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#### Aff is an example of slash and burn capitalism which discloses socialist goals, and promotes unregulated capitalism

Williams 20 [Joan C. Williams and Ro Khanna, Harvard Buisness Review, “It’s Time to End Slash-and-Burn Capitalism”, October 28, 2020. https://hbr.org/2020/10/its-time-to-end-slash-and-burn-capitalism]

The conversation about stakeholder capitalism is heartening evidence that the business community recognizes that capitalism has gone seriously off track. The obvious criticism is that, while CEOs are well-placed to pursue profits, they are ill-suited to weigh and balance the needs of the environment and many different stakeholders, as has been cogently argued in The New York Times. And so far, the follow-through on the embrace of stakeholder capitalism has been decidedly mixed. What’s needed is not to make CEOs into central planners but to evolve toward sustainable capitalism — and away from the slash-and-burn capitalism of recent decades. In their pursuit of quarterly profits and high salaries, there has emerged since the 1980s a dysfunctional version of capitalism that does to the economy what clearcutting does to forests — destroys the conditions necessary for long-term success by focusing excessively on short-term profits. We don’t need to reinvent capitalism. We just need to practice it. That means that corporations that embrace market mechanisms and decry government intervention in the good times should not change the rules when times turn tough. Privatizing profits while socializing risks isn’t capitalism: It’s rigged roulette. Equally important, practicing capitalism does not mean insisting on special treatment from government that benefits shareholders at the expense of other stakeholders. And it means treating government as the vital partner to business, one that supports the physical and social infrastructure, and the political stability, that make business possible. The pattern of privatizing profits while socializing risk goes back to the 2008 recession, and has continued in the current crisis: in the U.S., the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance covers independent contractors, but American companies pay into the tax that finances unemployment insurance only for workers classified as employees. So, in effect, companies that rely on gig workers have shifted the cost of those workers’ unemployment insurance onto taxpayers. So have traditional companies that pay so little that their workers qualify for Medicaid and other programs, shifting their health insurance costs onto the U.S. taxpayer; in fact, there’s a company that provides a service used throughout the U.S. to help corporate employees shift over from company benefits to government programs. But the airlines are the best example. During the flush times, airlines happily pocketed the profits on the grounds that they are private. But when travel tanked during the pandemic, suddenly airlines insisted on huge bailouts on the grounds that saving them entails a public good. As we saw in 2008, this creates moral hazards that undermine the incentive structures that make capitalism work. Starving Government Sustainable capitalism requires paying a fair share in taxes, but slash-and-burn capitalism aims to do exactly the opposite. In the process, it has severely hobbled government’s ability to deliver basic services. As the pandemic has shown so dramatically, the instinctive assumption that businesses thrive better when taxes are as low as possible is factually incorrect. “Starving the beast” led to the gutting of public health departments, which during the pandemic has had devastating effects for the economy and the businesses that operate within it. Even if the administration had wanted to take the kinds of effective steps that have worked so well in countries that have reopened, we did not have the public health infrastructure to do so. Digging deeper, slash-and-burn capitalism has undermined trust in government. That trust has been plummeting for decades, often fueled by business-financed campaigns against “over-regulation” and government programs. Only 17% of Americans say they trust government most or all of the time, among the lowest levels in the past half-century. The social contract to adhere to basic public health measures has collapsed, former CDC Director Dr. Richard Besser has pointed out. As elected officials and public health leaders respond to the pandemic, they have to contend with public indifference at best and death threats at worst: Dr. Anthony Fauci now has round-the-clock protection. The cumulative effects of distrust in, and defunding of, government have led us unable to launch an effective response to the pandemic. The U.S. has the highest death count in the world, the worst death rate among major countries, and an economy unable to reopen effectively. This is not an isolated example. The anti-tax movement has