# King RR – R2 – 1NC

## 1

#### Interpretation: Debaters may not read theoretically justified frameworks.

#### Violation: point 2 under the standard

#### Standards:

#### 1. Phil Ed – best happens with clash of justifications for theories because we clash over warrants, reading a TJF kills by decentralizing clash over framework arguments. It enables debaters to read generic justifications because they’re able to ignore constraints like actor specificity which changes based on the res, which enables them to ignore the nuances of different philosophies in different contexts. Clash is key to phil ed cuz if we don’t know how to justify different ethics normatively, it defeats the point of debating offense under those ethics if we don’t actually know why the ethic is logical in a real world context.

#### Paradigm:

#### Philosophical clash -

#### a. it’s the constitutive feature of LD so it outweighs since we can’t get it in policy or PF.

#### b. it better prepares us for the real world; only some of us will be policymakers but all of us will have to make personal ethical decisions.

#### DTD – Time spent on theory cant be compensated for, the 1nc was already skewed, and its key to deterring abuse.

#### Prefer Competing interps -

#### 1. reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention.

#### 2. it Causes a race to the bottom where debaters push the limit as to how reasonably abusive, they can be.

#### No RVI’s -

#### 1. Chills some debaters from reading theory against abusive postions.

#### 2. incentivizes theory baiting where you can just bait theory to win.

## 2

#### Interpretation: The affirmative debater must articulate a distinct ROB in the form of a delineated text in the 1AC speech.

#### Violation:

#### Standards:

#### 1 - Strat Skew – Absent a text in the 1AC, they can read multiple pieces of offense under different ROBs and then read a new one in the 1AR so they never substantively lose debates under the ROB. They can warrant things like condo logic, consequentialist policy-making offense for their aff, or kritikal impacts that deviate from their plan and then read an incredibly nuanced ROB in the 1ar that makes it so only the conceded or under-covered offense matters. Stable advocacies are key to fairness since otherwise you aren’t bound by anything you say. Infinite abuse – Reading a new ROB in the 1AR makes it so all you have to do is dump on the 1N ROB and marginally extend your warrants in the 2ar and the neg can’t do anything about it since there is no 3NR to answer the 2ar weighing or extrapolations, you already have conceded offense, all you need is the ROB.

#### 2 - Reciprocity –

#### A - restarting the ROB debate in the 1ar puts you at a 7-6 advantage on the framing debate since I have to propose one in the 1N since 2N arguments are new – putting it in the aff makes it 13-13

#### B - you have one more speech to contest my ROB and weigh, I can only possibly answer your ROB in the 2n but you can do comparative weighing in the 2ar

#### C - I can only read a ROB in the 1N so you should read it in your first speech as well – that’s definitionally an equal burden.

## 3

#### The ROB is to vote for the debater who bests proves the truth or falsity of the resolution.

#### Prefer:

#### 1. Ground - truth testing allows for the more ground than any other ROB since it allows for an infinite amount of arguments on a range of argumentation style giving the most breadth and depth of topic and phil ed.

#### 2. Necessity - All statements assert implicit truth value i.e. if I say “I smell violets” that is the same as saying “It is true that I smell violets.” This creates a double bind—either they assert the truth value of their indicts to truth testing meaning they implicitly accept truth testing as a paradigm or they don’t assert the truth value of their indicts which means that they are false and truth testing is true anyways.

#### 3. Inclusion – other ROBs open the door for personal lives of debaters to factor into decisions and compare who is more oppressed which causes violence in a space where some people go to escape. Specific role of the ballots exclude all offense besides those that follow from their framework which shuts out people without the technical skill or resources to prep for it.

#### 4. Textuality – Five Dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to affirm as to prove true[[2]](#footnote-2) and negate as to deny the truth of which means the sole judge jurisdiction is to vote on the resolution’s truth or falsity. This outweighs on common usage – it is abundantly clear that our roles are verified.

Negate -

#### 1 - The[[3]](#footnote-3) “(with a unit of time) the present; the current.” but appropriation has no specified time frame

#### 2 - appropriation[[4]](#footnote-4) is a sum of money or total of assets devoted to a special purpose.” but outer space cannot own a sum of money

#### 3 - of[[5]](#footnote-5) “expressing an age” but the rez is atemporal

#### 4 - outer[[6]](#footnote-6) is “further from the center or inside..” but the resolution is aspacial and doesn’t specify distance

#### 5 - space[[7]](#footnote-7) is to “the dimensions of height, depth, and width within which all things exist and move” but the rez doesn’t volume

#### 6 - by[[8]](#footnote-8) is “indicating the amount or size of a margin.” but the resolution and entities doesn’t specify

#### 7 - private[[9]](#footnote-9) is “(of a person) having no official or public role or position.” so entities have no authority over appropriation

#### 8 - entity[[10]](#footnote-10) is “the existence of a thing as contrasted with its attributes” but the rez doesn’t spec

#### 9 - is[[11]](#footnote-11) describes being “Stay in the same place or condition.” so action is impossible and negate on presumption

#### Permissibility negates:

#### a. negate means “to deny the truth of,” so the neg can disprove an obligation through permissibility since the 1ac must defend an active obligation to act,

#### b. lack of obligation proves the res false – it says you have to prove obligation, but you cannot be obligated and lack obligation simultaneously

#### Presumption negates:

#### a. we assume statements false until proven true which is why we don’t believe in alternate realities or conspiracy theories,

#### b. statements are more often false then true – if I say this pen is red, I can only prove it true by showing its red, but I can prove it false in infinite ways

## 4

#### CP Text: Private entities should enter into a prior and binding consultation with the International Court of Justice over if the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### Advisory opinions from ICJ are necessary to clarify and develop international space law and they say it is.

