### 1AC - Framework

#### The metaethic is moral constructivism – prefer -

#### 1 - Strangeness—moral facts can’t be located. We only have knowledge of physical facts that can be falsified through observation. It follows that morals can only be facts about agreement or belief, since those are observable.

#### 2 - Bindingness—only constructed facts bind, since we commit ourselves to them through the acceptance of agreement or identities. If morals existed outside of us, we could rationally reject them.

#### 3 - Epistemology – meta-ethics should not just be concerned with the process of creating rules, but rather the ways that we think. Formulating correct theories requires that we understand the mind and how subjects cohere moral knowledge which means the construction of knowledge over time is valuable.

#### Political Procedures must come from agreement –

#### Governments are pluralistic with inevitable disagreement – An ethical theory dictating a government must form consensus or it freezes action through constant dispute. Outweighs because different actors have different obligations.

John **Rawls 85** Harvard Philosophy Professor Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 3. 1985. <https://www.google.com/books/edition/Twentieth_Century_Political_Theory/4T7Mob-Y4HIC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=%22It+should+be+observed+that,+on+this+view,+justification+is+not+regarded+simply+as+valid+argument+from+listed+premises,+even+should+these+premises+be+true.+Rather,+justification+is+addressed+to+others+who+disagree%22&pg=PA19&printsec=frontcover> Recut Lindale PP

Now suppose justice as fairness were to achieve its aim and a publicly acceptable political conception of justice is found. Then this conception provides a publicly recognized point of view from which all citizens can examine before one another whether or not their political and social institutions are just. It enables them to do this by citing what are recognized among them as valid and sufficient reasons singled out by that conception itself. Society's main institutions and how they fit together into one scheme of social cooperation can be examined on the same basis by each citizen, whatever that citizens social position or more particular interests. It should be observed that, on this view, justification is not regarded simply as valid argument from listed premises, even should these premises be true. Rather, justification **is addressed to others who disagree** with us, **and** therefore it **must** always **proceed from** some consensus, that is, from **premises** that **we** and others publicly recognize as true; or better, **publicly recognize as acceptable** to us **for** the purpose of **establishing a working agreement on the fundamental questions of political justice.** It goes without saying that this agreement must be informed and uncoerced, and reached by citizens in ways consistent with their being viewed as free and equal persons." Thus, **the aim of** justice as fairness as **a political conception** is practical**,** and **not metaphysical or epistemological.** That is, **it** presents itself not as a conception of justice that is true, but one that **can serve as a basis of** informed and willing **political agreement** between citizens viewed as free and equal persons. This agreement when securely founded in public political and social attitudes sustains the goods of all persons and associations within a just democratic regime. **To secure** this **agreement we** try, so far as we can, to **avoid disputed philosophical,** as well as disputedmoraland religious, **questions.** We do this not because these questions are unimportant or regarded with indifference,' but **because we** think them too important and **recognize that there is no way to resolve them politically.**

#### The only theory that can resolve pluralism is the Original Position – the Original Position is a procedure where the subject imagines being someone else. Under the Original Position I do not know where in society I am, I just know that society exists with social categories and limited resources – With this understanding I create moral principles that every other subject under the original position would hypothetically agree with.

John Rawls 99, Philosopher and Professor who taught at Harvard and some other big and prominent universities, A theory of justice, 1999 edition, <http://library.lol/main/27C4F7DAB2179426871C0945224FBF1F> Lindale PP – [Bracketed for gendered language]

One should not be misled, then, by the somewhat unusual conditions which characterize the original position. The idea here is simply to make vivid to ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for principles of justice, and therefore on these principles themselves. Thus it seems reasonable and generally acceptable that no one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances in the choice of principles. It also seems widely agreed that it should be impossible to tailor principles to the circumstances of one’s own case. We should insure further that particular inclinations and aspirations, and persons’ conceptions of their good do not affect the principles adopted. The aim is to rule out those principles that it would be rational to propose for acceptance, however little the chance of success, only if one knew certain things that are irrelevant from the standpoint of justice. For example, if [someone] ~~a man~~ knew that ~~he~~ [they] was [were] wealthy, ~~he~~ [they] might ﬁnd it rational to advance the principle that various taxes for welfare measures be counted unjust; if ~~he~~ [they] knew that ~~he~~ [they] [were] was poor, ~~he~~ [they] would most likely propose the contrary principle. To represent the desired restrictions one imagines a situation in which everyone is deprived of this sort of information. One excludes the knowledge of those contingencies which sets men at odds and allows them to be guided by their prejudices. In this manner the veil of ignorance is arrived at in a natural way. This concept should cause no difﬁculty if we keep in mind the constraints on arguments that it is meant to express. At any time we can enter the original position, so to speak, simply by following a certain procedure, namely, by arguing for principles of justice in accordance with these restrictions. It seems reasonable to suppose that the parties in the original position are equal. That is, all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing principles; each can make proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on. Obviously the purpose of these conditions is to represent equality between human beings as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of their good and capable of a sense of justice. The basis of equality is taken to be similarity in these two respects. Systems of ends are not ranked in value; and each man is presumed to have the requisite ability to understand and to act upon whatever principles are adopted. Together with the veil of ignorance, these conditions deﬁne the principles of justice as those which rational persons concerned to advance their interests would consent to as equals when none are known to be advantaged or disadvantaged by social and natural contingencies.

#### Public reason is essential to a pluralistic society – it ensures reciprocity, freedom, and dialogue.

**Fox 13**, Carl. “Public Reason, Objectivity, And Journalism In Liberal Democratic Societies.” Res Publica 19 (3). 2013. https://philpapers.org/rec/FOXPRO

When Rawls calls something political, he means that it is appropriate to a particular level of discussion, one about the preferred structure and operation of the systems of social cooperation into which we are born and must necessarily engage, and what principles and institutions we should have to govern them. Rawls’s theory of political liberalism, where he develops the ideal of public reason, is designed to have nothing to say about how people live their lives apart from their attitude towards basic political questions and towards members of other comprehensive doctrines when they engage in political debate. The principles that apply at this level must be neutral between reasonable conceptions of the good. In tandem with this, he believes that society needs ‘guidelines of inquiry: principles of reasoning and rules of evidence in the light of which citizens are to decide whether substantive principles properly apply and to identify laws and policies that best satisfy them’ (Rawls 2005, p. 224). These guidelines develop into the ideal of public reason, the point of which is ‘that citizens are to conduct their fundamental discussions within the framework of what each regards as a political conception of justice based on values that others can reasonably be expected to endorse’ (Rawls 2005, p. 226). Despite standing in opposition to comprehensive doctrines, however, this political conception does have normative content: ‘The conception of the person is worked up from the way citizens are regarded in the public political culture of a democratic society, in its basic political texts and in the historical tradition of the interpretation of those texts’ (Rawls 2003, p. 19). Certain ideas, like that of people as being free and equal, are said to be present in the public political culture of a democratic society. What this means is that, for Rawls, there are certain basic ideas that almost all of us buy into and underpin the process of thinking in terms of how we can have a political community at all. He describes comprehensive doctrines as reasonable insofar as they endorse basic respect for persons, toleration and, crucially, accept the necessity of engaging with one another in a constructive dialogue in order to maintain a pluralistic society.9 Reasonableness is the key to the legitimacy of coercive political power10 and when we act as citizens, designing or imposing laws, we owe to our fellow citizens a very particular sort of public justification for our decisions. He introduces the criterion of reciprocity to show how reasonable citizens ought to motivate their political contributions with respect to their fellow citizens; ‘they must also think it at least reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social position’ (Rawls 2005, p. 446). People will disagree as to what is the best way to organise a political community, but so long as they can come to see that their respective submissions are all reasonable then there can be a stable basis for political dialogue, and ultimately such things as legitimate laws and institutions.

