concrete needs, and Red Guard collectives in Los Angeles have built serve the people programs and taken on a stance of militant resistance to gentrification. The movement is growing, its time is coming, and dual power is achievable within our life time. The opportunists are, in a sense, correct. We are not where we were in 1917, but we can begin to move in that direction and dual power can take us there. In order to achieve dual power we have to recognize that Lenin was right: there will be no socialist gains by working within state institutions designed to crush socialism. Furthermore, we must recognize that the strategies of the electoral opportunists trade off with dual power. Electing candidates drains resources, time, and energy **away from actually serving the people.** **And so, we should commit to undertake the difficult and dangerous task of building dual power**. We must reject opportunism, we must name the democratic party as our enemy, we must rally around power directly in the hands of the socialist movement. **We do not have a parallel system of soviets in the United States. We can change that**. Someday the cry “all power to the soviets” will be heard again. Lets make it happen.

## 3

#### Counterplan text: States ought to increase transparency measures between workers and employers to increase the opportunities of agreements before striking.

Davies 6 [Ross; George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty, The Green Bag; “Strike Season: Protecting Labor-Management Conflict in the Age of Terror,” SSRN; 4/12/06; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=896185]//SJWen

Part I of this Article lays out the unique threat posed by strikes (and, to a lesser extent, by lockouts) in the age of terror. Using American experience during the world wars, Part II shows that there is no way to prevent strikes from happening, foreclosing any argument for a fruitless ban on strikes or for some sort of nostalgic and fictional Greatest-Generation-inspired, return to a patriotic war footing regulation of labor-management relations. Part III reviews the generally applicable labor laws currently in force and shows that both experience and precedent limit their prospects for effective regulation of labor-management conflict in the age of terror, with the notable exception of the 1974 health care amendments to the NLRA. Part IV describes a proposed extension of the 1974 amendments to cover critical infrastructure more generally and explains how and why it would serve labor, management, and the American people in the age of terror. It would do so not by directly reducing strikes, lockouts, or the use of replacements (the three forms of risky work-stoppage-related behavior at which the proposed notice rule is directed), but rather by increasing transparency in the use of those weapons of labor-management conflict and thus increasing the opportunities for the parties, the government, and the public to share information and take appropriate precautions to avoid increased risks of effective terrorist attacks. The adoption of the rule proposed here would alter slightly the armaments of both labor and management, but in all likelihood it would do so without affecting the overall balance of power between them in any meaningful way.

## Case

#### Teacher strikes hurt student outcomes and may worsen income inequality

[**Illinois Policy**, 10-2-19, “Teacher strikes hurt student outcomes and may worsen income inequality” <https://www.illinoispolicy.org/press-releases/teacher-strikes-hurt-student-outcomes-and-may-worsen-income-inequality/>] // SC SD

CHICAGO (Oct. 2, 2019) – As the Chicago Teachers Union plans to announce this afternoon whether it will walk out on more than 360,000 students, [**studies show**](https://illinoispolicy.us1.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7fe208d3c85ffa1d03aeaade4&id=5ecc6a508a&e=0b391c8e91)strikes negatively affect student academic outcomes.

**Research published in the National Bureau of Economic Research indicates** strikes can temper growth in elementary student test scores by 2.2%. Given 90% of Chicago Public School students in 2018 were minority and 83% were classified as low-income, this means a strike will disproportionately harm those most in need **and leave them to endure the long term negative consequences.**

Experts from the nonpartisan Illinois Policy Institute are available to comment on how a strike would hurt minority and low-income students, potentially worsening income inequality.

**How strikes harm student populations:**

**Test score decline: Expert consensus finds strikes have long-term negative effects on students. One study published by the NBER discovered that** long strikes of 10 or more days have a significant negative effect on math test scores. Another published by Columbia University economists found extended disruptions, such as a strike, have negative effects on math and English achievement.

Less instruction: Unless the educational time lost during a strike is made up – such as by extending the school year – students lose the corresponding time in the classroom. In addition, students may require extensive review of material to get back up to speed.

