

I affirm

The value is morality because “ought” is defined as a moral obligation. Further, governments have a duty towards their citizens to fight suffering and ensure that their actions are not disproportionately harming people, Mayerfeld explains,

Jamie Mayerfeld, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington. *Suffering and Moral Responsibility*, Oxford Press, 1999. ISBN 0195154959, 9780195154955

We have a prima facie duty to relieve suffering, because suffering is bad and ought not to occur. Suffering is bad (as I said before) not only for the individual whom it afflicts, but bad from an impersonal point of view. Its occurrence makes the world that much worse. I add the claim that it “ought not to occur,” because to identify suffering as a bad understates what is involved. Some things are bad without it being the case that we have a prima facie duty to get rid of them. The badness of suffering is different. Here I need to use somewhat metaphorical language to get across what seems to me to be the heart of the matter. Where there is suffering, there exists a demand or an appeal for the prevention of that suffering. I say “a demand or an appeal,” but this demand does not issue from anyone in particular, nor is it addressed to anyone in particular. We might say (again metaphorically) that suffering cries out for its own abolition or cancellation.

Public policymakers must look to maximize the greatest good first because they act on behalf of a collective body of citizens, Goodin explains

Goodin 1995 Robert E. Goodin. *Philosopher of Political Theory, Public Policy, and Applied Ethics. Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press, 1995. p. 26-7 // MP 1.12.15

The great advantage of utilitarianism as a guide to public conduct is that it avoids gratuitous sacrifices, it ensures as best we are able to ensure in the uncertain world of public policy-making that policies are sensitive to people's interests or desires or preferences. The great failing of more deontological theories applied to those realms, is that they fixate upon duties done for the sake of duty rather than for the sake of any good that is done by doing one's duty. Perhaps it is permissible (perhaps it is even proper) for private individuals in the course of their personal affairs to fetishize duties done for their own sake. It would be a mistake for public officials to do likewise, not least because it is impossible. The fixation on motives makes absolutely no sense in the public realm, and might make precious little sense in the private on even, as Chapter 3 shows.

The standard is maximizing expected well-being

Prefer

1. Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first. Intuitions outweigh—they're the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions are most likely false even if we can't deductively determine why.

2. Actor specificity:

a. No act-omission distinction—governments are responsible for everything in the public sphere so inaction is implicit authorization of action: they have to yes/no bills, which means everything collapse to aggregation.

b. No intent-foresight distinction – the actions we take are inevitably informed by predictions from certain mental states, meaning consequences are a collective part of the will.

c. Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Takes out util calc inducts since they're empirically denied and link turns them because the alt would be no action.

3. Extinction comes first under any framework.

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. "Moral Agreement on Saving the World" Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now whatever general moral view we adopt; that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we're consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions... upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there's nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there's a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there's more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes: it is not the view that the latter don't matter. Even John Rawls wrote, "All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy." Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They'd thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn't significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one's character. What's even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial "point of view of the universe," indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one's own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don't care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler's recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I'd have very strong reason to reduce

existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I've just argued that there's agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions... upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It's possible they'll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won't get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: "We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy.... Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly." (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

Prefer

- a) Gateway issue- we need to be alive to debate competing moral theories
- b) **no moral theory can allow for extinction because it means the end of value.**

Plan text: The member nations of the WTO ought to reduce intellectual property protections for antiretrovirals.

Merriam Webster defines "Antiretroviral" as- acting, used, or effective against retroviruses

And "antiviral" as- acting, effective, or directed against viruses

ADVANTAGE 1- Superbugs

HIV is not solved yet. ARV access is key to solve the issue

HIV.gov 2021. [Governmental agency] “Global HIV/AIDS Overview”

<https://www.hiv.gov/federal-response/pepfar-global-aids/global-hiv-aids-overview>

Despite advances in our scientific understanding of **HIV** and its **prevention and treatment as well as years of significant effort by the global health community** and leading government and civil society organizations, **too many people with HIV** or at risk for HIV still **do not have access to prevention, care, and treatment**, and there is still no cure. Further, the HIV epidemic not only affects the health of individuals, it also impacts households, communities, and the development and economic growth of nations. Many of the countries hardest hit by HIV also suffer from other infectious diseases, food insecurity, and other serious problems

The longer we wait to stop HIV, the more likely it is that HIV will mutate and develop drug resistance, because retroviruses have high mutation rates. These mutations lead to superbug creation. We need to stop HIV now to prevent.

Kayla M. **Peck 18** [Division of Infectious Diseases, Department of Internal Medicine, University of Michigan] “Complexities of Viral Mutation Rates” 2018

<https://journals.asm.org/doi/10.1128/JVI.01031-17>

The higher per-site mutation rates of RNA viruses can be explained in part by the RNA-dependent RNA polymerases (RdRp) that replicate their genomes. Unlike many DNA polymerases, RdRp do not have proofreading activity and are thus unable to correct mistakes during replication. Notable exceptions are members of the *Nidovirales* family, including coronaviruses, toroviruses, and roniviruses, which have an RdRp-independent proofreading activity and thus lower mutation rates. This proofreading is thought to be a key factor in explaining how these viruses have much larger genomes (>26 kb) compared to other RNA viruses (7). **Retroviruses also have high mutation rates, because reverse transcriptase, like most RdRp, lacks proofreading activity.** Finally, for unclear reasons, single-stranded viruses tend to mutate more rapidly than double-stranded viruses, causing some single-stranded DNA (ssDNA) viruses to have rates comparable to those of double-stranded RNA (dsRNA) viruses (Fig. 1A) (5).