#### Impact Calc - Rawls is deontological – if everyone would agree to an action under the Original Position without knowing who they are or how people act in society then the action is good. The principles are lexical – meaning the first comes before the second – that’s how you weigh between impacts.

#### Thus, the standard is Consistency with the Original Position – Prefer -

#### 1 – Ideal Theory First

#### A - Measurement – Non-Ideal theory collapses to skep because it’s impossible to measure with a constantly changing yardstick

#### B - Is-ought gap – nonideal theories can only tell us what is not what ought to be.

#### C - Reflective Equilibrium means Ideal Theory is inevitable – when we reflect on our desires we compare our desires to an ideal of what we think our desires should be – means all ethics are inevitably ideal theory and that nonuniques any DAs.

#### 2 - Ethical frameworks are topicality interpretations of the word ought so they must be theoretically justified. Prefer on resource disparities—focusing on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep excluding lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A debater under my framework can easily be won without any prep since minimal evidence is required. That controls the internal link to other voters because a pre-req to debating is access to the activity.

#### 3 - Consequences fail –

#### A - They only judge actions after they occur, which fails action guidance and proves they aren’t binding.

#### B - Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence. Probability doesn’t solve because a] Probability is improvable, as it relies on inductive knowledge, but induction from past events can’t lead to deduction of future events and b] Probability assumes causation, we can’t assume every act was actually the cause of tangible outcomes

#### C - Every action is infinitely divisible, only intents unify action because we intend the end point of an action – but consequences cannot determine what step of action is moral or not.

#### D - You can’t aggregate consequences, happiness and sadness are immutable – ten headaches don’t make a migraine – causes inaction because you don’t know what kind of consequence matters more.

### adv. one

#### Advocacy:  In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

#### 1 - Objectivity - Journalism in a democracy must be transparent and resistant to bias. This necessitates public reason as a method to stay consistent with pluralism.

**Fox 13**, Carl. “Public Reason, Objectivity, And Journalism In Liberal Democratic Societies.” Res Publica 19 (3). 2013. https://philpapers.org/rec/FOXPRO

It is not enough to present the extreme sides of an argument, or to approach both the government and the opposition for quotes. The vital role of journalism in a liberal democracy necessitates a transparent process and an ethos that is hostile to bias. With the intention of recasting the journalistic commitment to objectivity as a definite methodology, I turn now to a discussion of Rawls’s conception of public reason. Public Reason Rawls (1999, 2005) came to be deeply concerned with the implications of what he thought of as the brute fact of reasonable pluralism.5 Reasonable and rational people, intelligent and thoughtful in their attempts to understand and solve fundamental common problems seem inevitably to differ and disagree. Indeed, Rawls described several ‘burdens of judgment’, such as complex and conflicting evidence, the inherent difficulty involved in the weighting of various considerations, and the subtle and shifting subjective biases that arise of the experience of living life itself,6 so as to demonstrate the inevitability of conflict in the generation and application of foundational values and beliefs.7 These factors lead ultimately to a myriad of substantially different worldviews or comprehensive doctrines and, following Mill, he thought that it can be perfectly reasonable for people to disagree so deeply. However, while we have no option but to come to terms with reasonable pluralism, the difficulties it presents are enormous. Indeed, one of the chief tasks of political philosophy is the project of reconciling these doctrines in order to make a legitimate and stable political association a possibility. The idea of public reason is Rawls’s answer to a vital question posed by reasonable pluralism, namely; how can a political community containing many comprehensive doctrines collectively decide fundamental political questions in spite of the apparently irreconcilable conflicts generated by these doctrines? Resolving this problem provides a template for a public sphere robust enough to withstand the difficulties that trouble, for example, Habermas. For Habermas (1996, 2008), the public sphere and the ability of private people to engage in rational public communication was a purely historical development that owes its origin to the radical effect of emerging capitalist values and strategies on the feudal hierarchy of the thirteenth century. It existed only briefly and soon flickered out, extinguished by the march of the very same political, social, and economic forces which gave rise to it. What remains for autonomous individuals is to commit to his ideal discourse theory, which espouses the creation of ideal conditions where ‘everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself into the understandings of the self and the world of others’ (Habermas 1995, p. 117). Ideal role-taking, he argues, can produce a common ‘we-perspective’ which will eventually allow for undistorted communication. This is how we can (objectively) share the information we need to participate in political institutions and hold public authorities to account. The problem with using ideal discourse theory to model journalistic objectivity is that, unlike public reason, it requires a profound shift in our collective moral thinking when, if I am correct, we can follow Rawls in more pragmatically demanding that particular institutions conform to the rules of public reason.8

#### Public reason necessitates objectivity in journalism.

**Fox 13**, Carl. “Public Reason, Objectivity, And Journalism In Liberal Democratic Societies.” Res Publica 19 (3). 2013. https://philpapers.org/rec/FOXPRO

Objectivity as a Methodological Commitment to Public Reason I have already argued that objectivity, as it applies to the practice and theory of journalism, should be conceived methodologically. It is my contention that this method can be successfully characterised as that of public reason. The purpose of public reason13 is to facilitate communication by ruling out recourse to irreconcilable values and beliefs. Essentially, it entails a deliberate and reflexive effort on the part of citizens to examine their own belief systems and weed out the propositions that they cannot reasonably expect others to endorse or view as evidential when they are required in certain important contexts to engage with others who do not share them. It involves and evolves a mutual respect between persons in their political dealings. Rawls himself characterises political principles that are agreed upon by way of public reason as objective. He says: ‘a conception of objectivity must establish a public framework of thought sufficient for the concept of judgment to apply and for conclusions to be reached on the basis of reasons and evidence after discussion and due reflection. Indeed, this is required for all kinds of inquiry, whether moral, political, or scientific, or matters of common sense’ (Rawls 2005, p. 110). The public use of reason is a mode of communication that citizens approximate by eliminating the dependence of their arguments or assertions on illegitimate comprehensive assumptions.14 Journalism should aim to accomplish exactly the same goal. Divesting articles, reports, and opinion pieces of implicit biases and reliance on controversial values would succeed in rendering journalism more objective precisely because it makes it less subjective. For example, financial journalists working for the BBC must register their business interests in order to prevent potential conflicts of interest.15 Further, the purpose of a commitment to the public use of reason would be to better serve a diverse audience, the members of which are understood to be entitled to certain types of information. If journalists commit to this method then they commit to selecting and presenting facts and arguments in such a way that even those inclined to disagree with their particular angle are still compelled to acknowledge it as reasonable and, therefore, legitimate. This can establish a solid foundation for our use of information and re-establish trust in journalistic organisations because whatever else they may be, in Baggini’s terms they would be truthful. As communicators, journalists have an interest in building (or rebuilding) this relationship with the public.

