# 1NC

## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must defend the hypothetical implementation of the resolution.

#### Resolved means a legislative policy

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Violation: Their advocacy states the aff as a general principle, which is not a fiated version of the aff

#### Standards:

#### Ground- we don’t get to read CPs or even DAs because those all are predicated upon the aff being a policy and they can spike out of links by saying we must prove the aff as a general principle is bad in a normative sense, kills fairness because none of my arguments stick and education because they can skirt questions of topic literature.

#### Burden of Rejoinder- the burden of the neg is to prove that the aff is a bad idea but we can’t do this when they’re a general principle because we become constrained to solely normative indicts and can’t test the aff from multiple angles. Kills neg flex and our ability to engage.

#### 3] SSD is good – it forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives. Non-T affs allow individuals to establish their own metrics for what they want to debate leading to ideological dogmatism. Even if they prove the topic is bad, our argument is that the process of preparing and defending proposals is an educational benefit of engaging it.

TVA: defend a fiated version of the plan with some sort of treaty and an alienation framework

#### Vote neg – they’ve destroyed the round from the beginning and topicality’s key to set the correct model of debate which means it comes first.

#### Voters:

#### Fairness is an impact – it’s an intrinsic good – debate is fundamentally a game and some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity Use competing interps – topicality is question of models of debate which they should have to proactively justify and we’ll win reasonability links to our offense. Drop the debater because dropping the arg is severance which moots 7 minutes of 1nc offense No rvis—it’s your burden to be fair and T—same reason you don’t win for answering inherency or putting defense on a disad.

## 2

#### Use the Role of Ballot of maximizing expected well-being

#### 1. Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about** the way **pleasure** feels **and** something **undeniably bad about** the way **pain** feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?”** This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “**But** what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the **pleasure is not good for anything further;** it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: **“We never ask** [a man] **what his end is in being pleased, because** we assume that **pleasure is** choice **worthy in itself.”**4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

#### 2] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

#### 3] Death is bad and outweighs – a] agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security which constrains every ethical theory, b] it destroys the subject itself – kills any ability to achieve value in ethics since life is a prerequisite which means it’s a side constraint since we can’t reach the end goal of ethics without life

**4] Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority.**

**Bostrom 12** [Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012)] These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest** an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ **Our present understanding of axiology might** well **be confused. We may not** nowknow — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet **be able to imagine the best ends** of our journey. **If we are** indeedprofoundly **uncertain** about our ultimate aims,then we should recognize that **there is a great** option **value in preserving** — and ideally improving — **our ability to recognize value and** to **steer the future accordingly. Ensuring** that **there will be a future** version of **humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely **is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain** a lot of **value.** To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

**5] Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one.**

**Bostrom 12** [Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.], Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdfEven if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, **we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives**. **This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives.** The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10 54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10 52 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. **One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives.** And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€”positive or negativeâ€”is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.

## 3

#### Commercial space sectors are promoting innovation now

Brian Weeden 15, technical adviser for the Secure World Foundation, 10-5-2015, "Op-ed," SpaceNews, https://spacenews.com/op-ed-american-leadership-in-space-2-0/

Of all the countries in the world, the United States is best placed to be able to fully leverage the benefits from a robust commercial space sector. It was the birthplace of the computer revolution, and is the global leader in information technology. It has a strong legal system for protecting intellectual property rights while simultaneously encouraging robust competition. It is the U.S. commercial space industry, not government space programs, that will truly play to America’s strengths in a more competitive environment. There are agencies within the U.S. government that have already embraced this approach. One standout is the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). Under the leadership of Robert Cardillo, NGA is implementing a new strategy to find and exploit the innovations of the private sector, and increase the data and products it releases publicly. NGA understands that the only way it can succeed in a more complex and dynamic world is by staying ahead of technology trends, which in turn means embracing private-sector innovation. The rest of the U.S. government should follow NGA’s lead and continue to implement the elements of the Obama administration’s 2010 National Space Policy that encourage, foster and leverage the commercial space revolution. The focus should be on putting in place policies that will enable the U.S. commercial sector to innovate even faster, ensuring that it will continue to outpace foreign competition and foreign government programs. Where necessary, the U.S. government should be funding basic research and development, incentivizing industrial R&D, and helping new technologies move through the “valley of death” from basic research toward commercialization. It should be looking at how commercial products and services can complement, or even replace, government-only programs. And at the same time it should be watching out for the public good and putting in place minimal oversight functions to ensure a sustainable, reliable and predictable space environment that allows private investment to flourish.

#### Strong commercial space catalyzes tech innovation – progress at the margins and spinoff tech change global information networks

Joshua Hampson 2017, Security Studies Fellow at the Niskanen Center, 1-25-2017, “The Future of Space Commercialization”, Niskanen Center, https://republicans-science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/TheFutureofSpaceCommercializationFinal.pdf

Innovation is generally hard to predict; some new technologies seem to come out of nowhere and others only take off when paired with a new application. It is difficult to predict the future, but it is reasonable to expect that a growing space economy would open opportunities for technological and organizational innovation. In terms of technology, the difficult environment of outer space helps incentivize progress along the margins. Because each object launched into orbit costs a significant amount of money—at the moment between $27,000 and $43,000 per pound, though that will likely drop in the future —each 19 reduction in payload size saves money or means more can be launched. At the same time, the ability to fit more capability into a smaller satellite opens outer space to actors that previously were priced out of the market. This is one of the reasons why small, affordable satellites are increasingly pursued by companies or organizations that cannot afford to launch larger traditional satellites. These small 20 satellites also provide non-traditional launchers, such as engineering students or prototypers, the opportunity to learn about satellite production and test new technologies before working on a full-sized satellite. That expansion of developers, experimenters, and testers cannot but help increase innovation opportunities. Technological developments from outer space have been applied to terrestrial life since the earliest days of space exploration. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains a website that lists technologies that have spun off from such research projects. Lightweight 21 nanotubes, useful in protecting astronauts during space exploration, are now being tested for applications in emergency response gear and electrical insulation. The need for certainty about the resiliency of materials used in space led to the development of an analytics tool useful across a range of industries. Temper foam, the material used in memory-foam pillows, was developed for NASA for seat covers. As more companies pursue their own space goals, more innovations will likely come from the commercial sector. Outer space is not just a catalyst for technological development. Satellite constellations and their unique line-of-sight vantage point can provide new perspectives to old industries. Deploying satellites into low-Earth orbit, as Facebook wants to do, can connect large, previously-unreached swathes of 22 humanity to the Internet. Remote sensing technology could change how whole industries operate, such as crop monitoring, herd management, crisis response, and land evaluation, among others. 23 While satellites cannot provide all essential information for some of these industries, they can fill in some useful gaps and work as part of a wider system of tools. Space infrastructure, in helping to change how people connect and perceive Earth, could help spark innovations on the ground as well. These innovations, changes to global networks, and new opportunities could lead to wider economic growth.

