## 1

#### Interpretation: Debaters may not read theoretically justified frameworks.

#### Violation:

#### Standards:

#### 1. Phil Ed – best happens with clash of justifications for theories because we clash over warrants, reading a TJF kills by decentralizing clash over framework arguments. It enables debaters to read generic justifications because they’re able to ignore constraints like actor specificity which changes based on the res, which enables them to ignore the nuances of different philosophies in different contexts. Clash is key to phil ed cuz if we don’t know how to justify different ethics normatively, it defeats the point of debating offense under those ethics if we don’t actually know why the ethic is logical in a real world context.

#### Paradigm:

#### Philosophical clash -

#### a. it’s the constitutive feature of LD so it outweighs since we can’t get it in policy or PF.

#### b. it better prepares us for the real world; only some of us will be policymakers but all of us will have to make personal ethical decisions.

#### DTD – Time spent on theory cant be compensated for, the 1nc was already skewed, and its key to deterring abuse.

#### Prefer Competing interps -

#### 1. reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention.

#### 2. it Causes a race to the bottom where debaters push the limit as to how reasonably abusive, they can be.

#### No RVI’s -

#### 1. Chills some debaters from reading theory against abusive postions.

#### 2. incentivizes theory baiting where you can just bait theory to win.

#### The shell comes prior to [Apriories, Truth Testing ROTB, Trix nonsense] .

#### 1. Truth Testing- absent legitimate clash over the issues it makes it impossible to test the truth value of their arguments which is a side constraint on deliberation.

#### 2. The shell indicts your ability to read these arguments in the first place which means you can’t weigh them.

#### 3. You need an external body to verify whether your theory is correct. Anything else leads to self-justified truths that and psychopathic lying which prevents rigorous testing. Testing outweighs because it’s the constitutive purpose of debate.

## 2

### Long

#### Ethics begin a posteriori.

#### 1. Knowledge is based on experience – I wouldn’t know 2+2=4 without experience of objects nor the color red without some experience of color. We can’t obtain evidence of goodness without experience.

#### 2. Indifference – Even if there are apriori moral truths, I can choose to ignore them. Cognition is binding – if I put my hand on a hot stove, I can’t turn off my natural aversion to it.

#### The meta-ethic is moral substitutability - only it can explain reasons for acting.

Sinnott-Armstrong 92 [Walter, professor of practical ethics. “An Argument for Consequentialism” Dartmouth College Philosophical Perspectives. 1992.]

A moral reason to do an act is consequential if and only if the reason depends only on the consequences of either doing the act or not doing the act. For example, a moral reason not to hit someone is that this will hurt her or him. A moral reason to turn your car to the left might be that, if you do not do so, you will run over and kill someone. A moral reason to feed a starving child is that the child will lose important mental or physical abilities if you do not feed it. All such reasons are consequential reasons. All other moral reasons are non-consequential. Thus, a moral reason to do an act is non-consequential if and only if the reason depends even partly on some property that the act has independently of its consequences. For example, an act can be a lie regardless of what happens as a result of the lie (since some lies are not believed), and some moral theories claim that that property of being a lie provides amoral reason not to tell a lie regardless of the consequences of this lie. Similarly, the fact that an act fulfills a promise is often seen as a moral reason to do the act, even though the act has that property of fulfilling a promise independently ofits consequences. All such moral reasons are non-consequential. In order to avoid so many negations, I will also call them 'deontological'. This distinction would not make sense if we did not restrict the notion of consequences. If I promise to mow the lawn, then one consequence of my mowing might seem to be that my promise is fulfilled. One way to avoid this problem is to specify that the consequences of an act must be distinct from the act itself. My act of fulfilling my promise and my act of mowing are not distinct, because they are done by the same bodily movements.10 Thus, my fulfilling my promise is not a consequence of my mowing. A consequence of an act need not be later in time than the act, since causation can be simultaneous, but the consequence must at least be different from the act. Even with this clarification, it is still hard to classify some moral reasons as consequential or deontological,11 but I will stick to examples that are clear. In accordance with this distinction between kinds of moral reasons, I can now distinguish different kinds of moral theories. I will say that a moral theory is consequentialist if and only if it implies that all basic moral reasons are consequential. A moral theory is then non-consequentialist or deontological if it includes any basic moral reasons which are not consequential. 5. Against Deontology So defined, the class of deontological moral theories is very large and diverse. This makes it hard to say anything in general about it. Nonetheless, I will argue that no deontological moral theory can explain why moral substitutability holds. My argument applies to all deontological theories because it depends only on what is common to them all, namely, the claim that some basic moral reasons are not consequential. Some deontological theories allow very many weighty moral reasons that are consequential, and these theories might be able to explain why moral substitutability holds for some of their moral reasons: the consequential ones. But even these theories cannot explain why moral substitutability holds for all moral reasons, including the non-consequential reasons that make the theory deontological. The failure of deontological moral theories to explain moral substitutability in the very cases that make them deontological is a reason to reject all deontological moral theories. I cannot discuss every deontological moral theory, so I will discuss only a few paradigm examples and show why they cannot explain moral substitutability. After this, I will argue that similar problems are bound to arise for all other deontological theories by their very nature. The simplest deontological theory is the pluralistic intuitionism of Prichard and Ross. Ross writes that, when someone promises to do something, 'This we consider obligatory in its own nature, just because it is a fulfillment of a promise, and not because of its consequences.'12 Such deontologists claim in effect that, if I promise to mow the grass, there is a moral reason for me to mow the grass, and this moral reason is constituted by the fact that mowing the grass fulfills my promise. This reason exists regardless of the consequences of mowing the grass, even though it might be overridden by certain bad consequences. However, if this is why I have a moral reason to mow the grass, then, even if I cannot mow the grass without starting my mower, and starting the mower would enable me to mow the grass, it still would not follow that I have any moral reason to start my mower, since I did not promise to start my mower, and starting my mower does not fulfill my promise. Thus, a moral theory cannot explain moral substitutability if it claims that properties like this provide moral reasons.