Simpson and Johnson 17 [Michael Simpson, International Space University · Space Policy and Law; Business and Management, Chris Johnson is the Space Law Advisor at the Secure World Foundation, a non-governmental organization (NGO) focused on the sustainable uses of outer space. Christopher does research, writes, and speaks about international and national space law with a special focus on peaceful uses of outer space, emerging governance challenges with non-traditional space activities, and identifying and characterizing deficiencies in existing space law., September 2017, Lacunae and Silence in International Space Law – A Hypothetical Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice, ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320596144\_Lacunae\_and\_Silence\_in\_International\_Space\_Law\_-\_A\_Hypothetical\_Advisory\_Opinion\_from\_the\_International\_Court\_of\_Justice 12-16-2021] rohan

* lacunae = situation where there is no applicable law
* non liquet = no answer from governing system

Since international space law has developed for at least 60 years in an environment devoid of judicial opinions on live controversies, it lacks the judicial contribution to clarification and elaboration of terms and principles normally enjoyed by a body of law. For this reason, advisory opinions may be particularly useful in this area. The mechanism for seizing the Court also appears to be favorably developed. In the nuclear weapons case, the ICJ turned down a 1993 request from the World Meteorological Organization on the grounds that WMO, acting ultra vires lacked standing. Only when the UN General Assembly later made the request in its own name did the Court take up the question. Since many of the questions amenable to illumination through advisory opinions are within the remit of the UN Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), which itself reports through Fourth Committee to the General Assembly, the procedural pathway to a UNGA request is both established and clear. Equally as helpful is that UNCOPUOS operates by consensus. Thus, early requests for clarification, could easily establish that the necessary political will to seek increased clarity was present and permit to begin with less controversial concepts. Once the efficacy of advisory opinions to clarify elements of space law is established, the General Assembly could possibly decide to forward more challenging issues even where consensus in COPUOS could not be expected. III. NON-LIQUET AT THE ICJ. It is a general principle of law at both the national and international level (indeed inherited from ancient Roman law) that when asked to deliver a judgement, a court knows the law (Iura novit curia). So it should seem as an unexpected and rare surprise when a court does not, indeed, know the law. In the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, the Court considered the existing law applicable to the threat or use of nuclear weapons, and their treatment under the various sources and bodies of law. The Court was asked to consider “is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances permitted under international law?” However, the Court slightly rephrased that question merely to “determine the legality or illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.”11 In seeking an answer, the Court looked to custom and to treaties, and looking to a diverse field of special regimes of international law, including the law of armed conflict (LOAC) a.k.a. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (including jus ad bellum and jus in bellow), environmental law, and human rights law. However, the law, as a system and as a whole, was weighed and found wanting. The Court concluded: 11 20 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports (1996) p. 226, 238 para. 97. Accordingly, in view of the present state of international law viewed as a whole, as examined above by the Court, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court is led to observe that it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in such circumstance of self-defense, in which its very survival would be at stake. Non liquet, meaning, it is not clear, is where a court finds the law insufficient, and does not permit a conclusion one way or the other regarding the issue it is presented with. 12 IV. SPACE LAW, LACUNAE, AND NON-LIQUET The idea that gaps in the law or uncertainty with its provisions can render judicial decisions impossible, difficult, or unwise is at least as old as Roman law. As such the concepts of lacunae and non liquet still bear the Latin names that would have been familiar to lawyers and legal scholars throughout the Roman Empire. As explained by Mark Bogdansky, non liquet can be extended to cover both the case where no legal rule can be found that applies to a case under consideration and to the case where lack of clarity in the facts or in a principle of law makes it impossible to discern clearly the implications of that principle in light of the facts presented. Bogdansky refers to the former situation as ontological non liquet and to the latter as epistemological. We will use lacunae to refer to apparent gaps in international space law and will confine our use of “non liquet” to situations where a principle has been articulated but is not clear. Definitions become extremely important in discussing the impact of lacunae and non liquet on international space law. Note for example the list of lacunae in José Monserrat Filho’s excellent paper, “Space Law In The Light Of Bobbio's Theory Of Legal Ordering,” IAC-12.E7. 5. 6.

1. Definition of “space object”, “space debris”, “space activities”, “space launching”;

2. Binding “Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines”;

3. Prohibition of all kind of weapons in Earth orbits;

4. Definition and delimitation of the outer space;

5. Regulation of commercialization of space activities;

6. Environmental damage in Liability Convention;

7. Industrial exploitation of lunar natural resources;

8. Remote sensing activities in the XXI century;

9. Satellite data as evidence in criminal proceedings;

10. The use of nuclear power sources in space;

11. The human presence in space.

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While items 2, 3, 6, and 11 fit clearly into our definition of lacunae, the others represent cases where legal principles have been articulated, but are subject to substantial disagreement as to their application to various fact situations. Where lacunae exist, the utility of advisory opinions is greatly constrained. The foundational principles of positivism and sovereignty that are key pillars of international law do not lend themselves to judicial activism in creating legal rules in the absence of political action to create them. On the other hand, where a situation of non liquet emerges from disagreement over definitions or the application of a legal principle to a particular situation, an advisory opinion could have either one of two beneficial outcomes. In the first case an advisory opinion could clarify the meaning of terms where uncertainty exists. This situation would require strong arguments to support the opinion and justify it. It might be elaborated on the basis of original intent reflected in the travaux préparatoires, clear patterns of application of terms and principles in the action of States parties to the agreements where uncertainty exists or lack of clarity is perceived, or lucid reasoning by analogy to similar situations where greater certainty can be demonstrated. The second case could result from an opinion that clarification cannot be provided and that the matter remains non liquet. In this case, there would be an unambiguous signal that political/ diplomatic action would be required to clarify the issues in dispute. Take for example the hypothetical example of a case seeking clarification of the non-appropriation clause of the Outer Space Treaty. A non liquet in such a case would leave those wishing to assert that a prohibition against off Earth mining existed in international law without a legal vindication of their position while those wishing to engage in such mining would face uncertainty because the Court had not ruled definitively that non appropriation did not apply to them. Since the mining advocates would be ~~handicapped~~ by uncertainty in their approaches to potential investors, both sides would have an incentive to seek a political resolution with the compromises that was likely to entail.