#### Tech innovation solves every existential threat – cumulative extinction events outweigh the aff

Dylan **Matthews 18**. Co-founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead @ Rutgers University. 10-26-2018. "How to help people millions of years from now." Vox. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good

If you care about improving human lives, you should overwhelmingly care about those quadrillions of lives rather than the comparatively small number of people alive today. The 7.6 billion people now living, after all, amount to less than 0.003 percent of the population that will live in the future. It’s reasonable to suggest that those quadrillions of future people have, accordingly, hundreds of thousands of times more moral weight than those of us living here today do. That’s the basic argument behind Nick Beckstead’s 2013 Rutgers philosophy dissertation, “On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future.” It’s a glorious mindfuck of a thesis, not least because Beckstead shows very convincingly that this is a conclusion any plausible moral view would reach. It’s not just something that weird utilitarians have to deal with. And Beckstead, to his considerable credit, walks the walk on this. He works at the Open Philanthropy Project on grants relating to the far future and runs a charitable fund for donors who want to prioritize the far future. And arguments from him and others have turned “long-termism” into a very vibrant, important strand of the effective altruism community. But what does prioritizing the far future even mean? The most literal thing it could mean is preventing human extinction, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity’s continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. But in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that while that’s certainly part of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address specific threats to humanity (which he calls “targeted” approaches to the far future) have to complement “broad” approaches, where instead of trying to predict what’s going to kill us all, you just generally try to keep civilization running as best it can, so that it is, as a whole, well-equipped to deal with potential extinction events in the future, not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. In other words, caring about the far future doesn’t mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation; it also means acting on pressing needs now. For example: We’re going to be better prepared to prevent extinction from AI or a supervirus or global warming if society as a whole makes a lot of scientific progress. And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn’t get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. So maybe one of the best things we can do for the far future is to improve school systems — here and now — to harness the group economist Raj Chetty calls “lost Einsteins” (potential innovators who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world. What if living ethically for the far future means living ethically now? Beckstead mentions some other broad, or very broad, ideas (these are all his descriptions): Help make computers faster so that people everywhere can work more efficiently Change intellectual property law so that technological innovation can happen more quickly Advocate for open borders so that people from poorly governed countries can move to better-governed countries and be more productive Meta-research: improve incentives and norms in academic work to better advance human knowledge Improve education Advocate for political party X to make future people have values more like political party X ”If you look at these areas (economic growth and technological progress, access to information, individual capability, social coordination, motives) a lot of everyday good works contribute,” Beckstead writes. “An implication of this is that a lot of everyday good works are good from a broad perspective, even though hardly anyone thinks explicitly in terms of far future standards.” Look at those examples again: It’s just a list of what normal altruistically motivated people, not effective altruism folks, generally do. Charities in the US love talking about the lost opportunities for innovation that poverty creates. Lots of smart people who want to make a difference become scientists, or try to work as teachers or on improving education policy, and lord knows there are plenty of people who become political party operatives out of a conviction that the moral consequences of the party’s platform are good. All of which is to say: Maybe effective altruists aren’t that special, or at least maybe we don’t have access to that many specific and weird conclusions about how best to help the world. If the far future is what matters, and generally trying to make the world work better is among the best ways to help the far future, then effective altruism just becomes plain ol’ do-goodery.\*

## 4

#### CounterPlan: Outer space ought to be recognized as a global commons as per the Goehring card. Goehring describes but does not advocate treating space in this way.

#### Solves the aff bc it allows private entities to appropriate outer space but lets govts collectively decide

Goehring 6/3 - John S. Goehring [B.A., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., Tulane Law School; LL.M., McGill University, Institute of Air and Space Law) is a space and international law attorney for the Department of Defense and a judge advocate in the United States Air Force Reserve], “Why Isn’t Outer Space a Global Commons?” *Journal of National Security Law and Policy*. Vol. 11:573. (June 3, 2021).<https://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Why\_Isnt\_Outer\_Space\_a\_Global\_Commons\_2.pdf> AT

