## 1

#### CP Text: A just government should recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike, except workers in the armed forces.

#### Armed forces can’t strike now.

LII 6 [Cornell Legal Information Institute, 2006, "10 U.S. Code § 976," Cornell Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/976]/Kankee

(a)In this section: (1)The term “member of the armed forces” means (A) a member of the armed forces who is serving on active duty, (B) a member of the National Guard who is serving on full-time National Guard duty, or (C) a member of a Reserve component while performing inactive-duty training. (2)The term “military labor organization” means any organization that engages in or attempts to engage in— (A)negotiating or bargaining with any civilian officer or employee, or with any member of the armed forces, on behalf of members of the armed forces, concerning the terms or conditions of military service of such members in the armed forces; (B)representing individual members of the armed forces before any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, in connection with any grievance or complaint of any such member arising out of the terms or conditions of military service of such member in the armed forces; or (C)striking, picketing, marching, demonstrating, or any other similar form of concerted action which is directed against the Government of the United States and which is intended to induce any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, to— (i)negotiate or bargain with any person concerning the terms or conditions of military service of any member of the armed forces, (ii)recognize any organization as a representative of individual members of the armed forces in connection with complaints and grievances of such members arising out of the terms or conditions of military service of such members in the armed forces, or (iii)make any change with respect to the terms or conditions of military service of individual members of the armed forces. (3)The term “civilian officer or employee” means an employee, as such term is defined in section 2105 of title 5. (b)It shall be unlawful for a member of the armed forces, knowing of the activities or objectives of a particular military labor organization— (1)to join or maintain membership in such organization; or (2)to attempt to enroll any other member of the armed forces as a member of such organization. (c)It shall be unlawful for any person— (1)to enroll in a military labor organization any member of the armed forces or to solicit or accept dues or fees for such an organization from any member of the armed forces; or (2)to negotiate or bargain, or attempt through any coercive act to negotiate or bargain, with any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, on behalf of members of the armed forces, concerning the terms or conditions of service of such members; (3)to organize or attempt to organize, or participate in, any strike, picketing, march, demonstration, or other similar form of concerted action involving members of the armed forces that is directed against the Government of the United States and that is intended to induce any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, to— (A)negotiate or bargain with any person concerning the terms or conditions of service of any member of the armed forces, (B)recognize any military labor organization as a representative of individual members of the armed forces in connection with any complaint or grievance of any such member arising out of the terms or conditions of service of such member in the armed forces, or (C)make any change with respect to the terms or conditions of service in the armed forces of individual members of the armed forces; or (4)to use any military installation, facility, reservation, vessel, or other property of the United States for any meeting, march, picketing, demonstration, or other similar activity for the purpose of engaging in any activity prohibited by this subsection or by subsection (b) or (d). (d)It shall be unlawful for any military labor organization to represent, or attempt to represent, any member of the armed forces before any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, in connection with any grievance or complaint of any such member arising out of the terms or conditions of service of such member in the armed forces. (e)No member of the armed forces, and no civilian officer or employee, may— (1)negotiate or bargain on behalf of the United States concerning the terms or conditions of military service of members of the armed forces with any person who represents or purports to represent members of the armed forces, or (2)permit or authorize the use of any military installation, facility, reservation, vessel, or other property of the United States for any meeting, march, picketing, demonstration, or other similar activity which is for the purpose of engaging in any activity prohibited by subsection (b), (c), or (d). Nothing in this subsection shall prevent commanders or supervisors from giving consideration to the views of any member of the armed forces presented individually or as a result of participation on command-sponsored or authorized advisory councils, committees, or organizations. (f)Whoever violates subsection (b), (c), or (d) shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, except that, in the case of an organization (as defined in section 18 of such title), the fine shall not be less than $25,000. (g)Nothing in this section shall limit the right of any member of the armed forces— (1)to join or maintain membership in any organization or association not constituting a “military labor organization” as defined in subsection (a)(2) of this section; (2)to present complaints or grievances concerning the terms or conditions of the service of such member in the armed forces in accordance with established military procedures; (3)to seek or receive information or counseling from any source; (4)to be represented by counsel in any legal or quasi-legal proceeding, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations; (5)to petition the Congress for redress of grievances; or (6)to take such other administrative action to seek such administrative or judicial relief, as is authorized by applicable laws and regulations. Amendments 1997—Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 105–85 substituted “shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, except that, in the case of an organization (as defined in section 18 of such title), the fine shall not be less than $25,000.” for “shall, in the case of an individual, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, and in the case of an organization or association, be fined not less than $25,000 and not more than $250,000.” 1987—Subsec. (a)(1) to (3). Pub. L. 100–26 inserted “The term” after each par. designation and struck out uppercase letter of first word after first quotation marks in each paragraph and substituted lowercase letter. 1986—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 99–661 struck out the second of two commas before “(B)”. 1984—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 98–525 added cl. (B) and redesignated existing cl. (B) as (C). Findings; Purpose Pub. L. 95–610, § 1, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3085, provided that: “(a)The Congress makes the following findings: “(1)Members of the armed forces of the United States must be prepared to fight and, if necessary, to die to protect the welfare, security, and liberty of the United States and of their fellow citizens. “(2)Discipline and prompt obedience to lawful orders of superior officers are essential and time-honored elements of the American military tradition and have been reinforced from the earliest articles of war by laws and regulations prohibiting conduct detrimental to the military chain of command and lawful military authority. “(3)The processes of conventional collective bargaining and labor-management negotiation cannot and should not be applied to the relationships between members of the armed forces and their military and civilian superiors. “(4)Strikes, slowdowns, picketing, and other traditional forms of job action have no place in the armed forces. “(5)Unionization of the armed forces would be incompatible with the military chain of command, would undermine the role, authority, and position of the commander, and would impair the morale and readiness of the armed forces. “(6)The circumstances which could constitute a threat to the ability of the armed forces to perform their mission are not comparable to the circumstances which could constitute a threat to the ability of Federal civilian agencies to perform their functions and should be viewed in light of the need for effective performance of duty by each member of the armed forces. “(b)The purpose of this Act [enacting this section] is to promote the readiness of the armed forces to defend the United States.”

#### Military unions wrecks US readiness.

**Caforio 18**, Giuseppe. "Unionisation of the Military: Representation of the Interests of Military Personnel." Springer, 20 May 2018, link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-71602-2\_19#citeas.

THE OPPOSITION TO UNIONIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES But if a convergence between the military establishment and civil society is in progress and has brought the two areas of life and work much closer together, why is there a unionization issue for the armed forces? Why is there opposition to a collective bargaining system for military personnel? The fundamental reason must be sought in the specificity of the military, which is summarized thusly by David R. Segal: Because of its unique social function—the legitimate management of violence—the military requires of its personnel a degree of commitment that differs from that required by other modern organizations. Military personnel, unlike their civilian counterparts, enter into a contract of unlimited liability with their employer. They cannot unilaterally terminate their employment any time they wish. They are subject to moving and working in any environment where the service decides they are needed. They are required to place the needs of service above the needs of their families, and must frequently endure long periods of separation. They are often called upon to work more than an eight-hour day, for which they receive no additional compensation. And in time of war, they must face prolonged danger, and may even forfeit their lives. Obviously, the man on the firing line is required to make a commitment of a different order from that made by the worker on the assembly line. (D. Segal and Kramer, 1977, p. 28). Bernhard Boene, in a study devoted to a different research topic (Boene, 1990), is both precise and efficacious in differentiating military "work" from civilian work. Military specificity, writes Boene, does not lie only in the area of the risks to which one supposes the combatant is exposed, but also in the limits of application of common rationality in combat and in the situation of habitual transgression of social norms that it entails. This implies a particular type of socialization. Notwithstanding partial analogies, according to Boene, civil emergencies belong to a different reality than military ones do. An officer, in particular, is not an ordinary civil servant: he must respond to a "call," consisting of a particular interest in military things, dedication to the common welfare, acceptance of risking his life, and submission to a series of obligations that are peculiar to the military profession. SOME THEORETICAL POSITIONS ON THE ISSUE Discussing a sample survey, David Segal observes that in the United States, in the absence of a union for military personnel, there is a considerable "misfit" between soldiers' perception of the characteristics of their role and the preferred characteristics, while in an analogous sample of civilian manpower this misfit is much smaller. In examining the attempted remedies, Segal states: "Any change to be achieved through organizational interventions, however, is likely to be incremental, and not to resolve the discrepancy between the characteristics that military personnel would like in their jobs and the characteristics that they perceived their jobs to have" (D. Segal and Kramer, 1977, p. 46). According to Segal, unionization can solve this problem, but it presents two dangers that must be carefully weighed: the first is that it tends to extend its influence also to aspects of management and direction of the military apparatus; the second is that it involves a politicisation of the personnel. Gwyn Harries Jenkins examines the consequences that unionisation would have on the operational efficiency of the armed forces and identifies three fundamental ones: 1. The creation of a dual authority structure: Since there has been a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment and a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion and group consensus, unionization extends the boundaries of these changes: it brings into armed forces the full effects of the organizational revolution which pervades contemporary society, creating a dual authority structure while modifying the traditional basis of compliance. (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 70) 2. A much greater resemblance of the style of military command to that of civilian management. The new tasks and the introduction of unionization would require commanders to possess skills and orientations more and more like those of civilian managers. 3. An abdication by the officer of his traditional image. Indeed, if the officer "wishes to retain his self-image and ideas of honor, then the introduction of trade unions into the military creates a conflict situation with substantial dysfunctional consequences" (H.Jenkins, 1977, p. 71). Harries Jenkins concludes, however, by affirming that, as a radical criticism of the existing military system, "the unionization of the armed forces can only result in an improvement to an otherwise defective situation" (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 69). According to William Taylor and Roger Arango (Taylor et al., 1977b), many reasons offered in the United States for or against the unionization of military personnel appear to be rhetorical and not sufficiently investigated. Those who take a negative critical stance, for example, contend that unionization would lead to a breakdown in discipline; threaten the chain of command; and, especially, undermine the military's ability to carry out its assigned mission. Through a concrete field analysis, these authors believe they can shed light on the advantages and disadvantages of this process. Among the advantages are the acquisition of a greater sense of individual security, a valorization of the dignity of individuals, improved social communication, and greater competitiveness with other occupations and professions in recruiting personnel. The real drawbacks would essentially be reduced to two: a risk of divisiveness within units, due to acquired strife between personnel categories; and an increase in personnel costs. Carlo Jean (Jean, 1981) states that in itself, the creation of unions would inevitably produce increased confrontation; without it, the union representatives would have neither prestige nor credibility. He does not believe, however, that the biggest drawback that would derive from it would be that of undermining the internal cohesiveness of the armed forces and their operational capacity. According to this author military leaders would align themselves with the union's demands out of necessity to avoid internal breakup. An unacceptable corporative force would be produced that sooner or later would inevitably oppose it to the political power. The danger that a union of military personnel involves for civil society is, in his opinion, much greater than its negative implications on the efficiency of the military itself. Along the same line is the fear expressed by Sen. Thurmond (reported by David Cortright, cited essay) that unionization might reinforce the military establishment and increase its influence over society at large, decreasing the capacity for political control. This issue had already been treated by Cortright in another essay (Cortright and Thurmond, 1977b), where on the one hand he argued that unionization in the armed forces would help to prevent any form of separateness from civil society while noting on the other that little attention was given to the possibility that unionization substantially strengthens the military's ability to wield influence. Thurmond, again, judges the European experience negatively and asks himself how unionized troops would respond in battle. However, to remain faithful to his position, Thurmond conceives the armed forces as a separate body from civil society, argues that military personnel are not comparable to other labor force categories, and advances the fear that union representation of the interests of military personnel would bring the defence budget to unacceptable levels. Of the countries included in our study, unions for military personnel exist in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and The Netherlands. Unionization is prohibited in England, the United States, Canada, France, Portugal, Turkey, and Greece. Strikes are allowed only in Austria and Sweden.

