# 1AC

## 1AR

#### **1 - Capitalism is inevitable, adaptive, and alternatives are comparatively worse.**

[Meltzer](http://public.tepper.cmu.edu/facultydirectory/FacultyDirectoryProfile.aspx?id=98) 09 Dr. Allan H. Meltzer, economist and professor of Political Economy at Carnegie Mellon University’s Tepper School of Business in Pittsburgh (The eighth lecture in the 2008-2009 Bradley Lecture series, 3/9/2009, “There is no better alternative than capitalism”, [http://hiram7.wordpress.com/2009/03/12/there-is-no-better-alternative-than-capitalism/)//](http://hiram7.wordpress.com/2009/03/12/there-is-no-better-alternative-than-capitalism/)//jk)

**There is no better alternative than capitalism** as a social system **for providing growth and personal freedom. The alternatives offer less freedom and lower growth. The “better alternatives” that people imagine are almost always someone’s idea of utopia**. Libraries are full of books on utopia. **Those that have been tried have not survived** or flourished. **The most common reason for failure is that one person or group’s utopian ideal is unsatisfactory for others** who live subject to its rules. Either the rules change or they are enforced by authorities. Capitalism, particularly democratic capitalism, includes the means for orderly change. **Critics of capitalism look for viable alternatives to support. They do not recognize that**, unlike Socialism, **capitalism is adaptive, not rigid. Private ownership of the means of production flourishes in many different cultures**. Recently **critics of capitalism discovered the success of Chinese capitalism as an alternative to American capitalism. Its main feature is mercantilist policies supported by rigid controls on capital**. China’s progress takes advantage of an American or western model–the open trading system–and the willingness of the United States to run a current account balance. China is surely more authoritarian than Japan or western countries, a political difference that previously occurred in Meiji Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Growth in these countries produced a middle class followed by demands for political freedom. China is in the early stages of development following the successful path pioneered by Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and others who chose export-led growth under trade rules. Sustained economic growth led to social and political freedom in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Perhaps China will follow. **Capitalism continues to spread. It is the only system humans have found in which personal freedom, progress, and opportunities coexist. Most of the faults and flaws on which critics dwell are human faults, as Kant recognized. Capitalism is the only system that adapts to all manner of cultural and institutional differences. It continues to spread and adapt and will for the foreseeable future.**

#### 2 - Cap solves war – no root cause.

Gartzke 05 (Erik, associate professor of political science at Columbia University and author of a study on economic freedom and peace contained in the 2005, Economic Freedom of the World Report “Future Depends on Capitalizing on Capitalist Peace,” 10/18, Windsor Star, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=5133)

With terrorism achieving "global reach" and conflict raging in Africa and the Middle East, you may have missed a startling fact - we are living in remarkably peaceable times. For **six decades**, developed nations have not fought each other. France and the United States may chafe, but the resulting conflict pitted french fries against "freedom fries," rather than French soldiers against U.S. "freedom fighters." Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac had a nasty spat over the EU, but the English aren't going to storm Calais any time soon. The present peace is unusual. Historically, powerful nations are the most war prone. The conventional wisdom is that democracy fosters peace but this claim fails scrutiny. It is based on statistical studies that show democracies typically don't fight other democracies. Yet, the same studies show that democratic nations go to war about as much as other nations overall. And more recent research makes clear that only the affluent democracies are less likely to fight each other. Poor democracies behave much like non-democracies when it comes to war and lesser forms of conflict. A more powerful explanation is emerging from newer, and older, **empirical research** - the "capitalist peace." As predicted by Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Norman Angell and others, nations with high levels of economic freedom not only fight each other less, they go to war less often, period. Economic freedom is a measure of the depth of free market institutions or, put another way, of capitalism. The "democratic peace" is a mirage created by the overlap between economic and political freedom. Democracy and economic freedom typically co-exist. Thus, if economic freedom causes peace, then statistically democracy will also appear to cause peace. When democracy and economic freedom are both included in a statistical model, the results reveal that economic freedom is considerably more potent in encouraging peace than democracy**, 50 times more potent**, in fact, according to my own research. Economic freedom is highly **statistically significant** (at the one-per-cent level). Democracy does not have a measurable impact, while nations with very low levels of economic freedom are **14 times more prone** to conflict than those with very high levels. But, why would free markets cause peace? Capitalism is not only an immense generator of prosperity; it is also a revolutionary source of economic, social and political change. Wealth no longer arises primarily through land or control of natural resources. New Kind of Wealth Prosperity in modern societies is created by market competition and the efficient production that arises from it. This new kind of wealth is hard for nations to "steal" through conquest. In days of old, when the English did occasionally storm Calais, nobles dreamed of wealth and power in conquered lands, while visions of booty danced in the heads of peasant soldiers. Victory in war meant new property. In a free market economy, war destroys immense wealth for victor and loser alike. Even if capital stock is restored, efficient production requires property rights and free decisions by market participants that are difficult or impossible to co-ordinate to the victor's advantage. The Iraqi war, despite Iraq's immense oil wealth, will not be a money-maker for the United States. Economic freedom is not a guarantee of peace. Other factors, like ideology or the perceived need for self-defence, can still result in violence. But, where economic freedom has taken hold, it has made war less likely. Research on the capitalist peace has profound implications in today's world. Emerging democracies, which have not stabilized the institutions of economic freedom, appear to be at least as warlike - perhaps more so - than emerging dictatorships. Yet, the United States and other western nations are putting immense resources into democratization even in nations that lack functioning free markets. This is in part based on the faulty premise of a "democratic peace." It may also in part be due to public perception. Everyone approves of democracy, but "capitalism" is often a dirty word. However, in recent decades, an increasing number of people have rediscovered the economic virtues of the "invisible hand" of free markets. We now have an additional benefit of economic freedom - **international peace**. The actual presence of peace in much of the world sets this era apart from others. The empirical basis for optimistic claims - about either democracy or capitalism - **can be tested and refined**. The way forward is to capitalize on the capitalist peace, to deepen its roots and extend it to more countries through expanding markets, development, and a common sense of international purpose. The risk today is that faulty analysis and anti-market activists may distract the developed nations from this historic opportunity.

#### Ought means should

Merriam Webster n.d. – Merriam Webster’s Learner’s Dictionary, “ought”, <http://www.learnersdictionary.com/definition/ought>  
ought /ˈɑːt/ verb  
Learner's definition of OUGHT [modal verb] 1 ◊ Ought is almost always followed by to and the infinitive form of a verb. The phrase ought to has the same meaning as should and is used in the same ways, but it is less common and somewhat more formal. The negative forms ought not and oughtn't are often used without a following to. — used to indicate what is expected They ought to be here by now. You ought to be able to read this book. There ought to be a gas station on the way. 2 — used to say or suggest what should be done You ought to get some rest. That leak ought to be fixed. You ought to do your homework.

No safety – IVI – implication is that you should disregard

### 1AC - FWK

#### The meta-ethic is moral substitutability - only it can explain reasons for acting.

Sinnott-Armstrong 92 [Walter, professor of practical ethics. “An Argument for Consequentialism” Dartmouth College Philosophical Perspectives. 1992.]

A moral reason to do an act is consequential if and only if the reason depends only on the consequences of either doing the act or not doing the act. For example, a moral reason not to hit someone is that this will hurt her or him. A moral reason to turn your car to the left might be that, if you do not do so, you will run over and kill someone. A moral reason to feed a starving child is that the child will lose important mental or physical abilities if you do not feed it. All such reasons are consequential reasons. All other moral reasons are non-consequential. Thus, a moral reason to do an act is non-consequential if and only if the reason depends even partly on some property that the act has independently of its consequences. For example, an act can be a lie regardless of what happens as a result of the lie (since some lies are not believed), and some moral theories claim that that property of being a lie provides amoral reason not to tell a lie regardless of the consequences of this lie. Similarly, the fact that an act fulfills a promise is often seen as a moral reason to do the act, even though the act has that property of fulfilling a promise independently ofits consequences. All such moral reasons are non-consequential. In order to avoid so many negations, I will also call them 'deontological'. This distinction would not make sense if we did not restrict the notion of consequences. If I promise to mow the lawn, then one consequence of my mowing might seem to be that my promise is fulfilled. One way to avoid this problem is to specify that the consequences of an act must be distinct from the act itself. My act of fulfilling my promise and my act of mowing are not distinct, because they are done by the same bodily movements.10 Thus, my fulfilling my promise is not a consequence of my mowing. A consequence of an act need not be later in time than the act, since causation can be simultaneous, but the consequence must at least be different from the act. Even with this clarification, it is still hard to classify some moral reasons as consequential or deontological,11 but I will stick to examples that are clear. In accordance with this distinction between kinds of moral reasons, I can now distinguish different kinds of moral theories. I will say that a moral theory is consequentialist if and only if it implies that all basic moral reasons are consequential. A moral theory is then non-consequentialist or deontological if it includes any basic moral reasons which are not consequential. 5. Against Deontology So defined, the class of deontological moral theories is very large and diverse. This makes it hard to say anything in general about it. Nonetheless, I will argue that no deontological moral theory can explain why moral substitutability holds. My argument applies to all deontological theories because it depends only on what is common to them all, namely, the claim that some basic moral reasons are not consequential. Some deontological theories allow very many weighty moral reasons that are consequential, and these theories might be able to explain why moral substitutability holds for some of their moral reasons: the consequential ones. But even these theories cannot explain why moral substitutability holds for all moral reasons, including the non-consequential reasons that make the theory deontological. The failure of deontological moral theories to explain moral substitutability in the very cases that make them deontological is a reason to reject all deontological moral theories. I cannot discuss every deontological moral theory, so I will discuss only a few paradigm examples and show why they cannot explain moral substitutability. After this, I will argue that similar problems are bound to arise for all other deontological theories by their very nature. The simplest deontological theory is the pluralistic intuitionism of Prichard and Ross. Ross writes that, when someone promises to do something, 'This we consider obligatory in its own nature, just because it is a fulfillment of a promise, and not because of its consequences.'12 Such deontologists claim in effect that, if I promise to mow the grass, there is a moral reason for me to mow the grass, and this moral reason is constituted by the fact that mowing the grass fulfills my promise. This reason exists regardless of the consequences of mowing the grass, even though it might be overridden by certain bad consequences. However, if this is why I have a moral reason to mow the grass, then, even if I cannot mow the grass without starting my mower, and starting the mower would enable me to mow the grass, it still would not follow that I have any moral reason to start my mower, since I did not promise to start my mower, and starting my mower does not fulfill my promise. Thus, a moral theory cannot explain moral substitutability if it claims that properties like this provide moral reasons.

#### Non-consequentialist moral theories fail to explain.

Sinnott-Armstrong 92 [Walter, professor of practical ethics. “An Argument for Consequentialism” Dartmouth College Philosophical Perspectives. 1992.]

Of course, there are many other versions of deontology. I cannot discuss them all. Nonetheless, these examples suggest that it is the very nature of deontological reasons that make **deontological theories unable to explain moral substitutability**. This comes out clearly if we start from the other side and ask which properties create the moral reasons that are derived by moral substitutability. **What gives me a moral reason to start the mower is the consequences of starting the mower.** Specifically**, it has the consequence that I am able to mow the grass.** This reason cannot derive from the same property as my moral reason to mow the lawn unless what gives me a moral reason to mow the lawn is *its* consequences. **Thus any non-consequentialist moral theory will have to posit two distinct kinds of moral reasons: one for starting the mower, and another for mowing the grass. Once these kinds of reasons are separated, we need to understand the connection between them. But this connection cannot be explained by the substantive principles of the theory**. That is why all deontological theories must lack the explanatory coherence which is a general test of adequacy for all theories.

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being.

Consequentialism SPEC: NEC (necessary enabler consequentialism) – all moral reasons for acts are provided by facts that the acts are necessary enablers for preventing death.

#### Prefer:

#### 1 - Pleasure and pain are intrinsic value and disvalue.

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**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10]. Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14]. Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals. Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it. It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring. Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding. There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health. Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage. Finding happiness is different between apes and humans As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure. Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even **produce the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered. Desire and reward centers It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation. In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41]. Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42]. Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans. In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45]. Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations. Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50] In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders. In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS. Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans’ ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

#### Prefer for bindingness – if I put my hand on a hot stove I have a biological imperative to pull it back – that happens before a signal is sent to my brain which outweighs because if an ethical theory isn’t binding people could say why not which makes it incoherent.

#### 2 - Actor Specificity:

#### a. No act-omission distinction—governments are responsible for everything in the public sphere so inaction is implicit authorization of action: they have to yes/no bills, which means everything collapse to aggregation.

#### b. No intent-foresight distinction – the actions we take are inevitably informed by predictions from certain mental states, meaning consequences are a collective part of the will.

#### c. Comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Takes out util calc indicts since they’re empirically denied and link turns them because the alt would be no action.

#### 3 - Extinction comes first under any framework.

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### a. Gateway issue - we need to be alive to assign value and debate competing moral theories.