#### Non-consequentialist moral theories fail to explain.

Sinnott-Armstrong 92 [Walter, professor of practical ethics. “An Argument for Consequentialism” Dartmouth College Philosophical Perspectives. 1992.]

Of course, there are many other versions of deontology. I cannot discuss them all. Nonetheless, these examples suggest that it is the very nature of deontological reasons that make **deontological theories unable to explain moral substitutability**. This comes out clearly if we start from the other side and ask which properties create the moral reasons that are derived by moral substitutability. **What gives me a moral reason to start the mower is the consequences of starting the mower.** Specifically**, it has the consequence that I am able to mow the grass.** This reason cannot derive from the same property as my moral reason to mow the lawn unless what gives me a moral reason to mow the lawn is *its* consequences. **Thus any non-consequentialist moral theory will have to posit two distinct kinds of moral reasons: one for starting the mower, and another for mowing the grass. Once these kinds of reasons are separated, we need to understand the connection between them. But this connection cannot be explained by the substantive principles of the theory**. That is why all deontological theories must lack the explanatory coherence which is a general test of adequacy for all theories.

#### Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions.

Moen 16, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267. SM

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good. 3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Although pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difﬁculty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one speciﬁc individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More speciﬁcally, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justiﬁed punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being.

Consequentialism SPEC: NEC (necessary enabler consequentialism) – all moral reasons for acts are provided by facts that the acts are necessary enablers for preventing death.

#### 1. Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first. Intuitions outweigh—they’re the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions are most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why.

#### 2. Actor specificity:

#### a. No act-omission distinction—governments are responsible for everything in the public sphere so inaction is implicit authorization of action: they have to yes/no bills, which means everything collapse to aggregation.

#### b. No intent-foresight distinction – the actions we take are inevitably informed by predictions from certain mental states, meaning consequences are a collective part of the will.

#### c. Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Takes out util calc indicts since they’re empirically denied and link turns them because the alt would be no action.

#### 3. Extinction comes first under any framework.

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### a. Gateway issue - we need to be alive to assign value and debate competing moral theories- extinction literally ends the debate on “ought”.

#### b. moral theories were formulated prior to the Anthropocene and human capacity for collective death so they cannot be relied on in situations of existential risk.

#### c. no coherent moral theory can allow for extinction because it means the end of value.

#### 4. Intuitions ow – if a very well justified, logical theory concluded "genocide” you wouldn’t say “huh I guess genocide is good” you would abandon it – also proves death outweighs because it’s counterintuitive to say extinction of the whole world doesn’t matter.

#### 5. Bindingness – Util is the only prescriptive moral theory since pain and pleasure are intrinsically binding and guide action. That outweighs if a ethical theory has no reason to guide action than anyone could say “why not” and not follow the theory only binding ethics can be applicable. Anything else devolves to skepticism since we can’t generate obligations absent grounds for accepting them.

#### 6. Phenomenal introspection - it’s the most epistemically reliable - historical moral disagreement over internal conceptions of morality such as questions of race, gender, class, religion, etc prove the fallibility of non-observational based ethics - introspection means we value happiness because we can determine that we each value it - just as I can observe a lemon’s yellowness, we can make those judgements about happiness.

## 3

### 1NC – OFF

#### CP Text – In a Democracy, a Free Press ought to prioritize Objectivity over Advocacy, except for instances of Solution Journalism.

#### The CP competes – Solution Journalism prioritizes Advocacy over Objectivity and violating some Objective Principals is critical to effective Solution Journalism.

Dyer 15 John Dyer 6-11-2015 "Is Solutions Journalism the Solution?" <https://niemanreports.org/articles/is-solutions-journalism-the-solution/> (John Dyer is a journalist based in Massachusetts. He serves as the American editor for Associated Reporters Abroad)//Elmer

That line can be hard to distinguish. Media coverage grants legitimacy and authority to solutions, potentially to the exclusion of other fixes that reporters or their sources never encountered—an easy oversight on big, complicated topics like healthcare, clean water and other global issues, says Arizona State University journalism professor Dan Gillmor. Gillmor wonders if journalists might compromise their objectivity when they approach a story with the goal of proving that a specific solution is valid. “The journalist goes into the topic with some sort of outcome in mind,” says Gillmor. “That’s fine if you are looking for examples of agreement.” The MIT Center for Civic Media’s Ethan Zuckerman believes the proponents of solutions journalism are trying too hard to distance themselves from advocacy. He co-founded a citizen journalism website, Global Voices, in part to advocate for freedom of expression. To Zuckerman, purposefully motivating readers to act on the issues raised in stories is perfectly respectable—indeed, necessary. As confidence in the mainstream media ebbs, why shouldn’t top-notch journalists tell audiences how they might become involved in an issue that energizes them. “What Bornstein is actually doing is essentially saying, ‘Let’s find the problem solvers and let’s do traditional journalism stories about them. Let’s look at them with caution and scrutiny. Let’s evaluate their claims,’” says Zuckerman. “Is it enough that we find a solution if it is a solution that our viewers or our readers can’t be a part of? For me, that’s the most challenging feature of this. Can we give our readers something positive and constructive they can do?”