led to an evisceration of property taxes in California and elsewhere. One result is that California public schools went from the first to the worst — and now schools in California and elsewhere don’t have the funds to make distance learning effective or to reopen in a way that’s safe. Schools are part of the basic infrastructure needed to get Americans to work. Massive public disinvestment also affects literal infrastructure: Our collapsing bridges make it literally impossible for workers to show up. Distrust of government also means we lack the care infrastructure that enables workers to show up for work, most notably paid family leave and childcare. As a result, some companies offered frontline workers $100 per shift to cover child care at the start of the pandemic, and paid leave is now financed through private employers rather than, as in virtually every other industrialized country, through the government. Is this really better for business? Profit and Pay Globalized supply chains are yet another example of slash-and-burn capitalism that looks different today than it did six months ago. Prominent members of both parties now recognize that globalized supply chains have created an economy that is hyper profitable but not resilient, to quote U.S. Senator Marco Rubio’s insightful analysis. The U.S.’s reliance on China for medical supplies from PPE to pharmaceuticals highlights again the vulnerability of an economy hyper focused on short-term profits without a thought to sustaining economic stability not just through thick, but also through thin. But the single most important example of slash-and-burn capitalism concerns wages. The current business philosophy that wages are just another cost to be cut is relatively recent. In 1914, Henry Ford — Henry Ford! — doubled wages because he recognized that workers need enough money to create demand, and he wanted his workers to be able to afford his cars. Half a century later, Kodak’s annual report listed the generous wages and benefits it paid its staff as proud accomplishments in its report to shareholders. That’s such a contrast to large, rich companies today that classify a third or more of their workforces as contractors even though they often work full time, sometimes for years. The unspoken core belief of contemporary capitalism reflects an old adage: to make the rich work harder, pay them more; to make the poor work harder, pay them less. That’s the logic behind the fact that executive salaries have ballooned from 20 times to over 300 times the average employee’s wage in recent decades, while wages for the formerly middle class have barely budged. Shareholder capitalism is really managerial-capture capitalism, as is evidenced by the company after company where CEOs’ compensation has skyrocketed during the pandemic. No wonder the 1% keeps getting richer: it’s not hard to win at rigged roulette. Slash-and-burn capitalism’s obsession with controlling labor costs has led to a sharp diminution in the sharing of productivity gains with the workforce that created them. During the decades after World War II, wages used to rise when productivity did; if that trend had continued, wages would be twice what they are today. As a result, only half of Americans born in 1980 will do better than their parents; virtually all Americans used to. The resulting pain and fury at the loss of the American dream has fueled economic populism. Many Trump voters are from the fragile or formerly middle class, deeply rooted in communities that are being left behind: voters in counties suffering economic distress trended for Trump. “We’re voting with our middle finger,” said one. The result is a dysfunctional economic populism that’s bad for business. It’s not just the trade wars, whose cost has been born chiefly by American consumers and businesses. The economic fury driving far-right populism is leading to the kind of political instability American business has rarely had to worry about. We have a president openly talking about not leaving office if he loses, and white supremacists just thwarted in a plan to kidnap the governor of Michigan. It’s time to replace slash-and-burn capitalism with sustainable capitalism that provides the economic and political infrastructure needed to support a healthy economy. Policy proposals are important, but first things first: let’s stop letting ideology distort our discussions of government and the market. The right is starry eyed about the market but coldly realistic about the limitations of government. The left is starry eyed about government but coldly realistic about the limitations of the market. As Churchill once said about democracy, it’s the worst possible system except for all the others. Both the market and the government are deeply flawed tools. But they are all we have. Let’s start a conversation about how to use them to restore the American dream of a stable government, a thriving economy, and a healthy middle class.

