# Cal – R5 – 1NC vs Marlbrough ML

## 1

#### Interp: The aff must defend the banning/unjust action of private appropriation in outer space, or a specification of the above statement. To clarify, defend the resolution or a subset.

#### Violation: Public vs private – their plan text refers to all types of outer space recognition because the noun is outer space.

Global Common Alliance, ND, URL: <https://globalcommonsalliance.org/global-commons/>, KR

The global commons are the resources we all need to survive, thrive and prosper. These resources, which include the ocean and freshwater, the climate and biodiversity, and forests and wetlands, are being overused. But the global commons also represents a management approach based on systems thinking, transformation and self-organisation to bring out the best in people. We want to bring out the best in people, cities, companies and countries. This is the foundation for our plan for the planet.

There are two definitions of the global commons: One is based in geopolitics. In this definition the global commons are areas – and their potential economic resources – that lie beyond national jurisdiction: the atmosphere, the high seas, Antarctica and outer space.

#### 1AC Vollmer says that “commons…shared ownership, public governance”

#### Their ev also talks about other forms of commons that are public. W read green.

#### **1AC Dardot 18** [Pierre Dardot, “What democracy for the global commons?,” The Commons and a New Global Governance, ed. Samuel Cogolati and Jan Wouters (2018). <https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/58613276/What_Democracy_-_Dardot_Leuwen_2018.pdf?1552469271=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DWhat_democracy_for_the_global_commons.pdf&Expires=1642726034&Signature=YJi8AG6~Y---mP0qsop4i3t~Z5bVLtQYwuDtUdXm6sdKaYwCJFFzQOL-OiY9nIH~JZsophnChwMlUMSGOCDVh7NhHmUonD28k9fU9PrfN2nYTNV2x8XnvoK2KtelSRvRyWN78eA7uC1isTAf1pO5~abPS9XQnORhjp9nPXjpIuBqLrrJhIUCKNjEorJ0u1h63DxkORBKVZfFh-TawG~PS~WdamGNqfljxjaP1G5bG-hUh1aNw0CuXhnqdd8yeH0-uT7iXVNu8cDl2zOtobIiAmD0SBKxjUXP8SYLkvNO0BETnpIzetK7gW8yksHtYjt-WasarhkMQpHeNwvJOY8QeA__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA>]

#### Thus, we are faced with a cheap if not unfinished version of a ‘common’, which is entrusted to states, and limits state sovereignty without even calling it into question.¶ With the Competitiveness Act (US Congress, 2015), we are faced with an act of state sovereignty that manages to circumvent the prohibition of appropriation by a sovereign state without formally violating it. This represents a sort of ‘delegation’ under which the state, on the one hand, grants its citizens a legal title that it denies to itself, on the other, it does so in order to better guarantee it to those to whom it has been delegated. The imperium (state sovereignty) gives full licence for all candidates to the dominium, to privately control and appropriate any resources they are able to seize: statutory law enforces beforehand the power that technology provides. Beyond this collusion between the state and private companies, what emerges here is the powerful homology between state and private ownership: imperium and dominium appear to be based on two forms of a similar logic of ownership, which affirm one another. The primary challenge facing the heritage of mankind paradigm is that it does not fundamentally break with interstate logic and, as such, leaves leeway for private appropriation.

#### Standards:

#### 1 - Limits – their model allows an infinite number of affs that can specifically sidestep offense – this aff, specifically, would allow global commons in space to pre-empt war and sidestep conflict since it might increase multilateralism. It garners offense off of the public sector or natl govts – which explodes limits and forces the neg to prepare for any permutation of private companies with another entity.

#### 2 - Clash – negs can’t engage with aff’s that define a new form of managing appropriation – today it’s the commons aff, tomorrow it adds a regulation to manage appropriation – destroys fairness bc we never have ground to answer the aff and they have inf frontlining time.

## 2

#### Russia’s international ambitions are low now due to space sector failures.

AFP 19 5/28/19 (Agence France-Presse - international news agency headquartered in Paris, “Moscow, we have a problem: theft plagues Russia’s space sector,” https://www.scmp.com/news/world/russia-central-asia/article/3012088/moscow-we-have-problem-theft-plagues-russias-space)

With millions of dollars missing and officials in prison or fleeing the country, Russia’s space sector is at the heart of a staggering embezzlement scheme that has dampened ambitions of recovering its Soviet-era greatness. For years, Moscow has tried to fix the industry that was a source of immense pride in the USSR. While it has bounced back from its post-Soviet collapse and once again become a major world player, the Russian space sector has recently suffered a series of humiliating failures. And now, massive corruption scandals at state space agency Roscosmos have eclipsed its plans to launch new rockets and lunar stations. “Billions (of roubles) are being stolen there, billions,” Alexander Bastrykin, the powerful head of Russia’s Investigative Committee – Russia’s equivalent of the FBI – said in mid-May. Investigations into corruption at Roscosmos have been ongoing “for around five years and there is no end in sight,” he added. In the latest controversy, a senior space official appears to have fled Russia during an audit of the research centre he headed. Yury Yaskin, the director of the Research Institute of Space Instrumentation, left Russia for a European country in April where he announced his resignation, the Kommersant paper reported. He feared the discovery of malpractice during an inspection of the institute, according to the newspaper’s sources. Roscosmos confirmed that Yaskin had resigned but did not clarify why. His Moscow institute is involved in developing the Russian satellite navigation system GLONASS designed to compete with the American GPS system. Corruption has particularly affected Russia’s two most important space projects of the decade: GLONASS and the construction of the country’s showpiece cosmodrome Vostochny, built to relieve Moscow’s dependence on Baikonur in ex-Soviet Kazakhstan. Almost all major companies in the sector, including rocket builders Khrunichev and Progress, have been hit by financial scandals that have sometimes led to prison sentences for large-scale fraud. Russia’s Audit Chamber, a parliamentary body of financial control, estimated that 760 billion roubles (around US$11.7 million) was misappropriated from Roscosmos in 2017, or nearly 40 per cent of the total misappropriated from the entire economy that year. Roscosmos said that “eradicating corruption” is one of its “primary goals”, adding that it regularly cooperates with investigations by the authorities. In mid-April, President Vladimir Putin stressed the need to “progressively resolve the obvious problems that slow down the development of the rocket-space sector.” “The time and financial frameworks to realise space projects are often unjustified,” the Russian leader Rebooting the space sector is a matter of prestige for the Kremlin. It symbolises its renewed pride and ability to be a major global power, especially in the context of increased tensions with the United States.

#### We stopped appeasing Russia – they’ll pocket concessions from coop and increase aggression – tensions aren’t the result of understandings but hardened differences.

Haddad **and Polakova** 18 [Benjamin Haddad Director, Future Europe Initiative - Atlantic Council. Alina Polyakova Director, Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe. Don’t rehabilitate Obama on Russia. March 5, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/03/05/dont-rehabilitate-obama-on-russia/]

Obama’s much-ballyhooed “Reset” with Russia, launched in 2009, was in keeping with optimistic attempts by every post-Cold War American administration to improve relations with Moscow out of the gate. Seizing on the supposed change of leadership in Russia, with Dmitry Medvedev temporarily taking over the presidency from Vladimir Putin, Obama’s team quickly turned a blind eye to Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia, which in retrospect was Putin’s opening move in destabilizing the European order. Like George W. Bush before him, Obama vastly overestimated the extent to which a personal relationship with a Russian leader could affect the bilateral relationship. U.S.-Russia disagreements were not the result of misunderstandings, but rather the product of long-festering grievances. Russia saw itself as a great power that deserved equal standing with the U.S. What Obama saw as gestures of good will—such as the 2009 decision to scrap missile defense plans for Poland and the Czech Republic—Russia interpreted as a U.S. retreat from the European continent. Moscow pocketed the concessions and increasingly inserted itself in European affairs. The Kremlin was both exploiting an easy opportunity and reasserting what it thought was its historic prerogative. Though Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was the final nail in the coffin of the Reset, President Obama remained reluctant to view Moscow as anything more than a local spoiler, and thought the whole mess was best handled by Europeans. France and Germany spearheaded the Minsk ceasefire process in 2014-2015, with U.S. support but without Washington at the table. The Obama administration did coordinate a far-ranging sanctions policy with the European Union—an important diplomatic achievement, to be sure. But to date, the sanctions have only had a middling effect on the Russian economy as a whole (oil and gas prices have hurt much more). And given that sanctions cut both ways—potential value is destroyed on both sides when economic activity is systematically prohibited—most of the sacrifice was (and continues to be) born by European economies, which have longstanding ties to Russia. In contrast, the costs of a robust sanctions policy have been comparatively minor in the United States; Obama spent little political capital to push them through at home. The Obama administration also sought to shore up NATO’s eastern flank through the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), which stationed rotating troops in Poland and the Baltics while increasing the budget for U.S. support. Nevertheless, the president resisted calls from Congress, foreign policy experts, and his own cabinet to provide lethal weapons to Ukraine that would have raised the costs on Russia and helped Kyiv defend itself against Russian military incursion into the Donbas. As Obama told Jeffrey Goldberg, he viewed any deterrent moves by the United States as fundamentally not credible, because Russia’s interests clearly trumped our own; it was clear to him they would go to war much more readily that the United States ever would, and thus they had escalatory dominance. Doing more simply made no sense to Obama. This timid realpolitik was mixed up with a healthy dose of disdain. Obama dismissed Russia as a “regional power” that was acting out of weakness in Ukraine. “The fact that Russia felt it had to go in militarily and lay bare these violations of international law indicates less influence, not more,” Obama said at the G7 meeting in 2014. This line has not aged well. Obama’s attitudes on Russia reflected his administration’s broadly teleological, progressive outlook on history. Russia’s territorial conquest “belonged in the 19th century.” The advance of globalization, technological innovation, and trade rendered such aggression both self-defeating and anachronistic. The biggest mistake for America would be to overreact to such petty, parochial challenges. The 2015 National Security Strategy favored “strategic patience”. But was it patience… or passivity? As its actions in 2016 proved, Russia is very much a 21st century power that understands how to avail itself of the modern tools available to it, often much better than we do ourselves. The same intellectual tendencies that shaped Obama’s timid approach to Ukraine were reflected in his administration’s restrained response as evidence of Russian electoral interference began to emerge in the summer of 2016. Starting in June, intelligence agencies began reporting that Russian-linked groups hacked into DNC servers, gained access to emails from senior Clinton campaign operatives, and were working in coordination with WikiLeaks and a front site called DCLeaks to strategically release this information throughout the campaign cycle. By August, Obama had received a highly classified file from the CIA detailing Putin’s personal involvement in covert influence operations to discredit the Clinton campaign and disrupt the U.S. presidential elections in favor of her opponent, Donald Trump. That fall through to his departure from the White House, the president and his key advisers struggled to find an appropriate response to the crime of the century. But out of all the possible options, which included a cyber offensive on Russia and ratcheted up sanctions, the policy that was adopted in the final months of Obama’s term was, characteristically, cautious. Obama approved additional narrow sanctions against Russian targets, expelled 35 Russian diplomats, and shut down two Russian government compounds. It’s true that Obama faced a difficult political environment that constrained his ability to take tougher measures. Republican opponents would have surely decried any loud protests as a form of election meddling on Hillary Clinton’s behalf. Donald Trump was already flogging the narrative that the elections were rigged against him. And anyway, Clinton seemed destined to win; she would tend to the Russians in her own time, the thinking went. But just as with the decision to not provide weapons to Ukraine, the Obama administration also fretted about provoking Russia into taking even more drastic steps, such as hacking the voting systems or a cyber attack on critical infrastructure. In the end, the administration’s worries proved to be paralyzing. “I feel like we sort of choked,” one Obama administration official told the Washington Post. Much ink has been spilled over President Trump’s effusive praise for Putin and his brutal regime. “You think our country’s so innocent?” candidate Trump famously replied to an interviewer listing the many human rights abuses of Putin’s Russia, including the harassment and murder of journalists. Obama, on the other hand, never had any ideological or psychological sympathy for Putin or Putinism. By the end of his second term, the two men were barely on speaking terms, the iciness of their encounters in full public view. For most of Obama’s two terms, however, this personal animosity did not translate into tougher policies. Has the Trump administration been tougher on Russia than Obama, as the president claims? Trump’s own boasting feels like a stretch, especially given how he seems to have gone out of his way to both disparage NATO and praise Putin during the course of his first year in office. Still, many of his administration’s good policies have been obscured by the politics of the Mueller investigation and the incessant furor kicked up by the president’s tweets. As Tom Wright has noted, the Trump administration seems to pursue two policy tracks at the same time: the narrow nationalism of the president’s inflammatory rhetoric openly clashing with the seriousness of his administration’s official policy decisions. These tensions are real, but all too often they become the story. Glossed over is the fact that President Trump has appointed a string of competent and widely respected figures to manage Russia policy—from National Security Council Senior Director Fiona Hill to Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs Wess Mitchell to the Special Envoy for Ukraine Kurt Volker. The Trump administration is, in fact, pursuing concrete policies pushing back on Russian aggression that the Obama administration had fervently opposed. The National Security Strategy of 2017, bringing a much-needed dose of realism to a conversation too often dominated by abstractions like the “liberal world order”, singles out both China and Russia as key geopolitical rivals. During Trump’s first year, the administration approved the provision of lethal weapons to Ukraine, shut down Russia’s consulate in San Francisco as well as two additional diplomatic annexes, and rather than rolling back sanctions, Trump signed into law additional sanctions on Russia, expanded LNG sales to a Europe dependent in Russian gas imports, and increased the Pentagon’s European Reassurance Initiative budget by 40 percent. (A president who berated U.S. investments for European defense has actually dramatically increased American military presence on Europe’s threatened borders.) While many of these policies may have been implemented despite rather than because of the president—on the expansion of sanctions in particular, Trump faced a veto-proof majority in Congress—credit should be given where credit is due. The Trump administration’s sober policy decisions should not excuse the president’s praise for Vladimir Putin, nor his reckless undermining of America’s stated commitment to enforcing Article 5 during his first speech in front of NATO. But the fact remains that the U.S. is taking concrete steps to strengthen Europe against Russian aggression. And let’s not be coy about it: if the president’s strident complaining about unequal burden-sharing in NATO finally snaps European allies out of their complacency and helps spur military investment on the continent, this won’t be good news for Russia either. Indeed, he will have succeeded in moving the needle on an issue that has frustrated every one of his predecessors since 1989. Has Trump’s bluster, especially on Article 5, been cost-free? Hardly. Nevertheless, talking to diplomats around town suggests that after initial months of uneasiness, most Europeans have learned to deal with the Trump administration in a dispassionate and pragmatic manner that stands in stark relief with much of the hysteria that passes for commentary in the U.S. Each administration should be judged on what it has achieved. At the end of the Obama’s two terms, Putin had elevated Russia to a credible revisionist power on the international stage. Russia annexed Crimea and occupied much of Eastern Ukraine; by successfully propping up the degenerate Assad regime, the Kremlin gained a veto on any possible political solution to Syria, and got a meaningful foothold in the broader region for the first time since Sadat threw Soviet advisors out; and its populist allies and fellow-travelers were on the rise in Europe, fueling both anti-Americanism and illiberalism; and most damning of all, it managed to meddle, almost unopposed, in U.S. politics—all on Obama’s watch. There is plenty left to criticize in how the Trump administration has done things in its first year. The Trump administration’s apparent unwillingness to take steps to deter hostile foreign powers from meddling in American politics is inexcusably irresponsible. And in the Middle East, the Trump administration seems hell-bent on following Obama’s myopic policy of retreat and narrow preoccupation with fighting ISIS to the exclusion of all else. But despite the president’s campaign promises, his administration has been the first in the post-Cold War era to not try for a “Reset” with Moscow. If Vladimir Putin wanted to sow chaos and confusion in Washington, he has succeeded beyond his wildest dreams. If he wanted a pliant ally in America, he has abjectly failed.

#### Space cooperation massively boosts prestige for Russia.

Juul 19 - Senior policy analyst at the Center for American Progress Peter Juul, “Trump’s Space Force Gets the Final Frontier All Wrong,” Foreign Policy. March 20, 2019. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/20/trumps-space-force-gets-the-final-frontier-all-wrong/>

--Space is k2 national prestige – we control it now because people remember Apollo and ISS but that won’t last forever – strong NASA leadership is key

--Autocracy link – working with Russia and China gives them diplomatic leverage because it treats them as co-equal despite HR violations

--Competition is key – drives all countries to try to outperform the others

But funding isn’t everything, and in the new geopolitical context, democracy must be seen to work effectively. When it comes to space exploration, that means ratcheting back U.S. space cooperation with Russia as well as forgoing any equally intimate cooperation with China and its secretive space agency. The fact that the [head of Russia’s space agency remains under U.S. sanctions](https://spacenews.com/nasa-postpones-rogozin-visit/) for his role in Moscow’s military intervention in Ukraine illustrates the hazards involved in working with autocracies in space. Deep cooperation with autocratic powers in space gives autocracies a major point of diplomatic leverage over the United States, and more generally allows them to poach unearned international prestige by working on goals set and largely carried out by the United States. In today’s world, there’s no reason for the United States to give Russia or China this sort of standing by association.

Cooperation between the United States and Russia won’t grind to an immediate halt, though. With the International Space Station in orbit until at least 2024—if not longer—it will take time to disentangle the web of functional ties that have bound NASA and its Russian counterpart over the last quarter century. Significant cooperation with China should be avoided altogether, especially given its [notoriously opaque](https://www.merics.org/en/blog/chinas-space-program-about-more-soft-power) and [military-run](https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/01/china-space/497846/) space program. The space programs and agencies of other nations—NASA, the European Space Agency and its member-nation agencies, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, and even Russia’s Roscosmos—remain led and run by civilians.

#### Specifically - conciliatory policies present an image of weakness and appeasement - Russia seizes on it.

Payne 17 – Served in the Department of Defense as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy Dr. Keith B. Payne, “Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and conflict,” Comparative Strategy, 2017. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495933.2017.1277121?needAccess=true>

Unless a fundamental change occurs in Russian leadership and strategy, conciliatory actions by the West to avoid confrontation seem likely to present an image of weakness and irresolution, and thereby invite further Russian expansionist policies and belligerence. How then should the West begin to formulate its response to this potential threat? In particular, how should the West neutralize the Russian threat of nuclear first use to “de-escalate” a conflict? Recent reports analyzing Russian incursions have not dealt in a comprehensive manner with this issue. Commentators typically propose either to proceed cautiously and avoid confrontation because of Russian nuclear threats or match Russian threats and actions.40 Developing a comprehensive strategy to combat Russia’s nuclear first-use strategy is a critical, albeit complex undertaking. A first step is to outline the myriad objectives of an effective strategy to be employed by the United States and allies to confront and negate this threat. The discussion below offers an initial broad outline of suggested objectives for this important first step.

#### Putin soft power is low now, and that prevents Baltic adventurism that goes nuclear - legitimizing him gives him an opening to make information warfare succeed.

Kagan 19 - American resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and a former professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, less famous brother of our favorite neighborhood neocon Robert Kagan Frederick W. Kagan, “CONFRONTING THE RUSSIAN CHALLENGE: A NEW APPROACH FOR THE U.S.,” Institute for the Study of War. June 2019. <https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000016b-6eef-dc80-a3ff-ffff778c0000> \*\*\*Apologies for it being super condensed - it’s a 90 pg article

Impact:

--Russia needs to use nuclear threats in adventurism bc of conventional inferioty

--Wld detonate tac nukes to dare us to go to strategic nukes – either we give up and lose NATO or retaliate

--Causes countervalue strikes that kill everyone

IL:

--Russia adventurism relies on hybrid/info warfare – need to be able to sell a narrative to succeed

--Legitimacy is key – putin’s opportunistic and strikes if he thinks people will buy his narratives

--He’ll view the plan as an opportunity – views multipolarity as legitimating and will see it as recognition of his right to seize soviet states

--Nostalgia link – his sopo strat is based on reminiscence about the old USSR days – space achieves that

UQ:

1] now key – Putin in frozen conflicts and not condoned or condemned – plan is viewed sa ex post facto condoning Ukraine which justifies future incursions – it says putin is fine to seize territory bc we’re willing to work with him anyway!

2] His foreign policy strat is failing now – states are’t aligned with him

3] SoPo low bc he’s been called out – he paid a high price for incursions and the US has shunned him – that means his actions are delegitimized and called out so he won’t try it, but the plan flips it