B. Global Commons as a Constraining Concept In an economic context, as opposed to a military or geopolitical context, “global commons” is typically used to convey a constraining concept. The concept of a “commons” may be thought of as constraining because it is often associated with notions of shared ownership, public governance, or limitations on use. Whether these constraints are viewed positively or negatively is a subjective assessment. The constraining concept is more complicated than the enabling concept because it can reflect two distinct meanings. This is likely a function of its history. “The ‘commons,’ of course, has a long historical and intellectual lineage ranging from the enclosure movement in England, to Garret Hardin’s famous Tragedy of the Commons parable, to Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel-prize winning work on governing common pool resources,” observe Professors Foster and Iaione.30 Applying rational-choice theory, Hardin postulated that individual actors “automatically tend to over-exploit and plunder common-pool resources that are freely available to everyone.”31 The only possible solution to this dilemma, according to Hardin, was “the enclosure of resources through private property, or, failing that, public regulation.”32 Ostrom’s work later “turned [Hardin’s] conventional wisdom upside down: complex socio-ecological systems (in which goods are extractable and beneficiaries are hard to exclude) can prove to be sustainable resource domains granted that its stakeholders adopt a polycentric and self-regulated mode of governance.”33 As this brief summary suggests, one meaning of “commons” is simply to describe a category of goods.34 This usage was typical prior to Ostrom’s influence.35 In this meaning, a common is a resource to which access is shared, such as an open hunting ground. Some common resources may offer more than one type of benefit. For example, a hunting ground may offer open space for recreation, game to hunt, and trees for building. Some common resources may be subtractable, meaning that use of the resource subtracts from the ability of others to use the resource, while others remain plentiful. Describing a resource in this manner, as a common resource, does not necessarily imply any particular property regime or use limitations.36 A common hunting ground, for instance, may be publicly owned or privately owned. Ostrom helped popularize the term “common pool resource” to describe this general category of resources.37 As Dr. Tepper argues, “[i]t is crucial to differentiate between resources and the legal regime that governs them.”38 This is because the term “global commons” – or simply “commons” – can also be used in an economic sense to refer to a form of collective ownership and governance rather than to the economic goods themselves.39 As Professors Cogolati and Woulters observe, “[u]nder Ostrom’s influence, the commons have become more closely connected with the collective self-governance and participatory mechanisms they imply, than with the strict category of (rivalrous and non-excludable) economic goods they used to refer to.”40 This may account for the notion held by some that “the commons is less a description of the resource and its characteristics and more of a normative claim to the resource” (emphasis original).41 Used in this way, a commons is a category of property rights based on collective ownership.42 Put simply, “commons” is sometimes used to refer to common property, meaning a resource with more than one owner, and which therefore should be governed collectively. This notion of a commons is sometimes associated with the common heritage of mankind concept, particularly in the context of outer space. As expressed in Article 11(3) of the 1979 Moon Agreement, the common heritage of mankind concept creates a new type of territorial status in which the moon and celestial bodies “are not only in themselves not subject to national appropriation in a territorial sense, but the fruits and resources of which are also deemed to be the property of mankind at large,” according to Professor Cheng.43 This principle, as characterized by Professor Christol, not only “protects the proposition what [sic] given areas and their resources are open to inclusive use and that there may not be exclusive use,” but also “goes farther: it asserts that there must be a sharing of the benefits and of the values derived from the indicated commons.”44 In other words, status as the common heritage of mankind does not permit full private property rights in space resources. It should be noted that the concept of the common heritage of mankind is not limited to the outer space domain. In 1970, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a non-binding resolution declaring “[t]he sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the area), as well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind.”45 Years later – after the completion of the Moon Agreement – this principle was codified in Article 136 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).46 Importantly, while the area is the common heritage of mankind according to the Convention, the high seas above the area remains free.47 Hence, some may refer to the high seas as a global commons (in the enabling sense), while others may refer to the deep sea bed as a global commons (in the constraining sense) – a clear example of why the term is fraught with misunderstanding. While the concept of common heritage of the seabed and of the Moon and other celestial bodies are linked, the Moon Agreement declares that the content of the common heritage of mankind concept as it applies to States Parties “finds its expression in the provisions of this Agreement” and nowhere else.48 In general, the concept “lacks a precise definition” but “basically wishes to convey the idea that management, exploitation and distribution of the natural resources of the area in question are matters to be decided upon by the international community and are not to be left to the initiative and discretion of individual States and their nationals.”49 The United States has not signed the Moon Agreement and rejects the notion that outer space resources are the common heritage of mankind, a position clearly reiterated in Executive Order 13914.50 The last of the five international space treaties to have been negotiated in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), the Moon Agreement is regarded as a failed treaty with only 18 nations having signed on, none of which is China, Russia, or the United States, the three most prominent space-faring States.51 VISITED STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELATING TO ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, https://perma.cc/8VA5-4UW8 (last July 11, 2020). The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, by contrast, has over 100 States Parties.52 Context is essential for discerning the distinction between the constraining concept and the enabling concept. By themselves, “global commons” or “commons” do not necessarily convey one concept or the other. Describing a resource as a “global commons” in an economic context implies a focus on an open access resource and the consumption of that resource; it suggests a resource allocation problem in need of a solution and inevitably invites questions about ownership. In contrast, referring to a global commons in a military or geopolitical context implies a focus on the use of an open access domain and, when used accurately, the lack of ownership is a settled question. Indeed, the distinction between a focus on a thing (res) itself and a focus on the right to use and explore a domain is among the reasons the term “res communis” is not interchangeable with “global commons” when used in a military or geopolitical sense.53

#### Treating space as a commons is key to ethical exploration and human survival.


Fisk N.D. - L. A. Fisk [President of the Committee on Space Research, chartered by the International Council for Scientific Unions], “Space as a Global Commons,” UNOOSA (Web). ND. Accessed Dec. 13, 2021. <https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/hlf/1st\_hlf\_Dubai/Presentations/26.pdf> AT

There is an urgency to consider and act on this issue. • With each passing year, our technological civilization becomes increasingly dependent on the satellites in orbit. • The primal threats to our civilization – global climate change and space weather – can only be understood, and dealt with by using the global perspective of observations from space. • We need to recognize also that we are extending the human presence, whether through robotic spacecraft or eventually with humans, throughout our solar system. And we have a commitment as a civilization to behave responsibility in this endeavor. To protect the environments we will explore, and to protect ourselves against any contamination of our planet that results from this exploration.

Space as a Global Commons It follows therefore that, given the centrality of space for the future of our civilization, we need to have policies and practices in place, which are shared by all spacefaring nations, that will allow and encourage each and every nation that desires to and has the capability to use and to explore space for peaceful purposes, to do so. We thus need to recognize, encourage, and enable space as a global commons. A ‘commons’ in the English language is a piece of land owned by and used by all members of a community, as in a pasture used by all residents of a village. Many nations of the world view space as a global commons, a resource not owned by any one nation but crucial to the future of all humankind.

## Case

#### Evidence ethics -- The violation is the sc from the article of the steinel card -- Full paragraphs must be cut properly and not conceal information, regardless of perceived relevancy. Cutting cards in the middle of a paragraph allows debaters to manipulate evidence and strategically leave out what contradicts with their arguments – putting rest of the uncut paragraph in the doc solves all your offense unless your intent was to cheat which is even worse. This is a reason to reject the team—miscutting evidence is academic misconduct that should disqualify any other argument they make in the debate from counting on the record—a brilliant plagiarized paper or speech would still get a zero.