Mutation rates determine the amount of genetic variation generated in a population, which is the material upon which natural selection can act. For this reason, a **higher mutation rate correlates with a higher evolutionary rate**, but only to a point (Fig. 1A and B). While the high mutation rates of retroviruses and RNA viruses may explain their higher evolutionary rates relative to those of DNA viruses, several DNA viruses exhibit evolutionary rates comparable to those of RNA viruses (3, 5). This highlights the importance of additional factors in determining the evolutionary rate, such as within-host dynamics (4) or cell tropism (8). Overall, **mutation rates are important, because they determine the probability that a mutation conferring drug resistance, antibody escape, or expanded host range will arise**. Additionally, mutation rates can determine whether a virus population will be susceptible to drug-induced lethal mutagenesis (9).

If we don't act to stop superbug creation now, 10 million people will die every year by 2050 and cost the global economy trillions, which leads to econ decline or collapse. World healthcare goes back into a dark age of limited treatment, which kills millions more.

https://amr-review.org/sites/default/files/160525_Final%20paper_with%20cover.pdf

JIM **O'NEILL 16** "Tackling Drug-Resistant Infections Globally: Final Report and Recommendations" May 2016

Our ability to cure infections that were once considered benign **is already damaged**. For instance, the **rapid development of drug-resistant strains** of gonorrhoea combined with the fact that we do not have a rapid diagnostic test to guide doctors' choice of prescription, means we are down to using our 'last line' antibiotic to treat gonorrhoea⁴. After this antibiotic fails, there are no more treatment options on the shelf. **For other infections, doctors running out of better options are using antibiotics that were once avoided due to their bad side effects**. This is the case with colistin, for example, which can cause kidney failure and so was never given to patients for many years. Over the past decade however, it has re-entered use as a last resort treatment for patients with particularly hard-to-treat Gram-negative bacterial infections⁵, and already colistin resistance is emerging. The economic impact is also already material. In the US alone, more than two million infections a year are caused by bacteria that are resistant to at least first-line antibiotic treatments⁶, costing the US health system 20 billion USD in excess costs each year⁷. This challenge **will only get worse in the future if we do not act now**. Based on scenarios of rising drug resistance for six pathogens to 2050, we estimated that **unless action is taken, the burden of deaths from AMR could balloon to 10 million lives each year by 2050, at a cumulative cost to global economic output of 100 trillion USD**. On this basis, by 2050, the **death toll** could be a **staggering one person every three seconds** and each person in the world today will **be more than 10,000 USD worse off**⁸. It is impossible to predict the path of emerging drug resistance, but it is a trend that has largely run only in one direction so far. What we can be certain of is that, in the absence of interventions to slow the emergence of resistance, and increase the supply of new antibiotics, **the impacts will be felt not just in isolated areas but at a far more fundamental level, across our societies and healthcare systems**.

As the **antibiotics** available to us **become less effective**, so the **risks of many treatments** which rely upon antibiotics **becomes higher**. This will progressively undermine the viability of interventions that many may not directly associate with antibiotics. Cancer **chemotherapy** or **organ transplantation** are just two examples of medical treatments that leave the patient highly vulnerable to bacterial infections. Most **invasive surgery** (particularly 'dirty' procedures, such as those involving the gut) is today routinely and dependably 'de-risked' by effective antibiotic prophylaxis and by the availability of reliable therapy for infections that do occur despite best practices. Intubated **patients in intensive care facilities** already experience very high rates of infection, including drug-resistant ones, as a result of the ventilation that they receive – and **the mortality risk associated** with this **will rise further** if treatment options for such

infections deplete. These **secondary impacts** are difficult to quantify but they **threaten to dramatically change healthcare** as we know it today.

Econ decline causes World War III.

Qian **Liu 18**, China-based economist, "From economic crisis to World War III." Project Syndicate, 11/8/2018.
<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/economic-crisis-military-conflict-or-structural-reform-by-qian-liu-2018-11>

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: **in the current social, political, and technological landscape, a prolonged economic crisis**, combined with rising income inequality, **could well escalate into a major global military conflict**. The 2008-09 global financial crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary stimulus, including **quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates**. But monetary stimulus is like an adrenaline shot to jump-start an arrested heart; it can revive the patient, but it does nothing to cure the disease. Treating a sick economy requires structural reforms, which can cover everything from financial and labour markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies. Policymakers have utterly failed to pursue such reforms, despite promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining governments now seems to take more time than actual governing. Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely) above water, rather than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment. The lack of structural reform has meant that the **unprecedented excess liquidity that central banks injected into their economies was not allocated to its most efficient uses**. Instead, it raised global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. In the United States, housing prices are now 8% higher than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio, which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now higher than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great Depression in 1929. As monetary tightening reveals the vulnerabilities in the real economy, the collapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger another economic crisis – one that could be even more severe than the last, because we have built up a tolerance to our strongest macroeconomic medications. A decade of regular adrenaline shots, in the form of ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary policies, has severely depleted their power to stabilise and stimulate the economy. If history is any guide, the consequences of this mistake could extend far beyond the economy. According to Harvard's Benjamin Friedman, **prolonged periods of economic distress have been characterised also by public antipathy toward minority groups or foreign countries** – attitudes that can help to **fuel unrest, terrorism, or even war**. For example, during the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 **Smoot-Hawley** Tariff Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, **World War II had begun**. To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors: there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict. According to research by the economist Thomas **Piketty**, a spike in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Income inequality then declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet to be proven, given the limited number of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality at historically high levels. This is all the more worrying in view of the numerous other factors stoking social unrest and diplomatic tension, including technological disruption, a record-breaking migration crisis, anxiety over globalisation, political polarisation, and rising nationalism. All are symptoms of failed policies that could turn out to be trigger points for a future crisis. Voters have good reason to be frustrated, but the **emotionally appealing populists** to whom they are increasingly giving their support are offering ill-advised solutions that **will only make matters worse**. For example, despite the world's unprecedented interconnectedness, **multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed**, as countries – most notably, Donald J. Trump's US – pursue unilateral, isolationist policies. Meanwhile, **proxy wars are raging in Syria and Yemen**. Against this background, we must take seriously the possibility that **the next economic crisis could lead to a large-scale military confrontation**. By the logic of the political scientist Samuel Huntington, considering such a scenario could help us avoid it because it would force us to take action. In this case, the key will be for policymakers to pursue the structural reforms that they have long promised while replacing finger-pointing and antagonism with a sensible and respectful global dialogue. The alternative may well be global conflagration.