#### Readiness solves nuclear war, terror, and WMD prolif but ground forces are key.

Bonds 17 [Timothy M. Bonds is vice president, Army Research Division, and director, RAND Arroyo Center. Bonds has served as a RAND vice president since 2011. Previously, he was deputy director of the Arroyo Center from 2003 to 2011, acting director from March 2009 to May 2010, and, from 1999 to 2003, director of the Aerospace Force Development Program within RAND Project AIR FORCE. Prior to joining RAND, Bonds spent nine years in the aerospace industry, where he led projects to develop high-speed vehicle and weapons concepts. He holds an M.S. in aero/astro engineering from the University of Illinois and an M.B.A. from Washington University, St. Louis. Limiting Regret: Building the Army We Will Need--An Update. Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces on March 1, 2017. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT466/RAND\_CT466.pdf]

For our first example, what might happen if the United States does not continue its missions to defeat ISIL, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other violent extremist groups around the world? One potential regret is enduring terror movements that continue to destabilize vulnerable nations and whole regions; harm captured peoples; exploit captured territory to train terrorists, raise funds, and attract new recruits; and export violence to the United States and its allies and friends. It remains unknown whether currently deployed forces are sufficient to achieve U.S. objectives. In fact, the United States has steadily increased troop deployments to Iraq and Syria and extended the mission in Afghanistan. However, this analysis assumes that U.S. ground forces will remain engaged at their current levels against extremist groups in order to continue to degrade them. Therefore, we assume here that these troops could not be pulled away for other operations without ending this mission. It is also possible that countering violent extremists will require more troops if the mission changes—for example, if additional ground troops are committed to combat operations, such as those in Syria and Iraq. Total troop requirements would remain those shown earlier as the worldwide commitments. For our second example, how might Russia take the same course in the Baltics that it has taken in Ukraine? Russian “volunteers” could enter and destabilize Estonia and Latvia, or worse, conventional forces could launch a surprise invasion and present a fait accompli to NATO. We estimate that against currently stationed forces, the Russians could reach the Baltic capitals in 36–60 hours. That would leave the President with few and bad choices. The President could negotiate for the Russians to leave and risk the fracture of NATO if negotiations and sanctions drag on for months or years, or the President could choose to launch a counteroffensive to retake NATO territory—against a nuclear-armed Russia that has threatened first use of nuclear weapons to defend its territory from conventional attack and prevent its military from being destroyed. While the risk of war with Russia is small, and the risks of escalation to nuclear conflict are smaller still, neither risk is zero. Since the human and financial costs of both would be catastrophic, it is prudent to hedge against them. Instead, NATO—and the United States—might place armored brigades in the Baltics. These armored brigades, along with other U.S. and NATO forces able to quickly deploy on warning, would be capable of denying Russia a quick victory. Such forces could be permanently stationed or rotationally deployed. These ground forces would be supported by air and sea power from the United States and its NATO allies. The European Reassurance Initiative and the four NATO battalion tactical groups deployed to Poland and the Baltics have made an important statement of alliance commitment and an initial “down payment” on the forces needed, but are not yet close to the amounts required to deny Russia a quick overrun of the Baltics. If the Russians attacked under this scenario, the United States and NATO would send air, sea, and land reinforcements to deny a Russian victory. Additional U.S. and NATO forces would be needed to defeat Russian forces and reverse any Russian territorial gains. We will now assess the numbers of ground forces needed for the missions described above. We will begin with continuing infrastructure tasks, including training new troops, supporting joint missions, and current overseas missions. Adding the forces supporting current missions, we have a demand for 434,000 soldiers to support infrastructure tasks and current missions. This includes the troops who are rotationally deployed; those forward-stationed in Europe, South Korea, and other places; and those supporting generating- and strategic-force operations (but who are not in the GRF or available for other missions). How large of an additional force would be required to deter and defeat aggression in the Baltics (shown here in orange)? For the deterrent force, we estimate that a total of three armored brigades would be needed on the ground in the Baltics on the day fighting started, along with the two U.S. brigades and supporting soldiers already in Europe, and two other U.S. Army and NATO rapid reaction brigades (the 82nd Airborne GRF and the NATO Very High Readiness Task Force) that can deploy to the Baltics on warning. In the future, our NATO allies should be able to provide one or more of the three armored brigades needed. However, in the near term, it is unlikely that any one of these nations would be able to sustain a deployed armored brigade. Therefore, we assume that the U.S. would need to deploy two more armored brigades and a fires brigade in addition to the forward stationed forces already in Europe and the armored and aviation brigades already deployed in a “heel to toe” fashion. In total, 36,000 additional soldiers would be needed over and above those already forward stationed or rotationally deployed to Europe. When deployed at a 1:2 rotation ratio, keeping 36,000 soldiers on the ground in the Baltics requires 108,000 soldiers to maintain a continuous presence. Including the 283,000 soldiers forward deployed in or rotating to Europe and other theaters, and the 151,000 soldiers engaged in infrastructure activities, a total of 542,000 soldiers would be required for these activities alone. This number exceeds the 476,000 soldiers now planned for the regular Army, forcing the DoD to reduce day-to-day operations, continuously deploy 66,000 National Guard or Army Reserve soldiers, grow the regular Army, or take some combination of these measures. Worse, this leaves no margin for higher demands if deterrence fails and war breaks out in Europe, Korea, or elsewhere in the world. In wartime, therefore, the DoD might be compelled to suspend troop rotations to maintain sufficient numbers of forces to meet contingency needs. From this point on in this testimony, we will discuss wartime demand, with troops deployed without rotation for the duration of a conflict. Such extended deployments for the duration of the conflict will impose extraordinary strain on troops and their families. (We should also note that some troop rotation will still be needed within theaters, so battle-worn units can pull back from the line for rest, refit, and replacement of casualties). If troop rotations to all theaters are suspended, including the deterrent force in the Baltics, troop demands will decline somewhat. The additional demand in the Baltics would decline to the 36,000 soldiers deployed at any one time; demand for the combination of other theaters would decline to 146,000, while the demand for infrastructure forces would remain steady at 151,000 soldiers. The total troops needed for these missions would decline to 334,000 soldiers when on a wartime footing. Additional troops would be needed if the Russians were not deterred and decided to invade. To expel the invading Russian forces, we estimate that an additional 85,000 U.S. troops, including six armored brigades and associated artillery, aviation, headquarters, and other supporting troops, would be needed to defeat a Russian invasion (shown in brown), along with eight brigades and a similar number of troops from our NATO allies. This raises the total U.S. troops needed to around 420,000 soldiers. This includes soldiers tasked to conduct infrastructure missions, continue current missions around the world, and deploy the U.S. contribution to the NATO deterrent and war-winning forces shown above. Once again, this assumes a wartime footing for all of these troops with no rotations of soldiers. We now turn to a third example—a war resulting from a provocation cycle that escalates to a North Korean attack on South Korea. Current DoD force planning seems to focus on an invasion threat to South Korea from North Korean forces, as depicted on the map. But the threat is changing. A provocation cycle could escalate out of control and lead to an artillery barrage of Seoul, involving some of the 10,000 artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers, firing from hardened positions that the DoD believes to be in range of South Korea.10 Or North Korea might collapse as a result of war or economic failure, leaving up to 200 nuclear, chemical, and biological program sites unsecured (as represented by dots on the map above)..11 In either event, a significant burden would fall on U.S. forces. To counter North Korean artillery, U.S. ground forces would need to provide forces to evacuate U.S. noncombatants; engineering, logistics, and maneuver units to sustain South Korean and U.S. operations to clear artillery within range of Seoul; WMD-elimination task forces to secure chemical or nuclear munitions deployed with artillery units; and ground combat forces to protect each of these types of units. South Korean forces would also be stretched to gain control over North Korean military forces, exert political control over territory captured, and deal with a massive humanitarian catastrophe—all at a time when the South Korean Army is decreasing in size by one-third from its peak. For these reasons, countering an artillery barrage or North Korean WMDs would require significant U.S. ground forces.