#### Journalists fulfill their duty through “pragmatic objectivity”.

**Ward 09**, Stephen. “A Free And Undemocratic Press?.” Center for the Study of Ethics in Society 27:3. February 12, 2022. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1084&context=ethics\_pa pers

The short answer is this: Journalists promote public reason when they fulfill two crucial functions of democratic media - an informative and a deliberative function. On my view, journalists have a duty to improve the informational and deliberative health of citizens as public health officers are responsible for the physical health of citizens. The Informative Function What is the informative function? It is not just reporting any sort of information. It is a combination of three types of journalism that require skill and disciplined inquiry. First, accurate, contextualized reporting on events. Second, investigative journalism, as the necessary exploration of what goes on below the surface of society. And three, informed interpretation of major social areas. Intelligent context and depth of investigation these are two qualities of democratic journalism. And I will mention a third: objectivity. The informative function is best fulfilled when journalists adopt the attitude of what I call “pragmatic objectivity.”? This is not a traditional objectivity of reporting just the facts. It is about adopting an objective stance and then evaluating stories according to a set of norms. Journalists adopt the objective stance when they are disinterested. They are disinterested when they do not prejudge a story in advance but follow the facts where they lead. They are willing to put a critical distance between them and their views. Journalists then have to test their stories with a set of criteria, such as the empirical strength of their reports and their coherence with existing knowledge. Pragmatic objectivity includes the critical evaluation of claims to fact, knowledge, and expertise. Objectivity is not neutrality or perfect knowledge of reality. It is a flexible imperfect method, a way of testing stories and reducing bias. If journalists carry out these three forms of journalism objectivity, they carry out a major task of democratic media. They express views grounded in knowledge, experience, research, and a critical but open mind. They provide a reliable base for all subsequent analysis and comment.

2.45

#### 2 – Democracy - Public reason is key to democracy.

**Rawls 97**, John. “The Idea Of Public Reason Revisited.” The University of Chicago Law Review 64:3. 1997. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5633&context=uclr ev

The idea of public reason, as I understand it,' belongs to a conception of a well ordered constitutional democratic society. The form and content of this reason-the way it is understood by citizens and how it interprets their political relationship-is part of the idea of democracy itself. This is because a basic feature of democracy is the fact of reasonable pluralism-the fact that a plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines,' religious, philosophical, and moral, is the normal result of its culture of free institutions.' Citizens realize that they cannot reach agreement or even approach mutual understanding on the basis of their irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines. In view of this, they need to consider what kinds of reasons they may reasonably give one another when fundamental political questions are at stake. I propose that in public reason comprehensive doctrines of truth or right be replaced by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens.4 Central to the idea of public reason is that it neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, except insofar as that doctrine is incompatible with the essentials of public reason and a democratic polity. The basic requirement is that a reasonable doctrine accepts a constitutional democratic regime and its companion idea of legitimate law. While democratic societies will differ in the specific doctrines that are influential and active within them-as they differ in the western democracies of Europe and the United States, Israel, and India-finding a suitable idea of public reason is a concern that faces them all.

### adv. 2

#### Climate “experts” are spreading disinformation on behalf of corporate lobbyists. This halts climate legislation, dissaudes the public, and destroys international cooperation – the plan is key.

**Harkins 19**, Steven. “Why Is Climate Change Still Not Top Of The News Agenda?.” The Conversation. September 19, 2019. https://theconversation.com/why-is-climate-change-still-not-top-of-the-news-agenda- 123800

They found that a group of scientific experts challenged the consensus on climate change on behalf of corporations and conservative think tanks. Some of the individuals involved in this had previously challenged scientific consensus on a range of issues including the negative health implications of tobacco smoke. Corporations engage in this creation of doubt through public relations activity because climate change requires international cooperation on environmental legislation. By performing what Tuchman calls a “strategic ritual” of objectivity, journalists obscure the scientific consensus on climate change by reporting it as a debate. This framing makes climate breakdown seem less urgent and therefore less newsworthy. How can we improve? The notion of objectivity needs to be reclaimed through good journalism which invests resources in providing analysis and verification. News organisations are in an important position to explain complex scientific concepts in a language that most people understand, but they need to improve their scientific literacy in order to verify the relative merit of competing claims. Journalists with a better grasp of the science (and indeed social science) of climate change would be less reliant on press releases, reducing the impact of corporate lobbyists and the need to include their public relations activity as part of the news. However, these suggestions are optimistic considering the wider power structures that constrain how journalists operate.

#### Public trust in climate change information is at a low. The plan takes the pen out of agenda-driven stakeholder’s hand.

**Ellison 21**, Jude. “Why Journalists – Not Just Advocates – Need To Report On Climate Change.” The City Journal. March 31, 2021. http://thecityjournal.net/opinion/why-journalists-not-just-advocates-need-to-report- on-climate-change/

As temperatures climb, rivers rise and fires burn, the need for informed and effective coverage of climate change is clear. But who should provide that coverage? Journalists specialising in it are few and far between, particularly in the Global South. In the absence of journalistic coverage, Non Government Organisations (NGOs) have produced news releases and other content for their in-house media centres. These organisations are openly agenda-driven, leaving readers to question if their accounts are accurate and unbiased. Further, unlike most journalistic news outlets, NGOs often publish pieces without bylines. Such work can be difficult to trust – who writes them, and why aren’t the writers credited? These uncertainties give readers reason to doubt what is reported. Doubt compounds inaction, which is an unacceptable outcome for an urgent topic like climate change. But even clear attribution and commitment to fact-based reporting isn’t enough. Journalistic coverage has actively harmed the public perception of climate change’s seriousness and discouraged readers from taking action. What went wrong? Ironically, one of the values that journalists use to earn trust – balance – has caused result in the work becoming less trustworthy. One study found that in a sample of articles from the United States’ “prestige press” between 1988 and 2002, not even 6% of articles stated that human activity alone was responsible for climate change. Worse, nearly the same proportion of articles said that human activity was not responsible for climate change. More than half the articles equivocated, stating that some sources believed human activity to be responsible and some did not. Another piece said that journalists’ sources on climate change issues are not only scientists and other subject experts, but also encompass “a broader range of stakeholders” that gives page space to public relations professionals and other non-experts. The situation is no better in the Global South. A study from the Australian Centre for Independent Journalism found nearly one-third of the articles it examined “did not accept the scientific consensus that human beings are major contributors to global warming”. What could go right? So far, journalistic values have not been helpful in climate change reporting. But it doesn’t have to be that way. For example, instead of perpetuating the illusion of a “he said, she said” debate about anthropogenic climate change, journalists could honour their commitment to balance (and accuracy) by quoting multiple experts who suggest different actions for readers to take. These differences do not need to be balanced in the sense of “put at odds,” which may bewilder readers into inaction – rather, they can be balanced in the sense of “complementary,” giving readers multiple paths to meaningful engagement. Two additional journalistic values, accuracy and fairness, may also support climate change reporters. A University of Kansas study found a neutral tone is more likely than an angry one to convince readers of an issue’s seriousness, so much so that “the more coverage used anger as a way to discuss the issue, the less people felt it was important”. Also, journalistic norms around attribution (that it should be done) and transparency (that conflicts, payments and potential threats to independence should be disclosed) make journalists’ work less susceptible to the scepticism mentioned earlier around byline-free, agenda-driven NGO content. Another thing that may alleviate readers’ reservations is journalism’s code of ethics. Codes vary between regions, but in democratic societies, practitioners pledge to observe a number of guidelines that hold their work to higher standards than that of non-journalists. Adherence to professional codes of ethics is imperfect because those who adhere to them are imperfect, but it is arguably better to have named writers striving to meet the codes’ requirements – and sometimes facing career-ending consequences should they fall short – than to have unknown writers bound to no such codes and at risk of no such consequences.