#### b. no moral theory can allow for extinction because it means the end of value.

5. Bindingness – Util is the only prescriptive moral theory since pain and pleasure are intrinsically binding and guide action. That outweighs if a ethical theory has no reason to guide action than anyone could say “why not” and not follow the theory only binding ethics can be applicable. Anything

### 1AC - Advantage

#### Status quo illegality decreases strike activity.

**Pope 10**, James. (Professor Pope received an A.B. and J.D. from Harvard, and a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton. From 1974 to 1980, he worked in the metal trades and was an active member of the International Association of Machinists and the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers. After law school, he clerked for Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird of the California Supreme Court. Prior to joining the Rutgers faculty in 1986, he was associated with the Boston law firm of Segal, Roitman & Coleman, where he represented labor unions and workers. Professor Pope is a member of the National Lawyers Guild and serves on the Executive Council of the Rutgers AAUP/AFT (AFL-CIO). His articles about workers’ rights, constitutional law, and labor history have appeared in a wide variety of publications including the Columbia Law Review, Law & History Review, the Michigan Law Review, the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, the Texas Law Review, the Yale Law Journal, Labor History, New Labor Forum (with Peter Kellman & Ed Bruno), and Working USA (also with Kellman & Bruno).) "The Right to Strike under the United States Constitution: Theory, Practice, and Possible Implications for Canada." Rutgers University Libraries, 2010, scholarship.libraries.rutgers.edu/discovery/fulldisplay/alma991031549922004646/01RUT\_INST:ResearchRepository.

In practice, however (with the sole exception of the Wolff Packing case, discussed below), the Supreme Court has upheld restrictions on the right to strike without considering their effect on the ability of workers to influence their conditions of employment. As a result, U.S. law is extraordinarily unprotective of the right to strike. The Court has, for example, approved the privilege of employers to permanently replace economic strikers, upheld a flat prohibition on secondary strikes, and sustained flat bans on public employee rights.6 The ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association has concluded that each of these outcomes violates international standards.7 Scholars have suggested that the permanent replacement rule, in particular, has contributed to a drastic decline in strike activity in the U.S.8 Once labor’s great equalizer, the threat of a strike has been appropriated by management both in negotiations, where employers are more likely to threaten permanent replacement than unions are to threaten a strike, and in organizing drives, where the threat of permanent replacement is “Exhibit Number One” against unionizing.9

#### Scenario 1 – Soft Power

#### US soft power is wavering - there’s still hope for recovery but it requires consistency

Brand 21 [Brand finance reports on a wide array of domestic and global news stories; news topics include politics/government, business, technology, religion, sports/entertainment, science/nature, and health/lifestyle. “The decline of US soft power? Last year's ranking leader, America plummets down the Global Soft Power Index.” May 2, 2021. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-decline-of-us-soft-power-last-years-ranking-leader-america-plummets-down-the-global-soft-power-index-301238970.html]

LONDON, March 2, 2021 /PRNewswire/ -- A year of widespread turmoil is starkly reflected in America's steep drop in the Global Soft Power Index 2021, making the US the fastest-falling soft power nation globally. Defined as ability to influence the preferences and behaviors of other nations around the world, soft power is linked to attraction or persuasion, rather than coercion. Between a turbulent election campaign and a haphazard COVID-19 response, the US lost its position as the world's soft power superpower, falling from last year's 1st to 6th position in 2021. With an overall Index score of 55.9 out of 100, down by -11.2 points on last year's 67.1 – the US recorded a more significant decline than any other nation in the ranking. With former President Donald Trump's hesitance to acknowledge the scale and severity of the pandemic criticized at home and abroad, the US places at the very bottom of the Index's COVID-19 metric, ranking at an abysmal 105th place among all nations rated in the study. David Haigh, CEO of Brand Finance, commented: "The raging of the virus across the US combined with President Trump's rebuke of medical expertise and touting of reckless home-remedies is the most likely culprit for the waning of America's long-held role model status internationally, at a time where sensible global leadership has arguably been most needed." Unveiled at the virtual Global Soft Power Summit 2021, hosted by leading brand valuation consultancy Brand Finance in partnership with BBC Global News, the Global Soft Power Index 2021 represents the most comprehensive research study on perceptions of nation brands – capturing the opinions of 75,000 respondents across 100 countries. Playing host to various speakers, the Summit also included inputs from David Miliband, CEO and President of the International Rescue Committee, as well as Joseph Nye – the Harvard University Professor originally responsible for coining the phrase 'soft power'. According to Professor Nye, the demise of US soft power began as early as 2017 under the Trump administration, but there is hope for recovery: "Trump's narrow view of international allies, withdrawal from global agreements like the Paris Climate Accord, and lack of support for the WHO were already damaging American soft power before COVID-19 even hit. "Trump was the first president that did not place a high emphasis on values. When America emphasized values, it made the nation more attractive to society, hence our soft power was unrivalled. "The question is if we can recover our soft power, and I think the answer is yes. If America continues making progress on vaccines and can get the pandemic under control, coupled with a sharp economic recovery, then our prospects look good. So, if I were to comment on what the Global Soft Power Index will say next year, I believe the US will be back on an upward trend." David Miliband, in turn, warned of the challenges ahead and underlined the importance of integrity and internal unity for soft power: "There are more power centers today than ever before, and this increased competition for soft power means reproducing past results is going to be much tougher. In this regard, I think the US is going to have to work a lot harder to re-establish its reputation in the next four years. "If a nation is divided, it becomes harder to attract others, and soft power will suffer as a result. Every government lives in coalition with its own people, regardless of the type of rule in place, and the greatest threat to the soft power of a country is dissonance between what it says it stands for and what its actions reveal it to stand for."

#### US disregard of ILO wrecks soft power.

Rosenberg 20 [Eli Rosenberg covers work and labor for The Washington Post.. “U.S. accused of violating international labor laws, forced-labor protections in new complaint.” October 7, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/10/08/international-complaint-worker-protections/]

The Labor Department and Occupational Safety and Health Administration did not respond to a request for comment. The National Labor Relations Board declined to comment. The complaint points to two main avenues of failure for U.S. labor law and policy: the country’s antiquated labor laws, such as the 1935 National Labor Relations Act, which leaves farmers, gig workers, contractors and other classes of workers without protection; and the softening of workers’ protections by the Trump administration that has continued into the pandemic. Some of the complaint’s harshest words were reserved for the Trump administration’s orders declaring industries such as meatpacking essential, compelling them to stay open even amid potential novel coronavirus outbreaks, while federal agencies, including OSHA, declined to issue enforceable safety regulations. “These executive orders gave a green light for employers to force workers to report for work and risk their lives or lose their jobs,” said the complaint, signed by Trumka and SEIU President Mary Kay Henry. “This is tantamount to forced labor.” The complaint highlighted the racial implications of these orders too, arguing one executive order was inherently discriminatory because the vast majority of meatpacking workers who contracted the coronavirus were Black or Hispanic. The complaint also took aim at other ways Trump’s labor agencies rolled back protections for workers. During the pandemic’s early weeks, the NLRB, which oversees union elections, suspended them, giving companies more time to maneuver against them, the complaint charged. The NLRB also issued a memo in March that the union presidents said signaled employers could avoid bargaining about proposed layoffs because of the pandemic. And in two cases in August, the NLRB said companies were in the clear for dismissing workers who expressed concern about safety issues during the pandemic, even though workers have protections from the National Labor Relations Act from being fired in many cases for raising safety concerns at work. “Each of these decisions disarms workers and their unions in the face of management actions to violate their collective bargaining rights in the Covid-19 crisis,” the complaint said. “Since these memoranda also serve as instructions to NLRB regional authorities on how to handle similar cases, they have a cascading effect that will undermine workers’ rights in weeks and months ahead as the pandemic continues to ravage American workplaces.” As they rushed to maintain U.S. meat supply, big processors saw meat plants become covid-19 hot spots, worker illnesses spike It also put a spotlight on OSHA, charged with upholding worker safety regulations, noting that the agency failed to issue a safety standard businesses would be required to adhere to for coronavirus safety. “The complaint is stunning in its level of detail and the number of examples,” said Joseph A. McCartin, a U.S. labor expert at Georgetown University. “What becomes clear is that the U.S. is far from an example for how to protect workers and is actually showing itself to be well behind the curve.” McCartin said the type of complaint was not very typical of prosperous, democratic countries. Countries that had complaints investigated by the U.N. labor body in 2019 include Burundi, China, Myanmar, Pakistan and France. Though the ILO does not have any enforcement power, a finding against the United States after an investigation could have serious ramifications for the country’s reputation, McCartin said. “It would strengthen politically the argument that our laws are inadequate,” McCartin said. “It could help to bring some political pressure to bear on those agencies if in the eyes of the world and this duly designated committee that the U.S. is found to be failing to ensure basic human rights.” The United States participates in the ILO but has not signed on to all of its conventions. “The committee’s finding that the U.S. is in violation of these essential international standards would make it a lot more difficult for the U.S. to hold other countries accountable,” said Lance Compa, a labor law expert who helped draft the complaint. “To the extent that the committee finds that the U.S. has violated international standards, it makes it a lot more difficult for the U.S. to, for example, hold China accountable for labor rights violations. Or Russia, or India, or Brazil.” Henry, SEIU’s president, said that state of labor protections in the United States was “unconscionable.”

#### Soft power fosters multilateralism - solves extinction but also renews the institutional foundation of the global order.

John G. Ikenberry 11, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, Spring, “A World of Our Making”, http://www.democracyjournal.org/20/a-world-of-our-making.php?page=all