### UV

#### a/2 nibs bad

#### Every arg skews ur start so nq

#### T is specifically good to check non topical abuse

#### a/2 weighing

#### can’t weigh in the 1nc bc the 1ar gets to weigh

#### time is nonuq bc the aff gets the 1ar and 2ar so we should get both speeches as well

#### offense solved by 2nr bc aff has the 2ar to respond to 2n

### Framing

**first piece of ev in the framing collapses to util – talks about the worst form of alienation death which is inherently a function of util**

**the second piece also collapses- that thing that is somewhere in between bc its pain and pleasure but its possible bc it proves how we act and how governments function and it proves that everything comes back to pain and pleasure bc it’s the in between**

**ex. If you put ur hand on a hot stove u instinctually take it off without thining bc it causes pain**

**a/2 motivation**

* **Util hijacks bc the structure of the will is pain and pleasure**

**a/2 self alienation**

* **Bc individuals form institutions, they have to aggregate which collapses to util**

**a/2 lutz**

* **Non unique – have to be alive to debate so util o/w**
* **Fallacy of origin – just because we need to be not alienated to debate doesn’t mean that’s all we should care about. For example, we need o2 to debate but that doenst mean ethics should only b about o2**

**a/2 rotb**

* **You have to be alive to do debate so util o/w**

#### THEIR OWN CARD STATES EXTINCTION IS SOMETHING TO BE MINDFUL OF – I read green

**Levine 15** [Nick Levine is an MPhil candidate in history of science at the University of Cambridge, Jacobin, “Democratize the Universe” 3/21/2015, [https://jacobinmag.com/2015/03/space-industry-extraction-levine]/](https://jacobinmag.com/2015/03/space-industry-extraction-levine%5d/) lm

**The privatization of the Milky Way has begun.**

Last summer, **the** bipartisan [**ASTEROIDS Act**](https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/5063) was introduced in Congress. The legislation’s **aim is to grant US corporations property rights over** any natural resources — like the platinum-group metals used in electronics — that they extract from asteroids.

Whether and how we should go to space are not profound philosophical questions, at least not primarily. What’s at stake is not just the “stature of man,” as Hannah Arendt [put it](http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-conquest-of-space-and-the-stature-of-man), but **a** political-economic **struggle over the future of the celestial commons**, which could result in a dramatic intensification of inequality — or a small step for humankind toward a more egalitarian state of affairs on our current planet.Undoubtedly, there are good reasons to be skeptical about going to space. Some have argued that it shifts attention away from solving the difficult problems of economic and environmental justice on Earth — think of Gil Scott-Heron’s spoken-word poem “Whitey on the Moon,” which juxtaposes the deprivation of the American underclass with the vast resources diverted to space. Scott-Heron’s critique is powerful, but it’s important to remember that he was denouncing an unjust economic system. He wasn’t issuing a timeless condemnation of space pursuits as such. Whether the aims of providing for all and developing outer space are mutually exclusive depends on the political forces on the ground.

We might also question whether mining asteroids would be detrimental to our current planet’s environment in the medium term. If we don’t find a renewable way to blast off into outer space, **the exploitation of** these **resources** could **lead to an intensification of,** not a move away from, **the fossil-fuel economy.**

If the environmental impact of space mining turns out to be large, it would be analogous to fracking — a technological development that gives us access to new resources, bu**t with devastating ecological side effects** — and ought to be opposed on similar grounds. On the other hand, some speculate that mining the Moon’s Helium-3 reserves, for example, could provide an abundant [source of clean energy](https://io9.gizmodo.com/5908499/could-helium-3-really-solve-earths-energy-problems). The terrestrial environmental impact of space activity remains an open question that must be explored before we stake our hopes on the economic development of outer space.

Philosophers have suggested that we might have ethical duties to preserve the “natural” states of celestial bodies. Others fear that our activities might unknowingly wipe out alien microbial life. **We should remain sensitive to the** aesthetic and cultural value of outer space, as well as the **potential for extinction and the exhaustion of resources misleadingly proclaimed to be limitless.**

Of course, there’s nothing inevitable about the benefits of productivity gains being distributed widely, as we’ve seen in the United States over the past forty years. This is a problem not limited to space, and **the myth of the “final frontier” must not distract us from** the already **existing problems** of wealth and income distribution **on Earth.**

#### their offense is consequentialist which proves consequences like cap good/bad are relevant under their framing

#### oth ways cap persists

### Top-Level

#### The affirmative has no enforcement mechanism – private corporations can just circumvent since they have the funding to launch rockets on their own.

**Sheetz 21** [Michael, “Elon Musk’s SpaceX raised about $850 million, jumping valuation to about $74 billion”, CNBC. 16 February 2021. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/16/elon-musks-spacex-raised-850-million-at-419point99-a-share.html] //DebateDrills LC

**SpaceX completed another monster equity funding round of $850 million last week**, people familiar with the financing told CNBC, sending **the company’s valuation skyrocketing to about $74 billion.**

**The company raised the new funds at $419.99 a share**, those people said — or just 1 cent below the $420 price that [Elon Musk](https://www.cnbc.com/elon-musk/) [made infamous in 2018](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/28/sec-says-elon-musk-at-tesla-chose-420-price-as-pot-reference.html) when he declared **he had “funding secured” to take**[**Tesla**](https://www.cnbc.com/quotes/TSLA)**private**

at that price.

The latest round also represents **a jump of about 60% in the company’s valuation** from its previous round in August, when [S**paceX raised near $2 billion at a $46 billion valuation**](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/14/tesla-investor-ron-baron-spacex-has-a-chance-to-be-just-as-large.html).

SpaceX did not immediately respond to CNBC’s request for comment. In addition to SpaceX further building a war chest for its ambitious plans, **company insiders and existing investors were able to sell $750 million in a secondary transaction**, one of the people said.