Underperforming state averages: CPS already underperforms state academic achievement benchmarks. Its average SAT scores are 56 points lower than the state average, its four-year graduation rates are 11 percentage points lower and the percentage of CPS teachers rated proficient or excellent is 11 percentage points lower. A strike could exacerbate this.

**Quote from Orphe Divounguy, chief economist for the nonpartisan Illinois Policy Institute:**

“In the case of a teachers’ strike in Chicago, it is students who will ultimately be left behind. Lost classroom time worsens academic achievement and harms poor and disadvantaged students the most.

“With growing concerns about income inequality, the best way to ensure low-income students succeed is for CTU to accept Mayor Lightfoot’s generous offer and keep students in the classroom.”

#### Robust empirical analysis confirm teacher strikes destroy education.

**Juame and Willén 18**, [David Jaume and Alexander Willén, JULY 25, 2018 • RESEARCH BRIEFS IN ECONOMIC POLICY NO. 123, “The Long‐​Run Effects of Teacher Strikes: Evidence from Argentina,” <https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/long-run-effects-teacher-strikes-evidence-argentina>] // SC SD

We construct a new data set on teacher strikes in Argentina and use this to present the first evidence in the literature on the effect of school disruptions caused by teacher strikes on student long‐​run outcomes. Between 1983 and 2014 Argentina experienced 1,500 teacher strikes, with substantial variation across time and provinces, making this a particularly interesting case for the study of teacher strikes. We analyze the relationship between exposure to strikes in primary school and relevant education, labor market, and sociodemographic outcomes when the exposed students are between ages 30 and 40. We also examine whether the effects we identify carry over to the individuals’ children.

Our empirical strategy consists of examining how education and labor market outcomes changed among adults who were exposed to more days of teacher strikes during primary school compared with adults who were exposed to fewer days of strikes. The sources of variation we exploit therefore come from within‐​province differences in strike exposure across birth cohorts and within‐​cohort differences in strike exposure across provinces. On average, provinces lost 372 instructional days because of strikes between 1983 and 2014, ranging from 188 days in La Pampa to 531 days in Rio Negro. The average number of primary school days lost because of teacher strikes was 88 among the individuals in our analysis sample—equivalent to half a year of schooling.

The main assumptions underlying our estimation strategy are that there are no shocks (or other policies) contemporaneous with teacher strikes that differentially affect the various cohorts and that the timing of teacher strikes is uncorrelated with prior trends in outcomes across birth cohorts within each province. We show extensive evidence that our data are consistent with these assumptions. In particular, our results are robust to controlling for local labor market conditions, accounting for cross‐​province mobility, excluding regions with persistently high frequencies of teacher strikes, and controlling for province‐​specific nonteacher strikes. We also show that the effects we identify disappear when reassigning treatment to cohorts that have just graduated from—or have not yet started—primary school, indicating that the timing of teacher strikes is uncorrelated with trends in outcomes across birth cohorts within each province.

**We find robust evidence in support of** adverse labor market effects when the students are between ages 30 and 40: being exposed to the average incidence of teacher strikes during primary school reduces wages for males and females by 3.2 percent **and 1.9 percent, respectively**. We find some suggestive evidence that exposure to strikes in early grades has larger effects than exposure in later grades, although these differences are often not statistically significantly different from zero. The prevalence of teacher strikes in Argentina means that the effect on the economy as a whole is substantial: a back‐​of‐​the‐​envelope calculation suggests an aggregate annual earnings loss of $2.34 billion. This amount is equivalent to the cost of raising the average employment income of all primary school teachers in Argentina by 62.4 percent.

In addition to adverse wage and earnings effects, **our results reveal negative effects on several other labor market outcomes. With respect to males, we find evidence of** both occupational downgrading and an increase in the likelihood of being unemployed. The effects are very similar for females. However, rather than an occupational downgrading effect, we find an increase in home production (neither working nor studying). These adverse labor market effects are driven, at least in part, by declines in educational attainment: being exposed to the average incidence of strikes leads to a reduction in years of schooling by 2.02 and 1.58 percent for males and females, respectively. By looking at students between ages 12 and 17, we show that these negative education effects are visible immediately after children have finished primary school and that they are larger among children from more vulnerable households. Our analysis reveals that strikes affect individuals on other sociodemographic dimensions as well. Specifically, individuals exposed to teacher strikes have less‐​educated partners and lower per capita family income. Finally, we find significant intergenerational effects: children of individuals exposed to strikes during primary school suffer negative education effects as well.