#### **Enforcement is stringent – employees will be held liable for misinformation about environmental practices.**

**Pellegrino 18**, Nicolette. “A Gap In Causation? Punishing Polluters For Contributing To Climate Change And Increasing Violent Cr.” Pace Environmental Law Review. December 11, 2018. https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/6/

Because climate change leads to migration and psychological stress, which increases the rates of rape and other violence, it is logical for the punishment of those who perpetrate environmental crimes that accelerate climate change to be greater. The vast consequences of environmental crimes that contribute to climate change authorize governments to enforce stricter sanctions. Intensifying the repercussions of perpetrating environmental crimes is likely to promote awareness of the severity of climate change and, in turn, deter individuals and businesses from hurting the environment. Currently, if an individual partakes in illegal deforestation or logging, they will face a potential penalty.127 However, if governments increase the severity of such punishments, individuals will be deterred from acting in damaging ways. The individuals participating in deforestation should not just face regulations and fines but should be criminally punished with prison time. Not only will jail time deter individuals from continuing their illegal acts, but it will also deter others from committing environmental crimes. Regarding businesses, the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA permitted the EPA to regulate GHG emissions once the Agency confirmed that GHGs contributed to climate change.128 Today, certain corporations are forced to pay large sums of money because of their emissions.129 An example is when Hyundai and Kia violated the CAA and were mandated to pay a $100 million fine and roughly $50 million to combat the damage done.130 Both large and small businesses wish to make a profit, not face sanctions or lose proceeds.131 If companies are faced with massive fines upon hurting the environment, they will be less likely to act in a manner that carries harmful consequences. However, to take it further, not only should the businesses be held liable for damaging the environment, but the individual actors who are partaking in the environmental crimes must be held personally liable, too. If an individual believes that not only will his or her company be forced to pay a substantial fine, but that they will also face civil or criminal penalties, they will be less likely to enable the environmentally hurtful conduct. In United States v. Park,132 the U.S. Supreme Court held that individuals within corporate entities would be liable for the wrongdoings of the company when “the indirect actor” occupied “a position of ‘responsibility and authority’ with regard to the criminal act or transaction.”133 Second, the “indirect actor” “must have had the power to prevent the criminal occurrence through the exercise of the highest standard of foresight and vigilance.”134 Thus, the government was able to hold individuals liable for actions for which it otherwise would have lacked the requisite element of scienter, and the individuals were allowed to prove themselves innocent if they had no power to stop the wrongful act.135 When considering the fines levied in the Hyundai-Kia settlement, it is clear that hefty fines already exist.136 Thus, to make enforcement more stringent, perhaps the fines could increase to $50 million per 1 million metric tons of GHG emissions.137 To ensure that such heavy fines are fair, one must consider the Park individual liability analysis.138 It would be unfair to hold an individual liable for something over which they had no control.139 However, similar to government-enforced “mandatory reporters” of child sexual abuse,140 governments should hold individuals liable who do not attempt to prevent their companies from participating in environmental crimes. For example, if an employee notices that their employer is violating EPA regulations, they will be mandated to report the violation to the proper authority. If they do not report, then they too will be held liable for the company’s violations. The vast implications of environmental crimes and the potential damage to public health permits such stringent punishment and regulation.

#### Warming causes extinction.

Peter Kareiva 18, Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA, et al., September 2018, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back,” Futures, Vol. 102, p. 39-50

In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (climate change, global freshwater cycle, and ocean acidification) do pose existential risks. This is because of intrinsic positive feedback loops, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all directly connected to the provision of food and water, and shortages of food and water can create conflict and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. Ample clean water is not a luxury—it is essential for human survival. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes Humans are remarkably ingenious, and have adapted to crises throughout their history. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). However, the many stories of human ingenuity successfully addressing existential risks such as global famine or extreme air pollution represent environmental challenges that are largely linear, have immediate consequences, and operate without positive feedbacks. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that very warming can cause more CO2 release which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that forest fires will become more frequent and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This catastrophic fire embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that could catch humanity off-guard and produce a true apocalyptic event. Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that runaway climate change, and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks portends even greater existential risks. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.

### AFC

#### Interpretation: The negative must concede the affirmative framework if it has an impact calc section that allows for negative ground and if it’s Rawlsian.

#### Violation: It’s preemptive

#### Standards:

#### 1 - Planks solve their offense – prevents any auto affirm frameworks and allows for clash on the advantage through the impact calc section.

#### 2 - Inclusion – Rawls forces people to think about their subject position and privilege they have in the world compared to other groups – spills over to worldview.

#### 3 - Time skew - Winning the negative framework moots 6 minutes of 1AC offense and forces a 1AR restart against a 7 min 1NC – that outweighs on quantifiability and reversibility – I can’t get back time lost and it’s the only way to measure abuse.

#### 4 - Prep skew- We can’t predict every single negative framework before round but they know the resolution coming into round which makes pre-tournament prep impossible. Especially true since there are millions of K’s and NC’s that could negate - Prep skew outweighs -

#### A - Sequencing- It’s a perquisite engaging in-round since you need prep to debate

#### B - Engagement- It ruins the quality and depth of discussions that make debate rounds educational.

#### DTD – Time spent on theory cant be compensated for, the 1ar would be skewed, and its key to deterring abuse .

#### Prefer Competing interps -

#### 1. reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention.

#### 2. it Causes a race to the bottom where debaters push the limit as to how reasonably abusive, they can be.

#### No rvis on AC theory – splits the 1AR between RVI, shell, and substance against 1NC brute force RVI dump

### UV

#### 1 - Aff gets 1AR theory – otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive and there’s no way to check back. 1AR theory is drop the debater and competing interps – the 1ARs too short to be able to rectify abuse and adequately cover substance. No RVI because you have 6 minutes to go for them whereas I only have a 3-minute 2AR to respond so I get crushed on time skew.

#### 2 - RVI on NC theory – you can read arguments such as T that are exclusively neg so I need them to compensate and weighing is structurally unfair since the 7-4-6-3 time skew means that the neg can just dump on weighing and the 2ar becomes impossible.

#### Democracy in the status quo is already on the decline

**Rosenfeld 1/7**, Sam. “Perspective | Democracy Is on the Brink of Disaster. for Voters, It's Politics as Usual.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 7 Jan. 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/01/07/democracy-threat-voters-politics/.