The people spoke on condition of anonymity because SpaceX is not a publicly traded company and the fundraising talks were private. SpaceX raised only a portion of the funding available in the marketplace, with one person telling CNBC that **the company received “insane demand” of about $6 billion in offers over the course of just three days**.

### Cap good

#### Capitalism turns alienation --- maintaining growth brings people out of poverty and gets them out of alienation

Pinker 18 (Stephen, professor of psychology at Harvard, “Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, EM) \*\*Modified for gendered language

In the stacked layer graph in figure 8-5, the thickness of the bottom slab represents the number of people living in extreme poverty, the thickness of the top slab represents the number not living in poverty, and the height of the stack represents the population of the world. It shows that the number of poor people declined just as the number of all people exploded, from 3.7 billion in 1970 to 7.3 billion in 2015. (Max Roser points out that if news outlets truly reported the changing state of the world, they could have run the headline NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN EXTREME POVERTY FELL BY 137,000 SINCE YESTERDAY every day for the last twenty-five years.) We live in a world not just with a smaller proportion of extremely poor people but with a smaller number of them, and with 6.6 billion people who are not extremely poor. Figure 8-5: Extreme poverty (number), 1820–2015 Sources: Our World in Data, Roser & Ortiz-Ospina 2017, based on data from Bourguignon & Morrison 2002 (1820–1992) and the World Bank 2016g (1981–2015). Most surprises in history are unpleasant surprises, but this news came as a pleasant shock even to the optimists. In 2000 the United Nations laid out eight Millennium Development Goals, their starting lines backdated to 1990.25 At the time, cynical observers of that underperforming organization dismissed the targets as aspirational boilerplate. Cut the global poverty rate in half, lifting a billion people out of poverty, in twenty-five years? Yeah, yeah. But the world reached the goal five years ahead of schedule. Development experts are still rubbing their eyes. Deaton writes, “This is perhaps the most important fact about wellbeing in the world since World War II.”26 The economist Robert Lucas (like Deaton, a Nobel laureate) said, “The consequences for human welfare involved [in understanding rapid economic development] are simply staggering: once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else.”27 Let’s not stop thinking about tomorrow. Though it’s always dangerous to extrapolate a historical curve, what happens when we try? If we align a ruler with the World Bank data in figure 8-4, we find that it crosses the x-axis (indicating a poverty rate of 0) in 2026. The UN gave itself a cushion in its 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (the successor to its Millennium Development Goals) and set a target of “ending extreme poverty for all people everywhere” by 2030.28 Ending extreme poverty for all people everywhere! May I live to see the day. (Not even Jesus was that optimistic: he told a supplicant, “The poor you will always have with you.”) Of course that day is a ways off. Hundreds of millions of people remain in extreme poverty, and getting to zero will require a greater effort than just extrapolating along a ruler. Though the numbers are dwindling in countries like India and Indonesia, they are increasing in the poorest of the poor countries, like Congo, Haiti, and Sudan, and the last pockets of poverty will be the hardest to eliminate.29 Also, as we approach the goal we should move the goalposts, since not-so-extreme poverty is still poverty. In introducing the concept of progress I warned against confusing hard-won headway with a process that magically takes place by itself. The point of calling attention to progress is not self-congratulation but identifying the causes so we can do more of what works. And since we know that something has worked, it’s unnecessary to keep depicting the developing world as a basket case to shake people out of their apathy—with the danger that they will think that additional support would just be throwing money down a rat hole.30 So what is the world doing right? As with most forms of progress, a lot of good things happen at once and reinforce one another, so it’s hard to identify a first domino. Cynical explanations, such as that the enrichment is a one-time dividend of a surge in the price of oil and other commodities, or that the statistics are inflated by the rise of populous China, have been examined and dismissed. Radelet and other development experts point to five causes.31 “In 1976,” Radelet writes, “Mao single-handedly and dramatically changed the direction of global poverty with one simple act: he died.”32 Though China’s rise is not exclusively responsible for the Great Convergence, the country’s sheer bulk is bound to move the totals around, and the explanations for its progress apply elsewhere. The death of Mao Zedong is emblematic of three of the major causes of the Great Convergence. The first is the decline of communism (together with intrusive socialism). For reasons we have seen, market economies can generate wealth prodigiously while totalitarian planned economies impose scarcity, stagnation, and often famine. Market economies, in addition to reaping the benefits of specialization and providing incentives for people to produce things that other people want, solve the problem of coordinating the efforts of hundreds of millions of people by using prices to propagate information about need and availability far and wide, a computational problem that no planner is brilliant enough to solve from a central bureau.33 A shift from collectivization, centralized control, government monopolies, and suffocating permit bureaucracies (what in India was called “the license raj”) to open economies took place on a number of fronts beginning in the 1980s. They included Deng Xiaoping’s embrace of capitalism in China, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its domination of Eastern Europe, and the liberalization of the economies of India, Brazil, Vietnam, and other countries. Though intellectuals are apt to do a spit take when they read a defense of capitalism, its economic benefits are so obvious that they don’t need to be shown with numbers. They can literally be seen from space. A satellite photograph of Korea showing the capitalist South aglow in light and the Communist North a pit of darkness vividly illustrates the contrast in the wealth-generating capability between the two economic systems, holding geography, history, and culture constant. Other matched pairs with an experimental group and a control group lead to the same conclusion: West and East Germany when they were divided by the Iron Curtain; Botswana versus Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe; Chile versus Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro—the latter a once-wealthy, oil-rich country now suffering from widespread hunger and a critical shortage of medical care.34 It’s important to add that the market economies which blossomed in the more fortunate parts of the developing world were not the laissez-faire anarchies of right-wing fantasies and left-wing nightmares. To varying degrees, their governments invested in education, public health, infrastructure, and agricultural and job training, together with social insurance and poverty-reduction programs.35 Radelet’s second explanation of the Great Convergence is leadership. Mao imposed more than communism on China. He was a mercurial megalomaniac who foisted crackbrained schemes on the country, such as the Great Leap Forward (with its gargantuan communes, useless backyard smelters, and screwball agronomic practices) and the Cultural Revolution (which turned the younger generation into gangs of