### 1 (1:50)

#### Burden text – The aff burden is to coherently justify the prohibitive action of the resolution. Prefer: a) Predictability – LD is a question of ethics which means this round should be a question of moral prohibitions b) Text – ought is defined as expressing obligation[[1]](#footnote-1) which means ought not necessitates prohibition c) Neg burden choice – The aff should have clarified one in the 1ac, by not doing so they have forfeited their right to read one. This would be like reading a new util framework in the 1ar, which kills 1NC strategy since I premised it on your lack of one.

Comp worlds doesn’t exclude

#### Non-cognitivism is true – ethical assertions are neither true or false –

#### 1] Open Question – Suppose goodness was synonymous with a property like “X”. It is impossible to answer to question “is X good” since either A) X is the exact same thing as good, in which case our answer is the meaningless tautology “good is good” or B) X is not the same as good in which case non-naturalism is true. The metaethic solves since moral statements aren’t making coherent claims about properties in the first place.

#### 2] Disagreement – only non-cognitivism explains disagreement over foundational moral principles since they are not truth-apt and thus a unifying conception of good is impossible – denying our fwk means the argument from disagreement gains force, which entails relativism since considering the agential status of every individual it’s more probable that disagreement arises from lack of unified good rather than 99% of people not having epistemic access to facts.

#### The inability to analyze moral statements is best explained by the emotive account of ethics.

A. J. Ayer, 1936, “A Critique of Ethics,” from Language, Truth and Logic JS

We begin by admitting that the fundamental ethical concepts are unanalysable, inasmuch as there is no criterion by which one can test the validity of the judgements in which they occur. So far we are in agreement with the absolutists. But, unlike the absolutists, we are able to give an explanation of this fact about ethical concepts. We say that the reason why they are unanalysable is that they are mere pseudo-concepts. The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that money,’ I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, ‘You stole that money.’ In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, ‘You stole that money,’ in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks. The tone, or the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker .If now I generalize my previous statement and say, ‘Stealing money is wrong.’ I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning—that is, expresses no proposition which can be either true or false. It is as if I had written ‘Stealing money!!’ - where the shape and thickness of the exclamation marks show, by a suitable convention, that a special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which is being expressed. It is clear that there is nothing said here which can be true or false. Another man may disagree with me about the wrongness of stealing, in the sense that he may not have the same feelings about stealing as I have, and he may quarrel with me on account of my moral sentiments. But he cannot, strictly speaking, contradict me. For in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am not making any factual statement, not even a statement about my own state of mind. I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments. And the man who is ostensibly contradicting me is merely expressing his moral sentiments. So that there is plainly no sense in asking which of us is in the right. For neither of us is asserting a genuine proposition.

#### Thus the standard is consistency with emotivism. Prefer it:

#### Text – the act of expressing obligation is a function of emotion. Ayer 2

A. J. Ayer, 1936, “A Critique of Ethics,” from Language, Truth and Logic JS

What we have just been saying about the symbol ‘wrong’ applies to all normative ethical symbols. Sometimes they occur in sentences which record ordinary empirical facts besides expressing ethical feeling about those facts: sometimes they occur in sentences which simply express ethical feeling about a certain type of action, or situation, without making any statement of fact. But in every case in which one would commonly be said to be making an ethical judgement, the function of the relevant ethical word is purely ‘emotive’. It is used to express feeling about certain objects, but not to make any assertion about them. It is worth mentioning that ethical terms do not serve only to express feeling. They are calculated also to arouse feeling, and so to stimulate action. Indeed some of them are used in such a way as to give the sentences in which they occur the effect of commands. Thus the sentence ‘It is your duty to tell the truth’ may be regarded both as the expression of a certain sort of ethical feeling about truthfulness and as the expression of the command ‘Tell the truth.’ The sentence ‘You ought to tell the truth’ also involves the command ‘Tell the truth’, but here the tone of the command is less emphatic. In the sentence ‘It is good to tell the truth’ the command has become little more than a suggestion. And thus the ‘meaning” of the word ‘good’, in its ethical usage, is differentiated from that of the word ‘duty’ or the word ‘ought’. In fact we may define the meaning of the various ethical words in terms both of the different feelings they are ordinarily taken to express, and also the different responses

#### Regress – I can question any moral principle infinitely, which eventually must terminate in a principle that has no justification, or an assertion – thus any universal principle collapses to the assertions of an individual will, which is an emotion or sentiment – the only alternative is no moral principles at all.