Grand Strategy as Liberal Order Building **American dominance** of the global system **will eventually yield to the rise of other powerful states. The unipolar moment will pass. In facing this circumstance, American grand strategy should be informed by answers to this question: What sort of international order would we like to see in place in 2020 or 2030 when America is less powerful?** Grand strategy is a set of coordinated and sustained policies designed to address the long-term threats and opportunities that lie beyond the country’s shores. Given the great shifts in the global system and the crisis of liberal hegemonic order, how should the United States pursue grand strategy in the coming years? The answer is that **the United States should work with others to rebuild and renew the institutional foundations of the liberal international order** and along the way re-establish its own authority as a global leader. The United States is going to need to invest in alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions, special relationships, great-power concerts, cooperative security pacts, and democratic security communities. That is, **the United States will need to return to the great tasks of liberal order building.** It is useful to distinguish between two types of grand strategy: positional and milieu oriented. With a positional grand strategy, a great power seeks to diminish the power or threat embodied in a specific challenger state or group of states. Examples are Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, the Soviet bloc, and perhaps—in the future—Greater China. With a milieu-oriented grand strategy, a great power does not target a specific state but seeks to structure its general international environment in ways that are congenial with its long-term security. This might entail building the infrastructure of international cooperation, promoting trade and democracy in various regions of the world, and establishing partnerships that might be useful for various contingencies. My point is that under conditions of unipolarity, in a world of diffuse threats, and with pervasive uncertainty over what the specific security challenges will be in the future, this milieu-based approach to grand strategy is necessary. The United States does not face the sort of singular geopolitical threat that it did with the fascist and communist powers of the last century. Indeed, compared with the dark days of the 1930s or the Cold War, America lives in an extraordinarily benign security environment. Rather than a single overriding threat, the United States and other countries face a host of diffuse and evolving threats. **Global** warming**,** nuclear proliferation, jihadist terrorism, energy security**, health** pandemics**—these and other dangers loom on the horizon. Any of these threats** could endanger **Americans’** lives **and way of life either directly or indirectly** by destabilizing the global system **upon which American security and prosperity depends**. What is more, these threats are interconnected—and it is their interactive effects that represent the most acute danger. And **if** several of **these threats materialize at the same time and interact to generate greater** violence and instability, then **the global order itself, as well as the foundations of American national security, would be put at risk.** What unites these threats and challenges is that they are all manifestations of rising security interdependence. More and more of what goes on in other countries matters for the health and safety of the United States and the rest of the world. Many of the new dangers—such as health pandemics and transnational terrorist violence—stem from the weakness of states rather than their strength. At the same time, technologies of violence are evolving, providing opportunities for weak states or nonstate groups to threaten others at a greater distance. When states are in a situation of security interdependence, they cannot go it alone. They must negotiate and cooperate with other states and seek mutual restraints and protections. The United States can-not hide or protect itself from threats under conditions of rising security interdependence. It must get out in the world and work with other states to build frameworks of cooperation and leverage capacities for action against this unusually diverse, diffuse, and unpredictable array of threats and challenges. This is why a milieu-based grand strategy is attractive. **The objective is to shape the international environment to maximize your capacities to protect the nation from threats.** To engage in liberal order building is to invest in international cooperative frameworks—that is, rules, institutions, partnerships, networks, standby capacities, social knowledge, etc.—in which the United States operates. **To build international order is to increase the global stock of “social capital**”—**which is the term** Pierre Bourdieu, Robert Putnam, and other **social scientists have used to define the actual and potential resources and capacities within a political community, manifest in and through its networks of social relations, that are available for solving collective problems.** If American grand strategy is to be organized around liberal order building, what are the specific objectives and what is the policy agenda? There are five such objectives. First, the United States needs to lead in the building of an enhanced protective infrastructure that helps prevent the emergence of threats and limits the damage if they do materialize. Many of the threats mentioned above are manifest as socioeconomic backwardness and failure that cause regional and international instability and conflict. These are the sorts of threats that are likely to arise with the coming of global warming and epidemic disease. What is needed here is institutional cooperation to strengthen the capacity of governments and the international com-munity to prevent epidemics or food shortages or mass migrations that create global upheaval—and mitigate the effects of these upheavals if they occur. The international system already has a great deal of this protective infrastructure—institutions and networks that pro-mote cooperation over public health, refugees, and emergency aid. But as the scale and scope of potential problems grow in the twenty-first century, investments in these preventive and management capacities will also need to grow. Early warning systems, protocols for emergency operations, standby capacities, etc.—these safeguards are the stuff of a protective global infrastructure. Second, the United States should recommit to and rebuild its security alliances. The idea is to update the old bargains that lie behind these security pacts. In NATO, but also in the East Asia bilateral partner-ships, the United States agrees to provide security protection to the other states and brings its partners into the process of decision-making over the use of force. In return, these partners agree to work with the United States—providing manpower, logistics, and other types of support—in wider theaters of action. The United States gives up some autonomy in strategic decision-making, although it is more an informal restraint than a legally binding one, and in exchange it gets cooperation and political support. Third, the United States should reform and create encompassing global institutions that foster and legitimate collective action. The first move here should be to reform the United Nations, starting with the expansion of the permanent membership on the Security Council. Several plans have been proposed. All of them entail adding new members—such as Germany, Japan, India, Brazil, South Africa, and others—and reforming the voting procedures. Almost all of the candidates for permanent membership are mature or rising democracies. The goal, of course, is to make them stakeholders in the United Nations and thereby strengthen the primacy of the UN as a vehicle for global collective action. There really is no substitute for the legitimacy that the United Nations can offer to emergency actions—humanitarian interventions, economic sanctions, uses of force against terrorists, and so forth. Public support in advanced democracies grows rapidly when their governments can stand behind a UN-sanctioned action. Fourth, the United States should accommodate and institution-ally engage China. China will most likely be a dominant state, and the United States will need to yield to it in various ways. The United States should respond to the rise of China by strengthening the rules and institutions of the liberal international order—deepening their roots, integrating rising capitalist democracies, sharing authority and functional roles. The United States should also intensify cooperation with Europe and renew joint commitments to alliances and multilateral global governance. The more that China faces not just the United States but the entire world of capitalist democracies, the better. This is not to argue that China must face a grand counterbalancing alliance against it. Rather, it should face a complex and highly integrated global system—one that is so encompassing and deeply entrenched that it essentially has no choice but to join it and seek to prosper within it. The United States should also be seeking to construct a regional security order in East Asia that can provide a framework for managing the coming shifts. The idea is not to block China’s entry into the regional order but to help shape its terms, looking for opportunities to strike strategic bargains at various moments along the shifting power trajectories and encroaching geopolitical spheres. The big bargain that the United States will want to strike is this: to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and accommodation of Washington’s core strategic interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia. In striking this strategic bargain, the United States will also want to try to build multilateral institutional arrangements in East Asia that will tie China to the wider region. Fifth, the United States should reclaim a liberal internationalist public philosophy. When American officials after World War II championed the building of a rule-based postwar order, they articulated a distinctive internationalist vision of order that has faded in recent decades. It was a vision that entailed a synthesis of liberal and realist ideas about economic and national security, and the sources of stable and peaceful order. These ideas—drawn from the experiences with the New Deal and the previous decades of war and depression—led American leaders to associate the national interest with the building of a managed and institutionalized global system. What is needed today is a renewed public philosophy of liberal internationalism—a shift away from neoliberal-ism—that can inform American elites as they make trade-offs between sovereignty and institutional cooperation. Under this philosophy, the restraint and the commitment of American power went hand in hand. Global rules and institutions advanced America’s national interest rather than threatened it. The alternative public philosophies that have circulated in recent years—philosophies that champion American unilateralism and disentanglement from global rules and institutions—did not meet with great success. So an opening exists for America’s postwar vision of internationalism to be updated and rearticulated today. The United States should embrace the tenets of this liberal public philosophy: Lead with rules rather than dominate with power; provide public goods and connect their provision to cooperative and accommodative policies of others; build and renew international rules and institutions that work to reinforce the capacities of states to govern and achieve security and economic success; keep the other liberal democracies close; and let the global system itself do the deep work of liberal modernization. **As it navigates this brave new world, the United States will find itself needing to share power and rely in part on others to ensure its security**. **It will not be able to depend on unipolar power or airtight borders.** It will need, above all else, authority and respect as a global leader. **The United States has lost some of that authority and respect in recent years. In committing itself to a grand strategy of liberal order building, it can begin the process of gaining it back.**

#### Institutional legitimacy checks conflict escalation even after hegemony erodes - key to prevent global transition wars and power vacuums.

Kromah 09 (Lamii Moivi Kromah, Department of International Relations University of the Witwatersrand, February 2009, “The Institutional Nature of U.S. Hegemony: Post 9/11”, <http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/7301/MARR%2009.pdf>)

After WWII the U.S. established organizations such as the United Nations, NATO and others. In each these new regimes it make Germany a member and eventual an integral partner. The interests of the leader are projected on a universal plane: What is good for the hegemon is good for the world. The hegemonic state is successful to the degree that other states emulate it. Emulation is the basis of the consent that lies at the heart of the hegemonic project.41 Since wealth depended on peace the U.S set about creating institutions and regimes that promoted free trade, and peaceful conflict resolution. U.S. benevolent hegemony is what has kept the peace since the end of WWII. The upshot is that U.S. hegemony and liberalism have produced the most stable and durable political order that the world has seen since the fall of the Roman Empire. It is not as formally or highly integrated as the European Union, but it is just as profound and robust as a political order, Kant’s Perpetual Peace requires that the system be diverse and not monolithic because then tyranny will be the outcome. As long as the system allows for democratic states to press claims and resolve conflicts, the system will perpetuate itself peacefully. A state such as the United States that has achieved international primacy has every reason to attempt to maintain that primacy through peaceful means so as to preclude the need of having to fight a war to maintain it.42 This view of the post-hegemonic Western world does not put a great deal of emphasis on U.S. leadership in the traditional sense. U.S. leadership takes the form of providing the venues and mechanisms for articulating demands and resolving disputes not unlike the character of politics within domestic pluralistic systems.43 America as a big and powerful state has an incentive to organize and manage a political order that is considered legitimate by the other states. It is not in a hegemonic leader's interest to preside over a global order that requires constant use of material capabilities to get other states to go along. Legitimacy exists when political order is based on reciprocal consent. It emerges when secondary states buy into rules and norms of the political order as a matter of principle, and not simply because they are forced into it. But if a hegemonic power wants to encourage the emergence of a legitimate political order, it must articulate principles and norms, and engage in negotiations and compromises that have very little to do with the exercise of power.44 So should this hegemonic power be called leadership, or domination? Well, it would tend toward the latter. Hierarchy has not gone away from this system. Core states have peripheral areas: colonial empires and neo-colonial backyards. Hegemony, in other words, involves a structure in which there is a hegemonic core power. The problem with calling this hegemonic power "leadership" is that leadership is a wonderful thing-everyone needs leadership. But sometimes I have notice that leadership is also an ideology that legitimates domination and exploitation. In fact, this is often the case. But this is a different kind of domination than in earlier systems. Its difference can be seen in a related question: is it progressive? Is it evolutionary in the sense of being better for most people in the system? I think it actually is a little bit better. The trickle down effect is bigger-it is not very big, but it is bigger.45 It is to this theory, Hegemonic Stability that the glass slipper properly belongs, because both U.S. security and economic strategies fit the expectations of hegemonic stability theory more comfortably than they do other realist theories. We must first discuss the three pillars that U.S. hegemony rests on structural, institutional, and situational. (1) Structural leadership refers to the underlying distribution of material capabilities that gives some states the ability to direct the overall shape of world political order. Natural resources, capital, technology, military force, and economic size are the characteristics that shape state power, which in turn determine the capacities for leadership and hegemony. If leadership is rooted in the distribution of power, there is reason to worry about the present and future. The relative decline of the United States has not been matched by the rise of another hegemonic leader. At its hegemonic zenith after World War II, the United States commanded roughly forty five percent of world production. It had a remarkable array of natural resource, financial, agricultural, industrial, and technological assets. America in 1945 or 1950 was not just hegemonic because it had a big economy or a huge military; it had an unusually wide range of resources and capabilities. This situation may never occur again. As far as one looks into the next century, it is impossible to see the emergence of a country with a similarly commanding power position. (2) Institutional leadership refers to the rules and practices that states agree to that set in place principles and procedures that guide their relations. It is not power capabilities as such or the interventions of specific states that facilitate concerted action, but the rules and mutual expectations that are established as institutions. Institutions are, in a sense, self-imposed constraints that states create to assure continuity in their relations and to facilitate the realization of mutual interests. A common theme of recent discussions of the management of the world economy is that institutions will need to play a greater role in the future in providing leadership in the absence of American hegemony. Bergsten argues, for example, that "institutions themselves will need to play a much more important role.46 Institutional management is important and can generate results that are internationally greater than the sum of their national parts. The argument is not that international institutions impose outcomes on states, but that institutions shape and constrain how states conceive and pursue their interests and policy goals. They provide channels and mechanisms to reach agreements. They set standards and mutual expectations concerning how states should act. They "bias" politics in internationalist directions just as, presumably, American hegemonic leadership does. (3) Situational leadership refers to the actions and initiatives of states that induce cooperation quite apart from the distribution of power or the array of institutions. It is more cleverness or the ability to see specific opportunities to build or reorient international political order, rather than the power capacities of the state, that makes a difference. In this sense, leadership really is expressed in a specific individual-in a president or foreign minister-as he or she sees a new opening, a previously unidentified passage forward, a new way to define state interests, and thereby transforms existing relations. Hegemonic stability theorists argue that international politics is characterized by a succession of hegemonies in which a single powerful state dominates the system as a result of its victory in the last hegemonic war.47 Especially after the cold war America can be described as trying to keep its position at the top but also integrating others more thoroughly in the international system that it dominates. It is assumed that the differential growth of power in a state system would undermine the status quo and lead to hegemonic war between declining and rising powers48, but I see a different pattern: the U.S. hegemonic stability promoting liberal institutionalism, the events following 9/11 are a brief abnormality from this path, but the general trend will be toward institutional liberalism. Hegemonic states are the crucial components in military alliances that turn back the major threats to mutual sovereignties and hence political domination of the system. Instead of being territorially aggressive and eliminating other states, hegemons respect other's territory. They aspire to be leaders and hence are upholders of inter-stateness and inter-territoriality.49 The nature of the institutions themselves must, however, be examined. They were shaped in the years immediately after World War II by the United States. The American willingness to establish institutions, the World Bank to deal with finance and trade, United Nations to resolve global conflict, NATO to provide security for Western Europe, is explained in terms of the theory of collective goods. It is commonplace in the regimes literature that the United States, in so doing, was providing not only private goods for its own benefit but also (and perhaps especially) collective goods desired by, and for the benefit of, other capitalist states and members of the international system in general. (Particular care is needed here about equating state interest with "national" interest.) Not only was the United States protecting its own territory and commercial enterprises, it was providing military protection for some fifty allies and almost as many neutrals. Not only was it ensuring a liberal, open, near-global economy for its own prosperity, it was providing the basis for the prosperity of all capitalist states and even for some states organized on noncapitalist principles (those willing to abide by the basic rules established to govern international trade and finance). While such behaviour was not exactly selfless or altruistic, certainly the benefits-however distributed by class, state, or region-did accrue to many others, not just to Americans.50 For the truth about U.S. dominant role in the world is known to most clear-eyed international observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's population. It is certainly a better international arrangement than all realistic alternatives. To undermine it would cost many others around the world far more than it would cost Americans-and far sooner. As Samuel Huntington wrote five years ago, before he joined the plethora of scholars disturbed by the "arrogance" of American hegemony; "A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country shaping global affairs”.51 I argue that the overall American-shaped system is still in place. It is this macro political system-a legacy of American power and its liberal polity that remains and serves to foster agreement and consensus. This is precisely what people want when they look for U.S. leadership and hegemony.52 If the U.S. retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it, not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world –and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a New Dark Age. Moreover, the alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be ‘apolarity’ –a global vacuum of power.53 Since the end of WWII the United States has been the clear and dominant leader politically, economically and military. But its leadership as been unique; it has not been tyrannical, its leadership and hegemony has focused on relative gains and has forgone absolute gains. The difference lies in the exercise of power. The strength acquired by the United States in the aftermath of World War II was far greater than any single nation had ever possessed, at least since the Roman Empire. America's share of the world economy, the overwhelming superiority of its military capacity-augmented for a time by a monopoly of nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them--gave it the choice of pursuing any number of global ambitions. That the American people "might have set the crown of world empire on their brows," as one British statesman put it in 1951, but chose not to, was a decision of singular importance in world history and recognized as such.54 Leadership is really an elegant word for power. To exercise leadership is to get others to do things that they would not otherwise do. It involves the ability to shape, directly or indirectly, the interests or actions of others. Leadership may involve the ability to not just "twist arms" but also to get other states to conceive of their interests and policy goals in theory thus shifts from the ability to provide a public good to the ability to coerce other states. A benign hegemon in this sense coercion should be understood as benign and not tyrannical. If significant continuity in the ability of the United States to get what it wants is accepted, then it must be explained. The explanation starts with our noting that the institutions for political and economic cooperation have themselves been maintained. Keohane rightly stresses the role of institutions as "arrangements permitting communication and therefore facilitating the exchange of information. By providing reliable information and reducing the costs of transactions, institutions can permit cooperation to continue even after a hegemon's influence has eroded. Institutions provide opportunities for commitment and for observing whether others keep their commitments. Such opportunities are virtually essential to cooperation in non-zero-sum situations, as gaming experiments demonstrate. Declining hegemony and stagnant (but not decaying) institutions may therefore be consistent with a stable provision of desired outcomes, although the ability to promote new levels of cooperation to deal with new problems (e.g., energy supplies, environmental protection) is more problematic. Institutions nevertheless provide a part of the necessary explanation.56 In restructuring the world after WWII it was America that was the prime motivator in creating and supporting the various international organizations in the economic and conflict resolution field. An example of this is NATO’s making Western Europe secure for the unification of Europe. It was through NATO institutionalism that the countries in Europe where able to start the unification process. The U.S. working through NATO provided the security and impetus for a conflict prone region to unite and benefit from greater cooperation. Since the United States emerged as a great power, the new ways. This suggests a second element of leadership, which involves not just the marshalling of power capabilities and material resources. It also involves the ability to project a set of political ideas or principles about the proper or effective ordering of po1itics. It suggests the ability to produce concerted or collaborative actions by several states or other actors. Leadership is the use of power to orchestrate the actions of a group toward a collective end.55 By validating regimes and norms of international behaviour the U.S. has given incentives for actors, small and large, in the international arena to behave peacefully. The uni-polar U.S. dominated order has led to a stable international system. Woodrow Wilson’s zoo of managed relations among states as supposed to his jungle method of constant conflict. The U.S. through various international treaties and organizations as become a quasi world government; It resolves the problem of provision by imposing itself as a centralized authority able to extract the equivalent of taxes. The focus of the identification of the interests of others with its own has been the most striking quality of American foreign and defence policy. Americans seem to have internalized and made second nature a conviction held only since World War II: Namely, that their own wellbeing depends fundamentally on the well-being of others; that American prosperity cannot occur in the absence of global prosperity; that American freedom depends on the survival and spread of freedom elsewhere; that aggression anywhere threatens the danger of aggression everywhere; and that American national security is impossible without a broad measure of international security.57