thugs who terrorized teachers, managers, and descendants of “rich peasants”).36 During the decades of stagnation from the 1970s to the early 1990s, many other developing countries were commandeered by psychopathic strongmen with ideological, religious, tribal, paranoid, or self-aggrandizing agendas rather than a mandate to enhance the well-being of their citizens. Depending on their sympathy or antipathy for communism, they were propped up by the Soviet Union or the United States under the principle “He may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch.”37 The 1990s and 2000s saw a spread of democracy (chapter 14) and the rise of levelheaded, humanistic leaders—not just national statesmen like Nelson Mandela, Corazon Aquino, and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf but local religious and civil-society leaders acting to improve the lives of their compatriots.38 A third cause was the end of the Cold War. It not only pulled the rug out from under a number of tinpot dictators but snuffed out many of the civil wars that had racked developing countries since they attained independence in the 1960s. Civil war is both a humanitarian disaster and an economic one, as facilities are destroyed, resources are diverted, children are kept out of school, and managers and workers are pulled away from work or killed. The economist Paul Collier, who calls war “development in reverse,” has estimated that a typical civil war costs a country $50 billion.39 A fourth cause is globalization, in particular the explosion in trade made possible by container ships and jet airplanes and by the liberalization of tariffs and other barriers to investment and trade. Classical economics and common sense agree that a larger trading network should make everyone, on average, better off. As countries specialize in different goods and services, they can produce them more efficiently, and it doesn’t cost them much more to offer their wares to billions of people than to thousands. At the same time buyers, shopping for the best price in a global bazaar, can get more of what they want. (Common sense is less likely to appreciate a corollary called comparative advantage, which predicts that, on average, everyone is better off when each country sells the goods and services that it can produce most efficiently even if the buyers could produce them still more efficiently themselves.) Notwithstanding the horror that the word elicits in many parts of the political spectrum, globalization, development analysts agree, has been a bonanza for the poor. Deaton notes, “Some argue that globalization is a neoliberal conspiracy designed to enrich a very few at the expense of many. If so, that conspiracy was a disastrous failure—or at least, it helped more than a billion people as an unintended consequence. If only unintended consequences always worked so favorably.”40 To be sure, the industrialization of the developing world, like the Industrial Revolution two centuries before it, has produced working conditions that are harsh by the standards of modern rich countries and have elicited bitter condemnation. The Romantic movement in the 19th century was partly a reaction to the “dark satanic mills” (as William Blake called them), and since that time a loathing of industry has been a sacred value of C. P. Snow’s Second Culture of literary intellectuals.41 Nothing in Snow’s essay enraged his assailant F. R. Leavis as much as this passage: It is all very well for us, sitting pretty, to think that material standards of living don’t matter all that much. It is all very well for one, as a personal choice, to reject industrialization—do a modern Walden if you like, and if you go without much food, see most of your children die in infancy, despise the comforts of literacy, accept twenty years off your own life, then I respect you for the strength of your aesthetic revulsion. But I don’t respect you in the slightest if, even passively, you try to impose the same choice on others who are not free to choose. In fact, we know what their choice would be. For, with singular unanimity, in any country where they have had the chance, the poor have walked off the land into the factories as fast as the factories could take them.42 As we have seen, Snow was accurate in his claims about advances in life and health, and he was also right that the appropriate standard in considering the plight of the poor in industrializing countries is the set of alternatives available to them where and when they live. Snow’s argument is being echoed fifty years later by development experts such as Radelet, who observes that “while working on the factory floor is often referred to as sweatshop labor, it is often better than the grand[parent] of all sweatshops: working in the fields as an agricultural day laborer.” When I lived in Indonesia in the early 1990s, I arrived with a somewhat romanticized view of the beauty of people working in rice paddies, together with reservations about the rapidly growing factory jobs. The longer I was there, the more I recognized how incredibly difficult it is to work in the rice fields. It’s a backbreaking grind, with people eking out the barest of livings by bending over for hours in the hot sun to terrace the fields, plant the seeds, pull the weeds, transplant the seedlings, chase the pests, and harvest the grain. Standing in the pools of water brings leeches and the constant risk of malaria, encephalitis, and other diseases. And, of course, it is hot, all the time. So, it was not too much of a surprise that when factory jobs opened offering wages of $2 a day, hundreds of people lined up just to get a shot at applying.43 The benefits of industrial employment can go beyond material living standards. For the women who get these jobs, it can be a liberation. In her article “The Feminist Side of Sweatshops,” Chelsea Follett (the managing editor of HumanProgress) recounts that factory work in the 19th century offered women an escape from the traditional gender roles of farm and village life, and so was held by some men at the time “sufficient to damn to infamy the most worthy and virtuous girl.” The girls themselves did not always see it that way. A textile mill worker in Lowell, Massachusetts, wrote in 1840: We are collected . . . to get money, as much of it and as fast as we can. . . . Strange would it be, if in money-loving New England, one of the most lucrative female employments should be rejected because it is toilsome, or because some people are prejudiced against it. Yankee girls have too much independence for that.44 Here again, experiences during the Industrial Revolution prefigure those in the developing world today. Kavita Ramdas, the head of the Global Fund for Women, said in 2001 that in an Indian village “all there is for a woman is to obey her husband and relatives, pound millet, and sing. If she moves to town, she can get a job, start a business, and get education for her children.”45 An analysis in Bangladesh confirmed that the women who worked in the garment industry (as my grandparents did in 1930s Canada) enjoyed rising wages, later marriage, and fewer and better-educated children.46 Over the course of a generation, slums, barrios, and favelas can morph into suburbs, and the working class can become middle class.47 To appreciate the long-term benefits of industrialization one does not have to accept its cruelties. One can imagine an alternative history of the Industrial Revolution in which modern sensibilities applied earlier and the factories operated without children and with better working conditions for the adults. Today there are doubtless factories in the developing world that could offer as many jobs and still turn a profit while treating their workers more humanely. Pressure from trade negotiators and consumer protests has measurably improved working conditions in many places, and it is a natural progression as countries get richer and more integrated into the global community (