#### International space legal regime are needed to solve space war - malleable laws are key in outer space.

Hart 21 [Amalyah Hart, Amalyah Hart is a science journalist based in Melbourne, 11-19-2021, "Do we need new space law to prevent space war", Cosmos Magazine, https://cosmosmagazine.com/people/society/space-law-to-prevent-space-war/] simha

The week before last, a UN panel approved the creation of a working group to discuss next-generation laws to prevent the militarisation of space. The move comes as space 2.0 seems to be going into hyper-drive, with countries and corporations racing to claim their stake in the final frontier. It’s timely, as the potential for friction is gathering by the day, with China, India, Russia and the US testing anti-satellite missiles on their own satellites and creating worrisome clouds of debris. This week’s destruction by Russia of its “dead” satellite, Cosmos 1408, underlined the issue. Meanwhile, the orbital space around Earth is becoming jammed with machinery; currently, there are 3,372 active satellites whizzing around Earth, but in one or two decades that number is set to leap to potentially 100,000 or more. And that’s ignoring the space stations, telescopes and spyware already in orbit as countries flex their aerospace muscles. It’s a cosmic fracas. And contested territory is prime fodder for international disputes, as we know. It’s these kinds of disputes the group of UK diplomats who proposed the UN motion want to prevent, by coming to an agreed-upon set of norms for behaviour in space. Space law: what are the issues at stake? The current international framework for law in space is the UN’s 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), which sets governing principles for the exploration of space, including that space should be free for use by all nations, that celestial bodies like the Moon should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that outer space should not be subject to national appropriation. Under international law, any and all objects being launched into space must be registered to avoid collisions. On top of these global laws, each nation-state has its own legal framework around the registering and launching of objects into space. But as technology evolves and new opportunities arise, are these old laws equipped to govern new problems? The UN’s 1967 Outer Space Treaty sets governing principles for the exploration of space, including that space should be free for use by all nations. “There exists an incredible amount of applicable law already, and it has served us really well,” says space law expert Steven Freeland, an emeritus professor at Western Sydney University and professorial fellow at Bond University. Freeland is vice-chair of a UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) working group that is developing laws around the exploitation of resources in space. “There’s a lot of law at the multilateral level that then filters down to other layers of bilateral or ‘minilateral’ agreements and national laws. But clearly things move so quickly with technology, we’re doing so many more things in space that were beyond the contemplation of the drafters of the original treaties. Ideally we need more.” Freeland says there are myriad complex, interconnected issues in space that need tighter laws. These include the increasing militarisation of space; the proliferation of satellites, which can lead to overcrowding of “popular” orbits and increased demand for radio-wave spectra; ethical issues around human spaceflight; and the possible extraction of resources on celestial bodies like the Moon. Resource exploitation It might sound like science fiction, but mining in outer space is looking increasingly likely in the not-too-distant future. In September 2020, NASA announced that it would award contracts to private companies for the extraction and purchase of lunar regolith (rock matter) from the surface of the Moon, which could be mined and then studied in situ by the company, before the data and rights are transferred to the space agency. The move heralds what our space-based future might look like, with private companies mining celestial bodies for their precious resources. In our solar system, composed of millions of celestial bodies both large and small, the opportunities for cashing in look potentially endless – provided technology advances to the level of practical spaceflight. “Most wars on Earth have historically been fought over a quest for resources,” says Freeland, “so it’s incredibly important [to have appropriate space laws].” Just last month, scientists announced the discovery of two extraordinarily metal-rich near-Earth asteroids (NEAs), comprised of roughly 85% metals like iron, nickel and cobalt, which are thought to exceed Earth’s entire known metallic reserves. These three highly valuable metals, often known as the “iron triad”, are particularly critical for the energy supply chain and a renewable energy future; they’re used to build lithium-ion batteries, electrochemical capacitators for storing energy, and nano-catalysts for use in the energy sector. Under the OST, outer-space resources cannot be appropriated by nations, but the law and principle around the commercial use of space resources is less clear. The 1979 Moon Treaty holds that any celestial body is under the jurisdiction of the international community and therefore subject to international law. The treaty outlaws the military use of any celestial body as well as providing a legal framing for the “responsible” exploitation of celestial resources. But, to date, no space-capable nation has ratified the treaty. Militarisation That brings us to the militarisation of space. As technology advances, the potential avenues for weapons that cross the border from terrestrial to cosmic continue to proliferate. So, what laws protect us from a space war? “The issues about security in space have historically been dealt with by the CD, the Conference of Disarmament, but more recently the UK has led discussions at the United Nations that effectively seek to change the diplomatic language and thinking about space security,” says Freeland. Currently, the principles for governing space under the OST forbid the military use of space, but space is already used for military purposes such as surveillance, and some missiles carve a path through outer space on their journeys to their targets. As it currently stands, the only weapons found in space are the TP-82 Cosmonaut survival pistols that Russian astronauts regularly take on board the Soyuz spacecraft, intended to protect them from a potential wild animal attack if they are forced to emergency land in “off-the-map” territory. But as technology proliferates, the opportunities for space-based militarisation also grow. The existing laws were drafted long before many of these technologies were even dreamed up. The most worrisome technologies currently being trialled are anti-satellite missiles. “We have this strategic competition going on amongst the major powers,” says Gilles Doucet, a space security consultant based in Canada who worked for 35 years with the Canadian Department of National Defence. Doucet is both an engineer and an expert in space law. “They all wish to be dominant and make sure that their national security is secured by controlling, or at least not having other people control, outer space.” But what kinds of defence technologies are being developed in space? Doucet says the most worrisome technologies currently being trialled are anti-satellite missiles of the sort that Russia deployed earlier this week. Known as direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles (DA-ASAT), they can destroy satellites in low Earth orbit. “This essentially looks a lot like ballistic missile defence, but it’s happening in outer space against satellites,” he says. In fact, DA-ASAT technology is dependent on the same technology used for midcourse ballistic missile defence – the technology that the US, for example, deploys to defend itself from potential ballistic missile attacks on North America. These missiles fly at altitudes of around 3,000 to 4,000 kilometres, well within the low-Earth orbit many satellites operate in. This technology is being developed and tested by the US, China, India and Russia. “Destroying another country’s satellites would only occur in an armed conflict scenario,” Doucet says. “It would be because the other country’s satellite is providing an important military role – for example, a GPS satellite for directing munitions or an imagery satellite for locating your forces.” Other military applications in space, Doucet says, include the jamming of satellite communications and navigation, as well as interference with some GNSS signals, of which GPS – the satellite navigation system we all use for things like Google Maps – is one. Satellite jamming can have major disruptive potential. “You might be conducting an operation in a conflict – let’s say you wish to target a certain facility. Your missile system or your drone-launching missiles rely on GPS to guide them,” Doucet says. “So if you’re on the other end of it wanting to protect yourself, then you’ll send out jamming signals.” But while these signals can help defend a military target, Doucet says many satellites provide services for military and civilian companies and organisations at once. In this case, jamming a satellite’s signal may also interfere with civilian services it provides, including aircraft and ship navigation, car mapping, even timing signals for financial transactions. This means satellite jamming has major disruptive potential. And there are other areas where satellite technology could have duplicitous or combative potential. “Close proximity operations seem to get countries a bit upset,” says Doucet. Close proximity operations, as the name suggests, involve satellites moving close to other satellites. “One reason might be intelligence or inspection, just to take close images to understand how it’s built. But you may be getting close to intercept signals or to interfere with signals. “So that is a concern, because it’s one thing to get close for passively collecting information, but if you’re close you may also be in a position to interfere.” What might new space law systems look like? “We have a lot of space systems that are dual use, that have the potential to do harm,” Doucet says. “I’d like to see some transparency on the mission, on what you’re doing, to help alleviate concerns. “That might sound like a small step, but to militaries it’s actually a really big step to provide transparency.” Doucet says he’d also like to see clarification of the existing principles for space law already set out in the OST and other treaties. In fact, he’s currently working on the MILAMOS Project, developing a Manual on International Law Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space at Canada’s McGill University. “I would like to see the existing legal regime being given a bit of life,” he says. “We’ve got tremendously good outer space principles, but over several decades countries have kind of refused to give them life because it’s too controversial. “The third thing I’d like to see is the major space powers sit down and talk. They’re all potentially losers if this keeps going down this path. I don’t think there’s a winner in a space war.” For all these complex problems, Doucet is cautiously optimistic about our chances of avoiding a space war. “I don’t think the issue about space security is as unique as people think,” he says. “Yes, it’s a very unique domain, but the actors are all the same, the interests are all the same. It’s the same people that have struggled over ballistic missile proliferation, nuclear weapons proliferation, treaties about the high seas, about aviation and all kinds of things. “So, we shouldn’t think this is an unsolvable problem. We may take lessons from how we’ve managed to agree to disagree in other areas beyond national jurisdiction.” Freeland agrees that even if international tensions may simmer at home, it’s in the best interest of major global powers to come to agreements about laws in space. “When it comes to these really big issues, particularly issues that have the propensity to go horribly wrong if we follow an irresponsible path, in the end it’s in [governments’] common interest to agree to the rules of the road,” he says. “The important element is that they have had the opportunity to buy in on the framing of those rules.“I think we need to be optimistic. With a great deal of caution, cool heads will prevail.”