#### The aff’s belief in the ability of a singular legal act to create a just and stable society is a fantasy that serves to cover up the unsustainable violence at the heart of capitalist ideology

Wardle in 2016

Benjamin James; PhD; The Four Axes of Legal Ideology; Griffith Law School; PhD thesis; http://hdl.handle.net/10072/367046

Žižek draws on and extends Marx’s understanding of ideology to posit a multifaceted conceptualisation. For Žižek ideology operates around three axes: a complex of ideas; the materiality of ideology; and the ‘spontaneous’ ideology at work at the heart of social ‘reality’ itself (1994, p. 9). Žižek illustrates his conclusion with liberalism which is ‘a doctrine (developed from Locke to Hayek) materialized in rituals and apparatuses (free press, elections, market, etc.) and active in the “spontaneous” (self-) experience of subjects as “free individuals”’ (1994, p. 10). Under this definition ideology can be produced by a ruling class, it can function largely unconsciously through material forms like commodities, and it can be produced by the exploited spontaneously through their daily experiences. By viewing the topography of ideology as multi-dimensional rather than a singular, monolithic structure Žižek draws together most of the insights in Marx’s three definitions and, in doing so, overcomes many of the contradictions between these definitions. In addition to overcoming a number of the inconsistencies between Marx’s three definitions of ideology Žižek draws on Lacanian psychoanalysis to develop new insights into how ideology ‘grips its subjects’ (Glynos 2001, p. 195). Lacanian psychoanalysis is difficult to briefly summarise without falling into essentialism and structuralism and so what follows should be treated as a crude impression of Jacque Lacan’s complex work.4 Lacan argues that the structure of subjectivity reflects the structure of language. Language is an incomplete, fragmented system of signification that never adequately encapsulates that which it describes. For example, the word “tree” never adequately describes a specific, individual tree. One result is that signification causes lack. As our consciousness is largely made up of a collection of signifiers there is a fundamental and unfillable lack at the heart of subjectivity just as there is a fundamental lack at the heart of signification. Lacan calls this fundamental lack the “Real.” While the response of subjects to fundamental lack is varied, in general we cannot accept the anxiety, uncertainty and sense of incompleteness that stems from lack and so elevate ideas, ideals, people, places, commodities or any other object in never-ending cycles to attempt to fill this lack. Lacan names this process “fantasy” as the void is unfillable and there is consequently an endless movement from object to object (1973/1998, p. 209). Fantasy structures the way subjects perceive reality. An ordinary object, person or idea can be seen as a sublime object capable of completing the subject. Coupled with fantasy is repression. The void at the heart of social reality produces anxiety and so a subject’s response to anything that threatens the perceived completeness produced by fantasy is often relegated from consciousness. Fantasy and repression can be integral in sustaining hierarchical, exploitative and violent social relations. Subjects obtain enjoyment from fantasy and this can overshadow the violent, exploitative and oppressive aspects of ideologies while repression can maintain a subject’s belief in an ideology by preventing experiences that highlight the inconsistencies, incompleteness or violent consequences of ideological beliefs from entering consciousness. As such fantasy and repression offer an explanation why individuals cling to ideological ideas or practices even when to do so is against ones self-interest, the interests of loved ones or humanity in general. Psychoanalytic theory can also offer a reason why individuals maintain these beliefs even following exposure to information or practices that expose the inaccuracy or oppressive nature of ideological beliefs.

#### The impact is racial capitalism: the global system that is recognized by war, colonialism, slavery, genocide, fascism, and dispossession – it deploys liberalist ideals of individualism that corrupts movements and undermines any and all social change.

Jodi Melamed, 2015, is associate professor of English and Africana Studies at Marquette University. She is the author of Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism (University of Minnesota Press, 2011) and has published many articles and chapters in a wide array of journals and editions “Racial Capitalism” published in Critical Ethnic Studies , Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2015), pp. 76-85. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/jcritethnstud.1.1.0076

