## 1

#### Interpretation: the affirmative must defend the hypothetical implementation of a topical plan within the resolution – Resolved: the appropriation of outer space is unjust

#### Violation: they don’t.

**Resolved indicates a policy action.**

Words and Phrases 64 [Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Multi-volume set of judicial definitions). “Resolved”. 1964.]

Definition of the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

#### Violation: They defend endorses the unimaginable desires of queerness. Voting affirmative rejects corporate expansion into space, rejects normative notions of fiat and productivity.

#### Vote neg for predictable limits—post-facto topic adjustment structurally favors the aff by manipulating the balance of prep which is anchored around the resolution as a stasis point. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months, which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subject to well-researched scrutiny. I can’t go for any disad, specific CPs, solvency turns, etc in order to answer the aff, you’ll just delink my offense in the 1ar. Kills neg ground since certain principles are good in the abstract; it only makes sense taking everything into context. Ground is key to fairness since equal access to arguments controls equal access to the ballot. Truth testing - you can’t vote on the case outweighs T because lack of preparation prevents rigorous testing of the AC claims. If we win fairness we don’t have to “outweigh” other impacts.

#### 3 impacts:

#### First is fairness—debate is fundamentally a game which requires both sides to have a relatively equal shot at winning and is necessary for any benefit to the activity. That outweighs:

#### a. decision-making: every argument concedes to the validity of fairness i.e. that the judge will make a fair decision based on the arguments presented. This means if they win fairness bad vote neg on presumption because you have no obligation to fairly evaluate their arguments.

#### b. probability: voting aff can’t solve any of their impacts but it can solve ours. All the ballot does is tell tab who won which can’t stop any violence but can resolve the fairness imbalance in this particular debate.

#### c. Extra T they get offence from their method not just the topic which means that they’ll always win against topical neg.

#### Second is switch side and idea-testing --- only a limited topic that leaves a role for the negative allows contestation and second-order testing that overcomes polarization. Switching sides forces them to scrutinize their own beliefs, which is valuable for developing and defending their own convictions more robustly.

Poscher 16 Ralf Poscher, Diat the Institute for Staatswissenschaft and Philosophy of Law at the University of Freiburg “Why We Argue About the Law: An Agonistic Account of Legal Disagreement”, Metaphilosophy of Law, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki/Adam Dyrda/Pawel Banas (eds.), Hart Publishing. 2016.

Hegel’s dialectical thinking powerfully exploits the idea of negation. It is a central feature of spirit and consciousness that they have the power to negate. The spirit “is this power only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it. This […] is the magical power that converts it into being.”102 The tarrying with the negative is part of what Hegel calls the “labour of the negative”103. In a loose reference to this Hegelian notion Gerald Postema points to yet another feature of disagreements as a necessary ingredient of the process of practical reasoning. Only if our reasoning is exposed to contrary arguments can we test its merits. We must go through the “labor of the negative” to have trust in our deliberative processes.104 This also holds where we seem to be in agreement. Agreement without exposure to disagreement can be deceptive in various ways. The first phenomenon Postema draws attention to is the group polarization effect. When a group of like‐minded people deliberates an issue, informational and reputational cascades produce more extreme views in the process of their deliberations.105 The polarization and biases that are well documented for such groups106 can be countered at least in some settings by the inclusion of dissenting voices. In these scenarios, disagreement can be a cure for dysfunctional deliberative polarization and biases.107 A second deliberative dysfunction mitigated by disagreement is superficial agreement, which can even be manipulatively used in the sense of a “presumptuous ‘We’”108. Disagreement can help to police such distortions of deliberative processes by challenging superficial agreements. Disagreements may thus signal that a deliberative process is not contaminated with dysfunctional agreements stemming from polarization or superficiality. Protecting our discourse against such contaminations is valuable even if we do not come to terms. Each of the opposing positions will profit from the catharsis it received “by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it”. These advantages of disagreement in collective deliberations are mirrored on the individual level. Even if the probability of reaching a consensus with our opponents is very low from the beginning, as might be the case in deeply entrenched conflicts, entering into an exchange of arguments can still serve to test and improve our position. We have to do the “labor of the negative” for ourselves. Even if we cannot come up with a line of argument that coheres well with everybody else’s beliefs, attitudes and dispositions, we can still come up with a line of argument that achieves this goal for our own personal beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. To provide ourselves with the most coherent system of our own beliefs, attitudes and dispositions is – at least in important issues – an aspect of personal integrity – to borrow one of Dworkin’s favorite expressions for a less aspirational idea. In hard cases we must – in some way – lay out the argument for ourselves to figure out what we believe to be the right answer. We might not know what we believe ourselves in questions of abortion, the death penalty, torture, and stem cell research, until we have developed a line of argument against the background of our subjective beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. In these cases it might be rational to discuss the issue with someone unlikely to share some of our more fundamental convictions or who opposes the view towards which we lean. This might even be the most helpful way of corroborating a view, because we know that our adversary is much more motivated to find a potential flaw in our argument than someone with whom we know we are in agreement. It might be more helpful to discuss a liberal position with Scalia than with Breyer if we want to make sure that we have not overlooked some counter‐argument to our case. It would be too narrow an understanding of our practice of legal disagreement and argumentation if we restricted its purpose to persuading an adversary in the case at hand and inferred from this narrow understanding the irrationality of argumentation in hard cases, in which we know beforehand that we will not be able to persuade. Rational argumentation is a much more complex practice in a more complex social framework. Argumentation with an adversary can have purposes beyond persuading him: to test one’s own convictions, to engage our opponent in inferential commitments and to persuade third parties are only some of these; to rally our troops or express our convictions might be others. To make our peace with Kant we could say that “there must be a hope of coming to terms” with someone though not necessarily with our opponent, but maybe only a third party or even just ourselves and not necessarily only on the issue at hand, but maybe through inferential commitments in a different arena.f) The Advantage Over Non‐Argumentative Alternatives It goes without saying that in real world legal disagreements, all of the reasons listed above usually play in concert and will typically hold true to different degrees relative to different participants in the debate: There will be some participants for whom our hope of coming to terms might still be justified and others for whom only some of the other reasons hold and some for whom it is a mixture of all of the reasons in shifting degrees as our disagreements evolve. It is also apparent that, with the exception of the first reason, the rationality of our disagreements is of a secondary nature. The rational does not lie in the discovery of a single right answer to the topic of debate, since in hard cases there are no single right answers. Instead, our disagreements are instrumental to rationales which lie beyond the topic at hand, like the exploration of our communalities or of our inferential commitments. Since these reasons are of this secondary nature, they must stand up to alternative ways of settling irreconcilable disagreements that have other secondary reasons in their favor – like swiftness of decision making or using fewer resources. Why does our legal practice require lengthy arguments and discursive efforts even in appellate or supreme court cases of irreconcilable legal disagreements? The closure has to come by some non‐argumentative mean and courts have always relied on them. For the medieval courts of the Germanic tradition it is bequeathed that judges had to fight it out literally if they disagreed on a question of law – though the king allowed them to pick surrogate fighters.109 It is understandable that the process of civilization has led us to non‐violent non‐ argumentative means to determine the law. But what was wrong with District Judge Currin of Umatilla County in Oregon, who – in his late days – decided inconclusive traffic violations by publicly flipping a coin?110 If we are counting heads at the end of our lengthy argumentative proceedings anyway, why not decide hard cases by gut voting at the outset and spare everybody the cost of developing elaborate arguments on questions, where there is not fact of the matter to be discovered?

#### Third is the small schools disad - under-resourced are most adversely effected by a massive, unpredictable caselist which worsens structural disparities

#### Ballot paradox - either they want the ballot and prove the competition arguments, or they’re only here for the discussion in which case vote neg but recognize the aff’s education is valuable – proves T comes first.

#### TVA -

#### Disads to the TVA prove there’s negative ground and that it’s a contestable stasis point, and if their critique is incompatible with the topic reading it on the neg solves and is better because it promotes switch-side debate.

#### Paradigm –

#### 1. TFW is drop the debater – it indicts their method of engagement and proves we couldn’t engage fairly with their aff.

#### 2. Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary, you can’t be reasonably topical, and causes a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation.

#### 3. RVIs and impact turns encourage all in on theory which decks substance and incentivize baiting theory with abusive practices.

#### 4. No impact turns— exclusions are inevitable—there are infinite topics that are important discussions but not all of them are debatable. Even if our vision of the topic can’t fully include their scholarship they have to weigh the marginal benefit of allowing their scholarship against having literally no limit on what the affirmative can talk about which proves maintaining the topic as a stasis point outweighs.