#### Advocating for a particular Solution suspends Objectivity in favor of Partial Campaigning.

Salvesen 18, Ingerid. "Should journalists campaign on climate change." (2018). (Ingerid Salvesen has written and produced stories for several of Norway´s biggest newspapers and media companies. Before she chose freelancing she worked, amongst others, as a foreign affairs reporter for the leading Norwegian news agency, NTB, and as a long form writer for the Magazine of Norway´s largest business daily, Dagens Næringsliv. As a journalist, she is interested in questions of environment, migration and inequality, and has increasingly been covering climate change science and politics. Together with two journalist colleagues, she started an independent foreign affairs podcast in 2016 called "Du verden!".)//Elmer

Still, it was not just climate science generally the Guardian embraced in its campaign, but a specific policy proposal – and this was met with criticism at the time. Yet Alan Rusbridger argue that it is acceptable for editorial objectivity to be suspended on matters which has such profound moral and social consequences as climate change arguably does have, and he likened it with apartheid and tobacco: “You can view this in two ways. One is that this is a moral issue, like tobacco and apartheid - you should not have your money with these companies, as they are irresponsible. Or you can argue that it is financially recklessness - these are stranded assets and if you are investing in a long-term perspective you are being irresponsible. We are not going to be neutral about that, or impartial about that – this is a campaign and here is what you can do” His latter point was one of the key arguments for running the KIITG-campaign: the perceived benefits of offering people an actionable alternative. The journalists in favour argued it would make the project stand out from normal journalism on climate change where you are mainly just offered (more of the same) information, and also it was argued it could break the feeling of hopelessness that they thought the public (and even many of the journalists themselves) were feeling when reading about climate change. “The advantages of a news organisation stepping into an advocacy role is that you provide a mechanism for taking action”, says Aron Pilhofer. “A campaign gives people agency and ownership and something that they can touch”, argued James Randerson.

#### Studies prove that Solutions Journalism is effective and works.

Alexander L. **Curry** and Keith H. **Hammonds, 14** [Alexander L. Curry, (Alex Curry (PhD, The University of Texas at Austin) is an assistant professor in the communication studies department at Western Oregon University, as well as a faculty research associate at the Center for Media Engagement. His research interests include sports, news, and civic engagement, and he is particularly interested in how sports tie people to their community and to each other. From 2005 to 2010, he served as a writer for Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.) Keith H. Hammonds (Keith H. Hammonds is the founder of Solutions Journalism Network and Ashoka News and Knowledge Initiative. He has been an editor Executive Editor and Associate Editor while also getting an MBA from Harvard. ]. "The Power of Solutions Journalism" June 2014, Accessed 3-3-2022. https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ENP\_SJN-report.pdf // duongie

CONCLUSION These study results suggest that solutions journalism could have significant ramifications for readers and news organizations alike, along with the potential to impact society at large. Compared to readers of non-solutions articles, readers of solutions-based articles not only indicate that they feel more informed by reading solutions stories, but that they want to continue to learn about the issue and were inspired to work toward a solution. For news organizations, the benefits lie in the solutions-readers’ deeper connection to the issues and desire to continue to engage on them, their increased propensity to share what they read, and their desire to read more articles by the author and from the same newspaper. These benefits to individuals, news organizations and, potentially, society, could make solutions journalism a valuable alternative to traditional problem-focused reporting. BACKGROUND ON SOLUTIONS JOURNALISM WHAT IS SOLUTIONS JOURNALISM? Solutions journalism is critical reporting that investigates and explains credible responses to social problems. It delves into the how-to’s of problem solving, often structuring stories as puzzles or mysteries that investigate questions like: What models are having success reducing the high school dropout rate and how do they actually work? When done well, the stories can provide valuable insights about how communities may better tackle important problems. As such, solutions journalism can be both highly informing and engaging. News organizations such as The Seattle Times, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, and the Deseret News, among others, have deployed solutions reporting in an attempt to create a foundation for productive, forward looking (and less polarizing) community dialogues about vital social issues. In trying to meet these goals, a solutions journalism story attempts to answer in the affirmative the following ten questions (which serve as a framework, not a set of rules): 11 1. Does the story explain the causes of a social problem? 2. Does the story present an associated response to that problem? 3. Does the story refer to problem solving and how-to details? 4. Is the problem solving process central to the story’s narrative? 5. Does the story present evidence of results linked to the response? 6. Does the story explain the limitations of the response? 7. Does the story contain an insight or teachable lesson? 8. Does the story avoid reading like a puff piece? 9. Does the story draw on sources that have ground-level expertise, not just a 30,000 foot understanding? 10. Does the story give greater attention to the response than to a leader, innovator, or do-gooder? A good example of solutions journalism will address many, though not necessarily all, of the above questions. Solutions journalism is a form of explanatory journalism that may serve as a form of watchdog reporting, highlighting effective responses to problems in order to spur reform in areas where people or organizations are failing to respond adequately, particularly when better options are available. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NEWS ORGANIZATIONS Many journalists report compellingly on the world’s problems, but they regularly fail to highlight and explain responses that demonstrate the potential to ameliorate problems, even when those initiatives show strong evidence of effectiveness. As a result, people are far more aware of what is wrong with society than what is being done to try to improve it. For many issues that receive ongoing news coverage, what’s most absent is not awareness about the problems but awareness about credible efforts to solve those problems. This omission causes many people to feel overwhelmed and to believe that their efforts to engage as citizens may be futile. Research indicates that when journalists regularly raise awareness about problems without showing people what can be done about them, news audiences are more likely to tune out and deny the message or even disengage from public life.12 These study results suggest that solutions journalism has the potential to address several major concerns confronting today’s newsrooms. These concerns include: (a) readers’ perceptions, real or imagined, that news is overwhelmingly negative, (b) readers’ feeling that the thoroughness of news reporting is on a downward trend; and (c) the decline in news readership. Each of these concerns, along with solutions journalism’s potential to address them, is explored below.

