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#### Ethics must be revisionary – theories cannot be grounded in unmovable principles because we are in a constant state of learning. Historical moral progress proves we radically shift our norms but only theories that are adaptable can withstand the test of time. Survivability underlies ethics – if rules don’t exist, then they aren’t action guiding.

#### Thus, the meta ethic is constructivism. Prefer –

#### 1 - Temporality – moral questions take time to answer. It is not possible to construct perfect theories because they’re debunked by the future when we realize it doesn’t perfectly fit our way of life; however, endorsing a process of perpetual addition circumvents restarting from scratch.

#### 2 - Epistemology – meta-ethics should not just be concerned with the process of creating rules, but rather the ways that we think. Formulating correct theories requires that we understand the mind and how subjects cohere moral knowledge which means the construction of knowledge over time is valuable.

#### 3 - Subject Formation – experiences shape identity because we construct our personalities and attitudes based on how we feel about particular things. Schemas are formed and modified through experience.

University at Buffalo Center for Educational Innovation **(U@Buffalo CEI)**. (**2020**, December 08). Constructivism. Retrieved April 14, 2021, from <http://www.buffalo.edu/ubcei/enhance/learning/constructivism.html> //Massa

**Constructivism** is the theory that **says learners construct knowledge rather than** just **passively take in information.** **As people experience the world and reflect** upon those experiences, **they build their own representations and incorporate new information into their pre-existing knowledge (schemas).**

Related to this are the processes of assimilation and accommodation.

* **Assimilation** refers to the process of taking new information and fitting it into an existing schema.
* **Accommodation** refers to using newly acquired information to revise and redevelop an existing schema.

**For example, if I believe** that **friends are always nice, and meet a** new **person who is** always **nice to me I may call this person a friend, assimilating them into my schema.** **Perhaps, however, I meet a different person who sometimes pushes me to try harder and is not always nice.** **I may decide to change my schema to accommodate** this person by deciding a friend doesn’t always need to be nice if they have my best interests in mind. **Further, this may make me reconsider whether the first person still fits into my friend schema.**

Consequences of constructivist theory are that:

* Students learn best when engaged in learning experiences rather passively receiving information.
* Learning is inherently a social process because it is embedded within a social context as students and teachers work together to build knowledge.
* Because knowledge cannot be directly imparted to students, the goal of teaching is to provide experiences that facilitate the construction of knowledge.

This last point is worth repeating. A traditional approach to teaching focuses on delivering information to students, yet constructivism argues that you cannot directly impart this information. Only an experience can facilitate students to construct their own knowledge. Therefore, the goal of teaching is to design these experiences.

#### Impacts to constructivism are infinite – it encompasses every theory’s foundation which means a hindrance of a constructivist process destroys the ability to experiment with other moral standards because we can’t modify our knowledge to account for new information. Infinite new theories mean infinite impacts with different magnitudes.

#### Further, meaning only makes sense within a frame of reference that isolates the practical difference that it makes in action. Pierce 1 “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” Charles S. Peirce Popular Science Monthly 12 (January 1878), 286-302. Charles Sanders Peirce was an American philosopher, logician, mathematician, and scientist who is sometimes known as "the father of pragmatism” Dulles AS

Let us illustrate this rule by some examples; and, to begin with the simplest one possible, let us ask **what** **we mean by calling a thing hard**. Evidently **that it will not be scratched by many other substances. The** whole **conception of this quality**, as of every other, **lies in its conceived effects. There is** absolutely **no difference between a hard thing and a soft thing so long as they are not brought to** the **test**. **Suppose, then, that a diamond could be crystallized in the midst of a cushion of soft cotton, and should remain there until it was finally burned up. Would it be false to say that that diamond was soft?** This seems a foolish question, and would be so, in fact, except in the realm of logic. There such questions are often of the greatest utility as serving to bring logical principles into sharper relief than real discussions ever could. In studying logic we must not put them aside with hasty answers, but must consider them with attentive care, in order to make out the principles involved. We may, in the present case, modify our question, and ask what prevents us from saying that all hard bodies remain perfectly soft until they are touched, when their hardness increases with the pressure until they are scratched. Reflection will show that the reply is this: there would be no falsity in such modes of speech. They would involve a modification of our present usage of speech with regard to the words hard and soft, but not of their meanings. For they represent no fact to be different from what it is; only they involve arrangements of facts which would be exceedingly maladroit. This leads us to remark that the question of **what would occur under circumstances which do not actually arise is not** a question of **fact, but only** of the most perspicuous **arrangement** of them. For example, the question of free-will and fate in its simplest form, stripped of verbiage, is something like this: I have done something of which I am ashamed; could I, by an effort of the will, have resisted the temptation, and done otherwise? The philosophical reply is, that this is not a question of fact, but only of the arrangement of facts. Arranging them so as to exhibit what is particularly pertinent to my question -- namely, that I ought to blame myself for having done wrong -- it is perfectly true to say that, if I had willed to do otherwise than I did, I should have done otherwise. On the other hand, arranging the facts so as to exhibit another important consideration, it is equally true that, when a temptation has once been allowed to work, it will, if it has a certain force, produce its effect, let me struggle how I may. There is no objection to a contradiction in what would result from a false supposition. The reductio ad absurdum consists in showing that contradictory results would follow from a hypothesis which is consequently judged to be false. Many questions are involved in the free-will discussion, and I am far from desiring to say that both sides are equally right. On the contrary, I am of opinion that one side denies important facts, and that the other does not. But what I do say is, that the above single question was the origin of the whole doubt; that, had it not been for this question, the controversy would never have arisen; and that this question is perfectly solved in the manner which I have indicated.

#### This commits us to practical deliberation as the method of moral inquiry Serra 1 Juan Pablo Serra. What Is and What Should Pragmatic Ethics Be? Some Remarks on Recent Scholarship*.* EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY. 2009. Francisco de Vitoria College, Humanities Department, Faculty member. Dulles AS