## 5

#### Kantian philosophy excludes the queer body – he believes homosexuality is not universalizable.

Alan **Soble 03**, The Monist 86:1 (Jan. 2003), pp. 55-89. Kant and Sexual Perversion

Kant immediately continues by completing his sparse inventory of three objectionable, sexually unnatural, practices: A second crimen carnis contra naturam is intercourse between sexus homogenii, in which the object of sexual impulse is a human being but there is homogeneity instead of heterogeneity of sex. . . . This practice too is contrary to the ends of humanity; for the end of humanity in respect of sexuality is to preserve the species without debasing the person; but in this instance the species is not being preserved (as it can be by a crimen carnis secundum naturam), but the person is set aside, the self is degraded below the level of the animals, and humanity is dishonoured. The third crimen carnis contra naturam occurs when the object of the desire is in fact of the opposite sex but is not human. Such is sodomy, or intercourse with animals. This, too, is contrary to the ends of humanity and against our natural instinct. It degrades mankind below the level of animals, for no animal turns in this way from its own species.75

#### This is not “Kant believed some other bad thing.” The argument follows from the necessity of avoiding contradiction in conception by willing the perpetuation of the species. Kant thought the homosexual maxim of sex without reproduction had no such function, so it constituted sacrificing your rational agency for the subordinate end of pleasure. That Negates – It makes trying to obligate people to act under Kant incoherent since

#### a. a large portion of the population has no reason to care about obligations under your framework since they aren’t Kantian agents and

#### b. even if they were, the standard just violates their freedom which is a prior condition to any other actions under it

#### Impact: They read morally repugnant arguments. Thus the alternative is to drop the debater:

#### 1. Accessibility –

#### a. it’s a prereq because you need people in debate to debate. Means it comes prior to engaging in any other flow.

#### b. all aff arguments presuppose that people feel safe in this space to respond to them.

#### 2. Safety - the judge has a proximal obligation to ensure inaccessible practices don’t proliferate.

## 6

#### Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions.