Conventional war means extinction, even without nukes.

Dvorsky 12 George Dvorsky, 12-12-2012. "9 Ways Humanity Could Bring About Its Own Destruction." [Dvorsky is a Canadian [bioethicist](#), [transhumanist](#) and [futurist](#). He is a contributing editor at [io9](#)[1] and producer of the Sentient Developments blog and podcast. He was Chair of the Board for the [Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies](#) (IEET)[2][3] and is the founder and chair of the IEET's Rights of Non-Human Persons Program,[4] a group that is working to secure human-equivalent rights and protections for highly sapient animals. He also serves on the Advisory Council of [METI \(Messaging Extraterrestrial Intelligence\)](#). Bio from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Dvorsky https://io9.gizmodo.com/9-ways-humanity-could-bring-about-its-own-destruction-5967660_SJBE

World War III At the close of the [Second World War](#), nearly 2.5% of the human population had perished. Of the 70 million people who were killed, [about 20 million died from starvation](#). And disturbingly, civilians accounted for nearly 50 percent of all deaths — a stark indication that war isn't just for soldiers any more. **Given the incredible degree to which technology has advanced in the nearly seven decades since this war, it's reasonable to assume that the next global 'conventional war' — i.e. one fought without nuclear weapons — would be near apocalyptic in scope.** The degree of human suffering that could be unleashed would easily surpass anything that came before it, **with combatants using many of the technologies already described in this list, including autonomous killing machines and weaponized nanotechnology.** And in various acts of desperation (or sheer malevolence), some belligerent nations could choose to unleash **chemical and biological agents that would result in countless deaths.** And like WWII, food could be used as a weapon; **agricultural yields could be brought to a grinding halt.** Thankfully, we're a far ways off from this possibly. **Though not guaranteed, the global conflicts of the 20th century may have been an historical anomaly — one now greatly mitigated by the presence of nuclear arms.**

Cost of ARV's is the barrier to controlling/stopping HIV. Prices for medicines would drop if we reduced IPP

Fernando Pascual 2014 [Consultant on HIV Health Policy, Barcelona, Spain]
<https://www.intmedpress.com/journals/avt/article.cfm?id=2901&pid=88&sType=AVT>

The cost of antiretroviral therapy (ART) — mostly determined by the price of **antiretroviral (ARV) medicines** and diagnostics, and the cost of service delivery and programme management — **is still an important barrier to successfully controlling the HIV pandemic** [1,2]. Over the past years, efforts to provide access to HIV care at national and international levels have permitted almost 10 million people living with HIV (PLHIV) to start ART, but there are still an estimated 16 million PLHIV eligible according to the 2013 WHO guidelines. More than three-quarters of PLHIV live in low- and middle-income countries [3]. International funds so far have been key in enabling this expansion; in 2012 donor money accounted for almost 50% of the resources available for HIV responses in low- and middle-income countries [4]. However, despite the international aid and the reduction of drug prices, ARVs account for at least 35% of the total annual treatment cost per patient [5]. Achieving the 2011

HIV/AIDS High Level Meeting [6] target of 15 million PLHIV on ART by 2015 will require an estimated total cost of at least 6.7 billion USD [4].

The increased number of patients requiring ART represents a challenge to many countries as this increasing number of patients will need to be on ART for longer as life expectancy of PLHIV on ART is increasing. Retention in care of patients who initiate therapy will require the use of effective drugs that are better-tolerated and with fewer side effects. This will include developing and using new ARV drugs and classes [3]. These newer drugs and ARV classes may be more affordable but are also subject to intellectual property (IP) rights.

In this context, a good understanding of the IP landscape, defined as an overview of patent issues affecting ARVs and other drugs, is key. The objective of this paper is to analyse how patents on ARVs may affect market competition and, in turn, access to ARVs for PLHIV in low- and middle-income countries. It will also look at which mechanisms have been used in the interests of public health and could continue to play important roles in the future.

IP rights are exclusive rights granted to the owner of a variety of 'creations of the mind'. One particular type of these rights are patents, which are exclusive rights given by law to inventors to make use of, and exploit, their inventions for a limited period of time. Generally speaking, a patent provides the patent owner with the right to decide how – or whether – the inventions can be used by others. The inventor is granted this temporary monopoly in exchange for a full description of how to perform the invention publicly available in the published patent document. Patents are granted by national authorities, mostly patent offices. In some cases, patents are granted by a regional organization. Patents on pharmaceuticals may be applied to active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and, in some cases, their pharmaceutical compositions, or the processes for their manufacture [7].