This separation of theory and practice runs parallel to another split, namely, that of ethics and morals or, better put, of ethical theory and moral practice. Peirce denies that morality is subject to rationality and thinks that **ethics is valuable** as a science in a broad sense. But he also regards ethics as a science which bears on human conduct only indirectly, **through** the **examination of past actions and** the **self-correction** of the self in view of future action. In addition, ethics would be a normative knowledge only in so far as it analyzes the adjustment of actions to ends and in so far as it studies the general way in which a good life can be lived. In morals Peirce appeals to instinct and sentiment, and in ethics he recommends the use of logical thinking —just as scientists do. However, even within the framework of his system, it’s not obvious that scientists may so easily set aside their instincts —in fact, instinct (or ‘rational instinct’ as he called it in 1908) plays a significant role in the economy of re- search. Moreover, the statement that in moral issues there may be no possibility of carrying out an inquiry that is truth-oriented is not an uncontroversial one. After all, **moral inquiry is performed in a deliberative way, weighing** up **argumentations**, beliefs **and principles, and comparing them** either **with** their probable or conceivable consequences or with lived as well as possible **experiences that** can be forceful or **impinge upon the** deliberative **subject** in such a way as to acquire the compulsory resistance due to reality. As Misak puts it succint- ly, “the practice of moral deliberation is responsive to experience, reason, argument, and thought experiments... **Such responsiveness is part of what it is to make a moral decision** and part of what it is to try to live a moral life” (2000: 52)3. Likewise, **this** same **deliberative activity implies an effort to acquire habits,** beliefs and principles **that contribute to** a truly **free deliberation** which, in turn, can result in creative conclusions. For Peirce, as you get more habit-governed, you become more creative and free, and your selfhood acquires plas- ticity and receptiveness to experience4. Vincent Colapietro has referred to Peirce’s description of human reason in terms of a deliberative rationality (1999: 24). Also, in another place he has explained that deliberation for Peirce is a process of preparation for future action which has to do with the checking of previous acts, the rehearsal in imagination of different roads to be followed by possible conduct and the nurturing of ideals (Colapietro 1997: 270, 281). It is precisely this experi- ment carried out within imagination that generates habits, because, as Peirce says in “A Survey of Pragmaticism”, “it is not the muscular action but the accompanying inward ef- forts, the acts of imagination, that produce the habit” (CP 5.479, 1907). Habits are regular ways of thinking, perceiving and interpreting that generate actions. As such, habits have a huge influence on human behavior, manifest themselves in the con- crete things we do and, at the same time, are formed within those same activities. Even more, according to Peirce, **the activity takes** the **form of experimentation** in the inner world; **and** the conclusion (if it comes to a definite conclusion), is that under given conditions, the interpreter will have formed the habit of acting in a given way whenever he may desire a given kind of result. **The** real and **living** logical **conclusion is** that **habit** (CP 5.491, 1907). Much more evidence could be given to support the view that habits are virtually decided (CP 2.435, c.1893) and also that intelligence comprises inward or potential actions that in- fluence the formation of habits (CP 6.286, 1893). Suffice it to say that, according to Peirce, deliberation is a function of the imagination, and that imagination is in itself an experiment which may have unexpected consequences that impose themselves upon the deliberative subject.

#### Thus, the standard is promoting pragmatic deliberation.

#### Prefer –

#### 1 - Moral Progress – Pragmatic revision is necessary to confronting our moral biases and constructing versions of ethics that avoid prejudice – slavery proves.

Elizabeth **Anderson 15** [UMich chair of philosophy dept, pragmatist], “Moral Bias and Corrective Practices: A Pragmatist Perspective”, presidential address delivered at the one hundred twelfth Central Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association on 20 Feb 2015 BE recut Massa