#### Specifically, solves Climate Change and Deforestation.

Lake 17 Rebecca Lake. CONSTRUCTIVE NEWS: CAN SOLUTIONS JOURNALISM SAVE OUR FORESTS?. <https://www.un-page.org/constructive-news-can-solutions-journalism-save-our-forests?fbclid=IwAR1v5jjkjQ_CxDeUJZaMzQdDG_1mdbYfmpzqYsSFvWRYN2aszSAFAffFpq4> [UNDP Communications Consultant]

Everyday day we are bombarded with devasting news about our natural world. From the latest IPBES report which warned of ‘unprecedented’ species extinction to mass deforestation and the rise of global temperatures, the daily cycle of bad news is relentless. And the research says audiences are switching off in droves because of this. According to a recent study conducted by the Reuters Institute, nearly 50 per cent of survey respondents said they currently avoid the news media because it had a negative effect on their moods. Almost a third said they avoided news because it made them feel helpless. Can a different approach to journalism, one which presents potential solutions alongside the problems, bring readers back and ultimately inspire change? Giselle Green, Editor of Constructive Voices, says news that only conveys doom and gloom isn’t actually telling us the entire story. She is among a growing cohort of journalism practitioners calling for more solutions to be featured alongside traditional news stories. “Basically constructive journalism, sometimes referred to as solutions reporting, is all about how journalism can react to problems,” explains the former BBC journalist. “It’s rigorous reporting, it’s not just fluffy stories that make you smile. It should spark a constructive response among audiences.” Some of the world’s biggest media organizations are already experimenting with a solutions approach. This includes the Guardian’s Upside series, which aims to seek out answers, solutions, movements and initiatives to some of the biggest problems besetting the world. In this series, articles ranges from ‘A new leaf: the hardy trees reforesting the Amazon’ to global examples of where carbon taxes are actually popular. Documentary films about climate change such as the recently released 2040 — by acclaimed Australian filmmaker Damon Gameau — are also looking to inspire audiences by showing viewers what’s possible with solutions that already exist. From regenerative farming to independent community solar power grids, 2040 presents just a small handful of climate solutions that have the potential to inspire and empower audiences worldwide. Nevertheless, many journalists and media outlets remain sceptical. Some claim that the approach can devolve into biased or “feel-good” advocacy, rather than a critical examination of important social issues that hold the powerful to account. However, proponents of solutions journalism argue that while the approach doesn’t necessarily try to uncover ‘hidden information’ or scandalous wrongdoings, it can still be influential by showcasing what governments and business could and should be doing. To further explore the potential of solutions journalism in the context of climate change and deforestation, the UNDP’s Green Commodities Programme, with the Good Growth Partnership, facilitated a shared learning experience in the Peruvian Amazon for eight international journalists. The initiative began with a two-day workshop in Lima, where selected journalists had the opportunity to consider the powerful role international media plays in reporting deforestation predominately driven by agricultural commodities. Despite extensive efforts over the past decade to slow tropical deforestation, the latest findings from WRI’s Global Forest Watch report paint a grim picture. Around 12 million hectares of forest in the world's tropical regions were lost in 2018, equivalent to 30 football fields per minute. Yet, while the urgency to halt deforestation is increasingly dominating headlines, the why and the how of doing so – the solution focus — is not as well known. Throughout the workshop – which was co-hosted by the Thomson Reuters Foundation and supported by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and Partnership for Action on Green Economy (PAGE) — the journalists were encouraged to consider the solutions for key sustainability and development issues in major agricultural commodity supply chains. Led by Sara El-Khalili of the Thomson Reuters Foundation, workshop guest speakers included Giselle Green of Constructive Voices, Paul Dickinson, Founder and Executive Chair of CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project). Deep insights into sustainability issues in Peru were provided by James Leslie, UNDP-Peru’s Technical Advisor on Ecosystems and Climate Change. After attending the opening high-level session of the Good Growth Conference in Lima — where the journalists had the opportunity to interview the Ministers of Environment and Agriculture from Peru and Ecuador — the reporters journeyed into the Amazon to put what they had learned about solutions journalism into practice. For Alejandra Agudo Lazareno, a reporter for Spain’s El Pais daily newspaper, ‘solutions journalism’ isn’t entirely a new concept. “In Planeta Futuro we regularly write pieces with positive points of view. But it’s not something I usually consider in the case deforestation and commodities,” she explained. “In general, this experience has been a great opportunity to gain new knowledge from other news outlets and learn more about the ways in which humanity is trying to do the right thing for the planet,” said Alejandra whose story was inspired by the successful sustainable development strategies being implemented in Peru’s San Martin region. This immersive approach to learning conducted in the heart of one of the world’s most important ecosystems is a defining feature of the Good Growth Conference. Being in the Amazon helped conference delegates, and journalists, gain a deeper connection to their work as well as the resilience and motivation needed to sustain collective efforts for change. For Bhimanto Suwastoyo of the Palm Scribe, the Good Growth Journalism Initiativeprovided a valuable opportunity to understand the deforestation challenge from different angles and perspectives. During his time in Peru, the Indonesian journalist reported on how the small Amazonian community of Chazuta transitioned from illicit coca production (for cocaine) to sustainable cocoa. “My takeaway from the training, and the Good Growth Conference, is that nothing beats on-site learning visits to motivate solution-based journalism and that the best solutions to problems, in any field, usually involve as many stakeholders as possible working together to arrive at the solution.” “I will now approach a story by first looking at it through the lenses of a number of different perspectives,” explained Bhimanto whose publication, The Palm Scribe, aims to help the palm oil sector foster a healthier and more constructive public discourse. Eromo Egbejule, West Africa Editor of The Africa Report, used his time in the Amazon to examine new approaches to sustainable agriculture in Latin America which could be applied across the Atlantic. “One of the biggest takeaways I gained from participating in the Good Growth Journalism Initiative was being exposed to what’s already being achieved in Peru and neighbouring countries.” “I heard Costa Rica’s remarkable story. The country managed to reverse what was one of the highest deforestation rates in the world, with radical reforms backed by political willpower. It’s a lesson countries in Africa ought to learn.” Eromo detailed his findings in an article he published in the Africa Report: Lessons on political willpower from Costa Rica and Peru. Meanwhile Fabiano Maisonnave, Amazon correspondent for Folha de São Paulo, used his time at the Good Growth Conference to investigate the environmental impacts of the invasive tilapia fish species, which was introduced in Peru three decades ago. “I noticed that every restaurant in the small Amazonian community of Sauce was only serving one variety of fish [tilapia],” he explained. On the other side of the forest system, in the Brazilian state of Tocantins, officials are currently experimenting with how best to cultivate the foreign fish species which was previously banned and has already decimated native fish stocks in Peru and Bolivia. During the conference, Fabiano was able to observe an exchange of ideas between Peru’s San Martin Production Director, Raúl Belaunde, and Marcelo Soares, head of Tocantins State's environmental licensing agency in Brazil. Belaunde — who participated in and co-hosted the week-long event with the Governor — explained that the tilapia in his province is “impossible to control” and regretted his country’s decision to introduce it. “I don’t think the Tocantins representative was deterred, but at least the Peruvian government officials were able to share and recommend best practices which may help to mitigate some risks to Brazil’s Amazonian ecosystem,” explained Fabiano. Fabiano’s report quotes a number of Brazilian conservationists and regional experts who are urgently seeking more information about the risks of tilapia cultivation as they try to avoid the same fate as neighbouring Amazonian countries. For Switzerland-based journalist, Paula Dupraz-Dobias, the chance to speak with the indigenous leaders of San Martin’s Quechua community meant she was able to gain first-hand accounts and local wisdom directly from those who know the forests best. “Listening to - and reporting on - indigenous peoples may allow us to learn from their wisdom, particularly in how we can live from resources at our doorstep and better appreciate the fragility of our global environment.” she said when asked about the opportunity to visit the indigenous community of Alto Pucalpillo. “Unfortunately, very often the voices of indigenous communities are dismissed in global discussions on climate change and sustainable development goals. Hopefully our access as journalists to these communities can help project their voices - and wisdom -to a wider audience.”