The contemporary rationale behind the patent system is to provide incentives to develop new products and processes through the possibility of getting a high return on research and development (R&D) investment. Innovation in the field of HIV is particularly important, as the virus can develop resistance to existing ARVs over time, thus requiring switch to more effective drugs. In addition, ARVs have become an important part of biomedical prevention strategies, including preexposure prophylaxis and treatment as prevention. Requirements to ensure the availability of ARVs for these multiple purposes depend on the existence of various contextual factors including a solid industrial R&D base, availability of risk capital and profitable commercial opportunities, conditions that are often lacking in many developing countries. In addition to the political environment coupled with the perception that the HIV pandemic was a global threat, market incentives also seem to have worked for the development of new ARVs, with 28 ARVs currently having received regulatory approval by the US Food and Drug Administration (US FDA) since 1995. However, patents fall short of stimulating innovation for products needed in developing country markets because the market cannot ensure return on R&D investment [8]. A clear example is paediatric HIV, for which there is a very limited market in high-income countries and as a result there is a more limited incentive for private R&D investment in developing paediatric ARVs. A similar case may apply to the development of medicines required for treatment of certain coinfections, which are highly prevalent in resource-limited settings.

Patents are granted and recognized by national or regional patent offices, and they protect an invention in a country or region on the basis of certain criteria: the invention has to be novel, involve an inventive step – or be 'non-obvious', as this criterion is known in certain countries – and be industrially applicable or useful [9]. National laws govern the enforcement and granting of patents and it is in principle up to the patent offices to decide on the way in which the patentability criteria are applied. However, country members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have the obligation to comply with international treaties regarding patents, in particular, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that set minimum standards on IP rights protection [10].

A patent gives the rights holder, such as a pharmaceutical company, the exclusive right to make, use, sell, export and import, with some limitations, the patented invention. This exclusivity is usually valid for 20 years counted from the date of filing the patent application. This means that, during this period, if a patent is granted, the patent owner has a monopoly over the patented product. They can prevent production and sale from generic producers and delay market competition until patent expiry. They can also choose to enable generic manufacturers to enter the market, for example by issuing voluntary licences to one or more manufacturers.

Medicines were not widely patented in the developing world before the TRIPS Agreement entered into force in 1995 [10,11]. This agreement established obligations regarding the protection of IP rights, including the obligation on all WTO member countries to accept and enforce, after the end of various transitional periods, patents on industrial goods, including medicines, in accordance with some minimum standards. Currently, only the transitional period for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) is still in force. Importantly, a WTO member that deviates from such standards may be subject, after dispute settlement procedures conducted under WTO rules, to trade retaliations imposed by other WTO members.

As noted, during the lifetime of a patent, the patent holder can limit market competition and charge higher prices than those that would exist in a competitive environment. After patent expiry, prices generally drop dramatically as competitors enter the market. Lower prices are essential to make treatment accessible to patients, particularly in the developing world, as illustrated by the progress made in HIV treatment [10].

Broad availability of generic drugs, especially in the form of fixed-dose combinations, was key in allowing the rapid increase in the number of PLHIV receiving ART during the past few years. From 2003 to 2008 there was a fourfold increase in the number of Indian generic drugs on the market that represented 80% of the global ARV market [12]. Generic competition facilitated a drop in prices of drugs to levels that allowed national HIV programmes to include significantly more PLHIV on ART without an unsustainable increase in health budgets. In addition, the availability of funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) and other bilateral donors, like the US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) helped these countries scale-up the provision of ART. The international community has established as a target to have 15 million people on treatment by 2015 [6]. The number of ART-eligible PLHIV will increase to 26 million with the implementation of the new threshold to start ART at a CD4⁺ T-cell count <500 cells/mm³ as recommended by the 2013 World Health Organization (WHO) consolidated guidelines [13]. The WHO seems to be progressively moving towards a 'test and treat' strategy that will imply treating all patients regardless of CD4⁺ T-cell count. A number of studies have suggested the mid- to long-term cost-effectiveness of this strategy [14], but once implemented in countries it could have a short-term effect of increasing drug budgets, unless more affordable and optimized drug regimens are widely available.

ADVANTAGE 2- US Heg

U.S. hegemony will inevitably decline without efforts to shore up soft power

Stewart **Patrick**, Center on International Cooperation, NYU "Concept Paper for Workshop on Multilateralism, and U.S. Foreign Policy," January 28, 2000,