Yet, moral beliefs about slavery did change. **After the Civil War, while Southern whites insisted on white supremacy, most came to accept sharecropping as superior to slavery.**44 **The practical success of emancipation led them to drop all of the arguments they had previously made in support of the supposed necessity of slavery.** The full story of how this change in moral beliefs came about is too complex for this lecture. Here I stress two major factors. **First,** **to change moral beliefs, slavery had to be challenged not only in pure moral arguments but in practical, collective action**. Second, slaves and free blacks had to actively participate in those challenges.¶ In social theory, “contention” refers to practices in which people make claims against others, on behalf of someone’s interests. “Contentious politics” consists of coordinated contention by groups around a shared agenda, involving governments as “targets, initiators of claims, or third parties.”45 Contentious practices span a spectrum from pure moral argument at one end, to riots, war, and other violent acts on the other. Between pure argument and violence is a wide range of contentious activities that are more or less disruptive of habitual ways of life, from petitioning, publicity campaigns, theatrical performances, candlelight vigils, litigation, and political campaigns, to street demonstrations, boycotts, teach-ins, sit-ins, picketing, strikes, building occupations, and other forms of civil disobedience. As people move beyond the pure moral argument pole, they manifest in action and not only words their refusal to go along with the moral norms they are rejecting. **Once it gets beyond pure moral argument, contention consists in the collective, concerted repudiation of morally objectionable practices by means of actions that disrupt the routine functioning of those practices**, and that express rejection of the moral authority of people to practice them.¶ Contention aims to secure the satisfaction of claims by eliciting the recognition of those in power of the legitimacy of those claims, and thereby the incorporation into social institutions of an established recognition of those claims.46 It might seem that violent acts, on this definition, could not count as contention, even if they have political aims. To be sure, political violence used simply to get one’s way by force, as in cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing, does not address the victims as agents of whom it is demanded that they respond to claims. But other kinds of violence do aim at eliciting the practical recognition from authorities of legitimate claims. For example, the American War of Independence aimed not simply at obtaining de facto independence from Britain but at securing recognition from Britain of the United States as a sovereign nation. The war was a form of violent contention.¶ I claim that, in some circumstances, **practical contention brings about collective moral learning**—learning on the part of societies—**that pure moral argument cannot**. We have evidence that moral change induced by contention counts as learning—as an improvement of moral beliefs— if the contention blocks, counteracts, bypasses, or corrects cognitive or moral biases that supported the status quo ante, such that the new moral beliefs embodied in altered practice are not, or at least less, distorted by those biases. In such cases, we have similar grounds for claiming that the new moral beliefs are more reliable as in cases of belief change on the basis of blinded placebo-controlled clinical trials.¶ **Practical contention, not just individual moral persuasion, is needed to effect collective moral belief change because collective moral beliefs are embodied in social norms**. Social norms are sustained by reciprocal expectations of conditional conformity. They involve tacit or explicit agreements within a society to conform to the norm, on condition that enough others conform. Collective moral beliefs are embodied in social norms of discussion, joint deliberation, and claim-making. A group shares a belief if that belief shapes discourse within the group: the group takes it for granted as a premise for further argument, not needing independent justification; its truth is treated as a settled matter; disputing it is regarded as, if not beyond the pale, requiring a heavy burden of proof; disputants are liable to censure or even social exclusion for calling such convictions into question.47 For belief in a moral principle to be collectively accepted also requires that the principle regulates interpersonal claim-making: members are free to make claims in accordance with the principle and generally do so when they are victimized by violations of it; other members acknowledge the legitimacy of such claims; the principle is widely if not completely obeyed by group members; the group punishes disobedience; members take steps to transmit the principle to future generations.48¶ Because collective moral beliefs are sustained by reciprocal expectations, an individual can privately dissent while still participating in the practices that sustain the belief for the group. Hence, **merely changing an individual’s mind through moral argument need not change the collective belief**. Furthermore, **individuals may resist acting on their personal conclusions because a belief is held collectively**. This is not simply because they lack the courage of their convictions. They may wonder whether they have reasoned correctly if they reach conclusions contrary to the group consensus, and think that the group’s belief is more reliable than their own reasoning. Pure moral argument may also lack a certain degree of seriousness, insofar as it is advanced in contexts outside of interpersonal claim-making, by people who lack direct stakes in what they are saying.¶ **Contentious politics avoids these weaknesses of pure moral argument**. In contentious political practices, people advance moral beliefs in the context of actual claim-making: the **stakes are real and serious**. Because these practices involve mass action in public repudiation of existing norms, they destabilize the shared expectations that hold those norms in place, casting doubt on the robustness or authenticity of the purported consensus around them. Their mass public nature may give courage to those who privately dissented, proving that their doubts about existing norms were not merely the product of idiosyncratic reasoning. To the extent that contentious politics disrupts the routine operation of challenged norms, it forces genuine practical deliberation about what to do, not mere idle speculation. In refusing to concede legitimacy to the enforcement of challenged norms, contentious politics threatens a loss of honor on the part of those who do enforce them—something that may inspire the enforcers to reconsider them.49¶ Contentious politics thus serves to awaken societies to serious practical reflection on entrenched moral beliefs. More is needed, however, to ensure that the direction their reflection takes is less biased. Many features of contention can play this role. Here I stress one: the participation of the victims of injustice in challenging the norms that oppress them.¶ So far I have discussed the moral arguments made by white abolitionists such as Hepburn, Clarkson, Weld, and Garrison. As we have seen, their strategies were ineffective against the slaveholding culture of the South. Racism posed powerful obstacles to their efforts. **Despite the abstract commitment of white abolitionists to the equality of blacks before God, and hence their equal moral considerability, racism biased their representation of the evils of slavery**. They overwhelmingly represented slaves as victims of cruelty and material deprivation. Weld’s American Slavery as It Is (1839) (the inspiration for Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, which, with Weld’s work, constituted the two most influential white abolitionist publications in the U.S.) documents in exhaustive detail the material deprivations inflicted on slaves and their subjection to cruel tortures. Notably, these wrongs can be suffered equally much by animals. By contrast, Weld’s work passes relatively lightly over slavery’s manifold assaults on slaves’ specifically human, dignitary interests in their agency and in recognition from others: the deprivation of autonomy, legal rights, education, and opportunities for self-advancement; the theft of the fruits of their labor; the dishonor inflicted on female slaves through slaveholder rape; the dishonor imposed on male slaves by denying them authority over family life, powers to protect their wives and children, and access to avenues for developing and exercising military virtues. White abolitionists thus tended to cast slaves more as objects of pity than as subjects of dignity entitled to command respect. They were notably weak in addressing slaveholders’ claims that blacks lacked intelligence, talent, foresight, and capacities for self-governance, and so would be unable to compete with whites in a free labor market, but sink into destitution, vagrancy, and crime if they were freed—key elements in slaveholders’ patriarchal defense of slavery as necessary for blacks’ welfare and social order.¶ Black abolitionists placed greater emphasis on the ways in which slavery deprived slaves of dignity, honor, and access to distinctively human rights and achievements. The central theme of Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl Written by Herself was the vulnerability of slave women to sexual harassment and rape at the hands of their masters. The female slave “is not allowed to have any pride of character. It is deemed a crime in her to wish to be virtuous.” Jacobs rated this injury as far worse than slavery’s material deprivations or consignment to a life of drudgery. She hid in a tiny, dark attic for almost seven years to avoid sexual assault, judging this fate better than slavery, even though she had never been whipped, beaten, or overworked as a slave.50 Frederick Douglass agreed with Jacobs’s priorities. Worse than the whip was slavery’s consignment of slaves to ignorance and incapacity to think for themselves. Indeed, the fundamental point, and greatest injury, of material deprivation and brutal physical punishment was to disable slaves from aspiring to freedom, to the exercise of rational capacities, to any kind of estimable activity.51 From this dignitary perspective, Douglass exposed slaveholders’ boasts of the material indulgence they granted their slaves on holidays, when they were encouraged to get drunk and discouraged from any work, as a great fraud, designed only “to disgust their slaves with freedom, by plunging them into the lowest depths of dissipation.”52¶ **Black abolitionists’** alternative critique of the evils of slavery led them to advocate a different strategy for bringing about moral change— one addressed as much to antislavery Northerners as to advocates of slavery. Their **critique identified racism**—the widespread, deeply entrenched contempt for blacks, **based on prejudicial feelings** of their being unfit for freedom and equal dignity with whites—**as the core moral bias upholding slavery. To counteract this prejudice, much more than pure moral argument was required**. Blacks needed to demonstrate in action their interest, capacity, and worthiness for freedom and dignity. “We . . . wish to see the charges of Mr. Jefferson refuted by the blacks themselves” for, if blacks fail to try, “we will only establish them.”53 As James McCune Smith, the first African-American to earn a medical degree, and editor of Douglass’s My Bondage and My Freedom, put the point:¶ The real object of that [antislavery] movement is not only to disenthrall, it is, also, to bestow upon the Negro the exercise of all those rights, from the possession of which he has been so long debarred. But this full recognition of the colored man to the right, and the entire admission of the same to the full privileges, political, religious and social, of manhood, requires powerful effort on the part of the enthralled, as well as on the part of those who would disenthrall them. The people at large must feel the conviction, as well as admit the abstract logic, of human equality; the Negro . . . must prove his title first to all that is demanded for him; in the teeth of unequal chances, he must prove himself equal to the mass of those who oppress him . . ..54¶ Without such effort by blacks themselves “to disprove their alleged inferiority, and demonstrate their capacity for a more exalted civilization than slavery and prejudice had assigned to them,” whites would “reconcile themselves” to blacks’ “enslavement and oppression, as things inevitable, if not desirable.”55¶ This task stood in tension with white abolitionists’ strategy to present slaves as objects of pity. Douglass grated under their requests that he merely “give us the facts,” and “we will take care of the philosophy.” They implored him to speak to audiences with an uneducated plantation accent, lest Northern whites think he wasn’t really a fugitive slave. They objected to his establishing a paper of his own, preferring that he continue to lecture under their sponsorship, oblivious to the importance Douglass saw in demonstrating blacks’ capacities and inspiring, through his achievements, other blacks to that call.56¶ In this dispute, black abolitionists proved to be far keener moral psychologists than their white counterparts. White abolitionists, in stressing the pathos of slavery, operated on the assumption that the core moral bias of slavery advocates was heard-heartedness. On that assumption, the key strategy for counteracting that bias should be to highlight those facts about slavery that arouse people’s sympathies and to cultivate social practices that encourage sentimentality and open­ heartedness, so that people feel free to respond appropriately to those facts. Black abolitionists identified the core weakness of this strategy: “Human nature is so constituted, that it cannot honor a helpless man, although it can pity him; and even this it cannot do long, if the signs of power do not arise.”57 If the core moral bias of slavery advocates was racist contempt, then this can only be counteracted by resisting subordination and oppression, demanding respect, and seizing it, by force if necessary, from those who withhold it. To demonstrate worthiness of respect, one must conduct oneself as entitled to it. Failing that, the contemptuous will think their targets uninterested in, incapable of, and hence undeserving of respect.