## 2

#### CP TEXT: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust except for Chinese Asteroid Mining

#### Chinese Asteroid Mining key to sustaining Rare Earth Minerals.

Cohen 21 Ariel Cohen 10-26-2021 "China’s Space Mining Industry Is Prepping For Launch – But What About The US?" <https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2021/10/26/chinas-space-mining-industry-is-prepping-for-launch--but-what-about-the-us/?sh=6b8bea862ae0> (I am a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and the Founding Principal of International Market Analysis, a Washington, D.C.-based global risk advisory boutique.)//Elmer

Exploration of space-based natural resources are on the Chinese policy makers’ mind. The question is, what Joe Biden thinks? In April of this year, China’s Shenzen Origin Space Technology Co. Ltd. launched the NEO-1, the first commercial spacecraft dedicated to the mining of space resources – from asteroids to the lunar surface. Falling costs of space launches and spacecraft technology alongside existing infrastructure provides a unique opportunity to explore extraterrestrial resource extraction. Current technologies are equipped to analyze and categorize asteroids within our solar system with a limited degree of certainty. One of the accompanying payloads to the NEO-1 was the Yuanwang-1, or “little hubble” satellite, which searches the stars for possible asteroid mining targets. The NEO-1 launch marks another milestone in private satellite development, adding a new player to space based companies which include Japan’s Astroscale. Private asteroid identification via the Sentinel Space Telescope was supported by NASA until 2015. As private investment in space grows, the end goal is to be capable of harvesting resources to bring to Earth. “Through the development and launch of the spacecraft, Origin Space is able to carry out low-Earth orbit space junk cleanup and prototype technology verification for space resource acquisition, and at the same time demonstrate future asteroid defense related technologies.” In the end, it will come down to progressively lowering the cost of launched unit of weight and booster rocket reliability – before fundamentally new engines may drive the launch costs even further down. The April launch demonstrates that China is already succeeding while the West is spinning its wheels. The much touted Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries (DSI) DSI -1% were supposed to be the vanguard of extra-terrestrial resource acquisition with major backers including Google’s GOOG -1.4% Larry Page. But both have since been acquired, the former by block chain company ConsenSys and the latter by Bradford Space, neither of which are prioritizing asteroid mining. This is too bad, given that that supply chain crunches here on Earth – coupled with the global green energy transition – are spiking demand for strategic minerals that are increasingly hard to come by on our environmentally stressed planet. And here China currently holds a monopoly on rare earth element (REE) extraction and processing to the tune of 90%. REE’s 17 minerals essential for modern computing and manufacturing technologies for everything from solar panels to semi-conductors. Resource-hungry China also has major involvement in global critical mineral supply chains, which include cobalt, tungsten, and lithium. As I’ve written before, the Chinese hold of upstream and downstream markets is staggering. Possessing 30% of the global mined ore, 80% of the global processing facilities, and an ever increasing list of high dollar investments around the world, China boasts over $36 billion invested in mining projects in Africa alone. Beijing’s space program clearly indicates that the Chinese would also like to tighten their grip on space-based resources as well. According to research, it is estimated that a small asteroid roughly 200 meters in length that is rich in platinum could be worth up to $300 million. Merrill Lynch predicts the space industry — including extraterrestrial mining industry – to value $2.7 trillion in the next three decades. REEs are fairly common in the solar system, but to what degree remains unknown. The most sought after are M-type asteroids which are mostly metal and hundreds of cubic meters. While these are not the most common, the 27,115 Near Earth asteroids are bound to contain a few. This – and military applications – are no doubt a driving factor of China’s ever increasing space ambitions.

#### China terrestrial mining slipping.

CPT 21 China Power Team. "Does China Pose a Threat to Global Rare Earth Supply Chains?" China Power. July 17, 2020. Updated May 12, 2021. Accessed December 19, 2021. <https://chinapower.csis.org/china-rare-earths/> //Elmer

Growing Global Competition While China maintains a commanding presence within the global rare earth industry, Beijing’s capacity to unilaterally disrupt supply chains is likely to be eroded in the coming years. A number of initiatives are underway that may prove successful at establishing new rare earth suppliers outside of China. Shifting market dynamics are likely to aid these efforts. There are already signs that other players have started to chip away at China’s dominance in certain areas. Mining of raw rare earth materials outside of China has ramped up significantly in recent years as the US’ Mountain Pass mine, and other mines around the world, have increased their output. China’s share of global mining production has slipped as a result, from a high of 97.7 percent in 2010 to 62.9 percent in 2019 – the lowest point since 1995. China’s share of global rare earth reserves has likewise fallen from 50 percent to 36.7 percent over the same period.3 China’s status as the preeminent supplier of oxides, metals, and permanent magnets has not been similarly diminished – but it may be in the coming years. In the US, the company MP Materials is working to bring online facilities at Mountain Pass that would allow it to process its mined minerals, instead of sending them to China for processing. The company aims to accomplish this in 2021 and to establish the ability to refine and separate rare earth metals in the coming years. International efforts are also underway. In April 2020, the US DoD green-lit initial funding for a joint venture between Australia’s Lynas Corporation and US-based Blue Line Corporation to construct a processing facility in Texas. If successful, it would allow Lynas to ship rare earth materials from its processing facility in Malaysia to the US for final processing – rather than to China. The Japanese government (through JOGMEC) is looking to invest in US and Australian initiatives, likely including the new facility in Texas. These steps are part of Tokyo’s announced goal of further reducing Japan’s reliance on Chinese rare earth imports to less than 50 percent by 2025. Due to growing demand for rare earths, these ventures will likely be more successful than previous attempts to establish rare earth suppliers outside of China. Much of this new demand is being driven by rapid growth of the renewable energy and electric vehicle industries, which utilize large quantities of rare earth permanent magnets. From 2007 to 2017, China’s production of renewable and nuclear energy more than tripled, accounting for roughly 51 percent of the global increase in production over this period. China’s electric vehicle market is growing even faster. Between 2014 and 2019, the number of electric vehicles in China swelled from approximately 90,000 to nearly 3.4 million.

#### REMs dominance solves the economy.

GH 14 [Greenovation Hub, conducts research on China-relevant issues in climate, energy and sustainable finance with a global perspective, “China’s Mining Industry at Home and Overseas: Development, Impacts and Regulation,” 2014, https://www.ghub.org/cfc\_en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/11/China-Mining-at-Home-and-Overseas\_Main-report2\_EN.pdf, EA]

Economic Development and Employment Opportunities The rapid growth China has experienced over the last three decades has been fuelled in part by its mining and metals industries. The industrialization of the country and extensive infrastructure development would not have been possible without high outputs of steel and other construction materials. Likewise, without China’s huge coal industry, there would have been insufficient electricity to power the factories and industries that propelled China to its current position as the world’s second largest economy. Mining and metal production generates large revenues, which constitutes a significant portion of the country’s GDP. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, in 2010 mining directly contributed around 5.2% of China’s total GDP. This figure is significantly higher if downstream industries and revenues are taken into account. According to the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), in 2010 the total production value of mining in China was over US$69.2 billion, which is an increase of over 555% since 2000. As well as generating revenue through taxation, royalties and sale of resources, mining also supports secondary industries such as those supplying machinery and other services to mining companies. Products of the mining industry can be traded on international markets, further adding to China’s foreign currency reserves.

#### Chinese economic decline leads to all-out war – specifically over Taiwan.

Joske 18 Stephen Joske 10-23-2018 “China’s Coming Financial Crisis And The National Security Connection” <https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/chinas-coming-financial-crisis-and-the-national-security-connection/> (senior adviser to the Australian Treasurer during the 1997–98 Asian crisis)//re-cut by Elmer

The biggest **national security issues**, however, **arise from** the unpredictable **political impact of a recession in China**. We learned this, or should have, during the 1997 to 1998 Asian crisis. China may have had a disguised recession or near recession in 1998, but it was in a much smaller economy. Apart from that one episode there is no collective memory of recession and how to deal with it. As such, **China** is now **psychologically unprepared** to deal with the challenges of a recession. China’s coming recession will be accompanied by a large uncontrolled devaluation of the RMB as foreign exchange reserves evaporate, so it will be impossible to conceal this time. All asset prices, including housing prices, will be hit. **Combine** the **shock** of an unexpected economic setback **with tensions** in a one party state where a single individual has been calling the shots, and **political instability could set in.** While Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has not eliminated corruption, it has created many enemies who are biding their time. Minxin Pei has documented the activities of China’s powerful corruption networks. These networks, not a debilitated civil society, represent the alternative government of China. Competition between them could easily be destabilizing in a winner-take-all political environment. While our understanding of elite politics in China is poor, a recession would likely discredit the existing leadership and **set off intense competition between corrupt factions** for control of China. Bo Xilai, a former Chongqing party chief and Politburo member, was purged in 2012 but his son appears to still be interested in politics. While the outcome is impossible to predict, we can **see** the conditions in place for destabilizing events ranging from **military adventurism** to **civil war**. Alternatively, the regime could reassert its stability through increased repression, which would make China harder to deal with and would spill over into the Chinese diaspora. China’s Belt and Road Initiative has never had a real economic base. It is all about power projection (such as the Gwadar port) and would quickly be dropped by Beijing as a post-crisis China becomes focused on domestic political and economic stability. **Any Chinese military adventurism is likely to be focused on Taiwan.** China’s military is currently poorly equipped for an invasion of Taiwan, which has difficult geography and a substantial military, making an invasion of Taiwan unlikely to succeed. However, it is possible the Chinese **leadership would miscalculate** the risks, leaving it in a limited war with no clear resolution that would quickly **draw in Japan and the U**nited **S**tates. China has spent most of its history disunited, reflecting its geography. It has a number of widely dispersed economic centers. It was in outright civil war as recently as the 1960s. If competition between political factions remains unresolved, a civil war could develop, leaving China as a battleground where Russia, Japan, and the United States seek to influence the outcome. This scenario would stall or even end China’s rise as a global military and political power.