it was the scariest of times, it was the stablest of times. Contemporary American politics offers an unsettling study in contrasts. On the one hand, Donald Trump’s lies about a stolen presidential election in 2020 and his attempts to undo the results of that contest, culminating in the violent storming of the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, provide blaring warning signs that our democratic system is in peril. Far from turning on Trump, a large portion of his party has continued his project: In 2021, Republican state legislatures passed new restrictions on voting access while attempting to seize control of the levers of election administration; meanwhile, GOP congressional leaders moved to isolate Republican lawmakers most critical of Trump’s conduct and claims. And the House’s Jan. 6 committee continues to unearth evidence that Republican House members schemed with the White House to overturn the election. Worries about the state of American democracy didn’t begin when Trump rejected the election’s results — indeed, they predate his entrance into politics. For the last two decades, analysts have connected dysfunction in governance to deepening party polarization, marked by an asymmetrical Republican shift toward procedural hardball and extremism. Trump’s rise both extended and accelerated a disturbing trend. When he trafficked in authoritarian rhetoric and brazenly mixed personal and public power — while steadily consolidating the loyalty of his party — analysts portrayed it as a lesson in “How Democracies Die” and “How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy.” As nearly 200 scholars with relevant expertise warned last summer: “Our entire democracy is now at risk.” But for all the alarm and political tumult caused by recent developments in the Republican Party, voting behavior has not changed in response; it’s shown remarkable stability and continuity with patterns established at the outset of the century. Trump himself, in 2016, probably performed worse than a more conventional GOP candidate would have — reflecting what three political scientists termed the “Trump tax” in lost votes that year — but the degree of underperformance was quite modest. In 2018, boosted by historic turnout, Democrats had a banner midterm election year, but their 40-seat gain in the House was still comparable to past “wave” elections for the party that didn’t control the White House. (It was smaller than what Republicans gained in 2010, the year of the tea party revolt, though with a bigger popular-vote margin owing to Democrats’ less-efficient distribution of voters across districts.) The 2020 election was a chance for the public to render a decisive verdict on Trump and his strongman tendencies. It featured further turbocharged turnout but stunning continuity with 2016 in the overall distribution of results. The electoral record shows that Trump’s presidency mainly accelerated patterns of polarization by age, education, geography and religiosity. (One of the important exceptions involved a shift in Trump’s favor: his gains among Hispanic voters.) President Biden and his party’s current grim poll numbers and poor performances in November’s gubernatorial elections, meanwhile, confirm that electoral dynamics continue to follow normal patterns after Trump, with the presidential party suffering at midterm. For those paying attention to the news, the concurrence of both realities — democratic doom and electoral business as usual — can’t help but feel dissonant, as one hammer blow after another to the ordinary course of politics leaves nary a mark on election outcomes. If citizens in a democracy don’t shift their voting patterns when the standard-bearer of one party rejects the results of an election, what would lead them to change their minds? The simultaneity of democratic peril and electoral politics as usual can be partly explained by one of the most potent forces in modern politics: partisanship. First, an intensified sense of partisan teamsmanship allows political elites to go for broke in pursuit of their enemies’ defeat — helping to explain why Republican insiders might condone Trump’s authoritarian bent in the service of sticking it to the “Democrat Party.” And second, partisan identity powerfully anchors ordinary voters’ choices at the ballot box, even when a particular candidate transgresses one norm after another. Whatever the causes, today’s mixture of ordinary and extraordinary politics underscores the notion that the American republic is more likely to perish with a whimper than with a bang — not through violent insurrection but rather through the piecemeal subversion of another closely fought election. Snow coats the Capitol dome after Monday’s storm. If historical patterns hold despite the current political turmoil, Democrats will lose congressional seats in this year’s midterm elections. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post) Putting the fate of democracy momentarily aside, the abiding sturdiness of electoral dynamics certainly augurs gloomy tidings for Democrats this year. Two governor’s races last fall offered an early taste. The party’s candidates lost in Virginia and won in New Jersey, but they got, respectively, 12 and 13 points less than Biden’s 2020 vote share — confirming that the basic laws of political physics in normal times are still operational. (The time-honored pattern of losses for the presidential party in off-year and midterm elections can be attributed to a combination of depressed turnout for the president’s party, compared with its presidential election performance, and predictable shifts in public opinion against that party’s policy direction, shifts that are sometimes compared to the response of a thermostat to temperature changes.) There are plausible reasons to expect the electoral environment to improve for Democrats by November: Inflation might subside, as gas prices have already begun to, while the economy continues to grow, and congressional Democrats might still break through the painful negotiating stage to get a Build Back Better package passed. But there’s no reason whatsoever to think that any such reversal would be enough to save the party from significant election losses in the fall, barring extraordinary events. So should Democrats scream from the rooftops that they are the republic’s last hope? Maybe not. Enduring electoral stability amid democratic peril suggests that messaging focused on democracy and its vulnerability has limited voter appeal. Tactically, such arguments may come across as too abstract to be motivating, particularly to swing voters, who are disproportionately less engaged with politics than partisans are. A recognition of this reality is clearly what inclined congressional Democratic leaders, in the 2018 midterm campaign, to emphasize Trump-free “kitchen table” appeals such as prescription drug pricing and to initially resist impeaching Trump — to the bewildered frustration of many progressives. In a more profound sense, many Americans’ commitment to democracy and the principles necessary to sustain it may simply be thinner than commonly thought. Recent survey experiments have confirmed what election results suggest: that Americans just don’t feel all that compelled to punish politicians for transgressing democratic norms, especially if they have to make partisan and ideological trade-offs to do it. For example, a survey by the organization Bright Line Watch, founded by political scientists concerned about the future of democracy in America, presented participants with hypothetical candidates for “an upcoming election.” The candidates were given randomly assigned genders, policy positions, party affiliations and stances on democratic values (such as a commitment to keeping law enforcement investigations of politicians free of partisan influence), among other characteristics. Respondents were about 19 percentage points more likely to vote for a candidate of their own party than the opposite party, regardless of their stances on policy issues and democratic values. Republicans and Democrats alike did disfavor candidates who signaled a clear willingness to politicize investigations — but only by four and five percentage points, respectively, all other things being equal. Candidates’ positions on taxing the rich, on the other hand, had twice as much influence for both parties. And actual voters may be even less likely to punish politicians for violating norms. The academic findings stem from studies in which anti-democratic positions are stipulated as fact, whereas in the real world such information is heavily mediated through partisan communication. An October Grinnell College poll showing that a higher share of Republicans than Democrats believe that American democracy is in danger — 71 percent vs. 35 percent — suggests the influence of such mediation, as does a more recent Washington Post-ABC poll showing a significantly higher proportion of Republicans than Democrats expressing doubt that their vote will be counted in this year’s midterm elections: Large numbers of Republicans, after all, have imbibed false claims about rampant Democratic voter fraud. In the face of genuine efforts to subvert practices intrinsic to democracy’s functioning — above all the acceptance of electoral outcomes and the transfer of power — voters’ general lack of responsiveness is not just troubling in its own right. By showing that there is little electoral penalty to be paid for such efforts, citizens give politicians an incentive to pursue these strategies and ease the path to office for anti-democratic actors. As Washington Post columnist Perry Bacon Jr. concluded after analyzing what he called the “fairly normal” results in Virginia and New Jersey: “With U.S. democracy on the precipice because of the extremism of the current GOP, everyone needs to understand that normal could well be catastrophic.” That’s why Democrats staring down an electoral buzz saw should pursue reforms that bolster democracy while they still can, suspending or ending the filibuster in the process if necessary. Dropping the filibuster to pass the Freedom to Vote Act should be a no-brainer, for example: The bill would prohibit extreme partisan gerrymandering; provide baseline standards for voter access, including automatic voter registration and uniform early and mail voting standards; and offer (admittedly modest) protections against state-level election subversion, such as empowering election administrators to sue if they are removed from office for political reasons. When it comes to safeguarding democratic procedures, there’s no alternative but for leaders to lead. But ultimately, of course, the principal responsibility resides with the GOP. As we’ve seen, many Republicans also perceive looming threats to democracy and to their survival as a party, in the form of voting rules that they consider overly permissive, inviting allegedly rampant fraud. The supposed need to thwart such threats serves to motivate and justify anti-democratic tactics. Recent contests suggest, though, that Republican electoral fears are as unwarranted as the evidence of fraud is scant: They confirm that the party remains perfectly competitive at the ballot box. Partly, it’s true, the GOP’s ability to keep winning elections is due to structural biases that give it a bump in the Senate, House and electoral college, but it’s not entirely due to those biases. Republicans picked up 13 House seats in 2020, and Trump came within 45,000 votes of another electoral college victory. In Virginia, Republican Glenn Youngkin won an outright majority in November’s gubernatorial election in a state that had looked solidly blue. Neither ongoing demographic change nor the recent increases in overall voter participation, it turns out, have stopped Republicans from winning elections without anti-democratic tactics. It would be helpful if more Republicans recognized that normal politics still gives them a perfectly good shot at victory — and that they don’t need to burn the house down to win power. But the party’s recent illiberal turn has deep roots, drawing on currents of extremism and procedural ruthlessness on the American right that stretch back many decades — and the very fact that the electoral punishment for transgressing democratic norms is so slight means Republicans have no need to grapple with the trade-off if they don’t wish to.