¶ On this point, black abolitionists were united. Their writings repeatedly testify to the power of blacks’ standing up for their rights, and the supreme importance of their doing so. Jacobs “resolved never to be conquered” and resisted her master’s sexual advances. Escaping North, she successfully opposed racial discrimination in hotel service by telling the black servants that they should stand up to oppose it.58 Douglass admired the unbowed resistance of Nelly to overseer Mr. Servier’s blows, noting that he never whipped her again.59 This incident prefigured his own triumphant struggle against the slavebreaker Covey, from which he drew his central insight into the moral psychology of overcoming oppression: to obtain recognition of one’s respectability from others, one must manifest self-respect in action by exacting respect from others.¶ This call to resistance was the core of David Walker’s Appeal.60 And resist the slaves did, taking deeds, more than words, as the key to progressive moral change. Slaves exploited the legal codes of the South to extract recognition of rights through innumerable acts of resistance on the plantations, including, in some cases (astonishingly!), the right to kill their masters in self-defense.61 There was no better proof that slaves desired freedom and repudiated enslavement than the steady flow of fugitives North, without regret or reversal. Toward the end of the Civil War, the Confederacy, running out of soldiers, debated whether to draft slaves into the army. Howell Cobb, one of the founders of the Confederacy, answered, “If slaves will make good soldiers our whole theory of slavery is wrong.”62 But fugitive slaves demonstrated, in their courageous service in the Union Army, that slaves did make good soldiers. They thereby heeded Walker’s call for blacks themselves to refute Jefferson’s aspersions on their race and shattered the South’s “whole theory of slavery.” While their actions did not end racism, they did force a momentous retreat of this profound moral bias. Slavery advocates were forced to concede that the case for slavery was spurious, and that blacks were fit at least for the autonomy that the emergent sharecropping economy conceded to them. This was not full freedom by any means, but it was a giant step up from slavery.¶ 4. SOME PRAGMATIST PATHS FORWARD FOR MORAL PHILOSOPHY¶ Let us step back and draw some lessons from this monumental episode of collective moral learning. Recall that **pragmatism replaces the quest for ultimate criteria of moral rightness, true in all possible worlds or at least at high levels of abstraction, with methods of intelligent updating**. I argued that **one important type of intelligent updating involves blocking, counteracting, or reducing the influence of moral biases**. We have reasons to believe that social power biases moral reasoning in systematic ways. First, as Smith argued, people tend to feel more sympathy, and more esteem, for the rich and powerful relative to the poor and powerless, controlling for equal suffering and equal merit. The latter unjustly suffer contempt. He could have added that such contempt tends to be rationalized by biased notions of group inferiority. Second, as Dewey and Tufts argued, the powerful—who shape social institutions to benefit their social groups at others’ expense—tend to confuse what they want with what is right so long as they have the power to enforce their demands.¶ Faced merely with pure moral argument, we have seen that the powerful, and their advocates, typically have substantial resources at their disposal, from the intuitive moral ideas and principles available in their society, to rationalize their side of the debate. Nor does purely speculative, a priori moral argument typically activate real practical reasoning. Hence, the powers of pure moral argument to dislodge prejudice and bias tend to be weak.¶ Stronger methods are needed to counteract the biases induced by social power. My case study of a society-wide change in moral belief, from proslavery to abolitionist, focused on two such methods. First, contentious politics—active, practical, mass resistance to the moral claims embodied in social institutions enforced by and catering to the powerful—is needed to activate genuine practical reasoning across all levels of society. The powerful won’t really listen to reason—that is, to claims from below—until they no longer have the power to routinely enforce their desires. Second, the subordinated and oppressed must actively participate in that contention. They must manifest in deed and not only words their own interest, capacity, and worthiness for the rights and privileges they are demanding. For if they meekly submit to oppression, this tends to make observers—not only the powerful, but anyone, as Smith held—think that the downtrodden have no interest in or capacity for uplift and do not deserve it. The oppressed must show their determination to cast off oppression in order to arouse the esteem and thereby enlist the support or at least the acquiescence of others.¶ Walker, Jacobs, McCune, and Douglass understood this. Respect is obtained from others not by abstract argument but by dignified exaction. No wonder Douglass lost all patience for abstract moral argument:¶ [W]here all is plain there is nothing to be argued. . . . Must I undertake to prove that the slave is a man? . . . The slaveholders themselves acknowledge it . . . when they punish disobedience on the part of the slave. What is this but the acknowledgement that the slave is a moral, intellectual, and responsible being . . . [I]t is not light that is needed, but fire. . . . The feeling of the nation must be quickened; the conscience of the nation must be roused; . . . the hypocrisy of the nation must be exposed; and its crimes against God and man must be proclaimed and denounced.63¶ In the language of contemporary moral philosophy, Douglass was calling for a shift from third-person to second-person address, from abstract impersonal argument to interpersonal claim-making, founded on an assertion of authority to demand respect from others.64 To be called to account, to be addressed as a bearer of duties to the addresser, to be upbraided for failure to do what is authoritatively demanded—these are essential experiences needed to become a morally responsible being, fit for living with others. And these are the experiences to which slaveholders, holding irresponsible totalitarian power over slaves, were least exposed before the Civil War. Yet, in the perverse corruption of moral sentiments Smith identified, until the enslaved actively repudiated their subjection, it was the slaves, rather than the slaveholders, who were thought unfit for living freely with others.¶ From our current moral perspective, it is easy for us to see the errors of the past, with respect to slavery. A skeptic might wonder whether we are merely begging the question in favor of our current moral beliefs. The pragmatist answers that this **change can be seen to be progressive, a case of moral learning, because it was brought about through practices that tend to counteract or reduce known moral biases rooted in human psychology**. As clinical conclusions reached on the basis of blinded, placebo-controlled clinical trials are more reliable, due to the ways they check the biases of wishful thinking, moral conclusions reached on the basis of practical methods that counteract the biases of power are similarly more reliable.¶ This pragmatist perspective suggests an alternative research program for moral philosophy, reaching beyond the a priori methods to which we philosophers are so wedded. **My point is to expand the tools we use, and to reduce our excessive reliance on the old tools**. Just as a bolt will turn uselessly without a nut to fasten it, or glued joints will be weak if they haven’t been clamped, our abstract moral arguments will spin without conclusion or fall apart uselessly unless they are used in conjunction with empirically grounded tools. We can make better progress by working in close conjunction with the social sciences and history to consider empirically how different circumstances, including social relations, shape our moral thinking. If we discover an influence on our moral thinking that we can’t justify, or that experience shows us to lead to untoward consequences, we have discovered a moral bias. Then we can seek empirically reliable methods to correct, block, counteract, or bypass those biases, keeping in mind that pure reasoning may not be enough. Some methods may be practical, not just speculative or theoretical, and involve concerted action in the world, sometimes collective political action.¶ This alternative research program does not reject intuitions. They are a basic material of moral thinking; we have no way around them. But we must be alert to the possibility that our intuitions might suffer from bias and would be improved under alternative conditions.¶ My case study raises an alarm for philosophy as we currently practice it. Without active participation of the oppressed and disadvantaged, the moral views reached by philosophers are liable to be biased—ignorant of and unresponsive to the concerns and claims of those not present.65 Dewey and Tufts identified that problem, too. Morality, understood as what we owe to each other, arises from the need to adjudicate the claims that everyone makes on everyone else. If the claims of the subordinated are suppressed, silenced, ignored, or misunderstood, the conclusions reached on the basis of the subset of claims that are considered are liable to be systematically biased. My case study indicates that purely a priori methods of bias correction are unlikely to reliably counteract such biases.66 There is no reason to think that ever-more-elaborate exploration of the contours of one’s own moral thoughts, or of the thoughts of similarly situated persons, will capture everyone’s moral concerns. Knowledge of what we owe to each other can only be generated through processes of interpersonal claim-making that include those occupying the full range of diverse situations in society. For moral philosophy to make progress, it must practice inclusion of diverse philosophers.¶ In this lecture, I have focused on bias correction as one basic pragmatist method. Another is experiments in living. The conclusions we reach from real experiments in living are likely to be more reliable than the conclusions we reach from thought experiments. Thought experiments are at best no more reliable than deliberation. We often find that our deliberations have gone astray once we act on them and experience unexpected results—some of which may inspire us to revise the initial terms in which we formulated the stakes in our decision.67 Ascent to the a priori offers no protection from such revision. We know from the history of morals that conceptions of value thought to be immutable do, in fact, change over time.