#### Scenario 2 - Union Strength

#### Strikes are necessary to sustain union strength.

**Reich**, Adam, **et al 20**. (Adam Reich received his PhD in sociology from UC Berkeley in 2012, and was a Robert Wood Johnson Health & Society Scholar at Columbia from 2012 to 2014.  He focuses on economic and cultural sociology.  Much of his research concerns how people make sense of their economic activities and economic positions within organizations.  Reich is the author of three books, the most recent of which is Selling Our Souls: The Commodification of Hospital Care in the United States (Princeton, 2014).  He is also the author of several peer-reviewed articles, which have appeared in journals such as the American Journal of Sociology and Social Science & Medicine. Education Ph.D.  University of California, Berkeley, 2012.) "Schooled by Strikes? The Effects of Large-Scale Labor Unrest on Mass Attitudes Toward the Labor Movement." Cambridge Core, 2 June 2020, www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/abs/schooled-by-strikes-the-effects-of-largescale-labor-unrest-on-mass-attitudes-toward-the-labor-movement/0B7101A887DCE4134E26B758D082C8DB.

Strikes and Labor Power in an Era of Union Decline We examined the political consequences of large-scale teacher strikes, studying how firsthand exposure changed mass attitudes and public preferences. Across a range of specifications and approaches, we find that increased exposure to the strikes led to greater support for the walkouts, more support for legal rights for teachers and unions, and, especially, greater personal interest in labor action at people’s own jobs, though not necessarily through traditional unions. Returning to the theoretical expectations we outlined earlier, the teacher strikes appear to have changed the ways that parents think about the labor movement, generating greater public support. The results regarding workers’ interest in undertaking labor action in their own jobs also suggests evidence in favor of the public inspiration and imitation hypothesis, underscoring the role that social movements and mobilizations can play in teaching noninvolved members about the movement and tactics. Still, an important caveat to these findings is that strike-exposed parents were not more likely to say that they would vote for a traditional union at their jobs, possibly reflecting the fact that the strikes emphasized individual teachers and not necessarily teacher unions as organizations either in schools or in parents’ own workplaces. Further research might explore this difference, together with the fact that we find somewhat stronger evidence in favor of the imitation hypothesis (i.e., support for labor action at one’s own work) than for the public support hypothesis (i.e., support for the striking teachers). Before we discuss the broader implications of our findings for the understanding of the labor movement, we briefly review and address several caveats to the interpretation of our results. One concern is whether the results we identify from a single survey can speak to enduring changes in public opinion about the strikes and unions. Given the timing of the teacher strikes in the first half of 2018, our respondents were reflecting on events that happened 7–12 months in the past. We therefore think that our results represent more durable changes in opinion as a result of the strikes, in line with other studies of historical mobilizations and long-term changes in attitudes (Mazumder 2018). The AFL-CIO time-series polling data, moreover, further suggest that there were increases in aggregate public support for unions in the strike states after the strikes occurred. Nevertheless, follow-up studies should examine how opinion toward, and interest in, unions evolve in the mass teacher strike states, and it would be especially interesting to understand whether unions have begun capitalizing on the interest in the labor movement that the strikes generated. We also note that, despite the large sample size of our original survey, we still lack sufficient statistical power to fully explore the effects of the strikes on all of our survey outcomes. Future studies ought to consider alternative designs with the power to probe the individual outcomes that were not considered in this study. Another question is how to generalize from our results to other strikes and labor actions. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to develop and test a more general theory of strike action, there are factors that suggest that the teacher strikes we study here represent a hard test for building public support. The affected states had relatively weak public sector labor movements, meaning that few individuals had personal connections to unions; most were also generally conservative and Republican leaning, further potentially reducing the receptivity of the public to the teachers’ demands. And lastly, the type of work we study —teaching—involves close interaction with a very sympathetic constituency: children and their parents. This should make strike disruptions more controversial and increase the likelihood of political backlash (and indeed, we do find that the strikes were less persuasive for parents who may have lacked access to childcare). Nevertheless, additional factors may have strengthened the effects of the strikes; namely, that education spending in the strike and walkout states had dropped so precipitously since the Great Recession, giving teachers the opportunity to connect their demands to broader public goods. Considering these factors together, we feel comfortable arguing that strikes are likely to be successful in other contexts where involved employees can successfully leverage close connections to the clients and customers they serve and connect their grievances to the interests of the broader community. This is likely to be especially true in cases where individuals feel they are not receiving the level of quality service they deserve from businesses or governments. The flip side of our argument is that strikes are less likely to be successful—and may produce backlash—when the mass public views striking workers’ demands as illegitimate or opposed to their own interests or when individuals are especially inconvenienced by labor action and do not have readily available alternatives (such as lacking childcare during school strikes). This suggests that teachers’ unions’ provision of meals and childcare to parents (as happened in a number of the recent strikes) is a particularly important tactic to avoid public backlash. In addition, our results suggest that future strikes on their own are unlikely to change public opinion if all they do is to provide information about workers’ grievances or disrupt work routines. Our exploratory analysis of the mechanisms driving our results suggests that it was not necessarily information about poor school quality or the strikes themselves that changed parents’ minds, but perhaps the fact that the teachers were discussing the public goods they were seeking for the broader community. We anticipate that strikes or walkouts that adopt a similar strategy—similar to the notion of “bargaining for the common good”—would be most likely to register effects like ours in the future (McCartin 2016). Notably, that is exactly the strategy deployed by teachers in Los Angeles, who spent several years building ties to community members and explaining the broader benefits that a stronger union could offer to their community in the run-up to a strike in early 2019 (Caputo-Pearl and McAlevey 2019). In all, our results complement a long line of work arguing for the primacy of the strike as a tactic for labor influence (e.g. Burns 2011; Rosenfeld 2006; Rubin 1986). Although this literature generally has focused on the economic consequences of strikes, we have shown that strikes can also have significant effects on public opinion. Even though private sector strikes have long sought to amass public support, public-facing strikes are even more important for public sector labor unions, given their structure of production and the fact that their“managers”are ultimately elected officials. But how should we view strikes relative to the other strategies that public sector unions might deploy in politics, such as campaign contributions, inside lobbying, or mobilization of their members (cf. DiSalvo 2015; Moe 2011)? Given the large cost of mass strikes in terms of time and grassroots organizing, we expect that public sector unions will be most likely to turn to public-facing strikes (like the 2018 teacher walkouts) when these other lower-cost inside strategies are unsuccessful and when their demands are popular in the mass public. Under these circumstances, government unions have every reason to broaden the scope of conflict to include the mass public (cf. Schattschneider 1960). But when unions can deploy less costly activities (like simply having a lobbyist meet with lawmakers) or when they are pursuing demands that are more controversial with the public, we suspect that unions will opt for less public-facing strategies (on the logic of inside versus outside lobbying more generally, see, for example, Kollman 1998). Indeed, our results complement work by Terry Moe and Sarah Anzia describing how teacher unions work through low-salience and low-visibility strategies, such as capturing school boards, pension boards, or education bureaucracies, when they are pushing policies that tend not to be supported by the public (Anzia 2013; Anzia and Moe 2015; Moe 2011). Our results yield a final implication for thinking about the historical development of the labor smovement: they suggest that the decline of strikes we tracked in Figure 1 may form a vicious cycle for the long-term political power of labor. As we have documented, strikes seem to be an important way that people form opinions about unions and develop interest in labor action. As both strikes and union membership have declined precipitously over the past decades, few members of the public have had opportunities to gain firsthand knowledge and interest in unions. Moreover, strikes appear to foster greater interest in further strikes, feeding on one another. If unions are to regain any economic or political clout in the coming years, our study suggests that the strike must be a central strategy of the labor movement.

#### A – Innovation

#### We’re on the brink - decline in R&D cedes dominance to China - labor market investment is the strongest internal link to tech development and jobs.

Augustine and Baker 21 [Norman R. Augustine is the retired chair and CEO of Lockheed Martin Corp. and former under secretary of the US Army. Neal Lane is a senior fellow in science and technology policy at the Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice University. He is a former presidential science adviser and director of the National Science Foundation. “America on Edge: Settling for Second Place?” October 22, 2021. https://issues.org/america-on-edge-settling-second-place-augustine-lane/]