#### Taiwan goes nuclear.

Talmadge 18 [Caitlin, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-China War Could Spiral Out of Control,” accessible online at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option>, published Nov/Dec 2018]//re-cut by Elmer

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a **military confrontation**—resulting, for example, **from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan**—**no longer seems** as **implausible** as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. **China**, by contrast, not only has **nuclear weapons**; it has also **intermingled** them **with its conventional** military **forces**, **making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other**. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. **Conventional forces** can threaten nuclear forces in ways that **generate pressures to escalate**—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. **If U.S. operations endangered** or damaged China’s **nuclear forces,** Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, **Beijing might** reluctantly **conclude** that limited **nuclear escalation**—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—**was** a **viable** option to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The **most worrisome flash point** for a U.S.-Chinese war **is Taiwan**. Beijing’s long-term objective of reunifying the island with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington’s longstanding desire to maintain the status quo in the strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Although U.S. law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Were Washington to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, the world’s sole superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. conventional military operations would likely threaten, disable, or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear capabilities—whether doing so was Washington’s stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but guaranteed. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bomb the island, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an antisubmarine campaign, which would likely threaten China’s “boomers,” the four nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China’s conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would thus not only disrupt the activities of China’s attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter jets. If the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that protects China’s ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically more vulnerable. Even more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions later. Adding to China’s sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear-armed submarine force means that just two such incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would likely be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return to destroyed ports. If that happened, China would essentially have no naval nuclear deterrent. The situation is similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China’s growing land-based conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would hinge on the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it would be virtually impossible to do so while leaving China’s nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters, meaning that they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they share some command-and-control networks, or that the United States would be unable to distinguish between the conventional and nuclear networks even if they were physically separate. To add to the challenge, some of China’s ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and the two versions are virtually indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading China’s coastal air defense network in order to fight a conventional war would also leave much of its nuclear force without protection. Once China was under attack, its leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country’s interior were vulnerable. For years, observers have pointed to the U.S. military’s failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990–91 Gulf War as evidence that mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles are larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, high-intensity conventional war. China’s vehement criticism of a U.S. regional missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing’s worry is that this system could help Washington block the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing’s eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously undermine other parts of China’s nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China’s real-time awareness of the state of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the favored **U.S. strategy** to ensure a conventional victory **would** likely **endanger** much of China’s **nuclear arsenal** in the process, at sea and on land. Whether the United States actually intended to target all of China’s nuclear weapons would be incidental. All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened. LESSONS FROM THE PAST At that point, the question becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the “no first use” pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down? Chinese writings and statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of capabilities China considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea-based nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical discontinuity in its calculus. The danger lies in **wartime developments** that could **shift** **China’s assumptions about U.S. intentions.** If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might see limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal. It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose—on an unpopulated area or at sea—as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline. If such escalation appears far-fetched, China’s history suggests otherwise. In 1969, similar dynamics brought China to the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. In early March of that year, Chinese troops ambushed Soviet guards amid rising tensions over a disputed border area. Less than two weeks later, the two countries were fighting an undeclared border war with heavy artillery and aircraft. The conflict quickly escalated beyond what Chinese leaders had expected, and before the end of March, Moscow was making thinly veiled nuclear threats to pressure China to back down. Chinese leaders initially dismissed these warnings, only to radically upgrade their threat assessment once they learned that the Soviets had privately discussed nuclear attack plans with other countries. Moscow never intended to follow through on its nuclear threat, archives would later reveal, but Chinese leaders believed otherwise. On three separate occasions, they were convinced that a Soviet nuclear attack was imminent. Once, when Moscow sent representatives to talks in Beijing, China suspected that the plane transporting the delegation was in fact carrying nuclear weapons. Increasingly fearful, China test-fired a thermonuclear weapon in the Lop Nur desert and put its rudimentary nuclear forces on alert—a dangerous step in itself, as it increased the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch. Only after numerous preparations for Soviet nuclear attacks that never came did Beijing finally agree to negotiations. China is a different country today than it was in the time of Mao Zedong, but the 1969 conflict offers important lessons. China started a war in which it believed nuclear weapons would be irrelevant, even though the Soviet arsenal was several orders of magnitude larger than China’s, just as the U.S. arsenal dwarfs China’s today. Once the conventional war did not go as planned, the Chinese reversed their assessment of the possibility of a nuclear attack to a degree bordering on paranoia. Most worrying, China signaled that it was actually considering using its nuclear weapons, even though it had to expect devastating retaliation. Ambiguous wartime information and worst-case thinking led it to take nuclear risks it would have considered unthinkable only months earlier. This pattern could unfold again today.

#### Nuke war causes extinction AND outweighs other existential risks.

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf> //Re-cut by Elmer

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about **20 percent** for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place.

## 2

#### The meta-ethic is moral substitutability - only it can explain reasons for acting.

Sinnott-Armstrong 92 [Walter, professor of practical ethics. “An Argument for Consequentialism” Dartmouth College Philosophical Perspectives. 1992.]

A moral reason to do an act is consequential if and only if the reason depends only on the consequences of either doing the act or not doing the act. For example, a moral reason not to hit someone is that this will hurt her or him. A moral reason to turn your car to the left might be that, if you do not do so, you will run over and kill someone. A moral reason to feed a starving child is that the child will lose important mental or physical abilities if you do not feed it. All such reasons are consequential reasons. All other moral reasons are non-consequential. Thus, a moral reason to do an act is non-consequential if and only if the reason depends even partly on some property that the act has independently of its consequences. For example, an act can be a lie regardless of what happens as a result of the lie (since some lies are not believed), and some moral theories claim that that property of being a lie provides amoral reason not to tell a lie regardless of the consequences of this lie. Similarly, the fact that an act fulfills a promise is often seen as a moral reason to do the act, even though the act has that property of fulfilling a promise independently ofits consequences. All such moral reasons are non-consequential. In order to avoid so many negations, I will also call them 'deontological'. This distinction would not make sense if we did not restrict the notion of consequences. If I promise to mow the lawn, then one consequence of my mowing might seem to be that my promise is fulfilled. One way to avoid this problem is to specify that the consequences of an act must be distinct from the act itself. My act of fulfilling my promise and my act of mowing are not distinct, because they are done by the same bodily movements.10 Thus, my fulfilling my promise is not a consequence of my mowing. A consequence of an act need not be later in time than the act, since causation can be simultaneous, but the consequence must at least be different from the act. Even with this clarification, it is still hard to classify some moral reasons as consequential or deontological,11 but I will stick to examples that are clear. In accordance with this distinction between kinds of moral reasons, I can now distinguish different kinds of moral theories. I will say that a moral theory is consequentialist if and only if it implies that all basic moral reasons are consequential. A moral theory is then non-consequentialist or deontological if it includes any basic moral reasons which are not consequential. 5. Against Deontology So defined, the class of deontological moral theories is very large and diverse. This makes it hard to say anything in general about it. Nonetheless, I will argue that no deontological moral theory can explain why moral substitutability holds. My argument applies to all deontological theories because it depends only on what is common to them all, namely, the claim that some basic moral reasons are not consequential. Some deontological theories allow very many weighty moral reasons that are consequential, and these theories might be able to explain why moral substitutability holds for some of their moral reasons: the consequential ones. But even these theories cannot explain why moral substitutability holds for all moral reasons, including the non-consequential reasons that make the theory deontological. The failure of deontological moral theories to explain moral substitutability in the very cases that make them deontological is a reason to reject all deontological moral theories. I cannot discuss every deontological moral theory, so I will discuss only a few paradigm examples and show why they cannot explain moral substitutability. After this, I will argue that similar problems are bound to arise for all other deontological theories by their very nature. The simplest deontological theory is the pluralistic intuitionism of Prichard and Ross. Ross writes that, when someone promises to do something, 'This we consider obligatory in its own nature, just because it is a fulfillment of a promise, and not because of its consequences.'12 Such deontologists claim in effect that, if I promise to mow the grass, there is a moral reason for me to mow the grass, and this moral reason is constituted by the fact that mowing the grass fulfills my promise. This reason exists regardless of the consequences of mowing the grass, even though it might be overridden by certain bad consequences. However, if this is why I have a moral reason to mow the grass, then, even if I cannot mow the grass without starting my mower, and starting the mower would enable me to mow the grass, it still would not follow that I have any moral reason to start my mower, since I did not promise to start my mower, and starting my mower does not fulfill my promise. Thus, a moral theory cannot explain moral substitutability if it claims that properties like this provide moral reasons.

#### Non-consequentialist moral theories fail to explain.

Sinnott-Armstrong 92 [Walter, professor of practical ethics. “An Argument for Consequentialism” Dartmouth College Philosophical Perspectives. 1992.]