The Russian threat’s effectiveness results mainly from the West’s weaknesses. NATO’s European members are not meeting their full commitments to the alliance to maintain the fighting power needed to deter and defeat the emerging challenge from Moscow. Increasing political polarization and the erosion of trust by Western peoples in their governments creates vulnerabilities that the Kremlin has adroitly exploited. Moscow’s success in manipulating Western perceptions of and reactions to its activities has fueled the development of an approach to warfare that the West finds difficult to understand, let alone counter. Shaping the information space is the primary effort to which Russian military operations, even conventional military operations, are frequently subordinated in this way of war. Russia obfuscates its activities and confuses the discussion so that many people throw up their hands and say simply, “Who knows if the Russians really did that? Who knows if it was legal?”—thus paralyzing the West’s responses. Putin’s Program Putin is not simply an opportunistic predator. Putin and the major institutions of the Russian Federation have a program as coherent as that of any Western leader. Putin enunciates his objectives in major speeches, and his ministers generate detailed formal expositions of Russia’s military and diplomatic aims and its efforts and the methods and resources it uses to pursue them. These statements cohere with the actions of Russian officials and military units on the ground. The common perception that he is opportunistic arises from the way that the Kremlin sets conditions to achieve these objectives in advance. Putin closely monitors the domestic and international situation and decides to execute plans when and if conditions require and favor the Kremlin. The aims of Russian policy can be distilled into the following: Domestic Objectives Putin is an autocrat who seeks to retain control of his state and the succession. He seeks to keep his power circle content, maintain his own popularity, suppress domestic political opposition in the name of blocking a “color revolution” he falsely accuses the West of preparing, and expand the Russian economy. Putin has not fixed the economy, which remains corrupt, inefficient, and dependent on petrochemical and mineral exports. He has focused instead on ending the international sanctions regime to obtain the cash, expertise, and technology he needs. Information operations and hybrid warfare undertakings in Europe are heavily aimed at this objective. External Objectives Putin’s foreign policy aims are clear: end American dominance and the “unipolar” world order, restore “multipolarity,” and reestablish Russia as a global power and broker. He identifies NATO as an adversary and a threat and seeks to negate it. He aims to break Western unity, establish Russian suzerainty over the former Soviet States, and regain a global footprint. Putin works to break Western unity by invalidating the collective defense provision of the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 5), weakening the European Union, and destroying the faith of Western societies in their governments. He is reestablishing a global military footprint similar in extent the Soviet Union’s, but with different aims. He is neither advancing an ideology, nor establishing bases from which to project conventional military power on a large scale. He aims rather to constrain and shape America’s actions using small numbers of troops and agents along with advanced anti-air and anti-shipping systems. Recommendations A sound U.S. grand strategic approach to Russia: • Aims to achieve core American national security objectives positively rather than to react defensively to Russian actions; • Holistically addresses all U.S. interests globally as they relate to Russia rather than considering them theater-by-theater; • Does not trade core American national security interests in one theater for those in another, or sacrifice one vital interest for another; • Achieves American objectives by means short of war if at all possible; • Deters nuclear war, the use of any nuclear weapons, and other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); • Accepts the risk of conventional conflict with Russia while seeking to avoid it and to control escalation, while also ensuring that American forces will prevail at any escalation level; • Contests Russian information operations and hybrid warfare undertakings; and • Extends American protection and deterrence to U.S. allies in NATO and outside of NATO. Such an approach involves four principal lines of effort. Constrain Putin’s Resources. Russia uses hybrid warfare approaches because of its relative poverty and inability to field large and modern military systems that could challenge the U.S. and NATO symmetrically. Lifting or reducing the current sanctions regime or otherwise facilitating Russia’s access to wealth and technology could give Putin the resources he needs to mount a much more significant conventional threat—an aim he had been pursuing in the early 2000s when high oil prices and no sanctions made it seem possible. Disrupt Hybrid Operations. Identifying, exposing, and disrupting hybrid operations is a feasible, if difficult, undertaking. New structures in the U.S. military, State Department, and possibly National Security Council Staff are likely needed to: 1. Coordinate efforts to identify and understand hybrid operations in preparation and underway; 2. Develop recommendations for action against hybrid operations that the U.S. government has identified but are not yet publicly known; 3. Respond to the unexpected third-party exposure of hybrid operations whether the U.S. government knew about the operations or not; 4. Identify in advance the specific campaign and strategic objectives that should be pursued when the U.S. government deliberately exposes a particular hybrid operation or when third parties expose hybrid operations of a certain type in a certain area; 5. Shape the U.S. government response, particularly in the information space, to drive the blowback effects of the exposure of a particular hybrid operation toward achieving those identified objectives; and 6. Learn lessons from past and current counter-hybrid operations undertakings, improve techniques, and prepare for future evolutions of Russian approaches in coordination with allies and partners. The U.S. should also develop a counter-information operations approach that uses only truth against Russian narratives aimed at sowing discord within the West and at undermining the legitimacy of Western governments. Delegitimize Putin as a Mediator and Convener. Recognition as one of the poles of a multipolar world order is vital to Putin. It is part of the greatness he promises the Russian people in return for taking their liberty. Getting a “seat at the table” of Western-led endeavors is insufficient for him because he seeks to transform the international system fundamentally. He finds the very language of being offered a seat at the West’s table patronizing. He has gained much more legitimacy as an international partner in Syria and Ukraine than his behavior warrants. He benefits from the continuous desire of Western leaders to believe that Moscow will help them out of their own problems if only it is approached in the right way. The U.S. and its allies must instead recognize that Putin is a self-declared adversary who seeks to weaken, divide, and harm them—never to strengthen or help them. He has made clear in word and deed that his interests are antithetical to the West’s. The West should therefore stop treating him as a potential partner, but instead require him to demonstrate that he can and will act to advance rather than damage the West’s interests before engaging with him at high levels. The West must not trade interests in one region for Putin’s help in another, even if there is reason to believe that he would actually be helpful. Those working on American policy in Syria and the Levant must recognize that the U.S. cannot afford to subordinate its global Russia policy to pursue limited interests, however important, within the Middle East. Recognizing Putin as a mediator or convener in Syria—to constrain Iran’s activities in the south of that country, for example—is too high a price tag to pay for undermining a coherent global approach to the Russian threat. Granting him credibility in that role there enhances his credibility in his self-proclaimed role as a mediator rather than belligerent in Ukraine. The tradeoff of interests is unacceptable. Nor should the U.S. engage with Putin about Ukraine until he has committed publicly in word and deed to what should be the minimum non-negotiable Western demand—the recognition of the full sovereignty of all the former Soviet states, specifically including Ukraine, in their borders as of the dates of their admission as independent countries to the United Nations, and the formal renunciation (including the repealing of relevant Russian legislation) of any right to interfere in the internal affairs of those states Defend NATO. The increased Russian threat requires increased efforts to defend NATO against both conventional and hybrid threats. All NATO members must meet their commitments to defense spending targets—and should be prepared to go beyond those commitments to field the forces necessary to defend themselves and other alliance members. The Russian base in Syria poses a threat to Western operations in the Middle East that are essential to protecting our own citizens and security against terrorist threats and Iran. Neither the U.S. nor NATO is postured to protect the Mediterranean or fight for access to the Middle East through the eastern Mediterranean. NATO must now prepare to field and deploy additional forces to ensure that it can win that fight. The West should also remove as much ambiguity as possible from the NATO commitment to defend member states threatened by hybrid warfare. The 2018 Brussels Declaration affirming the alliance’s intention to defend member states attacked by hybrid warfare was a good start. The U.S. and other NATO states with stronger militaries should go further by declaring that they will come to the aid of a member state attacked by conventional or hybrid means regardless of whether Article 5 is formally activated, creating a pre-emptive coalition of the willing to deter Russian aggression. Bilateral Negotiations. Recognizing that Russia is a self-defined adversary and threat does not preclude direct negotiations. The U.S. negotiated several arms control treaties with the Soviet Union and has negotiated with other self-defined enemies as well. It should retain open channels of communication and a willingness to work together with Russia on bilateral areas in which real and verifiable agreement is possible, even while refusing to grant legitimacy to Russian intervention in conflicts beyond its borders. Such areas could include strategic nuclear weapons, cyber operations, interference in elections, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty, and other matters related to direct Russo-American tensions and concerns. There is little likelihood of any negotiation yielding fruit at this point, but there is no need to refuse to talk with Russia on these and similar issues in hopes of laying the groundwork for more successful discussions in the future. INTRODUCTION The Russian challenge is a paradox. Russia’s nuclear arsenal poses the only truly existential threat to the United States and its allies, but Russia’s conventional military forces have never recovered anything like the power of the Soviet military. Those forces pose a limited and uneven threat to America’s European allies and to U.S. armed forces, partially because many U.S. allies are not meeting their NATO defense spending commitments. Russia is willing and able to act more rapidly and accept greater risk than Western countries because of its autocratic nature. Its cyber capabilities are among the best in the world, and it is developing an information-based way of war that the West has not collectively properly understood, let alone begun developing a response to. That information-based warfare has included attempts to affect and disrupt elections in the U.S. and allied states. The complexity and paradoxical nature of the Russian threat is perhaps its greatest strength. It is one of the key reasons for the failure of successive American administrations and U.S. partners around the world to develop a coherent strategy for securing themselves and their people and advancing their interests in the face of Russian efforts against them. The West’s lack of continuous focus on the Russian challenge has created major gaps in our collective understanding of the problem—another key reason for our failure to develop a sound counter-strategy. American concerns about Russia are bifurcated, moreover. Many Americans see the Russian threat primarily as a domestic problem: Moscow’s interference in the 2016 presidential election, attempts to interfere in the 2018 midterm election, and efforts to shape the 2020 elections. The U.S. national security establishment acknowledges the domestic problem but is generally more concerned with the military challenges a seemingly reviving Russia poses to U.S. NATO allies and other partners in the Euro-Atlantic region; with Russia’s activities in places like Syria and Venezuela; and with Russia’s outreach to rogue states such as North Korea and Iran. Even that overseas security concern, however, is pervaded by complexity and some confusion. The recommendations of the current U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) are dominated by responses to much-trumpeted Russian investments in the modernization of conventional and nuclear forces. At the same time, those documents acknowledge the importance of Russian capabilities at the lower end of the military spectrum and in the non-military realms of information, cyber, space, information, and economic efforts. Americans thus generally agree that Russia is a threat to which the U.S. must respond in some way, but the varying definitions of that threat hinder discussion of the appropriate response. Russia has entangled itself sufficiently in American partisan politics that conversation about the national security threat it poses is increasingly polarized. We must find a way to transcend this polarization to develop a strategy to secure the U.S. and its allies and advance U.S. interests, despite Russian efforts to undermine America’s domestic politics. AMERICAN INTERESTS—WHAT IS AT STAKE The Ideals of the American Republic The stakes in the Russo-American conflict are high. Russian leader Vladimir Putin seeks to undermine confidence in democratically elected institutions and the institution of democracy itself in the United States and the West.1 He is trying to interfere with the ability of American and European peoples to choose their leaders freely2 and is undermining the rules-based international order on which American prosperity and security rest. His actions in Ukraine and Syria have driven the world toward greater violence and disorder. The normalization of Putin’s illegal actions over time will likely prompt other states to emulate his behavior and cause further deterioration of the international system. Moscow’s war on the very idea of truth has been perhaps the most damaging Russian undertaking in recent years. The most basic element of the Russian information strategy, which we will consider in more detail presently, is the creation of a sense of uncertainty around any important issue. Russia’s strategy does not require persuading Western audiences that its actions in Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula or the Kerch Strait, which connects the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, for example, were legal or justified.3 It is enough to create an environment in which many people say simply, “who knows?” The “who knows?” principle feeds powerfully into the phenomena of viral “fake news,” as well as other falsehoods and accusations of falsehoods which, if left unchecked, will ultimately make civil discourse impossible. The Kremlin’s propaganda does not necessarily need its target audiences to believe in lies; its primary goal is to make sure they do not believe in the truth. This aspect of Putin’s approach is one of the greatest obstacles to forming an accurate assessment and making recommendations. It is also one of the most insidious threats the current Russian strategy poses to the survival of the American republic. The good news is that the war on the idea of truth does not involve military operations or violence, though it can lead to both. The bad news is that it is extraordinarily difficult to identify, let alone to counter. Yet we must counter it if we are to survive as a functioning polity. American Prosperity The debate about the trade deficit and tariffs only underscores the scale and importance of the role Europe plays in the American economy. Europe is the largest single market for American exports and the second-largest source of American imports, with trade totaling nearly $1.1 trillion.4 American exports to Europe are estimated to support 2.6 million jobs in the U.S.5 Significant damage to the European economy, let alone the collapse of major European states or Europe itself, would devastate the U.S. economy as well. American prosperity is tightly interwoven with Europe’s. American prosperity also depends on Europe remaining largely democratic, with market-based economies, and subscribing to the idea of a rulesbased international order. The re-emergence of authoritarian regimes in major European states, which would most likely be fueled by a resurgence of extremist nationalism, would lead to the collapse of the entire European system, including its economic foundations. European economic cooperation rests on European peace, which in turn rests on the continued submergence of extremist nationalism and adherence to a common set of values. Russian actions against Western democracies and support for extremist groups, often with nationalist agendas, reinforce negative trends emerging within Europe itself. These actions therefore constitute a threat to American prosperity and security over the long term. The American economy also depends on the free flow of goods across the world’s oceans and through critical maritime chokepoints. Russia posed no threat to those chokepoints after the Soviet Union fell, but that situation is changing. The establishment of what appears to be a permanent Russian air, land, and naval base on the Syrian coast gives Russia a foothold in the Mediterranean for the first time since 1991. Russian efforts to negotiate bases in Egypt and Libya and around the Horn of Africa would allow Moscow to threaten maritime and air traffic through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.6 Since roughly 3.9 million barrels of oil per day transited the Suez in 2016, to say nothing of the food and other cargo moving through the canal, Russian interference would have significant impacts on the global economy—and therefore on America’s economy.7 Russia’s efforts to establish control over the maritime routes opening in the Arctic also threaten the free movement of goods through an emerging set of maritime chokepoints.8 Those efforts are even more relevant to the U.S. because the Arctic routes ultimately pass through the Bering Strait, the one (maritime) border America shares with Russia. Russian actions can hinder or prevent the U.S. and its allies from benefiting from the opening of the Arctic. Russia is already bringing China into the Arctic region through energy investment projects and negotiations about the use of the Northern Sea Route, despite the fact that China is a state with no Arctic territory or claims.9 NATO The collective defense provision of the NATO treaty (known as Article 5) has been invoked only once in the 70-year history of the alliance: on September 12, 2001, on behalf of the United States. NATO military forces provided limited but important assistance to the U.S. in the immediate wake of the 9/11 attacks, including air surveillance patrols over the United States, and have continued supporting the U.S. in the long wars that followed. NATO established military missions in both Iraq and Afghanistan in the next two decades, deploying tens of thousands of soldiers to fight and to train America’s Iraqi and Afghan partners. American allies, primarily NATO members, have suffered more than 1,100 deaths in the Afghan war, slightly under half the number of U.S. deaths.10 The non-U.S. NATO member states collectively spent roughly $313 billion on defense in 2018—about half the American defense budget.11 The failure of most NATO members to meet their commitment to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense is lamentable and must be addressed. But the fact remains that the alliance and its members have spent large amounts of blood and treasure fighting alongside American forces against the enemies that attacked the U.S. homeland two decades ago, and that they provide strength and depth to the defense of Europe, which remains of vital strategic importance to the United States. The U.S. could not come close to replacing them without significantly increasing its own defense spending and the size of the U.S. military—to say nothing of American casualties. NATO is also the most effective alliance in world history by the standard that counts most: it has achieved its founding objective for 70 years. The alliance was formed in 1949 to defend Western Europe from the threat of Soviet aggression, ideally by deterring Soviet attack, and has never needed to fight to defend itself. The United States always provided the preponderance of military force for the alliance, but the European military contribution has always been critical as well. American conventional forces throughout the Cold War depended on the facilities and the combat power of European militaries, and the independent nuclear deterrents of France and Great Britain were likely as important to deterring overt Soviet aggression as America’s nuclear arsenal. The Soviets might have come to doubt that the U.S. would risk nuclear annihilation to defend Europe, but they never doubted that France and Britain would resort to nuclear arms in the face of a Soviet invasion. Has NATO become irrelevant with the passing of the Cold War and the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq and Afghanistan? Only if the threat of war has passed and Europe itself has become irrelevant to the United States. Neither is the case. Europe’s survival, prosperity, and democratic values remain central to America’s well-being, as noted above, and today’s global environment makes war more likely than it has been since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is not a given that Europe will remain democratic and a part of the international rules-based order if NATO crumbles. The U.S. can and should continue to work with its European partners to increase their defense expenditures and, more to the point, military capabilities (for which the percent of GDP spent on defense is not a sufficient proxy). The U.S. must also recognize the centrality of the alliance to America’s own security, as both the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy do.12 The maintenance and defense of NATO itself is a core national security interest of the United States. Cyber Russia is one of the world’s leading cyber powers, competing with the U.S. and China for the top spot, at least in offensive cyber capabilities. Russian hacking has become legendary in the U.S. thanks to Russia’s efforts to influence the 2016 presidential campaign, but Russia has turned its cyber capabilities against its neighbors in other damaging ways. Russia attacked Estonia in 2007 with a massive distributed denial-of-service attack. It attacked Ukrainian computers with the NotPetya malware in 2017, which eventually caused billions of dollars in damage, including in the Americas.13 It also employed cyberattacks in coordination with its ground invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. Fears of Russian cyber capabilities are warranted. This report does not consider the Russian cyber challenge in detail because others with far more technical expertise and support are actively engaged in combating it, defending against it, and deterring it. Our sole contribution in this area will be to consider it in the specific context of information operations support for hybrid operations in the recommendations section below. This approach stems from the recognition that the Kremlin’s cyber operations largely serve as enablers for its larger campaigns, rather than as a main effort. One must note, however, that while deterrence with conventional and nuclear forces prevents attacks, the United States is subject to cyberattack every day and has not established an effective means of retaliation, and thus deterrence. Weapons of Mass Destruction Russia’s nuclear arsenal is large enough to destroy the United States completely. The U.S. currently has no fielded ability to defend against a full-scale Russian nuclear attack—nor can Russia defend against a U.S. nuclear attack. American missile defense systems, by design, do not have the characteristics or scale necessary to shoot down any important fraction of the number of warheads the Russians have aimed at the U.S. from land- and sea-based launch platforms. America’s security against Russian nuclear attack today rests on the same principle as it has since the Russians first acquired nuclear weapons: deterrence. Russia also lacks the ability to shoot down American land- or sea-launched missiles and may not even be able reliably to shoot down U.S. nuclear-armed fifth-generation bombers. Deterrence is extremely likely to continue to work against Putin, who is a rational actor without the kinds of apocalyptic visions that might lead another leader to opt for annihilation in pursuit of some delusional greater good.14 The U.S. must pursue necessary modernization of its nuclear arsenal to sustain the credibility of its nuclear deterrent forces, but there is no reason to fear that deterrence will fail against Putin if it does so.15 It is less clear that Russia will continue to abide by its commitments to abjure chemical weapons, however. Russian agents have already conducted several chemical attacks, bizarrely using distinctive, military-grade chemical agents in attempted assassinations in the United Kingdom.16 Putin has also given top cover to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons against his own people, despite Russia’s formal role in guaranteeing Assad’s adherence to his 2013 promise to destroy his chemical weapons stockpile and refrain from any such use.17 Periodic Russian-inspired “rumors” that Western military personnel and Ukraine—which has no chemical weapons program—were planning to use chemical weapons on Ukrainian territory raise the concern that Russian agents provocateurs might conduct false flag operations of their own.18 Russia has the capability to produce chemical weapons at will—as does any industrialized state—but it is now showing that it may be willing to do so and to use them. The Soviet Union also maintained a vibrant biological weapons program. Russia has not thus far shown any signs of having restarted it or of having any intent to do so. The completely false claims that the U.S. has built biological weapons facilities in Russia’s neighboring states raise some concern on this front, since they could theoretically provide cover for the use of Russia’s own biological weapons, but they are more likely intended to influence the information space and justify other Russian actions.19 Terrorism Russia poses several challenges to any sound American approach to counter-terrorism. In addition to Iran, the world’s most prolific state sponsor of terrorism, Moscow’s preferred partners in the Middle East are those whose actions most directly fuel the spread of Salafi-jihadi groups. Russia encouraged and supported systematic efforts to eliminate moderate, secular opposition groups in Syria to the benefit of the Salafi-jihadi groups. Putin aims to expel or constrain the U.S. in the Middle East and establish his own forces in key locations that would allow him to disrupt American efforts to re-engage.20 Russia is the co-leader of a political and military coalition that includes Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah, the Assad regime, and Iranian-controlled Iraqi Shi’a militias.21 Russia provides most of the air support to that coalition in Syria, as well as special forces troops (SPETSNAZ), intelligence capabilities, air defense, and long-range missile strikes.22 That coalition’s campaign of sectarian cleansing has driven millions of people from their homes, fueling the refugee crisis that has damaged Europe.23 The coalition seeks to reimpose a minoritarian ‘Alawite dictatorship in Syria and a militantly anti-American and anti–Sunni Arab government in Iraq.24 The atrocities Russian forces themselves have committed, including deliberate and precise airstrikes against hospitals, have increased the sense of desperation within the Sunni Arab community in Syria, which Salafi-jihadi groups such as ISIS and al Qaeda have exploited.25 Russia supported Assad’s campaign to destroy the non-Salafi-jihadi opposition groups opposing him—particularly those backed by the U.S.—to aid the narrative that the only choices in Syria were Assad’s government or the Salafi-jihadis.26 That narrative was false in 2015 when Russian forces entered the fight but has become much truer following their efforts.27 Russia backed this undertaking with military force, but even more powerfully with information operations that continually hammered on the theme that the U.S. itself was backing terrorists in Syria and Russia was fighting ISIS.28 The insidiousness of the Russian demands that the U.S. remove its forces from Syria is masked by the current U.S. administration’s desire to do exactly that.29 One can argue the merits of keeping American troops in Syria or pulling them out— and this is not the place for that discussion—but the choice should be America’s. At the moment it still is. The consolidation of Russian anti-access/ area-denial (A2/AD) systems in Syria, however, together with the prospect of the withdrawal (or expulsion) of American forces from Iraq (or the closure of Iraqi airspace to support U.S. operations in Syria), could severely complicate American efforts to strike against terrorist threats that will likely re-emerge in Syria over time.30 The more the U.S. relies on an over-the-horizon strategy of precision strikes against terrorists actively planning attacks on the American homeland, the more vulnerable it becomes to the potential disruption of those strikes by Russian air defense systems, whether operated openly by Russians or nominally by their local partners. RUSSIA’S OBJECTIVES Mention of Putin’s objectives or of any systematic effort to achieve them almost always elicits as a response the assertion that Putin has no plan: Putin has no strategy; there is no Russian grand strategy, and so on. The other extreme of the debate considers Putin a calculated strategist with a grand master plan. The question of whether Putin has a plan, however that word is meant by those who assert that he does not, has important consequences for any American strategy to advance U.S. interests with regard to Russia. The trouble is that it is not clear what it would mean for Putin to have a plan or to lack one. We must first consider that more abstract question before addressing whether he has one. To have a plan usually means to have articulated goals, specific methods by which one will seek to achieve those goals, and identified means required for those methods to succeed. Goals, methods, and means can range from very specific to extremely vague and can be more flexible or more rigid. Specificity and flexibility can vary among the elements of this triad, moreover—goals may be very specific and rigid, methods general and flexible, means specific and flexible, or any other logical combination. When considering the question of Putin’s plan, therefore, we must break the discussion down into these four components: Does he have goals? Has he determined methods of achieving his goals? Has he specified resources required for those methods? How specific and how flexible are his goals, his methods, and the resources he allocates? Putting this discussion in context is helpful. Does a U.S. president have “a plan”? Not in any technical or literal sense. Every U.S. administration produces not a plan, but a National Security Strategy that is generally long on objectives—often reasonably specific—and very short on details of implementation (methods). Different national security advisers oversee processes within the White House to build out implementation details to greater or lesser degrees, but the actual implementation plans (methods) are developed by the relevant Cabinet departments. Those departments are also generally responsible for determining the resources that will be needed to implement their plans. The White House must then approve both the plans themselves and the allocation of the requested resources—and then must persuade Congress actually to appropriate the resources in the way the White House wishes to allocate them. This entire process takes more than a year from the start of a new administration and is never complete—the world changes, personnel turn over, and annual budget cycles and mid-term elections cause significant flutter. The one thing that does not happen is that a president receives and signs a “plan” with clear goals, detailed and specified methods, and the specific resources required, which is then executed.31 Putin does not have more of a plan than the U.S. does. It is virtually certain that he also lacks any such clear single document laying out the goals, methods, and means that he and his ministers are executing. But does he have as much of a plan as Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump have had? By all external signs, he does. Putin has clearly articulated a series of overarching objectives and goals for Russia’s foreign policy and national security. Putin has been continuously communicating them through various media, including Russia’s doctrinal documents, regular speeches, his senior subordinates, and the Kremlin’s vast propaganda machine for the past two decades. Russia has a foreign policy concept similar in scope and framing to the U.S. National Security Strategy, a military doctrine similar to the U.S. National Defense Strategy, and a series of other strategies (such as maritime, information security, and energy security) relating to the other components of national power and interest.32 These documents remain very much living concepts and have gone through multiple revisions in the decades since the fall of the Soviet Union. Through regular speeches, Putin consistently communicates his goals and the key narratives that underpin Russian foreign policy. He makes an annual speech to the Russian Federal Assembly that is similar in some respects to the U.S. president’s State of the Union address. Putin’s addresses tend to be even more specific (and much more boring) in presenting the previous year’s accomplishments and an outline of goals and intentions for the next year.33 Russia’s doctrines and concepts match Putin’s speeches closely enough to suggest that there is some connection between them. Putin also makes other regular speeches, including at the UN General Assembly, the Valdai Discussion Club, the Munich Security Conference at times, and during lengthy press conferences with the Russian media. These remarks are usually rather specific in their presentation of his objectives and sometimes, some of the means by which he intends to pursue them. Such speeches are neither less frequent nor less specific than the major policy speeches of American presidents. The widespread belief that Putin is simply or even primarily an opportunist who reacts to American or European mistakes is thus erroneous. Nor is Putin’s most common rhetorical trope—that he is the innocent victim forced to defend Russia against unjustified Western aggression—tethered to reality.34 Putin’s statements, key Russian national security documents, and the actions of Putin’s senior subordinates over the two decades of his reign cannot be distilled into a “plan,” but rather represent a set of grand strategic aims and strategic and operational campaigns underway to achieve them. Putin has remained open and consistent about his core objectives since his rise to power in 1999: the preservation of his regime, the end of American “global hegemony,” and the restoration of Russia as a mighty force to be reckoned with on the international stage. Some of his foreign policy pursuits are purely pragmatic and aimed at gaining resources; others are intended for domestic purposes and have nothing to do with the West. Putin has articulated a vision of how he wants the world to be and what role he wishes Russia to play in it. He seeks a world without NATO, where the U.S. is confined to the Western Hemisphere, where Russia is dominant over the former Soviet countries and can do what it likes to its own people without condemnation or oversight, and where the Kremlin enjoys a veto through the UN Security Council over actions that any other state wishes to take beyond its borders.35 He is working to bring that vision to reality through a set of coherent, mutually supporting, and indeed, overlapping lines of effort. He likely allows his subordinates a great deal of latitude in choosing the specific means and times to advance those lines of effort—a fact that makes it seem as if Russian policy is simply opportunistic and reactive. But we must not allow ourselves to be deluded by this impression any more than by other Russian efforts to shape our understanding of reality. Putin’s Domestic Objectives Maintaining relative contentment within his power circle is a key part of regime preservation. Putin has a close, trusted circle of senior subordinates, including several military and intelligence officials who have been with him for the past 20 years.36 His power circle has several outer layers, which include—but are not limited to—major Russian businessmen, often referred to as “oligarchs.” The use of the term “oligarch” to describe those who run major portions of the economy is inaccurate, however. Those individuals have power because Putin gives it to them, not because they have any inherent ability to seize or hold it independently. He shuffles them around—and sometimes retires them completely—at his will, rather than in response to their demands.37 They do not check or control Putin either individually or collectively, and they rarely, if ever, attempt to act collectively in any event. Putin controls Russia and its policies as completely as he chooses. This situation is different from the way in which the Soviet Union was ruled after Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953. The post-Stalin USSR really was an oligarchy. Politburo members had their own power bases and fiefdoms. They made decisions—including selecting new members, choosing new leaders, and even firing one leader (Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev)—by majority vote. There is no equivalent of the Politburo in today’s Russia, no one to balance Putin, and certainly no one to remove him. Putin seeks to keep the closest circle of subordinates and the broader Russian national security establishment content, as they form one of the core pillars of his power. He thus seeks to maintain a relative degree of contentment within various layers of his power structures, including among the “oligarchs.” For example, the Kremlin offered to help mitigate sanctions-related consequences for Russian businessmen.38 Kremlin-linked actors, in another example, reportedly embezzled billions of dollars in the preparations for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia—the $50 billion price tag of which was the highest for any Olympic games.39 Putin can still retire any of the “oligarchs” at