#### The harms of advocacy journalism are clear - it increases polarization by forcing people to pick sides.

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Research in journalism ethics typically focuses on the actions, intent and duty of practitioners rather than the expectations of the public at whom messages are directed. When we do devote attention to the public, we find them to be increasingly critical of journalism. Polling data reveals that the public widely believes the press to be inaccurate, one-sided and lacking independence (Pew Research Center, 2011). Interestingly, these criticisms represent precisely the inverse of the ideals espoused by journalistic codes of ethics. For example, the Associated Press Media Editors (1994) Statement of Ethical Principles affirms that “The good newspaper is fair, accurate, honest, responsible, independent and decent” while remaining impartial and dispassionate. Similar statements advocating independence, accuracy and impartiality can be found in the American Society of News Editors (1975) Statement of Principles, while the Society of Professional Journalists (1996) Code of Ethics emphasizes accuracy, fairness and independence. This essay traces the development of alternatives to the ethical value of objectivity over the past several decades, assesses the decline in public trust of the media during the same period and outlines several perceived causes of that decline. It further examines the public perception of disparity between the ethical actions of journalists and the ideals laid down in journalistic codes of ethics, presenting a call for renewed attention to the traditional ethical value of objectivity in journalism. Objectivity as a Norm Journalism has long been accorded a vital role in democracy. As Alexis de Tocqueville (1899) observed: When the right of every citizen to a share in the government of society is acknowledged, everyone must be presumed to be able to choose between the various opinions of his contemporaries and to appreciate the different facts from which inferences may be drawn. The sovereignty of the people and the liberty of the press may therefore be regarded as correlative (para. 6). When de Tocqueville published Democracy in America in 1835, the role of the press had begun to increasingly be seen as that of providing “objective” news rather than a “partisan viewpoint” as had previously been the norm (Schudson, 1981, p. 4). Objectivity as an ethical value evolved over the next 150 years to become the “supreme deity” of American journalism and a general expectation of the public (Mindich, 2000, p. 1). While challenges to objectivity have existed throughout its history as a journalistic value, they gained a substantial measure of support in the latter decades of the 21st century. By the mid-1990s, “public” or “civic” journalism had arisen as a proactive response to the public's opinion that, rather than help society solve its problems, the media were getting in the way of solutions (Merritt, 1995). Harkening back to the recommendations of the Hutchins Commission (1947), public journalism encouraged journalists to reconnect with their communities, strengthen civic culture and persuade citizens to play a more active role in politics and self-governance (Friedland, Rosen, & Austin, 1994). Some supporters worried that this new form of journalism could become an excuse for journalists to engage in subjective journalism reporting “from a clearly stated point of view” (Meyer, 1995, para. 24). But as the movement caught on in universities, as well as a number of media outlets, many began to rethink strict adherence to objectivity as an ethical value. In 1996, the Society of Professional Journalists elected to remove all references to the previously enshrined “objectivity” when it revised its Code of Ethics, opting instead for values such as fairness and accountability (Black, 1998). By the turn of the century, interest in public journalism had begun to wane and attention turned to a trend re-emerging in the new online environment—“citizen journalism,” which some proponents thought of as “Public Journalism 2.0” (Rosenberry & St. John, 2010). Citizen journalism, sometimes referred to as “participatory journalism,” calls upon citizens to go beyond serving as sources, subjects and receivers of the news and instead take an active role in producing journalism. Yet, despite the initial promise of presenting a true alternative to traditional media outlets, many citizen journalism projects have fallen flat. Thorson, Duffy, Lacy, & Riffe (2009) concluded that “Citizen journalism today is far from fulfilling the promise that many early proponents envisioned. It is clear that such enterprises are not replacements for legacy news media and the newsgathering capabilities of [the] professional newsroom” (para. 8). Meanwhile, Lowery & Anderson (2006) found that citizen journalism weakens journalistic authority and blurs the line between traditional news and other information sources, such as public relations practitioners and politicians. The broader the definition of “journalism,” the more media outlets could become vulnerable to criticism engendered by actions of participants outside the scope of traditional journalism. Advocacy Journalism Public journalism and, for the most part, citizen journalism can be viewed as examples of advocacy journalism, a form of journalism that endeavors to be fact-based, but does not separate editorial opinion from news coverage and often approaches the news from a specific viewpoint. Advocacy journalists distinguish the “good guys” from the “bad guys” and “actively participate in the debate, becoming more activists than observers of the events” (Ruigrok, 2010). Thus, they can be said to exhibit the same kind of “interventionist impulse” that scholars such as Hanitzsch (2007, p. 373) see at work in public journalism. Advocacy journalism has been at times credited with everything from combating “the moral failings of Western governments” (Hammond, 2002, p. 178) to offering "a more progressive notion of experts and expertise by citing community members while critiquing or pointedly ignoring dominant discourses from government and academic ‘experts’” (Heitner, 2009, p. 405). It has been tied to peace journalism (Kempf, 2007), “alternative” publications (Waisbord, 2009) and environmental journalism (Waisbord & Peruzzotti, 2009) among others. Some scholars contend that advocacy journalists can be assumed to write from a “leftist” point of view (Craig, 2004, p. 240), often as a counterweight to the “inherently conservative” notion of objectivity (Glasser, 1984, para. 3), which some argue serves as a tool to “help the powerful maintain order” (Ryan, 2009. p. 8). Many other scholars contend that any liberal bias on the part of journalists is more than offset by a conservative bias among owners. For example, Parry (2003) notes that “media owners historically have enforced their political views and other preferences by installing senior editors whose careers depend on delivering a news product that fits with the owner’s prejudices.” Advocacy journalism has been seen at work in mainstream journalism as well (Schultz, 2013). As Downie & Schudson (2009) reported, “in the plurality of the American media universe, advocacy journalism is not endangered—it is growing” (para. 