Of course, there are many other versions of deontology. I cannot discuss them all. Nonetheless, these examples suggest that it is the very nature of deontological reasons that make **deontological theories unable to explain moral substitutability**. This comes out clearly if we start from the other side and ask which properties create the moral reasons that are derived by moral substitutability. **What gives me a moral reason to start the mower is the consequences of starting the mower.** Specifically**, it has the consequence that I am able to mow the grass.** This reason cannot derive from the same property as my moral reason to mow the lawn unless what gives me a moral reason to mow the lawn is *its* consequences. **Thus any non-consequentialist moral theory will have to posit two distinct kinds of moral reasons: one for starting the mower, and another for mowing the grass. Once these kinds of reasons are separated, we need to understand the connection between them. But this connection cannot be explained by the substantive principles of the theory**. That is why all deontological theories must lack the explanatory coherence which is a general test of adequacy for all theories.

#### Pleasure and pain are intrinsic value and disvalue – everything else regresses – robust neuroscience.

Blum et al. 18 Kenneth Blum, 1Department of Psychiatry, Boonshoft School of Medicine, Dayton VA Medical Center, Wright State University, Dayton, OH, USA 2Department of Psychiatry, McKnight Brain Institute, University of Florida College of Medicine, Gainesville, FL, USA 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA 5Department of Precision Medicine, Geneus Health LLC, San Antonio, TX, USA 6Department of Addiction Research & Therapy, Nupathways Inc., Innsbrook, MO, USA 7Department of Clinical Neurology, Path Foundation, New York, NY, USA 8Division of Neuroscience-Based Addiction Therapy, The Shores Treatment & Recovery Center, Port Saint Lucie, FL, USA 9Institute of Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary 10Division of Addiction Research, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC. North Kingston, RI, USA 11Victory Nutrition International, Lederach, PA., USA 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA, Marjorie Gondré-Lewis, 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA 13Departments of Anatomy and Psychiatry, Howard University College of Medicine, Washington, DC US, Bruce Steinberg, 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA, Igor Elman, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, David Baron, 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA, Edward J Modestino, 14Department of Psychology, Curry College, Milton, MA, USA, Rajendra D Badgaiyan, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, Mark S Gold 16Department of Psychiatry, Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA, “Our evolved unique pleasure circuit makes humans different from apes: Reconsideration of data derived from animal studies”, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 28 February 2018, accessed: 19 August 2020, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/>, R.S.

**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10].

Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14].

Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals.

Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D

Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it.

It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring.

Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding.

There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health.

Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage.

Finding happiness is different between apes and humans

As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure.

Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even produce **the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered.

Desire and reward centers

It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation.

In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41].

Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42].

Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans.

In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45].

Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations.

Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50]

In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders.

In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS.

Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans’ ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

#### 2 - Death is bad and outweighs –

#### A - agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security which constrains every ethical theory.

#### B - it destroys the subject itself – kills any ability to achieve value in ethics since life is a prerequisite which means it’s a side constraint since we can’t reach the end goal of ethics without life.

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being.

Consequentialism SPEC: NEC (necessary enabler consequentialism) – all moral reasons for acts are provided by facts that the acts are necessary enablers for preventing death.

#### 3. Extinction comes first under any framework.

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### a. Gateway issue - we need to be alive to assign value and debate competing moral theories- extinction literally ends the debate on “ought”.

#### b. moral theories were formulated prior to the Anthropocene and human capacity for collective death so they cannot be relied on in situations of existential risk.

#### c. no coherent moral theory can allow for extinction because it means the end of value.

#### 4. Intuitions ow – if a very well justified, logical theory concluded "genocide” you wouldn’t say “huh I guess genocide is good” you would abandon it – also proves death outweighs because it’s counterintuitive to say extinction of the whole world doesn’t matter.

## CASE

### T/L

#### Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence

#### A. Ontological exclusion, gratuitous violence- its not our job to disprove them, it’s the aff job to convince you 100%. Any risk of contingency, resilience, or reversibility and you err neg – laws and public opinion has shifted favorably towards queer people.

Cai **Wilkinson 17**, School of Humanities and Social Sciences @ Deakin University. (2017): Are we winning? A strategic analysis of queer wars, Australian Journal of International Affairs, DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2017.1290049

Globally, there can be little doubt that LGBT activism has been the winner in many of the battles that constitute the ongoing queer wars. Reflecting the overall global trend towards increasing acceptance of homosexuality (Smith, Son, and Jibum 2014), a growing number of states have ‘come out’ in favour of recognising the rights of their LGBT citizens and amended legislation accordingly. As of June 2016, same-sex sexual acts are legal in 121 United Nations states; 95 states, plus Taiwan and Kosovo, have legislation or constitutional provisions protecting against workplace discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation; 39 states have non-discrimination legislation that extends beyond the workplace; 40 states have enacted legislation protecting LGBT people against hate crimes; 49 states have laws enabling adoption by same-sex couples either jointly or as a second parent; civil partnerships are available in 25 states; and, last but not least, same-sex marriage is now legal in 22 countries (Carroll 2016, 12, 34).

#### B. Prefer specific impacts- the state may not *eliminate* anti queer violence but it certainly *restrains* it which is net good.

#### Recent elections prove massive progress- change also reflected in legal/attitude change.

Blaine 19 (Kyle, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/23/politics/pete-buttigieg-gay-running-for-president/index.html>, 1-23)

South Bend Mayor Pete Buttigieg entered the 2020 race for president on Wednesday, announcing his intentions with a video featuring scenes of him and his husband, Chasten, cooking and playing with their dog, Buddy. Should Buttigieg win his long-shot bid for the Democratic nomination, he will become the first nominee of a major political party who publicly identifies as gay. If he goes on to defeat President Donald Trump, it'd be a historic win. This appears unlikely (but by no means impossible) at this point; Buttigieg is not very well-known outside of Indiana and he's entering a crowded field of more established contenders. That a gay married man is running a serious campaign for president, however, is a big deal, and we shouldn't let the improbability of his candidacy stop us from acknowledging this moment. Only a decade ago, his run would have been unthinkable. Gay marriage was legal in only two states in January 2009 -- Massachusetts and Connecticut. Voters in California -- one of the most Democratic states in the country -- had just passed Proposition 8, banning same-sex marriage in the state. Barack Obama became President, and although he was supportive of expanding legal rights for the LGBT community and gay couples, he was on the record during his campaign as being opposed to same-sex marriage. "I believe marriage is between a man and a woman. I am not in favor of gay marriage," Obama told MTV News during the 2008 campaign. It would have been fair to think that progress would come slowly for the LGBT community if even Obama, who was considered to be a progressive within the Democratic Party on many critical issues, was publicly opposed to same-sex marriage at the time. But the next eight years of his presidency saw rapid change. In 2010, President Obama signed into law the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act, ending a policy enacted in 1993 that prevent gay men and lesbians from serving openly in the military. In 2012, in the heat of a presidential campaign, Obama became the first sitting US president to support same-sex marriage, telling ABC News, "At a certain point I've just concluded that for me, personally, it is important for me to go ahead and affirm that I think same-sex couples should be able to get married." LGBT Rights Milestones Fast Facts LGBT Rights Milestones Fast Facts Three years later, the Supreme Court ruled that states cannot ban same-sex marriage, making it legal nationwide for gay and lesbian couples to marry. Public attitude shifted as well. In 2009, 54% of Americans opposed same-sex marriage and only 37% supported it, according to Pew Research Center. By 2017, that number had flipped: 62% of Americans supported same-sex marriage, while only 32% opposed it. And during this time, candidates who publicly identify as gay, bisexual and transgender have broken barriers with their wins. In 2012, Wisconsin's Tammy Baldwin became the first gay person elected to the US Senate (she was re-elected in 2018). Kate Brown became the first bisexual governor in the US in 2015 when she was appointed in Oregon. She has been elected twice since then. In last year's midterm elections, Colorado's Jared Polis became the first gay man in the US to be elected governor, Kyrsten Sinema, who is bisexual, won a US Senate seat in Arizona, and Sharice Davids, a lesbian, won her US House race in Kansas. All of this is to say, quite simply, that in a relatively brief period of time, the politics surrounding gay marriage and LGBT equality shifted dramatically. And even though issues surrounding LGBT equality are hardly settled, Buttigieg's announcement is a good reminder of the progress that has been made. Buttigieg, who was elected mayor in 2011 at the age of 29, came out in 2015 -- days before the Supreme Court struck down same-sex marriage bans nationwide. In a column titled 'Why coming out matters," he wrote about the difficulty he had coming to terms with his sexuality and being open about it publicly. "We Midwesterners are instinctively private to begin with, and I'm not used to viewing this as anyone else's business," he wrote. "But it's clear to me that at a moment like this, being more open about it could do some good. For a local student struggling with her sexuality, it might be helpful for an openly gay mayor to send the message that her community will always have a place for her. And for a conservative resident from a different generation, whose unease with social change is partly rooted in the impression that he doesn't know anyone gay, perhaps a familiar face can be a reminder that we're all in this together as a community." Buttigieg might not have a real chance at winning the Democratic nomination. But by announcing he is running for the highest office in the land with a video that features his husband, he's already on the path to accomplishing what he set out to do in his column. He acknowledged as much to CNN's Dan Merica on Wednesday, saying, "I am also mindful of the fact that this just might make it a little easier for the next person who comes along. My sincere hope is that by the time my kids are old enough, once we have kids, to understand politics, that it won't even be newsworthy." And who knows. Maybe he'll make the debate stage. Maybe he'll take off in Iowa, and that momentum will propel him further than we can foresee now. But one thing is for sure: Having a gay candidate -- or nominee, or president -- is no longer such a farfetched idea.