will without fear of meaningful consequences—yet his regime is much more stable if they collectively remain reasonably satisfied. This reality will drive Putin to continue to seek access to resources, legal and illegal, with which to maintain that satisfaction. Maintaining popular support is a core objective of Putin’s policies. Putin is an autocrat with democratic rhetoric and trappings. Putin’s Russia has no free elections, no free media, and no alternative political platforms. He insists, however, on maintaining the “democratic” façade. He holds elections at the times designated by law (even if he periodically causes the law to be amended) and is genuinely (if decreasingly) popular. Nor is his feint at democratism necessarily a pose. The transformation of the Soviet Union into a democracy was the signal achievement of the 1990s.40 Putin played a role in that achievement, supporting St. Petersburg mayor Anatoliy Sobchak, then Boris Yeltsin, in their battles against attempts by communists to regain control and destroy the democracy, and then by an extreme right-wing nationalist party to gain power.41 Putin has called out many weaknesses of the Yeltsin era—but never the creation of a democratic Russia. Putin has not yet shown any sign of formally turning away from democracy as the ostensible basis of his power, although he has constrained the political space within Russia to the point that the elections are a sham. However, were he to abandon the democratic principles to which he still superficially subscribes, he would need fundamentally to redesign the justification of his rule and the nature of his regime. Nevertheless, he can only maintain even the fiction of democratic legitimacy if he remains popular enough to win elections that are not outrageously stolen. He has not been able to fix the Russian economy, despite early efforts to do so. The fall of global oil prices from their highs in the 2000s, as well as the Western sanctions imposed for his actions in Ukraine, among other things, are causing increasing hardship for the Russian people.42 Putin has adopted an information operations approach to this problem by pushing a number of core narratives, evolving over time, to justify his continued rule and explain away the failures of his policies. He has also grown the police state within Russia for situations in which the information operations do not work to his satisfaction. Putin’s justification of his rule has evolved over time. He first positioned himself as the man who will bring order. The 1990s was a decade of economic catastrophe for Russia. Inflation ran wild, unemployment skyrocketed, crime became not only pervasive but also highly organized and predatory, and civil order eroded. Putin succeeded Yeltsin with a promise to change all that. His “open letter to voters” in 2000 contained a phrase fascinating to students of Russian history: “Our land is rich, but there is no order.” That phrase is similar to one supposedly sent by the predecessors of the Russians at the dawn of Russian history to a Viking prince who would come to conquer them: “Our land is rich, but there is no order. Come to rule and reign over us.” By using the first part of that line, Putin, like Riurik, the founder of Russia’s first dynasty, cast himself as the founder of a new Russia in which order would replace chaos.43 Putin’s initial value proposition to his population was thus order and stability. He did, indeed, attempt to bring order to Russia’s domestic scene. Putin strengthened government institutions and curbed certain kinds of crime. He restored control over the region of Chechnya through a brutal military campaign. He tried to work with economic technocrats to bring the economy into some kind of order. The task was immense, however—Soviet leaders had built the entire Russian industrial and agricultural system and economic base in a centralized fashion. Undoing that centralization and creating an economy in which the market really could work was beyond Putin’s skill and patience. He largely abandoned the effort within a few years, both because it was too hard and because it seemed unnecessary.44 The rising price of oil in the early 2000s fueled the Russian economy and filled the government’s coffers on the one hand.45 The genuine structural reforms and innovation that were needed, on the other, also became antithetical to Putin’s ability to maintain control, as government corruption is a powerful tool of influence in Russia. Putin began to erode civil liberties in that period offering the unspoken but clear exchange: Give me your liberties and I will give you prosperity and stability. The 2008 global financial crisis collapsed oil prices, and the post-2014 sanctions regime removed the patches and workarounds Putin had used to offset his failure to transform Russia’s economy. Continuing low oil prices (and sanctions) have prevented it from recovering with much of the rest of the global economy, even as Putin has continued to eschew any real effort to address the systemic failings holding Russia’s economy back. Putin has therefore refocused on a different value proposition: Give me your liberties and I will give you greatness. He is increasingly linking the legitimacy of his own autocracy with Russia’s position on the world stage and with Russia’s ability to stand up to American “global hegemony.”46 Putin has simultaneously erected a narrative to deflect criticism for Russia’s problems onto the West. The West, supposedly fearful of Russia rising and determined to keep Russia down, has thwarted its rightful efforts to regain its proper place in the world at every turn. Putin claims the Russian economy is in shambles because of unjust and illegal sanctions that have nothing to do with Russia’s actions and are simply meant to keep “the Russian bear in chains.”47 Putin has also consistently fostered a complex narrative that combines diverse and—from the Western perspective—often conflicting elements, including Soviet nostalgia, Eastern Orthodoxy, Russian nationalism, and the simultaneous emphasis on Russia’s multiethnic and multireligious character. The importance Putin gives this narrative is visible in things large and small. He has named Russia’s ballistic missile submarines after Romanov tsars and Muscovite princes.48 He issued a decree in 2009 mandating the introduction of religious education in Russian schools, which began in 2012.49 He continues to place a major emphasis on Soviet-era achievements. Putin and his information machine take these various elements, refine and tailor them, and produce a mix of ideas to cater to various parts of the Russian population. We can expect Putin’s narratives to continue to shift to accommodate changing realities, but the current rhetorical linkage between Russia’s position on the world stage and the legitimacy of Putin’s domestic power is concerning. It suggests that Putin may be more stubborn about making and retaining gains in the international arena than he was in the first 15 years of his rule, as he seeks ways to bolster his popularity, which is flagging, and on which his mythos relies. Blocking a “color revolution” in Russia is the overarching justification Putin gives for the erosion of political freedom and the expansion of Russia’s police state. Revolutions overturned post-Soviet governments in Georgia (the Rose Revolution in 2003), Ukraine (the Orange Revolution in 2004), and Kyrgyzstan (the Tulip Revolution in 2005). Putin blamed all of them on efforts by the West, primarily the U.S., to undermine pro-Russian governments, even though all three emerged indigenously and spontaneously without external assistance. He regarded the Ukrainian EuroMaidan Revolution of 2014 as an extension of this phenomenon.50 The rhetoric Putin and other Russian officials and writers use about “color revolutions” is extreme. It paints them as part of a coherent Western effort aimed ultimately at overthrowing the Russian government itself. It is quite possible that Putin believes that there is such an effort underway and that the events that rocked the post-Soviet states were a part of it. Even if he did not believe this when he started to talk about it, he may well have convinced himself of it after 15 years of vituperation on the subject. The notion of a “color revolution” conspiracy against Russia is also a convenient way for Putin to discredit any opposition, an easy way to tar political opponents as foreign agents and traitors, to control and expel foreign non-governmental organizations, and generally to justify the erosion of civil liberties, human rights, and free expression in Russia. It externalizes resistance to Putin’s increasing autocracy while simultaneously providing scapegoats to blame for Russia’s problems. It also creates the narrative basis for casting any Western efforts to constrain Russian actions anywhere as part of a larger effort to set preconditions for a “color revolution” in Moscow. It fuels a narrative to which Russians are historically amenable: that Russia is surrounded and under siege by hostile powers trying to contain or destroy it. Putin can cast almost any action foreign states take of which he does not approve as part of this effort.51 The net effects of this narrative are threefold. First, it tends to consolidate support behind Putin as he presents himself as the defender of Russia against a hostile world—and his near-total control of the information most of his people receive makes it difficult for many to hear and believe any other side. Second, it constantly confronts the West with the suspicion that someone really is trying to orchestrate a conspiracy to cause “regime change” in Russia. Although no state or alliance has had any such objective since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the negative connotations of even the idea of attempting regime change create opposition to policies labeled in this way. Third, it also creates opposition to a potential peaceful change in the nature of the Russian regime from within, as Putin has associated the idea of political change with the “color revolution” prism of chaos, destruction, and an inevitably worsening economy. Putin presents his people a simple (but false) choice between the prospect of going back to something like the chaos and poverty of the 1990s ... or Vladimir Putin. Using the bogey of the “color revolution” conspiracy theory and other narratives, Putin is expanding the already-significant state control over his people’s communications and moving to a more rigid authoritarian model. He has prevented the emergence of any significant political opposition party or leader. Key opposition figures have been murdered, imprisoned, poisoned, and otherwise attacked.52 Putin’s regime suppresses—sometimes brutally— political dissent in the form of peaceful street protests or demonstrations, despite their small sizes.53 The political environment in Russia today is not markedly different from that of the Soviet Union in its last decade. Putin has brought the overwhelming majority of significant Russian media outlets into line with his own desired narratives, presenting the Russian people with a coherent stream of propaganda virtually without deviation. He appears to have decided that even this level of information control is insufficient, however, and has recently begun to assert even greater technical and policy control over Russians’ access to the internet.54 He has not yet matched these activities with recreation of an internal security apparatus on the scale needed to control the population through coercion, intimidation, and force, but he has been steadily expanding the internal security services during his two decades of rule. He has centralized some elements of the internal security apparatus under the control of a loyal lieutenant, but he would need to expand it considerably to be able to rely on it to maintain order by force beyond Moscow and St. Petersburg.55 In assessing whether Putin aims to shift the basis of his rule to more overt dictatorship, one of the key indicators to watch for is further expansion of that apparatus. It is also an indicator of the degree to which he sincerely believes that any sort of “color revolution” is in the offing. Expansion of the Russian economy remains an important component of Putin’s ability to sustain and grow his assertive foreign policy, popular support, and the resources subsidizing his close circle. Putin seems largely to have given up the idea of reforming the economy and has thus set about at least two major undertakings to improve it without reform. Undermining the Western sanctions regime. The imposition of major sanctions on Russia following the invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 has inflicted great damage on the Russian economy. Putin has launched a number of efforts to erode and break those sanctions, both in Europe and in the U.S. Despite repeated declarations about the ineffectiveness of sanctions, Putin clearly believes that nothing would improve the economy more dramatically and rapidly than their elimination. The Mueller Report amply documents Putin’s fear of new sanctions after the 2016 elections and his efforts to deflect them or have them nullified.56 He even went so far as to promise not to retaliate against the sanctions the Obama administration imposed, in hopes of persuading the incoming Trump administration to reverse or block them. His efforts failed, however, as Congress insisted on new sanctions and President Trump did not stop them. Russian activities in Europe have aimed in part to suborn one or more members of the European Union (EU) to refuse to renew the sanctions imposed following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. Openly pro-Russian governments in Budapest and now Rome, along with other states that have indicated greater reluctance to continue the sanctions regime, have not yet cast the vote to stop the renewal of sanctions. Putin has not given up, however, and continues to work to shape the political, informational, and economic environment in Europe to make it safe for one country to vote against sanctions renewal—and one vote is all he needs in the consensus-based EU model. The collapse of the sanctions regime and a flood of foreign direct investment into Russia could dramatically increase the resources available to support Putin’s foreign and defense efforts, even without fundamentally addressing the problems of the Russian economy. Putin would likely use those resources to return to the aggressive conventional military buildup he was pursuing before the imposition of sanctions in 2014 and to supercharge his economic efforts to establish Russian influence around the world. Developing new revenue streams is another obvious approach to bringing cash into the Russian economy and government. Russia is at a disadvantage in this regard because of the structural weaknesses of its economy. Its principal exports are almost entirely in the form of mineral wealth—oil, coal, and natural gas, as well as other raw materials. Weapons and military training services are the major industrial export. The use of private military companies (PMCs) such as the Wagner Group is a foreign policy tool for the Kremlin, but also one of the main exportable “services.” Civilian nuclear technology is a niche expertise that Putin is willing to sell as well. Putin has worked hard to expand Russia’s economic portfolios in all these areas. He has pushed both the Nord Stream II and the Turk Stream natural gas pipelines to make Europe ever more heavily dependent on Russian natural gas and to eliminate Russia’s dependency on the Ukrainian gas transit system. His lieutenants are actively negotiating deals throughout the Middle East and Africa to sell civilian nuclear technology. This generates continuous revenue because the states that commit to using Russian nuclear reactor technology will likely become dependent on Russian equipment and expertise to keep it running.57 Russia’s military activities in Syria can be described as a massive outdoor weapons exposition.58 The Russian armed forces have ostentatiously used several advanced weapons systems that were not required for the specific tactical tasks at hand.59 The Russian military staged these displays with the informational and geopolitical aim of demonstrating Russia’s renewed and advanced conventional capabilities. They also showed the effectiveness of weapons and platforms whose export versions are for sale. Russian military hardware salesmen are active throughout the Middle East and are having success. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems committed to purchasing the S-400 air defense system, despite vigorous American and NATO opposition and the threat that the U.S. will refuse to complete planned sales of the F-35 stealth aircraft to Turkey.60 The U.S. should certainly not deliver the F-35 to Turkey if Erdogan proceeds with purchase of the S-400. A Turkish trade of the F-35 for the S-400 would nevertheless be a significant victory for Putin in both economic and political terms. Putin’s efforts to steal arms business from the U.S. would also be assisted by legislation or executive decisions blocking the export of weapons systems to Saudi Arabia over the conduct of the war in Yemen. Income from such sales is a trivial percentage of American net exports, to say nothing of U.S. GDP, but would be much larger in the Russian ledgers, where totals are more than an order of magnitude smaller. The proliferation of Russian PMCs is another potential source of revenue—in addition to being a Kremlin foreign policy tool—although it is hard to assess its significance because of the secrecy surrounding the entire PMC enterprise. The reported numbers of mercenaries deployed by various Russian PMCs are generally in the low hundreds here and there—not large enough, in principle, to suggest that the income from them would be very great. There is no knowing the terms of their contracts, however, or what other activities they might engage in while stationed in poorly governed states rife with corruption and organized crime. None of these activities is likely to generate floods of money into Russia’s coffers in the near term, which is likely why Putin remains so heavily focused on sanctions relief. Putin has no other viable options for obtaining resources on a large scale. A significant increase in the price of hydrocarbons—either oil or natural gas—would once again flood Russia with cash. But Putin has no obvious way of directly causing such an increase in the price of oil, since Russia’s share of the oil market is not large enough to allow him to force price increases on OPEC. His ability to manipulate the price he charges Europeans for natural gas is also constrained. If he raises it too high, he could drive the Europeans to search harder for alternative sources of fuel or, given the Trump Administration’s willingness to export American liquefied natural gas (LNG), to rely on the U.S. instead of Russia. Such a European turn away from Russian gas would be a disaster for Russia. Without the ability to export LNG on a large scale, Russia can only sell gas where the pipelines go—and right now, they go to Europe. Russia could expand cooperation with China to create another major source of cash. Putin is very likely aware of the long-term risks of growing Chinese influence over Russia and its neighbors, yet he still may pursue greater economic ties with Xi Jinping’s China, given the likely calculation that he can control this relationship in the near term. Even so, Chinese cash usually comes with a heavy non-cash price, and Putin is savvy enough to be wary of becoming too dependent on Beijing’s largesse. Russia’s economy is therefore likely critical but stable. None of the economic efforts Putin has put into effect will fix the Russian economy’s fundamental structural flaws. All are palliatives with half-lives. Putin lacks a meaningful plan in this sense—nothing he is saying or doing will create a stable economic basis for Russia’s future. Neither, on the other hand, is Russia heading for a crash. The current level of economic stagnation is likely stable and sustainable—a constraint on Putin’s ability to expand his conventional capabilities and use economic instruments of power abroad, but not a threat to his rule. Russia has been a relatively poor country for much of its history. Yet it has proved capable of asserting itself on the European or global stage for most of that time. Russians are used to being a “poor power”; this is a normal state. These realities do not undercut the value of Western economic pressure on Russia; they should, rather, help set the proper objectives and expectations in applying such pressure. Retaining power constitutionally and managing a succession are the last major domestic campaigns in which Putin is engaged. Putin faces a significant watershed when his current presidential term ends in 2024, as he is constitutionally prohibited from running for re-election again in that cycle. He faced this dilemma in 2008 and chose then to allow Dmitrii Medvedev to become president while he retained effective control of Russian policy from the post of prime minister. He could pursue a similar model in 2024, but it is unlikely that he will do so. Among other things, Medvedev appears to have made at least one decision of which Putin violently disapproved—the failure to veto the UN resolution authorizing intervention in Libya against Moammar Ghaddafi—but he chose not to stop or reverse it. His ability to continue to control Russian policy and, even more, manage his succession from a position nominally subordinate to even a puppetlike president could also become more problematic as he ages. Putin could always cause the Duma to adjust the constitution again to let him run for another term, but he has not been laying the groundwork for such an approach (although it is admittedly early days yet for such an action). He might be pursuing an effort that offers a more interesting potential resolution to the dilemma in the form of further implementation of the Union Treaty with Belarus. He has been actively “negotiating” with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to create a full integration of the Russian and Belarusian armed forces and security services, bringing Belarus nearly completely back under de facto Russian control.61 Belarus would nevertheless remain a nominally independent sovereign state. The integrated forces would function under the rubric of a union of the two states, which would naturally have a president. Putin might shift to that role, retaining full control over the security apparatuses of both states, as well as the dominance he holds by virtue of his control of Russia’s economy and kleptocracy. He could then allow a puppet to take over as Russia’s president but now in a role subordinated to him rather than nominally superior to him. External Objectives Putin has been as explicit as it is possible to be in his overarching foreign policy aims: he seeks to end American dominance and the “unipolar” world order, restore “multipolarity,” and reestablish Russia as a global force to be reckoned with. He identifies NATO as an adversary and a threat and clearly seeks to weaken it and break the bonds between the U.S. and NATO’s European members. Breaking Western unity is thus one of Putin’s core foreign policy objectives. Three major lines of effort support this undertaking: invalidating the collective defense provision of the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 5), weakening or breaking the European Union, and destroying the faith of Western societies in their governments and institutions. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that an attack on one member of the alliance is an attack on all, with the requisite defense commitments. The provision’s activation is far from automatic, however. A member state under attack must request support from the alliance whose political body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), must then vote unanimously to provide it. The alliance has activated Article 5 only once, as noted above, and on behalf of the United States. Putin is working to ensure that it is never activated again. Putin can achieve this by creating a situation in which one or more member states votes against a request to activate Article 5, or in which a member state under attack does not request such a vote for fear that it will fail. If a state under Russian attack does not seek or fails to secure the alliance’s support, then the collective defense provision that is the bedrock of the alliance will have been weakened badly if it has not collapsed entirely. Putin’s efforts to secure Hungarian and also Italian support to end the renewals of EU sanctions help him in this undertaking as well, since both Hungary and Italy are NATO members. Hungary’s Viktor Orban in particular is so overtly pro-Russian that he could well seize on any doubt about the reality of a Russian hybrid intervention to refuse to vote for an Article 5 activation. Putin has acquired a potentially more interesting route to Article 5 nullification, moreover, in his entente with Turkey, also a NATO member, over Syria. His noteworthy failure to respond to the downing by the Turkish Air Force of a Russian fighter that crossed the Turkish border in 2015 has paid dividends. His efforts to sell the Turks the S-400 system are also advancing the aim of driving a deep wedge between Ankara and Washington. Erdogan’s suspicions that the U.S. backed the failed 2016 coup against him make very real the possibility that he would come before even Orban in refusing to vote for an Article 5 action in the case of a hybrid campaign in Latvia, for instance. The question of how much Putin seeks to destroy the collective defense provisions of the NATO treaty rather than simply to regain formerly Soviet territories should loom large in considerations of possible military scenarios. The direct deployment of regular, uniformed Russian armed forces personnel in one of the Baltic states would make it very difficult for any NATO member state to refuse to honor a request to invoke Article 5. Erdogan, Orban, or some other leader might still find a way, but the pressure to show alliance solidarity in such a situation would be intense. A Crimea-type scenario, then, in which the hybrid war starts with “little green men” (Russian soldiers out of uniform) but then escalates quickly to the use of conventional Russian military personnel, with their equipment and insignia, is much less likely if Article 5 is the target. A better Russian approach in that case would be the model Putin used in eastern Ukraine: Russian soldiers out of uniform work with local proxies, some already existing, others created as they go along, and try hard never to show themselves overtly.62 Russian information operations work around the clock to obfuscate emerging evidence of any Russian military presence, while the Kremlin praises the brave warriors of the Russianspeaking patriots within the target state, who are surprisingly well armed and well led. In such a case, Putin is more likely to attempt to leverage an insurgency (which he probably created) to break the government and create chaos of some sort than to move to overt deployment of conventional forces—at least until he is as sure as he can be that even such a deployment would not rouse the alliance to invoke Article 5 at the last moment. He might well accept or even prefer an ostensible “failure” to gain control of the target country (at that time) in return for making obvious to all that NATO is dead. After all, once the collective defense provisions of the alliance and the Western will to defend the Baltics are destroyed, Putin can pick them off at his leisure. Weaken or break the European Union. Putin has been energetically supporting Euroskeptic parties for many years—his financial aid to Marine Le Pen in France is the most ostentatious example, but there are numerous others.63 He stands to benefit from weakening or breaking the European Union in several ways. First, the EU is an exclusive economic club that Russia will be unable to join in Putin’s lifetime. The corruption and opacity of the Russian economy are too deeply established for Putin to imagine a time when Russia might meet the standards for EU membership—and Putin relies on this corruption and opacity, as we have noted, for continued control over the major economic actors in Russia. Nor is he likely to desire such membership. Sitting around a table on an equal basis with Luxembourg and Belgium is not appealing to a man who aspires to be one of the poles in a multipolar world. But the EU collectively wields great economic power through its ability to control trade with the bloc and impose sanctions. Putin would do much better in a Europe where he could negotiate and pressure individual states on a bilateral basis—and a Europe that was unable to impose multilateral sanctions on him and require all member states to abide by them—and he appears to understand that. Second, the Euroskeptic parties are generally extremely nationalistic. The reemergence of nationalism within Europe poses an enormous challenge to the stability of intra-European relations and could even undermine the long peace that has held in Western Europe since 1945.64 It would likely translate into conflict at the North Atlantic Council and could well drive increased tensions between individual European countries and the United States. Putin appears to be untroubled by the prospect of a reemergence of German nationalism, even though that ideology historically has targeted Russia. He may believe that the benefit of shattering the Western bloc outweighs risks that he likely expects to be able to handle in other ways. Weakening Western will and trust in democratic institutions is another line of effort Putin is pursuing to break the Western bloc. His interference in the Western political systems and information space is intended to destroy Westerners’ trust in their governments and in the idea of democracy, as much as to bring about the election or defeat of particular candidates—if not more so.65 He is explicit in his attacks on the Western political system: “Even in the so-called developed democracies, the majority of citizens have no real influence on the political process and no direct and real influence on power,” he said in 2016, adding that “it is not about populists … ordinary people, ordinary citizens are losing trust in the ruling class.”66 This effort benefits from trends in Western societies that were already undermining popular faith in institutions. Americans’ confidence in institutions generally has dropped by about 10 percent from its post–Cold War high in 2004.67 The Iraq War, the 2008 financial crisis, and revelations of classified U.S. surveillance programs, among other things, have eroded Americans’ trust in institutions almost across the board. The military is a remarkable exception to this trend. The massive, unauthorized release of classified materials by Edward Snowden was particularly important in this regard, as it has cemented the erroneous impression that the U.S. government was listening to the phone calls and reading the e-mails of all its citizens and those of many other countries. That impression has widened the wedge between some major technology companies and the government, hindering the development of a national cyber-defense capability and even the government’s ability to contract for advanced software.68 It is not surprising that Snowden ended up in Moscow or that Putin has granted him asylum. Snowden advanced a major Russian line of effort, apparently without any orders from Putin. These negative trends in the West have created openings that Putin is working to exploit by compromising elections, supporting extremist candidates, and pursuing aggressive information operations that stoke divisions and mistrust within Western societies. Establishing Russian suzerainty over the states of the former Soviet Union is a second major foreign policy objective. Suzerainty is “a dominant state controlling the foreign relations of a vassal state but allowing it sovereign authority in its internal affairs.”69 It is the most precise way of capturing Putin’s aims vis-à-vis the former Soviet states and the limitations of those aims. He is not attempting to reconquer the lost territory nor to govern it directly from Moscow. He has asserted, rather, that the world must recognize that post-Soviet states have only a truncated sovereignty over their own affairs. They may not freely join alliances such as NATO or economic blocs such as the EU without Moscow’s permission, for example. Putin further claims that Russia has the right to protect Russian speakers in those states against oppression or discrimination (as defined and determined by Putin), and that it may use military force to do so. Assertion of the right to defend Russian speakers abroad is not Putin’s innovation. Boris Yeltsin’s government articulated it in the early 1990s, but Yeltsin never acted on it.70 Opposition to NATO’s expansion also originated in the Yeltsin era, and the 1997 National Security Concept identified such expansion as a “national security threat.”71 But whereas Yeltsin nevertheless continued to try to work with NATO and establish a relationship with it, Putin has been frankly antagonistic toward the alliance. The actual expansion of NATO to include the three Baltic states as well as Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004 was likely a tipping point in Putin’s attitudes. The critical nuance to consider is that Putin has always been more concerned about the loss of control over Russia’s perceived sphere of influence than an actual NATO threat to Russia.72 NATO expansion coincided with the first of the “color revolutions” in Ukraine, which clearly fueled Putin’s fears that the former Soviet states were at risk of slipping entirely out of Moscow’s orbit. Putin initiated active efforts to regain control over the former Soviet states shortly after he took office in 1999-2000, but it took several years before he adopted a more combative tone and aggressive policies. Putin’s speech before the Munich Security Conference in 2007 and then his invasion of Georgia in 2008 underscored this overt turn.73 He has clearly made it a priority to ensure that no more former Soviet states join NATO or the EU, while working to undermine the bonds linking the Baltic states to the alliance. Putin’s claims to suzerainty over the former Soviet states have been met with ambivalence in the West. Russia experts and others often defend the assertion of a unique Russian sphere of influence over those states on historical or geopolitical bases.74 Even the seizure and annexation of Crimea has been presented as somehow ambiguous. Putin’s argument—that Soviet Communist Party secretary general Nikita Khrushchev’s transfer of the region from Russia to Ukraine was an internal matter that should not have led to the peninsula’s inclusion in an independent Ukraine—has gotten a surprising amount of traction in the expert community.75 Examined closely, however, Putin’s claims over the former Soviet states are completely indefensible. All 15 of the Soviet Socialist Republics, including Russia, were recognized as sovereign states after the USSR collapsed, and they were admitted to the UN on an equal basis with all other UN member states. The Russian Federation recognized them all and their UN accessions without reservations. The subsequent complaints by Yeltsin’s foreign minister, Yevgenii Primakov, and then Putin, about the folly of Yeltsin’s decisions to do so does not change or invalidate those decisions.76 The 15 former Soviet states thus have all the same rights as every other member of the UN—including the right to make such alliances and join such blocs as they choose without needing the permission of another power, and the right to govern their own people, including minorities, as they wish. It is ironic, to say the least, that Putin vigorously defends Assad’s right to conduct horrifying atrocities against his own people on the grounds of sovereignty, while claiming that alleged discrimination against the use of Russian language in post-Soviet states justifies his own military intervention in those states. Russia can certainly decide that the shift of post-Soviet states into the NATO or EU orbit poses such a significant threat to its security and interests that it must use force to stop or reverse it, just as any sovereign state can see threats in the actions of its neighbors and decide that it must respond with force. But the resort to force in such circumstances is aggression, not a defensive move, and must be regarded and treated as such by the international community. Accepting the Russian argument that Moscow has an inherent right to intervene, including militarily, in its neighbors based on their treatment of their Russian minorities or their intentions to join alliances is a truncation of their sovereignty that undermines the entire basis of international law and the UN Charter. Putin is actively working to establish precisely that principle as a matter of international norm and is making a distressing amount of progress. Both Yeltsin and Putin have retained Russian suzerainty over some post-Soviet states in legal and legitimate ways as well. Russian ground and air forces have remained in Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan almost continuously since the fall of the Soviet Union at the invitation of the governments of those states. A small Russian military contingent also remains in Moldova in more ambivalent circumstances. The government in Chisinau does not welcome its presence and the parliament has called on it to depart, but the Moldovan government has not formally ordered the Russians to leave.77 These deployments give Russia significant influence in the Caucasus, eastern Central Asia, and Moldova. The deployment in Tajikistan also creates a platform for Russian engagement and interference in Afghanistan. The situation in Belarus is the most worrisome of the legal reconsolidation efforts because of the strategic impacts it could have on NATO’s ability to defend the Baltic states (see Appendix I for a more detailed consideration of this problem). Negotiations currently underway could lead to the merging of the Russian and Belarusian armed forces and the technical subordination of the governments of Russia and Belarus to some new Union State. It is tempting, as we have noted, to imagine Putin taking control of this new combined polity after the end of his current presidential term, thereby finding an elegant solution to the constitutional problems of extending his reign. Returning Russia to the status of a global power shaping the international system is the last major external objective Putin is pursuing. Several lines of effort support this objective: Regain a global military footprint. Putin has been working to regain parts of the Soviet global military position lost in the late 1980s. A principal aim of this undertaking is to impose increasing costs on America’s efforts to continue operating around the world as it chooses and to offset part of the huge financial deficit holding Putin back from pursuing his larger aims. It is not meant to create platforms for global or even major regional wars, still less to advance an ideology (one of the Soviet objectives in creating the footprint in the first place). Putin’s establishment of a long-term air and naval base in Syria was the first significant step in this effort.78 He has also been cultivating the leaders of other states that were formerly Soviet clients and partners, including Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Sudan, and Cuba.79 In addition, he has recently added to the list by deploying Russian mercenaries (at least) in Venezuela and solidifying an entente with Iran that the Soviet Union never had.80 The Russian armed forces and/or mercenaries are now openly operating out of bases in Syria, Ukraine, and Venezuela. Russian PMCs have also reportedly been operating in Sudan, Central African Republic, and Libya.81 Russian forces have episodically used bases in Iran as well.82 This footprint is far smaller than the Soviets’, but is