17). Public Perception of Journalism Scholarly investigation into the public’s perception of journalism has tended to focus on media credibility and trust. Early research in this area examined credibility primarily along two fronts: source credibility and medium credibility. Source credibility studies date back at least to Hovland & Weiss (1951), who examined the impact of “untrustworthy” sources on the reception of content. This research has influenced a wide variety of studies involving sources used by the media into this century. Manning (2001) examined source credibility as an element in political and socio-economic control of the news, finding that mainstream journalists tended to rely upon official or elite sources in their work, thus granting advantages to the powerful. Alternative media may mitigate this effect by making use of sourcing routines that emphasize “ordinary” sources as opposed to those favored by mainstream media (Atton & Wickendon, 2005). Source diversity, e.g., the inclusion of both governmental and non-governmental sources, has been shown to increase perceived credibility of articles about risk issues (Cozma, 2006). It also led to examination of individual journalists as sources themselves (Messner & Distaso, 2008; Phillips, 2010; Nah & Chung, 2012). In addition to looking at the credibility of journalists as sources, scholars have also examined the trustworthiness of specific media as channels—otherwise known as media credibility. Roper’s (1985) decades-long examination of perceived credibility among radio, television, magazines and newspapers showed that audiences consistently reported television as the medium they would be most inclined to believe when faced with conflicting versions of the same story. That trend began to reverse in recent decades. Kiousis (2001) looked at how audiences perceived news credibility among print, television and online media. The research indicated that media consumers, skeptical of all three media, gave especially low marks to television—a move away from the higher credibility ratings given to television in previous studies (e.g., Gaziano & McGrath, 1986). Others have examined media credibility within the framework of “trust.” Kohring & Matthes (2007) suggested a move away from attempting to assess credibility, which they found theoretically and methodologically troublesome, and toward evaluating “trust.” Their multidimensional scale measures trust in terms of selectivity of topics, selectivity of facts, accuracy of depictions and journalistic assessment such as commentary and explicit calls for action. The move toward trust stems from earlier research by Tsfati & Capella (2003), who found distrust or skepticism of the media correlated negatively and significantly with consumption of mainstream news. Those who distrusted media content were less likely to consume mainstream news and more likely to seek out alternative sources. Additional research by Tsfati (2003) indicated that media skeptics were also less likely to exhibit the effects of agenda-setting than non-skeptics. Media skeptics themselves tended to be more conservative, leading the researcher to question whether those who were more resistant to the agenda-setting effects of the media appeared so because of media skepticism, conservative orientation or some combination of the two. Observations of decreased trust in the media have been supported by numerous surveys conducted in recent years, which continue to show a steep and steady worsening of the public's perception of the media. A 2012 Gallup poll found that 60% of Americans “have little or no trust in the mass media to report the news fully, accurately and fairly” (Morales, 2012). A similar poll by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press [Pew] (2012) showed a sharp fall in media credibility, with every news outlet in the survey experiencing a double-digit drop in believability ratings during the previous decade. Partisanship and Media Credibility The 2012 Pew poll notes huge partisan gaps in media credibility ratings between Democrats and Republicans. Of the 13 news organizations included in the survey, only FOX News was rated more highly by Republicans than Democrats, and even that had fallen 10 percentage points in believability ratings since the previous poll in 2010. Predictably, Republicans gave the lowest believability ratings to MSNBC (32%), The New York Times (37%) and CNN (40%). Just as predictably, Democrats gave their only low believability rating to FOX News (37%). With few exceptions at the extremes, believability ratings among Independents looked far more like that of Republicans than Democrats. Media believability ratings for the 13 news organizations among Independents were on average 5% (2.46 points) higher than Republicans and 24% (16 points) lower than Democrats. Source: 2012 Pew Research report (p. 6) The poll showed a drop in media credibility for all news organizations among members of both parties over the course of the previous decade. Every one of the 13 news organizations received a lower credibility rating in 2012 than 2002. However, the decline was much more substantial among Republicans. Among Democrats, half of the noted declines were within the margin of error. (However, no value was given for The New York Times in 2002.) Only the credibility decline for “Local TV News” fell within the margin of error for Republicans. Clearly, Republicans are skeptical of news organizations, and their mistrust has deepened substantially over the past decade. One might be tempted to blame Republican skepticism on the “hostile media” phenomenon identified by Vallone, Ross, & Lepper (1985). Hostile media phenomenon points to the effect of partisanship on the assessment of media bias, noting that strong partisans on both sides of an issue view the media as being biased against their side. However, like the 2012 Pew poll, research on American media has increasingly shown trust varying along political lines. For example, Oh, Park, & Wanta (2011) found that, while hostile media phenomena existed for both political parties, they were much greater for Republicans than for Democrats. Moreover, they noted that Democrats experienced a higher incidence of biased assimilation. In other words, Democrats in the study were more likely to view the media as supporting their own views, whereas Republicans were more likely to see the media as hostile to their views. Jones (2004) observed that trust in the media has a marked connection to political partisanship with strong Democrats representing the largest group of participants who “just about always” trust the media and strong Republicans making up the largest group who “almost never” do so (p. 66). Nearly 40% of all Republicans could be classified as media skeptics, according to the study. Instead of falling along a normal bell-shaped curve, with large amounts of trust in the middle and small amounts at each end, the data are skewed to one side with strong Democrats exhibiting an unusual amount of trust in the media and strong Republicans an unusual amount of mistrust. Allegations of Liberal Bias A number of books in the popular press (e.g., Goldberg, 2001; Stossel, 2004; Anderson, 2005; Bozell, 2004) have attempted to attribute the growing mistrust of journalism to inherent liberal bias within the media.