The United States is on edge in ways the nation has rarely experienced throughout its young history. The country’s global leadership is being challenged in a rapidly changing and increasingly competitive world. Meanwhile, the nation’s sustained complacency in dealing with long-festering domestic needs has weakened our institutions from within and placed in grave danger our leadership in the critical fields of science and technology—on which so much of our economy and security is based. America is at a tipping point, in short, and Americans are justifiably unsettled. The country has faced existential challenges in the past—moments in history that shook its foundation—but has risen to the occasion under strong leadership. Four overarching challenges we face today require comparable leadership and response: competing with China, coping with climate change, maintaining cybersecurity, and combating and preparing for pandemics. There are many causes of the nation’s current dilemmas, and their solutions will require exceptionally wise policy actions across a broad spectrum. But, as in the past, advances in science and technology (S&T) and research and development (R&D), driven by accelerated and focused investments, will be critical to success. America is at a tipping point, in short, and Americans are justifiably unsettled. As presidential science adviser Vannevar Bush recognized more than 75 years ago in his pioneering report, Science, the Endless Frontier, efforts in basic research—funded primarily by the federal government—and overall science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education will continue to be critical in the future. University-performed basic research, whether purely curiosity-driven or use-inspired, is of special consequence as its products include not only discoveries (made freely available to the world), but also science and engineering graduates, the engines of research and the transfer of knowledge and technology from laboratory to society. Because of the exploratory nature of basic research, progress requires freedom, patience, tolerance of risk, and sustained support. And since nature is global, even universal, basic research prospers best with international cooperation. US researchers need access to sites, facilities, and the best minds from across the globe. The critical role of S&T has not gone unrecognized in other parts of the world. In 2008, for example, Wen Jiabao, former premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, wrote, “Scientific discovery and technological inventions have brought about new civilizations, modern industries, and the rise and fall of nations…. I firmly believe that science is the ultimate revolution.” On May 30, 2021, China’s president Xi Jinping was quoted by the South China Post saying, “Scienceand technology has become the main battleground of global power rivalry. Competition over cutting-edge technology has intensified to an unprecedented level. We must have a strong sense of urgency and be fully prepared.” Meanwhile, in the United States, the federal government has cut its investment in R&D over recent decades from 1.5% of gross domestic product (or 12% of the federal budget) to 0.7% of GDP (3% of the federal budget). The portion supporting basic research, as defined by the federal government, now constitutes only 0.2% of GDP—an amount roughly equivalent to what the US population spends every year on beer. Because of the exploratory nature of basic research, progress requires freedom, patience, tolerance of risk, and sustained support. While surveys have shown that Americans are generally supportive of scientific research, that support has not prompted elected representatives to give research funding higher priority in government budgets. Too often, the public does not recognize how the products that pervade our daily lives were made possible by basic research that took place in a laboratory often decades before. Examples are ubiquitous: television, microwave ovens, stents, cell phones, laptops, GPS, meteorological and communication satellites, artificial joints, CT scans, all-electric cars, clean water, vaccines for polio and smallpox, a cure for hepatitis C, medications, jet aircraft, solar energy, and much more—including the mRNA vaccines for COVID-19. More broadly, it is advancements in S&T that power the US economy, the foundation of the nation’s ability to educate its people, provide quality jobs, defend itself, keep its population healthy, sustain social programs, modernize infrastructure, and combat climate change. China is now making many of these advances more quickly and convincingly than the United States and is reaping the rewards. To be sure, in today’s interconnected world a responsible foreign policy with China is far more complicated than a race between two nations. All the same, it is clear that the United States cannot afford to continue on its current path of complacency. DIFFERING TRAJECTORIES Comparison with China illuminates how deeply this complacency has taken hold in the United States. In many respects, China is in the midst of a revolution, managed by the central government and controlled by one political party with a membership of under 7% of the population. This revolution is focused on employing science, technology, and innovation to make China more prosperous, and its government is rapidly growing investments in R&D to provide the necessary new knowledge and tools. Indeed, for many years China’s leadership has been drawn from the ranks of engineers and scientists. In the United States, by contrast, only about 1% of the US Congress has degrees in science or engineering, and only two presidents—Herbert Hoover and Jimmy Carter—have had backgrounds in STEM. An education in science and engineering may not be vital to effective political leadership, but it does help policymakers understand the power and promise of S&T to propel a nation forward. In today’s interconnected world a responsible foreign policy with China is far more complicated than a race between two nations. China’s president since 2013, Xi Jinping, himself an engineer, has promised the nation’s 1.4 billion people a share of the “Chinese Dream.” China’s middle class, once miniscule, is now roughly the size of the entire US population. China’s ambitious infrastructure program—the Belt and Road Initiative, announced in 2013—comprises an investment of over $1.3 trillion to connect over 60 countries on land (the belt) and by sea (the road), stretching from East Asia to Europe and Africa. China assigns a high priority to educating its people, but the gap in educational opportunities between rural and urban children continues to be large. In response, China is rapidly increasing its number of universities and colleges—now numbering more than 2,600, with a new institution opening every week—as well as the quality of faculty and the education provided. In the 2021 US News & World Report rankings of Best Global Universities, China had the second-highest number of the world’s top 100 universities, after the United States. According to the 2021 Times Higher Education World University Rankings, Tsinghua and Peking Universities have now moved up in rank to join the top 25 in the world. China produces more than twice as many engineers and half again as many scientists each year as the United States, and the differential is rapidly expanding. Moreover, under its Thousand Talents Program, China offers large financial and professional incentives to talented scientists and engineers from around the world to move to China. To date, the effort has not had a dramatic impact in the United States: STEM doctoral students from China attending US universities still have a high stay rate—currently about 83%—even with a difficult process for renewing visas and obtaining green cards. Similarly, recent surveys show that when researchers around the world were asked to what country they would prefer to move were they to leave their home country, about 57% answered the United States and only about 9% answered China. Still, there is no doubt that China is taking very ambitious steps to attract and retain STEM researchers, and countries that wish to compete must take this into account. The anti-China rhetoric that many political leaders routinely include in their statements is not likely to encourage young people to choose the United States as the place to study and establish their careers. China’s efforts are also reflected in its investment activities. Between 2000 and 2017, the country’s domestic spending on R&D grew by an average of 17% per year, compared to 4% per year for the United States. Though China’s economy has cooled in recent years, it is still making substantial investments in such critical fields as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum information, high-performance computing, 5G communications, genomics, and renewable energy and energy storage. China produces more than twice as many engineers and half again as many scientists each year as the United States, and the differential is rapidly expanding. These investments have paid off. Since 2011, the share of US-based smartphone companies and solar panel manufacturers in the global marketplace has fallen from 19% to 15% and from 8% to just 1%, respectively. Meanwhile, China has increased its share in these sectors from 11% to 58% in smartphone sales and from 35% to 67% in solar panel sales. China also holds the clear majority of market share of commercial drones (80% to the United States’ 4%), lithium-ion batteries (projected 2800 GWh production capacity by 2030, to the United States’ projected 500 GWh production capacity), and network infrastructure equipment (36% to the United States’ 9%), led by the telecom giant Huawei. And while the United States still remains the leader in semiconductors (47% of the total, compared to China’s 4%), many US companies do not manufacture these chips, but rather outsource their production to major overseas manufacturers. The United States continues to maintain a lead in a number of key areas, but the margins are closing. China has now passed the United States in the number of Fortune 500 domestically headquartered companies. It has also overtaken the United States as the top merchandise trading partner among the world’s nations. Of the 19 firms created in the past 25 years that are valued at over $100 billion, nine are in the United States and eight are in China. And of critical importance, China is projected to pass the United States in GDP not long after the United States celebrates its 250th birthday in 2026. Measured by purchasing power parity, China’s GDP has already surpassed that of the United States. To be clear, the United States still invests more in R&D than any other country. But China has been rapidly increasing its R&D spending and can be expected to overtake the United States within the present decade. And China is not alone in assigning a higher priority to investing in R&D than the United States, which now ranks ninth among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations, having fallen from second place in a few decades. In terms of the percentage of R&D funded by the federal government, the United States has fallen to 29th in the world. For a half century, the total US fraction of GDP devoted to R&D has remained stagnant, in spite of the increasing impact of S&T on everyday life. Lack of R&D investment is one of the reasons the United States ranks ninth on the Bloomberg Innovation Index. It ranks 21st in the number of professionals engaged in R&D per capita.

#### Unions are critical to R&D and innovation.

**Shin et al. 19**, Illhang, et al. (Affiliation: Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Accounting, College of Business, Gachon University, Seongnam-si, Gyunggi-do) "The effect of labor unions on innovation and market valuation in business group affiliations: new evidence from South Korea." Springer Link, 26 Oct. 2019, link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41291-019-00089-9.

In contrast, unions can facilitate innovation by reducing grievances and staff turnover or by improving employees’ moral and training (Freeman and Medof 1984). Ulph and Ulph (1989) argued that an increase in union power can actually increase R&D as the union bargains over employment and wages. Furthermore, unions may allow firms to increase the speed of diffusion and implementation of technology and, hence, increase the firm’s incentive to invest (Menezes-Filho et al. 1998a, b). For instance, in the European studies, there was no compelling evidence that unions have a detrimental effect on R&D (e.g., Menezes-Filho et al. 1998a, b; Schnabel and Wagner 1992). Menezes-Filho et al. (1998a) showed that a negative relationship between unions and R&D investment disappears when unions could control the availability of innovative technology in the industry in the UK. Furthermore, Menezes-Filho et al. (1998b) showed that unions in the UK improve a firm’s relative R&D performance. In addition, Schnabel and Wagner (1992) showed that unions do not impede innovation in Germany, because of the more cooperative nature of industrial relations. Strong labor unions may act as a corporate governance mechanism that monitors the agency problems, thereby mitigating managerial myopia. This may eventually encourage risk taking and innovative behaviors. According to Chen et al. (2011), labor unions can effectively monitor managerial actions because they can acquire their firms’ information more easily than can outside stakeholders can. Also, unions exert their power on management by using their bargaining power to increase the corporate transparency. For instance, affiliated labor unions in Korea have asked management to share information and to allow their participation in decision making in order to monitor whether managers harm the transparency and betray the trust of stakeholders.2 The union social responsibility (USR) declared by LG Electronics is an example of such a role being taken by labor unions. The USR describes the four major guidelines: (1) to protect the ecosystem, (2) to help the disadvantaged, (3) to increase the transparency of union and company, and (4) to lead innovations in the feld. Hence, these arguments support the prediction that labor unions promote innovating activities by increasing transparency and mitigating managerial myopia.

#### China uses biotech gains for massive bio-military advantages over the US – spurs bio-attacks.

**Kuo 17**, Mercy. “The Great US-China Biotechnology and Artificial Intelligence Race.” The Diplomat, 23 Aug. 2017, thediplomat.com/2017/08/the-great-us-china-biotechnology-and-artificial-intelligence-race/.

Trans-Pacific View author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into the U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Eleonore Pauwels – Director of Biology Collectives and Senior Program Associate, Science and Technology Innovation Program at the Wilson Center in Washington D.C. – is the 104th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.” Explain the motivation behind Chinese investment in U.S. genomics and artificial intelligence (AI). With large public and private investments inland and in the U.S., China plans to become the next AI-Genomics powerhouse, which indicates that these technologies will soon converge in China. China’s ambition is to lead the global market for precision medicine, **which necessitates acquiring strategic tech**nological and human capital in both genomics and AI. And the country excels at this game. A sharp blow in this U.S.-China competition happened in 2013 when BGI purchased Complete Genomics, in California, with the intent to build its own advanced genomic sequencing machines, therefore securing a technological knowhow mainly mastered by U.S. producers. There are significant economic incentives behind China’s heavy investment in the increasing convergence of AI and genomics. This golden combination will drive precision medicine to new heights by developing a more sophisticated understanding of how our genomes function, leading to precise, even personalized, cancer therapeutics and preventive diagnostics, such as liquid biopsies. By one estimate, the liquid biopsy market is expected to be worth $40 billion in 2017. Assess the implications of iCarbonX of Shenzhen’s decision to invest US$100 million in U.S.-company PatientsLikeMe relative to AI and genomic data collection. iCarbonX is a pioneer in AI software that learns to recognize useful relationships between large amounts of individuals’ biological, medical, behavioral and psychological data. Such a data-ecosystem will deliver insights into how an individual’s genome is mutating over time, and therefore critical information about this individual’s susceptibilities to rare, chronic and mental illnesses. In 2017, iCarbonX invested $100 million in PatientsLikeMe, getting a hold over data from the biggest online network of patients with rare and chronic diseases. If successful, this effort could turn into genetic gold, making iCarbonX one of the wealthiest healthcare companies in China and beyond. The risk factor is that iCarbonX is handling more than personal data, but potentially vulnerable data as the company uses a smartphone application, Meum, for customers to consult for health advice. Remember that the Chinese nascent genomics and AI industry relies on cloud computing for genomics data-storage and exchange, creating, in its wake, new vulnerabilities associated with any internet-based technology. This phenomenon has severe implications. How much consideration has been given to privacy and the evolving notion of personal data in this AI-powered health economy? And is our cyberinfrastructure ready to protect such trove of personal health data from hackers and industrial espionage? In this new race, will China and the U.S. have to constantly accelerate their rate of cyber and bio-innovation to be more resilient? Refining our models of genomics data protection will become a critical biosecurity issue. Why is Chinese access to U.S. genomic data a national security concern? **Genomics** and computing research **is inherently dual-use, therefore a strategic advantage in a nation’s security arsenal.** Using AI systems to understand how the functioning of our genomes impacts our health **is of strategic importance for biodefense.** This knowledge will lead to increasing developments at the forefront of medical countermeasures, **including vaccines**, antibiotics, and targeted treatments relying on virus-engineering and microbiome research. Applying deep learning to genomics data-sets could help geneticists learn how to use genome-editing (CRISPR) to efficiently engineer living systems, but also to treat and, even “optimize,” human health, **with potential applications in military enhancements**. A $15 million partnership between a U.S. company, Gingko Bioworks, and DARPA aims to genetically design new probiotics as a protection for soldiers against a variety of stomach bugs and illnesses. China could be using the same deep learning techniques on U.S. genomics data to better comprehend how to develop, patent and manufacture tailored cancer immunotherapies in high demand in the United States. Yet, what if Chinese efforts venture into understanding how to impact key genomics health determinants relevant to the U.S. population? **Gaining access to increasingly large U.S. genomic data-sets gives China a knowledge advantage into leading the next steps in bio-military research.** Could biomedical data be used to develop bioweapons? Explain. Personalized medicine advances mean that personalized bio-attacks are increasingly possible. The combination of AI with biomedical data and genome-editing technologies will help us predict genes most important to particular functions. Such insights will contribute to knowing how a particular disease occurs, how a newly-discovered virus has high transmissibility, but also why certain populations and individuals are more susceptible to it. Combining host susceptibility information with pathogenic targeted design, **malicious actors could engineer pathogens that are tailored to overcome the immune system or the microbiome of specific populations.**

#### Bio-attacks cause extinction – overcomes any conventional defense.

Walsh 19, Bryan. End Times: A Brief Guide to the End of the World. Hachette Books, 2019. (Future Correspondent for Axios, Editor of the Science and Technology Publication OneZero, Former Senior and International Editor at Time Magazine, BA from Princeton University)//Elmer