a dramatic change from Russian policies and capabilities between 1991 and 2013. Indications are that Putin intends to expand further using the sale of advanced weapons systems as the entry wedge. One major reason the U.S. is unwilling to give Turkey the F-35 if Ankara proceeds with the Russian S-400 air defense system purchase is that Russian technical specialists would be stationed in Turkey with its deployment. For the U.S., the military implications of these efforts are complex. The Russian military does not now have the capability to deploy large enough numbers of advanced offensive conventional weapons systems to bases beyond its borders to challenge a major American military effort to destroy them. The defensive systems, especially advanced A2/AD systems like the S-300, S-400, and Bastion anti-ship cruise missile system pose much greater challenges.83 But the U.S. military could defeat the limited numbers of such systems the Russians have emplaced in Syria and might emplace elsewhere if it chose to allocate the necessary resources. The most immediate consequence of the expanded Russian global conventional footprint, then, is the requirement that the U.S. and its allies ensure the availability of the forces that might be needed to handle the Russian systems. That resource requirement is significant. Neither the U.S. nor NATO has anticipated having to fight in the Mediterranean since the end of the Cold War, and the alliance does not have the necessary assets permanently allocated to respond to such a threat. It has instead generally used the resources that would be needed to counter Russian positions to conduct counter-terrorism operations throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The Russian deployments thus force on the alliance, in the event of an escalation with Moscow, the choice of reducing counter-terrorism operations, reallocating forces from the Indo-Pacific theater (not really an option in the current geostrategic environment), or creating and deploying new forces to deal with the emerging threat. In this context, the loss of Turkey as a reliable U.S. partner is very damaging. The Turkish air force is significant in its own right, although it is still recovering from Erdogan’s post–coup attempt purge, and the ability to use Turkish bases for operations against Russian positions in Syria would be strategically very significant.84 But the burgeoning Russo-Turkish entente means that the U.S. and NATO cannot count on Ankara in a showdown, further raising the requirement to develop and deploy new resources. The Russian deployments in Syria, Venezuela, and elsewhere are, in fact, part of a hybrid operation aimed not at preparing to fight a conventional war, but rather, at persuading the U.S. and its allies to withdraw from the threatened regions or limit their operations. Putin likely aims to increase both the risk and the cost of continuing to conduct military operations in the MENA area to a level at which the U.S. yields to its ever-growing impulse to pull back from the region entirely. This operation is surely also aimed at securing economic resources. Recent Russian deployments to Venezuela have gone to key oil-producing areas, and Putin’s financial interactions with Nicolas Maduro are well reported.85 Russian forces in Syria are also supporting Putin’s efforts to gain at least partial control over the reconstruction resources expected to flow into that country if ever he can persuade the international community to send them.86 Putin’s Syria campaign has already helped leach resources for his inner circle. For example, a Russian company run by Yevgeniy Prigozhin, a close Putin associate central to Russia’s attack on the U.S. political system, secured a stake in Syrian oil and gas fields via the Assad regime.87 It is vital in assessing Russia’s apparent reconstruction of the Soviet global military posture to recognize the essential differences in aims driving Putin from those motivating the Soviets. Putin intends to raise the cost to the U.S. of being a global power to levels higher than he thinks Americans will wish to pay. The U.S. must recognize the limitations of his ambitions in this regard as it develops intelligent responses at reasonable cost, even while being clear-eyed about the real threats Russia’s expanding global footprint present. Normalize Russia’s violations of international law. The Russian cyberattack against Estonia in 2007; invasion of Georgia in 2008, with the subsequent annexation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; invasion of Ukraine in 2014; deliberate attacks against civilians in Syria; defense of Assad’s use of chemical weapons and other crimes against humanity; chemical-weapons attacks on Russian expatriates in the UK; and seizure of Ukrainian naval vessels and personnel attempting to transit the Kerch Strait are all violations of international law. Russia has paid virtually no price for any of them except the invasion of Ukraine. On the contrary, Putin has positioned himself as a mediator in Syria (although not a successful one) by convening a pseudo–peace process in Astana that competes with the internationally recognized Geneva Process (which has also been unsuccessful, to be sure). Putin continues to portray Russia as a mediator even in the Ukraine conflict where he is a belligerent. He successfully obfuscated the illegality of his actions in and beyond the Kerch Strait, and has deflected some of the opprobrium his activities in Syria deserve by accusing the U.S. of supporting terrorists and the Syrian opposition of conducting the chemical weapons attacks.88 The expulsion of Russian officials—including intelligence officers— by the U.S., UK, and other states in response to the chemical weapons attacks in Britain was hardly a crippling response.89 The net result of these repeated violations of international law that do not result in meaningful consequences is their normalization. Each one establishes a precedent that Putin can and will then use to defend similar or even more aggressive activities. If the West accepted the clearly illegal seizure of Ukrainian ships in international waters near the Kerch Strait, how will it react if Russian forces seize some other ship on a trumped-up pretext while it attempts to transit the opening Arctic shipping route? Having taken no action against Russia for its defense of Assad’s use of chemical weapons, how would the West respond to a covert Russian operation to use chemical warfare in Ukraine while attributing the incident to the Ukrainian or a Western government? The principled answer is that, of course, failure to act in one case does not preclude action in subsequent cases. If the West has not responded adequately to most of these Russian transgressions, neither has it explicitly condoned them—yet. That is a line that we must be very wary of inadvertently crossing. Imagine an unlikely but not an impossible situation in which Ukraine’s President Volodymir Zelensky, elected in April 2019, asks the U.S. and the EU to waive Russian sanctions for Ukraine—or lift them altogether—as part of a deal he is negotiating to “end the conflict” in his country. It would be difficult to resist such a request since ending wars is desirable, especially if it can be done with the apparent acceptance of both sides. The net effect of endorsing such a deal, however, which would surely leave Crimea in Russia’s hands and eastern Ukraine in a changed political relationship to Kyiv, would be to endorse retroactively the violations of international law Putin committed in 2014. Doing so would indeed establish a precedent that Putin can impose his will on other states as long as he subsequently succeeds well enough to convince or coerce those states into recognizing his actions. There is, of course, no new principle at work here. It has always been true in the modern states system that a successful aggressor can have his aggression legitimized by a subsequent peace agreement, even one forcefully imposed on the defeated state. The novelty in this situation is twofold. First, Russia has not been universally identified as the aggressor— Putin’s efforts in Ukraine are not generally accepted as the offensive land-grab they actually were—and Putin’s role in any deal would be as mediator rather than belligerent. It is one thing to accept that Putin launched, waged, and won a war of aggression, the outcome of which the defeated state chose to accept; it is another to say that he facilitated and mediated a peace agreement in a conflict to which he was not actually party, when, in fact, he initiated it and directly benefited from it. Second, the principle at issue goes beyond the straightforward one of legitimizing a forcible conquest—it also touches on the nature of the post-Soviet states’ sovereignty. Putin has asserted, as we have argued, that Russia has the right to intervene by force in any of the post-Soviet states and the international community has no right to interfere (including even by offering an opinion). Recognizing his activities in Ukraine ex post facto recognizes this principle as well. It establishes as a firm precedent, reinforcing the precedent already established by the invasion of Georgia, that there are degrees of sovereignty in the international community and that some states are more sovereign than others. Putin is clearly attempting to establish precisely that principle. The West must resist the temptations he may offer to allow him to do so. Create a constellation of alliances and friendly states that gravitate toward Russia. Putin has been working hard to create multiple blocs and groupings of which Russia is either the sole center or one of a small number of core states, as an alternative to the U.S.-dominated international order he so opposes.90 Few of these individual efforts have been particularly effective, nor is it clear that the sum of them will result in a truly Russia-centric constellation of states. But the tenacity with which he has pursued this objective and the sheer number of attempts to reach it demonstrate, if nothing else, the importance he seems to attach to it. Some of these groupings offer Russia little inherent influence. BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) began simply as an acronym to describe major emerging markets, for example. It has no formal decision-making process, nor are its members aligned with one another on political or economic policies. It has no military component at all. Some, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) require Russia to compete with China for predominant influence.91 That competition is not going well for Moscow, at least in the case of the SCO, leading Putin to de-emphasize this forum for the moment. Some, like the Eurasian Economic Union, remain largely aspirational. They have not yet established themselves as meaningful associations through which Russia could hope to exert influence now, nor is it clear that they will gain more significance over time—although Putin continues to work at it.92 Others are operational and meaningful. The Astana Process tripartite has not brought peace to Syria, but it has helped establish Putin at the heart of a triad with Iran and Turkey that is shaping Ankara’s drift away from NATO and toward Moscow. The Quartet Intelligence Center has not yet integrated the Iraqi military or government into the Russian orbit as fully as Putin might like, but it gives form to the very real military coalition of Russia, Iran, and Syria that is fighting in Syria.93 Still others, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are largely moribund at the moment, but the Union Treaty with Belarus had also been dormant almost since its creation in the 1990s, and Putin is attempting to reify it.94 We cannot discount the possibility that he may do so with one of the other agreements that are legacies of the 1990s. The purpose of laying out these various efforts is not to suggest that they are likely to succeed, or that their success would have dire consequences for American national security—it might or might not, depending on the circumstances. The purpose is, rather, to demonstrate again the coherence between Putin’s stated grand strategic vision and the undertakings the Russian state is pursuing to achieve it. Putin’s goals are antithetical to the security and national interests of the United States and its allies. We must prevent him from achieving them, without resorting to major war if at all possible. We turn next, therefore, to the means by which Putin and his subordinates pursue his aims—an examination that will show the tremendous challenges his methods pose, on the one hand, and the opportunities to respond with means well short of war, on the other. THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR The Russian way of war today is based on recognition of Russia’s fundamental weaknesses and the fact that Russia is not a near-peer of the U.S. and will not become one any time soon. It is designed to achieve Moscow’s objectives without fighting a major war against the West that Russia would likely lose if it did not escalate to using nuclear weapons.95 Its technological emphases have therefore been on less-expensive and asymmetric capabilities such as information operations, cyber operations, A2/ AD systems, and nuclear systems. Its intellectual development has focused on the category of political-informational-military activities encapsulated in the terms “hybrid war” or “gray zone” conflict.96 Russia is optimizing itself to fight a poor man’s war because it is poor and will remain so. Putin is sufficiently in contact with reality to know that he will fail if he attempts to regain anything approaching conventional military parity with the West. Assessing the novelty of this Russian approach is difficult. None of the concepts or technologies on which it relies is new or unique to it. Most of the key intellectual framework goes back to the early days of Soviet military thinking. Some can be traced back centuries to Sun Tsu. Nor has Russia abandoned traditional military approaches and conventional capabilities. It would be both wrong and dangerous to ascribe to Russia the invention of an entirely new way of war that is the only way in which it will fight now, or in the future. There are nevertheless important differences between the current Russian approach and the approach that characterized Russian military and national security strategy and doctrine in the 2000s and the 1990s, to say nothing of the Soviet period. The differences lie partly in emphasis and partly in the degree of intellectual development of certain concepts at the expense of others. It would be equally wrong and dangerous, therefore, to see the current Russian approach to war as the same as, or even congruent with, all of the post-Soviet period. The Russian military in the 1990s and 2000s focused largely on acquiring the capabilities it most envied in the stunning conventional American military victories against Iraq in 1991 and 2003. It sought to acquire long-range precision-strike capabilities that the Soviet military never had, stealth technology, and tanks and aircraft roughly equivalent with the mainstay technologies of NATO countries.97 It also sought to transform itself from a mass cadre-andreserve conscript force into a volunteer professional military, recognizing the tremendous value the U.S. transition to the all-volunteer force had brought on the battlefield.98 It has managed to achieve only partial success in most of these measures after nearly three decades. It has re-equipped many, but by no means all, of its combat units with weapons systems roughly equivalent to American fourth-generation aircraft (such as the F-15E Strike Eagle), M1 tanks, etc. It has struggled to field a force of fifth-generation aircraft and is unlikely to build a large enough arsenal of such aircraft to pose a serious challenge to American capabilities in any short period of time.99 It has acquired and demonstrated the ability to employ precision weapons, including long-range precision missile systems. Its mix of those systems and “dumb bombs” in Syria, however, was more similar to the mix the U.S. used in 1991 than to the mix American forces use today—the large majority of Russian munitions dropped in Syria were not precision-guided munitions because the Russian stockpiles are not large enough to support their widespread employment.100 The Russian military has notably failed to transition fully to an all-volunteer force, moreover, and has given up the effort. It has become, therefore, a segmented force with a volunteer element (so-called contract soldiers) and a large body of conscripts serving one-year terms (half the two-year service requirement for conscripts in the Red Army). This partial professionalization will continue to exercise a drag on its ability to complete its modernization programs; one-year conscripts simply cannot learn both how to be soldiers and how to use very advanced modern weapons systems. Russia’s modernization efforts lurched dramatically in 2008 with the appointment of Anatolii Serdyukov as defense minister.101 Serdyukov’s mandate was to reduce the cost of the Russian military significantly in response to the collapse in global oil prices resulting from the global financial crisis. He sought to make major personnel cuts, to restructure weapons system acquisition, and to reorganize the military, especially the ground forces, in a way that would have severely degraded its ability to conduct large-scale conventional warfare without optimizing it for any other sort of warfare. Serdyukov’s successor, Sergei Shoigu, along with Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov, have reversed many, but not all, of those reforms. It is important to note, therefore, that some of the changes being made to the Russian military that enhance its ability to fight maneuver war are reversals of changes made in 2008 for cost-cutting purposes, rather than new improvements on an already-sound structure. The emphasis in Russian military development has changed significantly since the start of Russian involvement in Ukraine in 2014 and Syria in 2015. Gerasimov published a noteworthy article in 2013, discussion of which in the Western press gave rise to the phrase “Gerasimov doctrine.”102 The author of that phrase subsequently not only retracted it, but also aggressively attacked the idea of its existence.103 As with “hybrid war” and “gray zone,” this paper will not attempt to defend or attack the validity of the term, but will explore the collection of concepts and actions to which it could meaningfully be said to apply and that do actually comprise the current Russian approach to war.104 The heart of this approach is the conclusion that wars are won and lost in the information space rather than on the battlefield. Russian military thinkers have gone so far as to argue that every strategic, operational, and even tactical undertaking should be aimed first at achieving an effect in the information space, and that it is the information campaign that is decisive.105 Formal Russian doctrine has not gone this far, nor has Russian military activity on the ground, but the extreme statement is a measure of how important the concept is.106 The importance of information operations is old hat for any Sovietologist. The Soviets were renowned for the “active measures” of the KGB, for “disinformation” and various efforts to suborn groups in the West, sometimes unwittingly, to advance their ideological and concrete agendas. The Soviet military evolved an elaborate theory of deception, bringing the term “maskirovka” into common parlance among those who studied it. The Soviets also built out a concept called “reflexive control” that is the most noteworthy element of Putin’s ability to play a poor hand well.107 Reflexive control is a fancy way of saying “gaslighting.” It is the effort to shape the information space in which an adversary makes decisions so that he voluntarily chooses to act contrary to his own interests and his own benefit—all the while believing that he is actually advancing his own cause. Reflexive control is a form of intellectual jiu-jitsu, which may be one reason it appeals to Putin, who is a long-time and high-level practitioner of the Russian form of judo known as sambo.108 It uses the enemy’s strength against him in the best case, but at least causes him to avoid bringing his strength to bear against you. None of this, again, is new. Even the additions of cyber operations and cyber-enabled information operations such as bots and troll farms are not new or unique to the Russian approach to war. The novelty comes in part from the relative emphasis in Russian operations on efforts to shape the information space and the frequent subordination of conventional military operations and the threat of such operations to those efforts. Another novel aspect is the vulnerability of Western societies to these kinds of efforts, resulting in part from the effects of changes in the technological shape of the information space and the way in which it interacts with the psychology and sociology of Western individuals and societies. The current information environment favors the attacker over the defender for several reasons. The extremely widespread penetration of the internet in Western societies gives an attacker almost universal access to the population, unfiltered by government agency or corporate leadership. The anonymity made possible by the internet makes it difficult or impossible for individuals to know who is speaking to them. The decentralization of sources of information magnifies the effect of that anonymity by allowing it to seem that multiple independent sources verify and validate each other even when a single individual or group controls all of them. And the psychological asymmetry of outrage and retraction means that corrections and fact-checking almost never fully undo the damage done by a false accusation and often have little effect. These characteristics of the modern information space have created the ideal environment in which ideas first developed and attempted by the Soviets can flourish in ways the Soviets could never have imagined. We must be careful to avoid attributing too much brilliance to Putin and Gerasimov. It is not necessarily the case, or even likely, that they perceived the opportunities these phenomena would present and skillfully designed a “doctrine” to take advantage of them. On the contrary, they and their Russian and Soviet predecessors have been trying to make these approaches work all along. The increased intellectual, doctrinal, and organizational emphasis on them, starting overtly in 2015, likely results instead from the realization that they were suddenly working very well. As with all important military innovations, therefore, the emergence of the current Russian approach to war was almost certainly the result of theory, action, experience, and reflections on interactions with the adversary rather than a sudden explosion of insight. Whatever its origins and novelty or lack thereof, this Russian approach has allowed Putin to make gains he could never have hoped to make with conventional military forces alone.109 Syria is a case in point. Russia could never have established a lodgment on the Syrian coast and then expanded it to encompass a naval facility, a permanent and expanded military airbase, and a ground forces garrison—all protected by advanced air defense systems—through conventional military operations, against the wishes of the U.S. and its allies. Russian aircraft flying to Syria must transit either NATO airspace (through Turkey or Romania or Bulgaria and then Greece) or Iraqi airspace (via Iran) that the U.S. dominates. Had the U.S. been determined to prevent Russian planes from getting to Syria, the Russian Air Force could not have penetrated the defenses the U.S. and its allies could have put up. But the U.S. and its allies made no such decision. They have, on the contrary, worked hard to avoid any risk of military confrontation with Russian aircraft—a project made challenging, not unironically, by the periodic aggressiveness of Russian pilots. The prospect of a Russian naval expedition forcing its way into the Tartus naval facility in the face of efforts by the U.S. Sixth Fleet to stop it is even more fanciful. The key to Putin’s success in this gambit lay in his ability to persuade American and NATO leaders that Russia’s military presence in Syria was not a threat and might even be helpful—while simultaneously stoking the belief that any U.S. effort to oppose or control the Russian deployment would lead to major, possibly nuclear, war. The key to that success, in turn, lay in the fact that neither the Obama nor the Trump administration wanted to be in Syria or wished to fight any kind of conflict with Russia. President Obama, on the contrary, invited Putin into Syria in 2013 to help him out of the trap he had created by announcing that any further use of chemical weapons by Assad was a “red line”—without actually being willing to enforce that red line when Assad crossed it. Obama’s decision to reach out to Moscow likely resulted in part from the long bipartisan trend of seeking to “reset” relations with Russia, bring Russia back into the fold of responsible international stakeholders, and generally return to what Americans saw as the golden age of U.S.-Russian cooperation in the 1990s. This trend began in the first years of the George W. Bush administration, shortly after Putin’s accession to power. It continued with Hillary Clinton’s vaunted push of the “reset” button and Donald Trump’s praise for Putin and continued attempts to find ways to cooperate with him toward supposedly common objectives.110 The conviction that a Russian reset and a return to the golden years of the 1990s is just one phone call or summit away has become one of the few truly bipartisan foreign policy assumptions in this increasingly polarized era. Putin has used it skillfully to advance his own projects while offering few or no concessions in return. Conventional military forces play a critical role in the Russian approach to war nevertheless. Russian airpower and long-range precision-strike capability were critical to preserving, stabilizing, and then expanding the Assad regime and the territory it controlled in Syria. Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the other components of the pro-regime coalition all lack similar capabilities. The hardening of opposition defenses in various parts of Syria before the Russian intervention raised the requirement for continued regime offensive operations beyond what the pro-regime coalition could provide.111 The Russian intervention was therefore essential to the survival of the regime and remains essential to its precarious stability and to any hope it has of regaining control of the rest of Syria. The very limited deployment of a few dozen aircraft and salvoes of long-range missiles made Russia indispensable to the pro-regime coalition and gave Putin enormous leverage in Syria at relatively low risk and low cost. The deployment of Russian S-300 and S-400 anti-aircraft systems to Syria dramatically increased that leverage, again at very low risk and cost. The American military could destroy those systems and operate freely over Syrian airspace even against Moscow’s wishes, but the cost in U.S. aircraft and missiles devoted to the operation, in time, and possibly in casualties and aircraft losses would be significant. The range of the S-300 and the reported locations at which launchers were deployed, moreover, means that most Israeli Air Force and some Turkish Air Force aircraft are within range of those systems the moment they take off from airbases in Israel and Turkey. That fact has not been lost on Israeli or Turkish leaders. Putin has also used conventional military forces on a limited scale in Ukraine. He relied on the naval infantry forces already deployed in Crimea, reinforced by small numbers of special forces and other units, to seize control of that peninsula in 2014. Small numbers of conventional forces battalion tactical groups and similar-sized formations helped local proxies seize and hold ground in eastern Ukraine, while highly skilled special forces elements supported them in the battle area and in the rear of the Ukrainian forces.112 Russia has provided air defense capabilities and significant electronic warfare support to its Ukrainian proxies and also to its fighters and allies in Syria. The highly targeted assistance of Russia’s conventional military is probably even more essential to Putin’s proxies in Ukraine than in Syria. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are likely to regain control over the Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine if the Russian military stops supporting its proxies on the battlefield. The current Russian way of war, therefore, truly is hybrid. It requires the use of limited numbers of highly capable conventional forces able to conduct expeditionary operations beyond Russia’s borders. However, it also relies on the creation and maintenance of a political and information environment that facilitates the presence and activities of those forces without serious opposition from any state or actor that could meaningfully challenge them. The conventional forces themselves are enablers to a larger political-informational campaign rather than being the main effort. Evidence for that assessment lies in Putin’s response to the several occasions on which his conventional forces suffered losses— specifically, the Turkish downing of a Russian aircraft in 2015; the accidental downing of another Russian plane by Syrian forces during an Israeli airstrike in 2018; and the killing of several hundred members of the Wagner PMC during an attack by that group on an outpost in eastern Syria held by the opposition, where American advisers were also present.113 Washington and the world held their breath in each case, worrying about Putin’s possible response. The U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, reached out immediately to Gerasimov to send messages of both deterrence and de-escalation each time.114 Putin did not retaliate militarily on any of these occasions. He responded to the Turkish shoot-down by deploying Russian S-300 systems operated by Russian troops, and to the Syrian shoot-down by completing a contract with the Assad regime for S-300 systems of its own, which had long been held up. He made no meaningful response to the Wagner incident and did not even use his air defense systems to disrupt the massive U.S. air operations against the attacking Wagner forces as they were destroyed. Putin has similarly refrained from using his own S-300 and S-400 systems to shoot at Israeli aircraft during any of Israel’s repeated airstrikes against regime targets within Syria and has, reportedly, prevented the Syrians from using their S-300 system.115 Nor has Putin retaliated against Israel for those strikes or against the U.S. for the 2017 missile strikes Washington launched against the Shayrat airbase in response to Assad’s renewed use of chemical weapons. The aircraft and missile systems Putin has deployed to Syria, therefore, are clearly not meant to give him control over Syria’s skies. They are also obviously not meant to challenge the ability of the U.S., Turkey, or Israel to conduct anti-regime operations, at least within the current limits of such operations. Lastly, they are not meant to enable Putin to retaliate in any symmetrical tit-for-tat manner for Russian losses suffered directly or indirectly at the hands of the U.S., Turkey, or Israel. The relative inaction of Russia’s aircraft against those states could be at least partially explained by Moscow’s focus on fighting the opposition. But the air defense systems can only be intended to defend against the U.S., Turkey, and Israel, since the opposition has never had aircraft against which those systems are effective.116 The Kremlin has, in other words, deployed systems to defend against attacks that have, in fact, come—and yet not used those systems to defend against those attacks. This conundrum can only be resolved by recognizing that the purpose of those systems is to shape the behavior of the U.S., Turkey, and Israel rather than to fight openly against them. The deployments of advanced air defense weapons, and also of some of the air-to-air-optimized aircraft Russia has periodically sent to Syria, support a political-informational campaign rather than a conventional military operation (even if we regard counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism as being in that category). Circumstances might, of course, arise in which Putin would authorize his troops to use some or all of their capabilities conventionally against the U.S. and its partners and allies. That fact drives the fear of escalation that leads the U.S. Joint Chiefs chairman to jump on the phone to Moscow every time a major incident occurs. It also shapes American, Turkish, and Israeli calculations about military options they might choose. This is exactly the point from Moscow’s perspective. Putin’s S-300 and S-400 systems in Syria work best if they are never used. Problems of Escalation—for Russia The U.S. military and those who study it are preoccupied, understandably, by its shortcomings and inadequacies. The shortcomings are real, and the military is, indeed, inadequate for the global requirements it must meet. The preoccupation with our own failings has tended to obscure an objective assessment of the relative risks to the U.S. and Russia of a conventional military confrontation in Syria, however. The U.S. has therefore tended to overestimate the likelihood that a crisis with Russia in Syria will escalate to the point of such a major confrontation and, as a result, has allowed Putin’s very limited deployment of combat power and good use of the information space to drive a high degree of American self-deterrence. Russia has rarely had more than a couple of dozen combat aircraft at its airfields in Syria at any given time.117 Most of them are usually ground-attack planes (principally Su-25 Frogfoots, which are roughly similar to the U.S. Air Force A-10), and they have limited ability to conduct air-to-air combat against U.S. fighter bombers. The rest are generally variants of the Su-30 fighter bomber, sometimes with a few more-advanced airframes optimized for air-to-air combat, including, occasionally, the Su-57 stealth fighter bomber. A single U.S. carrier strike group has around 48 strike fighters, all with air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities. The U.S. Navy alone has more than 775 strike aircraft (including all variants of the F/A-18 and the F-35).118 The U.S. Air Force has more than 1,240 fighters and fighter bombers, as well as around 140 strategic bombers.119 The single carrier strike group—almost invariably in the Mediterranean or in or near the Persian Gulf—thus outguns the Russian aircraft in Syria by a significant margin, and the U.S. Air Force and Navy could rapidly begin to flow crushing numbers of reinforcements to the theater. The Russian Air Force, by contrast, has a total of roughly 745 fighter bombers in its entire inventory, according to the most recently published Defense Intelligence Agency estimates.120 It has an additional 215 attack aircraft (mostly Su-25s) and another 141 strategic bombers. It is thus somewhat larger than the U.S. Navy, considerably smaller than the U.S. Air Force, and about one-third the size of both together. These numbers exclude the roughly 240 F-16s in the Turkish Air Force—which have demonstrated their ability to shoot down Russian fighters in limited engagements, and so should not be dismissed—as well as those of America’s other NATO allies, not to mention the Israeli Air Force, one of the best in the world. The U.S. thus has absolute escalation dominance in an air-to-air fight over the skies of Syria, unless one imagines that Russian aircraft and pilots are an order-of-magnitude more lethal than their American counterparts—a notion there is no evidence for, and considerable evidence against.121 Critics of this argument need not challenge this assertion, but could argue instead that it is beside the point. The U.S. military cannot focus solely on fighting the Russians in Syria. It must support American ground forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan; conduct counter-terrorism operations throughout Africa; and deter and be ready to respond to aggressions by China, North Korea, and Iran, at least. The concentration of aircraft, ships, and pilots needed to fight a significant air war against Russia in Syria would severely degrade the U.S. military’s ability to meet these other requirements. This fact more than any fear of confronting the Russian military in the Middle East explains the self-paralysis of the U.S. military. Putin, by contrast, has projected a willingness to mix it up in Syria. His pilots ostentatiously fly close to American aircraft, engage in risky maneuvers near them, lock targeting radars on them, and in other ways portray almost an eagerness to engage in a fight.122 The Turkish downing of a Russian aircraft in 2015 resulted from repeated violations of Turkish airspace by Russian pilots in another set of deliberate provocations.123 Putin’s message through these actions has consistently been: You will not fight me here, but I am willing to fight you. Yet on each occasion when blows have been traded, Putin has backed down. One reason is that his escalation calculus is far worse than America’s. The Russian Air Force also has essential tasks outside Syria that would prevent it from concentrating all, or even most of its available assets there. It must cover Russia’s enormous periphery, the largest land border of any country in the world, including a long border with China. Putin would be foolish to strip aircraft from St. Petersburg, a short flight from NATO airfields, while fighting the U.S. in Syria. Nor could he denude his forces in Crimea, linked to the Russian mainland by a single bridge, or his forces in and near eastern Ukraine. He could not even prudently strip his far east of all advanced aircraft. He might— or might not—decide that China would not take advantage of any weakening of his defenses, but the U.S. can threaten him from carriers in the Pacific even if Japan opts to deny the use of its bases in a conflict with Russia to which it is not party. Would the U.S. bomb St. Petersburg or Vladivostok while fighting Russia in Syria? Of course not. But strategic calculus does not work that way. It is a fact that the U.S. could conduct such attacks, and any professional military staff forced to confront the prospect of an escalation to major conventional war in one theater would have to consider the possibility that such a war might spread to other theaters. Best professional military advice in such a situation would be to maintain sufficient combat power in any other vulnerable theater to deter and, if necessary, defeat enemy attempts to transfer the conflict there. It is equally true, after all, that a rapid U.S.-Russia dustup in Syria would be very unlikely to trigger a Chinese military adventure or a North Korean invasion of South Korea. Yet the U.S. military allows the fears of just such scenarios to undermine its willingness to contemplate fighting Russia in Syria— and the Russian military will behave no differently. Even that calculation is not Russia’s most serious problem with the idea of escalation to conventional conflict in the skies over Syria. The biggest problem is actually financial. Russia could not afford to replace the losses it would inevitably take in such a fight, whereas the U.S. could. Bad as the differential in aircraft looks for the Russians, we must recall that the differential in overall economic power and in defense budgets looks much worse. The Russian economy and defense budgets are less than one-tenth the size of America’s. Its military is struggling to “modernize” to a level of technology similar to what the U.S. has had for decades. The cost of having to replace many lost modern aircraft would disrupt Russian defense programs for years. The U.S. could make good such losses in short order if it chose.