#### Hyperpartisanship, or excessive splitting of sides, is enough to destroy democracy.

**Drutman 17**, Lee. “Hyperpartisanship Could Destroy US Democracy.” Vox, Vox, 5 Sept. 2017, https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/9/5/16227700/hyperpartisanship-identity-american-democracy-problems-solutions-doom-loop.

It’s December 2020, and President Donald Trump has still refused to concede that he lost the tumultuous presidential election. A month earlier, Sen. Kamala Harris narrowly defeated Trump. Even though the incumbent held onto the Rust Belt states he had gained in 2016, record-high minority turnout gave Harris narrow wins in Arizona, Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina. Democrats also narrowly took back both the House and the Senate, with razor-thin pickups in North Carolina and Georgia. The urban/rural partisan divide continued to widen. And for the first time in American history, a majority of one party’s voters (the Democrats) were nonwhite. The Trump campaign demanded recounts in the four states Harris narrowly won, blaming “illegal voting” and Chinese hacking. Recounts confirmed the original totals. Trump dismissed the recounts. With the balance of power in both the Senate and House potentially implicated as well, House Speaker Kevin McCarthy and Senate Majority Leader John Thune quietly backed the Trump administration. Sen. Harris, daughter of Indian and Jamaican immigrants, gained momentum early with a strong pro-immigrant, pro-civil rights campaign that electrified the Democratic base. A former prosecutor, she promised to intervene with an even hand in the increasingly contentious battles over policing and to prosecute Trump once and for all for collaborating with Russia. Though special prosecutor Robert Mueller indicted and convicted a few Trump campaign affiliates in early 2018, Trump kept up the drumbeat about a “witch hunt,” containing the damage. Trump ran a brutal campaign, accusing Harris of harboring a secret plan to implement Sharia Law in the US, and promising to open our borders and grant amnesty to millions of “illegals.” He repeatedly said that if Harris stole the presidency (he never acknowledged she could win legitimately), America may as well surrender to radical Islam. After the recounts, Trump held increasingly large rallies in Arizona, Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina, saying a Democratic victory would mark the “end of America.” He openly encouraged violence if Harris failed to concede. Nobody knew what would happen if Trump had to be forcibly removed from the White House. Could something like this really happen here? The prospect may be remote. But it feels a lot more likely now than at any other time in the past 150 years. American democracy, like all political systems, rests on norms. Rules can only save us if they are agreed upon and respected. For a long time, we collectively assumed that respect for elections and peaceful transfer of power were so sacred to the stability of our political system that nobody would ever challenge them. But in 2016, Trump, a major party candidate, promised to keep the country in suspense over whether he would concede if he lost. (Since he won, we’ll never know what would have happened had he pressed the issue.) For a long time, we assumed that while we might have strong political disagreements with each other, there were certain neutral arbiters in society whose authority we would all respect and abide by. There were enough generally agreed-upon facts that our disputes wouldn’t threaten the foundations of our political system. But for years now, we’ve been retreating into our separate tribal epistemologies, each with their own increasingly incompatible set of facts and first premises. We’re entering a politics where the perceived stakes are higher and higher (“the fate of our nation lies in the balance”) that they justify increasingly extreme means. When it is a war of good versus evil, “norms” and “fair play” seem like quaint anachronisms. President Trump Holds Rally In Phoenix, Arizona Our politics is increasingly divided into two camps, neither of which understands or respects the other. Ralph Freso/Getty Images We often talk about this in terms of record-high polarization. This is quantitatively true: Both elites and voters are now highly separated into partisan camps. But qualitatively, this is something more. It’s not just how much we are divided, but more fundamentally how we are divided. The core problem is that the fundamental disagreement in our politics is now over what it means to be an American — it’s over what our nation’s core values are. And that has historically spelled trouble. Recent events in Charlottesville bring these divisions into sharp relief: Can “very fine people” march alongside Neo-Nazis? Do counterprotesters on the alleged “alt-left” deserve just as much (or maybe even more) of the blame for any violence? Do Confederate generals deserve commemoration in our public squares? Answers to these questions reveal very different visions of both the past and the future of our country. And they break overwhelmingly along partisan lines. To the political left, Donald Trump is un-American: His xenophobic, racist rhetoric stands in opposition to the true American vision of tolerance. It’s an affront to our nation of immigrants, a country in which equality is written into our founding documents. Any Republican who supports or voted for him is guilty by association. To the political right, it’s the Democrats who are un-American. They denigrate our founding as a Christian nation and want to secularize everything. They want to sacrifice our sovereignty to globalist institutions under the guise of invented problems like global warming and to undermine our exceptional heritage by opening our borders to anybody, even those who want to blow us up. There is only one “real America” and it doesn’t include the coasts or cities where many Democrats live. We now have two political parties with very different and increasingly irreconcilable ideas about what it means to be American, and, perhaps more saliently, what it is to be un-American. Political scientists have documented how the spirited disagreements that used to characterize our political system have turned to rancor and disdain. Democrats and Republicans alike are far more likely today than they were only a few decades ago to say their rivals are not just wrong but stupid, selfish, and close-minded This statistic is particularly telling: In 1960, only 5 percent of Republicans and 4 percent of Democrats said they would be displeased if their son or daughter married somebody with the opposing party affiliation. In 2010, 49 percent of Republicans said they would be unhappy if their son or daughter married a Democrat, and 33 percent of Democrats said they’d be unhappy if their son or daughter married a Republican. My strong hunch is that if this survey were conducted in 2017, those percentages would be even higher.

#### Democratic leadership solves great power war.

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To answer these questions, we lack a crystal ball, but theory and history can serve as a guide they suggest a clear answer: democracies enjoy a built-in advantage in long-run geopolitical competitions.¶ The idea that democracies are better able to accumulate and maintain power in the international system has a distinguished pedigree. Polybius, Machiavelli, and Montesquieu are among the classical political theorists who argued that republican forms of government are best able to harness available domestic resources toward national greatness. And recent social science research concurs. For the past two decades, cutting-edge research in economics and political science has been obsessed with the issue of whether democracies are different and the consistent finding is that they perform a number of key functions better than their autocratic counterparts. They have higher long-run rates of economic growth.13 They are better able to raise debt in international capital markets and become international financial centers.14 They build stronger and more reliable alliances.15 They are more effective in international coercive diplomacy.16 They are less likely to fight wars (at least against other democracies).17 And they are more likely to win the wars that they fight.18¶ This book takes this line of argument a step further by aggregating these narrower findings into a broader theory about the relative fitness of democracy and autocracy in great power political competitions. The central argument of this book is that democracies do better in major power rivalries. After all, it is not much of a logical leap to assume that states that systematically perform better on these important economic, diplomatic, and military tasks will do better in long-run geopolitical competitions than those that do not¶ This hunch is supported by the empirical record. As this book will show, autocrats often put up a good fight, but they fail to ultimately seize lasting global leadership. Napoleon, Hitler, and the Soviet Union are among the examples of authoritarian nations that launched campaigns for world domination, but came up short. On the other hand, states with relatively more open forms of government have often been able to establish themselves as the international system’s leading state, from Athens and the Roman Republic in the Ancient world to British Empire and the United States in more recent times. According to some scholars, the world’s leading state since the 1600s has also been among its most democratic. 19 It is hard to argue with an undefeated record of four centuries and counting.¶ America’s greatest strength in its coming competition with Russia and China, therefore, is not its military might or economic strength, but its institutions. For all of its faults, America’s fundamentals are still better than Russia’s and China’s. There is good reason to believe, therefore, that the American era will endure and the autocratic challenges posed by China and Russia will run out of steam.¶ The idea that democracies dominate may seem counterintuitive. After all, throughout history many have argued that dictators have a foreign policy advantage. 20 Autocrats can be ruthless when necessary, but democracies are constrained by public opinion and ethical and legal concerns. Autocrats take decisive action, but democracies dither in endless debate. Autocrats strategically plan for the long-term while democracies cannot see beyond a two or four-year election cycle. Many today laud Russia and China’s autocratic systems for precisely these reasons. Russians play chess and Chinese play go, but Americans play checkers, as the aphorism has it.¶ It is true that autocracies are better at taking swift and bold action, but impulsive decisions uninformed by vigorous public debate often result in spectacular failure. Hitler, for example, was able to harness new technology to create Blitzkrieg warfare and conquer much of Europe, but he also invaded Russia in winter and needlessly declared war on the United States. Unfortunately, for autocracies, this story is all too common. As Machiavelli wrote in his Discourses on Livy in the 16th century: “Fewer errors will be seen in the people than in the prince—and those lesser and having greater remedies.”21 “Hence it arises that a republic has greater life and has good fortune longer than a principality.”22¶ There is good reason to hope that this argument is true because continued American leadership would be beneficial to the United States and the rest of the free world. The decline of American power would certainly be unwelcome for the United States. Americans have certainly grown accustomed to the benefits that accrue to the world’s leading power. But billions of others also have a stake in America’s success. For all of its faults, the United States has been a fairly benevolent hegemon. While far from perfect, it has gone to extraordinary lengths to provide security, promote economic development, and nurture democracy and human rights. The world is certainly safer, richer, and more free today than it was before the dawn of the American era.¶ There is little reason to believe that Russia and China will be as kind. These autocratic powers long to establish spheres of influence in their near abroad and they have shown little concern for the sovereignty or personal freedoms of their own citizens or subjected populations. If readers doubt these claims, they can simply ask citizens of American allies in Eastern Europe or East Asia whether they desire continued American leadership, or whether they would prefer to live under the thumb of Moscow and Beijing, respectively.¶ Even more consequentially for the globe, however, the decline of the United States could very well result in a major war. As noted above, international relations theory maintains that the decline of one dominant power and the rise of another often results in great power war.23