<http://www.nyu.edu/pages/cic/projects/Unilateralism/WorkingPaper.html>

In the several decades after 1945, the **willingness of other countries to defer to U.S. leadership depended on** the ability and **willingness** of the United States **to** provide collective goods, promote shared values, and **commit itself** credibly **to multilateral cooperation**. Since there were few checks on the exercise of U.S. power, **weaker countries needed to be confident that the United States would not exploit its privileges** or defect from its international obligations. During the Cold War, America's partners could find comfort in its bipartisan consensus on international engagement; the relative transparency of its domestic decision-making processes; and Washington's readiness to consult regularly with partners on important international matters. (Cowhey, 1993) Both international and domestic circumstances have changed, however, undermining the credibility of U.S. commitments. In their cumulative impact, **recent instances of U.S. unilateralism threaten to undercut the legitimacy of U.S. leadership** within the international community. The United States flatters itself that it is the world's "indispensable nation," in the words of Madeleine Albright, able to "stand taller and see farther" because of its unmatched power and universal principles. Moreover, **it is often said that the current U.S. dominance is benign**, since it is based on the attraction of the U.S. model rather than the coercive imposition of its political values, commercial products, and popular culture. This notion of the United States as a "benevolent hegemon" is a seductive one. **But it is not a sentiment universally shared abroad** -- where even U.S. partners are sensitive to hypocrisy and exploitation. In recent months, the State Department has grappled with the backlash created by overwhelming U.S. preponderance. This criticism has extended to traditional **allies**, whose leaders **have complained about Washington's** susceptibility to "unilateral temptations" and **tendency "to go it alone."** In the current constellation of global power, **of course, some resentment of the United States is inevitable.** As the only country to assert global responsibilities, the United States alternatively risks coming on too hard, thus alienating its partners, or too soft, thus disappointing them. Nevertheless, many foreign observers contend that **Washington had exacerbated this predicament by claiming a right to** define the global interest and to **pursue policies without regard to the opinions** of those it claims to lead. Today, it is unclear whether the United States is as prepared to shoulder the obligations of world leadership as it is to enjoy the privileges of its dominant position. What becomes increasingly clear is that **the country's authority as a leader will erode if it is not longer able or willing to supply international public goods**, if it resorts to exploitative or coercive behavior, or if it repeatedly violates international norms or standards. Sustaining a position of legitimate leadership and the authority that comes with it will require greater self-restraint. As in 1945, it will generally be in the long-term interests of the United States to act with others, even when it is possible to impose unilateral solutions. A more egalitarian and cooperative style of leadership will require adjustments in U.S. attitudes and expectations. A longstanding U.S. presumption has been that collective frameworks, regimes, and formal organizations should be constraining to other countries but not to the United States. (Karns and Mingst, 1990) **The challenge for the country is to accept that multilateralism implies mutual obligations and collective constraints.** It is in the nature of any multilateral setting that **no single participant, even the most powerful one, will get its way all of the time; participants must engage in "give and take"** and accept occasional defeat in the knowledge that long-term benefits outweigh short-term disadvantages. To engage in effective multilateral

diplomacy, Washington must treat its partners with tact, commit itself to genuine and timely consultations prior to taking firm positions, avoid the temptation to veto proposals on the basis of narrow self-interest, and be willing to compromise on the objectives and forms of collective action.

Gilead Sciences, an American pharma company, owns patents on multiple antiretroviral medicines.

Business Wire 21 “Gilead to Present New Data at IAS 2021 Demonstrating the Company’s Commitment to Advancing Innovation in HIV Research” July 2021

<https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210712005412/en/Gilead-to-Present-New-Data-at-IAS-2021-Demonstrating-the-Company’s-Commitment-to-Advancing-Innovation-in-HIV-Research>

Gilead Sciences, Inc. **is a biopharmaceutical company** that has pursued and achieved breakthroughs in medicine for more than three decades, with the goal of creating a healthier world for all people. The company is **committed** to advancing innovative medicines **to** prevent and **treat** life-threatening diseases, including **HIV**, viral hepatitis and cancer.

For more than 30 years, **Gilead** has been a **leading innovator in** the field of **HIV**, driving advances in treatment, prevention and cure research. Gilead researchers have **developed eleven HIV medications, including** the first single tablet regimen to treat HIV and the first once-daily oral **antiretroviral** tablet for pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) to reduce the risk of acquiring HIV infection. These advances in medical research have helped to transform HIV into a preventable, chronic condition for millions of people.

A reduction in IPP for ARV’s comes across as US health aid, which develops strong relations with developing countries and bolsters US soft power around the world, which solidifies US heg.

Eran **Bendavid 19** [*communications manager for the Center for Health Policy/Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research.*] “Foreign aid for public health bolsters America’s ‘soft power’” 2019

<https://med.stanford.edu/news/all-news/2019/05/foreign-aid-for-public-health-bolsters-americas-soft-power.html>

U.S. government aid for treating children and adults with HIV and malaria in developing countries has done more than expand access to lifesaving interventions: It **has changed how people around the world view the United States**, according to a new study by researchers at the Stanford University School of Medicine.

Compared with other types of foreign aid, investing in health is uniquely associated with a better opinion of the United States, improving its “soft power” and standing in the world, the study said.

Favorability ratings of the United States increased in proportion to health aid from 2002 to 2016 and rose sharply after the implementation of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in 2003 and the launch of the President’s Malaria Initiative in 2005, the researchers reported.

Their findings were published online May 16 in the *American Journal of Public Health*. The lead author is postdoctoral scholar Aleksandra Jakubowski, PhD, MPH. The senior author is Eran Bendavid, professor of medicine.

“Using data on aid and opinions of the United States, we found that investments in health offer a unique opportunity to promote the perceptions of the United States abroad, in addition to disease burden relief,” the authors wrote. “Our study provides new evidence to support the notion that health diplomacy is a net win for the United States and recipient countries alike.”

The Trump administration, however, has proposed a 23% cut in foreign aid in its 2020 budget, including large reductions to programs that fight AIDS and malaria overseas.

The Stanford researchers believe their study is the first to add heft to the argument that U.S. health aid boosts the “soft power” that wins the hearts and minds of foreign friends and foes.

“Our study shows that investing in health aid improves our nation’s standing abroad, which could have important downstream diplomatic benefits to the United States,” Jakubowski said. “Investments in health aid help the United States accumulate soft power. Allowing the U.S. reputation to falter would be contrary to our own interests.”

US Heg is key to trade and interdependence

WALT 02

Stephen Walt, [JFKSchool of Government Professor at Harvard University Naval War College Review, Spring, 2002www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2002/spring/art1-sp2.htm

By facilitating the development of a more open and liberal world economy, American primacy also fosters global prosperity. Economic interdependence is often said to be a cause of world peace, but it is more accurate to say that

peace encourages interdependence by making it easier for states to accept the potential vulnerabilities of extensive international intercourse. Investors are more willing to send money abroad when the danger of war is remote, and states worry less about being dependent on others when they are not concerned that these connections might be severed. When states are relatively secure, they will also be less fixated on how the gains from cooperation are distributed. In particular, they are less likely to worry that extensive cooperation will benefit others more and thereby place them at a relative disadvantage over time.