Nuclear Escalation

The prospect of the world’s two largest nuclear powers going to war, even in a limited conventional way, is of course terrifying. The U.S. certainly should do everything in its power to achieve its objectives without resorting to major combat operations against Russia—that is the guiding principle of current national security documents and of this report.

The straightforward equation sometimes made between any such local conflict and global nuclear war, however, is entirely unjustified. It simply is not the case that any major conventional war will lead inevitably, or even probably, to nuclear war.

One can trace escalation paths from a conventional war Putin is losing in Syria to his use of a theater nuclear weapon, either to change the odds or to try to force the U.S. to back down. He could use such a weapon to destroy a U.S. airfield in one of the regional states (Turkey, perhaps, or Kuwait) or a U.S. aircraft carrier strike group. The destruction of any single airbase or carrier would not prevent the U.S. from carrying forward an air war to successful conclusion. There are simply too many bases and carriers the U.S. could use for the elimination of a single one to terminate a campaign. Unless Putin were willing to destroy many airbases in many different countries (most of them NATO members) and sink every carrier moving into the theater, he could not prevent the U.S. from destroying his assets in the Middle East. It is impossible to predict the American response to such a use of nuclear weapons—regardless of the occupant of the White House. The U.S. could respond by using theater nuclear weapons of its own against Russian forces in the Middle East (which this report emphatically does not support or recommend)—and here, a single nuclear device dropped on the airfield near Latakia would pretty much destroy Russian capabilities to continue the air war in the region. Alternatively, Washington could engage in either conventional or nuclear retaliation against Russian forces beyond the region, including in Russia proper (and, again, this report does not support or recommend using nuclear weapons under any circumstances, except possibly in extremis situations far more dire than those under consideration here). Putin would then be forced to decide whether to escalate further. He could conduct a larger nuclear strike against NATO (since any effort seriously to disrupt U.S. military capabilities in and around Europe would require breaking or badly damaging the alliance). He could also go directly for a strike on the U.S. homeland. If he chose the latter and launched an all-out strike, the U.S. president would likely respond in kind, leading to the destruction of both Russia and the U.S.—and possibly life on Earth. One could endlessly consider lesser variants, but they all lead to dramatically increased risk of Armageddon.

## 3

#### CP Text: The UNOOSA should

#### establish market-share liability

#### fund distributions of costs to parties cleaning up space debris –

#### divvy up costs to liable states

#### **their own author concludes**

Muñoz-Patchen 19 ,Chelsea - (J.D. Candidate at The University of Chicago Law School., "Regulating the Space Commons: Treating Space Debris as Abandoned Property in Violation of the Outer Space Treaty," University of Chicago, 2019, 12-6-2021, https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space)//LB

C. USING MARKET-SHARE LIABILITY TO IMPLEMENT THE OBLIGATION TO CLEAN UP SPACE DEBRIS In this Subsection, this Comment argues for extending the concept of market-share liability and establishing a U.N.-run fund to be distributed to parties for costs incurred when cleaning up space debris. This subsection will introduce market-share liability and then describe how it could be more effectively used not as compensation for loss, but as part of a regulatory device aimed at reducing the amount of existing space debris. Market-share liability has been suggested as a way to deal with the difficulty of identifying the individual ownership of objects and it could be put to use in the obligation to clean up debris.[154](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space" \l "footnote154_64oqe18" \o "See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 106; Mark J. Sundahl, Note, Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for a Market-Share Liability Regime, 24 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 125 (2000).) Market-share liability would allow for the apportionment of responsibility based on the respective contribution to the risk, and would not require the identification of individual pieces of space debris.[155](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote155_weihpqh) Market-share liability has already been successfully applied where multiple parties contribute to a dangerous situation, but where it is virtually impossible to tie a particular party to the harm caused.[156](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote156_kcgulrb) Market-share liability was created in 1980 in the case Sindell v. Abbott Labororatories.[157](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote157_whm51t2) In Sindell, the Supreme Court of California devised the concept in response to a case in which pharmaceuticals that were marketed to pregnant women caused cancer in their children at least a decade later.[158](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote158_g2453b4) Since the latent period was so long, the women naturally could not remember the specific pill manufacturer out of two hundred such manufacturers.[159](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote159_al0ptsp) The court found that each defendant’s market share could be determined fairly accurately, and therefore used market share as a basis for the apportionment of liability.[160](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote160_cdknxhc) While market-share liability has not been broadly adopted, this is likely because cases with fungible products and a serious causation problem are rare.[161](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote161_ubc78w9) Academics have taken this idea and sought to apply it to space debris, which has similar fungibility and causation issues, but their applications have been limited to a tort-like context.[162](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space" \l "footnote162_8hg4l2f" \o "Peter T. Limperis, Comment, Orbital Debris and the Spacefaring Nations: International Law Methods for Prevention and Reduction of Debris, and Liability Regimes for Damage Caused by Debris, 15 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 319 (1998); Roberts, supra note 3 (arguing for a market-share liability pool to be called upon when debris damages another’s space object, building on the Liability Treaty); Sundahl, supra note 154, at 143.) One author suggested that whenever a collision occurs due to an unidentifiable piece of debris and a functional space object, liability and compensation should be apportioned “among spacefaring nations equal to the percentages of the total debris population for which the particular nation is responsible.”[163](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote163_sye0a7p) This mechanism frees the victim from having to prove causation by a specific nation, when that would be virtually impossible.[164](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote164_ow9949k) There will be difficulties calculating the percentage with precision in such a system, but there is fairly accurate information from the U.N., including registry, sampling, mathematical models, and other records of known collisions and the resultant debris.[165](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote165_n0srbzr) Without strong buy-in, it may be challenging to get this rarely used domestic tort theory to apply in international space law, especially with the potential for disputes over the proper apportionment of market share.[166](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote166_zp5s2si) The states primarily responsible for existing debris are the U.S., Russia, and China – powerful countries unlikely to be pleased with this newfound expense. That said, though these nations would be paying the highest cost, this would be proportional to their respective contributions to the problem. Indeed, these nations may welcome this remedy, because their space activity is threatened by the proliferation of space debris and they likely value continuing their extensive and advanced use of space. This solution solves the free rider problem and would compensate any nation or company that cleans up space such that any nation (like the U.S., Russia, or China) fearing the collapse of its space program and unwilling to bear all the cleanup costs itself would see this as an attractive solution. It is even possible that liable states like the U.S. and Russia will be eager to aid in debris identification, so as to add to other states’ liability.[167](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote167_7gusojc) This regulatory remedy would resolve the current tragedy of the commons. By assigning responsibility for the cost of cleanup, nations or companies would be incentivized to begin cleanup operations, because they would know that others will not freeride on their costly efforts. Instead, they will have guaranteed compensation from those responsible. Obtaining the funds is crucial, particularly since the high cost of deploying existing technology to destroy space debris has been a hindrance thus far.[168](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote168_864qm02) Using market-share liability is also a useful way to compensate victims of debris collisions and to incentivize spacefaring nations to avoid creating new debris in the future.[169](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote169_nse4798) However, this does not do enough to remedy the persistent existence of space debris, which is threatening the very continuation of space activity. The Outer Space Treaty creates an obligation on states to carry out space activities “for the ‘benefit and interests of all countries,’ and that outer space shall never be subject to national appropriation.”[170](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote170_k75wmfp) To uphold their obligations under this treaty, nations should not be creating debris, because it interferes with the ability of others to conduct their space activities, or perhaps keeps them from space altogether. Due to this legal violation, and the negative externality created by property abandonment, states should be required to pay for the disposal of debris in proportion to the amount they create. While the creation of debris may be unavoidable, there are existing practices that can greatly minimize the proliferation of debris, and any debris that is nonetheless created can be dealt with through market-share liability payments. This collection of market-share disposal payments would not simply be a tax on operations or tort compensation for harmful acts. Instead, once liability is apportioned, (and this could be done on an ongoing or periodic basis to reflect new developments), nations or companies undertaking actions to clean up space would be compensated for their costs by the nations responsible according to their percentage of responsibility. The U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) could allocate the percentage of liability, drawing on its role in promoting international cooperation and the peaceful use of outer space, as well as preparing reports and studies.[171](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote171_p0px338) If any disputes were to arise from non-payment, familiar procedures could be employed—perhaps by drawing from other notable space treaties that provide “established procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”[172](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote172_ahq61oa) In many of the space treaties and conventions, including the Liability Convention, disputes and claims can be brought to the Secretary-General of the U.N.[173](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote173_5xtik0e) These bodies could be utilized here to assure fairness in allocating liability and handling routine compensation disputes. This new regulatory regime can thus be grounded in the existing space treaty regime and administered by existing authorities. It would resolve the incentive problems that exist in the international commons of space through regulation that allocates the cost of debris cleanup to those who have created and continue to create it. The regime can also adapt as the outer space marketplace and the actors who comprise it shift over time, and as the registry of space objects, incidents, and tracking capabilities improves. This regulatory regime also ultimately would allocate cleanup funds to parties who would like to continue to operate in space, removing the disincentive to carry the cost in the face of potential freeriding. VI. Conclusion Space debris poses a serious threat to the continued use of space. Many have called for a new treaty to solve the perceived failure of the current space treaty regime to address debris clean up and define space debris.[174](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote174_imlbz4k) This Comment has demonstrated that the existing treaties, resolutions, and guidelines create a definition of space debris as nonfunctional objects, separate from space objects. This Comment has also shown that space debris has been abandoned and must be regulated in order to rid the space commons of this negative externality. This Comment has demonstrated that the existing treaty regime can be used to enforce an obligation to clean debris up. This is based on first principles such as free access, included in the original Outer Space Treaty and reflected in other specific treaties and guidelines for outer space activities. This Comment has shown how failing to clean up space debris violates the Outer Space Treaty and has proposed a market-share liability regime under which debris-creating nations fund the cleanup. This Comment has provided an avenue for bringing practice and understanding into accordance with the existing legal regime in international space law. An obligation to clean up is critical for the removal of the debris that already exists in space and, in line with the Debris Mitigation Guidelines, preventing the creation of any new debris. The Outer Space Treaty establishes space as a common resource. In order to preserve this common resource for all, spacefaring nations must be held to regulations that make them internalize the costs created by their debris. [175](https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/regulating-space-commons-treating-space-debris-abandoned-property-violation-outer-space#footnote175_e0w9765)

## 4

#### Constellations key to Precision Ag – key to food sustainability and increasing food supply to account for exponential population growth.

Greensight 21 3-15-2021 "Can Starlink Save the World by Connecting Farms?" <https://www.greensightag.com/logbook/can-starlink-save-the-world-by-connecting-farms/> (Data Management Consulting Firm)//Elmer

GreenSight innovates in a number of different areas, but one of the areas we are most passionate about is in agriculture. We’ve deployed our drone intelligence systems all over the world at all sorts of different facilities. One of the most challenging has been deployments at farms, and one of the biggest challenges has been connectivity. Connected farms are a requirement to feed the world, and Starlink will make that happen. Most urban and suburban households in the United States have had easy and reasonably inexpensive access to high speed internet access for 20 years. It is easy to forget that the situation is not the same for rural areas of the country. Many areas have no access to high speed, “broadband”, internet access, with some having only dialup internet access in their homes. According to the 2015 FCC broadband report, only 53% of rural households have access to high speed internet, even using low standards for “high” speed. On average farms have even less access, and that doesn’t even include high speed connectivity out in their fields. Cellular service is spotty especially on large farms in primarily agricultural areas, and legacy satellite systems provide slow upload speeds at expensive prices. Utilizing modern internet connected technologies and cloud based systems that require constant, high speed access can be a challenge at best and potentially impossible. A 2016 research study by Goldman and Sachs projected that by 2050, the world’s food production efficiency needs to increase by 50% to support our growing population. This paper backs up this conclusion with a lot of research, but the fundamental conclusion is that farming land area is unlikely to increase nor will the number of farmers. Increased global food production increases must come from productivity boosts. Researchers feel that productivity improvements from chemistry and genomics are unlikely to yield significant increases as they have in the past. They predict that the most likely area for these improvements are with precision farming techniques, notably precision planting and precision application of chemicals and water. The term “Precision Agriculture” was coined in the late 1960s and 1970s in seminal research that projected that in the future farming would be driven by data with inputs and practices varied and optimized based on weather, measurements from the field, and accurate year over year yield measurements. Since then, many tools and technologies have been developed that have made true precision agriculture more and more practical. Precision RTK GPS can guide equipment with precision better than an inch. Drones and satellite mapping of fields using remote sensing can map out health and detect problems with the crops. In field IoT sensors will stream live data (such as our partners Soil Scout). Soil genomics and analysis can analyze macro and micro nutrient content of the soil and track the genetics of the soil microbiome (like our friends at Trace Genomics). Robotic and automated farming equipment (like our partners at Monarch Tractor and Husqvarna are building) can vary applications and planting according to precomputed variable rate application maps. Despite all these breakthroughs, precision farming techniques still have a low penetration. There are many reasons for this (more than could be discussed in this article!) but one of them is inadequate connectivity. Most of these modern technologies rely on access to the internet and in many cases it just isn’t possible. For decades subsidies and programs have been rolled out to improve rural connectivity but the reality is that connecting up far flung areas is expensive, often labor intensive, and consequently from a pure business standpoint does not make sense for the connectivity providers. Even as infrastructure expands to more remote areas, there will always remain large swaths of rural america where conventional connectivity infrastructure is highly impractical. Most of GreenSight’s data processing is done in the cloud. Several gigabytes of imagery data are uploaded from our aircraft after every flight to be processed and delivered to our customers. Our custom artificial intelligence analyses the data and informs farmers to problem areas. From many remote farm fields, uploading can be a slow process. We’ve invested heavily in the portability of our systems and our upcoming next generation aircraft will be capable of onboard processing, but despite this connectivity will still be needed to make data available for farmers and other automated agriculture systems. Advanced sensing systems like ours have to be able to integrate with connected robotic sprayers, harvesters and tractors, unlocking the productivity potential of precision agriculture. Humanity needs precision agriculture, and connected data-driven systems will be a big part of that revolution. Beyond the global necessity, the economics for farmers work too! A 2018 USDA studies indicate that connecting US farmland will unlock $50B in industry revenue. We are extremely excited about Starlink and its potential to bring cost effective internet connectivity to farms and rural areas. Starlink levels the playing field for rural areas, enabling high speed connectivity everywhere. No longer will farmers have to wait for high speed wired connectivity to come to their area or install a complex mesh network on their property. IoT data can be streamed from fields as easily as it now streams from urban homes. Starlink will be a catalyzing force for chance, advancing access to precision agriculture globally and contributing to solving global food challenges.

#### Food Insecurity goes nuclear – escalates multiple hotspots.

Cribb 19 Julian Cribb 8-23-2019 “Food or War” <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/food-or-war/hotspots-for-food-conflict-in-the-twentyfirst-century/1CD674412E09B8E6F325C9C0A0A6778A> (principal of Julian Cribb & Associates who provide specialist consultancy in the communication of science, agriculture, food, mining, energy and the environment. , His published work includes over 8000 articles, 3000 media releases and eight books. He has received 32 awards for journalism.)//Elmer