This contribution to the inaugural volume of the Critical Ethnic Studies seeks to strengthen the activist hermeneutic “racial capitalism” to respond to three conditions with which critical ethnic studies must reckon in the present. The first is that so-called primitive accumulation—where capital is accrued through transparently violent means (war, land-grabbing, dispossession, neo/colonialism)—**has become everywhere interlinked and continuous** with accumulation through expanded reproduction, which we used to think of as requiring only “the silent compulsion of economic relations.”1 **With the top 10 percent taking 50 percent of total U.S. income** in 2012, and the top 1 percent taking a striking 95 percent of all post-Recession income gains, it has become increasingly plain that accumulation for financial asset owning classes requires violence toward others and seeks to expropriate for capital the entire field of social provision (land, work, education, health).2 The second condition is the degree to which ideologies of individualism, liberalism, and democracy, shaped by and shaping market economies and capitalist rationality from their mutual inception, monopolize the terms of sociality**,** despite their increasing hollowness in the face of neoliberalism’s predations. The third condition is the emergence of new horizons of activism that challenge the interpretative limits of ethnic studies in that they exceed the antimonies of political/economic activism, bust up old terms and geographies of solidarity, and are often Indigenous-led, requiring a rethinking of activist scholarship in light of the importance of Indigenous activism and critical theory. Our dominant critical understanding of the term racial capitalism stays close to the usage of its originator, Cedric Robinson, in his seminal Black Marxism: The Making of a Black Radical Tradition. 3 Robinson develops the term to correct the developmentalism and racism that led Marx and Engels to believe mistakenly that European bourgeois society would rationalize social relations. Instead, Robinson explains, the obverse occurred: “The development, organization, and expansion of capitalist society pursued essentially racial directions, so too did social ideology. As a material force . . . racialism would inevitably permeate the social structures emergent from capitalism. I have used the term ‘racial capitalism’ to refer . . . to the subsequent structure as a historical agency.”4 Thus the term “racial capitalism” requires its users to recognize that capitalism is racial capitalism. Capital can only be capital when it is accumulating, and it can only accumulate by producing and moving through relations of severe inequality among human groups—c

#### The alternative is to affirm the model of the Communist Party – only the vertical dual power organizing can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct unproductive tendencies, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for international liberation.

**Escalante 18**  
(Alyson Escalante, you should totally read her work for non-debate reasons, Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/> rvs)

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: **in order** to mobilize the base **which base builders hope to create,** we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable,

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#### Interp and violation: "The member nations" denotes the totality of member nations in the WTO. The aff may not defend a subset of WTO member nations ought to reduce IP protections for medicines.

Sharvy 80 [Richard Sharvy, philosopher. "A More General Theory of Definite Descriptions on JSTOR," The Philosophical Review, Vol. 89, No. 4, Oct. 1980, accessed 8-22-2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2184738] HWIC