Moen 16, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267. SM

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good. 3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Although pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difﬁculty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one speciﬁc individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More speciﬁcally, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justiﬁed punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being.

Consequentialism SPEC: NEC (necessary enabler consequentialism) – all moral reasons for acts are provided by facts that the acts are necessary enablers for preventing death.

#### 1. Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first. Intuitions outweigh—they’re the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions are most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why.

#### 2. Actor specificity:

#### a. No act-omission distinction—governments are responsible for everything in the public sphere so inaction is implicit authorization of action: they have to yes/no bills, which means everything collapse to aggregation.

#### b. No intent-foresight distinction – the actions we take are inevitably informed by predictions from certain mental states, meaning consequences are a collective part of the will.

#### c. Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Takes out util calc indicts since they’re empirically denied and link turns them because the alt would be no action.

## Case

### Kant

o/v

#### Threats of extinction come first:

#### 1. Living is a prerequisite to what framework entails because if we aren’t alive then we can’t respect rational agency.

#### 2. Deontologists concede that the threat of extinction overwhelms the importance of constraints—none of their evidence assumes their framework is up against a threat of extinction—if all people will inevitably be violated, it doesn’t matter to a particular agent if the violation occurs as a means or an end.

#### 3. It functions as an empirical constraint on all moral theories—its rationally impossible to accept the destruction of all human life because that would prevent any benefit or value—empirical logic comes prior to all other meta-ethical concerns because it can either verify or falsify analytical claims at 100% certainty.

#### Kantian reflection devolves into infinite regress.

Moland 08, Lydia L (Associate Professor of Philosophy @ Colby College). "Commitments of a Divided Self: Authenticity, Autonomy and Change in Korsgaard's Ethics." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4.1 (2008): 25-44. SM

There is, additionally, a problem if we try to decipher the way in which each self is free. Based on Korsgaard’s description of the reflective self as acting on law and principle, it seems that the reflective self is free without interaction with the world. The committed self would then have the limited freedom of ordering its desires according to the reflective self ’s principles. But in order to order these desires, the committed self would need to be reflective as well. In that case, the committed self itself must be divided into a reflective self and a committed self, and an infinite regress looms. For how would the original committed self ’s committed self know to aspire to act on the ideals that the committed self ’s reflective self sets for it? If the committed self has any aspirations— which it must, in order to have the sense that it has something to live up to—it must also be reflective. But then how is it different from the reflective self? Perhaps we should not imagine selves within selves, then, but rather another, greater me, a me that is behind both the reflective me and the desiring me, choosing (ideally) the reflective me. But by what criteria would it choose unless it was also reflective? Perhaps it is indeed reflective, and what we have been calling the reflective self is not in charge of choosing actions but is in charge only of constructing principles. Perhaps, in other words, there are three selves: the principle-making self, the committed, desiring self, and the reflective self that chooses between them. But which self would be living up to which self, in this case? Would the reflective self try to live up to the principlemaking self? Which of the two would the committed self live up to? Again, how will the committed self aspire to live up to either if it is not reflective? The problems, it seems, proliferate as the selves do. Even if I could identify the reflective self as myself in some way, explaining how that reflective self interacts with the committed self continues to pose serious difficulties. It seems to me, in other words, that Korsgaard cannot claim that the committed self is reflective, on pain of infinite regress. That leaves the committed self, as described, as the jumble of desires and the reflective self, the self acting on principle and law and not on the contingencies of the actual world, adjudicating all decisions about the desires the committed self is subject to. In other words, if we accept the distinct selves model suggested by Korsgaard’s language isolating the “real” self, problems familiar from the Kantian case emerge.18 If the empirical and intellectual characters are ontologically distinct, how do we explain the interaction between them? How can a self in time and a self out of time affect each other? If that is problematic, explaining why the real self is the intelligible or reflective self is all the more so. For what connection can there then be between my real self and my self in the world? One of the images that most suggests a deeply split self is Korsgaard’s repeated claim that we must be able to shed our commitments.19 I have, under this description, multiple components of practical identity, but I must be able to shed them if reflection shows them to go against any of the reflective self ’s principles. I must be able to “discard” my identity as a daughter or a pharmacist or an American and the obligations that accompany these roles. I want to focus briefly on such cases as I think they isolate a particular problem with the ontologically divided self suggested by Korsgaard’s theory. I will list three categories of change and indicate the difficulties each causes for this image of the self.

#### 1. Reason is not the source of morality

#### a. You conflate reason as a normative justification for action as opposed to a regular motivation for action – even if we ask why it does not establish normative authority but why we are motivated to follow that action

#### b. Schmagency – agency is escapable since we can opt out of it – individuals can just choose to opt out of the game of agency

#### c. Disinterested participant – we can engage in the process of agency but apathetically i.e. I can play chess not bc of the constitutive aim of causing checkmate but because the pieces move in cool ways, which means that agency is not binding

#### We don’t require reason for all actions.

Cohen 96, Gerald A (Marxist political philosopher who held the positions of Quain Professor of Jurisprudence, University College London and Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory, All Souls College, Oxford.). "Reason, humanity, and the moral law." The sources of normativity (1996): 167-188. SM