By providing a tranquil international environment, in short, U.S. primacy has created political conditions that are conducive to expanding global trade and investment. Indeed, American primacy was a prerequisite for the creation and gradual expansion of the European Union, which is often touted as a triumph of economic self-interest over historical rivalries. Because the United States was there to protect the Europeans from the Soviet Union and from each other, they

could safely ignore the balance of power within Western Europe and concentrate on expanding their overall level of economic integration. The expansion of world trade has been a major source of increased global prosperity, and U.S. primacy is one of the central pillars upon which that system rests. The United States also played a leading role in establishing the various

institutions that regulate and manage the world economy. As a number of commentators have noted, the current era of “globalization” is itself partly an artifact of American power. As Thomas Friedman puts it, “Without America on duty, there will be no America Online.”

Collapse of trade leads to great power wars, terror, and poverty

Panitchpakdi 04

Supachai Panitchpakdi, [Secretary-general of the UN Conference on Trade and Development] 2/26/2004, “American Leadership and the World Trade Organization”, 2004

p. http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spsp_e/spsp22_e.htm

The second point is that strengthening the world trading system is essential to America's wider global objectives. **Fighting terrorism, reducing poverty, improving health, integrating China and other countries in the global economy — all of these issues are linked, in one way or another, to world trade.** This is not to say that trade is the answer to all America's economic concerns; only that **meaningful solutions are inconceivable without it.** The **world trading system is the linchpin of today's global order** — underpinning its security as well as its prosperity. A successful WTO is an example of how multilateralism can work. Conversely, if it weakens or fails, much else could fail with it. This is something which the US — at the epicentre of a more interdependent world — cannot afford to ignore. These priorities must continue to guide US policy — as they have done since the Second World War. **America has been the main driving force behind eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, including the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO.**

The US — together with the EU — was instrumental in launching the latest Doha Round two years ago. Likewise, the recent initiative, spearheaded by Ambassador Zoellick, to re-energize the negotiations and move them towards a successful conclusion is yet another example of how essential the US is to the multilateral process — signalling that the US remains committed to further liberalization, that the Round is moving, and that other countries have a tangible reason to get on board. The reality is this: when the US leads the system can move forward; when it withdraws, the system drifts. The fact that US leadership is essential, does not mean it is easy. As WTO rules have expanded, so too has the complexity of the issues the WTO deals with — everything from agriculture and accounting, to tariffs and telecommunication. The WTO is also exerting huge gravitational pull on countries to join — and participate actively — in the system. The WTO now has 146 Members — up from just 23 in 1947 — and this could easily rise to 170 or more within a decade. Emerging powers like China, Brazil, and India rightly demand a greater say in an institution in which they have a growing stake. So too do a rising number of voices outside the system as well. More and more people recognize that the WTO matters. More non-state actors — businesses, unions, environmentalists, development NGOs — want the multilateral system to reflect their causes and concerns. A decade ago, few people had even heard of the GATT. Today the WTO is front page news. A more visible WTO has inevitably become a more politicized WTO. The sound and fury surrounding the WTO's recent Ministerial Meeting in Cancun — let alone Seattle — underline how challenging managing the WTO can be. But these challenges can be exaggerated. They exist precisely because so many countries have embraced a common vision. Countries the world over have turned to open trade — and a rules-based system — as the key to their growth and development. They agreed to the Doha Round because they believed their interests lay in freer trade, stronger rules, a more effective WTO. Even in Cancun the great debate was whether the multilateral trading system was moving fast and far enough — not whether it should be rolled back. Indeed, it is critically important that we draw the right conclusions from Cancun — which are only now becoming clearer. The disappointment was that ministers were unable to reach agreement. The achievement was that they exposed the risks of failure, highlighted the need for North-South collaboration, and — after a period of introspection — acknowledged the inescapable logic of negotiation. Cancun showed that, if the challenges have increased, it is because the stakes are higher. The bigger challenge to American leadership comes from inside — not outside — the United States. In America's current debate about trade, jobs and globalization we have heard a lot about the costs of liberalization. We need to hear more about the opportunities. We need to be reminded of the advantages of America's openness and its trade with the world — about the economic growth tied to exports, the inflation-fighting role of imports, the innovative stimulus of global competition. We need to explain that freer trade works precisely because it involves positive change — better products, better job opportunities, better ways of doing things, better standards of living. While it is true that change can be threatening for people and societies, it is equally true that the vulnerable are not helped by resisting change — by putting up barriers and shutting out competition. They are helped by training, education, new and better opportunities that — with the right support policies — can flow from a globalized economy. The fact is that for every job in the US threatened by imports there is a growing number of high-paid, high skill jobs created by exports. Exports supported 7 million workers a decade ago; that number is approaching around 12 million today. And these new jobs — in aerospace, finance, information technology — pay 10 per cent more than the average American wage. We especially need to inject some clarity — and facts — into the current debate over the outsourcing of services jobs. Over the next decade, the US is projected to create an average of more than 2 million new services jobs a year — compared to roughly 200,000 services jobs that will be outsourced. I am well aware that this issue is the source of much anxiety in America today. Many Americans worry about the potential job losses that might arise from foreign competition in services sectors. But it's worth remembering that concerns about the impact of foreign competition are not new. Many of the reservations people are expressing today are echoes of what we heard in the 1970s and 1980s. But people at that time didn't fully appreciate the power of American ingenuity. Remarkable advances in technology and productivity laid the foundation for unprecedented job creation in the 1990s and there is no reason to doubt that this country, which has shown time and again such remarkable potential for competing in the global economy, will not soon embark again on such a burst of job-creation. America's openness to service-sector Trade — combined with the high skills of its workforce — will lead to more growth, stronger industries, and a shift towards higher value-added, higher-paying employment. Conversely, closing the door to service trade is a strategy for killing jobs, not saving them. Americans have never run from a challenge and have never been defeatist in the face of strong competition. Part of this challenge is to create the conditions for global growth and job creation here and around the world. I believe Americans realize what is at stake. The process of opening to global trade can be disruptive, but they recognize that the US economy cannot grow and prosper any other way. They recognize the importance of finding global solutions to shared global problems. Besides, what is the alternative to the WTO? Some argue that the world's only superpower need not be tied down by the constraints of the multilateral system. They claim that US sovereignty is compromised by international rules, and that multilateral institutions limit rather than expand US influence. Americans should be deeply sceptical about these claims. Almost none of the trade issues facing the US today are any easier to solve unilaterally, bilaterally or regionally. The reality is probably just the opposite. What sense does it make — for example — to negotiate e-commerce rules bilaterally? Who would be interested in disciplining agricultural subsidies in a regional agreement but not globally? How can bilateral deals — even dozens of them — come close to matching the economic impact of agreeing to global free trade among 146 countries? Bilateral and regional deals can sometimes be a complement to the multilateral system, but they can never be a substitute.