#### Nuke war causes extinction.

Steven **Starr 15**. “Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting To Happen.” Ratical. March 2015. <https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html> TG

A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that [ends human history](https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StarrNuclearWinterOct09.pdf). There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food. Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making. The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to [destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer](https://www2.ucar.edu/atmosnews/just-published/3995/nuclear-war-and-ultraviolet-radiation) and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.

## 2

#### The global economy is stabilizing and set for increases in 2021 but is still vulnerable to shocks.

**WB 21**. (The World Bank Group is one of the world’s largest sources of funding and knowledge for developing countries. Its five institutions share a commitment to reducing poverty, increasing shared prosperity, and promoting sustainable development.) "The Global Economy: on Track for Strong but Uneven Growth As COVID-19 Still Weighs." World Bank, 8 June 2021, www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/06/08/the-global-economy-on-track-for-strong-but-uneven-growth-as-covid-19-still-weighs.

A year and a half since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the global economy is poised to stage its most robust post-recession recovery in 80 years in 2021. But the rebound is expected to be uneven across countries, as major economies look set to register strong growth even as many developing economies lag. Global growth is expected to accelerate to 5.6% this year, largely on the strength in major economies such as the United States and China. And while growth for almost every region of the world has been revised upward for 2021, many continue to grapple with COVID-19 and what is likely to be its long shadow. Despite this year’s pickup, the level of global GDP in 2021 is expected to be 3.2% below pre-pandemic projections, and per capita GDP among many emerging market and developing economies is anticipated to remain below pre-COVID-19 peaks for an extended period. As the pandemic continues to flare, it will shape the path of global economic activity.

#### Strikes dismantle critical core industries that is necessary to avoid recession.

**McElroy 19**, John. (John is editorial director of Blue Sky Productions and producer of "Autoline" for WTVS-Channel 56 Detroit and "Autoline Daily" the online video newscasts.) "**Strikes** Hurt Everybody." WardsAuto, 25 Oct. 2019, www.wardsauto.com/ideaxchange/strikes-hurt-everybody.

This creates a poisonous relationship between the company and its workforce. Many GM hourly workers don’t identify as GM employees. They identify as UAW members. And they see the union as the source of their jobs, not the company. It’s an unhealthy dynamic that puts GM at a disadvantage to non-union automakers in the U.S. like Honda and Toyota, where workers take pride in the company they work for and the products they make. Attacking the company in the media also drives away customers. Who wants to buy a shiny new car from a company that’s accused of underpaying its workers and treating them unfairly? Data from the Center for Automotive Research (CAR) in Ann Arbor, MI, show that GM loses market share during strikes and never gets it back. GM lost two percentage points during the 1998 strike, which in today’s market would represent a loss of 340,000 sales. Because GM reports sales on a quarterly basis we’ll only find out at the end of December if it lost market share from this strike. UAW members say one of their greatest concerns is job security. But causing a company to lose market share is a sure-fire path to more plant closings and layoffs. Even so, unions are incredibly important for boosting wages and benefits for working-class people. GM’s UAW-represented workers earn considerably more than their non-union counterparts, about $26,000 more per worker, per year, in total compensation. Without a union they never would have achieved that. Strikes are a powerful weapon for unions. They usually are the only way they can get management to accede to their demands. If not for the power of collective bargaining and the threat of a strike, management would largely ignore union demands. If you took away that threat, management would pay its workers peanuts. Just ask the Mexican line workers who are paid $1.50 an hour to make $50,000 BMWs. But strikes don’t just hurt the people walking the picket lines or the company they’re striking against. They hurt suppliers, car dealers and the communities located near the plants. The Anderson Economic Group estimates that 75,000 workers at supplier companies were temporarily laid off because of the GM strike. Unlike UAW picketers, those supplier workers won’t get any strike pay or an $11,000 contract signing bonus. No, most of them lost close to a month’s worth of wages, which must be financially devastating for them. GM’s suppliers also lost a lot of money. So now they’re cutting budgets and delaying capital investments to make up for the lost revenue, which is a further drag on the economy. According to CAR, the communities and states where GM’s plants are located collectively lost a couple of hundred million dollars in payroll and tax revenue. Some economists warn that if the strike were prolonged it could knock the state of Michigan – home to GM and the UAW – into a recession. That prompted the governor of Michigan, Gretchen Whitmer, to call GM CEO Mary Barra and UAW leaders and urge them to settle as fast as possible. So, while the UAW managed to get a nice raise for its members, the strike left a path of destruction in its wake. That’s not fair to the innocent bystanders who will never regain what they lost. John McElroyI’m not sure how this will ever be resolved. I understand the need for collective bargaining and the threat of a strike. But there’s got to be a better way to get workers a raise without torching the countryside.

#### Strikes create a stigmatization effect over labor and investment - devastates growth.

**Tenza 20**, Mlungisi. (Mr Mlungisi Tenza is a lecturer in the field of Labour Law at the School of Law. He holds a LLM Degree. His research interests are in Constitutional Law, Law of Trade Marks and Competition Law.. Academic Qualifications: LLB LLM Professional Qualifications: Admitted Attorney of the High Court of South Africa Commissioner of the CCMA) "THE EFFECTS OF VIOLENT STRIKES ON THE ECONOMY OF A DEVELOPING COUNTRY: A CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA." SciELO - Scientific Electronic Library Online, 2020, www.scielo.org.za/pdf/obiter/v41n3/04.pdf.