### Framing

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the better debater—anything else is arbitrary, self-serving, and begs the question of the rest of the debate.

#### You should vote negative on presumption – the affirmative’s advocacy does not solve the harms they’ve isolated for 3 reasons:

#### 1. Systems – the 1AC argues that material institutions create the social realities that replicate violence but ceding the state refuses to alter these conditions.

#### 2. Spillover – the aff assumes that its advocacy of a certain affect is sufficient to result in the liberation of the flesh BUT they are missing a robust internal link to solving oppression inside OR outside the round.

#### 3. they’ve read topical affs in other debates which proves T isn’t intrinsically violent or exclusionary and that they’re decisions about what aff to read is motivated by strategy which proves our fairness offense.

PRESUME NEG:

**1. Aff has the ability to read the first framework and spikes which I have to coincide with and react to which outweighs since:**

**a. you have infinite prep time to frontline your aff before round so you’ll always be ahead of me.**

**b. this turns my abvility to react since you can mold my advocacy until I’m forced into generics that you are ready to debate.**

**2. You speak first and last which means you have a psychological judge persuasion advantage since you frame the round in their mind and are the last thing they remember.**

**3. Aff sets the stage for the debate by choosing the advocacy which means they can exclude all neg ground and win easily.**

### Lbl

**Their thesis is wrong—queerness requires futurity to combat heteronormativity—turns the aff**

**Muñoz 6** [José Esteban, Associate Professor of Performance Studies at NYU], PMLA, v121, n3, May, p. 825-826

I have chosen to counter polemics that argue for antirelationality by insisting on the essential need for an understanding of queerness as collectivity. At the 2005 MLA panel, in recent essays, and in my forthcoming book Cruising Utopia, I respond to the assertion that there is no future for the queer by arguing that queerness is primarily about futurity. Queerness is always on the horizon. Indeed, for queerness to have any value whatsoever, it must be considered visible only on the horizon. **My argument is therefore interested in critiquing the ontological certitude that I understand to accompany the politics of presentist and pragmatic contemporary gay identity.** This certitude is often represented through a narration of disappearance and negativity that boils down to another game of fort-da. My conference paper and the forthcoming book it is culled from have found much propulsion in the work of Ernst Bloch and other Marxist thinkers who did not dismiss utopia. Bloch found strident grounds for a critique of a totalizing and naturalizing idea of the present in his concept of the no-­longer-­conscious. A turn to the no-longerconscious enabled a critical hermeneutics attuned to comprehending the not yet here. This temporal calculus deployed the past and the future as armaments to combat the devastating logic of the here and now, in which nothing exists outside the current moment and **which naturalizes cultural logics like capitalism and heteronormativity**. Concomitantly, Bloch has also sharpened our critical imagination’s emphasis on what he famously called “a principle of hope.” Hope is an easy target for antiutopians. But while antiutopians might understand themselves as critical in the rejection of hope, they would, in the rush to denounce it, miss the point that hope is spawned of a critical investment in utopia that is nothing like naive but, instead, profoundly resistant to the stultifying temporal logic of a broken-down present. My turn to Bloch, hope, and utopia challenges theoretical insights that have been stunted by the lull of presentness and by various romances of negativity and that have thus become routine and resoundingly anticritical. This antiutopian theoretical faltering is what I referred to earlier, almost in jest, as poststructuralist pieties. I have learned quite a bit from critical practices commonly described as poststructuralist and have no wish to denounce them. The corrective I want to make by turning to utopia is attuned to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s critique of the way in which paranoid reading practices have become so nearly automatic in queer studies that they have, in many ways, ceased to be critical. In queer studies, antiutopianism, more often than not intertwined with antirelationality, has led many scholars to an impasse wherein they cannot see futurity for the life of them. Utopian readings are aligned with what Sedgwick would call reparative hermeneutics.

#### The future is not the sole province of the child.

**Ruti 17**, professor of Critical Theory at the University of Toronto, March, ’17 (Mari, The Ethics of Opting Out: Queer Theory's Defiant Subjects, Columbia University Press, pg. 90-91)

-Only ppl who have future can flirt with rejecting it

-future is not province of all children

-reconfigure the parameters of future solves

The stakes of Muñoz’s accusation are high, revolving around the question of who can afford to relinquish all hope of a better future in the way that Edelman’s rendering of queer negativity—with includes the derisive critique of the child as a sentimental emblem of reproductive futurity that I mentioned in chapter 1—calls for. Muñoz suggests that only those who “have” a future in the first place have the luxury of flirting with the idea of rejecting it; conversely, those whose futures are concretely (empirically) threatened are unlikely to advocate the annihilation of these futures. More specifically, Muñoz contends that it would be disastrous to “hand over futurity to normative white reproductive futurity,” arguing that the fact that this version of futurity is currently winning “is all the more reason to call on a utopian political imagination that will enable us to glimpse another time and place: a ‘not-yet’ where queer youths of color actually get to grow up” (2009, 95–96). In this manner, Muñoz alerts us to the fact that while Edelman elevates the child to an icon of reproductive futurity, “the future” has never been the province of all children; that is, though Muñoz agrees with the broad outlines of Edelman’s critique of reproductive futurity, he reminds us that this critique does not apply to the vast majority of the world’s children, that “racialized kids, queer kids, are not the sovereign princes of futurity” (95). Like Edelman, Muñoz admits that the world as it stands is “not enough” (2009, 96), not able to offer adequate resources for subjective flourishing. But in his view, the way to deal with the world’s insufficiency and messiness is not to reject the future wholesale but rather to reconfigure its parameters. This, Muñoz asserts, can only be done by resurrecting “various principles of hope that are, by their very nature, relational” (94). As he elaborates, relationality may not always be “pretty,” “but the option of simply opting out of it, or describing it as something that has never been available to us, is imaginable only if one can frame queerness as a singular abstraction that can be subtracted and isolated from a larger social matrix” (94).

#### Their scholarship is flawed – sociality is contingent, and negativity destroys possibilities for queer agency. A commitment to survival is more radical than nihilism – this card is fire.

Ruti 17(Mari, CompLit@Harvard, ProfCriticalTheory/Gender@Toronto, “The Ethics of Opting Out: Queer Theory’s Defiant Subjects,” p. 127-129, Columbia University Press) BW