3. Definite Plural Descriptions. Phrases like 'the sheep in New Zealand' and 'the people in Auckland' are also ordinary and common definite descriptions, and they do denote. But because their contained predicates are plural predicates like 'are people in Auckland', which apply to more than one object, such expressions are not subject to a Russellian analysis. There is no such thing as (ax \* x are people in Auckland), since a number of distinct items satisfy the predicate-the men in Auckland are people in Auckland, and so are the women in Auckland and the children in Auckland. The definite plural description 'the people in Auckland' designates the sum or totality of all the people in Auckland. This is the sum of all that to which the predicate 'are people in Auckland' applies: the sum of all the items such as the women in Auckland, the children in Auckland, etc., that satisfy the plural predicate 'are people in Auckland'. What sort of entity is the denotation of a definite plural description such as 'the children in Auckland'? A first attempt might be to say that such expressions denote sets or classes. Then a sum of such items would be the union of such classes. Russell would insist on calling the people in Auckland a "class as many" (1903, pp. 68-72, 76-77). But if the predicate 'are people in Auckland' is taken to apply to x just if x is a set of people in Auckland,5 then the definite plural description 'the people in Auckland' refers to the union of these sets: U {x: x is a set of people in Auckland). So let us first consider set-theoretic union as a candidate for the sort of sum needed here in the analysis of definite plural descriptions. This might seem more complicated than '{x: x is a person in Auckland)', which refers to the same class. But the former expression has the advantage of preserving the predicate as a plural predicate, as it appeared in the original definite plural description. A standard definition of union is U a = {x: (ay) (x ecy .y E a)) (cf. Quine 1963, p. 53). In my notation this would be written: Ua = {x:xe(Qy yEa)) -the x's that are a member of some member of a. Quine observes 5I do not say 'nonempty' simply because it would be redundant: no class of people is empty. I do include the singletons, so that {Sharvy} are people in Auckland. This might seem odd. However, the instances or instantiations of 'all men are mortal' include sentences like 'Sharvy is mortal' along with sentences like 'the men in Auckland are mortal'; thus, the plural does include the singular. Notice that 'all men are mortal' should be symbolized '(x) (x are men D x are mortal)'; logic students are generally wrongly taught to write '(x) (x is a man D x is mortal)', which is more properly a symbolization of 'every man is mortal', which has the singular subject 'every man'. 616 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS that if everything is a class, this definition implies that the union U {x} of a singleton is its member x; this effect is preserved for an apparent nonclass by identifying it with its own unit class. So with this convention, if G applies to exactly one object, then U {x: Gx} = ( 7x . Gx ). So the Russellian definite singular description again emerges, here as a species of definite plural description.6 This would occur with, e.g., 'the men in this room' if there were exactly one man in the room. Notice also that plural predicates, like mass predicates, are cumulative: any sum of parts which are cats are cats. So 'G(the G)' holds for any instantiated plural predicate when 'the G' is defined as such a sum: the men in Auckland are men in Auckland, the poor are poor, etc. The analysis of definite plural description as union is not entirely satisfactory. One reason is that it explicitly uses the mechanism of class abstraction and the membership relation in a way that requires that such definite plural descriptions do denote classes. Now there is no problem about what 'the people in Auckland' denotes: it denotes the people in Auckland. Whether the people in Auckland are a set or class is an ontological question that should be discussed elsewhere. (Indeed, ontological questions generally should be independent of a theory of descriptions: we should be able to explain phrases like 'the first symphony of Beethoven' without discussing the ontological nature of symphonies.) My aim here is simply to explain plural definite descriptions like 'the people in Auckland' in a way that remains neutral on that ontological question by avoiding explicitly settheoretic notions. Another reason to turn away from the above analysis of 'the C as 'U {x: Gx}' is that it lacks generality. It lets in too much 6 I thank W. V. Quine for calling my attention to this passage. 'one object' means 'one class'. Consider the predicate 'are men and women in this room', and suppose the room contains just one man, m, and one woman, w. Then only one object, {m,w} satisfies that predicate, and U {a: a are men and women in this room) = U {{m,w}} = {m,w} = (7a a are men and women in this room). See note 8 also. Consider the definite description 'the square root of 2'. This is ordinarily used to refer to the positive square root of 2. My theory explains this; if real numbers are defined in the usual way as lower cuts of rationals (cf. Russell 1903, ch. 33), the positive root is the union of the negative and positive roots. 