It is important to highlight that the pervasive level of teacher strikes during our analysis period is not a deviation from the norm in Argentina and that current students are exposed to similar levels of strikes. These factors cement the relevance of our research and highlight the urgency of implementing reforms that can reduce the prevalence of teacher strikes in the country. One policy could be to introduce labor contracts that extend over several years and to only allow teachers to strike if a bargaining impasse is reached when renewing these multiyear contracts. This policy would eliminate sporadic teacher strikes while still allowing teachers to use industrial action as a tool to ensure fair contracts.

#### Government recognition doesn’t involve policy action or any change – this is terminal defense to the aff’s solvency since they don’t actually cause strikes or even protect it.

Law Dictionary ‘ND [The Law Dictionary; Featuring Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Ed.; No Date; “What is RECOGNIZE?”; https://thelawdictionary.org/recognize/; Accessed 10-28-2021] AK

To try; to examine in order to determine the truth of a matter. Also to enter into a recognizance.

#### Strikes fail and spark backlash – leads to fragmentation.

Grant and Wallace 91 [Don Sherman Grant; Ohio State University; Michael Wallace; Indiana University; “Why Do Strikes Turn Violent?” University of Chicago Press; March 1991; <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2781338.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aca3144a9ae9e4ac65e285f2c67451ffb>]//SJWen

\*\*RM = Resource-Mobilization, or Strikes

3. Violent tactics.-Violent tactics are viewed by RM theorists exclu- sively as purposeful strategies by challengers for inciting social change with little recognition of how countermobilization strategies of elites also create violence. The role of elite counterstrategies has been virtually ig- nored in research on collective violence. Of course, history is replete with examples of elites' inflicting violence on challenging groups with the full sanction of the state. Typically, elite-sponsored violence occurs when the power resources and legal apparatus are so one-sidedly in the elites' favor that the outcome is never in doubt. In conflicts with weak insiders, elites may not act so openly unless weak insiders flaunt the law. Typically, elite strategies do not overtly promote violence but rather provoke violence by the other side in hopes of eliciting public condemnation or more vigorous state repression of challenger initiatives. This is a critical dynamic in struggles involving weak insiders such as unions. In these cases, worker violence, even when it appears justified, erodes public support for the workers' cause and damages the union's insider status.

4. Homogeneity and similarity.-Many RM theorists incorrectly as- sume that members of aggrieved groups are homogeneous in their inter- ests and share similar positions in the social structure. This (assumed) homogeneity of interests is rare for members of outsider groups and even more suspect for members of weak-insider groups. Indeed, groups are rarely uniform and often include relatively advantaged persons who have other, more peaceful channels in which to pursue their goals. Internal stratification processes mean that different persons have varying invest- ments in current structural arrangements, in addition to their collective interest in affecting social change. Again, these forces are especially prev- alent for weak insiders: even the group's lowest-status members are likely to have a marginal stake in the system; high-status members are likely to have a larger stake and, therefore, less commitment to dramatic change in the status quo.

Internal differences may lead to fragmentation of interests and lack of consensus about tactics, especially tactics suggesting violent confronta- tion. While group members share common grievances, individual mem- bers may be differentially aggrieved by the current state of affairs or differentially exposed to elite repression. White's (1989) research on the violent tactics of the Irish Republican Army shows that working-class members and student activists, when compared with middle-class partici- pants, are more vulnerable to state-sponsored repression, more likely to be available for protest activities, and reap more benefits from political violence. When we apply them to our study of strike violence, we find that differences in skill levels are known to coincide with major intraclass 1120 Strikes divisions in material interests (Form 1985) and are likely to coincide with the tendency for violent action. For instance, skilled-craft workers, who are more socially and politically conservative than unskilled workers, are less likely to view relations with employers as inherently antagonistic and are prone to separate themselves from unskilled workers, factors that should decrease their participation in violence.