#### Warming causes extinction.

Yangyang Xu and Ramanathan 17, Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at Texas A&M University; and Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, 9/26/17, “Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 114, No. 39, p. 10315-10323

We are proposing the following extension to the DAI risk categorization: warming greater than 1.5 °C as “dangerous”; warming greater than 3 °C as “catastrophic?”; and warming in excess of 5 °C as “unknown??,” with the understanding that changes of this magnitude, not experienced in the last 20+ million years, pose existential threats to a majority of the population. The question mark denotes the subjective nature of our deduction and the fact that catastrophe can strike at even lower warming levels. The justifications for the proposed extension to risk categorization are given below. From the IPCC burning embers diagram and from the language of the Paris Agreement, we infer that the DAI begins at warming greater than 1.5 °C. Our criteria for extending the risk category beyond DAI include the potential risks of climate change to the physical climate system, the ecosystem, human health, and species extinction. Let us first consider the category of catastrophic (3 to 5 °C warming). The first major concern is the issue of tipping points. Several studies (48, 49) have concluded that 3 to 5 °C global warming is likely to be the threshold for tipping points such as the collapse of the western Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of deep water circulation in the North Atlantic, dieback of Amazon rainforests as well as boreal forests, and collapse of the West African monsoon, among others. While natural scientists refer to these as abrupt and irreversible climate changes, economists refer to them as catastrophic events (49). Warming of such magnitudes also has catastrophic human health effects. Many recent studies (50, 51) have focused on the direct influence of extreme events such as heat waves on public health by evaluating exposure to heat stress and hyperthermia. It has been estimated that the likelihood of extreme events (defined as 3-sigma events), including heat waves, has increased 10-fold in the recent decades (52). Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat stress. For example, the 2013 European heat wave led to about 70,000 premature mortalities (53). The major finding of a recent study (51) is that, currently, about 13.6% of land area with a population of 30.6% is exposed to deadly heat. The authors of that study defined deadly heat as exceeding a threshold of temperature as well as humidity. The thresholds were determined from numerous heat wave events and data for mortalities attributed to heat waves. According to this study, a 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. Climate risks can vary markedly depending on the socioeconomic status and culture of the population, and so we must take up the question of “dangerous to whom?” (54). Our discussion in this study is focused more on people and not on the ecosystem, and even with this limited scope, there are multitudes of categories of people. We will focus on the poorest 3 billion people living mostly in tropical rural areas, who are still relying on 18th-century technologies for meeting basic needs such as cooking and heating. Their contribution to CO2 pollution is roughly 5% compared with the 50% contribution by the wealthiest 1 billion (55). This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C (54). However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C. Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (>5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ∼1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity due to increased CO2) can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90% of species to the dangers of extinction (57). The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security, as summarized recently (58), motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as unknown??, implying the possibility of existential threats. Fig. 2 displays these three risk categorizations (vertical dashed lines).

## 4

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose round reports on the 2019-20 NDCA LD wiki for every round they have debated this season. Round reports disclose which positions (AC, NC, K, T, Theory, etc.) were read/gone for in every speech.

#### Violation: screenshot in the doc

#### Graphical user interface, application Description automatically generated

#### Standards:

#### 1. Level Playing Field – big schools can scout and collect flows but independents are left in the dark so round reports are key to prep - they give an idea of what layers debaters go for so you can best prepare your strategy. Accessibility first and independent voter – it’s an impact multiplier – it’s the only way students continue coming into debate.