The passage from 1 (which I shall not question) to 3 rests on 2, but I do not see that 2 is true, except in the trivial sense that, if I treat something as a reason, then it follows that I regard myself as, identify myself as, the sort of person who is treating that item, here and now, as a reason. I do not see that I must consult an independent conception of my identity to determine whether a possible spring of action is to be endorsed or not, nor even that such endorsement must issue in such a conception, other than in the indicated trivial sense. When I am thirsty, and, at a reflective level, I do not reject my desire to drink, I have, or I think that I have, a reason for taking water, but not one that reflects, or commits me to, a (relevandy) normative conception of my identity. Merely acting on reasons carries no such commitment. The inference from 3 to 5 depends on the idea that, being, as we are, inescapably reflective, we must employ the normative conception of our identities (that we therefore necessarily have) to 'endorse or reject'43 the impulses which present themselves to us as possible springs of action. But the very fact (supposing that it is one) that I must endorse and reject shows that I do not endorse a human impulse just because it is a human impulse. Human impulses are not, therefore, of value just because they are human. So, consistently with the structure of reflective consciousness, I can pass harsh judgment on my own, or on another's panoply of desires and bents, the more so if that other is disposed to endorse them. And if my endorsement of a given impulse means that I regard my humanity as pro tanto of positive value, then, by the same token, my rejection of another impulse must mean that I regard my humanity as pro tanto of negative value. No reason emerges for the conclusion that I must treat human beings, as such, as valuable, or for the requirement, which some might think a Kantian morality embodies, that I must treat them as equal in their value.

#### Performativity:

#### 1. conflates the pre-fiat ability to discuss frameworks with determination of what theory should be used to evaluate resolutional action. It also doesn’t apply to states because they don’t have individual wills.

#### 2. this proves the nc because preventing extinction and preserving life is a pre-requisite to literally everything including the process of justification.

Consequences good –

1] aggregation

2] squo

#### Universalizability is wrong –

#### 1. Universal ethics is impossible and violent -- ethics is informed by social location – a rich white person might have an obligation not to steal but that doesn’t mean someone stealing to feed their family is bad – this proves the link

#### 2. Tailoring objection – you can tailor your rule to be specific to your circumstance which prevents a contradiction when its universalized

#### Universality fails non contradiction assumes this

#### a. A priori reason is impossible – knowledge is experiential since we cannot gain a concept of a thing or an idea absent an experience of it i.e. no matter how much you describe to me the sun I cannot infer qualities abt it from your definition i.e. its warmth, its brightness, etc

#### b. I can universalize my respect for myself but don’t have to do it for others – I can universalize our respect from ourselves without having to universalize respect for everyone

### 1NC - Contention

#### 1 - A model of freedom mandates a market-oriented approach to space—that negates.

**Broker 20** [(Tyler, work has been published in the Gonzaga Law Review, the Albany Law Review and the University of Memphis Law Review.) “Space Law Can Only Be Libertarian Minded,” Above the Law, 1-14-20, <https://abovethelaw.com/2020/01/space-law-can-only-be-libertarian-minded/>] TDI

The impact on human daily life from a transition to the virtually unlimited resource reality of space cannot be overstated. However, when it comes to the law, a minimalist, dare I say libertarian, approach appears as the only applicable system. In the words of NASA, “2020 promises to be a big year for space exploration.” Yet, as Rand Simberg points out in Reason magazine, it is actually private American investment that is currently moving space exploration to “a pace unseen since the 1960s.” According to Simberg, due to this increase in private investment “We are now on the verge of getting affordable private access to orbit for large masses of payload and people.” The impact of that type of affordable travel into space might sound sensational to some, but in reality the benefits that space can offer are far greater than any benefit currently attributed to any major policy proposal being discussed at the national level. The sheer amount of resources available within our current reach/capabilities simply speaks for itself. However, although those new realities will, as Simberg says, “bring to the fore a lot of ideological issues that up to now were just theoretical,” I believe it will also eliminate many economic and legal distinctions we currently utilize today. For example, the sheer number of resources we can already obtain in space means that in the rapidly near future, the distinction between a nonpublic good or a public good will be rendered meaningless. In other words, because the resources available within our solar system exist in such quantities, all goods will become nonrivalrous in their consumption and nonexcludable in their distribution. This would mean government engagement in the public provision of a nonpublic good, even at the trivial level, or what Kevin Williamson defines as socialism, is rendered meaningless or impossible. In fact, in space, I fail to see how any government could even try to legally compel collectivism in the way Simberg fears. Similar to many economic distinctions, however, it appears that many laws, both the good and the bad, will also be rendered meaningless as soon as we begin to utilize the resources within our solar system. For example, if every human being is given access to the resources that allows them to replicate anything anyone else has, or replace anything “taken” from them instantly, what would be the point of theft laws? If you had virtually infinite space in which you can build what we would now call luxurious livable quarters, all without exploiting human labor or fragile Earth ecosystems when you do it, what sense would most property, employment, or commercial law make? Again, this is not a pipe dream, no matter how much our population grows for the next several millennia, the amount of resources within our solar system can sustain such an existence for every human being. Rather than panicking about the future, we should try embracing it, or at least meaningfully preparing for it. Currently, the Outer Space Treaty, or as some call it “the Magna Carta of Space,” is silent on the issue of whether private individuals or corporate entities can own territory in space. Regardless of whether governments allow it, however, private citizens are currently obtaining the ability to travel there, and if human history is any indicator, private homesteading will follow, flag or no flag. We Americans know this is how a Wild West starts, where most regulation becomes the impractical pipe dream. But again, this would be a Wild West where the exploitation of human labor and fragile Earth ecosystem makes no economic sense, where every single human can be granted access to resources that even the wealthiest among us now would envy, and where innovation and imagination become the only things we would recognize as currency. Only a libertarian-type system, that guarantees basic individual rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness could be valued and therefore human fidelity to a set of laws made possible, in such an existence.