When South Africa obtained democracy in 1994, there was a dream of a better country with a new vision for industrial relations.5 However, the number of violent strikes that have bedevilled this country in recent years seems to have shattered-down the aspirations of a better South Africa. South Africa recorded 114 strikes in 2013 and 88 strikes in 2014, which cost the country about R6.1 billion according to the Department of Labour.6 The impact of these strikes has been hugely felt by the mining sector, particularly the platinum industry. The biggest strike took place in the platinum sector where about 70 000 mineworkers’ downed tools for better wages. Three major platinum producers (Impala, Anglo American and Lonmin Platinum Mines) were affected. The strike started on 23 January 2014 and ended on 25 June 2014. Business Day reported that “the five-month-long strike in the platinum sector pushed the economy to the brink of recession”. 7 This strike was closely followed by a four-week strike in the metal and engineering sector. All these strikes (and those not mentioned here) were characterised with violence accompanied by damage to property, intimidation, assault and sometimes the killing of people. Statistics from the metal and engineering sector showed that about 246 cases of intimidation were reported, 50 violent incidents occurred, and 85 cases of vandalism were recorded.8 Large-scale unemployment, soaring poverty levels and the dramatic income inequality that characterise the South African labour market provide a broad explanation for strike violence.9 While participating in a strike, workers’ stress levels leave them feeling frustrated at their seeming powerlessness, which in turn provokes further violent behaviour.10 These strikes are not only violent but take long to resolve. Generally, a lengthy strike has a negative effect on employment, reduces business confidence and increases the risk of economic stagflation. In addition, such strikes have a major setback on the growth of the economy and investment opportunities. It is common knowledge that consumer spending is directly linked to economic growth. At the same time, if the economy is not showing signs of growth, employment opportunities are shed, and poverty becomes the end result. The economy of South Africa is in need of rapid growth to enable it to deal with the high levels of unemployment and resultant poverty. One of the measures that may boost the country’s economic growth is by attracting potential investors to invest in the country. However, this might be difficult as investors would want to invest in a country where there is a likelihood of getting returns for their investments. The wish of getting returns for investment may not materialise if the labour environment is not fertile for such investments as a result of, for example, unstable labour relations. Therefore, investors may be reluctant to invest where there is an unstable or fragile labour relations environment. 3 THE COMMISSION OF VIOLENCE DURING A STRIKE AND CONSEQUENCES The Constitution guarantees every worker the right to join a trade union, participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union, and to strike. 11 The Constitution grants these rights to a “worker” as an individual.12 However, the right to strike and any other conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike such as a picket13 can only be exercised by workers acting collectively.14 The right to strike and participation in the activities of a trade union were given more effect through the enactment of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 199515 (LRA). The main purpose of the LRA is to “advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace”. 16 The advancement of social justice means that the exercise of the right to strike must advance the interests of workers and at the same time workers must refrain from any conduct that can affect those who are not on strike as well members of society. Even though the right to strike and the right to participate in the activities of a trade union that often flow from a strike17 are guaranteed in the Constitution and specifically regulated by the LRA, it sometimes happens that the right to strike is exercised for purposes not intended by the Constitution and the LRA, generally. 18 For example, it was not the intention of the Constitutional Assembly and the legislature that violence should be used during strikes or pickets. As the Constitution provides, pickets are meant to be peaceful. 19 Contrary to section 17 of the Constitution, the conduct of workers participating in a strike or picket has changed in recent years with workers trying to emphasise their grievances by causing disharmony and chaos in public. A media report by the South African Institute of Race Relations pointed out that between the years 1999 and 2012 there were 181 strike-related deaths, 313 injuries and 3,058 people were arrested for public violence associated with strikes.20 The question is whether employers succumb easily to workers’ demands if a strike is accompanied by violence? In response to this question, one worker remarked as follows: “[T]here is no sweet strike, there is no Christian strike … A strike is a strike. [Y]ou want to get back what belongs to you ... you won’t win a strike with a Bible. You do not wear high heels and carry an umbrella and say ‘1992 was under apartheid, 2007 is under ANC’. You won’t win a strike like that.” 21 The use of violence during industrial action affects not only the strikers or picketers, the employer and his or her business but it also affects innocent members of the public, non-striking employees, the environment and the economy at large. In addition, striking workers visit non-striking workers’ homes, often at night, threaten them and in some cases, assault or even murder workers who are acting as replacement labour. 22 This points to the fact that for many workers and their families’ living conditions remain unsafe and vulnerable to damage due to violence. In Security Services Employers Organisation v SA Transport & Allied Workers Union (SATAWU),23 it was reported that about 20 people were thrown out of moving trains in the Gauteng province; most of them were security guards who were not on strike and who were believed to be targeted by their striking colleagues. Two of them died, while others were admitted to hospitals with serious injuries.24 In SA Chemical Catering & Allied Workers Union v Check One (Pty) Ltd,25 striking employees were carrying various weapons ranging from sticks, pipes, planks and bottles. One of the strikers Mr Nqoko was alleged to have threatened to cut the throats of those employees who had been brought from other branches of the employer’s business to help in the branch where employees were on strike. Such conduct was held not to be in line with good conduct of striking.26 These examples from case law show that South Africa is facing a problem that is affecting not only the industrial relations’ sector but also the economy at large. For example, in 2012, during a strike by workers employed by Lonmin in Marikana, the then-new union Association of Mine & Construction Workers Union (AMCU) wanted to exert its presence after it appeared that many workers were not happy with the way the majority union, National Union of Mine Workers (NUM), handled negotiations with the employer (Lonmin Mine). AMCU went on an unprotected strike which was violent and resulted in the loss of lives, damage to property and negative economic consequences including a weakened currency, reduced global investment, declining productivity, and increase unemployment in the affected sectors.27 Further, the unreasonably long time it takes for strikes to get resolved in the Republic has a negative effect on the business of the employer, the economy and employment. 3 1 Effects of violent and long strikes on the economy Generally, South Africa’s economy is on a downward scale. First, it fails to create employment opportunities for its people. The recent statistics on unemployment levels indicate that unemployment has increased from 26.5% to 27.2%. 28 The most prominent strike which nearly brought the platinum industries to its knees was the strike convened by AMCU in 2014. The strike started on 23 January 2014 and ended on 24 June 2014. It affected the three big platinum producers in the Republic, which are the Anglo American Platinum, Lonmin Plc and Impala Platinum. It was the longest strike since the dawn of democracy in 1994. As a result of this strike, the platinum industries lost billions of rands.29 According to the report by Economic Research Southern Africa, the platinum group metals industry is South Africa’s second-largest export earner behind gold and contributes just over 2% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).30 The overall metal ores in the mining industry which include platinum sells about 70% of its output to the export market while sales to local manufacturers of basic metals, fabricated metal products and various other metal equipment and machinery make up to 20%. 31 The research indicates that the overall impact of the strike in 2014 was driven by a reduction in productive capital in the mining sector, accompanied by a decrease in labour available to the economy. This resulted in a sharp increase in the price of the output by 5.8% with a GDP declined by 0.72 and 0.78%.32

#### Err neg – data is misleading and underestimates economic damage.

**Babb ND**, Katrina. (Economics Instructor at Indiana State University) "Chapter 11: The Economic Impact of Unions." ISU, isu.indstate.edu/conant/ecn351/ch11/chapter11.htm.

Strikes ­ Simple statistics on strike activity suggest that strikes are relatively rare and the associated aggregate economic losses are relatively minimal. Table 11-3 provides data on major work stoppages, defined as those involving 1000 or more workers and lasting at least one full day or one work shift. But these data can be misleading as a measure of the costliness of a strike. On the one hand, employers in the struck industry may have anticipated the strike and worked their labor force overtime to accumulate inventories to supply customers during the strike period, so that the work lost data overstates the actual loss. On the other hand, the amount lost can be understated by the data if production in associated industries ( those that buy inputs from the struck industry or sell products to it) is disrupted. As a broad generalization, the adverse effects of a strike on nonstriking firms and customers are likely to be greater when services are involved and less when products are involved. Remember, that strikes are the result of the failure of both parties to the negotiation, so it is inaccurate to attribute all of the costs associated with a strike to labor alone.

#### Decline goes nuclear.

Tønnesson 15, Stein. "Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace." International Area Studies Review 18.3 (2015): 297-311. (the Department of Peace and Conflict, Uppsala University, Sweden, and Peace research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway)

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

#### Nuke war causes extinction.

Steven **Starr 15**. “Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting To Happen.” Ratical. March 2015. <https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html> TG

A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that [ends human history](https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StarrNuclearWinterOct09.pdf). There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food. Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making. The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to [destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer](https://www2.ucar.edu/atmosnews/just-published/3995/nuclear-war-and-ultraviolet-radiation) and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.

## 3

#### The meta ethic is perspectivism – truth is not absolute but rather created by individuals based on their own individual perspective. Prefer it

1] Bindingness - Even if agents can obtain an objective viewpoint, they wouldn't be obligated to act upon those truths – I can just choose not to be a Kantian or a Rawlsian, but I cannot choose to detach from my subjectivity and act without any influence from experience.

2] Distortion – Even if an objective view exists – it would be distorted by experience. i.e., a person brought up in a racist household is more likely to think all black people are criminals independent of an objective framework telling them otherwise.

3] Rule-following paradox—rules are infinitely regressive because they rely on more rules to explain them that are based in social understanding.

4] Epistemology—the way we interpret the natural world is necessarily framed by social constructs—we don’t call trees trees because of some natural fact about trees.

5] Externalism fails—even if a priori normative facts exist, they’re epistemically inaccessible because humans are products of their molecular biology—the mind can’t derive facts independent of material, external forces like gravity.

#### But the state of nature leads to infinite violence – competing truth claims means conflicts cannot be resolved. Five warrants:

1] Ambiguity – everyone can assert their own claims to be true and refuse contestation – this means we always fight over who is correct. This is irresolvable because there is no mediator to adjudicate the dispute and tell who is correct – we just fight forever

2] Self-Interest – everyone wants their truth claims to be true because it benefits them – this leads to conflict because we can’t divide limited resources and must compete – terminates in death because neither of us want to concede to the other

3] Pre-emption—if there’s no basis to condemn actions, then everyone acts solely in their own self-interest—that means the most rational strategy is to take people out before they can hurt you

4] Resource Wars—a finite amount of material resources creates conflict between different people who want it

5] Action Theory—the imposition of your world view through action necessitates violence against the other since it de-legitimizes their perspective.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the will of the sovereign.

#### There is no objective solution to this conflict, because truth is relative. Instead, conflict requires the creation of the sovereign, to resolve disputes. In exchange for their safety, subjects agree to give up their claims to meaning to the sovereign.