#### 2 - Value – procedural decisions have infinite value because they allow agents to take steps to reduce harms under any index. To shut down an avenue for pragmatic discourse necessitates foreclosing all possible decisions in that situation except a static theory we can’t change. Kills the net most value – alternative theories with massive impacts can’t be considered.

#### Two Impacts –

#### A - Precedes substantive moral frameworks – procedural frameworks create the proper circumstances to deploy substantive theories.

#### B - Rational Decision Theory – it’s the best evaluative metric.

**Jalan 16**. Akhil.  “A Defense of Offense-Defense: Replying to Bogaty and Gosain.” [Los Angeles Debate Intensive].

Instead, I believe we should instead use a more traditional conception of offense-defense, in which defensive responses lower the judge’s credence in a particular premise (and by extension, the credence of the entire argument). For the rest of this section, I will explain what I mean by offense-defense as a paradigm for debate. ¶ Roughly, what I mean by offense defense is the view that **the judge should** vote for whatever side they have most reason to vote for. [2] There are 2 kinds of things which offense-defense is concerned with: probability of an outcome and value of that outcome. [3]¶ This two-fold concern is best illustrated by classical rational decision theory – specifically, the VNM utility function [4][5]. While it sounds like a mouthful, this simple paradigm is one that most people employ without even realizing it. In a nutshell, it says: **take the probabilities of each outcome of an event multiplied by the value of that outcome, and add it up**.¶ Say **I am offered a drink from an enemy of mine, which I am 1% sure contains poison and 99% sure is harmless. Would I drink it? VNM says no, since the harm from dying from poison is more than 100 times worse than the benefit from having a tasty drink.¶** In economics and decision theory, VNM is a description of what an idealized agent would do. Of course, in real life people don’t have a complete list of probabilities and often act using mental shortcuts and biases. But if a person knew what the likelihood of each result of some action was, and they assigned values to each of those outcomes (for example – tasty drink, +1 units, death, -1,000 units), it seems they could then make the optimal decision.¶ In debate, **an offense-defense judge should approximate this model** of decision-making by considering what values they have (perhaps they have a 100% confidence that one should treat people as ends in themselves as a result of the framework debate) and what relevant values each outcome of their decision reflects: usually, the judge compares the outcomes of the aff world and the neg world. Offense-defense means the judge should adjust their credence level in a particular argument (their belief in its likelihood of being true) on a 0-100% scale based on arguments made in round.¶ Returning to the problem of what counts as “logical flaw,” this new probability model of argument illustrates the problem with Bogaty and Gosain’s view. **Terminal defense**, in this model, **would be an argument that concludes there is a 0% probability of an argument being true. Equivalently, we would be certain that the argument is false. But how can we be certain of anything in the real-world, when most debate arguments are based on empirical observation and extrapolation from data? Even philosophical arguments, which sometimes attempt to be pure extensions of logic, are arguably based on base assumptions such as “humans deserve autonomy” which we can very fairly claim we don’t know for certain** [6]. Compounding the problem, **it’s unclear how judges can make this judgment call, since every defensive response that correctly attacks a premise in an argument can be said to point out a “flaw in the logic”** of the argument as Bogaty and Gosain say.¶ In particular, **this means that a rational-decision maker** (and by extension, a rational judge) **should pick the side with the highest net value, even if that side’s arguments have a lower probability** (recall the poison example). This seems to be my main disagreement with Bogaty and Gosain, who argue that certain defensive responses are under-valued by an offense-defense paradigm. But the question of what defense should be relevant carries assumptions about what the nature of debate should be, leading to the next section. ¶

#### 3 - Agential Specificity – Democratic governments are pragmatic theories in action – it’s intrinsic to their agential position.

Shook 12, John R. (PhD, is Director of Education and Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Inquiry in Amherst, N.Y.; he has been Research Associate in Philosophy at the University at Buffalo since 2006. Among his authored and edited books are Dewey’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality (2000), Pragmatic Naturalism and Realism (2003), A Companion to Pragmatism (2005), Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers (2005), and The Future of Naturalism (2009).) *Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Public Democracy.* 2012. //Massa

#### Pragmatists such as John Dewey and Richard Rorty defended the idea that public democracies are pragmatic theories in action, in two major senses. First, public democracy is a proposed method of social inquiry. When educated and communicating citizens make intelligent inquiries into their social conditions and changes to society, they are in a position to learn about how their society functions and how it can function differently. Democracy can produce social knowledge. Second, public democracy is itself an experimental test of the political proposition that citizens become more powerful over the conditions of life if their society becomes more and more democratic. Democracy can produce freer citizens. Pragmatism is demonstrably false if public democracy fails to increase social knowledge and fails to produce freer citizens. These two pragmatic tests of pragmatism are made in the actual experiments of free public democracy, in the same way that pragmatism is tested through the actual successes of free scientific inquiry into nature. During the twentieth century, cultural pluralism and especially race pluralism challenged pragmatism to prove its value for democracy in practice

#### Impact Calc:

#### Deliberation is procedural not substantive, which means that we are first concerned with the decision-making procedure of deliberation and then evaluation of what impacts matter most. To clarify, consequences are a sequencing question. Serra 2

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION: As LaFollette presents it, the key to understanding pragmatist ethics is that it is not an ethical theory per se, but rather it is an anthropology, a way of understanding the human being and his moral action. Therefore, pragmatist ethics in reality does not propose a new ethical theory, but rather “reconstructs” through a new prism the basic intuitions of the best ethical theories. The fundamental element on which the attention of pragmatist ethics centers is deliberation. **Deliberation is not directly responsible for directing action, but** only **does so indirectly, by** means of a critique of past actions, **the effort to** correct or **reinforce certain habits** and mental experiments that each actor performs in order to determine his own future conduct, and even to determine in a general manner the way in which one wishes to live one’s life (or, what amounts to the same thing, the type of person one wishes to be). **The task of a pragmatist** ethics, therefore**, is not to provide final solutions, but** rather to indicate that it is **only** via **the testing and communication of experiences that** the **superiority** of **one** moral **idea** over another **can be demonstrated**. In this sense, one of the principal missions of any given version of pragmatist ethics is to indicate some general manner in which habits can be acquired which, later, will facilitate personal deliberation – both internal and external – in the broad variety of circumstances which make up the moral life.

#### Consequences fail –

#### A - They only judge actions after they occur, which fails action guidance and proves they aren’t binding.

#### B - Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence. Probability doesn’t solve because a] Probability is improvable, as it relies on inductive knowledge, but induction from past events can’t lead to deduction of future events and b] Probability assumes causation, we can’t assume every act was actually the cause of tangible outcomes

#### C - Every action is infinitely divisible, only intents unify action because we intend the end point of an action – but consequences cannot determine what step of action is moral or not.

#### D - You can’t aggregate consequences, happiness and sadness are immutable – ten headaches don’t make a migraine – causes inaction because you don’t know what kind of consequence matters more.