617 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RICHARD SHARVY when applied to a singular definite description whose contained predicate applies to more than one object: 'the author of PM' would denote {Whitehead, Russell). This was Frege's convention (?1 1), but it is clearly artificial; 'the author of PM' should fail to denote. And finally, 'U {x: Gx)' just doesn't look enough like the analysis given earlier of definite mass descriptions. Mass terms and plural terms are alike in numerous ways, and it would be nice if their uses in forming definite descriptions had analyses that reflected this similarity. Specifically, we should express summation without using the membership relation e, which has no analogue in the semantics of mass terms. The solution is to observe that there is a part of relation available: the men in Auckland are part of the people in Auckland. (This relation looks very much like the relation of being a nonempty subset of.) Writing it as '<', we may then define 'the G' for plural predicates as (4) above: sm G that all G are part of. The requirement in (4) that x satisfy G is useful for distinguishing the definite plural description 'the authors of PM' from the definite singular description 'the author of PM'. The former denotes Whitehead and Russell, as it should.7 Without the requirementhat x satisfy G, using (1) or simply union, so would the latter. But although Whitehead and Russell are authors of PM, they are not an author of PM. That requirement also leads to the intuitively correct results for expressions like 'the Wilmington Ten' and 'the five men in this room'. If there are only four men in this toom, the description 'the five men in this room' fails to denote because the predicate 'are five men in this room' applies to nothing. If there are six men in this room, then that description also fails to denote-not because that predicate applies to more than one item (i.e., to every part of the six containing just five men), but because it fails to apply to their sum. A word of caution about part is needed here. I am taking it in what I think is its plain and ordinary sense. However, Goodman, Quine, and other writers on the theory of parts (mereology) have used it in an extended sense which is not appropriate here. 7 But it does not denote Whitehead, and it does not denote Russell. The property of being denoted by an expression is not dissective. I may refer to something without referring to each of its parts. 618 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS The difference is that these writers combine mereology with a kind of materialism. (An exception is Foradori.) Thus Quine writes, "there are parts of water, sugar, and furniture too small to count as water, sugar, furniture" (1960, p. 99). Here, by 'parts of furniture' he means something like 'spatiotemporally determined parts of the material constituting the world's furniture'; by 'parts of water' he means 'spatiotemporally determined parts of the world's water'. However, in the ordinary sense of 'part', the parts of water are hydrogen and oxygen. In the ordinary sense of part, shrimp is a part of shrimp salad. Here, the words 'shrimp' and 'shrimp salad' refer to types or kinds, and not to the world's shrimp and the world's shrimp salad. Indeed, the world's shrimp is not part of the world's shrimp salad. Now, my furniture is part of the world's furniture, and the chair in my billiard room is part of my furniture. But is a leg of that chair part of my furniture? I doubt it. In a distinguishable sense of 'part', a leg of my chair is a part of that chair and a part of my furniture. In the plural of that same sense, the legs are parts of my furniture. But those legs are not part of my furniture. The matter of the legs is part of the matter of the furniture; also, the chairs in my billiard room are part of my furniture. But the legs of the chairs are not part of the furniture. The men in Auckland are part of the men and women in Auckland, but the arms of the men in Auckland are not part of the men and women in Auckland. The explanation is not that the arms fail to satisfy the contained predicate 'are men and women in Auckland', for the men in Auckland also fail to be men and women in Auckland. Rather, the explanation is that x are part of y in this ordinary sense just if x are some ofy. Notice the difference between 'some' and 'some of. It's true that some of the men and women in Auckland are men, but false that some men and women in Auckland are men. It's true that some of the whiskey-and-water inmy glass is water, but false that some whiskey-and-water inmy glass is water. 'part of' and 'some of' seem to be synonymous here; examples like these occur with mass and plural predicates that are not dissective. The legs of my chair are not part of my furniture, because 619 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RICHARD SHARVY it's false that they are some of my furniture. Given our understanding of 'part' then, being furniture and being men in Auckland are dissective properties; it is compounds like 'are men and women' that fail to be dissective. So only articles of furniture count as part of my furniture. It is a totally distinct feature of Goodman's system that causes his notion of 'part' to be broader than mine, so that, e.g., the chair legs are also part of my furniture. That feature is a sort of materialism. The set of my tables # the set of my table tops and legs; but the matter of my tables = the matter of my tops and legs. If we remove this materialism from mereology, we have a purer theory of part and whole, and consequently of sum. The mereological sum, then, of my articles of furniture is my furniture, and not the matter of my furniture. With this ordinary and intended sense of 'part', then, the expressions 'the counties of Utah' and 'the townships of Utah' will have distinct denotations, as they should. Without the distinction made above, they might appear to collapse into the same object, since the territory occupied by the counties is identical to that occupied by the townships; (px) (x is territory of (b.y) (y are counties, etc.) ) = etc. What sort of entity is denoted by the definite plural description 'the men in Auckland'? This question contains the mistaken implication that this phrase denotes a single entity. But the phrase 'the men in Auckland' obviously denotes the men in Auckland. One might ask, "What sort of entities are those?" But the answer is easy: they are entities that eat, drink, sleep, and are numerous. The error to avoid is an insistence on the singular. 