I’ve lived through disease outbreaks, and in the previous chapter I showed just how unprepared we are to face a widespread pandemic of flu or another new pathogen like SARS. But a deliberate outbreak caused by an engineered pathogen would be far worse. We would face the same agonizing decisions that must be made during a natural pandemic: whether to ban travel from affected regions, how to keep overburdened hospitals working as the rolls of the sick grew, how to accelerate the development and distribution of vaccines and drugs. To that dire list add the terror that would spread once it became clear that the death and disease in our midst was not the random work of nature, but a deliberate act of malice. We’re scared of disease outbreaks and we’re scared of terrorism—put them together and you have a formula for chaos. As deadly and as disruptive as a conventional bioterror incident would be, an attack that employed existing pathogens could only spread so far, limited by the same laws of evolution that circumscribe natural disease outbreaks. But a virus engineered in a lab to break those laws could spread faster and kill quicker than anything that would emerge out of nature. It can be designed to evade medical countermeasures, frustrating doctors’ attempts to diagnose cases and treat patients. If health officials manage to stamp out the outbreak, it could be reintroduced into the public again and again. It could, with the right mix of genetic traits, even wipe us off the planet, making engineered viruses a genuine existential threat. And such an attack may not even be that difficult to carry out. Thanks to advances in biotechnology that have rapidly reduced the skill level and funding needed to perform gene editing and engineering, what might have once required the work of an army of virologists employed by a nation-state could soon be done by a handful of talented and trained individuals. Or maybe just one. When Melinda Gates was asked at the South by Southwest conference in 2018 to identify what she saw as the biggest threat facing the world over the next decade, she didn’t hesitate: “A bioterrorism event. Definitely.”2 She’s far from alone. In 2016, President Obama’s director of national intelligence James Clapper identified CRISPR as a “weapon of mass destruction,” a category usually reserved for known nightmares like nuclear bombs and chemical weapons. A 2018 report from the National Academies of Sciences concluded that biotechnology had rewritten what was possible in creating new weapons, while also increasing the range of people capable of carrying out such attacks.3 That’s a fatal combination, one that plausibly threatens the future of humanity like nothing else. “The existential threat that would be most available for someone, if they felt like doing something, would be a bioweapon,” said Eric Klien, founder of the Lifeboat Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to helping humanity survive existential risks. “It would not be hard for a small group of people, maybe even just two or three people, to kill a hundred million people using a bioweapon. There are probably a million people currently on the planet who would have the technical knowledge to pull this off. It’s actually surprising that it hasn’t happened yet.”

#### B – Democracy

#### Current decline in unionization causes rampant wage inequality and collapses democracy – right to strike solves.

**Rhomberg 12**, Chris. (Chris Rhomberg works in the areas of urban and political sociology, race and ethnicity, labor and labor movements, and historical methods. His first book, No There There: Race, Class and Political Community in Oakland (University of California Press, 2004) received the 2006 Robert E. Park Award for best book in urban and community sociology from the American Sociological Association, and his second book, The Broken Table: The Detroit Newspaper Strike and the State of American Labor (Russell Sage, 2012), received the 2013 best book award from the ASA section on Labor and Labor Movements. Among his articles are “A Signal Juncture: The Detroit Newspaper Strike and Post-Accord Labor Relations in the United States” (American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 115, No. 6, May 2010: 1853–94), which received the 2010 Distinguished Scholarly Article Award from the ASA section on Labor and Labor Movements and was co-winner of the 2011 Distinguished Scholarly Contribution Award (Article) from the ASA section on Political Sociology.  His research has centered on issues of race, labor, and urban politics in American political development, and on workplace organization and labor relations in the United States. Methodologically, he is interested in narrative forms of sociological explanation and problems of representing collective agency, topics explored in his article “Class and Collective Action: Writing Stories about Actors and Events,” Sociología Histórica, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2013: 93-116 [also translated as “Clase y Acción Colectiva: Escribir Historias sobre Actores y Eventos,” in the same issue.] Current projects include a study of the production process in cultural or creative industries, inequalities in urban labor markets and the organization of work, and emerging forms of workers' mobilization for change. Education BA Brandeis University MA, Rutgers University PhD, University of California Berkeley, 1998) "The Return of Judicial Repression: What Has Happened to the Strike?" Fordham University, 2012, www.fordham.edu/download/downloads/id/1129/the\_return\_of\_judicial\_repression\_what\_has\_happened\_to\_the\_strike.pdf.

The consequences of this regime go well beyond the fate of unionized workers, and are damaging for American society. In the last several decades economic inequality has risen sharply in the United States, as both academics and journalists have noted. During the middle of the 20th Century the distance between rich and poor in America steadily declined, but in the last quarter of the century the pattern was reversed. In the private sector labor market, wage inequality increased by 40 percent between 1973 and 2007, with declining unionization accounting for a fifth to a third of the increase (Western and Rosenfeld 2011). For more than a generation, the benefits of economic growth have gone disproportionately to corporate profits and to the top fifth of households, while incomes for the middle and bottom fifths have remained stagnant and fallen behind.For many political theorists, modern mass democracy requires multiple institutional spaces for dialogue and decision-making among plural collective actors, including the actors in the workplace. Decades of economic re-structuring have now radically altered the spaces for such dialogue, on the job, in the com munity, and in the public sphere. The result highlights the historic dedemocratization of the institutional regulation of labor in the United States, from the scope of collective bargaining in the workplace, to the civic spaces for group mediation, to the protection for workers’ and citizens’ rights to protest under the law. What’s Next? Recovering the Right to Collective Action The right to strike is essential to any discussion of the future of the labor movement in the United States. The renewal of American labor does not require the restoration of all the elements of the New Deal order, even if that were possible. It does, however, imply a challenge to the logic and legal mechanisms that reproduce the anti-union regime, including the practices of impasse and implementation, permanent replacement of strikers, and other limits on collective action. The current regime radically reduces the scope for public engagement and dialogue between the parties in the employment relationship. We need to restore the integrity of the collective bargaining process which rests, ultimately, on a genuine right to strike. This need not take the form of the institutional channeling established during the postwar accord. Rather, widening the scope of collective action could enlarge the spaces for public engagement and civic mediation among employers, unions, and community actors. That could encourage more flexibility, communication and innovation in negotiations between management and unions. It could also allow for the development of broader partnerships in support of the firm, its workers, and the local area. There is no a priori reason to credit company managers with exclusive wisdom to control the enterprise on behalf of all stakeholders. In the Detroit strike, the newspapers pursued a scorched-earth policy toward the strikers in a community that placed a high value on unionism. The newspapers lost a third of their circulation and at least $130 million and forced the dispute to go through years of litigation. It is not obvious that these actions benefitted the workplace, the community, or even the shareholders in the long run. Admittedly, reforming the law will be no easy task. Political forces in the United States make even modest labor law reform extremely difficult, and the record of union efforts to pass legislation in Congress is not encouraging. The labor movement may have to find its own ways to take back the right to collective action. As labor scholars have shown, union growth or revitalization in American history has frequently occurred in episodic bursts or “upsurges” (Freeman 1998; Clawson 2003). Strike mobilization is a key driver of these upsurges, especially in a liberal market economy with decentralized labor market institutions (like the U.S.). Such periods often coincide with the growth of new forms of organization or outreach to previously unorganized groups of workers. In the 1890s, nativeborn and Northern European immigrant skilled workers built the craft unions that came together in the American Federation of Labor. During the 1930s, Southern and Eastern European ethnic factory workers joined the new wave of industrial unionism in the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Similarly, African American workers organized into public sector unions in conjunction with the civil rights movement the 1960s, and immigrant Hispanic and Asian workers form the base for union growth in low-wage service sectors today. The return of judicial repression underlines the extent of labor’s deinstitutionalization under the current regime. In response, unions have increasingly turned to innovative organizing tactics and mobilizing grassroots allies in the community. Yet, community coalitions are not a magic solution, and civil society is a competitive field no less than the economy and the state. In Detroit, the newspapers deployed tremendous resources to override the power of the NLRB and pressure from an alliance of unions, local civic leaders, and members of the reading public. The outcomes for future struggles will depend on the conjuncture of forces in the economy and the state as well as in civil society. In areas where labor and other structural inequalities coincide, where new immigrant or minority working-class communities combine with local cultures of union militancy, or where organizational and framing strategies re-define previously divided group identities, there may be greater possibilities for collective action. Moreover, the boundaries of mobilization are no longer strictly local. As corporations become larger and more globally integrated, unions have learned to use new leverage, from the strategic location of jobs in worldwide commodity chains, from regulations under national and international law, and from access to global media and civil society. Such changes may prefigure a new path of opposition to the now dominant anti-union regime.

#### Reviving unions is critical to preventing global authoritarianism.

Nussbaum 19 ,Karen. (Karen Nussbaum, former Director of the United States Women's Bureau at the Department of Labor with a BA from Goddard College), 2019, “Unions and Democracy,” Labor Studies Journal, https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1177/0160449X19890523]/