### 1AC – Contention

#### I defend the whole resolution - resolved:  In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

#### Objective journalism lies in objectivity of its methodology.

Jones 09 Alex Jones 9-15-2009 "An Argument Why Journalists Should Not Abandon Objectivity" <https://niemanreports.org/articles/an-argument-why-journalists-should-not-abandon-objectivity/> (Alex S. Jones, a 1982 Nieman Fellow, is director of the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University.)//Elmer

In their book “The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know and the Public Should Expect,” Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, describe what they call “the lost meaning of objectivity.”… As [they] point out, “In the original concept, in other words, the method is objective, not the journalist.” It was because journalists inevitably arrived with bias that they needed objectivity as a discipline to test that bias against the evidence so as to produce journalism that would be closer to truth. They argue that the quickening of objectivity as the American journalistic standard was born of a desire to have a more scientific way of approaching news. The nation’s faith in science was surging, and the scientific method seemed suited to journalism. Scientists begin their research with assumptions. They have expectations of what will happen, but they don’t know what will happen. They have, in other words, their own opinions and beliefs—their point of view or even bias—about what is likely the truth, and they do their research to test those assumptions. Their objective, scientific inquiry is not one that is without bias, but one in which bias has to stand up to evidence and results. This is the sensible and realistic approach to objectivity that might be termed genuine objectivity. It begins with the assumption that journalists have bias, and that their bias has to be tested and challenged by gathering facts and information that will either support it or knock it down. Often, there is information that does both, and that ambiguity needs to be reported with the same dispassion with which a scientist would report variations in findings that were inconclusive. If the evidence is inconclusive, then that is—by scientific standards—the truth. But journalistic objectivity is an effort to discern a practical truth, not an abstract, perfect truth. Reporters seeking genuine objectivity search out the best truth possible from the evidence that the reporter, in good faith, can find. To discredit objectivity because it is impossible to arrive at perfect truth is akin to dismissing trial by jury because it isn’t perfect in its judgments.

#### Objectivity in the press is consistent with the pragmatic theory of truth via rigorous inquiry and pluralist decision-making.

Ward 17 [Stephen J. A. Ward (Distinguished Lecturer in Ethics at the University of British Columbia, Courtesy Professor at the School of Journalism and Communication at the University of Oregon, and founding director of the Center for Journalism Ethics at the University of Wisconsin). “ENGAGEMENT AND PRAGMATIC OBJECTIVITY”. Center for Journalism Ethics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. March 27, 2017. Accessed 2/26/2022. <https://ethics.journalism.wisc.edu/2017/03/27/engagement-and-pragmatic-objectivity/> //Xu]

In the first article in this series, I argued for a radical rethink of ethics to respond properly to the challenge of journalism in a time of Trump. We need to practice democratically engaged journalism, which views journalists as social advocates. But they are advocates of a special kind: objective advocates for plural democracy. Here, I’ll examine the method of objective engagement, what I call pragmatic objectivity. Journalists of this ilk are neither partisans nor neutral reporters of “just the facts.” Objective engagement sounds strange to some ears; it runs against a strong strain of dualistic thinking in journalism ethics: I can be a disinterested journalist or an interest-driven advocate but not both. Facts versus opinion, facts versus values, neutrality versus engagement. These dualisms are the trouble-making heritage of a journalism ethic from a different media era a century ago. Pragmatic objectivity rejects the dualisms, but not objectivity. It redefines it. But how can journalists be engaged and objective? OBJECTIVITY AS TESTING What does it mean to be objective, and why be objective? Since philosophy in antiquity, objectivity has been an ideal of inquiry. Objectivity in this tradition is ontological, i.e., it is knowledge of the world as it exists independent of mind. Objective beliefs map the world. Subjective beliefs fail to map. To be concerned about objectivity is to ask: Which beliefs, reports, and theories are reliable representations of the world? Humans make mistakes. The sources of error are known: our desires, ideologies, prejudices, faulty logic, and interests. How decide which beliefs map the world? There is only one way. We examine how we formed a belief. We evaluate its reasons and its methods. Objectivity becomes epistemological. Objective belief is supported by evidence. Subjective belief lacks support. Objectivity comes down to testing beliefs by the methods and criteria of good inquiry. For example, we test beliefs to see if they follow valid statistical methods. The most familiar modes of testing are the methods of science. But criteria for objective inquiry populate philosophy, logic, critical thinking, social science, law, and journalism. Objectivity is an ideal. Even if never fully realized, it is a target at which to aim. Being objective is not easy. It requires mental discipline and a willingness to critique one’s views. So “Why be objective?” becomes, “Why value well-evidenced belief?” For two reasons. We need objective beliefs to guide actions. And, we need objective methods for adjudication: Teachers need to mark exams objectively; judges need to adjudicate disputes by law and fact. Too much time has been wasted of late on the flabby, unfocused question as to whether objectivity exists, or whether it is valuable. Of course objectivity exists, if we mean there are people capable of reasonably objective judgments. That happens every day. And, it is clear that objective judgment has value in many domains of life. So what is the debate over objectivity in journalism about, anyway? The real issue is what type of objective testing is appropriate for journalism? OLD AND NEW OBJECTIVITY Historically, journalism objectivity has been reductionist. Testing for objectivity is reduced to testing for facts and neutrality. The conception, adopted in the early 1900s for professional newsrooms, is that a report is objective if and only if it neutrally reports only observable facts. The sphere of objective belief is reduced to beliefs derived from the senses. Traditional objectivity is dualistic: it draws a firm line between observation and interpretation of fact, neutral reporting and advocacy. It is exclusive: Reporter’s opinions and interpretations are to be excluded from good reporting. This is the old objectivity. It makes objective engagement ‘sound strange.’ This way of thinking continues to haunt debates, even if people doubt objectivity. Reporters still balk at the suggestion they interpret events. They worry about losing neutrality when covering Trump. Too many commentators reject objectivity because they think of it as strict neutrality, as if there was not some other conception. Pragmatic objectivity is a new objectivity. It is plural and holistic. It evaluates beliefs with a variety of standards. It is inclusive, open to the evaluation of many kinds of writing. It denies dualisms, viewing journalism as both factual and interpretive, an engaged chronicling. For pragmatic objectivity, the sphere of objective belief is larger than the sphere of fact. What we know depends not only on observation but on our perspectives—webs of belief and values. Knowledge is an interpretation, in which fact and theory are entangled. Even what we consider a fact is determined by our webs of belief. Hence, expert analysis of political events and scientific theories of unobservable forces in nature can be objective, even if not reducible to observable fact. They are objective to the extent that they are reliable indicators of the world and guides to action. Journalism stories are web-dependent interpretations. They are not pure observations of fact. Even apparent facts-only reporting, e.g., reporting a news conference, require the journalist to select salient statements, decide on quotations, and make sense of the conference for a public. Salience, choosing content, and creating meaning are interpretive functions. If this view is true, then we need a notion of objectivity that disciplines and tests our interpretive tendencies, rather than tries to eliminate them. We need appropriate standards of evaluation. Pragmatic objectivity provides a list for journalism. They are: Standards of attitude: Journalists should adopt the objective stance, step back from their beliefs, display a passion for truth and give reasons that others could accept. Standards of empirical validity: What is the empirical evidence for the story? Are the facts carefully collected, verified, complete and placed in context? Are counter-facts treated seriously? Standards of clarity, logic, and coherence: Does the story cohere with existing knowledge in the field? Is the interpretation logically consistent? Are the concepts clear? Are fallacious arguments or manipulative techniques used? Standards of diverse and trusted sources: Are important sources taken into account and fairly assessed? Standards of self-consciousness: In constructing a story, are we conscious of the conceptual frame we use to understand the topic? Are there other frames? Standard of open, public scrutiny: Have we subjected our views to the views of others? Are we prepared to alter our views? The standards apply to many forms of journalism from ‘straight’ reporting to editorial commentary and advocacy journalism. It is a flexible, platform-neutral method.