Fortunately, as I have noted, this division is increasingly breaking down as a result of the sweeping popularity of the trope of opting out within queer theory. At first glance, this may imply that the pendulum is swinging toward Edelman’s antisocial thesis. But as I will show in the chapters that follow, the counterforce of sociality and relationality is not being run over by antisociality. Rather, it is being rearticulated in more sophisticated ways. More specifically, it offers a convincing alternative to Edelmanian antisociality by sidestepping some of the latter’s theoretical weaknesses. As I have attempted to illustrate in this chapter, foremost among these is the idea that sociality as such is the enemy of queer subjectivity, for this conception fails to adequately differentiate between hegemonic and enabling forms of sociality; it fails to take into account the fact that even though we are inevitably interpellated into dominant sociosymbolic structures, we remain capable of generous kinds of sociality (and intersubjectivity). Along related lines, as I have argued, Edelman’s insistence on equating jouissance with the death drive overlooks inflections of jouissance that reach toward the inspired. It is true, of course, that the Lacanian notion of jouissance connotes a pleasure that is so acute as to border on the painful, and that it is consequently impossible to divorce it from the death drive. But to fully subsume it to this drive is to deny the possibility that jouissance can potentially rejuvenate—rather than merely obliterate—the subject. In this sense, Edelman faithfully repeats the sterile tenets of the kind of poststructuralist theory that insists on the emptiness of subjectivity, that sees no value in regeneration, and that cannot admit notions of psychic reparation into its steely vocabulary. In contrast, more relational critics strive to retheorize these concepts without thereby losing sight of the centrality of negativity in human life. It seems to me that the humanist subject can die in a variety of different ways. Edelman’s account of queer antisociality drains the subject of creativity, meaning, relationality, and agency, allowing it to be overtaken by the mindless pulsation of the death drive. But there are those of us who would like to reconfigure the posthumanist subject in less dejected terms, who, instead of dismissing notions like creativity, meaning, relationality, agency, and inner restoration, would like to figure out what these concepts might mean in the posthumanist context. This is not a matter of returning to a time before poststructuralism but rather of working toward a place beyond it; it is not a matter of discarding the critical tools that we have gained from poststructuralism but rather of putting these tools to less doctrinaire use; and it is not a matter of holding on to an outdated vision of the masterful and self-transparent subject but rather of building a better understanding of what it means to live in the world as an embodied creature who can never fully master or understand the parameters of its own being. It is not insignificant that those of us advancing this softer version of posthumanist theory tend to possess a strong commitment to matters of social survival, justice, and responsibility. Among other things, this commitment explains why we are not averse to the possibility that hopefulness may at times be more radical than the cynicism of neo-Lacanian austerity. I would propose that it is in these more limber genres of posthumanist theory that the innovative (rather than merely defensive) spirit of poststructuralism lives on in a reinvigorated form. I would also argue—and this point should not be taken as a criticism of Edelman, whose stylistic acrobatics I count among the merits of No Future—that insofar as these new forms of posthumanist theory reject faithfulness to torpid forms of overworked rhetoric, they exemplify what is most revolutionary about queer theory, namely, its resistance to obsolete kinship structures of all kinds. For me at least, there is nothing as strange as queer theory that remains intractably devoted to the most sacrosanct pieties of poststructuralism. Let us assume from the outset that the subject is alienated, fragmented, and non-self-identical, that its every attempt at self-mastery is undermined by unconscious currents of desire, and that its sociality is always to some extent disrupted by the antisocial energies of the real. Let us also assume that nonreproductive pleasure is valuable, that eros in its unshackled form is rebellious, and that we want to defeat heteronormative, patriarchal, and racist structures of social organization. What we are then left with is the dicey question of how the queer subject—or any subject for that matter—is to proceed with its life. After all, the fact that the subject is socially constituted rather than essential, that it only manages to attain a culturally intelligible identity at the price of lack, and that it is internally torn by antagonistic forces that pull it in contradictory directions does not mean that it is released from the task of fashioning a livable life for itself; if anything, it means that this task is all the more demanding, sometimes even perhaps calling for the type of negotiation with hegemonic power that Butler advocates. The main fissure I see in contemporary queer theory resides between those who recognize the necessity of such existential negotiation—affect theorists such as Berlant being the most obvious example—and those who persist in the notion that any concession to the idea that there are lives to be lived in the “real” world leads to soft-hearted and naïve forms of theorizing. Even though I believe that Butler negotiates too willingly, I find Edelman’s extreme version of queer antisociality even more problematic, which is why I have sought to offer an alternative reading of Lacanian negativity. I have sought to show that, far from foreclosing the future in the manner that Edelman proposes, Lacanian negativity holds open the future as a space of ever-renewed possibility. This insight in turn allows me to conceptualize the contours of (queer) subjectivity along less nihilistic lines. After all, barring some life-erasing catastrophe, there will always be a future in the future, even (hopefully for some time) for Professor Edelman. The question that remains—the only question worth asking—is what this future should (or could) entail.

#### Rejection of hope are perceived as a heteronormative affect means that hope is key even if queer resistance fail.

Hall 14 (Kim, prof in the department of philosophy and religion, appalacian state university, “No Failure: Climate Change, Radical Hope, and Queer Crip Feminist Eco-Futures,” Radical Philosophy Review 17:1)

If queer is by definition a failed identity with no future, is there any non-naive way in which there could be hope for queers? Could this hope be radical? I certainly appreciate Halberstam's point and agree that queer has been associated with failure to achieve heteronormative happiness and suc- cess. Nonetheless, I am concerned that embracing failure leaves only a reactionary role for queer resistance. In other words, queer resistance, when understood as failure, becomes a mere rejection of hope, which is under- stood as only a heteronormative affect. Because this ultimately limited con- ception of queer resistance does not reflect our naturecultural being in the world, it is unable to address how modes of life and thinking among global elites have contributed to a toxic environment for human and nonhuman bodies and communities.

#### Edelman’s anti-futurism lacks praxis – it also erases the history of black queer futurity.

Bliss 15 (James, Professor at the University of California, Irvine, Hope Against Hope: Queer Negativity, Black Feminist Theorizing, and Reproduction without Futurity”) //BS 11-6-2017

Critiques of Edelman have run the gamut from accusations that his arguments amount to little more than a dissembled optimism, that he ignores the polymorphous perversity of really-existing children, that he mispprehends Lacan entirely, and that his polemic is overwritten by an intransigent, smirking whiteness that limits the applicability of his conclusions.1 Fair enough. For my part, I am interested in how the latter critique has been marshaled by some utopian (or, to borrow from José Muñoz, James Bliss 85 anti-antiutopian) queer theorists whose critiques rely on the figure of the “other” child.2 In a 2007 GLQ roundtable, Judith Halberstam described Edelman’s project as “utterly compelling [. . .] for certain subjects in certain social locations. For others, that place of pure critique might constitute epistemological self-destruction” (Dinshaw et al. 194). To which Edelman challenged, especially for Halberstam’s “unidentified ‘others,’” “why not endorse, to the contrary, ‘epistemological self-destruction’ for all? Why not accept that queerness, taken seriously, demands nothing less?” (195) In their endorsement of Muñoz’s Cruising Utopia, Halberstam restates this position, that “for some queers, particularly for queers of color, hope is not something one can afford to lose and for them giving up on futurity is not an option.”3 Indeed, Muñoz himself offers that “the future is only the stuff of some kids. Racialized kids, queer kids, are not the sovereign princes of futurity” (95). For Halberstam and Muñoz, Edelman’s stubborn refusal of futurity is structured by the privilege of having a guaranteed future, foreclosing the possibility that his project can speak to the concerns of non-white queers. More interesting, perhaps, is to consider how Edelman’s avoidance of race weakens his critique of the Child and futurity. Neither Edelman nor his utopian critics seem willing or able to imagine a mode of reproduction that is not reproductive futurism; that is, Black reproduction. On this score, we can consider Hortense Spillers’s seminal essay, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book.” In her gloss of the Moynihan Report, Spillers seems to anticipate Edelman’s well known passage, quoted above: “According to Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s celebrated ‘Report’ of the late sixties, the ‘Negro Family’ has no father to speak of—his name, his law, his symbolic function mark the impressive missing agencies in the essential life of the black community” (204). On Spillers’s reading, the father, the L/law, and the “whole network of symbolic relations” that Edelman rejects in the name of the queer are foreclosed a priori for the Black. Spillers marks how “the Black family” is refused entry into the symbolic order except negatively as a site of pure dysfunction. This incoherence that accrues around Black filiation is also what Orlando Patterson has labeled “natal alienation.” One of the “constituent elements” of slavery described in his Slavery and Social Death, Patterson offers natal alienation as “what is critical in the slave’s forced alienation, the loss of ties of birth in both ascending and descending generations” (7). I want to rest on this point for a moment because it is a point that queer negativity is unwilling to theorize and that queer anti-antiutopianism theorizes only to the extent that it can still enable an orientation toward the future. What does reproductive futurity mean for the natally alienated? What is the status of the Child or of the family for those “alienated from all ‘rights’ or claims of birth”? What does reproduction mean a “genealogical isolate”? Patterson offers a formulation much like those of Edelman and Spillers in describing the natally alienated: for the enslaved, seeking out, creating, or maintaining synchronic and diachronic bonds “meant struggling with and penetrating the iron curtain of the master, his community, his laws, his policemen or patrollers, and his heritage” (5). Rather than argue, following the anti-antiutopians, that “others” cannot “afford” to give up on hope for the future, we might argue instead that Edelman does not account for those modes of reproduction that are not future-oriented, the children who do not register as such, and the “families” that are not granted the security of nuclear bonds. And we might find in this reproduction without futurity not a crisis scenario demanding redoubled attention to either the family (Moynihan et al.) or the future (the anti-antiutopians), but an opportunity to develop a politics of position that inhabits the incoherence of Black reproduction. Reproduction without futurity, then, names nothing more (and nothing less) than the queer capacity of Blackness to reproduce without being productive and to orient lives extimate—simultaneously internal and external—to sociality as Edelman might understand it.