#### 2. Strategy -

#### a. small schools - round reports help novices understand the context in which positions are read by good debaters and help with brainstorming potential 1NCs vs affs – helps compensate for kids who can’t afford coaches to prep out affs.

#### b. don’t know what positions you go for which skews my strategy when picking positions because you know mine – ow under reciprocity.

#### Paradigm:

#### Fairness – Debate is a competitive activity governed by rules. You can’t evaluate who did better debating if the round is structurally skewed, so fairness is a gateway to substantive debate.

#### Education – Only portable impact from debate and why schools fund it.

#### DTD – Time spent on theory cant be compensated for, the 1nc was already skewed, and its key to deterring abuse.

#### Prefer Competing interps -

#### 1. reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention.

#### 2. it Causes a race to the bottom where debaters push the limit as to how reasonably abusive, they can be.

#### No RVI’s -

#### 1. Chills some debaters from reading theory against abusive postions.

#### 2. incentivizes theory baiting where you can just bait theory to win.

## CASE

### U/V

#### Reject 1ar theory on face:

#### a. They get a 7-6 time advantage which is worse later in the debate since there's less arguments they have to cover and they can blow individual arguments up.

#### b. They get 2 speeches versus my one, which makes the 2NR super unfair since I have to do ridiculous amounts of weighing and pre-empting which forces me to over-allocate on theory but the 2AR can choose not to go for theory and moot the entire 2N.

#### c. 2AR kills me on theory—they can get away with new weighing and they have the perceptual advantage. They can prioritize all their impacts and moot the entire 2NR because 2AR moves are impossible to predict. Also means reject new 2AR weighing, even if it's in response to mine—they should've done it in the 1AR.

#### d. Deters the 1NC from checking abuse out of fear for 1AR meta-theory, which destroys me since it's also preclusive. Turns their infinite abuse args.

#### e. Resolvability double bind—either you automatically accept 2AR responses to 2NR counter-standards which means they always win since I can't answer those responses, or you have to intervene to determine the credence you give those 2AR responses, which makes it irresolvable and unfair.

#### f. Reject infinite abuse claims— 1 - there's only finite speech time, 2 - if I win I can't engage in 1AR theory then you could never check infinite abuse since we can't use your shells to determine what's abusive.

#### ROB is comp worlds -

#### 1. Reciprocity- prevents infinite tricky NIBs or cheap one-shots to win debates which destroy substantive discussion and null the reason of topic rotation. edu

#### 2. Real world- ethical judgments are relevant only in terms of how they impact the world.

#### 3. Topic education- forcing them to defend a plan requires research about the topic- only unique impact to topic rotation.

#### 4. Advocacy- forces them to defend an alternative vision of the world.

#### 5. Inclusion- our interp includes all methods of debate- they exclude Ks which prevents deconstruction of harmful mindsets or racist language- independent reason to reject.

#### 6. Collapses to competing worlds- truth of the resolution can *only* be determined if it is better than other worlds

#### 7. Non-sequitur- that all statements are either true or false doesn’t require the debate center on the truth value of the rez.

#### 8. Textuality – Parcher defines resolved as

(Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, [)](https://www.coursehero.com/file/p7iq73k/GDI-2011-61-Gemini-Lab-Framework-AT-Resolved-Is-Before-The-Colon-1-The/)JFS)

**Resolved** comes **from** the adoption of **resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not.** It's a question before a legislative body. **Should this statement be adopted** or not.

#### Reject TT

1 – terrible for predictability – explodes to different paradoxes, defintions that all auto affirm which we cant predict – comparative world binds debaters to the world of the advocacies –

2 – ground is bad bc of predictability – they contradict – NCs, DAs, Ks, CPs all solve under CW

3 – util is flowable by both sides and under comparative worlds –

#### 4 - Truth testing collapses – They didn’t define what it means to prove the resolution true. Prefer a pragmatist theory of truth — what is true is what is useful for people to believe is true. That justifies util since what is useful for people to believe is what aggregates the greatest good across people. Anything else privileges certain people over others or don’t improve end-states, which wouldn’t be pragmatically useful for people to believe is true.

#### 5 - No Constituvism - The judge can go out their jurisdiction, if a debater said the N word, then the judge would vote them down, so its not a side constraint. Comp worlds isn’t going out of jurisdiction – its just a different way of determine truth or falsity. No impact to jurisdiction – judges vote for non T affs and we can redefine.

### Framing

#### Rawls collapses to util.

#### a. Equality means util- only an impartial consequentialist theory can treat everyone’s pain and pleasure equally- anything else arbitrarily prioritizes one over another

Ratner 84 [Leonard G. Ratner, professor of law at USC, Hofstra Law Journal, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 723, spring, 1984]