#### A pragmatically objective press is a necessary component of a pluralist and deliberative democracy.

Ward 17 [Stephen J. A. Ward (Distinguished Lecturer in Ethics at the University of British Columbia, Courtesy Professor at the School of Journalism and Communication at the University of Oregon, and founding director of the Center for Journalism Ethics at the University of Wisconsin). “ENGAGEMENT AND PRAGMATIC OBJECTIVITY”. Center for Journalism Ethics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. March 27, 2017. Accessed 2/26/2022. <https://ethics.journalism.wisc.edu/2017/03/27/engagement-and-pragmatic-objectivity/> //Xu]

OBJECTIVITY WITHIN ENGAGEMENT How is pragmatic objectivity compatible with journalism as engaged? Objectivity and engagement are compatible because there is a difference between methods and goals. Goals are the aims of engagement in life and society. We are partial about our goals, favoring them over others. But our methods of achieving goals can be objective or subjective. The value of objectivity is that it helps us to be engaged, to achieve certain goals or perform certain functions. Scientists follow objective methods to create new technology to solve a problem. Judges follow the objective methods of law to pursue their goal of justice. Democratically engaged journalists have a dual commitment: they are committed to impartial methods as a means to their partial commitment to plural democracy. They commit themselves to rational and objective methods for deciding what to publish and how to persuade. Their desire for objective belief is part of a desire for reason-based democratic processes. In contrast, there are engaged citizens, such as extreme partisans, who use partial methods for partial goals. They do whatever it takes to advance their cause. Their manipulative strategies exploit the sources of subjective belief such as fears, biases, and stereotypes. Objective engagement does not require an all-encompassing neutrality which precludes expressing a view or coming to a conclusion. Both scientists and judges are impartial in method but they rightly come to conclusions and take sides in conflicts. Objectively engaged journalists are impartial or disinterested because they do not let their partialities or interests undermine objective judgment and inquiry. They do not prejudge the story before fairly weighing all relevant evidence. But after such inquiry, journalists are free to draw an informed conclusion. Such is the method of investigative journalism. Objectivity is not a value-free zone. TRUMP AND PRAGMATIC OBJECTIVITY How might pragmatic objectivity shape our response to journalism in a time of Trump? It would open up the space in which we think about journalism, refusing to reduce the options to a forced choice between neutral stenography and biased partisanship. Calling for a return to traditional objective journalism is like proposing that we go backward in time. Not only do many journalists not practice traditional facts-only reporting but the public sphere that once justified such an ethic has greatly disappeared. The situation is too serious for outdated solutions. Evidence, fact, and truth are ideas increasingly defined by politics, power, and manipulative persuasion. What is a fact is too often what someone claims is a fact, for self-interested reasons. Partisans and leaders, including Trump and his advisers, tweet unsubstantiated claims for political reasons: to galvanize their base of support, to maintain their ideology; and to distract the media. One strategy is to insert fake news into the infosphere knowing it will be there forever, influencing someone, diluting the influence of other interpretations. This insouciance toward objective reasons and disciplined thinking is disturbing. We face the end of the ideal of informed and reasonable democratic publics. In this corrupted media sphere, journalists should not be passive or neutral. Such a climate needs an active journalism with a method that resists subjective claims. Pragmatic objectivity encourages journalists to do the things that need to done: There is no better antidote to fake news than real news, objectively tested. Fake news and alternate facts are just other terms for biased, subjective belief. There is no better antidote to a passive, manipulatable press than a press objectively engaged as watchdogs for plural democracy, who fact-test political claims and investigate conflicts of interest among Trump’s family and advisers. There is no better antidote to illiberal and intolerant media than an objectively engaged journalism that performs the political explanatory journalism noted in the first article. Finally, news media that follow pragmatic objectivity, aimed at protecting plural democracy, can justifiably take legal and other action against a presidential decision, law, or policy that violates a constitutional principle, such as free expression, or the rights of minorities.

### 1AC – Adv

#### Climate “experts” are spreading disinformation on behalf of corporate lobbyists. This halts climate legislation, dissaudes the public, and destroys international cooperation – the plan is key.

**Harkins 19**, Steven. “Why Is Climate Change Still Not Top Of The News Agenda?.” The Conversation. September 19, 2019. https://theconversation.com/why-is-climate-change-still-not-top-of-the-news-agenda- 123800

They found that a group of scientific experts challenged the consensus on climate change on behalf of corporations and conservative think tanks. Some of the individuals involved in this had previously challenged scientific consensus on a range of issues including the negative health implications of tobacco smoke. Corporations engage in this creation of doubt through public relations activity because climate change requires international cooperation on environmental legislation. By performing what Tuchman calls a “strategic ritual” of objectivity, journalists obscure the scientific consensus on climate change by reporting it as a debate. This framing makes climate breakdown seem less urgent and therefore less newsworthy. How can we improve? The notion of objectivity needs to be reclaimed through good journalism which invests resources in providing analysis and verification. News organisations are in an important position to explain complex scientific concepts in a language that most people understand, but they need to improve their scientific literacy in order to verify the relative merit of competing claims. Journalists with a better grasp of the science (and indeed social science) of climate change would be less reliant on press releases, reducing the impact of corporate lobbyists and the need to include their public relations activity as part of the news. However, these suggestions are optimistic considering the wider power structures that constrain how journalists operate.

#### Public trust in climate change information is at a low. The plan takes the pen out of agenda-driven stakeholder’s hand.

**Ellison 21**, Jude. “Why Journalists – Not Just Advocates – Need To Report On Climate Change.” The City Journal. March 31, 2021. http://thecityjournal.net/opinion/why-journalists-not-just-advocates-need-to-report- on-climate-change/

As temperatures climb, rivers rise and fires burn, the need for informed and effective coverage of climate change is clear. But who should provide that coverage? Journalists specialising in it are few and far between, particularly in the Global South. In the absence of journalistic coverage, Non Government Organisations (NGOs) have produced news releases and other content for their in-house media centres. These organisations are openly agenda-driven, leaving readers to question if their accounts are accurate and unbiased. Further, unlike most journalistic news outlets, NGOs often publish pieces without bylines. Such work can be difficult to trust – who writes them, and why aren’t the writers credited? These uncertainties give readers reason to doubt what is reported. Doubt compounds inaction, which is an unacceptable outcome for an urgent topic like climate change. But even clear attribution and commitment to fact-based reporting isn’t enough. Journalistic coverage has actively harmed the public perception of climate change’s seriousness and discouraged readers from taking action. What went wrong? Ironically, one of the values that journalists use to earn trust – balance – has caused result in the work becoming less trustworthy. One study found that in a sample of articles from the United States’ “prestige press” between 1988 and 2002, not even 6% of articles stated that human activity alone was responsible for climate change. Worse, nearly the same proportion of articles said that human activity was not responsible for climate change. More than half the articles equivocated, stating that some sources believed human activity to be responsible and some did not. Another piece said that journalists’ sources on climate change issues are not only scientists and other subject experts, but also encompass “a broader range of stakeholders” that gives page space to public relations professionals and other non-experts. The situation is no better in the Global South. A study from the Australian Centre for Independent Journalism found nearly one-third of the articles it examined “did not accept the scientific consensus that human beings are major contributors to global warming”. What could go right? So far, journalistic values have not been helpful in climate change reporting. But it doesn’t have to be that way. For example, instead of perpetuating the illusion of a “he said, she said” debate about anthropogenic climate change, journalists could honour their commitment to balance (and accuracy) by quoting multiple experts who suggest different actions for readers to take. These differences do not need to be balanced in the sense of “put at odds,” which may bewilder readers into inaction – rather, they can be balanced in the sense of “complementary,” giving readers multiple paths to meaningful engagement. Two additional journalistic values, accuracy and fairness, may also support climate change reporters. A University of Kansas study found a neutral tone is more likely than an angry one to convince readers of an issue’s seriousness, so much so that “the more coverage used anger as a way to discuss the issue, the less people felt it was important”. Also, journalistic norms around attribution (that it should be done) and transparency (that conflicts, payments and potential threats to independence should be disclosed) make journalists’ work less susceptible to the scepticism mentioned earlier around byline-free, agenda-driven NGO content. Another thing that may alleviate readers’ reservations is journalism’s code of ethics. Codes vary between regions, but in democratic societies, practitioners pledge to observe a number of guidelines that hold their work to higher standards than that of non-journalists. Adherence to professional codes of ethics is imperfect because those who adhere to them are imperfect, but it is arguably better to have named writers striving to meet the codes’ requirements – and sometimes facing career-ending consequences should they fall short – than to have unknown writers bound to no such codes and at risk of no such consequences.