#### Growth triggers war

Boehmer, Charles R., 5-14-2010, "ECONOMIC GROWTH AND VIOLENT INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: 1875–1999," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10242690903568801

The theory set forth earlier theorizes that economic growth increases perceptions of state strength, increasing the likelihood of violent interstate conflicts. Economic growth appears to increase the resolve of leaders to stand against challenges and the willingness to escalate disputes. A non‐random pattern exists where higher rates of GDP growth over multiple years are positively and significantly related to the most severe international conflicts, whereas this is not true for overall conflict initiations. Moreover, growth of military expenditures, as a measure of the war chest proposition, does not offer any explanation for violent interstate conflicts. This is not to say that growth of military expenditures never has any effect on the occurrence of war, although such a link is not generally true in the aggregate using a large sample of states. In comparison, higher rates of economic growth are significantly related to violent interstate conflicts in the aggregate. States with growing economies are more apt to reciprocate military challenges by other states and become involved in violent interstate conflicts. The results also show that theories from the Crisis‐Scarcity perspective lack explanatory power linking GDP growth rates to war at the state level of analysis. This is not to say that such theories completely lack explanatory power in general, but more particularly that they cannot directly link economic growth rates to state behavior in violent interstate conflicts. In contrast, theories of diversionary conflict may well hold some explanatory power, although not regarding GDP growth in a general test of states from all regions of the world across time. Perhaps diversionary theory better explains state behaviors short of war, where the costs of externalizing domestic tensions do not become too costly, or in relation to the foreign policies of particular countries. In many circumstances, engaging in a war to divert attention away from domestic conditions would seemingly exacerbate domestic crisis conditions unless the chances of victory were practically assured. Nonetheless, this study does show that domestic conflict is associated with interstate conflict. If diversionary conflict theory has any traction as an economic explanation of violent interstate conflicts, it may require the study of other explanatory variables besides overall GDP growth rates, such as unemployment or inflation rates. The contribution of this article has been to examine propositions about economic growth in a global study. Most existing studies on this topic focus on only the United States, samples of countries that are more developed on average (due to data availability in the past), or are based on historical information and not economic GDP data. While I have shown that there is no strong evidence linking military expenditures to violent interstate conflicts at the state level of analysis, much of the remaining Growth‐as‐Catalyst perspective is grounded in propositions that are not directly germane to questions about state conflict behavior, such as those linking state behavior to long‐cycles, or those that remain at the systemic level. What answer remains linking economic growth to war once we eliminate military expenditures as an explanation? Considering that the concept of foreign policy mood is difficult to identify and measure, and that the bulk of the literature relies solely on the American historical experience, I do not rely on that concept. It is still possible that such moods affect some decision‐makers. Instead, similar to Blainey, I find that economic growth, when sustained over a stretch of years, has its strongest effect on states once they find themselves in an international crisis. The results of this study suggest that states such as China, which have a higher level of opportunity to become involved in violent interstate conflicts due to their capabilities, geographic location, history of conflict, and so on, should also have a higher willingness to fight after enjoying multiple years of recent economic growth. One does not have to assume that an aggressive China will emerge from growth. If conflicts do present themselves, then China may be more likely to escalate a war given its recent national performance.

#### Economic growth causes climate change and biodiversity loss.

Dan O'Neill, 2013 (lecturer in ecological economics at the University of Leeds), THE GUARDIAN, May 1, 2013. Retrieved Apr. 28, 2018 from <https://www.theguardian.com/business/economics-blog/2013/may/01/economics-of-enough>

In our new book, Enough Is Enough: Building a Sustainable Economy in a World of Finite Resources, Rob Dietz and I argue that it's time to abandon the pursuit of growth in wealthy nations and consider a new strategy – an economy of enough. Suppose that instead of chasing after more stuff, more jobs, more consumption, and more income, we aimed for enough stuff, enough jobs, enough consumption and enough income. Abandoning the pursuit of growth may seem like a radical idea, but there's a strong case to be made for it. Economic growth is causing a number of global environmental problems, ranging from climate change to biodiversity loss. At the same time, economic growth is no longer improving people's lives in wealthy nations like the UK. To continue to pursue growth for growth's sake is simply irresponsible.