John Rawls derives an equality principle from individual autonomy by presuming that "in the original position," i.e., in a "state of nature", where a "veil of ignorance" cloaks prospective resource distributions, everyone (1) would be reluctant to risk impoverishment for a chance at abundance, and, consequently, (2) would agree to equal distribution generally, but (3) would allow above-average distributions for productivity incentives that increase resources sufficiently to reimburse those with below-average distributions. [164](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=754140ea250c3e13cdfa30aef4da39a8&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=031548f35fa80bab5596b0fd0b35fe07" \l "n164" \t "_self) Similar agreement on voting equality (which is the essential  [\*760]  procedural norm for majoritarian choice) [165](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=754140ea250c3e13cdfa30aef4da39a8&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=031548f35fa80bab5596b0fd0b35fe07" \l "n165" \t "_self) and on such "basic liberties" as "freedom of speech . . . conscience . . . thought . . . person . . . property [ownership] . . . and freedom from arbitrary arrest" [166](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=754140ea250c3e13cdfa30aef4da39a8&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=031548f35fa80bab5596b0fd0b35fe07" \l "n166" \t "_self) is premised on a general awareness that the "quality of civilization" [167](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=754140ea250c3e13cdfa30aef4da39a8&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=031548f35fa80bab5596b0fd0b35fe07" \l "n167" \t "_self) will be enhanced by "the most extensive liberty [for each] compatible with a like liberty for all," [168](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=754140ea250c3e13cdfa30aef4da39a8&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=031548f35fa80bab5596b0fd0b35fe07" \l "n168" \t "_self) i.e., by equal liberty "unless an unequal distribution . . . is to everyone's advantage." [169](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=754140ea250c3e13cdfa30aef4da39a8&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=031548f35fa80bab5596b0fd0b35fe07" \l "n169" \t "_self) This concept, offered as "an alternative to utilitarian thought," is rested ultimately on "a sense of justice," derived from an inherent "moral capacity," "considered judgments," "intuitively appealing" presumptions, and a "reflective equilibrium" reached after weighing competing moral positions. But the intuitive conclusion suggests utilitarian perceptions. The presumed majoritarian preference for *assured* need fulfillment rather than *possible* need-plus-want fulfillment; the productivity-incentive corollary; and the voting-equality, basic-liberties postulate imply: a long-run survival goal; the diminishing marginal utility of resources; [172](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=754140ea250c3e13cdfa30aef4da39a8&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=031548f35fa80bab5596b0fd0b35fe07" \l "n172" \t "_self) the priority of need fulfillment over want fulfillment; [173](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=754140ea250c3e13cdfa30aef4da39a8&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=031548f35fa80bab5596b0fd0b35fe07" \l "n173" \t "_self) the need-fulfilling consequences of productivity incentives; the needimpairing, counterproductive effect of minority discontent, majority insecurity, inhibited thought, disrupted communication, and arbitrarily constrained movement; the enhancement of per capita need/want fulfillment by avoidance of need-impairing allocations; and the contributions of both individual autonomy and majoritarian choice to such fulfillment. The accuracy of these propositions in fact turns on empirically verifiable information about the world as it is, not on intuitively appealing presumptions about a fictitious state of nature. Despite his explicit rejection of utilitarian thought, Rawls intimates a utilitarian foundation for his equal-treatment conclusions by noting that a sense of justice, moral feelings, and altruistic reciprocity may have evolutionary origins and by designating scarce resources, conflicting resource claims, and resulting collaborative arrangements as "circumstances of justice." [176](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=754140ea250c3e13cdfa30aef4da39a8&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5=031548f35fa80bab5596b0fd0b35fe07" \l "n176" \t "_self) His environmental paradigm, however, is not an epochal struggle to survive but "the original position," and his rationale is not long-run survival, but innate moral intuition.

#### b. Consequences are the knowledge we know behind the veil because those are the only relevant facts that are impartial to individual bias – without states of affairs we have no knowledge under the veil, so it’s nonfunctional

#### c. People in the original position will maximize average utility since they could be anybody.

Harsanyi, 77 – Nobel Prize winning Hungarian-American economist. He is best known for his contributions to the study of game theory and its application to economics [John C. Harsanyi, “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour”, Social Research Vol. 44, No. 4, Rationality, Choice, and Morality (WINTER 1977), pp. 623-656]