#### 2 - Private entities utilize their own property and resources to fund and conduct space exploration which means – Prohibition of it is a violation of a) Their ability to use their own property (like their rocketships or fuel) to set their ends in space and

### 1NC – Adv

#### Space debris creates existential deterrence and a taboo.

**Bowen 18** [(Bleddyn, lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester) “The Art of Space Deterrence,” European Leadership Network, February 20, 2018, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/] TDI

Fourth, the ubiquity of space infrastructure and the fragility of the space environment may create a degree of existential deterrence. As space is so useful to modern economies and military forces, a large-scale disruption of space infrastructure may be so intuitively escalatory to decision-makers that there may be a natural caution against a wholesale assault on a state’s entire space capabilities because the consequences of doing so approach the mentalities of total war, or nuclear responses if a society begins tearing itself apart because of the collapse of optimised energy grids and just-in-time supply chains. In addition, the problem of space debris and the political-legal hurdles to conducting debris clean-up operations mean that even a handful of explosive events in space can render a region of Earth orbit unusable for everyone. This could caution a country like China from excessive kinetic intercept missions because its own military and economy is increasingly reliant on outer space, but perhaps not a country like North Korea which does not rely on space. The usefulness, sensitivity, and fragility of space may have some existential deterrent effect. China’s catastrophic anti-satellite weapons test in 2007 is a valuable lesson for all on the potentially devastating effect of kinetic warfare in orbit.

#### No debris cascades—This ev answers all aff warrants.

Fange 17 (Daniel Von Fange, Web Application Engineer, Founder and Owner of LeanCoder, Full Stack, Polyglot Web Developer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped”, 5/21/2017, http://braino.org/essays/kessler\_syndrome\_is\_over\_hyped/)

Kessler Syndrome is overhyped. A chorus of online commenters great any news of upcoming low earth orbit satellites with worry that humanity will to lose access to space. I now think they are wrong. What is Kessler Syndrome? Here’s the popular view on Kessler Syndrome. Every once in a while, a piece of junk in space hits a satellite. This single impact destroys the satellite, and breaks off several thousand additional pieces. These new pieces now fly around space looking for other satellites to hit, and so exponentially multiply themselves over time, like a nuclear reaction, until a sphere of man-made debris surrounds the earth, and humanity no longer has access to space nor the benefits of satellites. It is a dark picture. Is Kessler Syndrome likely to happen? I had to stop everything and spend an afternoon doing back-of-the-napkin math to know how big the threat is. To estimate, we need to know where the stuff in space is, how much mass is there, and how long it would take to deorbit. The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions. Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over. High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue. Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge, and the number of satellites so few, that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here. GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per 1000km of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here. How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be? Let’s imagine a worst case scenario. An evil alien intelligence chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death orbiting at 1000km, spread as evenly across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. Is humanity cut off from space? I’m guessing the world has launched about 10,000 tons of satellites total. For guessing purposes, I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites and junk currently in High LEO. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So there would be one cube of junk per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than 1 in 10,000. So even in the worst case, we don’t lose access to space. Now though you can travel through the debris, you couldn’t keep a satellite alive for long in this orbit of death. Kessler Syndrome at its worst just prevents us from putting satellites in certain orbits. In real life, there’s a lot of factors that make Kessler syndrome even less of a problem than our worst case though experiment.

* Debris would be spread over a volume of space, not a single orbital surface, making collisions orders of magnitudes less likely.
* Most impact debris will have a slower orbital velocity than either of its original pieces - this makes it deorbit much sooner.

**Wall 21** [Mike Wall, Michael Wall is a Senior Space Writer with [Space.com](http://space.com/) and joined the team in 2010. He primarily covers exoplanets, spaceflight and military space. He has a Ph.D. in evolutionary biology from the University of Sydney, Australia, a bachelor's degree from the University of Arizona, and a graduate certificate in science writing from the University of California, Santa Cruz. 11/15/21, "Kessler Syndrome and the space debris problem," Space, [https://www.space.com/kessler-syndrome-space-debris accessed 12/10/21](https://www.space.com/kessler-syndrome-space-debris%20accessed%2012/10/21)] Adam

Earth orbit is getting more and more crowded as the years go by. Humanity has launched about 12,170 satellites since the dawn of the space age in 1957, [according to the European Space Agency](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers) (ESA), and 7,630 of them remain in orbit today — but only about 4,700 are still operational. That means there are nearly 3,000 defunct spacecraft zooming around Earth at tremendous speeds, along with other big, dangerous pieces of debris like upper-stage rocket bodies. For example, orbital velocity at 250 miles (400 kilometers) up, the altitude at which the ISS flies, is about 17,100 mph (27,500 kph). At such speeds, even a tiny shard of debris can do serious damage to a spacecraft — and there are huge numbers of such fragmentary bullets zipping around our planet. ESA estimates that Earth orbit harbors at least 36,500 debris objects that are more than 4 inches (10 centimeters) wide, 1 million between 0.4 inches and 4 inches (1 to 10 cm)