There is a bigger danger. By treating some countries preferentially, bilateral and regional deals exclude others — fragmenting global trade and distorting the world economy. Instead of liberalizing trade — and widening growth — they carve it up. Worse, they have a domino effect: bilateral deals inevitably beget more bilateral deals, as countries left outside are forced to seek their own preferential arrangements, or risk further marginalization. This is precisely what we see happening today. There are already over two hundred bilateral and regional agreements in existence, and each month we hear of a new or expanded deal. There is a basic contradiction in the assumption that bilateral approaches serve to strengthen the multilateral, rules-based system. Even when intended to spur free trade, they can ultimately risk undermining it. This is in no one's interest, least of all the United States. **America led in the creation of the multilateral system after 1945 precisely to avoid a return to hostile blocs — blocs that had done so much to fuel interwar instability and conflict.** America's vision, in the words of Cordell Hull, was that “**enduring peace and the welfare of nations was indissolubly connected with the friendliness, fairness and freedom of world trade.**” **Trade would bind nations together, making another war unthinkable.** Non-discriminatory rules would prevent a return to preferential deals and closed alliances. A network of multilateral initiatives and organizations — the Marshall Plan, the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT, now the WTO — would provide the institutional bedrock for the international rule of law, not power. Underpinning all this was the idea that freedom — free trade, free democracies, the free exchange of ideas — was essential to peace and prosperity, a more just world. It is a vision that has emerged pre-eminent a half century later. Trade has expanded twenty-fold since 1950. Millions in Asia, Latin America, and Africa are being lifted out of poverty, and millions more have new hope for the future. All the great powers — the US, Europe, Japan, India, China and soon Russia — are part of a rules-based multilateral trading system, greatly increasing the chances for world prosperity and peace. **There is a growing realization that — in our interdependent world — sovereignty is constrained, not by multilateral rules, but by the absence of rules.**

ADVANTAGE 3- Terror

American withdrawal from Afghanistan sparks global terrorism in other countries in the developing world.

Economist 21 “After Afghanistan, Where Next for Global Jihad” August 28, 2021

<https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/08/28/after-afghanistan-where-next-for-global-jihad>

In Yemen they set off fireworks; in Somalia they handed out sweets; in Syria they praised the Taliban for providing a “living example” of how to “bring down a criminal regime” through jihad. **Around the world, jihadists were elated by the fall of Kabul.** Through willpower, patience and cunning, a low-budget band of holy warriors has vanquished America and taken charge of a medium-size country. To Muslims who yearn to expel infidels and overthrow secular states, it was evidence that God approves. The ripple effects could be felt far and wide. In the next few days President Joe Biden will have to sort out the mess he has created at Kabul airport, where **thongs are clamouring to flee.** It is a dangerous moment for his presidency. **In the longer term the world must deal with the boost to jihadism from America's humiliation.** The chief risk is not that terrorists will use Afghanistan as a base from which to strike the West, as they did on September 11th 2001. Such attacks are harder now, since rich countries have better security. Besides, the Taliban are unlikely to tolerate big training camps for global-minded terrorists, as they crave recognition and aid. Granted, some feel a duty of hospitality to foreign Sunni jihadists, and **some will aid their militant cousins in Pakistan, making that nuclear-armed state even less stable.** But outside Afghanistan, the **main ripple effects will be psychological.** The **Taliban's triumph will fire up jihadists in other countries, and spur recruits to join them.** **Some** who live in rich countries **will be inspired to commit acts of terrorism there.** It does not take many such attacks to sow a sense of fear or roil domestic politics. **Even worse will be the effect in poorer, weaker states, where jihadists aspire not merely to kill but to control territory,** or at least prevent the government from doing so. In places like Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, Nigeria, Mali, Somalia and Mozambique, they already do. **In several other parts of Asia, Africa and the Middle East, they threaten to.** Many are asking: if our Afghan brothers can beat a superpower, surely we can beat our own wretched rulers? Jihadists are not all the same. Many disagree about doctrine. Many hate and fight each other. Supporters of Islamic State deride the Taliban, absurdly, as American stooges. One of the first things the Taliban did in Kabul last week was to pull the leader of Islamic State in South Asia out of jail and kill him. Most jihadist groups are motivated primarily by local grievances: a predatory government, an ethnic or sectarian divide, infidel intruders. Yet they also tap into a global narrative. On their phones they see daily evidence that the oppression they face at home is part of wider pattern of persecution of Muslims, from the gulag of Xinjiang to the hellscape of Gaza. **When jihadists anywhere succeed, they feel pride—and a call to action.**