### Impact

#### **Capitalism is inevitable, adaptive, and alternatives are comparatively worse.**

[Meltzer](http://public.tepper.cmu.edu/facultydirectory/FacultyDirectoryProfile.aspx?id=98) 09 Dr. Allan H. Meltzer, economist and professor of Political Economy at Carnegie Mellon University’s Tepper School of Business in Pittsburgh (The eighth lecture in the 2008-2009 Bradley Lecture series, 3/9/2009, “There is no better alternative than capitalism”, [http://hiram7.wordpress.com/2009/03/12/there-is-no-better-alternative-than-capitalism/)//](http://hiram7.wordpress.com/2009/03/12/there-is-no-better-alternative-than-capitalism/)//jk)

**There is no better alternative than capitalism** as a social system **for providing growth and personal freedom. The alternatives offer less freedom and lower growth. The “better alternatives” that people imagine are almost always someone’s idea of utopia**. Libraries are full of books on utopia. **Those that have been tried have not survived** or flourished. **The most common reason for failure is that one person or group’s utopian ideal is unsatisfactory for others** who live subject to its rules. Either the rules change or they are enforced by authorities. Capitalism, particularly democratic capitalism, includes the means for orderly change. **Critics of capitalism look for viable alternatives to support. They do not recognize that**, unlike Socialism, **capitalism is adaptive, not rigid. Private ownership of the means of production flourishes in many different cultures**. Recently **critics of capitalism discovered the success of Chinese capitalism as an alternative to American capitalism. Its main feature is mercantilist policies supported by rigid controls on capital**. China’s progress takes advantage of an American or western model–the open trading system–and the willingness of the United States to run a current account balance. China is surely more authoritarian than Japan or western countries, a political difference that previously occurred in Meiji Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Growth in these countries produced a middle class followed by demands for political freedom. China is in the early stages of development following the successful path pioneered by Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and others who chose export-led growth under trade rules. Sustained economic growth led to social and political freedom in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Perhaps China will follow. **Capitalism continues to spread. It is the only system humans have found in which personal freedom, progress, and opportunities coexist. Most of the faults and flaws on which critics dwell are human faults, as Kant recognized. Capitalism is the only system that adapts to all manner of cultural and institutional differences. It continues to spread and adapt and will for the foreseeable future.**

### 1NC - Sustainable

#### Capitalist growth is sustainable.

Rune **Westergård 18**. Entrepreneur, Engineer and Author, founder of the technical consulting company CITEC. 2018. “Real and Imagined Threats.” One Planet Is Enough, Springer International Publishing, pp. 71–80. CrossRef, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-60913-3\_7.

Threatening reports about our ability to create disasters and even exterminate ourselves are not a new idea. A standard example is the British national economist Thomas Malthus in the early 19th century, who predicted that population growth would come to a halt because of starvation. Malthus calculated that the available food in the world couldn’t feed more than one billion people. He extrapolated the development from a still picture of his own time and couldn’t fathom that food production would increase tremendously thanks to new knowledge and technology. Our present food production is sufficient for seven times as many. Malthus didn’t pay attention to the fact that we live in a continuously changing civilisation, and the same kind of miscalculations are still made today. There are people who have even achieved the status of media superstars by presenting various dystopias and catastrophe scenarios. As early as 1968, Professor Paul Erlichs at Stanford University published the bestseller The Population Bomb, where he predicted that an imminent population explosion would result in hundreds of millions of deaths by starvation in the 1970s and 80s. Basically, he made the same mistake as Malthus, i.e. he treated knowledge and technology as if they were static phenomena. The most widely read environment report in the world, State of the World, was a loud whistle-blower when it was first published in the early 1980s. The Swedish version, Tillståndet i världen, was published yearly from 1984 and some years into the 2000s by the Worldwatch Institute Norden; I still have some of the early issues left. This report contains many valuable observations and suggestions, but also several basic analytical mistakes. In other words, it acts as an eye-opener, but it suffers from being tainted by political ideology. Its main weakness is that it doesn’t take the intrinsic driving forces of progress into account. State of the World was translated into most major languages and is, as already mentioned, the world’s most widely read environmental report. It has affected us all, directly or indirectly, through school and media. Even if the Swedish version I refer to was written some years ago, it is still worthy of discussion, firstly because it maintains an appearance of scientific validity, and secondly because it has served as a trendsetter for the general ideology which has been adopted by many later books and reports on the subject at hand. It still lives on as an engraved pattern in our conception of the world. In the report we can, for instance, read the following: A world where human desires and needs are fulfilled without the destruction of natural systems demands an entirely new economic order, founded on the insight that a high consumption level, population growth, and poverty are the powers behind the devastation of the environment. The rich have to reduce their consumption of resources so that the poor can increase their standard of living. The global economy simply works against the attempts to reduce poverty and protect the environment. We stubbornly insist to regard economic growth as synonymous with development, even though it makes the poor even poorer. Even if we up to this point have mainly described the environment revolution in economic terms, it is, in its most fundamental meaning, a social revolution: to change our values. Massive threat scenarios are still presented, for instance in the British scientist Tim Jackson’s book Prosperity Without Growth from 2009, which is one of the most widely read and frequently quoted works in this area. Tim Jackson, who is an economist and professor in sustainable development, explains how we humans are indulging in a ruthless pursuit of new-fangled gadgets in a consumption society running at full speed towards its doom. He also claims that material things in themselves cannot help us to flourish; on the contrary, they may even restrain our welfare. In other words, we cannot build our hopes that the economy, technology or science can help us to escape from the trap of Anthropocene, which has brought us to the brink of an ecological disaster. There are hundreds on books on this theme, and they all agree that the general state of the world is pure misery; everything is getting worse, the resources are being depleted, and that man will soon have destroyed the entire planet. The apparent reason for this, of course, is due to the consumption culture and the present financial system—which exposes man as a greedy, ruthless and ultimately weak creature. This attitude may serve a purpose as an eye-opener. But it is not very credible, and it may even be counterproductive. Of course, we can see a lot of problems ahead of us; but to solve them, we need the correct diagnostics instead of dubious doomsday prophesies. Focus: The Problem Since the focus of attention is so profoundly fixated on the problems in the climate and environmental debate, the progress already made—and the opportunities at hand—are often overshadowed. The example below will help to illustrate this point: In the year 2014, the Nobel Prize in physics was awarded to three scientists who had invented blue light emitting diodes—a technology that has made high-bright and energy-efficient LED lighting possible. As lighting accounts for 20% of the world’s total electrical consumption, this invention has the potential to radically reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. In an interview made by the major Swedish daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter, one of the prize winners, Hiroshi Amano, says the following about energy-efficient, inexpensive and high-bright LED lights: “They are now being used all over the world. Even children in the developing countries can use this lighting to read books and study in the evenings. This makes me very very happy”. Shortly after this announcement, the news headlines declared that LED lighting was a threat to the environment. This statement was based on a report showing that LED lighting could be hazardous to flies and moths, which in turn might disturb the eco system. This is a typical example of how progress pessimists and, not least the media, think and act. In this case, they focused on a potential problem associated with LED lighting, and ignored the tremendous possibilities that the new technology offered to dramatically reduce greenhouse gases and thus spare the eco system (not to mention all the other advantages). Books and reports of the kind mentioned above tell us repeatedly about disasters, threats, problems, collapses and famines. On the other hand, they are notoriously silent about the great improvements actually made—the reduction of extreme poverty (not only as a percentage but also in absolute numbers), longer lifespans, dramatic global progress in education and healthcare, etc. The lack of positive media coverage on the environment means that many people believe that too little is being done, which is quite understandable considering the one-sided nature of the information they are presented with. Alarmist reporting almost always reminds me of pirates: they are unreliable and half their vision is blocked by their eye patches. It is vital that the media not only one-sidedly focus on the misery without presenting the progress made and suggesting constructive courses of action. The quality of our decisions in all respects depends on our knowledge, insight and attitude. Real and Imagined Threats Many people are convinced that the climate and environmental problems are growing. It is certainly true that our planet has its limitations, but many of the predictions from alarmist literature have been proven false. In the 1980s, the forest dieback was a frequently discussed subject. To quote the well-known German news magazine Der Spiegel, an “ecological Hiroshima” was imminent. Most experts at the time claimed that a wide-spread forest death seemed unavoidable. Additionally, the general mood of impending doom was augmented by the threat of a nuclear disaster during the cold war. I remember the pessimistic discussions among friends and how frequently the gloomy reports appeared in Swedish and Finnish television. The future of humankind appeared to be depressingly bleak. But the forest dieback never happened. On the contrary, the forest area has been constantly expanding in Europe, even during the entire period when the forest was believed to be dying. Today, only two thirds of the yearly accretion in Europe are cut down, according to the Natural Resource Institute in Finland. There are different opinions as to why the large-scale forest dieback didn’t occur. One theory is that the researchers’ evidence and conclusions had been incomplete and too hasty; the forest was actually never in danger. Others suggest that the emission limitations implemented prevented the disaster. My point is that the environmental catastrophe did not happen. Some other environmental problems, exaggerated or not, that have concerned us during the last decades have also disappeared from the immediate agenda: overpopulation, DDT, the ozone hole, heavy metals, lead poisoning, soot particles, the waste mountain, and the acidification of our lakes. Unfortunately, some environmental problems, like soot particles and waste, still remain in some areas, especially in poorer countries, where there are other, even worse problems that have yet to be resolved. The conclusion is, however, that we and our society in most cases have handled threatening situations quite well. When alarming symptoms are noted, scientists and other experts are summoned, and we act according to their diagnoses. It is no big deal that the diagnoses are sometimes wrong, as long as the side effects are not too severe. The main thing is that we do our best to avoid disasters, and on the whole, humankind has succeeded rather well this far. As individuals, we react very differently to various kinds of threats. The closer and more tangible the threat is, the more violent are the reactions—while distant and invisible symptoms, like the depletion of the ozone layer, concern us less. In the latter cases, we have to trust the scientists’ and later the politicians’ reactions. Does this mean that disasters are avoided thanks to war headlines, threats, and anxiety? I don’t think that this is the most important explanation; rather, it is factual and science-based information that produces effective results. But if exaggerated threat scenarios and reports of misery are needed to inspire the necessary political opinion, acquire research funding and create behavioural changes, we will have to live with that. The most important thing to remember in this context is that the actions shouldn’t cause more harm than the original problem itself. The risk with exaggerated threat and misery reporting is that it may inspire an over-reaction based on misleading diagnoses, or the opposite—a paralysing feeling of helplessness. It is necessary to take threats against the climate and the environment seriously, but not to a degree where our ability to reason and act is blocked by fear or anxiety. Many environmental debaters claim that the fall of the Inca and Roman empires were caused by the same causes that are now threatening our present civilisation—a short-sighted over-exploitation and rape of nature. Easter Island is another popular example. However, in my opinion it is both worthless and irresponsible to judge the world situation of today by copying the outcome of earlier cultural endeavours in history. The inhabitants of the Inca empire and Easter Island didn’t have anything even remotely comparable with the organisations, technology, medicine or general knowledge of today. It would be like comparing a case of appendicitis in the past to a case today. In pre-modern times, it was a fatal condition. In this day and age, it is cured by a simple routine operation. Today, humankind is conscious of the climate changes and other ecological challenges. And we also have the knowledge and resources needed to act. Facts, Propaganda and Hidden Messages During all the years I have followed the development of technology and society, I have repeatedly observed how a mishmash of serious research, political propaganda, and the hidden agendas of individuals have been distributed more or less randomly by the media. There are of course many different kinds of alarmism— everything from well-founded research reports to exaggerated prophesies of doom. It is far from simple to separate the wheat from the chaff. The actions taken against ozone depletion, lead emissions and the toxic chemical, dioxin, are all examples of how research has shown the way to successful results. Today, greenhouse gas emissions top the list of issues deserving our gravest attention, as it is a global phenomenon—just as the depletion of the ozone layer once was. There are also a considerable number of local environmental problems, such as drought, air pollution, forest depletion and overfishing. All of these are real threats that have to be acted upon, even though they are not global. However, I am always disturbed when a single global environmental issue is bundled with an assortment of several local issues, rather like a simplified trademark advertisement for the negative consequences of civilisation. This makes the information abstract and inaccurate, ignoring the fact that different locales require different solutions. Fear and alarmism are natural reactions that once protected us when we were living at the mercy of nature—they are evolutionary relics from our life in the savanna. Today, the same properties can be significant drawbacks. The transition from a primitive, animal-like state to the society we have today must, on the whole, be counted as a great success. But many people regard the same world as over-exploited, depleted, unjust, war-ridden and balancing on the brink of destruction. How can people living in the same epoch have so entirely different views of the world? In the sustainability debate, there is one faction dealing with the natural resources and ecosystems, and another focusing on the redistribution of wealth. There is even a third faction discussing a minimalistic lifestyle; for example, downshifting, with less work and less material welfare. When all these ingredients are mixed without discretion, the result is an anxiety soup that many have choked on. In a situation like that, we cannot expect any constructive initiatives to materialise. Instead, it would be far better to explore, research and discuss each dimension separately. What Is the Real State of the Planet? It is easy to generalise and say that we over-exploit the planet’s resources and pollute the world with our waste. But how many care to examine these statements in detail and ask exactly which resources are over-exploited? • Are fish becoming extinct? It is true that overfishing occurs in many places, which is, of course, unsustainable. However, this is not an unavoidable threat to the world’s total food resources. Fortunately, there are several examples of fish stocks that have either recovered or started to replenish once the fishing effort has been eased. • Is the air being poisoned? Many are convinced that the air we breathe is becoming dirtier all the time. But that isn’t true, at least not in the Western world. From the year 1990, emissions of sulphur dioxide have been reduced by 80%, nitrogen oxides by 44%, volatile organic substances by 55%, and carbon monoxide by 62%. Despite these dramatic improvements, 64% of Europeans believe that pollution is increasing. • Are the forests dying? It is a general belief that the forests in the developed countries are dwindling. But that isn’t true; on the contrary, the wooded areas are expanding. However, the forests are decreasing in the poor countries, where forestry and farming are still major sources of income, as they once were in the industrialised countries. • Are we drowning in waste? There are many who believe that we are surrounded by constantly growing mountains of waste. In the developed countries, the truth is that increasing amounts of waste are being recycled and the landfills are decreasing. • Will there be enough phosphorus? Phosphorus is an important nutrient in farming, extracted from phosphate ore. Many scientists fear that the finite natural resource of phosphate ore will become depleted in the future, which may jeopardise the world’s food supply. But there are already working solutions for this problem, such as by reclaiming phosphorus through digestion residues and sewage sludge. There are also technological solutions for the chemical extraction of phosphorus from polluted water—the remediation of lakes and rainwater by removing phosphorus is already a common procedure. Here we achieve a win-win situation—phosphorus is collected while preventing the eutrophication of lakes. • Will there be enough energy to go around? A common statement is that the earth’s population is too large, and that we consume too much energy with respect to the climate. This is one of those issues where we have to think in terms of symptoms, diagnoses, and medication. The symptoms are there for all to see: climate change. On the other hand, the diagnosis that we consume too much energy is wrong. The correct diagnosis is that we are not using the right technology; i.e. energy efficient power production without harmful emissions. Consequently, the correct statement would be that we consume energy that is produced by technologies that are harmful to the climate. The difference in wording is important. As the first diagnosis is “too high energy consumption”, the remedy will be to use a different medication than a diagnosis based on “the wrong technology”. Alarmist reporting can inspire bad decisions if the statements aren’t systematically reviewed and evaluated. It can also be misguiding to express environmental threats in general terms. Actions must be based on precise specific symptoms with corresponding diagnoses. If the doctor discovers that the patient is lame and suffers from a high fever, it doesn’t help to predict imminent death. Maybe the lameness and the fever have different causes altogether! A successful cure would probably include two different diagnoses with separate medications. Several recent surveys of the general conception of the world have been made— one is Project Ignorance by Gapminder and Novus in Sweden. One of the questions asked was whether CO2 emissions per capita and year had increased or decreased in the world during the last 40 years. The surveyed group was large and representative in order to give a fairly accurate picture of the common opinion. No less than 90% believed that CO2 emissions had increased. The truth is that they haven’t increased at all. It is important that decision makers on all levels learn how to see the wood from the trees. Decisions based on false preconditions can halt technological development, and thus also the development of the economy, welfare, and a healthier environment. The flow of innovations in the climate and environmental areas is accelerating rapidly.