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <https://www.google.com/search?q=the+definitino&oq=the+definitino&aqs=chrome..69i57j0i67i433j0i67l2j46i433i512j69i60l3.1308j1j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> [Definition #3] [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. <https://www.google.com/search?q=appropriation&sxsrf=AOaemvKQemU4kDt9dtiwQnUVUU7LW9GCoQ%3A1639410269344&ei=XWq3YbTHFI-tqtsPs_eviAo&ved=0ahUKEwj06fqVj-H0AhWPlmoFHbP7C6EQ4dUDCA4&uact=5&oq=appropriation&gs_lcp=Cgdnd3Mtd2l6EAMyCQgjECcQRhD5ATIECCMQJzIECCMQJzINCAAQgAQQhwIQsQMQFDIFCAAQkQIyBQgAEJECMgUIABCRAjIFCAAQgAQyBQgAEIAEMgUIABCABDoHCAAQRxCwAzoRCC4QgAQQsQMQgwEQxwEQ0QM6BQguEIAEOg4ILhCABBCxAxDHARCjAjoLCAAQgAQQsQMQgwE6CAguELEDEIMBOggIABCABBCxAzoICAAQsQMQkQJKBAhBGABKBAhGGABQ3wNY4gxgiQ5oA3ABeACAAbsBiAHTDZIBBDAuMTKYAQCgAQHIAQjAAQE&sclient=gws-wiz> [Definition #2] [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. <https://www.google.com/search?q=of+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=of+definition&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i61l3.1473j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. <https://www.google.com/search?q=outer+definition&sxsrf=AOaemvIhqFMqUlofS44KTL7ifSUoUpqMpg%3A1639410214502&ei=Jmq3YdOBHpeAqtsP386owAY&ved=0ahUKEwjTrOf7juH0AhUXgGoFHV8nCmgQ4dUDCA4&uact=5&oq=outer+definition&gs_lcp=Cgdnd3Mtd2l6EAMyCggAEIAEEEYQ-QEyBggAEBYQHjIGCAAQFhAeMgYIABAWEB4yBggAEBYQHjIGCAAQFhAeMgYIABAWEB4yBggAEBYQHjIGCAAQFhAeMgYIABAWEB46BwgjELADECc6BwgAEEcQsAM6BwgAELADEEM6CgguEMgDELADEEM6EAguEMcBENEDEMgDELADEEM6BAgjECc6BAgAEEM6BwguELEDEEM6DQgAEIAEEIcCELEDEBQ6CAgAEIAEELEDOggILhCABBCxAzoPCAAQgAQQhwIQFBBGEPkBOgUIABCABDoFCC4QgAQ6CAgAEBYQChAeSgQIQRgASgQIRhgBUKUEWKULYNYMaAFwAngAgAG7AogB1gySAQc0LjMuMi4xmAEAoAEByAEUwAEB&sclient=gws-wiz> [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. <https://www.google.com/search?q=space+definition&sxsrf=AOaemvJCUtDfS7K6xg7bvFxIzhK9FJW9zg%3A1639410218441&ei=Kmq3YYeqGquxqtsPsOKc6Ao&ved=0ahUKEwiH59f9juH0AhWrmGoFHTAxB60Q4dUDCA4&uact=5&oq=space+definition&gs_lcp=Cgdnd3Mtd2l6EAMyEggAEIAEEIcCELEDEBQQRhD5ATIKCAAQgAQQhwIQFDIFCAAQgAQyBQgAEIAEMgUIABCABDIFCAAQgAQyBQgAEIAEMgYIABAHEB4yBggAEAcQHjIGCAAQBxAeOgcIABBHELADOgcIABCwAxBDOggIABDkAhCwAzoKCC4QyAMQsAMQQzoJCAAQDRBGEPkBOgQIABANSgQIQRgASgQIRhgBUMADWM4KYPoLaAJwAngBgAG4AogByAaSAQcyLjMuMC4xmAEAoAEByAERwAEB&sclient=gws-wiz> [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. https://www.google.com/search?q=bydefinition&sxsrf=AOaemvIC6dSnVeMkZO0wlH47wbNgFcIzjQ%3A1639411091334&ei=k223YeLmE4e4qtsPtbK\_wAw&ved=0ahUKEwii\_PSdkuH0AhUHnGoFHTXZD8gQ4dUDCA4&uact=5&oq=bydefinition&gs\_lcp=Cgdnd3Mtd2l6EAMyBggAEAcQHjIHCAAQsQMQQzIGCAAQBxAeMgYIABAHEB4yBggAEAcQHjIGCAAQBxAeMgYIABAHEB4yBAgAEAoyBggAEAcQHjIGCAAQBxAeOgcIABBHELADOgcIABCwAxBDSgQIQRgASgQIRhgAUMIDWI0EYNsFaAJwAngAgAFmiAG6AZIBAzEuMZgBAKABAcgBCsABAQ&sclient=gws-wiz [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. <https://www.google.com/search?q=private+&sxsrf=AOaemvKrE7ST0w4qUZ-RKdtZn9IgoX7yRg%3A1639411236676&ei=JG63YaHlKOGuqtsP_Per4AI&ved=0ahUKEwihh5zjkuH0AhVhl2oFHfz7CiwQ4dUDCA4&uact=5&oq=private+&gs_lcp=Cgdnd3Mtd2l6EAMyBAgjECcyBAgjECcyCAgAEIAEEMkDMgUIABCSAzIFCAAQkgMyCAguEIAEELEDMggIABCABBCxAzIFCAAQgAQyCAgAEIAEELEDMggIABCABBCxAzoHCAAQRxCwAzoFCAAQkQI6CAguELEDEIMBOg4ILhCABBCxAxDHARCjAjoFCC4QgAQ6CwguEIAEEMcBEKMCOgsILhCABBCxAxCDAToOCC4QgAQQsQMQxwEQ0QM6CAgAELEDEJECOg0IABCABBCHAhCxAxAUOgoIABCABBCHAhAUOgUIABCxA0oECEEYAEoECEYYAFDkBFi_C2CbDWgDcAF4AIAB4wGIAesJkgEFMC42LjKYAQCgAQHIAQjAAQE&sclient=gws-wiz> [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. <https://www.google.com/search?q=worker+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=worker+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57.3726j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/be> [↑](#footnote-ref-11)