'the men in Auckland' is not a singular term-it is a plural term. This should hardly need to be said. But some writers have gone astray by failing to see that plurals are plural, and so insisting that they must denote something singular. For example, Richard E. Grandy says that in the sentence 'Lions are widespread', " 'lions' must be a singular [sic] term denoting the class of lions" (p. 297). Given this, it will follow that a certain class is widespread (which does not seem as odd to me as it might to many). But what seems odd is that Grandy claims that it does not follow from his statement that any class is widespread; apparently 620 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS he prefers to give up the indiscernibility of identicals rather than the dogma that classes are "abstract." Now the words 'set' and 'class' have uses as dummy nominal measure words whose only function is the syntactic one of turning a plural into an apparent singular: the rational numbers are countable -- the set of rational numbers is countable. But no semantic consequences follow from such a use of the words 'set' and 'class'. The rational numbers are the set of rational numbers; the set of rational numbers is the rational numbers. The people in this room weigh 1000 kilograms; the set of people in this room weighs 1000 kg. The men in this room are not abstract; the set of men in this room is not abstract. We can avoid Grandy's contortions simply by taking the plural seriously as a plural, and abandoning the fetish for the singular that pervades contemporary decadent Western ontology. Along these same lines we can affirm that (i) 'the world's lions are widespread' and (ii) 'the world's lions are mammalian' do have the same logical form. In particular, the form of (ii) is 'Ml' and not '(x)(Lx D Mx)'; this is clear for (i). Question: how, then, does (ii), along with 'Aslan is a lion' imply 'Aslan is mammalian'? Answer: the implication is not a formal one at all, but depends on the fact that 'are mammalian' is dissective; 'are widespread' is not dissective. This situation is quite familiar: 'Ben weighs less than 60 kg' and 'Ben's nose is part of Ben' imply 'Ben's nose weighs less than 60 kg'. But again, the implication is not formal-it is not due to the logical form of these statements (this is easily seen by putting 'more' for 'less'). Rather, the implication holds because 'weighs less than 60 kg' is dissective. 4. Conclusion. For any given predicate G there is an appropriate part of or some of relation ? on the extension of G.8 Notice that 8The structure <{x: Gx},?) is often a mereology, i.e., a model of the so-called calculus of individuals. But it may fail to be a mereology. Idefine a quasi-mereology to be any structure (S, ?) where ? partially orders S (reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric), and where the <-least upper bound of a is a member of S for every nonempty subset a of S. One interesting type of quasi-mereology results from taking the algebraic direct product of two 621 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RICHARD SHARVY for most singular count predicates, < is just the identity relation: for 'is a shoe I own' < is the identity relation, for the extension of that predicate contains no two objects of which either is part of the other. Regardless of how many shoes I own, x - y only if x = y, for every x and y in that domain. In all such cases, '( px Gx )' defined as (4) comes out as desired, designating the gold in Zurich or the men in Auckland; and if I own just one shoe, '( pxS x is a shoe I own)' designates it, but otherwise that description fails. The analysis of 'the G' as (4) is therefore a general theory of definite descriptions, of which definite mass descriptions, definite plural descriptions, and Russellian definite singular count descriptions are species.9 full mereologies. (This description of the situation is due to Mark Nixon.) For example, (M, ) X <W. 5), where M is the set of sets of men and W is the set of sets of women, is isomorphic to (MW, 5), where MW is the set of sets of men and women, i.e., of sets containing at least one man and one woman. (MW, C ) is simply the corresponding quasi-mereology of the predicate 'are men and women'; this predicate is satisfied by the people in Auckland (they are men and women), but not by the men in Auckland. The structure fails to be a mereology because it is not properly closed under subtraction: there are sets a, b, each of which are men and women, and where a - b is not null yet fails to be men and women; a - b might just be men. However, we can combine the mereologies (M, C) and <W, 5) so that a mereology results. Add the null element to each, take the direct product, and then remove the null element: ((M U {4}, 5) X (W U {4}, 5))- ((4,4), 5). This is isomorphic to the mereology corresponding to the predicate 'are adults', i.e., to the set of nonempty subsets of the set of all men and women, under subset: V(P(U (M U W)) - {4}, C). 9 We have an account of the generic 'the' along these same lines. The New Zealand Flag is a New Zealand flag to which every New Zealand flag bears a certain relation ?. This seems a little more natural if we add the syllables 'akes' or 'icipates' to the word 'part' in reading '<' here: the New Zealand Flag is that New Zealand flag in which every New Zealand flag participates. The fact that it participates in itself does not lead to a "third man" regress, because participation in, as a variant of the part of relation, is not used to explain predication; predication remains primary. Of course, nothing in my discussion requires that there be such an entity (nor does anything here count against it). My theory is quite neutral. If there is such an entity, '( px x is a New Zealand flag)' picks it out. If there is no such entity, but merely a number of flags none of which bears ? to anything but itself, then ? is coextensive with the identity relation on those flags, and the situation is the same as for 'my shoe'. John Bacon, however, claims 622 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS With this analysis and some thought about examples of definite mass descriptions and definite plural descriptions, we see that the primary use of 'the' is not to indicate uniqueness. Rather, it is to indicate totality; implication of uniqueness is a side effect.