as we will see in chapters 12 and 17 when we look at the history of working conditions in our own society).48 Progress consists not in accepting every change as part of an indivisible package—as if we had to make a yes-or-no decision on whether the Industrial Revolution, or globalization, is a good thing or bad thing, exactly as each has unfolded in every detail. Progress consists of unbundling the features of a social process as much as we can to maximize the human benefits while minimizing the harms. The last, and in many analyses the most important, contributor to the Great Convergence is science and technology.49 Life is getting cheaper, in a good way. Thanks to advances in know-how, an hour of labor can buy more food, health, education, clothing, building materials, and small necessities and luxuries than it used to. Not only can people eat cheaper food and take cheaper medicines, but children can wear cheap plastic sandals instead of going barefoot, and adults can hang out together getting their hair done or watching a soccer game using cheap solar panels and appliances. As for good advice on health, farming, and business: it’s better than cheap; it’s free. Today about half the adults in the world own a smartphone, and there are as many subscriptions as people. In parts of the world without roads, landlines, postal service, newspapers, or banks, mobile phones are more than a way to share gossip and cat photos; they are a major generator of wealth. They allow people to transfer money, order supplies, track the weather and markets, find day labor, get advice on health and farming practices, even obtain a primary education.50 An analysis by the economist Robert Jensen subtitled “The Micro and Mackerel Economics of Information” showed how South Indian small fishermen increased their income and lowered the local price of fish by using their mobile phones at sea to find the market which offered the best price that day, sparing them from having to unload their perishable catch on fish-glutted towns while other towns went fishless.51 In this way mobile phones are allowing hundreds of millions of small farmers and fishers to become the omniscient rational actors in the ideal frictionless markets of economics textbooks. According to one estimate, every cell phone adds $3,000 to the annual GDP of a developing country.52 The beneficent power of knowledge has rewritten the rules of global development. Development experts differ on the wisdom of foreign aid. Some argue that it does more harm than good by enriching corrupt governments and competing with local commerce.53 Others cite recent numbers which suggest that intelligently allocated aid has in fact done tremendous good.54 But while they disagree on the effects of donated food and dollars, all agree that donated technology—medicines, electronics, crop varieties, and best practices in agriculture, business, and public health—has been an unalloyed boon. (As Jefferson noted, he who receives an idea from me receives instruction without lessening mine.) And for all the emphasis I’ve placed on GDP per capita, the value of knowledge has made that measure less relevant to what we really care about, quality of life. If I had squeezed a line for Africa into the lower right corner of figure 8-3, it would look unimpressive: the line would curve upward, to be sure, but without the exponential blastoff of the lines for Europe and Asia. Charles Kenny emphasizes that the actual progress of Africa belies the shallow slope, because health, longevity, and education are so much more affordable than they used to be. Though in general people in richer countries live longer (a relationship called the Preston curve, after the economist who discovered it), the whole curve is being pushed upward, as everyone is living longer regardless of income.55 In the richest country two centuries ago (the Netherlands), life expectancy was just forty, and in no country was it above forty-five. Today, life expectancy in the poorest country in the world (the Central African Republic) is fifty-four, and in no country is it below forty-five.56 Though it’s easy to sneer at national income as a shallow and materialistic measure, it correlates with every indicator of human flourishing, as we will repeatedly see in the chapters to come. Most obviously, GDP per capita correlates with longevity, health, and nutrition.57 Less obviously, it correlates with higher ethical values like peace, freedom, human rights, and tolerance.58 Richer countries, on average, fight fewer wars with each other (chapter 11), are less likely to be riven by civil wars (chapter 11), are more likely to become and stay democratic (chapter 14), and have greater respect for human rights (chapter 14—on average, that is; Arab oil states are rich but repressive). The citizens of richer countries have greater respect for “emancipative” or liberal values such as women’s equality, free speech, gay rights, participatory democracy, and protection of the environment (chapters 10 and 15). Not surprisingly, as countries get richer they get happier (chapter 18); more surprisingly, as countries get richer they get smarter (chapter 16).59 In explaining this Somalia-to-Sweden continuum, with poor violent repressive unhappy countries at one end and rich peaceful liberal happy ones at the other, correlation is not causation, and other factors like education, geography, history, and culture may play roles.60 But when the quants try to tease them apart, they find that economic development does seem to be a major mover of human welfare.61 In an old academic joke, a dean is presiding over a faculty meeting when a genie appears and offers him one of three wishes—money, fame, or wisdom. The dean replies, “That’s easy. I’m a scholar. I’ve devoted my life to understanding. Of course I’ll take wisdom.” The genie waves his hand and vanishes in a puff of smoke. The smoke clears to reveal the dean with his head in his hands, lost in thought. A minute elapses. Ten minutes. Fifteen. Finally a professor calls out, “Well? Well?” The dean mutters, “I should have taken the money.”

#### Embracing globalism is good and alt exacerbates climate change significantly—also poverty, violence, and exploitation date back much further than capitalism

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(Rasmus, “The Environmental Risks of Incomplete Globalisation,” Globalizations, August)

While neither xenophobia nor militarism is by any means new in history, what is striking is the **lack of enthusiasm** among contemporary elites and leading academics for accelerating globalisation processes or actively planning for a future of shared prosperity. As climate change has emerged as the defining political issue of our time, the rise of the poor is increasingly treated as a problem rather than a transformative opportunity (Myers & Kent, 2003). What is worse, **cultural perfectionist ideas** about the perceived superficiality of “mass consumption” have been allowed to **blend with protectionist fears of foreign competition** into a **silent acceptance of chronic poverty** abroad, preferably **under the guise of “sustainable livelihoods”** powered by small-scale renewable energy, as a tolerable price for avoiding a climate emergency. According to Paul and Anne Ehrlich, avoiding a collapse of global civilisation will require “widely based cultural change” and dramatic reductions of both “population size and overconsumption” (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2013:5). For those subscribing to such views, a delayed or incomplete globalisation is seen as a blessing of sorts as it takes away some of the urgency of climate mitigation.