Future Food Wars The mounting threat to world peace posed by a food, climate and ecosystem increasingly compromised and unstable was emphasised by the US Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats, in a briefing to the US Senate in early 2019. 'Global environmental and ecological degradation, as well as climate change, are likely to fuel competition for resources, economic distress, and social discontent through 2019 and beyond', he said. 'Climate hazards such as extreme weather, higher temperatures, droughts, floods, wildfires, storms, sea level rise, soil degradation, and acidifying oceans are intensifying, threatening infrastructure, health, and water and food security. Irreversible damage to ecosystems and habitats will undermine the economic benefits they provide, worsened by air, soil, water, and marine pollution.' Boldly, Coats delivered his warning at a time when the US President, Trump, was attempting to expunge all reference to climate from government documents. 23 Based upon these recent cases of food conflicts, and upon the lessons gleaned from the longer history of the interaction between food and war, several regions of the planet face a greatly heightened risk of conflict towards the mid twentyfirst century. Food wars often start out small, as mere quarrels over grazing rights, access to wells or as one faction trying to control food supplies and markets. However, if not resolved quickly these disputes can quickly escalate into violence, then into civil conflagrations which, if not quelled, can in turn explode into crises that reverberate around the planet in the form of soaring prices, floods of refugees and the involvement of major powers — which in turn carries the risk of transnational war. The danger is magnified by swollen populations, the effects of climate change, depletion of key resources such as water, topsoil and nutrients, the collapse of ecosystem services that support agriculture and fisheries, universal pollution, a widening gap between rich and poor, and the rise of vast megacities unable to feed themselves (Figure 5.3). Each of the world's food 'powderkeg regions' is described below, in ascending order of risk. United States In one sense, food wars have already broken out in the United States, the most overfed country on Earth. Here the issue is chiefly the growing depletion of the nation's mighty ground- water resources, especially in states using it for food production, and the contest over what remains between competing users — farmers, ranchers and Native Americans on the one hand and the oil, gas and mining industry on the other. Concern about the future of US water supplies was aggravated by a series of savage droughts in the early twentyfirst century in the west, south and midwest linked to global climate change and declining snow- pack in the Rocky Mountains, both of which affect not only agriculture but also the rate at which the nation's groundwater reserves recharge. 'Groundwater depletion has been a concern in the Southwest and High Plains for many years, but increased demands on our groundwater resources have overstressed aquifers in many areas of the Nation, not just in arid regions', notes the US Geological Survey.24 Nine US states depend on groundwater for between 50 per cent and 80 per cent of their total freshwater supplies, and five states account for nearly half of the nation's groundwater use. Major US water resources, such as the High Plains aquifers and the Pacific Northwest aquifers have sunk by 30—50 metres (100—150 feet) since exploitation began, imperilling the agricultural industries that rely on them. In the arid south- west, aquifer declines of 100—150 metres have been recorded (Figure 5.4). To take but one case, the famed Ogallala Aquifer in the High Plains region supports cropping industries worth more than US $20 billion a year and was in such a depleted state it would take more than 6000 years to replace by natural infiltration the water drawn from it by farmers in the past 150 years. As it dwindles, some farmers have tried to kick their dependence on ground- water other users, including the growing cities and towns of the region, proceeded to mine it as if there was no tomorrow.25 A study by Kansas State University concluded that so far, 30 per cent of the local groundwater had been extracted and another 39 per cent would be depleted by the mid century on existing trends in withdrawal and recharge.26 Over half the US population relies on groundwater for drinking; both rural and urban America are at risk. Cities such as New Orleans, Houston and Miami face not only rising sea levels — but also sinking land, due to the extraction of underlying ground- water. In Memphis, Tennessee, the aquifer that supplies the city's drinking water has dropped by 20 metres. Growing awareness of the risk of a nation, even one as large and technologically adept as the USA, having insufficient water to grow its food, generate its exports and supply its urban homes has fuelled tensions leading to the eruption of nationwide protests over 'fracking' for oil and gas — a process that can deplete or poison groundwater — and the building -of oil pipe- lines, which have a habit of rupturing and also polluting water resources. The boom in fracking and piping is part of a deliberate US policy to become more self-reliant in fossil fuels.27 Thus, in its anxiety to be independent of overseas energy suppliers, the USA in effect decided to barter away its future food security for current oil security — and the price of this has been a lot of angry farmers, Native Americans and concerned citizens. The depletion of US groundwater coincides with accelerating climate risk, which may raise US temperatures by as much as 4—5 oc by 2100, leading to major losses in soil moisture throughout the US grain belt, and the spread of deserts in the south and west. Food production will also be affected by fiercer storms, bigger floods, more heatwaves, an increase in drought frequency and greater impacts from crop and livestock diseases. In such a context, it is no time to be wasting stored water. The case of the USA is included in the list of world 'hot spots' for future food conflict, not because there is danger of a serious shooting war erupting over water in America in the foreseeable future, but to illustrate that even in technologically advanced countries unforeseen social tensions and crises are on the rise over basic resources like food, land and water and their depletion. This doesn't just happen in Africa or the Middle East. It's a global phenomenon. Furthermore, the USA is the world's largest food exporter and any retreat on its part will have a disproportionate effect on world food price and supply. There is still plenty of time to replan America's food systems and water usage — but, as in the case of fossil fuels and climate, rear-guard action mounted by corporate vested interests and their hired politicians may well paralyse the national will to do it. That is when the US food system could find itself at serious risk, losing access to water in a time of growing climatic disruption, caused by exactly the same forces as those depleting the groundwater: the fossil fuels sector and its political stooges. The probable effect of this will, in the first instance, be a decline in US meat and dairy production accompanied by rising prices and a fall in its feedgrain exports, with domino effects on livestock industries worldwide. The flip-side to this issue is that America's old rival, Russia, is likely to gain in both farmland and water availability as the planet warms through the twentyfirst century — and likewise Canada. Both these countries stand to prosper from a US withdrawal from world food markets, and together they may negate the effects of any US food export shortfalls. Central and South America South America is one of the world's most bountiful continents in terms of food production — but, after decades of improvement, malnutrition is once more on the rise, reaching a new peak of 42.5 million people affected in 2016. 28 'Latin America and the Caribbean used to be a worldwide example in the fight against hunger. We are now following the worrisome global trend', said regional FAO representative Julio Berdegué. 29 Paradoxically, obesity is increasing among Latin American adults, while malnutrition is rising among children. 'Although Latin America and the Caribbean produce enough food to meet the needs of their population, this does not ensure healthy and nutritious diets', the FAO explains. Worsening income inequality, poor access to food and persistent poverty are contributing to the rise in hunger and bad diets, it adds.30 'The impact of climate change in Latin America and the Caribbean will be considerable because of its economic dependence on agriculture, the low adaptive capacity of its population and the geographical location of some of its countries', an FAO report warned.31 Emerging food insecurity in Central and Latin America is being driven by a toxic mixture of failing water supplies, drying farmlands, poverty, maladministration, incompetence and corruption. These issues are exacerbated by climate change, which is making the water supply issue worse for farmers and city people alike in several countries and delivering more weather disasters to agriculture. Mexico has for centuries faced periodic food scarcity, with a tenth of its people today suffering under-nutrition. In 2008 this rose to 18 per cent, leading to outbreaks of political violence. 2 In 2013, 52 million Mexicans were suffering poverty and seven million more faced extreme hunger, despite the attempts of successive governments to remedy the situation. By 2100 northern Mexico is expected to warm by 4—5 oc and southern Mexico by 1.5—2.5 oc. Large parts of the country, including Mexico City, face critical water scarcity. Mexico's cropped area could fall by 40—70 per cent by the 2030s and disappear completely by the end of the century, making it one of the world's countries most at risk from catastrophic climate change and a major potential source of climate refugees.33 The vanishing lakes and glaciers of the high Andes confront montane nations — Bolivia, Peru and Chile especially — with the spectre of growing water scarcity and declining food security. The volume of many glaciers, which provide meltwater to the region's rivers, which in turn irrigate farmland, has halved since 1975.34 Bolivia's second largest water body, the 2000 square kilometres Lake Poopo, dried out completely.35 The loss of water is attributed partly to El Niho droughts, partly to global warming and partly to over-extraction by the mining industries of the region. Chile, with 24,000 glaciers (80 per cent of all those in Latin America) is feeling the effects of their retreat and shrinkage especially, both in large cities such as the capital Santiago, and in irrigation agriculture and energy supply. Chile is rated by the World Resources Institute among the countries most likely to experience extreme water stress by 2040.36 Climate change is producing growing water and food insecurity in the 'dry corridor' of Central America, in countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Here a combination of drought, major floods and soil erosion is undermining efforts to raise food production and stabilise nutrition. Food production in Venezuela began falling in the 1990s, and by the late 2010s two thirds of the population were malnourished; there was a growing flood of refugees into Colombia and other neighbouring countries. The food crisis has been variously blamed on the Venezuelan government's 'Great Leap Forward' (modelled on that of China — which also caused widespread starvation), a halving in Venezuela's oil export earnings, economic sanctions by the USA, and corruption. However, local scientists such as Nobel Laureate Professor Juan Carlos Sanchez warn that climate impacts are already striking the densely populated coastal regions with increased torrential rains, flooding and mudslides, droughts and hurricanes, while inland areas are drying out and desertifying, leading to crop failures, water scarcity and a tide of climate refugees.37 These factors will tend to deepen food insecurity towards the mid century. Venezuela's climate refugees are already making life more difficult for neighbouring countries such as Colombia. Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon has, in recent decades, removed around 20 per cent of its total tree cover, replacing it with dry savannah and farmland. At 40 per cent clearance and with continued global warming, scientists anticipate profound changes in the local climate, towards a drying trend, which will hammer the agriculture that has replaced the forest.38 Brazil has already wiped out the once- vast Mata Atlantica forest along its eastern coastline, and this region is now drying, with resultant water stress for both farming and major cities like Säo Paulo. Brazil's outlook for 2100 is for further drying — tied to forest loss as well as global climate change — increased frequency of drought and heatwaves, major fires and acute water scarcity in some regions. Moreover, as the Amazon basin dries out, if will release vast quantities of C02 from its peat swamps and rainforest soils. These are thought to contain in excess of three billion tonnes of carbon and could cause a significant acceleration in global warming, affecting everyone on Earth. 39 Latin America is the world capital of private armies, with as many as 50 major guerrilla groups, paramilitaries, terrorist, indigenous and criminal insurgencies over the past half century exemplified in familiar names like the Sandanistas (Nicaragua), FARC (Colombia) and Shining Path (Peru). 40 Many of these drew their initial inspiration from the international communist movement of the mid twentieth century, while others are right-wing groups set up in opposition to them or else represent land rights movements of disadvantaged groups. However, all these movements rely for oxygen on simmering public discontent with ineffectual or corrupt governments and lack of fair access to food, land and water generally. In other words, the tendency of South and Central America towards internal armed conflict is supercharged significantly by failings in the food system which generate public anger, leading to sympathy and support for anyone seen to be challenging the incumbent regimes. This is not to suggest that feeding every person well would end all insurgencies — but it would certainly take the wind of popular support out of a lot of their sails. In that sense the revolutionary tendency of South America echoes the preconditions for revolution in France and Russia in the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. Central Asia The risk of wars breaking out over water, energy and food insecurity in Central Asia is high.41 Here, the five main players — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan — face swelling populations, crumbling Soviet-era infrastructure, flagging resource cooperation, a degrading land- scape, deteriorating food availability and a changing climate. At the heart of the issue and the region's increasingly volatile politics is water: 'Without water in the region's two great rivers — the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya — vital crops in the down- stream agricultural powerhouses would die. Without power, life in the upstream countries would be unbearable in the freezing winters' , wrote Rustam Qobil. Central Asia's water crisis first exploded onto the global consciousness with the drying of the Aral Sea — the world's fourth largest lake — from the mid 1960s43, following the damming and draining of major rivers such as the Amu Darya, Syr Darya and Naryn. It was hastened by a major drought in 200844 exacerbated by climate change, which is melting the 'water tower' of glacial ice stored in the Tien Shan, Pamir and Hindu Kush mountain ranges that feed the region's rivers. The Tien Shan alone holds 10,000 glaciers, all of them in retreat, losing an estimated 223 million cubic metres a year. At such a rate of loss the region's rivers will run dry within a generation.45 Lack of water has already delivered a body blow to Central Asia's efforts to modernise its agriculture, adding further tension to regional disputes over food, land and water. 'Water has always been a major cause of wars and border conflicts in the Central Asian region', policy analyst Fuad Shahbazov warned. This potential for conflict over water has been exacerbated by disputes over the Fergana valley, the region's greatest foodbowl, which underwent a 32 per cent surge in population in barely ten years — while more and more of it turned to desert.46 The Central Asian region is ranked by the World Resources Institute as one of the world's most perilously water-stressed regions to 2040 (Figure 5.6). With their economies hitting rock bottom, corrupt and autocratic governments that prefer to blame others for their problems and growing quarrels over food, land, energy and water, the 'Stans' face 'a perfect storm', Nate Shenkkan wrote in the journal Foreign Policy 47 Increased meddling by Russia and China is augmenting the explosive mix: China regards Central Asia as a key component of its 'Belt and Road' initiative intended to expand its global influence, whereas Russia hopes to lure the region back into its own economic sphere. Their rival investments may help limit some of the problems faced by Central Asia — or they may unlock a fresh cycle of political feuding, turmoil and regime change.48 A 2017 FAO report found 14.3 million people — one in every five — in Central Asia did not have enough to eat and a million faced actual starvation, children especially. It noted that after years of steady improvement, the situation was deteriorating. This combination of intractable and deteriorating factors makes Central Asia a serious internal war risk towards the mid twentyfirst century, with involvement by superpowers raising the danger of international conflict and mass refugee flight. The Middle East The Middle East is the most water-stressed region on Earth (see Figure 5.5 above). It is 'particularly vulnerable to climate change. It is one of the world's most water-scarce and dry regions, with a high dependency on climate-sensitive agriculture and a large share of its population and economic activity in flood-prone urban coastal zones', according to the World Bank. 49 The Middle East — consisting of the 22 countries of the Arab League, Turkey and Iran — has very low levels of natural rainfall to begin with. Most of it has 600 millimetres or less per year and is classed as arid. 'The Middle East and North Africa [MENA] is a global hotspot of unsustainable water use, especially of ground- water. In some countries, more than half of current water withdrawals exceed what is naturally available', the Bank said in a separate report on water scarcity. 50 'The climate is predicted to become even hotter and drier in most of the MENA region. Higher temperatures and reduced precipitation will increase the occurrence of droughts. It is further estimated that an additional 80—100 million people will be exposed by 2025 to water stress', the Bank added. The region's population of 300 million in the late 2010s is forecast to double to 600 million by 2050. Average temperatures are expected to rise by 3—5 oc and rainfall will decrease by around 20 per cent. The result will be vastly increased water stress, accelerated desertification, growing food insecurity and a rise in sea levels displacing tens of millions from densely popu- lated, low-lying areas like the Nile delta.51 The region is deemed highly vulnerable to climate impacts, warns a report by the UN Development Programme. 'Current climate change projections show that by the year 2025, the water supply in the Arab region will be only 15 per cent of levels in 1960. With population growth around 3 per cent annually and deforestation spiking to 4 per cent annually... the region now includes 14 of the world s 20 most water-stressed countries.'52 The Middle Fast/North Africa (MENA) region has 6 per cent of the world's population with only 1.5 per cent of the world's fresh water reserves to share among them. This means that the average citizen already has about a third less water than the minimum necessary for a reasonable existence — many have less than half, and populations are growing rapidly. Coupled with political chaos and ill governance in many countries, growing religious and ethnic tensions between different groups — often based on centuries-old disputes — a widening gap between rich and poor and foreign meddling by the USA, Russia and China, shortages of food, land and water make the Middle East an evident cauldron for conflict in the twentyfirst century. Growing awareness of their food risk has impelled some oil-rich Arab states into an international farm buying spree, purchasing farming, fishing and food processing companies in countries as assorted as South Sudan, Ethiopia, the Philippines, Ukraine, the USA, Poland, Argentina, Australia, Brazil and Morocco. In some food-stressed countries these acquisitions have already led to riots and killings.53 The risk is high that, by exporting its own food—land—water problems worldwide, especially to regions already facing scarcity, the Middle East could propagate conflicts and government collapses around the globe. This is despite the fact that high-tech solar desalination, green energy, hydroponics, aquaponics and other intensive urban food production technologies make it possible for the region to produce far more of its own food locally, if not to be entirely self-sufficient. Dimensions of the growing crisis in the Middle East include the following. Wars have already broken out in Syria and Yemen in which scarcity of food, land and water were prominent among the tensions that led to conflict between competing groups. Food, land and water issues feed into and exacerbate already volatile sentiment over religion, politics, corruption, mismanagement and foreign interference by the USA, China and Russia. The introduction of cheap solar-powered and diesel pumps has accelerated the unsustainable extraction of groundwater throughout the region, notably in countries like Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Morocco. 54 Turkish building of new dams to monopolise waters flowing across its borders is igniting scarcity and potential for conflict with downstream nations, including Iraq, Iran and Syria. 55 Egypt's lifeline, the Nile, is threatened by Ethiopian plans to dam the Blue Nile, with tensions that some observers consider could lead to a shooting war. 56 There are very low levels of water recycling throughout the region, while water use productivity is about half that of the world as a whole. There is a lack of a sense of citizen responsibility for water and food scarcity throughout the region. Land grabs around the world by oil-rich states are threatening to destabilise food, land and water in other countries and regions, causing conflict. A decline in oil prices and the displacement of oil by the global renewables revolution may leave the region with fewer economic options for solving its problems. There is a risk that acquisition of a nuclear weapon by Iran may set off a nuclear arms race in the region with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and possibly Turkey following suit and Israel rearming to stay in the lead. This would translate potential food, land and water conflicts into the atomic realm. Together these issues, and failure to address their root causes, make the Middle East a fizzing powder keg in the twentyfirst century. The question is when and where, not whether, it explodes — and whether the resulting conflict will involve the use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, thus affecting the entire world. China China is the world's biggest producer, importer and consumer of food. Much of the landmass of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is too mountainous or too arid for farming, but the rich soils of its eastern and southern regions are highly productive provided sufficient water is available and climate impacts are mild. Those, however, are very big 'ifs'. In 1995, American environmentalist Lester R. Brown both Eked and aroused the PRC Communist Party bosses with a small, hard-hitting book entitled Who Will Feed China? Wake-Up Call for a Small Planet.57 In it he posited that Chinese population growth was so far out of control that the then-agricultural system could not keep up, and China would be forced to import vast amounts of grain, to the detriment of food prices and availability worldwide. His fears, so far, have not been realised — not because they were unsoundly based, but because China managed — just — to stay abreast of rising food demand by stabilising and subsidising grain prices, restoring degraded lands, boosting agricultural science and technology, piping water from south to north, developing high-intensity urban farms, buying up foreign farmland worldwide and encouraging young Chinese to leave the country. What Brown didn't anticipate was the economic miracle that made China rich enough to afford all this. However, his essential thesis remains valid: China's food supply will remain on a knife-edge for the entire twentyfirst century, vulnerable especially to water scarcity and climate impacts. If the nation outruns its domestic resources yet still has to eat, it may well be at the expense of others globally. Some western commentators were puzzled when China scrapped its 35-year 'One Child Policy' in 2015, but in fact the policy had done its job, shaving around 300 million people off the projected peak of Chinese population. It was also causing serious imbalances, such as China's huge unmarried male sur- plus. Furthermore, rising urbanisation and household incomes meant Chinese parents no longer wanted large families, as in the past. Policy or no policy, China's birthrate has continued to fall and by 2018 was 1.6 babies per woman — well below replacement, lower than the USA and nearly as low as Germany. Its population was 1.4 billion, but this was growing at barely 0.4 per cent a year, with the growth due at least in part to lengthening life expectancy. 58 For China, female fertility is no longer the key issue. The critical issue is water. And the critical region is the north, where 41 per cent of the population reside. Here surface and ground- waters — which support not only the vast grain and vegetable farming industries of the North China Plain but also burgeoning megacities like Beijing, Tianjin and Shenyang — have been vanishing at an alarming rate. 'In the past 25 years, 28,000 rivers have disappeared. Groundwater has fallen by up to 1—3 metres a year. One consequence: parts of Beijing are subsiding by 11 cm a year. The flow of the Yellow River, water supply to millions, is a tenth of what it was in the 1940s; it often fails to reach the sea. Pollution further curtails supply: in 2017 8.8 per cent of water was unfit even for agricultural or industrial use', the Financial Times reported.59 On the North China Plain, annual consump- tion of water for all uses, including food production, is about 27 billion cubic metres a year — compared with an annual water availability of 22 billion cubic metres, a deficit that is made up by the short-term expedient of mining the region's groundwater. 60 To stave off disaster, the PRC has built a prodigious network of canals and pipelines from the Yangtse River in the water-rich south, to Beijing in the water-starved north. Hailed as a 'lifeline', the South—North Water Transfer Project had two drawbacks: first, the fossil energy required to pump millions of tonnes of water over a thousand kilometres and, second, the fact that while the volume was sufficient to satisfy the burgeoning cities for a time, it could not supply and distribute enough clean water to meet the needs of irrigated farming over so vast a region in the long run, nor meet those of its planned industrial growth.61 Oft-mouthed 'solutions' like desalination or the piping of water from Tibet or Russia face similar drawbacks: demand is too great for the potential supply and the costs, both financial and environmental, prohibitive. China is already among the world's most water-stressed nations. The typical Chinese citizen has a 'water footprint' of 1071 cubic metres a year — three quarters of the world average (1385 cubic metres), and scarcely a third that of the average American (2842 cubic metres).62 Of this water, 62 per cent is used to grow food to feed the Chinese population — and 90 per cent is so polluted it is unfit to drink or use in food processing. Despite massive investment in water infrastructure and new technology, many experts doubt that China can keep pace with the growth in its demand for food, at least within its own borders, chiefly because of water scarcity.63 Adding to the pressure is that China's national five-year plans for industrialisation demand massive amounts more water — demands that may confront China with a stark choice between food and economic growth. 'The Chinese government is moving too slowly towards the Camel Economy. It has plans, incentives for officials; it invests in recycling, irrigation, pollution, drought resistant crops; it leads the world in high voltage transmission (to get hydro, wind and solar energy from the west of China). None of this is sufficient or likely to be in time', the Financial Times opined. As the world's leading carbon emitter, China is more responsible for climate change than any other country. It is also, potentially, more at risk. The main reason, quite simply, is the impact of a warming world on China's water supply — in the form of disappearing rivers, lakes, groundwater and mountain glaciers along with rising sea levels. To this is coupled the threat to agriculture from increasing weather disasters and the loss of ecosystem services from a damaged landscape. 65 China is thus impaled on the horns of a classic dilemma. Without more water it cannot grow its economy sufficiently to pay for the water-conserving and food-producing technologies and infrastructure it needs to feed its people. Having inadvertently unleashed a population explosion with its highly successful conversion to modern farming systems, the challenge for China now is to somehow sustain its food supply through the population peak of the mid twentyfirst century, followed by a managed decline to maybe half of today's numbers by the early twentysecond century. It is far from clear whether the present approach — improving market efficiency, continuing to modernise agricultural production systems, pumping water, trying to control soil and water losses and importing more food from overseas will work. 66 China has pinned its main hopes on technology to boost farm yields and improve water distribution and management. Unfortunately, it has selected the unsustainable American industrial farming model to do this — which involves the massive use of water, toxic chemicals, fertilisers, fossil fuels and machines. This in turn is having dreadful consequences for China's soils, waters, landscapes, food supply, air, climate and consumer health. Serious questions are now being asked whether such an approach is not digging the hole China is in, even deeper. Furthermore, some western analysts are sceptical whether the heavy hand of state control is up to the task of generating the levels of innovation required to feed China sustainably.67 Plan B, which is to purchase food from other countries, or import it from Chinese-owned farming and food ventures around the world, faces similar difficulties. Many of the countries where China is investing in food production themselves face a slow-burning crisis of land degradation, water scarcity, surging populations and swelling local food demand. By exporting its own problems, China is adding to their difficulties. While there may be some truth to the claim that China is helping to modernise food systems in Africa, for example, it is equally clear that the export of food at a time of local shortages could have dire consequences for Africans, leading to wars in Africa and elsewhere. How countries will react to Chinese pressure to export food in the face of their own domestic shortages is, as yet, unclear. If they permit exports, it could prove cata- strophic for their own people and governments — but if they cut them off, it could be equally catastrophic for China. Such a situation cannot be regarded as anything other than a menace to world peace. Around 1640, a series of intense droughts caused widespread crop failures in China, leading to unrest and uprisings which, in 1644, brought down the Ming Dynasty. A serious domestic Chinese food and water crisis today — driven by drought, degradation of land and water and climate change in northern China coupled with failure in food imports — could cause a re-run of history: 'The forthcoming water crisis may impact China's social, economic, and political stability to a great extent', a US Intelligence Assessment found. The adverse impacts of climate change will add extra pressure to existing social and resource stresses.' 68 Such events have the potential to precipitate tens, even hundreds, of millions of emigrants and refugees into countries all over the world, with domino consequences for those countries that receive them. Strategic analysts have speculated that tens of millions of desperate Chinese flooding into eastern Russia, or even India, could lead to war, including the risk of international nuclear exchange. 69 Against such a scenario are the plain facts that China is a technologically advanced society, with the foresight, wealth and capacity to plan and implement nationwide changes and the will, if necessary, to enforce them. Its leaders are clearly alert to the food and water challenge — and its resolution may well depend on the extent of water recycling they are able to achieve. As to whether the PRC can afford the cost of transitioning from an unsustainable to a sustainable food system, all countries have a choice between unproductive military spending and feeding their populace. A choice between food or war. It remains to be seen which investment China favours. However, it is vital to understand that the problem of whether China can feed itself through the twentyfirst century is not purely a Chinese problem. It's a problem, both economic and physical, for the entire planet — and it is thus in everyone's best interest to help solve it. For this reason, China is rated number 3 on this list of potential food war hotspots. Africa Food wars — that is, wars in which food, land and water play a significant contributing role — have been a constant in the story of Africa since the mid twentieth century, indeed, far longer. In a sense, the continent is already a microcosm of the world of the twentyfirst century as climate change and resource scarcity com- bine with rapid population growth to ratchet up the tensions that lead competing groups to fight, whether the superficial distinc- Mons between them are ethnic, religious, social or political. We have examined the particular cases of Rwanda, South Sudan and the Horn of Africa — but there are numerous other African conflicts, insurgencies and ongoing disturbances in which food, land and water are primary or secondary triggers and where famine is often the outcome: Nigeria, Congo, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Mali, Chad, the Central African Republic, the Maghreb region of the Sahara, Mozambique, Cote d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe have all experienced conflicts in which issues of access to food, land and water were important drivers and consequences. The trajectory of Africa's population in the first two decades of the twentyfirst century implies that the number of its people could quadruple from 1.2 billion in 2017 to 4.5 billion by 2100 (Figure 5.6). If fulfilled, this would make Africans 41 per cent of the world population by the end of the century. The UN Popula- tion Division's nearer projections are for Africans to outnumber Chinese or Indians at 1.7 billion by 2030, and reach 2.5 billion in 2050, which represents a doubling in the continent's inhabitants in barely 30 years. 70 While African fertility rates (babies per woman) remain high by world standards — 4.5 compared with a global average of 2.4 — they have also fallen steeply, from a peak of 8.5 babies in the 1970s. Furthermore, the picture is uneven with birthrates in most Sub-Saharan countries remaining high (around five to six babies/woman), while those of eight, mainly southern, countries have dropped to replace- ment or below (i.e. under 2.1). As has been the case around the world, birth rates tend to drop rapidly with the spread of urban isation, education and economic growth — whereas countries which slide back into poverty tend to experience rising birth- rates. Food access is a vital ingredient in this dynamic: it has been widely observed that better-fed countries tend to have much lower rates of birth and population growth, possibly because people who are food secure lose fewer infants and children in early life and thus are more open to family planning. So, in a real sense, food sufficiency holds one of the keys to limiting the human population to a level sustainable both for Africa and the planet in general. Forecasting the future of Africa is not easy, given the complexity of the interwoven climatic, social, technological and political issues — and many do not attempt it. However, the relentless optimism of the UN and its food agency, the FAO, is probably not justified by the facts as they are known to science — and may have more to do with not wishing to give offence to African governments or discourage donors than with attempting to accurately analyse what may occur. Even the FAO acknowledges however that food insecurity is rising across Sub-Saharan Africa as well as other parts. In 2017, conflict and insecurity were the major drivers of acute food insecurity in 18 countries and territories where almost 74 million food-insecure people were in need of urgent assistance. Eleven of these countries were in Africa and accounted for 37 million acutely food insecure people; the largest numbers were in northern Nigeria, Demo- cratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and South Sudan the agency said in its Global Report on Food Crises 2018.71 The FAO also noted that almost one in four Africans was undernourished in 2016 — a total of nearly a quarter of a billion people. The rise in undernourishment and food insecurity was linked to the effects of climate change, natural disasters and conflict according to Bukar Tijani, the FAO's assistant director general for Africa. 72 Even the comparatively prosperous nation of South Africa sits on a conflict knife-edge, according to a scientific study: 'Results indicate that the country exceeds its environmental boundaries for biodiversity loss, marine harvesting, freshwater use, and climate change, and that social deprivation was most severe in the areas of safety, income, and employment, which are significant factors in conflict risk', Megan Cole and colleagues found. 73 In the Congo, home to the world's second largest tropical forest, 20 years of civil war had not only slain five million civilians but also decimated the forests and their ecological services on which the nation depended. Researchers found evidence that reducing conflict can also help to reduce environ- mental destruction: 'Peace-building can potentially be a win for nature as well, and.. conservation organizations and govern- ments should be ready to seize conservation opportunities'. 74 As the African population doubles toward the mid century, as its water, soils, forests and economic wealth per capita dwindle, as foreign corporations plunder its riches, as a turbulent climate hammers its herders and farmers — both industrial and traditional — the prospect of Africa resolving existing conflicts and avoiding new ones is receding. The mistake most of the world is making is to imagine this only affects the Africans. The consequences will impact everyone on the planet. A World Bank study has warned that 140 million people will have to leave just three regions of the world as climate refugees before 2050 — and the vast majority of these, some 86 million, would be displaced from their homes in Sub-Saharan Africa. 75

#### Nuke war causes extinction AND outweighs other existential risks.

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf> //Re-cut by Elmer

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about **20 percent** for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.

## 5

#### Private companies are set to mine in space – new tech and profit motives make space lucrative.

Gilbert 21, (Alex Gilbert is a complex systems researcher and PhD student in Space Resources at the Colorado School of Mines, “Mining in Space is Coming”), 4-26-21, Milken Institute Review, https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/mining-in-space-is-coming // MNHS NL

Space exploration is back. after decades of disappointment, a combination of better technology, falling costs and a rush of competitive energy from the private sector has put space travel front and center. indeed, many analysts (even some with their feet on the ground) believe that commercial developments in the space industry may be on the cusp of starting the largest resource rush in history: mining on the Moon, Mars and asteroids. While this may sound fantastical, some baby steps toward the goal have already been taken. Last year, NASA awarded contracts to four companies to extract small amounts of lunar regolith by 2024, effectively beginning the [era of commercial space mining](https://payneinstitute.mines.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/149/2020/09/Payne-Institute-Commentary-The-Era-of-Commercial-Space-Mining-Begins.pdf). Whether this proves to be the dawn of a gigantic adjunct to mining on earth — and more immediately, a key to unlocking cost-effective space travel — will turn on the answers to a host of questions ranging from what resources can be efficiently. As every fan of science fiction knows, the resources of the solar system appear virtually unlimited compared to those on Earth. There are whole other planets, dozens of moons, thousands of massive asteroids and millions of small ones that doubtless contain humungous quantities of materials that are scarce and very valuable (back on Earth). Visionaries including Jeff Bezos [imagine heavy industry moving to space](https://www.fastcompany.com/90347364/jeff-bezos-wants-to-save-earth-by-moving-industry-to-space) and Earth becoming a residential area. However, as entrepreneurs look to harness the riches beyond the atmosphere, access to space resources remains tangled in the realities of economics and governance. Start with the fact that space belongs to no country, complicating traditional methods of resource allocation, property rights and trade. With limited demand for materials in space itself and the need for huge amounts of energy to return materials to Earth, creating a viable industry will turn on major advances in technology, finance and business models. That said, there’s no grass growing under potential pioneers’ feet. Potential economic, scientific and even security benefits underlie an emerging geopolitical competition to pursue space mining. The United States is rapidly emerging as a front-runner, in part due to its ambitious Artemis Program to lead a multinational consortium back to the Moon. But it is also a leader in creating a legal infrastructure for mineral exploitation. The United States has adopted the world’s first spaceresources law, recognizing the property rights of private companies and individuals to materials gathered in space. However, the United States is hardly alone. Luxembourg and the United Arab Emirates (you read those right) are racing to codify space-resources laws of their own, hoping to attract investment to their entrepot nations with business-friendly legal frameworks. China reportedly views space-resource development as a national priority, part of a strategy to challenge U.S. economic and security primacy in space. Meanwhile, Russia, Japan, India and the European Space Agency all harbor space-mining ambitions of their own. Governing these emerging interests is an outdated treaty framework from the Cold War. Sooner rather than later, we’ll need [new agreements](https://issues.org/new-policies-needed-to-advance-space-mining/) to facilitate private investment and ensure international cooperation. Back up for a moment. For the record, space is already being heavily exploited, because space resources include non-material assets such as orbital locations and abundant sunlight that enable satellites to provide services to Earth. Indeed, satellite-based telecommunications and global positioning systems have become indispensable infrastructure underpinning the modern economy. Mining space for materials, of course, is another matter. In the past several decades, planetary science has confirmed what has long been suspected: celestial bodies are potential sources for dozens of natural materials that, in the right time and place, are incredibly valuabl**e**. Of these, water may be the most attractive in the near-term, because — with assistance from solar energy or nuclear fission — H2O can be split into hydrogen and oxygen to make rocket propellant, facilitating in-space refueling. So-called “rare earth” metals are also potential targets of asteroid miners intending to service Earth markets. Consisting of 17 elements, including lanthanum, neodymium, and yttrium, these critical materials (most of which are today mined in China at great environmental cost) are required for electronics. And they loom as bottlenecks in making the transition from fossil fuels to renewables backed up by battery storage. The Moon is a prime space mining target. Boosted by NASA’s mining solicitation, it is likely the first location for commercial mining. The Moon has several advantages. It is relatively close, requiring a journey of only several days by rocket and creating communication lags of only a couple seconds — a delay small enough to allow remote operation of robots from Earth. Its low gravity implies that relatively little energy expenditure will be needed to deliver mined resources to Earth orbit. The Moon may look parched — and by comparison to Earth, it is. But recent probes have confirmed substantial amounts of water ice lurking in [permanently shadowed craters](http://lroc.sese.asu.edu/posts/1105) at the lunar poles. Further, it seems that solar winds have implanted significant deposits of helium-3 (a light stable isotope of helium) across the equatorial regions of the Moon. Helium-3 is a potential fuel source for second and third-generation fusion reactors that one hopes will be in service later in the century. The isotope is packed with energy (admittedly hard to unleash in a controlled manner) that might augment sunlight as a source of clean, safe energy on Earth or to power fast spaceships in this century. Between its water and helium-3 deposits, the Moon could be the resource stepping-stone for further solar system exploration. Asteroids are another near-term [mining target](https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/28/the-asteroid-miners-guide-to-the-galaxy-space-race-mining-asteroids-planetary-research-deep-space-industries/). There are all sorts of space rocks hurtling through the solar system, with varying amounts of water, rare earth metals and other materials on board. The asteroid belt between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter contains most of them, many of which are greater than a kilometer in diameter. Although the potential water and mineral wealth of the asteroid belt is vast, the long distance from Earth and requisite travel times and energy consumption rule them out as targets in the near term. The prospects for space mining are being driven by technological advances across the space industry. The rise of reusable rocket components and the now-widespread use of off-the-shelf parts are lowering both launch and operations costs. Once limited to government contract missions and the delivery of telecom satellites to orbit, private firms are now emerging as leaders in developing “NewSpace” activities — a catch-all term for endeavors including orbital tourism, orbital manufacturing and mini-satellites providing specialized services. The space sector, with a market capitalization of $400 billion, could grow to as much as $1 trillion by 2040 as private investment soars.