Nebel 19. [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution.” Vbriefly. August 12, 2019. <https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/?fbclid=IwAR0hUkKdDzHWrNeqEVI7m59pwsnmqLl490n4uRLQTe7bWmWDO_avWCNzi14> TG

Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions.

Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window.

So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why.

“Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons.

First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural.

Second, “colleges and universities” fails the [upward-entailment test](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#IsolGeneInte) for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals.

Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universitiesz generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. (Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution.

#### It applies to “nations” – 1] upward entailment test – “member nations of the World Trade Organization” doesn’t entail that political bodies ought to reduce intellectual property protections because it doesn’t prove that the UN should reduce 2] adverb test – adding “always” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning because reduce is permanent.

#### Standards:

#### [1] precision – the counter-interp justifies them arbitrarily doing away with random words in the resolution which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution. Independent voter for jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff if there wasn’t a legitimate aff.

#### [2] Limits and ground – their model allows affs to defend anything from India to US to Indonesia— there's no universal DA since each has different functions and political implications — that explodes neg prep and leads to random country of the week affs which makes cutting stable neg links impossible — limits key to reciprocal engagement since they create a caselist for neg prep and it takes out ground like DAs to certain nations which are some of the few neg generics when affs spec nations.

#### [3] TVA solves – you could’ve read your plan as an advantage under a whole res advocacy. Potential abuse doesn’t justify in round abuse, and having no prep leads to cheaty word PICs and Process Cps which are net worse

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Outweighs because it’s the only intrinsic part of debate – all other rules can be debated over but rely on some conception of fairness to be justified.

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] set better norms for debate.

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – [1] You shouldn’t win for proving you’re being fair – that’s an expectation. If the judge voted for who followed speech times best, it would be irresolvable since that is expected by both sides

#### [2] Baiting – good theory debaters bait the rvi with an abusive strategy which either [a] causes massive abuse substantively or [b] leads to a debate of who is the better theory debater, which is a bad model for debate

#### [3] Kill substantive education – invites debaters to collapse to theory for an rvi

#### [4] Chilling effect – debaters are too scared to read theory because good theory debaters beat them on the rvi, means infinite unchecked abuse and ow on severity

#### [5] Timeskew – they get 7-6 theory advantage, with 2ar recontextualization devastates negatives



#### [6] Theory becomes nib that the negative is more incentivized to collapse to, which kills substantive education

## 3

### Open Source

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions on open source with highlighting on the 2020-21 NDCA LD wiki after the round in which they read them.

#### Violation – screenshots in the doc prove I do and they don’t



#### 1] Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs – it equals the playing field.

Overing 18 – Bob Overing, LD Scholar (“Holiday Disclosure Post #6 – 10 Things Edition” JANUARY 12, 2018. http://www.premierdebate.com/disclosure-post-6/)

**Open source improves on usual disclosure practices** in the obvious way – **you can read their evidence for better prep**aration – and in a number of smaller ways too. **It solves the analytics problem** I discussed above, **so round-altering uncarded arguments are available** (though this doesn’t really apply to Harvard-Westlake), **and it gives access to evidence from paywalled articles**. **Every season I coach debaters who lack access to major databases; for schools without robust online library offerings or teams without college coaches, this matters a lot**.

#### 2] Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify pre-round that cards aren’t miscut or highlighted or bracketed unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat

#### 3] Depth of clash – it allows debaters to have nuanced researched objections to their opponents evidence before the round at a much faster rate, which leads to higher quality ev comparison – outweighs cause thinking on your feet is NUQ but the best quality responses come from full access to a case.