**Parrish 04** [Parrish, Rick, (Rick Parrish teaches at Loyola University New Orleans. His current research is focused on the play of violence and respect within justice.) "Derrida’S Economy Of Violence In Hobbes’ Social Contract" Theory &amp; Event, Vol. 7 No. 4, 2005, 2005, http://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119#back, DOA:6-30-2018 // WWBW]

All of the foregoing points to the conclusion that in the commonwealth **the sovereign's** first and **most fundamental job is to be the ultimate definer**. Several other commentators have also reached this conclusion. By way of elaborating upon the importance of the moderation of individuality in Hobbes' theory of government, Richard Flathman claims that peace "is possible only if the ambiguity and disagreement that pervade general thinking and acting are eliminated by the stipulations of a sovereign."57 Pursuant to debunking the perennial misinterpretation of Hobbes' mention of people as wolves, Paul Johnson argues that "one of the primary functions of the sovereign is to provide the necessary unity of meaning and reference for the primary terms in which men try to conduct their social lives."58 "The whole raison d'être of sovereign helmsmanship lies squarely in the chronic defusing of interpretive clashes,"59 without which humans would "fly off in all directions"60 and fall inevitably into the violence of the natural condition**.** 26. It is not surprising that so many noted students of Hobbes have reached this conclusion, given how prominently he himself makes this claim. According to Hobbes, "in the state of nature, where every man is his own judge, and differeth from others concerning the names and appellations of things, and from those differences arise quarrels and breach of peace, it was necessary there should be a common measure of all things, that might fall in controversy."61 The main categories of the sovereign's tasks are "to make and abrogate laws, to determine war and peace, [and] to know and judge of all controversies,"62 but each of these duties is a subspecies of its ultimate duty to be the sole and ultimate definer in matters of public importance. **It is only through the** sovereign's effective continued accomplishment of this duty **that the people** of a commonwealth **avoid** the definitional problems that typify **the state of nature.** 27. Judging controversies, which Hobbes lists as the third main task of the sovereign, is the duty most obviously about being the ultimate definer. In fact, Hobbes declares it a law of nature that "in every controversy, the parties thereto ought mutually to agree upon an arbitrator, whom they both trust; and mutually to covenant to stand to the sentence he shall give therein."63 As I repeatedly alluded to above, this agreement to abide by the decision of a third party arbitrator, **a sovereign** in the commonwealth, **is necessary because of the** fundamentally perspectival and **relative nature of persons' imputations of meaning** and value **into the situations they construct.** Hobbes understands this problem, as evidenced by his claim that "seeing right reason is not existent, the reason of some man or men must supply the place thereof; and that man or men, is he or they, that have the sovereign power"64 to dictate meanings that will be followed by all. The sovereign is even protected from potential democratic impulses, by which a 'true' meaning would be that agreed upon by the greatest number of people. Because "no one man's reason, nor the reason of any one number of men, makes the certainty," they will still "come to blows . . . for want of a right reason constituted by nature"65 unless both the majority and the minority agree to abide by the meanings promulgated by the sovereign. 28. These meanings are usually created and promulgated by the sovereign in the form of laws, another of the tasks with which Hobbes charges it. In one of his clearest explanations of the law, Hobbes writes that "it belongs to the same chief power to make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what another's, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what evil; that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoided in our common course of life."66 The civil law is the set of the sovereign's definitions for ownership, justice, good, evil, and all other concepts that are important for the maintenance of peace in the commonwealth. When everyone follows the law (that is, when everyone follows the sovereign's definitions) there are far fewer conflicts among persons because everyone appeals to the same meanings. This means that people know what meanings others will use to evaluate the actions of themselves and others, so the state of nature's security dilemmas and attempts to force one's own meanings upon others are overcome. 29. **There is to be no question of the truth or falsity of the sovereign's definitions** because "there are no authentical doctrines concerning right and wrong, good and evil, besides the constituted laws in each realm and government."67 In fact, Hobbes specifically says that one of the "diseases of a commonwealth" is that "every private man is judge of good and evil actions."68 **Only when individual persons agree to follow the** meanings promulgated by **the sovereign, which** of course **includes refraining from trying to impose their own meanings** on others, **can persons live together in peace -- when they take it upon themselves to impose meaning** on situations of public import, **they descend into violence again.**

#### Now negate –

1] Since there’s no central international sovereign, there can’t be an obligation for states to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike

2] States are only bound to their citizens, not other states so even if there was an international authority they wouldn’t be obligated to act.

3] Since states have not recognized the unconditional right of workers to strike, that means it is the will of the sovereign to have them.

4] Can’t put obligation on the sovereign on how to treat their subjects.

5] The aff creates conflicting sovereigns, past efforts prove right to strike was done by the states and local governing whereas the aff tries to impose a new sovereign which is contradictory in conception

6] Rollback – even if the policy was fiated, it would just get eliminated since it hinders the sovereign.

7] states can’t have obligations to external standards like international law since their only obligation is to avoid the state of nature –the state can’t restrict its own power since it exists outside the law which means the res is impossible – vote neg on presumption

8] the state has an obligation to maintain its coercive power since that’s how it arbitrates disputes – it can’t give up recognize the right to strike since they’re necessary to resolve the state of nature

9] Permissibility negates - ought is defined as a moral obligation so the aff has to prove obligation, resolved means to be firmly determined so the aff isn’t firmly determined if its permissible, Triple Trichotomy an action can’t be obligatory and permissible

10] Presumption negates – negating is harder; 6 mins of solid offense in the AC, they get infinite prep, they get first and last speech, better judge persuasion because they speak last, they set the terms of the round with the AC, and statements are more often false than true

## 4

#### Global tech innovation high now.

Mercury News et al 21 [Mercury News and East Bay Times Editorial Boards, June 4, 2021, “Editorial: How America can Win the Global Tech War” <https://www.mercurynews.com/2021/06/04/editorial-why-silicon-valley-needs-endless-frontier-bill/> //gord0]

The nation that wins the global tech race will dominate the 21st century. This has been true since the 1800s. Given the rapid pace of innovation and tech’s impact on our economy and defense capabilities in the last decade, there is ample evidence to suggest that the need for investment in tech research and development has never been greater. China has been closing the tech gap in recent years by making bold investments in tech with the intent of overtaking the United States. This is a tech war we cannot afford to lose. It’s imperative that Congress pass the Endless Frontier Act and authorize the biggest R&D tech investment in the United States since the Apollo years. Rep. Ro Khanna, D-Santa Clara, made a massive increase in science and technology investment a major part of his platform while campaigning for a seat in Congress in 2016. Now the co-author of the 600-page legislation is on the cusp of pushing through a bipartisan effort that has been years in the making. Khanna and his co-authors, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., Sen. Todd Young, R-Ind., and Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wisc., are shepherding the bill through the Senate, which is expected to approve it sometime later this month. That would set up a reconciliation debate between the House and Senate that would determine the bill’s final language. The ultimate size of the investment is still very much up in the air. Khanna would like Congress to authorize $100 billion over a five-year period for critical advancements in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity, semiconductors and other cutting-edge technologies. The Senate is talking of knocking that number down to $50 billion or $75 billion. They should be reminded of China Premier Li Keqiang’s March announcement that China would increase its research and development spending by an additional 7% per year between 2021 and 2025. The United States still outspends China in R&D, spending $612 billion on research and development in 2019, compared to China’s $514 billion. But the gap is narrowing. At the turn of the century, China was only spending $33 billion a year on R&D, while the United States was spending nearly 10 times that amount. The bill would authorize 10 technology hubs throughout the nation designed to help build the infrastructure, manufacturing facilities and workforce needed to help meet the nation’s tech goals. Building tech centers throughout the United States should also create more support for the industry across the country. Tech’s image has taken a beating in recent years — the emergence of the term “Big Tech” is hardly a positive development — and the industry will need all the support it can muster in Congress. The United States continues to have a crucial tech edge over its competitors, most notably China. The only way we can hope to win the 21st century is to make significant investments in research and development that will spark the next wave of innovation.

#### Unionization wrecks innovation.

**Frick 15**, Walter. (Walter Frick is executive editor, membership at Quartz. Before that he was an editor at Harvard Business Review for six years, most recently as Deputy Editor of HBR.org. He's based in Boston and is interested in economics, technology, and the future of media.) "When Treating Workers Well Leads to More Innovation." Harvard Business Review, 3 Nov. 2015, hbr.org/2015/11/when-treating-workers-well-leads-to-more-innovation.

But not everything that’s good for workers is necessarily good for innovation. A forthcoming paper in Management Science examined the impact of unionization on innovation. It looked at U.S. firms from 1980 to 2005 that voted to unionize, but where the vote was close. The idea was that a close vote mirrored an experiment – the vote could plausibly have gone either way, so it was somewhat random whether the firm ended up unionized. The researchers found that unionization caused a significant decline in innovation, measured by the number and quality of patents issued. (Previous research on how unionization impacts innovation, measured by R&D spending, has been more mixed.) Why might some worker benefits make firms more innovative, but not others? Economic theory suggests the answer may have to do with long-term incentives. If workers feel pressure to deliver results in the short-term, either for fear of being fired or in order to be promoted, they may be less likely to pursue riskier innovations. On the other hand, if failure in the short-term is acceptable or even rewarded, and if workers have a stake in the company’s long-term performance, they should be more likely to innovate. Employee stock options clearly meet these criteria, by tying workers’ incentives to the long-term fate of the company. Other worker benefits may also encourage workers to take a longer view, at least indirectly; more satisfied workers stay at the firm longer, and therefore have more of a stake in the company’s long-term success. Labor laws may have a similar effect. So what’s different about unions? Daniel Bradley, a professor at the University of South Florida and co-author of the unionization study, suggested the answer is loyalty. “Union employees invest significantly less in their company’s 401k compared to non-union workers,” he told me, citing a 2009 study which interprets this fact as evidence that union workers are less loyal to their employer. “Unionization inhibits employee loyalty,” he continued, “because having a too loyal workforce would jeopardize the collective bargaining process.” “Ultimately, firms must find a way of motivating employees to be willing to take risks in order to come up with innovative inventions,” said Edward Podolski-Boczar, professor at LaTrobe, and co-author of the worker treatment paper. “Not all forms of improved employee conditions naturally translate into improved innovation outcomes,” he added, when I asked about the unionization result. But as his research demonstrates, many do. Treating workers well is part of building an innovative company, but it isn’t enough. Employees also need to have a long-term stake in the company’s success.