Nottage was commissioned to write a play about an American revolution. She chose de-industrialization. Trump had not yet been elected when the play was written, but “Trumpism” is the coda in real life. I’ve seen this story repeated in communities across the country. Many have become inured to the decline of unions but were unprepared for the rise of authoritarianism around the globe. “You can’t have a strong middle class without unions, and you can’t have democracy without a strong middle class.” That succinct analysis didn’t come from a labor leader but from Tim Collins, CEO of the private equity firm Ripplewood. Collins is not representative of business leaders, but he is right. The link between unions and the middle class is well-made. But how important are unions to democracy? Very. Workers Do with Less So Big Business Gets More The reality depicted in “Sweat” started years ago, around the time I got my start in the labor movement. I got a job as a clerk-typist in 1970 and organized my coworkers— women office workers in Boston and then nationally in 9to5, a national association and our sister organization, District 925, SEIU. We built 9to5 on the wave of women’s liberation, a term our members would have rejected. But we were confronted by corporate opposition, characterized by an abrupt shift in strategy to maximize profits in an increasingly competitive world. American employers chose to cut workers’ pay. To do that, companies had to break workers’ collective power. Business Week laid it out in stark terms in a 1974 editorial: “It will be a bitter pill for many American to swallow the idea of doing with less so that big business can have more.” Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone (1988) called this new strategy and the corporate restructuring and the polarization of America it created “The Great U-Turn.” Rather than compete with Germany, Japan, and Scandinavia on product quality, worker productivity, and skill level, corporations slashed wages and benefits, and outsourced jobs. I remember discovering that law offices were outsourcing the typing of legal briefs to Asia, and coming to terms with the fact that it was cheaper to have non-English-speaking workers type what to them would be nonsense characters than to employ American workers who were likely not making much more than minimum wage. Union busting firms sprang up to go after organized industries. In the 1980s and 1990s, unions suffered hallmark defeats throughout the economy: PATCO in transportation,1 Phelps-Dodge in mining,2 Hormel in food processing,3 and Caterpillar in manufacturing,4 to name a few. Union busters even went after 9to5. One seminar which focused on beating back clerical worker organizing had a slide show warning “Don’t be fooled into thinking you need to look out for the likes of Jimmy Hoffa . . . Here’s who you should be worried about” with a picture of me.5 Americans did with less so that banks and big business could have more. The wealth from productivity gains, which had been distributed relatively evenly after World War II and built the middle class, now skewed dramatically to the top. According to Joseph Stiglitz, Some 90 percent [of American citizens] have seen their incomes stagnate or decline in the past 30 years. This is not surprising, given that the United States has the highest level of inequality among the advanced countries and one of the lowest levels of opportunity. The Economic Policy Institute (2018) reports that income inequality is continuing at such a dramatic pace that federal data can’t keep up with it. From Collective Power to Self-Reliance Public consciousness changed as well. In the 1970s, when I asked working women, “who do you turn to if you have a problem on the job?” they imagined calling their Congressperson or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, National Organization of Women, or 9to5. Over the years, their view of their options narrowed: “I’d complain to a co-worker”; “I’d call my mother”; “I’d pray to God.” After some years, the most typical answer was, “No one. I rely on myself.” Shaun Barclay, international secretary-treasurer of the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), remembers being part of a strong community in his poor neighborhood. The community’s cohesion was reinforced by his job as a union clerk at an organized grocery store at the age of 16. But over the years he has seen the erosion of communal values in popular culture. “When I was young, the most popular magazine was Life. It was replaced by People—not as comprehensive as Life but still pretty broad. Us came along, narrower than People, to be replaced finally by Self.” Working America, the community affiliate of the AFL-CIO, sees the effects of declining unions as they go door to door in working-class communities. With twelve million conversations over the last sixteen years, they found fewer people who had a family member in a union. Without the anchor of a labor union, Working America canvassers found that working people were vulnerable to right-wing social wedge issues, and since 2016 more explicitly racist appeals. Unions, a Cornerstone of Civic Life Unions provide trusted information to members about issues and elections and boost voter civic participation. Union members are 12 points more likely to vote than nonunion workers (Freeman 2003). The passage of Right to Work laws reduced turnout by 2 percent in presidential elections (Feigenbaum, Hertel-Fernandez, and Williamson 2018). And democracy declines with union density. In states with low union density (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor 2018), new voter suppression laws (Brennan Center for Justice n.d.) were passed in ten states,6 compared to two states with high union density.7 How does the union have this impact? By engaging it’s members on politics. Consider one historical example. One million women belonged to the United Auto Workers (UAW) Union Women’s Auxiliary in the 1950s. The Auxiliary’s membership was far more than the union’s. It was the biggest political action organization in the country. The women had an ambitious agenda. They lobbied for free nurseries for working mothers, maternity leave, equal pay, and an end to job discrimination against African Americans. And, according to the UAW, the women led discussions around the dinner table with their children about the role of work and unions. Union influence on members was tested when Barack Obama ran for president in 2008. Elected labor leaders struggled with how to communicate to white members who didn’t want to vote for a black man. Rich Trumka, then secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO, led by example in a speech to the United Steelworkers that fall. He described meeting a woman in his home town of Nemocolin, Pennsylvania. They talked about the election. “I just don’t trust Obama,” she said. When Trumka pressed her on why, she admitted, “because he’s black.” Trumka then said, Look around. Nemacolin’s a dying town. There’re no jobs here. Kids are moving away because there’s no future here. And here’s a man, Barack Obama, who’s going to fight for people like us and you won’t vote for him because of the color of his skin. He went on to tell his steelworker audience, Brothers and sisters, we can’t tap dance around the fact that there are a lot of folks out there just like that woman. A lot of them are good union people; they just can’t get past this idea that there’s something wrong with voting for a black man. Well, those of us who know better can’t afford to look the other way. Labor leaders around the country leaned into this complicated, racially charged discussion with members. A massive member outreach campaign reached one-third of union members at the workplace, and 83 percent received mail from their unions about the election. Sixty-seven percent of union members voted for Obama that year.8 The Culinary Workers Union 226, UNITE HERE in Las Vegas is a stunning example of member political mobilization today. They represent 60,000 workers who come from 178 countries and speak more than forty languages. Despite these challenges, they have good paying, stable jobs in hotels and casinos. They are engaged and militant, and run the most impressive political outreach program in the country by building community among their members. Their members can get two months of time off to work on elections, and they have been turning the state a political “blue.” Organizers for Working America connect with working people on economic issues and find common ground outside of a workplace context through door-todoor canvassing. Canvasser Mike Logan worked on the 2017 Virginia governor’s race near Lynchburg, a very conservative part of the state. “Who are you voting for?” Mike asked a middle-aged white male voter. “The Republican.” “What’s your biggest issue?” Mike continued. “Confederate statues.” “Well, check out this petition for expanding Medicaid,” Mike pressed on. “Oh yeah, my daughter’s on Medicaid,” the voter responded, signing the petition, talking to Mike about the election, and being open to now voting for the Democrat. Those conversations resulted in moving the vote by 8 points in a part of the state that voted more than 20 points for Trump the year before.9 The Rise of Authoritarianism The democratic civic space provided by unions and the subsequent decline of unions as a countervailing force to corporate power, contributes to the appalling trends of the last fifty years: Gilded Age levels of inequality, devastated communities, and heightened civic polarization by race, religion, and ethnic origin. These conditions have led to a wave of autocratic governments around the globe. Alarm is growing. How Democracies Die (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2019) is a New York Times bestseller; The People Vs. Democracy (Mounk 2019) warns, “this may be our last chance to save democracy.” When people lose high-paying, unionized jobs they do not just lose their footing in the middle class; rather they also stand to lose a whole set of social connections that structure their lives and give them meaning. Cas Mudde (2019) in The Far Right Today describes the evolution of right-wing ideologies since World War II. “In the fourth wave, which roughly started in the 21st century, radical right parties have become mainstreamed and, increasingly normalized, not just in Europe, but across the world.” Unions, Bridging Divides I talked to union leaders in Minnesota about how they deal with the rise of anti-democratic ideologies and how they bridge divides among their members in a state that voted both for Ilhan Omar in Minneapolis and Donald Trump in the southern and northern parts of the state. “We need more organizations where people take minutes!” insisted Bethany Winkels,10 political director of the Minnesota AFL-CIO: There’s a lack of opportunity for people to experience democracy—debate issues, argue about how to spend dues money, vote, take minutes—the tools of transparency and accountability. People need to experience power on issues. They need structures and systems. Unions are a place where people can get that, and can change their minds. Political strategist Michael Podhorzer says, “there is a growing consensus that unions are an agent keeping authoritarianism at bay.”11 He cites the daily work of union activists who handle grievances, bargain contracts, and organize new workers. In each instance, to be successful you have to include everyone. And success is tangible, in better wages and benefits, fair working conditions, and solidarity. He notes that studies show that union members are more likely to have racially progressive views than nonunion working people. “Can you have a liberal progressive America without unions? (Plumer 2012)” asks historian Nelson Lichtenstein? “History says no. For 200 years the existence of the union movement has been wedded to the rise of democracy. We saw this here, in South Korea, in Spain, in Africa.” And the decline of unions is wedded to the rise of the authoritarianism. A major shift by working-class voters in Brazil elected right-winger Jair Bolsonaro in October 2018. Brazilian sociologist Ruy Braga (2019) argues that “Bolsonaro’s election marked the decline of trade unions as the primary site of working-class organization; and the rise of Evangelical churches in their place” with collective identities being shaped by the church rather than by unions. Braga points to a painful symbol of this shift in influence in the working class—the sale of the labor federation, CUT, headquarters in Sao Paulo to the World Church of the Power of God. On the positive side is Tunisia, the birthplace of the Arab Spring in 2011. The union federation backed the uprising, 150,000 workers went on strike, and President Ben Ali fled the country. The Nobel Committee recognized the role of unions in promoting democracy when it granted the 2015 Peace Prize to the Tunisian General Labor Union as one of four civic society partners (the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet), which created a constitutional form of government. Solutions: Policy + Organizing We can strengthen unions and rebuild this crucial element of civic society through public policy. The key bill for broadening the rights of workers to organize in Congress is the Protect the Right to Organize (PRO) Act. It eliminates right to work provisions, expands the coverage of eligible workers, prohibits the use of permanent replacement workers during strikes, repeals the restriction on secondary activity, provides for first contract arbitration, addresses misclassification of workers and the overuse of independent contractors, and imposes much tougher penalties for employer violations. There are other bills focused on expanding bargaining rights to all public sector workers. But good legislation will need much more than rhetorical from politicians. Lynn Rhinehart, labor lawyer and former general counsel of the AFL-CIO, argues that as part of strengthening protections for workers engaged in collective action, giving workers the power to act in solidarity with each other beyond the borders of their own workplaces is key: Workers should have the right to require multiple employers to sit down and bargain with them at the same time. And the law needs to allow for strikes, picketing, and other solidarity actions by workers outside their own workplace, including up and down the supply chain.12 Rhinehart is cautious about embracing a tripartite wage board-type system to set wages for an industry. “I worry that a focus on government wage boards might undermine efforts to build strong, democratic, member-based worker organizations because of the distance this government process puts between workers and the decisions affecting their working lives.”13 Worker mobilization is key to getting new laws passed and enforced. Union organizing, including in new forms, is growing. The wave of teachers’ strikes continues throughout the country. Gig drivers are finding ways to bargain, with the help of unions including the Teamsters, National Taxi Workers Alliance, and the Machinists union. And developers in the video game industry are reacting to profit maximization at their expense, calling for unionization. These gamers are getting support from the International Association of Theater Stage Employees, which represents illustrators and others in the entertainment industry, the Writers Guild East, and a new association called Game Workers Unite. These are encouraging efforts, but still not at the scale we need to turn around historic low union density. In the meantime, we need to build intermediate forms of organization that bridge divides within the working class and promote collective power. A number of organizations are connecting with workers through membership: Working America, which reaches more than half a million working people face-to-face every year, two-thirds of whom sign up as members; Fight for $15 with organizing in 300 cities around the world; and local advocacy organizations such as Casa de Maryland, organizing immigrant workers since 1985. Building organizations that confront citizen polarization isn’t easy. Josh Lewis,14 a long-time Working America lead organizer, talked about how ugly it can get and why he perseveres. “There was a lot of hate at the doors,” Josh summed up his experience as a black organizer in white working-class communities in 2018: It was especially bad for black women. Our biggest challenge was to keep people on the job. It wasn’t enough for me to do one-on-ones with black staff. We went to Sartre in the tool box. I said, “We’re in this fight because it’s the right thing to do. We may not win. But we are fighting fascism, staring down the beast.” We expect the hostility to be worse in 2020, when the worst racists will feel backed into a corner and come out even more. But I’m not going to let them get me down. The fire in my belly is too strong. There is a crisis in democracy. We should heed Bethany Winkels’ call for democratic structures, and Josh Lewis’ challenge to have the passion and discipline that is needed. We need unions, not because they boost turnout and change a voter’s choice, but because they create the muscle memory of democratic control. Without that, democracy is lost.

#### Strong democracy is key to prevent a plethora of existential threats.

Kendall-Taylor 16 [Andrea; Deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council, Senior associate in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington; “How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the International Order,” CSIS; 7/15/16; <https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-order>/]

Democratic decline would weaken U.S. partnerships and erode an important foundation for U.S. cooperation abroad. [Research demonstrates](file:///C:\Users\PMeylan\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary%20Internet%20Files\Content.Outlook\5V2CJVRN\160715_KendallTaylor_DemocracysDecline_Commentary.docx#http://cmp.sagepub.com/content/18/1/49.abstract) that domestic politics are a key determinant of the international behavior of states. In particular, **democracies** are **more likely to form alliances and cooperate more fully with other democracies than with autocracies**. Similarly, **authoritarian countries have established mechanisms for cooperation and sharing of “worst practices.” An increase in authoritarian countries**, then, **would provide a broader platform** for coordination that could enable these countries to overcome their divergent histories, values, and interests—factors that are frequently cited as obstacles to the **formation of a cohesive challenge to the U.S.-led international system**. Recent examples support the empirical data. **Democratic backsliding in Hungary and** the hardening of **Egypt’s autocracy** under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi **have led to enhanced relations between these countries and Russia. Likewise, democratic decline in Bangladesh has led Sheikh Hasina Wazed and her ruling Awami League to seek closer relations with China and Russia**, in part **to mitigate Western pressure and bolster** the **regime’s domestic standing**. Although none of these burgeoning relationships has developed into a highly unified partnership, democratic backsliding in these countries has provided a basis for cooperation where it did not previously exist. And while the United States certainly finds common cause with authoritarian partners on specific issues, **the** depth and reliability of such cooperation is limited. Consequently, **further democratic decline could** seriously compromise **the United States’ ability to form the kinds of deep partnerships that will be required** to confront today’s increasingly complex challenges. Global issues such as **climate change, migration, and** violent extremism demand the coordination and cooperation that democratic backsliding would put in peril. Put simply, **the United States is a less effective and influential actor if it loses its ability to rely on its partnerships** with other democratic nations. A **slide toward authoritarianism could also** challenge the current global order by diluting U.S. influence in critical international institutions, including the [United Nations](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/christopher-walker-authoritarian-regimes-are-changing-how-the-world-defines-democracy/2014/06/12/d1328e3a-f0ee-11e3-bf76-447a5df6411f_story.html) , the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Democratic decline would **weaken Western efforts within these institutions to advance issues such as Internet freedom and the responsibility to protect**. In the case of Internet governance, for example, Western **democracies support an open, largely private, global Internet. Autocracies**, in contrast, **promote state control over the Internet**, including laws and other mechanisms that facilitate their ability to censor and persecute dissidents. Already many autocracies, including Belarus, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, have coalesced in the “Likeminded Group of Developing Countries” within the United Nations to advocate their interests. Within the IMF and World Bank, autocracies—along with other developing nations—seek to water down conditionality or the reforms that lenders require in exchange for financial support. If successful, diminished conditionality would enfeeble an important incentive for governance reforms. In a more extreme scenario, **the rising influence of autocracies could enable these countries to bypass the IMF and World Bank all together**. For example, **the Chinese-created Asian Infrastructure** and Investment Bank and the BRICS Bank—which includes Russia, China, and an increasingly authoritarian South Africa—**provide countries with the potential to bypass existing global financial institutions when it suits their interests. Authoritarian-led alternatives pose the risk that global economic governance will become** [**fragmented and less effective**](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2016.1161899?journalCode=tsur20#.V2H3MRbXgdI)**.**  **Violence and instability would** also likely increase if more democracies give way to autocracy. [International relations literature](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/1995-05-01/democratization-and-war) tells us that **democracies are** less likely to fight wars **against other democracies, suggesting that interstate wars would rise as the number of democracies declines**. Moreover, **within countries that are already autocratic, additional movement** away from democracy, or an “authoritarian hardening,” would **increase global instability**. Highly repressive autocracies are the most likely to **experience state failure, as was the case in the Central African Republic**, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In this way, **democratic decline would significantly strain the international order** because rising levels of instability would exceed the West’s ability to respond to the tremendous costs of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and refugee flows.