#### 3] Appeals to emotivism are best for motivating real world solutions to oppression. Yaouzis,

Nicolas Olsson MORALITY AND OPPRESSION, published in The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously, December 18, 2018, ///AHS PB First, note that although moral error theory entails that there are no moral reasons, it does not entail that there are no other kinds of reasons. For example, Olson (2014) points out that there is a reductive meaning of “reason” that does not entail irreducible normativity. I have a prudential reason for attending the department’s political philosophy seminar rather than go out for ice cream because I’m interested in learning more about political philosophy, and the best way to accomplish this is to attend the seminar. Similarly, someone can have a prudential reason to support a policy to pay reparations to the descendants of victims of the transatlantic slave trade if they think that this will further their interests. This will not alleviate Mills’s worry. Even if the descendants of the transatlantic slave trade have prudential reasons to support such a policy, it seems (at first glance) unlikely that most members of other groups have prudential reasons to support it. However, I think that there is cause for optimism. After all, humans feel sympathy for each other. We grieve at others’ sorrow and rejoice at their pleasure. We also tend to become upset at people who cause suffering and applaud people who make others happy. To use David Hume’s words ([1740] 1985: 436): “When we observe a person in misfortunes, we are affected with pity and love; but the author of their misfortunes becomes the object of our strongest hatred, and is the more detested in proportion to the degree of our compassion.” So, when a person hears about, say, the plight of an Afghan refugee soon to be deported, it is natural for the observer to feel affection and pity for the refugee, while at the same time hatred and antipathy toward the persons responsible for the decision to deport the refugee. Affection for the refugee and antipathy for the persons responsible for the decision often tend to give rise to a desire for change. Therefore, an activist can appeal to these desires, rather than to non-existing moral facts, to convince politicians and fellow citizens to not deport Afghan refugees.

#### Now negate:

#### Every emotive judgement is indexed to a particular individual and circumstance, no emotive sentiments can ever be fully universal. This means that the resolution negates since there is no emotion that can be applied to a universal claim that x is y.

#### The aff cannot prove the resolution true since statements like the aff are not truth apt but just expressions which makes them non-binding – thus they haven’t met their burden and you negate – this also means non-cognitivism negates independently.

### 2

#### A: Interpretation – Debaters must only read normatively justified frameworks that can guide action in every instance

#### B: Violation – You read an impact justified framework – [explain]

C: Standards—

#### 1. Strat skew – Reading an impact justified framework destroys my strategy: Turn ground – it artificially exclude impacts from a larger framework that would justify your impact being bad which means you can cherry pick any impact that flows one direction. Strat skew controls the internal link to fairness because it’s impossible for me to debate absent a coherent accessible strategy to engage.

#### 2. Phil ed – Impact justified framework destroy phil ed: Justification – impact justification destroys the requirement to learn concepts like normativity, metaphysics, meta-ethics, and other types of justifications for frameworks since all you need is reasons why one impact is bad

#### Voters – Fairness is a voter since debate is a competitive activity that intrinsically requires an equal shot at winning. Education is a voter since it’s the reason schools fund debate and its ultimate impact.

#### DD – a) to deter future abuse, b) otherwise they could just kick and go for the positive time tradeoff on theory, c) the round has been skewed so theory is the only fair place to vote

#### CI – a) reasonability requires judge intervention because I don’t know where your BS meter is, and b) reasonability creates a race to the bottom since it motivates debaters to use increasingly unfair strategies and get away with them by playing defense on theory.

#### No RVIs – a) It’s illogical to vote for you for being fair, rounds without theory would be irresolvable b) It incentivizes you to bait theory and win off a scripted CI.

### Case

1. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)