#### Full private sector maneuverability is key.

Diakovska & Aliieva 20 [Halyna Diakovska and Olga Aliieva, Ph.D.s in Philosophy, Associate Professors, Donbass State Pedagogical University, “Consequentialism and Commercial Space Exploration,” 2020, *Philosophy and Cosmology*, Vol. 24, pp. 5-24, https://doi.org/10.29202/phil-cosm/24/1, EA]

The experience of the USA showed that leadership in space exploration, which is maintained solely through public funding, could be erroneous. Since 1984, the share of public funding has gradually decreased in space telecommunications, commercial space transportation, remote sensing, etc., while the share of participation of non-state enterprises has increased rapidly. A legal and regulatory framework has been modified to stimulate space commercialization. The stages of space law development are discussed in the research of Valentyn Halunko (Halunko, 2019), Larysa Soroka (Soroka & Kurkova, 2019), etc. Larysa Soroka and Kseniia Kurkova explored the specifics of the legal regulation of the use and development of artificial intelligence for the space area (Soroka & Kurkova, 2019). As a result of changing the legal framework and attracting private investors to the space market, the US did not lose its leadership in space exploration, but rather secured it. Private investment along with government funding have significantly reduced the risk of business projects in the space industry. The quality and effectiveness of space exploration programs have increased. In 2018, Springer published an eloquent book The Rise of Private Actors in the Space Sector. Alessandra Vernile, the author of the book, explores a broad set of topics that reveal the role of private actors in space exploration (Vernile, 2018). The book covers the following topics: “Innovative Public Procurement and Support Schemes,” “New Target Markets for Private Actors,” etc. In the “Selected Success Stories,” Vernile provides examples of successful private actors in space exploration (Vernile, 2018). The current level of competition, which has developed on the space market, allows us to state the following fact. Private space companies have been able to compete with entire states//in launching spacecraft, transporting cargo to orbital stations, and exploring space objects. The issue of mining on space objects, the creation of space settlements and the intensive development of the space tourism market are on the agenda.In the 21st century, the creation of non-governmental commercial organizations specializing in the field of commercial space exploration, is regarded as an ordinary activity. They are established as parts of the universities around projects funded by private investors. For example, Astropreneurship & Space Industry Club based on the MIT community (Astropreneurship, 2019). Large-scale research in the field of commercial space exploration, as well as the practical results achieved, led to the formation of a new paradigm called “New Space” ecosystem. The articles of Deganit Paikowsky’s (Paikowsky, 2017), Clelia Iacomino (Iacomino & Ciccarelli, 2018) et al. reveal its key meanings and the opportunities it offers in the space sector. The “New Space” ecosystem is a new vision for commercial space exploration. It is the formation of a cosmic worldview, in which the near space with all the wealth of its resources and capabilities, becomes a part of the global economy and the sustainable development of the society. The “New Space” ecosystem offers the following ways for commercial space exploration (Iacomino & Ciccarelli, 2018): 1. Innovative public procurement and support schemes, which significantly expand the role of commercial actors in space exploration. 2. Attracting new entrants in the space sector. First of all, these are companies working in the domain of Information and communications technology, artificial intelligence, etc. that are expanding their research in space markets. They offer innovative business models and new solutions to space commercialization. 3. Innovative industrial approaches based on new processes, methods, and industrial organization for the development and production of space systems or launchers. 4. Disruptive market solutions, which significantly reduce commercial space exploration prices, increase labor productivity, provide new types of services, etc. 5. Substantial private investment from different sources and involving different funding mechanisms. For instance, these are private fortunes, venture capital firms, business angels, private equity companies, or banks, etc. 6. Involvement of an increasing number of space-faring nations investing in the acquisition of turnkey space capabilities or even in the development of a domestic space industrial base. This expands the space markets and makes it more competitive. The analysis of the research and advances in commercial space exploration allows us to draw the following conclusions: 1. In fact, the space market has already been created. It is currently undergoing continuous development that will integrate the resources and capabilities of the near space into the global economy over the next decade.

#### Mining is key to solve a laundry list of impacts - climate change, economic decline and asteroid collisions.

Chris **Taylor 19** [journalist], 19 - ("How asteroid mining will save the Earth — and mint trillionaires," Mashable, 2019, accessed 12-13-2021, https://mashable.com/feature/asteroid-mining-space-economy)//ML

How much, exactly? We’re only just beginning to guess. [Asterank](http://www.asterank.com/), a service that keeps track of some 6,000 asteroids in NASA’s database, prices out the estimated mineral content in each one in the current world market. More than 500 are listed as “>$100 trillion.” The estimated profit on just the top 10 asteroids judged “most cost effective” — that is, the easiest to reach and to mine, subtracting rocket fuel and other operating costs, is around $1.5 trillion.¶ Is it ours for the taking? Well, here’s the thing — we’re taking it already, and have been doing so since we started mining metals thousands of years ago. Asteroid strikes are the only reason rare metals exist in the Earth’s crust; the native ones were all sucked into our planet’s merciless iron core millions of years ago. Why not go to the source?¶ As a side project, space mining can grab water from the rocks and comets — water which, with a little processing makes rocket fuel. Which in turn makes even more currently unimaginable space operations possible, including ones that could give the planet all the energy it needs to avert climate catastrophe. Cislunar space — the bit around us and the moon, the local neighborhood, basically — is about to get very interesting.¶ It’s hard, even for the most asteroid-minded visionaries, to truly believe the full scope of this future space economy right now. Just as hard as it would have been in 1945, when an engineer named Vannevar Bush first proposed [a vast library of shared knowledge that people the world over would access via personal computers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memex), to see that mushroom into a global network of streaming movies and grandmas posting photos and trolls and spies who move the needle on presidential elections. ¶ No technology’s pioneer can predict its second-order effects.¶ The space vision thing is particularly difficult in 2019. Not only do we have plenty of urgent problems with democracy and justice to keep us occupied, but the only two companies on the planet to have gone public with asteroid-mining business plans, startups that seemed to be going strong and had launched satellites already, were just bought by larger companies that are, shall we say, less comfortable executing on long-term visions.¶ Planetary Resources was founded in 2012 in a blaze of publicity. Its funding came from, among others, Larry Page, Eric Schmidt, Ross Perot, and the country of Luxembourg. It had inked an orbital launch deal with Virgin Galactic. And it was sold last October to a blockchain software company. (To 21st century readers, this paragraph would look like I’m playing tech world mad libs.)¶ In January, the other company, Deep Space Industries, also partly funded by Luxembourg (way to get in the space race, Luxembourg!), was sold to Bradford Space, owned by a U.S. investment group called the American Industrial Acquisition Corporation. Maybe these new overlords plan on continuing their acquisitions' asteroid mining endeavors rather than stripping the companies for parts. Both companies have been notably silent on the subject. “The asteroid mining bubble has burst,” [declared The Space Review](http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3633/1), one of the few online publications to even pay attention.¶ That’s also to be expected. After all, anyone trying to build Google in 1945 would go bankrupt. Just as the internet needed a half-dozen major leaps forward in computing before it could even exist, space industry needs its launch infrastructure.¶ Currently, the world’s richest person and its most well-known entrepreneur, Jeff Bezos and Elon Musk, respectively, are working on the relatively cheap reusable rockets asteroid pioneers will need. (As I was writing this, Bezos announced in an email blast that one of his New Shepherd rockets had flown to space and back five times like it was nothing, delivering 38 payloads for various customers while remaining entirely intact.) ¶ Meanwhile, quietly, Earth’s scientists are laying the groundwork of research the space economy needs. Japan’s Hayabusa 2 spacecraft has been in orbit around asteroid Ryugu for the last year and a half, learning everything it can. (Ryugu, worth $30 billion according to Asterank, is the website's #1 most cost-effective target.) The craft dropped [tiny hopping robot rovers](https://www.space.com/41941-hayabusa2-asteroid-rovers-hopping-tech.html) and a [small bomb](https://www.space.com/japan-hayabusa2-asteroid-bomb-video.html) on its target; pictures of the small crater that resulted were released afterwards.¶ Officially, the mission is to help us figure out how the solar system formed. Unofficially, it will help us understand whether all those useful metals clump together at the heart of an asteroid, as some theorize. If so, it’s game on for asteroid prospectors. If not, we can still get at the metals with other techniques, such as optical mining (which basically involves sticking an asteroid in a bag and drilling with sunlight; sounds nuts to us, but [NASA has proved it in the lab](https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/spacetech/niac/2017_Phase_I_Phase_II/Sustainable_Human_Exploration/)). It’ll just take more time.¶ Effectively, we’ve just made our first mark at the base of the first space mineshaft. And there’s more to come in 2020 when Hayabusa 2 returns to Earth bearing samples. If its buckets of sand contain a modicum of gold dust, tiny chunks of platinum or pebbles of compressed carbon — aka diamonds — then the Duchy of Luxembourg won’t be the only deep-pocketed investor to sit up and take notice.¶ The possibility of private missions to asteroids, with or without a human crew, is almost here. The next step in the process that takes us from here to where you are? Tell us an inspiring story about it, one that makes people believe, and start to imagine themselves mining in space. How would you explain the world-changing nature of the internet to 1945? How would you persuade them that there was gold to be mined in Vannevar Bush’s idea? You’d let the new economy and its benefits play out in the form of a novel.¶ As Hayabusa dropped a bomb on Ryugu, Daniel Suarez was making the exact same asteroid the target of his fiction. Suarez is a tech consultant and developer turned New York Times bestselling author. His novels thus far have been techno-thrillers: his debut, [Daemon](https://www.amazon.com/dp/B003QP4NPE/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1), a novel of Silicon Valley’s worst nightmare, AI run rampant, made more than a million dollars.¶ So it was a telling shift in cultural mood that Suarez’s latest thriller is also a very in-depth description of — and thinly-disguised advocacy for — asteroid mining. In [Delta-v](https://www.amazon.com/Delta-v-Daniel-Suarez-ebook/dp/B07FLX8V84/ref=sr_1_1?crid=UMNUUSR3NCBX&keywords=delta-v&qid=1556930756&s=digital-text&sprefix=delta-v%2Cdigital-text%2C204&sr=1-1), published in April, a billionaire in the 2030s named Nathan Joyce recruits a team of adventurers who know nothing about space — a world-renowned cave-diver, a world-renowned mountaineer — for the first crewed asteroid mission.¶ Elon Musk fans might expect this to be Joyce’s tale, but he soon fades into the background. The asteroid-nauts are the true heroes of Delta-v. Not only are they offered a massive payday — $6 million each for four years’ work — they also have agency in key decisions in the distant enterprise. Suarez deliberately based them on present-day heroes. The mission is essential, Joyce declares, to save Earth from its major problems. First of all, the fictional billionaire wheels in a fictional Nobel economist to demonstrate the actual truth that the entire global economy is sitting on a [mountain of debt](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-247-trillion-global-debt-bomb/2018/07/15/64c5bbaa-86c2-11e8-8f6c-46cb43e3f306_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5fb3ff1155d9). It has to keep growing or it will implode, so we might as well take the majority of the industrial growth off-world where it can’t do any more harm to the biosphere.¶ Secondly, there’s the climate change fix. Suarez sees asteroid mining as the only way we’re going to build [solar power satellites](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space-based_solar_power). Which, as you probably know, is a form of uninterrupted solar power collection that is theoretically more effective, inch for inch, than any solar panels on Earth at high noon, but operating 24/7. (In space, basically, it’s always double high noon). ¶ The power collected is beamed back to large receptors on Earth with large, low-power microwaves, which researchers think will be harmless enough to let humans and animals pass through the beam. A space solar power array like [the one China is said to be working on](https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottsnowden/2019/03/12/solar-power-stations-in-space-could-supply-the-world-with-limitless-energy/#2d3f78a54386) could reliably supply 2,000 gigawatts — or over 1,000 times more power than the largest solar farm currently in existence. ¶ “We're looking at a 20-year window to completely replace human civilization's power infrastructure,” Suarez told me, citing the report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on the coming catastrophe. Solar satellite technology “has existed since the 1970s. What we were missing is millions of tons of construction materials in orbit. Asteroid mining can place it there.”¶ The Earth-centric early 21st century can’t really wrap its brain around this, but the idea is not to bring all that building material and precious metals down into our gravity well. Far better to create a whole new commodities exchange in space. You mine the useful stuff of asteroids both near to Earth and far, thousands of them taking less energy to reach than the moon. That’s something else we’re still grasping, how relatively easy it is to ship stuff in zero-G environments. ¶ Robot craft can move 10-meter boulders like they’re nothing. You bring it all back to sell to companies that will refine and synthesize it in orbit for a myriad of purposes. Big pharma, to take one controversial industry, would [benefit by taking its manufacturing off-world](https://medium.com/fitch-blog/why-is-big-pharma-interested-in-the-space-economy-c078ac1bf67c). The molecular structure of many chemicals grows better in microgravity.¶ The expectation is that a lot of these space businesses — and all the orbital infrastructure designed to support them — will be automated, controlled remotely via telepresence, and monitored by AI. But Suarez is adamant that thousands if not millions of actual human workers will thrive in the space economy, even as robots take their jobs in old industries back on Earth.¶ “Our initial expansion into space will most likely be unsettled and experimental. Human beings excel in such environments,” he says. “Humans can improvise and figure things out as we go. Robots must be purpose-built, and it's going to take time and experience for us to design and build them.”¶ Which is another way startups back on Earth will get rich in the new economy: designing and building those robots, the nearest thing to selling picks and shovels to prospectors in the space gold rush. Thousands of humans in space at any one time will also require the design and construction of stations that spin to create artificial gravity. Again, this isn’t a great stretch: Using centrifugal force to simulate gravity in space was first proposed by scientists in the 19th century. NASA has had workable designs for spinning cislunar habitats called [O’Neill cylinders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O%27Neill_cylinder) since the 1970s. We just haven’t funded them. ¶ But the trillionaires clearly will.¶ In short, Suarez has carefully laid out a vision of the orbital economy that offers something for everyone in our divided society. For Green New Deal Millennials, there’s the prospect of removing our reliance on fossil fuels at a stroke and literally lifting dirty industries off the face of the planet. For libertarians and other rugged individualists, there’s a whole new frontier to be developed, largely beyond the reach of government. ¶ For those who worry about asteroids that could wipe out civilization — though luckily, [this isn't likely to happen any time soon](https://mashable.com/article/armageddon-asteroid-threat) — here is a way for humanity to get proficient in moving them out of the way, fast. Indeed, the National Space Society has offered [a proposal](https://space.nss.org/technologies-for-asteroid-capture-into-earth-orbit/) to capture the asteroid Aphosis (which is set to miss Earth in the year 2029, but [not by a very comfortable margin](https://www.space.com/asteroid-apophis-2029-flyby-planetary-defense.html)), keep it in orbit, and turn it into 150 small solar-power satellites, as a proof of concept. ¶ For the woke folks who care about the bloody history of diamond production, there’s the likelihood that space mining would wipe out Earth’s entire diamond industry. “They will be found in quantities unattainable on Earth,” claims Suarez, with good reason. We are starting to discover that there is more crystalized carbon in the cosmos than we ever suspected. Astronomers have identified one [distant planet made entirely of diamond](https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/phenomena/2014/06/24/diamond-the-size-of-earth/); there may be more, but they are, ironically, hard to see. ¶ We don’t have diamond planets in our solar system (and we can’t do interstellar missions), but we do have diamond-studded asteroids. Mine them for long enough and you will wear diamonds on the soles of your shoes.¶ For investors and entrepreneurs, there is the thrill of racing to be the first member of the four-comma club. ([Neil deGrasse Tyson believes that the first trillionaire will be an asteroid mining mogul](https://www.nbcnews.com/science/space/neil-degrasse-tyson-says-space-ventures-will-spawn-first-trillionaire-n352271); Suarez isn’t sure whether they’ll be the first, but he suspects that asteroid mining “will mint more trillionaires than any industry in history.”) ¶ For the regular guy or gal with a 401K, there’ll be a fast-rising stock market — inflated not by financial shenanigans this time, but an actual increase in what the world counts as wealth.¶ For workers, there is the promise of sharing in the untold riches, both legally and otherwise. It would be hard to stop miners attaining mineral wealth beyond their paycheck, under the table, when your bosses are millions of miles away. Then there’s the likelihood of rapid advancement in this new economy, where the miners fast gain the knowledge necessary to become moguls.¶ “After several tours in space working for others, perhaps on six-month or year-long contracts, it's likely that some workers will partner to set up their own businesses there,” says Suarez. “Either serving the needs of increasing numbers of workers and businesses in space, marketing services to Earth, or launching asteroid mining startups themselves.” All in all, it’s starting to sound a damn sight more beneficial to the human race than the internet economy is. Not a moment too soon. I’ve written encouragingly about asteroid mining several times before, each time touting the massive potential wealth that seems likely to be made. And each time there’s been a sense of disquiet among my readers, a sense that we’re taking our rapacious capitalist ways and exploiting space.¶ Whereas the truth is, this is exactly the version of capitalism humanity has needed all along: the kind where there is no ecosystem to destroy, no marginalized group to make miserable. A safe, dead space where capitalism’s most enthusiastic pioneers can go nuts to their hearts’ content, so long as they clean up their space junk. ¶ ([Space junk](https://mashable.com/category/space-junk) is a real problem in orbital space because it has thousands of vulnerable satellites clustered closely together around our little blue rock. The vast emptiness of cislunar space, not so much.)¶ And because they’re up there making all the wealth on their commodities market, we down here on Earth can certainly afford to focus less on growing our stock market. Maybe even, whisper it low, we can afford a fully functioning social safety net, plus free healthcare and free education for everyone on the planet.¶ It’s also clearly the area where we should have focused space exploration all along. If we settle on Mars, we may disturb as-yet-undiscovered native bacteria — and as the character Nathan Joyce shouts at a group of “Mars-obsessed” entrepreneurs in Delta-V, Mars is basically filled with toxic sand and is thus looking increasingly impossible to colonize. (Sorry, Mark Watney from The Martian, those potatoes would probably kill you.)

#### Warming causes extinction.

Peter Kareiva 18, Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA, et al., September 2018, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back,” Futures, Vol. 102, p. 39-50

In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (climate change, global freshwater cycle, and ocean acidification) do pose existential risks. This is because of intrinsic positive feedback loops, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all directly connected to the provision of food and water, and shortages of food and water can create conflict and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. Ample clean water is not a luxury—it is essential for human survival. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes Humans are remarkably ingenious, and have adapted to crises throughout their history. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). However, the many stories of human ingenuity successfully addressing existential risks such as global famine or extreme air pollution represent environmental challenges that are largely linear, have immediate consequences, and operate without positive feedbacks. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that very warming can cause more CO2 release which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that forest fires will become more frequent and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This catastrophic fire embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that could catch humanity off-guard and produce a true apocalyptic event. Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that runaway climate change, and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks portends even greater existential risks. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.

## Case

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#### 3. Extinction comes first under any framework.

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### a. Gateway issue - we need to be alive to assign value and debate competing moral theories- extinction literally ends the debate on “ought”.

#### b. moral theories were formulated prior to the Anthropocene and human capacity for collective death so they cannot be relied on in situations of existential risk.

#### c. no coherent moral theory can allow for extinction because it means the end of value.

### ID – Debris

#### Squo debris thumps.

**Wall 21** [Mike Wall, Michael Wall is a Senior Space Writer with [Space.com](http://space.com/) and joined the team in 2010. He primarily covers exoplanets, spaceflight and military space. He has a Ph.D. in evolutionary biology from the University of Sydney, Australia, a bachelor's degree from the University of Arizona, and a graduate certificate in science writing from the University of California, Santa Cruz. 11/15/21, "Kessler Syndrome and the space debris problem," Space, [https://www.space.com/kessler-syndrome-space-debris accessed 12/10/21](https://www.space.com/kessler-syndrome-space-debris%20accessed%2012/10/21)] Adam

Earth orbit is getting more and more crowded as the years go by. Humanity has launched about 12,170 satellites since the dawn of the space age in 1957, [according to the European Space Agency](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers) (ESA), and 7,630 of them remain in orbit today — but only about 4,700 are still operational. That means there are nearly 3,000 defunct spacecraft zooming around Earth at tremendous speeds, along with other big, dangerous pieces of debris like upper-stage rocket bodies. For example, orbital velocity at 250 miles (400 kilometers) up, the altitude at which the ISS flies, is about 17,100 mph (27,500 kph). At such speeds, even a tiny shard of debris can do serious damage to a spacecraft — and there are huge numbers of such fragmentary bullets zipping around our planet. ESA estimates that Earth orbit harbors at least 36,500 debris objects that are more than 4 inches (10 centimeters) wide, 1 million between 0.4 inches and 4 inches (1 to 10 cm) across, and a staggering 330 million that are smaller than 0.4 inches (1 cm) but bigger than 0.04 inches (1 millimeter). These objects pose more than just a hypothetical threat. From 1999 to May 2021, for example, the ISS conducted 29 debris-avoiding maneuvers, including three in 2020 alone, [according to NASA officials](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html). And that number continues to grow; the station performed [another such move in November 2021](https://www.space.com/space-station-dodging-chinese-space-junk-spacex-crew-3), for example. Many of the smaller pieces of space junk were spawned by the explosion of spent rocket bodies in orbit, but others were more actively emplaced. In January 2007, for instance, China intentionally destroyed one of its defunct weather satellites in a much-criticized test of anti-satellite technology that generated [more than 3,000 tracked debris objects](https://swfound.org/media/9550/chinese_asat_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf) and perhaps 32,000 others too small to be detected. The vast majority of that junk remains in orbit today, experts say. Spacecraft have also collided with each other on orbit. The most famous such incident occurred in February 2009, when Russia's defunct Kosmos 2251 satellite slammed into the operational communications craft Iridium 33, producing [nearly 2,000 pieces of debris](https://swfound.org/media/6575/swf_iridium_cosmos_collision_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf) bigger than a softball. That 2009 smashup might be evidence that the Kessler Syndrome is already upon us, though a cataclysm of "Gravity" proportions is still a long way off. "The cascade process can be more accurately thought of as continuous and as already started, where each collision or explosion in orbit slowly results in an increase in the frequency of future collisions," [Kessler told Space Safety Magazine in 2012](http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-debris/kessler-syndrome/don-kessler-envisat-kessler-syndrome/).

#### Collision risk is infinitesimally small

Fange 17 Daniel Von Fange 17, Web Application Engineer, Founder and Owner of LeanCoder, Full Stack, Polyglot Web Developer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped”, 5/21/2017, http://braino.org/essays/kessler\_syndrome\_is\_over\_hyped/

The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions. Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over. High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue. Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge, and the number of satellites so few, that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here. GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per 1000km of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here. How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be? Let’s imagine a worst case scenario. An evil alien intelligence chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death orbiting at 1000km, spread as evenly across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. Is humanity cut off from space? I’m guessing the world has launched about 10,000 tons of satellites total. For guessing purposes, I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites and junk currently in High LEO. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So there would be one cube of junk per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than 1 in 10,000.

#### Debris creates deterrence by raising the bar for conflict – international norms fail

Miller 21 [(Gregory, Chair of the Department of Space Power at the Air Command and Staff College, Ph.D. in Political Science from The Ohio State University) “Deterrence by Debris: The Downside to Cleaning up Space,” Space Policy, 7/31/2021] JL

The danger of kinetic strikes increasing orbital debris is a common theme in the literature, but the positive deterrent effects of some debris are often overlooked. The debris resulting from destroyed satellites, or other space objects, creates a deterrent effect on actors who might otherwise violate international norms and strike at objects in space, either to test their capabilities or as an act of hostilities. This is not deterrence in the traditional sense, of one actor publicly threatening punishment in response to another actor’s unwanted actions. It is not deterrence by denial since the attacker is not damaged and may even achieve its objective. Nor is it deterrence by punishment because the debris itself does not threaten to punish the attacker’s country. But debris can increase the future costs to the aggressor, even if their initial attack succeeds, and thus it has a similar restraining effect on certain behavior. Like the automated response of the U.S. tripwire in West Germany, the threat that debris can pose to state interests acts as a form of deterrence, at least to prevent some actors from taking certain types of actions. Removing the danger of debris will weaken that restraint and thus weaken deterrence, making ASAT tests and hostile actions in space more likely.

Several factors may deter a state from launching kinetic tests or striking against an adversary’s interests in space. For one thing, if a state’s adversary has similar capabilities to destroy objects in space, deterrence would be a function of not wanting to escalate tensions. Although international law only explicitly prohibits states from placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit, international space law, like the Outer Space Treaty [30], does provide a framework for addressing the activities of one state that lead to the damage of another state’s property. Likewise, there are international norms (informal but expected rules of behavior) against the weaponization of space. But these norms seem to be in decline [31], and such norms only deter a state from engaging in certain types of behavior if the state cares about following norms, if it cares about how states perceive its behavior, or if it believes other states are willing to enforce the norms. The beauty of debris as a deterrent is that it does not rely on the enforcement of norms or the credibility of states to succeed.