#### Plan: The United States federal government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### 1 - Solves ILO.

Brudney 21 [James; Joseph Crowley Chair in Labor and Employment Law, Fordham Law School; “The Right to Strike as Customary International Law,” THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW; January 2021; <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=yjil>] \*\*\*CIL = customary international law

3. Federal Courts’ Position on CIL as National Law What about the position of the federal courts toward CIL and its acceptance as national law in the US? The leading Supreme Court decision, Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 219 involved a claim by Alvarez-Machain for violation of CIL under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).220 A cause of action under the ATS may be distinguished from the right to strike setting in two respects. As a jurisdictional matter, the ATS typically involves lawsuits alleging violations of CIL committed in foreign countries and brought by citizens of foreign countries. By contrast, as developed in parts III and IV, the right to strike as CIL would be asserted by U.S. workers against U.S. employers within the U.S. Further, as explained in Part III, the CIL right to strike is to be asserted directly as a form of federal common law, rather than being applied through a particular statute that may impose its own historically grounded limits.221At the same time, the substantive standard set forth in Sosa is relevant in allowing for suitably delineated CIL to be directly applied in domestic federal and state court contexts.222 While urging lower courts to exercise a “restrained conception” when considering new causes of action based on CIL, the Court in Sosa added that such claims can be recognized if “rest[ing] on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”223 The Court’s formulation in the ATS setting is slightly different from the two elements—general practice and opinio juris—that have been discussed at length in defining and applying modern CIL.224 But Sosa’s emphasis on international law norms that are precisely defined and reflect the importance of general practice is compatible with contemporary conceptions of CIL.225Lower courts have understood that Sosa sets a “‘high bar to new private causes of action’ alleging violations of CIL”226 based on whether the sources of such law are “sufficiently specific, universal, and obligatory.”227 But they have proceeded to recognize such causes of action when “multiple international agreements (including one that is binding on more than 160 signatory states), as well as the domestic laws of over 80 states, adopt a particular definition of that norm.”228 As has been amply demonstrated in sections B and C of this Part, the universality of the claims based on the right to strike as part of FOA can qualify under this approach. The right is recognized under multiple international agreements (**including ILO conventions** ratified by over 150 states and other international agreements ratified by over 170 states); regional human rights agreements around the world; domestic constitutions and laws in over 90 countries; and major court decisions at both a regional and national level. Further, this CIL norm includes a sufficient level of specificity regarding the two key areas that are the focus of analysis for purposes of U.S. law: the right of public employees to engage in strike activities with limited exceptions and the right of all strikers to be protected against permanent replacement.229All of the above suggests that U.S. failure to ratify Convention 87 is likely to be compatible with its recognizing FOA and the right to strike as CIL.230 At the same time, there is no independent or tripartite analysis comparing Convention 87 to U.S. labor law, identifying what changes in national and state law would be needed to comply with the Convention in general and the right to strike in particular. 231 U.S. employer representatives have expressed concern that ratification would alter national and state labor law in a number of important respects including the right to strike.232 Given the U.S. historical position of nonobjection alongside non-ratification, the Article next addresses whether—even if the right to strike under FOA is accepted as CIL in traditional international law terms and is recognized under the Sosa standard—the right can be asserted in U.S. courts as CIL. This question implicates several distinct problems, which are discussed in Parts III and IV.

#### 2 - Plan solves civic participation – increases turnout and politically active laborers – it spills over.

**McElwee 15**, Sean. (Sean McElwee is a research associate at [Demos](http://www.demos.org/sean-mcelwee).) "How Unions Boost Democratic Participation." The American Prospect, 16 Sept. 2015, prospect.org/labor/unions-boost-democratic-participation/.

Labor organizer Helen Marot once observed, "The labor unions are group efforts in the direction of democracy." What she meant is that more than simply vehicles for the economic interests of workers (which they certainly are), labor unions also foster civic participation for workers. And nowhere is this clearer than in voter turnout, which has suffered in recent years along with union membership. Indeed, new data from the Census Bureau and a new analysis of American National Election Studies data support the case that unions' declining influence has also deeply harmed democracy. In 2014, voter turnout was abysmal, even for a midterm. Census data suggest that only 41.9 percent of the citizen population over 18 turned out to vote. However, as I note in my new Demos report Why Voting Matters, there are dispiriting gaps in turnout across class, race, and age. To examine how unions might affect policy, I performed a new analysis of both Census Bureau and American National Election Studies data. The data below, from the 2014 election, show the differences in voter turnout between union and non-union workers (the sample only includes individuals who were employed, and does not include self-employed workers). While only 39 percent of non-union workers voted in 2014, fully 52 percent of union workers did. As part of ongoing research, James Feigenbaum, an economics PhD candidate at Harvard, ran a regression using American National Election Studies data suggesting that union members are about 4 percentage points more likely to vote and 3 points more likely to register (after controlling for demographic factors) and individuals living in a union household are 2.5 points more likely to vote and register. This is largely in line with the earlier estimates of Richard Freeman. These numbers may appear modest, but in a close national election they could be enough to change the result. Other research has found an even stronger turnout effect from unions. Daniel Stegmueller and Michael Becher find that after applying numerous demographic controls, union members are 10 points more likely to vote. What's particularly important is that unions boost turnout among low- and middle-income individuals. In a 2006 study, political scientists Jan Leighley and Jonathan Nagler found that, "the decline in union membership since 1964 has affected the aggregate turnout of both low and middle-income individuals more than the aggregate turnout of high-income individuals." In 2014, the gap between unions and non-union workers shrunk at the highest rung of the income ladder. There was a 15-point gap among those earning less than $25,000 (40 percent turnout for union workers, and 25 percent turnout for non-union workers). Among those earning more than $100,000, the gap was far smaller (49 percent for non-union workers and 52 percent for union workers). Individuals living in union households are also more progressive than those in non-union households. I examined 2012 ANES data and find that union households aren't largely different from non-union households on many issues regarding government spending, but they are more likely to have voted for Obama, identify as Democratic, and support a robust role for the government in reducing income inequality. When looking at union members specifically, the gaps become slightly larger. More upscale union members are far more progressive than their non-union counterparts. Non-union households with an income above $60,000 oppose government intervention to reduce inequality by 11 points, with 32.2 percent in favor and 43.4 percent against. But richer union households support government intervention, with 42.5 percent in favor and 29.9 percent opposed. As Richard B. Freeman has pointed out, "union members are more likely to vote for a Democrat for the House or Presidency than demographically comparable nonunion voters." He similarly finds that "unionism moves members to the left of where they would be given their socioeconomic status," in line with the data I examined from 2012. A 2013 study by Jasmine Kerrissey and Evan Schofer finds that union members are not only more likely to vote, but also more likely to belong to other associations, and to protest. They also find that these effects are strongest among people with lower levels of education, suggesting that unions may help mobilize the least politically active groups. A recent study of European countries finds union members vote more and identifies those aspects of union membership that contribute to the higher turnout. The strongest factor is that workers who engage in democratic organizations in the workplace (via collective bargaining) are more likely to engage in democracy more broadly by, for instance, voting. Other studies support the idea that civic participation creates a feedback loop that leads to higher voting rates. Another factor is that union members make more money, and higher income is correlated with voting behavior. Finally, union members are encouraged by peers and the union to engage in politics, which also contributes to higher levels of turnout. It's not entirely surprising that politicians who savage unions often share a similar contempt for the right to vote. Democracy in the workplace leads to democracy more broadly throughout society. Workers with more democratic workplaces are more likely to democratically engage in in society. Further, when unions and progressives demonstrate that government can benefit them, Americans are more likely to want to participate in decision-making. For all these reasons, unions play a unique and indispensable role in the progressive project. As Larry Summers, certainly not a leftist, recently argued, "the weakness of unions leaves a broad swath of the middle class largely unrepresented in the political process."

#### 3 - The plan restores electoral legitimacy and ensures democracy in the workplace.

**Luce 20**, Stephanie. (Stephanie Luce is a professor at the School of Labor and Urban Studies/CUNY. She is the author of 'Labor Movements: Global Perspectives and Fighting for a Living Wage' and is an Editor of Organizing Upgrade. Her writing can be found at stephanieluce.net.) "Strike for Democracy! » Organizing Upgrade." Organizing Upgrade, 26 Oct. 2020, www.organizingupgrade.com/strike-for-democracy/.

Trump and the Republican Party have launched a full-fledged assault on the electoral process, from voter suppression to misleading ballot boxes. We may see violence aimed at keeping people from the polls or just meant to create general fear and chaos. Trump has dropped repeated suggestions that he may try to shut down the election, stop votes from being counted, or refuse to step down even if he loses. A range of groups have mobilized to fight for a fair election and plan around worst case scenarios. Some unions have been active in a few of these groups, such as Protect the Vote. According to experts who study coups, the best way to stop an electoral coup is by getting a large turnout and strong victory. The larger a vote for Biden, the smaller the space Trump will have to claim the vote is illegitimate. Unions are doing their part to make this happen. This is a major part of union activity every election cycle. But according to Bob Master, Assistant to the Vice President of District 1 of the Communications Workers, it was tough to get union members to volunteer for Hilary Clinton four years ago. This year, there are hundreds of members signed up to phone bank, some doing it three or four nights a week. It isn’t that they are necessarily Biden fans, he says, but they understand what is at stake. UNITE HERE is running an intensive “Take Back 2020” get-out-the-vote effort, phone banking and even knocking on doors in Arizona, Florida, Nevada and Pennsylvania. In Philadelphia, for example, over 100 hospitality workers plan to visit 100,000 homes before the election. In Arizona they are partnering with Seed the Vote. Unions such as the Communications Workers of America, SEIU, AFT and the UAW are looking to connect some of their core activists with local “protect the vote” groupings in key states and cities to show up to polls and fight to make sure every vote is counted. Unions are increasingly turning attention to possible election scenarios. “There’s some sense in the leadership that in fascist countries, unions are at the top of the list of targets,” Master says. “And it is the role of unions, which are the guarantors of some measure of democracy in the workplace, to ensure that democracy survives in the society.” A handful of activists have started to organize in their workplace for labor to be ready to respond. Postal workers in Detroit are handing out flyers that ask coworkers to sign a pledge from Choose Democracy, committing to vote then take action if needed to protect the vote. ARE UNIONS READY? Will unions be ready to strike if Trump won’t step down? The sizable share of union members backing Trump makes it tough for some unions to frame the fight as anti-Trump, or pro-Biden. But if unions commit to the integrity of the democratic process, they have more ground to stand on. The Rochester Central Labor Council in New York passed a resolution calling for a general strike in the event that Trump loses and does not step down. The resolution calls on the national AFL-CIO and all other labor organizations to “prepare for and enact a general strike, if necessary, to ensure a Constitutionally mandated peaceful transition of power as a result of the 2020 Presidential Elections.” A handful of other labor bodies have followed suit. Sara Nelson, International President of the Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO, is also taking a bold stand, stating that in the event of a contested election, labor “has to be ready to mobilize in a series of strikes or leading to a general strike.” Despite high unemployment, workers still have power, she says. She points to how the federal government ended its shutdown last year, after Nelson spoke publicly about the idea of a general strike and a handful of air traffic controllers did not show up for their shifts. “Where can we actually flex that muscle in a series of strikes . . . in a way that is going to be very effective?” she asks. “And frankly, if the planes all stop that is something that will grab everyone’s attention and suddenly there has to be action to fix that.”

#### 4 - The right to strike is key to preserve democracy – flips concentration of power.

**IER 17**. (The IER exists to inform the debate around trade union rights and labour law by providing information, critical analysis, and policy ideas through our network of academics, researchers and lawyers. We were established in February 1989 as an independent organisation to act as a focal point for the spread of new ideas in the field of labour law. In 1994 the Institute became a registered charity.) "UN Rights Expert: Right to Strike is Essential to Democracy." IER, 10 Mar. 2017, www.ier.org.uk/news/un-rights-expert-right-strike-essential-democracy/.

The United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, has reminded member states of the International Labour Organization (ILO) – including the UK – that they have a positive obligation to uphold the right to strike. Speaking at an ILO meeting on Monday 06 March 2017 in Geneva, Kiai argued that the right to strike is fundamental to the preservation of democracy. “The concentration of power in one sector – whether in the hands of government or business – inevitably leads to the erosion of democracy, and an increase in inequalities and marginalization with all their attendant consequences. The right to strike is a check on this concentration of power,” he explained. The right to strike has been established in international law as a corollary to the right of freedom of association for decades, and is enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights as Article 11. As a member state of the ILO and of the EU, the UK is legally obliged to uphold the right to strike, although through the Trades Union Act 2016 and the anti-trade union laws that preceded it, the government is making it harder and harder for trade unions to take industrial action. Kiai criticised such actions, saying government’s have a duty not to impede workers’ ability to take industrial action. “I deplore the various attempts made to erode the right to strike at national and multilateral levels,” the expert said, reminding delegates: “Protest action in relation to government social and economic policy, and against negative corporate practices, forms part of the basic civil liberties whose respect is essential for the meaningful exercise of trade union rights. This right enables them to engage with companies and governments on a more equal footing, and Member States have a positive obligation to protect this right, and a negative obligation not to interfere with its exercise.”