#### **Enforcement is stringent – employees will be held liable for misinformation about environmental practices.**

**Pellegrino 18**, Nicolette. “A Gap In Causation? Punishing Polluters For Contributing To Climate Change And Increasing Violent Cr.” Pace Environmental Law Review. December 11, 2018. https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/6/

Because climate change leads to migration and psychological stress, which increases the rates of rape and other violence, it is logical for the punishment of those who perpetrate environmental crimes that accelerate climate change to be greater. The vast consequences of environmental crimes that contribute to climate change authorize governments to enforce stricter sanctions. Intensifying the repercussions of perpetrating environmental crimes is likely to promote awareness of the severity of climate change and, in turn, deter individuals and businesses from hurting the environment. Currently, if an individual partakes in illegal deforestation or logging, they will face a potential penalty.127 However, if governments increase the severity of such punishments, individuals will be deterred from acting in damaging ways. The individuals participating in deforestation should not just face regulations and fines but should be criminally punished with prison time. Not only will jail time deter individuals from continuing their illegal acts, but it will also deter others from committing environmental crimes. Regarding businesses, the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA permitted the EPA to regulate GHG emissions once the Agency confirmed that GHGs contributed to climate change.128 Today, certain corporations are forced to pay large sums of money because of their emissions.129 An example is when Hyundai and Kia violated the CAA and were mandated to pay a $100 million fine and roughly $50 million to combat the damage done.130 Both large and small businesses wish to make a profit, not face sanctions or lose proceeds.131 If companies are faced with massive fines upon hurting the environment, they will be less likely to act in a manner that carries harmful consequences. However, to take it further, not only should the businesses be held liable for damaging the environment, but the individual actors who are partaking in the environmental crimes must be held personally liable, too. If an individual believes that not only will his or her company be forced to pay a substantial fine, but that they will also face civil or criminal penalties, they will be less likely to enable the environmentally hurtful conduct. In United States v. Park,132 the U.S. Supreme Court held that individuals within corporate entities would be liable for the wrongdoings of the company when “the indirect actor” occupied “a position of ‘responsibility and authority’ with regard to the criminal act or transaction.”133 Second, the “indirect actor” “must have had the power to prevent the criminal occurrence through the exercise of the highest standard of foresight and vigilance.”134 Thus, the government was able to hold individuals liable for actions for which it otherwise would have lacked the requisite element of scienter, and the individuals were allowed to prove themselves innocent if they had no power to stop the wrongful act.135 When considering the fines levied in the Hyundai-Kia settlement, it is clear that hefty fines already exist.136 Thus, to make enforcement more stringent, perhaps the fines could increase to $50 million per 1 million metric tons of GHG emissions.137 To ensure that such heavy fines are fair, one must consider the Park individual liability analysis.138 It would be unfair to hold an individual liable for something over which they had no control.139 However, similar to government-enforced “mandatory reporters” of child sexual abuse,140 governments should hold individuals liable who do not attempt to prevent their companies from participating in environmental crimes. For example, if an employee notices that their employer is violating EPA regulations, they will be mandated to report the violation to the proper authority. If they do not report, then they too will be held liable for the company’s violations. The vast implications of environmental crimes and the potential damage to public health permits such stringent punishment and regulation.

#### Warming causes extinction.

Peter Kareiva 18, Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA, et al., September 2018, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back,” Futures, Vol. 102, p. 39-50

In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (climate change, global freshwater cycle, and ocean acidification) do pose existential risks. This is because of intrinsic positive feedback loops, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all directly connected to the provision of food and water, and shortages of food and water can create conflict and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. Ample clean water is not a luxury—it is essential for human survival. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes Humans are remarkably ingenious, and have adapted to crises throughout their history. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). However, the many stories of human ingenuity successfully addressing existential risks such as global famine or extreme air pollution represent environmental challenges that are largely linear, have immediate consequences, and operate without positive feedbacks. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that very warming can cause more CO2 release which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that forest fires will become more frequent and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This catastrophic fire embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that could catch humanity off-guard and produce a true apocalyptic event. Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that runaway climate change, and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks portends even greater existential risks. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.

### 1AC – Disclosure

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions they read in the cite boxes or open source on the 2021-2022 NDCA LD Wiki or a verified messenger source for both sides they debate at TFA State 2022.

#### Violation:

Graphical user interface, text, application, chat or text message

Description automatically generatedGraphical user interface, application, website

Description automatically generated

A picture containing graphical user interface

Description automatically generated

#### Standards:

#### 1 - Engagement – disclosure allows in-depth prep before the round which checks back against unpredictable positions, it’s for reciprocal engagement where each side has an equal opportunity to prepare.

#### 2 - Small School Inclusion – Big schools will inevitably get your docs through judges, debaters, and coaches with connections to other judges only disclosure allows small schools equal access.

#### 3 - Reciprocity - They have infinite prep before round to make the perfect strategy – only our interp gives us a time to prep. Reciprocity outweighs because it controls the internal link to fairness – fairness means reciprocal access to the ballot.

**4 - Academic Ethics—disclosure deters mis-cutting, power-tagging, abuse of brackets and ellipses, and plagiarism – makes it harder to beat evidence because I can’t find all the issues in-round—it’s a real-world norm and debate loses all educational value if we can just make up cards. I cannot go through all their cards in four minutes and still manage to craft a strategy. I cannot check in round. Academic Ethics outweighs because it controls entry to universities and higher learning – biggest internal link to education, universities will kick you out if you are academically dishonest.**

**5 – verified messenger source solves – no disclosure rules bc it doesn’t go on the wiki and no way to check – don’t let them get away with the “we would have disclosed docs if u send the aff” because the AFF WAS NEW**

**6 – they will say we didn’t disclose but their methods are comparatively worse – they have ZERO docs on the wiki, we don’t know what they’ve gone for, and there’s no way to check their evidence ethics. We also broke new and disclosed plan text – they get generic DA links, all PICs, and K links, but we have no idea what their past strats are**

E – why schools fund debate

F – k2 competitve equity, concedes authority

DTD – deter abuse

CI – judge intervention

No RVIS on AC theory – encourages 7 min RVI dump that overpowers the 1AR

### 1AC - UV

#### 1 - Aff gets 1AR theory – otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive and there’s no way to check back. 1AR theory is drop the debater and competing interps – the 1ARs too short to be able to rectify abuse and adequately cover substance. No RVI because you have 6 minutes to go for them whereas I only have a 3-minute 2AR to respond so I get crushed on time skew.

#### 2 - All K Links must quote explicit lines in the because they are an infinite amount of things the AC can implicitly justify reciprocally exploding neg ground.