Any moral value judgement is a judgement of preference, but it is a judgement of preference of a very special kind. Suppose somebody tells us: ‘I much prefer our capitalist system over any socialist system because under our capitalist system I happen to be a millionaire and have a very satisfying life, whereas under a socialist system I would be in all probabil- ity at best a badly paid minor government official.’ This may be a very reasonable judgement of personal preference from his own individual point of view. But nobody would call it a moral value judgement because it would he obviously a judgement based primarily on self-interest. Compare this with a situation where somebody would express a preference for the capitalist system as against 'the socialist system without knowing in advance what particular social position he would occupy under either system. To make it more precise, let us assume that he [they] would choose between the two systems under the assumption that, in either system, he [they] would have the same probability of occupying any one of the available social positions. In this case, we could be sure that his choice would be independent of morally irrelevant selfish considerations. There- fore his choice (or his judgement of preference) between the two systems would now become a genuine moral value judgement. Of course, it is not really necessary that a person who wants to make a moral assessment of the relative merits of capitalism and of socialism should be literally ignorant of the actual social position that he does occupy or would occupy under each system. But it is necessary that he should at least try his best to disregard this morally irrelevant piece of information when he is making his moral assessment. Otherwise his assessment will not be a genuine moral value judgement but rather will be merely a judgement of personal preference. For short reference, the fictitious assumption of having the same proba- bility of occupying any possible social position will be called the equipm- bability postulate, whereas the entire preceding decision model based on this assumption will be called the equiprobability model of moral value judgments. We can better understand the implications of this model if we subject it to decision-theoretical analysis. Suppose the society we are considering consists of n individuals, numbered as individual 1, 2, . . . , n, according to whether they would occupy the lst (highest), 2nd (second highest), nth (lowest) social position under a given social system. Let U ,, U2, U”, denote the utility levels that individuals 1, 2, . . . , n would enjoy under this system. The individual who wants to make a moral value judgement about the relative merits of capitalism and of socialism will be called individual i. By the equiprobability postulate, individual i will act in such a way as if he assigned the same probability l/n to his occupying any particular social position and, therefore, to his utility reaching any one of the utility levels U1, U2, . . . , Um Now, under the assumed conditions, according to Bayesian decision theory, a rational individual will always choose that particular social system that would maximise his expected utility, that is, the quantity Wi = 1/n [summation from j=1 to n] Uj, representing the arithmetic mean of all individual utility levels in society. We can express this conclusion also by saying that a rational individual will always use this mean utility as his social welfare function; or that he [they] will be a utilitarian, Who defines social utility as the mean of individual utilities (rather than as their sum, as many utilitarians have done).12 Of course, this conclusion makes sense only if we assume that it is mathematically admissible to add the utilities of different individuals, that is, if we assume that interpersonal comparisons of utility represent a meaningful intellectual operation. I will try to show that this is in fact the case. In describing this equiprobability model, I have assumed that individual i, who is making a moral value judgement on the merits of the two alternative social systems, is one of the n members of the society in question. But exactly the same reasoning would apply if he were an interested outsider rather than a member. Indeed, for some purposes it is often heuristically preferable to restate the model under this alternative assumption. Yet, once we do this, our model becomes a modern restate- ment of Adam Smith’s theory of an impartially sympathetic observer. His impartiality requirement corresponds to my equiprobability postulate, whereas his sympathy requirement corresponds to my assumption that individual i will make his choice in terms of interpersonal utility compar- isons based on empathy with various individual members of society (see section 5). This equiprobability model of moral value judgements gives us both a powerful analytical criterion and a very convenient heuristic criterion for deciding practical moral problems. If we want to decide between two alternative moral standards A and B, all we have to do is ask ourselves the question, ‘Would I prefer to live in a society conforming to standard A or in a society conforming to standard B? - assuming I would not know in advance what my actual social position would be in either society but rather would have to assume to have an equal chance of ending up in any one of the possible positions.’ Admittedly, this criterion - or any conceivable moral criterion - will still leave each of us with the great moral responsibility, and the often very difficult intellectual task, of acrually choosing between these two alterna- tive moral standards in terms of this criterion. But by using this criterion we will know at least what the actual intellectual problem is that we are trying to solvein choosing between them. My equiprobability model was first published in 1953, and was ex- tended in 195 5.13 Vickrey had suggested a similar idea,“ but my work was independent of his. Later John Rawls again independently proposed a very similar model, which he called the ‘original position’, based on the ‘veil of ignorance’.'5 But while my own model served as a basis for a utilitarian theory, Rawls derived very nonutilitarian conclusions from his own. Yet the difference does not lie in the nature of the two models, which are based on almost identical qualitative assumptions. Rather, the difference lies in the decision-theoretical analysis applied to the two models. One difference is that Rawls avoids any use of numerical probabilities. But the main difference is that Rawls makes the technical mistake of basing his analysis on a highly irrational decision rule, the maximin principle, which was fairly fashionable thirty years ago but which lost its attraction a few years later when its absurd practical implications were realised."5 Our model of moral value judgements can also be described as follows. Each individual has two very different sets of preferences. On the one hand, he has his personal preferences, which guide his everyday behaviour and which are expressed in his utility function U,. Most peeple’s personal preferences will not be completely selfish. But they will assign higher weights to their own interests and to the interests of their family, their friends, and other personal associates than they will assign to the interests of complete strangers. On the other hand, each individual will. also have moral preferences which may or may not have much influence on his everyday behaviour but which will guide his thinking in those - possibly very rare - moments when he forces a special impersonal and impartial attitude, that is, a moral attitude, upon himself. His moral preferences, un- like his personal preferences, will by definition always assign the same weight to all individuals’ interests, including his own. These moral pref- erences will be expressed by his social-Welfare function W,. Typically, dif- ferent individuals will have very different utility functions U,- but, as can be seen from Equation (1) above, in theory they will tend to have identical social-welfare functions - but only if they agree in their factual assump- tions on the nature of the individual utility functions U,- and on the con- version ratios between different individuals’ utilities (as decided by inter- personal utility comparisons) - which, of course, may not be the case.

#### Util hijacks—there’s no way of determining objectively what people would want under the veil—some people might be for a jobs guarantee and others against it—only util can resolve those tradeoffs

#### The veil of ignorance can’t be a sufficient guide to action- it doesn’t include situational challenges.

[Elizabeth **Ashford 03**, [Professor of Philosophy, St. Andrews] The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism, Univesrity of Chicago Press, [Vol. 113, No. 2, January 2003](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/et.2003.113.issue-2)]

One of Scanlon’s main claims is that **we cannot invoke a veil of ignorance**. When our act would impose a great burden on someone, we must be able to argue that our act is permitted by some principle that this person could not reasonably reject, even given full knowledge of the burden that she would have to bear. **The problem with acting on a principle that might be justified on the fictional assumption of general compliance when we are actually in circumstances of minimal compliance is that this fails to address the actual case at hand and to acknowledge the burden that particular individuals actually face.**

## 5

## Shell

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must have a carded solvency advocate in the 1AC.

#### Violation -

#### Standards:

#### 1. predictability - no way for the neg to predict the advocacy because it’s not in the lit – this decks DA and CP ground - outweighs because ground is the key determinant of engagement.

#### 2. limits – no solvency advocate allows infinite possible affs – also justifies breaking affs that are at the edges of the topic with no advocate.

#### 3. shiftiness - no way to guarantee the DAs and CPs we read link or solve because they can re-interpret the plan in the 1ar – creates a 7-6 skew that prevents new 2nr ev to prove normal means from checking.

#### Paradigm:

#### Fairness – Debate is a competitive activity governed by rules. You can’t evaluate who did better debating if the round is structurally skewed, so fairness is a gateway to substantive debate.

#### DTD – Time spent on theory cant be compensated for, the 1nc was already skewed, and its key to deterring abuse.

#### Prefer Competing interps -

#### 1. reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention.

#### 2. it Causes a race to the bottom where debaters push the limit as to how reasonably abusive, they can be.

#### No RVI’s -

#### 1. Chills some debaters from reading theory against abusive postions.

#### 2. incentivizes theory baiting where you can just bait theory to win.