### 1NC – Transition

**Capitalism leads to successful space operations—4 reasons.**

**Zimmerman 17** - Robert Zimmerman, award-winning independent science journalist and historian who has written four books and innumerable articles on science, engineering, and the history of space exploration and technology for Science, Air & Space, Sky & Telescope, Astronomy, The Wall Street Journal, USA Today, and a host of other publications. He also reports on space, science, and culture on his website, http://behindtheblack.com. He does not work for any aerospace company and has never received any money from NASA for his reporting. His books include Leaving Earth: Space Stations, Rival Superpowers, and the Quest for Interplanetary Travel (Joseph Henry Press), which won the American Astronautical Society’s Eugene M. Emme Astronautical Literature Award in 2003 as that year’s best space history for the general public. He also has written Genesis: The Story of Apollo 8 (Mountain Lake Press) and The Universe in a Mirror: The Saga of the Hubble Space Telescope and the Visionaries Who Built It (Princeton University Press). In 2000 he was co-winner of the David N. Schramm Award, given by the High Energy Astrophysics Division of the American Astronomical Society for Science Journalism, for his essay in The Sciences, “There She Blows,” on the 35-year-old astronomical mystery of gamma ray bursts, 17 ("Capitalism in Space," CNAS, 3-10-2017, Available Online at https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/capitalism-in-space, Accessed on 7-9-2017 //JJ)

**It is essential for any nation that wishes to thrive and compete on the world stage to have a successful and flourishing aerospace industry, centered on the capability of putting humans and payloads into space affordably and frequently.** This is a bipartisan position held by elected officials from both American political parties since the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957. **The reasons for this are straightforward: Military strength: For strategic reasons, the military must have the capability of launching satellites into orbit for the purpose of surveillance and reconnaissance. In addition, the country’s missile technology must be state-of-the-art to make this data gathering as effective as possible. A healthy aerospace industry is the only way to achieve both. Natural resources: The resources in space – raw materials from asteroids and the planets as well as energy from the Sun – are there for the taking.** Other nations are striving to obtain those resources and the wealth those assets will provide for their citizens. **Without direct access to those resources, American society will have less opportunity for growth and prosperity**, and the country will eventually fall behind as a major power. **Economic growth: A thriving aerospace industry helps fuel the U.S. economy. It develops cutting-edge technology in fields such as computer design, materials research, and miniaturization that drives innovation and invention in every other field. National prestige:** Even if the previous three reasons did not exist, **the prestige of the United States requires that we remain competitive in the increasingly global race to explore and settle the solar system. If the United States doesn’t compete in this effort, future generations of Americans will be left behind as China, Russia, Europe, India, and an increasing number of other nations establish operations in space and permanent colonies on the Moon, Mars, and the asteroids.**