#### Victories like the aff mobilizes unions in the IT sector.

Vynck et al 21 [Gerrit De; Carleton University, BA in Journalism and Global Politics, tech reporter for The Washington Post. He writes about Google and the algorithms that increasingly shape society. He previously covered tech for seven years at Bloomberg News; Nitashu Tiku; Columbia University, BA in English, New York University, MA in Journalism, Washington Post's tech culture reporter based in San Francisco; Macalester College, BA in English, Columbia University, MS in Journalism, reporter for The Washington Post who is focused on technology coverage in the Pacific Northwest; “Six things to know about the latest efforts to bring unions to Big Tech,” The Washington Post; https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/26/tech-unions-explainer/]//SJWen

In response to tech company crackdowns and lobbying, gig workers have shifted their strategy to emphasize building worker-led movements and increasing their ranks, rather than focusing on employment status as the primary goal, says Veena Dubal, a law professor at the University of California Hastings College of the Law in San Francisco. The hope is that with President Biden in the White House and an even split in the Senate, legislators will mobilize at the federal level, through the NLRA or bills such as the PRO Act, to recognize gig worker collectives as real unions.

#### Technological innovation solves every existential threat – which outweighs.

Matthews 18 Dylan. Co-founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead @ Rutgers University. 10-26-2018. "How to help people millions of years from now." Vox. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good

If you care about improving human lives, you should overwhelmingly care about those quadrillions of lives rather than the comparatively small number of people alive today. The 7.6 billion people now living, after all, amount to less than 0.003 percent of the population that will live in the future. It’s reasonable to suggest that those quadrillions of future people have, accordingly, hundreds of thousands of times more moral weight than those of us living here today do. That’s the basic argument behind Nick Beckstead’s 2013 Rutgers philosophy dissertation, “On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future.” It’s a glorious mindfuck of a thesis, not least because Beckstead shows very convincingly that this is a conclusion any plausible moral view would reach. It’s not just something that weird utilitarians have to deal with. And Beckstead, to his considerable credit, walks the walk on this. He works at the Open Philanthropy Project on grants relating to the far future and runs a charitable fund for donors who want to prioritize the far future. And arguments from him and others have turned “long-termism” into a very vibrant, important strand of the effective altruism community. But what does prioritizing the far future even mean? The most literal thing it could mean is preventing human extinction, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity’s continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. But in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that while that’s certainly part of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address specific threats to humanity (which he calls “targeted” approaches to the far future) have to complement “broad” approaches, where instead of trying to predict what’s going to kill us all, you just generally try to keep civilization running as best it can, so that it is, as a whole, well-equipped to deal with potential extinction events in the future, not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. In other words, caring about the far future doesn’t mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation; it also means acting on pressing needs now. For example: We’re going to be better prepared to prevent extinction from AI or a supervirus or global warming if society as a whole makes a lot of scientific progress. And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn’t get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. So maybe one of the best things we can do for the far future is to improve school systems — here and now — to harness the group economist Raj Chetty calls “lost Einsteins” (potential innovators who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world. What if living ethically for the far future means living ethically now? Beckstead mentions some other broad, or very broad, ideas (these are all his descriptions): Help make computers faster so that people everywhere can work more efficiently Change intellectual property law so that technological innovation can happen more quickly Advocate for open borders so that people from poorly governed countries can move to better-governed countries and be more productive Meta-research: improve incentives and norms in academic work to better advance human knowledge Improve education Advocate for political party X to make future people have values more like political party X ”If you look at these areas (economic growth and technological progress, access to information, individual capability, social coordination, motives) a lot of everyday good works contribute,” Beckstead writes. “An implication of this is that a lot of everyday good works are good from a broad perspective, even though hardly anyone thinks explicitly in terms of far future standards.” Look at those examples again: It’s just a list of what normal altruistically motivated people, not effective altruism folks, generally do. Charities in the US love talking about the lost opportunities for innovation that poverty creates. Lots of smart people who want to make a difference become scientists, or try to work as teachers or on improving education policy, and lord knows there are plenty of people who become political party operatives out of a conviction that the moral consequences of the party’s platform are good. All of which is to say: Maybe effective altruists aren’t that special, or at least maybe we don’t have access to that many specific and weird conclusions about how best to help the world. If the far future is what matters, and generally trying to make the world work better is among the best ways to help the far future, then effective altruism just becomes plain ol’ do-goodery.

## CASE

#### Democratic transitions produce transition wars – statistics and empirics.

Mansfield and Snyder 95 – Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science, Chair of the Political Science Department, and Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania; Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science and a Member of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University (Edward D. and Jack L., “Democratization and War,” *Foreign Affairs*, 1 May 1995, Web, accessed 20 July 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50974/edward-mansfield-and-jack-snyder/democratization-and-war>

But countries do not become mature democracies overnight. They usually go through a rocky transition, where mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics in a volatile way. Statistical evidence covering the past two centuries shows that in this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states. In fact, formerly authoritarian states where democratic participation is on the rise are more likely to fight wars than are stable democracies or autocracies. States that make the biggest leap, from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy--like contemporary Russia--are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization as are states that remain autocracies.¶ This historical pattern of democratization, belligerent nationalism, and war is already emerging in some of today's new or partial democracies, especially some formerly communist states. Two pairs of states--Serbia and Croatia, and Armenia and Azerbaijan--have found themselves at war while experimenting with varying degrees of electoral democracy. The electorate of Russia's partial democracy cast nearly a quarter of its votes for the party of radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Even mainstream Russian politicians have adopted an imperial tone in their dealings with neighboring former Soviet republics, and military force has been used ruthlessly in Chechnya.¶ The following evidence should raise questions about the Clinton administration's policy of promoting peace by promoting democratization. The expectation that the spread of democracy will probably contribute to peace in the long run, once new democracies mature, provides little comfort to those who might face a heightened risk of war in the short run. Pushing nuclear-armed great powers like Russia or China toward democratization is like spinning a roulette wheel: many of the outcomes are undesirable. Of course, in most cases the initial steps on the road to democratization will not be produced by any conscious policy of the United States. The roulette wheel is already spinning for Russia and perhaps will be soon for China. Washington and the international community need to think not so much about encouraging or discouraging democratization as about helping to smooth the transition in ways that minimize its risks.

#### Democratic transition empirically leads to war.

Le Roy 12, Alex, 2012 (Alex Le Roy is an International Relations Graduate from the University of Portsmouth. Alex Le Roy is a frequent contributor to Conflict & Security of the International Policy Digest, an online news site that has been featured in many prominent media sources, “Is Democracy Good For Economic Growth? Part 2”, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/11/28/is-democracy-good-for-economic-growth-part-2/)