Bad government creates an opening for jihadism. When a state is unjust, its citizens may imagine that one run by jihadists might be better. Even if they do not take up arms, they may quietly support those who do. Many rural Afghans decided that Taliban justice, though harsh, was quicker and less corrupt than government courts, and that Taliban checkpoints were less plunderous. This is one reason the Taliban's final march to power met so little resistance. The other was psychological: they won because when America pulled out Afghans did not want to die fighting for a lost cause. Similar principles apply elsewhere. Jihadists in north-eastern Nigeria are hard to beat because locals detest the central government and army officers sell their own men's weapons to the guerrillas and pocket the cash. Once jihadists win power, however, they find that their ideology makes governing hard (see our [Special report on the Arab world](#)). Their desire to create a perfectly pious society, and ruthless intolerance of deviation from that ideal, make pragmatic compromise tricky. Islamic State's rule over a big chunk of Iraq and Syria lasted only three years. Its habit of drowning people in cages alienated a potentially sympathetic Sunni population. So did its failure to foster economic activities other than looting and kidnapping. It scared outside powers and Shia Iraqis so much that they clubbed together to crush it.

The Taliban were also dreadful rulers when they last ran Afghanistan. Much depends on whether they have learned from their mistakes. **If a group of jihadists could not only seize a country but also run it tolerably well, jihadists everywhere would see it as a beacon.** Senior Taliban are at pains to seem pragmatic and insist they will respect human rights. But rocky times lie ahead. Taliban footsoldiers are already committing atrocities. Many urban Afghans, who have tasted the freedom to dress, work and study as they please, even if they are female, despise the new regime. Because reserves are frozen in America, it is short of cash. The Afghan economy has seized up; prices are soaring. The Taliban have yet to unveil good ideas for reviving it. Instead they bluster that skilled Afghans must not emigrate. Skilled Afghans may have other ideas.

One lesson of the Afghan fiasco is that what happens in far-off failing states matters not only to the people who live there, but also to the rest of the world. **Calamity in Kabul today means bigger refugee flows, more jihadist attacks and a greater chance that other Islamist insurgencies will prevail.** That could **destabilise a large number of countries,** endangering both locals and the foreigners who visit or do business there.

Terrorists use/or attempt to use WMDs - Extinction

Sid-Ahmed 2004

Mohamed Sid-Ahmed 04 Political Analyst, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm>

A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. **What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails,** it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. **Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate.** It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is **if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious.** Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, **this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.**

A reduction in IPP for ARVs comes across as US health aid because Gilead holds ARV patents, which improves relations with developing countries.

Eran Bendavid 19 [communications manager for the Center for Health Policy/Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research.] "Foreign aid for public health bolsters America's 'soft power'" 2019 <https://med.stanford.edu/news/all-news/2019/05/foreign-aid-for-public-health-bolsters-americas-soft-power.html>

U.S. government aid for treating children and adults with HIV and malaria in developing countries has done more than expand

access to lifesaving interventions: It **has changed how people around the world view the United States,** according to a new study by researchers at the [Stanford University School of Medicine](#).

Compared with other types of foreign aid, **investing in health is uniquely associated with a better opinion of the United States, improving its "soft power" and standing in the world,** the study said.

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“Using data on aid and opinions of the United States, we found that **investments in health** offer a unique opportunity to **promote the perceptions of the United States abroad**, in addition to disease burden relief,” the authors wrote. “Our study provides new evidence to support the notion that **health diplomacy** is a **net win** for the United States and recipient countries alike.”

The Trump administration, however, has proposed a 23% cut in foreign aid in its 2020 budget, including large reductions to programs that fight AIDS and malaria overseas.

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Strong US relations with developing countries key to countering terrorism across developing world.

NATO 2021 “Countering Terrorism”

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm

As the **global counter-terrorism** effort **requires a holistic approach**, **Allies** have resolved to **strengthen outreach to and cooperation with** partner countries and **international actors**. With partners increasingly, **partners** are taking advantage of **partnership mechanisms for dialogue and practical cooperation** relevant to counter-terrorism, including defence capacity building. Interested partners are encouraged to include a section on counter-terrorism in their individual cooperation agreements with NATO. **Allies** place particular emphasis on **shared awareness, capacity building, civil emergency planning and crisis management to enable partners to identify and protect vulnerabilities and to prepare to fight terrorism more effectively**. Countering improvised explosive devices, the promotion of a whole-of-government approach and military border security are among NATO’s areas of work with partners.

Underview

[1] Aff gets 1AR theory – otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive and there’s no way to check back. 1AR theory is drop the debater and competing interps – the 1ARs too short to be able to rectify abuse and adequately cover substance. No RVI because you have 6 minutes to go for them whereas I only have a 3-minute 2AR to respond so I get crushed on time skew.

[2] RVI on NC theory – you can read arguments such as T that are exclusively neg so I need them to compensate and weighing is structurally unfair since the 7-4-6-3 time skew means that the neg can just dump on weighing and the 2ar becomes impossible. This means that if either side has any offense under any framing then you default aff.