The primary aim of this paper is to show that, far from offering a path to long-term climate stability, such a development may lead policy-makers to **grossly underestimate** the true scope of the climate/energy challenge (Arto et al., 2016) and pursue policies that continue to lock in non-scalable forms of low-carbon technologies. More generally, beyond the formidable human cost of maintaining a divided world, the possibility of incomplete globalisation is likely to make the transition to a “Good Anthropocene” (Ellis, 2014) more difficult, reduce overall resilience, and **divert resources** away from important social and environmental ends.

The paper is structured so that it proceeds from a general critique of traditional environmental ideas of intentional localisation through a more specific discussion on the effects of “climate nationalism” towards a normative argument in favour of deliberately, i.e. by political and democratic means, accelerating the transition to a fully integrated high-energy planet as a way of reducing global environmental risks. **None of this comes from facile cornucopian optimism** or any attempt to downplay the existential challenges that humanity is currently facing with regard to the natural environment. It is rather the very urgency of those risks that makes it important to **contest existing discourses** on the relationship between globalisation and the environment, both those discourses that reflect **Malthusian beliefs** (Christoff & Eckersley, 2013) and those who deny the very reality of global environmental problems such as climate change.

The transition fallacies of localism

One long-running theme in the literature on sustainability **has been the virtues of localism and decentralisation** (Dobson, 2007:95; Goodin, 1992:147). Local economies are thought to be (a) intrinsically more sustainable, (b) better equipped to cope with resources scarcities, and (c) less vulnerable to environmentally catastrophes. As a consequence, the “Transition Town” movement and others have come to see intentional localisation as an appropriate response to climate change and other Anthropocene risks (Barry & Quilley, 2009; North, 2010). While such arguments obviously form part of a much broader discussion on political economy and the future of capitalism, there are many reasons to be **sceptical of this localist discourse**.

Starting with the first claim and assuming a basic natural resource point of view, **it is clear that different geographical locations have different endowments of everything from soil types to moisture variability. This naturally invites specialisation and intensification of production. If each locale were to produce the full range of goods necessary even for meeting basic human needs, then efficiency would be much lower and land use much higher than today. Inefficient modes of production would thus not only require higher inputs of labour, energy, and raw materials but also leave less room for nature** (Desrochers & Shimizu, 2012). As agricultural production would be pushed into landscapes of increasingly lower productivity (e.g. poorer soils, less favourable climatic conditions, and steeper slopes) the result would be **lower yields yet again**. In a field such as metallurgy, even the most rudimentary processes require inputs that are geographically dispersed. To unthink trade is therefore essentially to unthink modern civilisation. While this may in fact be the explicit goal of some of the most radical voices (Zerzan, 2008) there is very little recognition in localist literature for how much of human welfare that actually depends on economies of scale, specialisation, and exchange. Yet, it simply suffice to consider how little most individuals in advanced economies know of farming, forestry or mining to realise what an enormous loss in productivity and knowledge that would follow if these tasks were to be more broadly shared within local communities. Similarly, the ecological toll that would follow if billions of people would go out in nature in search for food and fuel is clearly unfathomable. It is thus not surprising that most advocates of localism **fall short of endorsing autarky** or complete self-reliance. However by romanticising the local and discriminating in favour of it (Woodin & Lucas, 2004:30) these scholars show little appreciation for the enormous gains in welfare, not to mention the formidable progress in science and technology, which have been made possible over the last centuries precisely thanks to specialisation and the integration of markets.

**Even if pre-modern human history was essentially defined by poverty,**

**social domination, and violent conflict, it is still common to blame the prevalence of such ills on modernity.** Yet, as many have rightly pointed out, what is difficult to explain is not underdevelopment but that development was at all possible. According to a progressive reading of history, the key driver behind the great acceleration of the last centuries has been the emergence of broad social investments (Lindert, 2004). While both Marxists and libertarians may think otherwise, equality is crucial for modern capitalism to function as it provides both consumers who can afford the goods of industrialism and producers who can create ever more sophisticated things of value to others. Whatever short-term gains that may be obtained through exploitation or other unequal forms of exchange, they are dwarfed by the long-term gains that come with greater measures of equality as clearly illustrated by the resounding economic success of welfare capitalism over the course of the 20th century (Berman, 2006). The same of course holds true in a globalised economy. Rich countries may benefit in the short run from low consumer prices of imported goods but, for every Bangladesh that becomes a South Korea, the value of rising global demand and new export markets is obviously much greater.

As for the second claim that localism promotes resilience, there is a strong intuitive argument that if consumption and production are taking place in close proximity, supply chain interruptions can be minimised. Yet, considering how deeply integrated global supply chains have already become, the opposite may in fact be the case. This is so because either discrimination in favour of local products (1) remains the kind of boutique concern for environmental elites that it is in the present and then it will not matter much in a situation of global trade disruption or (2) it forms part of a comprehensive protectionist regime and then it may be the very thing that triggers the disruption of global trade in the first place. As a consequence, the best way to mitigate situations of resource scarcity is therefore rather to ensure the existence of a robust world trade system (Deudney, 1990:470) since it not only allows communities to offset immediate local shortages but also gives them more time to come up with substitutes through technological innovation (the costs of which presumably can be shared among a large number of consumers worldwide). Moreover, judging from the history of the 20th century, the existence of an open world trade system is in itself crucial for driving overall growth and making eventual economic convergence possible (Williamson, 1996).

Finally, as to the third claim, that **decentralised local communities would be better suited to cope with environmental disasters thanks to their “organic” or “embedded” nature, the opposite again seems to be the case. As the events following the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami clearly illustrate, the existence of cosmopolitan norms of solidarity abroad and the possibility to bring in resources from unaffected, far-away lands offered much better help than any policy of national isolation. Likewise, after the super typhoon Haiyan hit in 2013, remittances from people working overseas and the help from international NGOs have been essential for the rebuilding of the city of Tacloban in the Philippines. As these and many other similar cases illustrate, accelerated global integration appears far more appropriate in any real-world scenario of environmental catastrophe than traditional environmental visions of self- sufficiency and communitarianism**.