I previously argued that democracy often inhibits the economic growth of developing states. This is because democracy generally results in the diffusion of economic decision making throughout the population, which exposes domestic businesses to larger, more efficient, foreign competitors. Thus, I contended that centrally coordinated control over economic policy allows for greater long term growth, and the political conditions most favourable for this are authoritarian ones. For example, all of the so called ‘Asian Tigers’ achieved economic growth through the implementation of protectionist economic policies, which were coordinated via a centralised authority. Moreover, almost all of these countries democratised only after their economies had become developed. Nonetheless, they did democratise, which brings us to another question: Is economic growth good for democracy. And the answer is, initially, no As stated in the first article, only three of the world’s top twenty richest countries are not democratic. Of these three, both Saudi Arabia and Russia derive their wealth from the primary economic sector, resource extraction, in the form of non-renewable energy reserves. The former, in particular, generates massive revenue from its abundant crude oil reserves, which constitute 95 percent of exports. Coupled with a relatively small population, of which around a third are foreign expatriates, the kingdom is blessed with a very high per capita GDP. In the case of Russia, many people associate democracy with the chaos that ensued within Russia as a result of the failed economic transition of the early 1990’s. As Russia embarked on an ambitious dual transition (economic and political) from a communist system, a policy of economic ‘shock’ therapy created vast inequalities, resulting in the impoverishment of much of the population. Coupled with the 1998 financial crisis, it is not surprising that many ordinary Russians were very supportive of Vladimir Putin when he instigated a programme of political and economic centralisation, which led to stable economic growth. Nonetheless, there are renewed calls for democracy in Russia, demonstrated by several recent protests, and it is arguable that domestic conditions are favourable for political reform, though such speculation is moot at present. The third country, China, has not yet matured economically, having undergone an economic transition gradually since 1978. The result of this transition to a market economy has resulted in the largest industrial revolution in history, controlled centrally through the government’s policy of pursuing five year plans. Consequently, the Chinese government has managed to maintain annual economic growth at around 10 percent, maintaining its legitimacy by improving the lives of almost all of its citizens. Thus, the three exceptions to the rule, which poses the question; why are these authoritarian regimes the exceptions, and not the rule? The answer, arguably, lies in the way that the authorities deal with dissent. Significantly, as the Russian example illustrated, such dissent is largely fuelled by economic strife. Economic strife is usually caused by market intervention. An example of market intervention is central planning.Ultimately, central planning undermines capitalism because it distorts the ‘real’ market, the invisible hand, coined by Adam Smith to explain the way in which the market regulates itself through an equilibrium of supply and demand. A contemporary example of this is the manner in which the Chinese authorities are fixing exchange rates to ensure that their domestic currency, the Yuan, is being maintained at an artificially low value. The perceived benefit of this is a reduction in the cost of Chinese exports to foreign consumers. Ultimately, this practice is unsustainable because it encourages inflation, which is only being managed at the present time by the export boom, which will inevitably end. The prominent economist, Friedrich von Hayek, argued that the economy, in its vast entirety, is too complex to be fully understood. Consequently, central planning results in a mismanagement that ultimately culminates in disaster; and as soon as it becomes clear that the government does not have all the answers, people want to take decisions into their own hands. Thus, on a fundamentally political level, the source of dissent becomes less significant than the way in which it is channelled. Within democracies, grievances can be dealt with through a change of government effected by popular consent in the form of elections, as well as direct measures such as petitions. Authoritarian regimes find discontent a lot harder to manage, primarily because they do not have this option. Furthermore, if authoritarian regimes do attempt to utilise these measures, the public often correctly recognises them as contrived. As tensions build, the only means for authoritarian regimes to contain dissent are repressive; and as the Arab Spring has recently illustrated, these lead to political polarisation, and, more often than not, failure. However, the consequences of democratic transition are often ruinous for national economies, as the price of democracy is usually paid in blood; armed rebellion, and in extreme cases, civil war. So, in the short term, democracy is bad for economic growth. However, the long term impact of democratic governance is the best thing possible for the economy.

**No impact to US hegemony — it’s not key to global stability. US lacks *persuasion* and *influence* which are key to coercion and international cooperation — proven by *decades* of economic and military failures.**

Simon **Reich 17**, Professor in the Division of Global Affairs at Rutgers University, Newark, Richard Ned Ledbow, Professor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College, and James O. Freedman, President Emeritus of Dartmouth College, “Influence and Hegemony: Shifting Patterns of Material and Social Power in World Politics,” *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace* 6(1), January 2017, pp. 17-47