1] Kessler himself said it was overhype – prefer on their own author

2] Small/Large object double bind: small objects don’t have an impact, and large objects can be tracked – that’s Fange

3] no “risk” framing - Force a brightline – make them tell you how many satellites is a risk – Wall says 32,000 arlready exist and the ones that are fast are too small

NO REHIGHLIGHTING:

1. They quote Kessler again from 2012 – I mean come on he backtracked in ~2018~
2. They contextualized it to the status quo – that’s their uq – explosions have already occurred those are the warrants

### IT – Cap Good

#### **Capitalism is inevitable, adaptive, and alternatives are comparatively worse.**

[Meltzer](http://public.tepper.cmu.edu/facultydirectory/FacultyDirectoryProfile.aspx?id=98) 09 Dr. Allan H. Meltzer, economist and professor of Political Economy at Carnegie Mellon University’s Tepper School of Business in Pittsburgh (The eighth lecture in the 2008-2009 Bradley Lecture series, 3/9/2009, “There is no better alternative than capitalism”, [http://hiram7.wordpress.com/2009/03/12/there-is-no-better-alternative-than-capitalism/)//](http://hiram7.wordpress.com/2009/03/12/there-is-no-better-alternative-than-capitalism/)//jk)

**There is no better alternative than capitalism** as a social system **for providing growth and personal freedom. The alternatives offer less freedom and lower growth. The “better alternatives” that people imagine are almost always someone’s idea of utopia**. Libraries are full of books on utopia. **Those that have been tried have not survived** or flourished. **The most common reason for failure is that one person or group’s utopian ideal is unsatisfactory for others** who live subject to its rules. Either the rules change or they are enforced by authorities. Capitalism, particularly democratic capitalism, includes the means for orderly change. **Critics of capitalism look for viable alternatives to support. They do not recognize that**, unlike Socialism, **capitalism is adaptive, not rigid. Private ownership of the means of production flourishes in many different cultures**. Recently **critics of capitalism discovered the success of Chinese capitalism as an alternative to American capitalism. Its main feature is mercantilist policies supported by rigid controls on capital**. China’s progress takes advantage of an American or western model–the open trading system–and the willingness of the United States to run a current account balance. China is surely more authoritarian than Japan or western countries, a political difference that previously occurred in Meiji Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Growth in these countries produced a middle class followed by demands for political freedom. China is in the early stages of development following the successful path pioneered by Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and others who chose export-led growth under trade rules. Sustained economic growth led to social and political freedom in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Perhaps China will follow. **Capitalism continues to spread. It is the only system humans have found in which personal freedom, progress, and opportunities coexist. Most of the faults and flaws on which critics dwell are human faults, as Kant recognized. Capitalism is the only system that adapts to all manner of cultural and institutional differences. It continues to spread and adapt and will for the foreseeable future.**

#### Cap solves war – no root cause.

Gartzke 05 (Erik, associate professor of political science at Columbia University and author of a study on economic freedom and peace contained in the 2005, Economic Freedom of the World Report “Future Depends on Capitalizing on Capitalist Peace,” 10/18, Windsor Star, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=5133)

With terrorism achieving "global reach" and conflict raging in Africa and the Middle East, you may have missed a startling fact - we are living in remarkably peaceable times. For **six decades**, developed nations have not fought each other. France and the United States may chafe, but the resulting conflict pitted french fries against "freedom fries," rather than French soldiers against U.S. "freedom fighters." Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac had a nasty spat over the EU, but the English aren't going to storm Calais any time soon. The present peace is unusual. Historically, powerful nations are the most war prone. The conventional wisdom is that democracy fosters peace but this claim fails scrutiny. It is based on statistical studies that show democracies typically don't fight other democracies. Yet, the same studies show that democratic nations go to war about as much as other nations overall. And more recent research makes clear that only the affluent democracies are less likely to fight each other. Poor democracies behave much like non-democracies when it comes to war and lesser forms of conflict. A more powerful explanation is emerging from newer, and older, **empirical research** - the "capitalist peace." As predicted by Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Norman Angell and others, nations with high levels of economic freedom not only fight each other less, they go to war less often, period. Economic freedom is a measure of the depth of free market institutions or, put another way, of capitalism. The "democratic peace" is a mirage created by the overlap between economic and political freedom. Democracy and economic freedom typically co-exist. Thus, if economic freedom causes peace, then statistically democracy will also appear to cause peace. When democracy and economic freedom are both included in a statistical model, the results reveal that economic freedom is considerably more potent in encouraging peace than democracy**, 50 times more potent**, in fact, according to my own research. Economic freedom is highly **statistically significant** (at the one-per-cent level). Democracy does not have a measurable impact, while nations with very low levels of economic freedom are **14 times more prone** to conflict than those with very high levels. But, why would free markets cause peace? Capitalism is not only an immense generator of prosperity; it is also a revolutionary source of economic, social and political change. Wealth no longer arises primarily through land or control of natural resources. New Kind of Wealth Prosperity in modern societies is created by market competition and the efficient production that arises from it. This new kind of wealth is hard for nations to "steal" through conquest. In days of old, when the English did occasionally storm Calais, nobles dreamed of wealth and power in conquered lands, while visions of booty danced in the heads of peasant soldiers. Victory in war meant new property. In a free market economy, war destroys immense wealth for victor and loser alike. Even if capital stock is restored, efficient production requires property rights and free decisions by market participants that are difficult or impossible to co-ordinate to the victor's advantage. The Iraqi war, despite Iraq's immense oil wealth, will not be a money-maker for the United States. Economic freedom is not a guarantee of peace. Other factors, like ideology or the perceived need for self-defence, can still result in violence. But, where economic freedom has taken hold, it has made war less likely. Research on the capitalist peace has profound implications in today's world. Emerging democracies, which have not stabilized the institutions of economic freedom, appear to be at least as warlike - perhaps more so - than emerging dictatorships. Yet, the United States and other western nations are putting immense resources into democratization even in nations that lack functioning free markets. This is in part based on the faulty premise of a "democratic peace." It may also in part be due to public perception. Everyone approves of democracy, but "capitalism" is often a dirty word. However, in recent decades, an increasing number of people have rediscovered the economic virtues of the "invisible hand" of free markets. We now have an additional benefit of economic freedom - **international peace**. The actual presence of peace in much of the world sets this era apart from others. The empirical basis for optimistic claims - about either democracy or capitalism - **can be tested and refined**. The way forward is to capitalize on the capitalist peace, to deepen its roots and extend it to more countries through expanding markets, development, and a common sense of international purpose. The risk today is that faulty analysis and anti-market activists may distract the developed nations from this historic opportunity.

#### Capitalism is key for CCS

Gregory F. Nemet et al. 16, Associate Professor, La Follette School of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Martina Kraus, German Institute for Economic Research Vera Zipperer, German Institute for Economic Research, November, 2016, The Valley of Death, the Technology Pork Barrel, and Public Support for Large Demonstration Projects, La Follette School Working Paper No. 2016-007

Because the ultimate (but not immediate) goal of supporting demonstrations is to facilitate widespread adoption, demand a6nd thus markets are of course key (Kingsley et al., 1996). In climate change, policies are central to those markets (Taylor et al., 2003; Zhou et al., 2015), thus credibility in those policies is also central (Rai et al., 2010; Finon, 2012). But it is striking how many demonstration programs confronted markets that involved negative shocks around the time that projects came on-line—we see it in synfuels, biofuels, and solar thermal electricity (Figure 9), and CCS (Figure 10). The 1.9 year average lag from project initiation to time on-line is crucial. It would be a mistake to assume a Hotelling price path in which prices of an exhaustible resource (e.g. oil, atmospheric storage of CO2) rise at a constant pure rate of time preference. In this case the relevant price is the level at which avoided CO2 emissions are remunerated. Rather the experience of the past suggests we are more likely to see shocks and boom–bust cycles (Krautkraemer, 1998; Zaklan et al., 2011). We see it in our data in the prices related to each demonstration program (Figure 8). Lupion and Herzog (2013) attribute the failure of the NER300 program to stimulate the construction of any CCS projects to 4 factors: competition with renewables, project complexity, low carbon prices, and a combination of fiscal austerity and weak climate policy around the global financial crisis. Note that three of the four problems involved future demand, not the funding structure itself. Demonstrations need markets that pay off innovation investments not just under a steadily increasing Hotelling-style market, but under a broad range of market conditions. Features of robust demand pull include niche markets (Kemp et al., 1998), hedging across jurisdictions (Nemet, 2010), and flexible production (Sanchez and Kammen, 2016). Government price guarantees have played an important role as we have seen on synfuels, solar thermal electricity, and on a smaller scale, photovoltaics.

#### Try or die for CCS to solve warming.

Moniz 19 - 13th Secretary of Energy (2013 to 2017) and is the founder and CEO of the Energy Futures Initiative Fredd Krupp is president of the Environmental Defense Fund, Ernest Moniz, “Cutting Climate Pollution Isn’t Enough — We Also Need Carbon Removal,” Text, TheHill, September 23, 2019, <https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/462609-cutting-climate-pollution-isnt-enough-we-also-need-carbon-removal>.

It has been almost four years since the Paris climate agreement was signed. But as leaders gather in New York this week for the United Nations Climate Change Summit, the world remains far off track from meeting the Paris objective of limiting global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius -- and pursuing efforts at 1.5 degrees. To meet that target, the world must achieve a 100 percent clean economy — one that produces net zero emissions, or no more climate pollution than can be removed from the atmosphere — soon after mid-century, with the United States and other advanced economies reaching that milestone no later than 2050. It’s a daunting but doable task. The consequences of falling short are enormous. This year, the U.S. government’s fourth National Climate Assessment documented the huge economic and social impacts of unchecked warming. The Pentagon has repeatedly warned of the impacts on national security and our troops. Achieving a 100 percent clean economy will require a swift transition to renewables and other zero-carbon energy sources. But we also need to face the reality that meeting the Paris target will require taking carbon out of the atmosphere at massive scale. In part, that’s because eliminating emissions will be very challenging for some sectors, especially the transportation industry and agriculture. Removing carbon from the atmosphere would also bring concentrations down, helping to stabilize the climate at safer levels. So, the push for clean energy must be supplemented by a suite of technologies known as carbon dioxide removal (CDR). It is not a question of what we’d prefer. It’s a question of insurmountable math. The crucial role carbon removal must play is becoming more widely recognized. The 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report stressed the importance of carbon removal, and the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine late last year estimated that ten billion tons of CO2 will need to be pulled from the atmosphere annually by 2050, and double that by 2100. For context, today’s global emissions are less than 40 billion tons per year. If the 10 billion tons of CO2 from CDR were stored underground, that would be roughly double the world’s annual oil production. The good news is that there are a surprisingly large number of promising pathways for carbon dioxide removal. Nature-based approaches include reforestation and forest management as well as agricultural practices that increase carbon stored in soils. Some of the attendant challenges include competition for land and permanence of the carbon sequestration. Technological approaches include direct air capture — machines that actually suck carbon from the air — and technologically-enhanced natural processes, such as plants genetically modified with deep roots to fix carbon in the soil; enhanced mineralization, which uses certain reactive rocks to bind with carbon from the air; and accelerated ocean uptake in phytoplankton. These technologies are immature and require considerable research, development and demonstration to ensure viability and affordability at very large scale. Despite the urgency, there is no dedicated federal effort to develop these crucial technologies; existing programs are piecemeal and largely focused on sequestering emissions from industrial and electricity generating sources. The National Academies recommended the rapid establishment of a robust, focused, scalable and accelerated federal research program spanning the Departments of Energy and Agriculture, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the National Science Foundation, among others. Such a program would encompass the full range of technological pathways that can remove CO2 from the environment. ‘’Clearing the Air,’’ an analysis of CDR’s value and a proposed plan to deploy it, has been completed by the Energy Futures Initiative. Over the next decade, the program scale would be about a billion dollars a year. Carbon dioxide removal is not a magic bullet. We must do everything we can to deploy innovative low- and zero-carbon methods to generate electricity, heat homes, fuel vehicles, and power industry, creating new economic opportunities in the process. Tackling the climate crisis also requires placing a declining limit and a price on carbon pollution, as well as a significant increase in energy technology innovation and deployment across the board. But CDR is also not a “Plan B.” It is a critical part of any “Plan A” for climate, a necessary complement to emission reduction. It can provide more flexibility and optionality in policy planning, which could ease the transition to a carbon-neutral economy while minimizing transition costs and providing greater assurance that science-based climate goals can be met in a timely manner. It would eventually enable a net negative global economy that could bring the atmospheric carbon concentrations down — and global temperatures with it. We have delayed meaningful action for far too long. As a result, the scale and urgency of the challenge is such that we cannot simply work on doing better in the future. We need to correct what we did in the past. Carbon removal is the enabler.

## if time

#### Capitalist growth is sustainable.

Rune **Westergård 18**. Entrepreneur, Engineer and Author, founder of the technical consulting company CITEC. 2018. “Real and Imagined Threats.” One Planet Is Enough, Springer International Publishing, pp. 71–80. CrossRef, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-60913-3\_7.

Threatening reports about our ability to create disasters and even exterminate ourselves are not a new idea. A standard example is the British national economist Thomas Malthus in the early 19th century, who predicted that population growth would come to a halt because of starvation. Malthus calculated that the available food in the world couldn’t feed more than one billion people. He extrapolated the development from a still picture of his own time and couldn’t fathom that food production would increase tremendously thanks to new knowledge and technology. Our present food production is sufficient for seven times as many. Malthus didn’t pay attention to the fact that we live in a continuously changing civilisation, and the same kind of miscalculations are still made today. There are people who have even achieved the status of media superstars by presenting various dystopias and catastrophe scenarios. As early as 1968, Professor Paul Erlichs at Stanford University published the bestseller The Population Bomb, where he predicted that an imminent population explosion would result in hundreds of millions of deaths by starvation in the 1970s and 80s. Basically, he made the same mistake as Malthus, i.e. he treated knowledge and technology as if they were static phenomena. The most widely read environment report in the world, State of the World, was a loud whistle-blower when it was first published in the early 1980s. The Swedish version, Tillståndet i världen, was published yearly from 1984 and some years into the 2000s by the Worldwatch Institute Norden; I still have some of the early issues left. This report contains many valuable observations and suggestions, but also several basic analytical mistakes. In other words, it acts as an eye-opener, but it suffers from being tainted by political ideology. Its main weakness is that it doesn’t take the intrinsic driving forces of progress into account. State of the World was translated into most major languages and is, as already mentioned, the world’s most widely read environmental report. It has affected us all, directly or indirectly, through school and media. Even if the Swedish version I refer to was written some years ago, it is still worthy of discussion, firstly because it maintains an appearance of scientific validity, and secondly because it has served as a trendsetter for the general ideology which has been adopted by many later books and reports on the subject at hand. It still lives on as an engraved pattern in our conception of the world. In the report we can, for instance, read the following: A world where human desires and needs are fulfilled without the destruction of natural systems demands an entirely new economic order, founded on the insight that a high consumption level, population growth, and poverty are the powers behind the devastation of the environment. The rich have to reduce their consumption of resources so that the poor can increase their standard of living. The global economy simply works against the attempts to reduce poverty and protect the environment. We stubbornly insist to regard economic growth as synonymous with development, even though it makes the poor even poorer. Even if we up to this point have mainly described the environment revolution in economic terms, it is, in its most fundamental meaning, a social revolution: to change our values. Massive threat scenarios are still presented, for instance in the British scientist Tim Jackson’s book Prosperity Without Growth from 2009, which is one of the most widely read and frequently quoted works in this area. Tim Jackson, who is an economist and professor in sustainable development, explains how we humans are indulging in a ruthless pursuit of new-fangled gadgets in a consumption society running at full speed towards its doom. He also claims that material things in themselves cannot help us to flourish; on the contrary, they may even restrain our welfare. In other words, we cannot build our hopes that the economy, technology or science can help us to escape from the trap of Anthropocene, which has brought us to the brink of an ecological disaster. There are hundreds on books on this theme, and they all agree that the general state of the world is pure misery; everything is getting worse, the resources are being depleted, and that man will soon have destroyed the entire planet. The apparent reason for this, of course, is due to the consumption culture and the present financial system—which exposes man as a greedy, ruthless and ultimately weak creature. This attitude may serve a purpose as an eye-opener. But it is not very credible, and it may even be counterproductive. Of course, we can see a lot of problems ahead of us; but to solve them, we need the correct diagnostics instead of dubious doomsday prophesies. Focus: The Problem Since the focus of attention is so profoundly fixated on the problems in the climate and environmental debate, the progress already made—and the opportunities at hand—are often overshadowed. The example below will help to illustrate this point: In the year 2014, the Nobel Prize in physics was awarded to three scientists who had invented blue light emitting diodes—a technology that has made high-bright and energy-efficient LED lighting possible. As lighting accounts for 20% of the world’s total electrical consumption, this invention has the potential to radically reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. In an interview made by the major Swedish daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter, one of the prize winners, Hiroshi Amano, says the following about energy-efficient, inexpensive and high-bright LED lights: “They are now being used all over the world. Even children in the developing countries can use this lighting to read books and study in the evenings. This makes me very very happy”. Shortly after this announcement, the news headlines declared that LED lighting was a threat to the environment. This statement was based on a report showing that LED lighting could be hazardous to flies and moths, which in turn might disturb the eco system. This is a typical example of how progress pessimists and, not least the media, think and act. In this case, they focused on a potential problem associated with LED lighting, and ignored the tremendous possibilities that the new technology offered to dramatically reduce greenhouse gases and thus spare the eco system (not to mention all the other advantages). Books and reports of the kind mentioned above tell us repeatedly about disasters, threats, problems, collapses and famines. On the other hand, they are notoriously silent about the great improvements actually made—the reduction of extreme poverty (not only as a percentage but also in absolute numbers), longer lifespans, dramatic global progress in education and healthcare, etc. The lack of positive media coverage on the environment means that many people believe that too little is being done, which is quite understandable considering the one-sided nature of the information they are presented with. Alarmist reporting almost always reminds me of pirates: they are unreliable and half their vision is blocked by their eye patches. It is vital that the media not only one-sidedly focus on the misery without presenting the progress made and suggesting constructive courses of action. The quality of our decisions in all respects depends on our knowledge, insight and attitude. Real and Imagined Threats Many people are convinced that the climate and environmental problems are growing. It is certainly true that our planet has its limitations, but many of the predictions from alarmist literature have been proven false. In the 1980s, the forest dieback was a frequently discussed subject. To quote the well-known German news magazine Der Spiegel, an “ecological Hiroshima” was imminent. Most experts at the time claimed that a wide-spread forest death seemed unavoidable. Additionally, the general mood of impending doom was augmented by the threat of a nuclear disaster during the cold war. I remember the pessimistic discussions among friends and how frequently the gloomy reports appeared in Swedish and Finnish television. The future of humankind appeared to be depressingly bleak. But the forest dieback never happened. On the contrary, the forest area has been constantly expanding in Europe, even during the entire period when the forest was believed to be dying. Today, only two thirds of the yearly accretion in Europe are cut down, according to the Natural Resource Institute in Finland. There are different opinions as to why the large-scale forest dieback didn’t occur. One theory is that the researchers’ evidence and conclusions had been incomplete and too hasty; the forest was actually never in danger. Others suggest that the emission limitations implemented prevented the disaster. My point is that the environmental catastrophe did not happen. Some other environmental problems, exaggerated or not, that have concerned us during the last decades have also disappeared from the immediate agenda: overpopulation, DDT, the ozone hole, heavy metals, lead poisoning, soot particles, the waste mountain, and the acidification of our lakes. Unfortunately, some environmental problems, like soot particles and waste, still remain in some areas, especially in poorer countries, where there are other, even worse problems that have yet to be resolved. The conclusion is, however, that we and our society in most cases have handled threatening situations quite well. When alarming symptoms are noted, scientists and other experts are summoned, and we act according to their diagnoses. It is no big deal that the diagnoses are sometimes wrong, as long as the side effects are not too severe. The main thing is that we do our best to avoid disasters, and on the whole, humankind has succeeded rather well this far. As individuals, we react very differently to various kinds of threats. The closer and more tangible the threat is, the more violent are the reactions—while distant and invisible symptoms, like the depletion of the ozone layer, concern us less. In the latter cases, we have to trust the scientists’ and later the politicians’ reactions. Does this mean that disasters are avoided thanks to war headlines, threats, and anxiety? I don’t think that this is the most important explanation; rather, it is factual and science-based information that produces effective results. But if exaggerated threat scenarios and reports of misery are needed to inspire the necessary political opinion, acquire research funding and create behavioural changes, we will have to live with that. The most important thing to remember in this context is that the actions shouldn’t cause more harm than the original problem itself. The risk with exaggerated threat and misery reporting is that it may inspire an over-reaction based on misleading diagnoses, or the opposite—a paralysing feeling of helplessness. It is necessary to take threats against the climate and the environment seriously, but not to a degree where our ability to reason and act is blocked by fear or anxiety. Many environmental debaters claim that the fall of the Inca and Roman empires were caused by the same causes that are now threatening our present civilisation—a short-sighted over-exploitation and rape of nature. Easter Island is another popular example. However, in my opinion it is both worthless and irresponsible to judge the world situation of today by copying the outcome of earlier cultural endeavours in history. The inhabitants of the Inca empire and Easter Island didn’t have anything even remotely comparable with the organisations, technology, medicine or general knowledge of today. It would be like comparing a case of appendicitis in the past to a case today. In pre-modern times, it was a fatal condition. In this day and age, it is cured by a simple routine operation. Today, humankind is conscious of the climate changes and other ecological challenges. And we also have the knowledge and resources needed to act. Facts, Propaganda and Hidden Messages During all the years I have followed the development of technology and society, I have repeatedly observed how a mishmash of serious research, political propaganda, and the hidden agendas of individuals have been distributed more or less randomly by the media. There are of course many different kinds of alarmism— everything from well-founded research reports to exaggerated prophesies of doom. It is far from simple to separate the wheat from the chaff. The actions taken against ozone depletion, lead emissions and the toxic chemical, dioxin, are all examples of how research has shown the way to successful results. Today, greenhouse gas emissions top the list of issues deserving our gravest attention, as it is a global phenomenon—just as the depletion of the ozone layer once was. There are also a considerable number of local environmental problems, such as drought, air pollution, forest depletion and overfishing. All of these are real threats that have to be acted upon, even though they are not global. However, I am always disturbed when a single global environmental issue is bundled with an assortment of several local issues, rather like a simplified trademark advertisement for the negative consequences of civilisation. This makes the information abstract and inaccurate, ignoring the fact that different locales require different solutions. Fear and alarmism are natural reactions that once protected us when we were living at the mercy of nature—they are evolutionary relics from our life in the savanna. Today, the same properties can be significant drawbacks. The transition from a primitive, animal-like state to the society we have today must, on the whole, be counted as a great success. But many people regard the same world as over-exploited, depleted, unjust, war-ridden and balancing on the brink of destruction. How can people living in the same epoch have so entirely different views of the world? In the sustainability debate, there is one faction dealing with the natural resources and ecosystems, and another focusing on the redistribution of wealth. There is even a third faction discussing a minimalistic lifestyle; for example, downshifting, with less work and less material welfare. When all these ingredients are mixed without discretion, the result is an anxiety soup that many have choked on. In a situation like that, we cannot expect any constructive initiatives to materialise. Instead, it would be far better to explore, research and discuss each dimension separately. What Is the Real State of the Planet? It is easy to generalise and say that we over-exploit the planet’s resources and pollute the world with our waste. But how many care to examine these statements in detail and ask exactly which resources are over-exploited? • Are fish becoming extinct? It is true that overfishing occurs in many places, which is, of course, unsustainable. However, this is not an unavoidable threat to the world’s total food resources. Fortunately, there are several examples of fish stocks that have either recovered or started to replenish once the fishing effort has been eased. • Is the air being poisoned? Many are convinced that the air we breathe is becoming dirtier all the time. But that isn’t true, at least not in the Western world. From the year 1990, emissions of sulphur dioxide have been reduced by 80%, nitrogen oxides by 44%, volatile organic substances by 55%, and carbon monoxide by 62%. Despite these dramatic improvements, 64% of Europeans believe that pollution is increasing. • Are the forests dying? It is a general belief that the forests in the developed countries are dwindling. But that isn’t true; on the contrary, the wooded areas are expanding. However, the forests are decreasing in the poor countries, where forestry and farming are still major sources of income, as they once were in the industrialised countries. • Are we drowning in waste? There are many who believe that we are surrounded by constantly growing mountains of waste. In the developed countries, the truth is that increasing amounts of waste are being recycled and the landfills are decreasing. • Will there be enough phosphorus? Phosphorus is an important nutrient in farming, extracted from phosphate ore. Many scientists fear that the finite natural resource of phosphate ore will become depleted in the future, which may jeopardise the world’s food supply. But there are already working solutions for this problem, such as by reclaiming phosphorus through digestion residues and sewage sludge. There are also technological solutions for the chemical extraction of phosphorus from polluted water—the remediation of lakes and rainwater by removing phosphorus is already a common procedure. Here we achieve a win-win situation—phosphorus is collected while preventing the eutrophication of lakes. • Will there be enough energy to go around? A common statement is that the earth’s population is too large, and that we consume too much energy with respect to the climate. This is one of those issues where we have to think in terms of symptoms, diagnoses, and medication. The symptoms are there for all to see: climate change. On the other hand, the diagnosis that we consume too much energy is wrong. The correct diagnosis is that we are not using the right technology; i.e. energy efficient power production without harmful emissions. Consequently, the correct statement would be that we consume energy that is produced by technologies that are harmful to the climate. The difference in wording is important. As the first diagnosis is “too high energy consumption”, the remedy will be to use a different medication than a diagnosis based on “the wrong technology”. Alarmist reporting can inspire bad decisions if the statements aren’t systematically reviewed and evaluated. It can also be misguiding to express environmental threats in general terms. Actions must be based on precise specific symptoms with corresponding diagnoses. If the doctor discovers that the patient is lame and suffers from a high fever, it doesn’t help to predict imminent death. Maybe the lameness and the fever have different causes altogether! A successful cure would probably include two different diagnoses with separate medications. Several recent surveys of the general conception of the world have been made— one is Project Ignorance by Gapminder and Novus in Sweden. One of the questions asked was whether CO2 emissions per capita and year had increased or decreased in the world during the last 40 years. The surveyed group was large and representative in order to give a fairly accurate picture of the common opinion. No less than 90% believed that CO2 emissions had increased. The truth is that they haven’t increased at all. It is important that decision makers on all levels learn how to see the wood from the trees. Decisions based on false preconditions can halt technological development, and thus also the development of the economy, welfare, and a healthier environment. The flow of innovations in the climate and environmental areas is accelerating rapidly.