US hegemony was a **short-lived** postwar phenomenon. Imre Latakos famously asserted that waning theories built auxiliary hypotheses when presented with important evidence with which they are irreconcilable.26 Liberals and realists appear to have been revising both history and theory through this means in an effort to substantiate their continued research program on American hegemony. Admittedly, they go through cycles where they assert, in the famous words of Samuel Huntington, either American “decline or renewal.” 27 Although this scholarship recognizes the cycles and challenges to American hegemony, there is little dissent from the view among these scholars that unipolarity continues unabated. Certainly, the political science and historical literatures are replete with warnings about imperial overstretch, ranging from Robert Gilpin’s seminal War and Change in World Politics to Paul Kennedy‘s historical tome The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.28 Yet the debate appears to replay, dating from the 1980s, without a consensus being agreed about any terminative date. Robert Keohane for example, published his seminal book After Hegemony in 1984. Charles Kindleberger, who coined the term “stabilizer,” and on whose analysis liberals and realists are so reliant, declared American hegemony dead even earlier - by the end of the 1970s.29 Then the rise of Japan created the specter of a power transition. Yet the end of the Cold War and the implosion of Japan’s economy provided both liberals and realists with the opportunity to resurrect the notion of continued American hegemony. A brazen arrogance led to military adventurism in Iraq – what Richard Haass famously referred to as a war of choice.30 Most recently, the current debate over China clearly echoes that about Japan two decades ago, as less distinguished, anxiety-generating books with titles like Hegemon: China’s Plan to dominate Asia and the World clearly attest. Even these sensationalist books find their counterparts in mainstream academia, with titles like those of Aaron L. Freidberg’s, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia.31 The content of the latter may be sober and reflective, but the answer is based on a **similar set of assumptions**: the US is hegemonic, it is in decline, and the key question is when the lines with China will cross, in the process of power transition. Yet liberals and realists are still today resolved to maintain a view of the US as hegemonic. Even now, approximately three decades after Kindleberger’s and Keohane’s declarations that hegemony had ended, Ikenberry describes the current crisis as one “of authority within the old hegemonic organization of liberal order, not a crisis in the deep principles of the order itself. It is a crisis of governance.” As a result, “the character of rule in world politics has been thrown into question.”32 Although American leadership is being challenged, the liberal international order remains resilient. “As an organizational logic of world politics,” it is, however, a victim of its own success suggests Ikenberry. A new bargain needs to be struck between the US and emergent actors. It will still rest on a unipolar distribution of power, and with it, “constituencies that support a continued -- if renegotiated -- American hegemonic role” within a liberal hegemonic order. Under such a new arrangement, the US would still qualify as a hegemon.33 Comparably, as evidence of the continued pervasiveness of comparable assumptions in the policy world, the introduction to a 2012 Rand report on the US’ global defense posture commissioned for the Air Force reflexively opened with declaration that the US is a global hegemon.34 **In influential scholarship and policy work, the myth thus lives on**. Part of the problem in evaluating this claim is that there appears to have been few systematic attempts to codify, operationalize and measure the six indicators of being a “**stabilizer**” that Kindleberger outlined in his original work, Simon Reich‘s 2015 study with Carla Norrlof being the exception.35 This omission has left many Liberals and Realists to claim America was a hegemon during the Cold War, when they were the dominant economy for at least a large part of that period, even though military power was clearly bipolar. It then allowed them to make the same claim after 1991 when military power was (and is) unipolar but the US clearly **no longer served** as the lender of **last resort or stabilizer**. A more dispassionate view suggests that **American hegemony was very short lived and quickly eroded**. By any serious economic measure, it **stopped serving as the world’s economic hegemon decades ago**. In 1944, the US GDP peaked at 35 percent of the world total, a figure that had dropped to 25 by 1960 and 20 percent by 1980.36 Today, by way of comparison, it has fluctuated in recent years at around 25%, never approximating its peak. The US ran **significant deficits** during the Viet Nam war and delinked the dollar from the gold standard in 1971.37 In the 1980s, the US ran up budget deficits and systematically reneged on its own liberal trading rules by introducing a variety of **tariffs and quotas** under the Reagan administration instead of bearing the costs of economic adjustments.38 Contemporary policymakers have done the same to China.39 More specific figures support this general picture. Until the end of the 1960s, the US current account balance ran at zero or a small surplus. That position dramatically eroded in the 1980s, and the US current account deficit peaked at 6% in 2006, just before the financial crisis.40 This took place at a time when there was a consistent decline in net US public and private savings.41 American policies had the effect of making the US government and consumers **increasingly reliant on foreign capital to finance their expenditures**. Over-expenditure by individual Americans and their government -- reflected in low personal savings rates coupled with increased government deficits -- became important causes of global imbalances.42 The growth in American **personal debt** has been unmistakable: from a peak of 14.6% in 1975, and an average of around 9% in the 1980s, the American net savings rate declined to around zero by the turn of the century. It reached a low of -0.5% in 2005, a statistic not seen since during the Great Depression in 1933.43 As savings plummeted, debt increased. By 2005, total U.S. household debt, including mortgage loans and consumer debt, stood at $11.4 trillion.44 A decade later, despite the salutary lessons of the Great Recession, it had increased $12.07 trillion.45 The US federal **budget deficit** grew in a similar fashion. Since the end of second Clinton Administration, the debt of the US government has increased annually. It went from $186.2bn inflation-adjusted dollars in 2002 to over $16.8 trillion by April of 2013.46 The National Clock then calculated a figure: an average of nearly $53,500 owed per citizen.47 It ballooned during the Obama administration.48 Figures for the US trade deficit are just as illuminating. According to the US Census Bureau, the US has run a **trade deficit** in goods and services every year since 1969, with the exception of 1973 and 1975. Comparable to the budget deficit, these figures have worsened over time and have also ballooned since the turn of the century, peaking in 2006 on the eve of the financial crisis.49 Liberals and realists thus consistently **ignore a wealth of economic data** in proclaiming American postwar hegemony. The **same is true in terms of its military capacity to achieve its foreign policy objectives**. Triumph over Germany and Italy in World War II, the invention and use of nuclear weapons to end the war with Japan, and America’s nuclear arsenal all consolidated Americans’ sense of themselves as hegemonic. The Cold War victory consolidated that view. Yet **military failures** like MacArthur’s push north in the Korean War, the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Vietnam, and more recently, failed interventions in Lebanon, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq, were reconceived of as “victories” (Korea), inconsequential (the Bay of Pigs) or part and parcel of strategies that were, or will be, successful in the longer-term. Bush “hawks,” for example, in revisionist fashion, hailed the Iraq invasion as the necessary prelude to the now-aborted Arab Spring years later, despite its unprecedented cost, while Afghanistan – America’s longest serving war – is reputed to have been a key component of a successful campaign to defeat al Qaeda.50 For all of America’s unprecedented military capacity, it is **hard to reconcile this long list of questionable military interventions with the dominance that unipolarity and hegemony implies**. Yet realists and liberals continue to apply these terms despite America’s failures to achieved its prescribed policy goals stretching back over the last five decades. More recently, liberals -- and to a lesser extent realists -- have convinced themselves that the role of this military is to ensure the global system’s stability. Often this has been inaccurate if stability is equated with the absence of war. If we calculate ‘war years’ as a simple function of each war multiplied by its longevity, **since 1945, the US has fought more war years than any other country in the world**, with the possible exception of the UK and France.51 A proportion of these wars have been justified by American policymakers as preventative interventions (such as the invasions of Iraq or Afghanistan) or humanitarian ones (such as the invasion of Grenada) and thus validated by a “just war” doctrine. Critics, however, claim it is hard to reconcile starting wars with maintaining stability, suggesting that these are merely a pretext for imperialism.52 Even more mainstream pillars of the establishment – such as Richard Haass, who served in the Bush White House and is currently president of the Council on Foreign Relations – have written approvingly at times of the idea of an imperial US foreign policy.53 Thus, **by either the measure of starting wars or of winning them, American military capacity cannot be equated with hegemony**. Its short preeminence has, nonetheless, been erringly rewritten as the longue durée. 4. Power versus Influence So why has the US, if it is so powerful, **failed to achieve its policy goals**? Proponents of American hegemony still **overwhelmingly rely on a materialist view of power**. As noted earlier, many liberals do note, en passant, the importance of norms and rules. Joseph Nye Jr. have gone much further in focusing on the significance of soft power, although the concept itself is impossible to operationalize and only obtusely linked to foreign policy choices.54 Yet material power is often neither fungible nor the basis for achieving desired foreign policy goals, claims substantiated by the failed American interventions spanning from Korea in the 1950s to Afghanistan and Iraq today. So many failures to explain outcomes or to achieve prescribed policy goals logically suggest that Liberals and Realists need to rethink their position on the significance of power. Conversely, constructivists have erred by focusing exclusively on what Barnett and Duval characterize as social forms of power: framing, argumentation and persuasion.55 We argue that **the concept of “influence,” rather than that of power, is key**. Influence is composed of two aspects: one is **material power**, defines as economic and military resources. The other is social, derived from **the legitimacy of the actor** and the linkage between the actor‘s claim and universalistic values and principles, promoted through processes of persuasion and argumentation.56 Some Constructivists have recognized that social and material forms of power are related.57 Peter Katzenstein, in recalling the perspective of Hedley Bull on the importance of norms, for example, states that “the international system is a society in which states, as a condition of their participation in the system, adhere to shared norms and rules in a variety of issue areas. Material power matters, but **within a framework of normative expectations** embedded in public and customary international law.” 58 Yet, in practice, Constructivists largely remain agnostic on the dynamics of the relationship between social and material power. They prefer to focus on the significance of social power in isolation from material power.59 We recognize different kinds of power and the diverse ways in which power might be translated into influence. In practice, material capabilities and power are related in indirect, complex and often problematic ways. Material capabilities are a principal source of power, but **critical choices must be made** about which capabilities to develop and how to use them. **The Cold War demonstrated the irrelevance of certain raw forms of power**. The USSR and US developed impressive nuclear arsenals and diverse delivery systems for them. These weapons were all but unusable. The principal purpose for which they were designed – all-out superpower war – would have constituted mutual, if not global, suicide. Intended to deter the other side, nuclear weapons and forward deployments of their delivery systems became a principal cause of superpower conflict and greatly extended the Cold War.60 In contrast to most IR theorists, we stress the **dynamic interaction between material and social forms of power**. Both state and non-state actors use combinations of material and social power in attempting to influence other actors in differing configurations and with differing degrees of success. In its most simple conception and formulation, countries can enjoy relatively high degrees of both forms of power and are thus relatively influential. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, is a country that has established high degrees of material and social power in its post-Nazi process of rehabilitation. In global public opinion polls, it consistently scores among the most admired countries in the world and its economy is among the largest and most productive.61 While its military capacities are limited, they are consistent with the foreign policy objectives of German government. As a result, theGermans have become increasingly influential, within the European Union, beyond the Eastern borders of the EU, in a variety of multilateral forums, and even in the halls of power in Beijing, Moscow and Washington.62 Alternatively, Iran is an example of a country whose leadership lacks much by way of material or social power, which may in part explain its sustained efforts to develop a nuclear capability for a decade, even as its economy was ravaged by the effects of sanctions. Despite the conclusion of a nuclear agreement, Teheran’s comments and actions remain distrusted by all but a handful of allies (who themselves often lack credibility).63 In comparable global opinion polls, for example, it has consistently been regarded among the ranks of the more dangerous countries in the world although that sentiment has been mitigated in many countries by the signing of the agreement.64 The same is true of North Korea, an impoverished country that lacks even Iran’s oil.65 Other countries invariably link social and material power to different degrees and in different ways. Norway, for example, is a small country with significant social power because of its consistent, vocal and material support for civilian protection campaigns in multilateral forums. Yet it has a limited material capacity. Qatar is another country that clearly attempts to use its limited material and social resources in tandem to enhance its influence through judicious investment practices (such as buying major sports teams in France and Spain), providing aid and participating in multilateral alliances as it attempts to build legitimacy. The People’s Republic of China is an example of a country with growing material power (both military and economic). It seeks to use its economic power to generate influence through its investment in US Treasuries, European government bonds and African aid. Yet despite its efforts at Sinicization, its social power is relatively limited, given the distrust of many other countries in the region.66 Endemic to the concept of influence is a recognition that **legitimacy is foundational for social power**. Scholars working within America’s broadly defined hegemony research program either discount the importance of legitimacy (the most evident example being the work of structural realists such as Kenneth Waltz) or they **assume American legitimacy** and often declare it to be the case.67 Ikenberry, for example, proclaims that “American global authority was built on a Hobbesian contract -- that is, other countries, particularly in Western Europe and later in East Asia, handed the reins of power to Washington, just as Hobbes‘ individuals in the state of nature voluntarily construct and hand over power to the Leviathan.”68 An alternative formulation, and to our way of thinking, a more sophisticated one, conceives of **hegemony as the result of legitimacy as well as power**.69 Drawing on Gramsci, Roger Simon describes hegemony as a relation “not of domination by means of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological leadership.”70 Theorists differ about whether consent is a function of self-interest – it is better to bandwagon than oppose the dominant power – or legitimacy -- the hegemon protects and advances shared norms, values and policies.71 Realists **John Mearsheimer and Christopher Layne** emphasize material interests because they see power at the core of all international relations.72 Scholars who, in contrast, stress the normative aspects of hegemony note that great power and hegemonic status rest on the recognition of rights and duties and are therefore quasi-judicial categories. In practice, powerful states, like Russia, that have not met their responsibilities in the eyes of other actors and who transgressed international law through the annexation of Crimea, are often denied the standing and respect conferred by great power status.73 Persuasion is founded on the bedrock of legitimacy. Legitimacy is a long run, low cost, means of social control as compliance becomes habitual when values are internalized. Where an actor accepts a rule because it is **perceived as legitimate, that rule assumes an authoritative quality**. The rule is then in some sense hierarchically superior to the actor, and partly determinate of its behavior. Over time, it contributes to the actor’s definition of its own interests. An organization that is perceived as a legitimate rule maker has authority vis-à-vis its members. The character of power accordingly changes when it is exercised within a framework of legitimate relations and institutions. The concepts of power and legitimacy might be said to come together in the exercise of “authority.”74 Ancient Greeks understood this distinction well, describing what Realists (to a greater degree) and Liberals (to a lesser degree) think of as power as archē. In contrast, a combination of legitimacy and material capability was described as hegēmonia. Hēgemonia described an honorific status conferred on a leading power because of the services it has provided to the community. It confers a right to lead, based on the expectation that this leadership will continue to benefit the community as a whole. Hēgemonia represents a clientalist approach to politics: the powerful gain honor in return for providing practical benefits to the weak. The latter willingly accept their inferior status **in return for economic and security benefits** and the constraints such an arrangement imposes on the powerful. Attempts to translate power directly into influence rest on carrots and sticks. Such exercises, even when successful, consume resources and work only so long as the requisite bribes and threats are available and effective. More effective **influence rests on persuasion**, which manages to convince others that it is their interest to do what you want them to do. Persuasion depends on **shared values and accepted practices**, and when it works, helps to build common identities that can make cooperation and persuasion more likely in the future. Influence of this kind also benefits from material capabilities but is limited to shared goals and requires considerable political skills. Power is also relevant to influence of this kind. But it is most effective when enacted by **skilled leaders and diplomats, enabled by shared discourses**, used to advance policies that **build on precedent, and exploits existing penchants for cooperation and convinces others** that they are active contributors to these policies and their implementation. **America has sorely failed in several of these dimensions, raising the question of how power is reflected in the current global system**.