### 1

#### The meta-ethic is internalism – a priori moral facts don’t exist, but instead ethical claims must be made with reference to individual desires.

#### 1] Disagreement – the fact that there’s widespread disagreement in morality is best explained by reference to there being no universal good rather than a majority of people with the capacity for reason having no access to moral facts – fact that objective facts in math or science have consensus on its basic foundations further proves.

#### 2] Regress – no universal moral fact exists since we can demand justification for any moral fact infinitely – means any moral principle must stop with an arbitrary preference else there would be no principle at all so externalism collapses.

#### 3] Externalism collapses – the only reason agents follow external demands is those demands are consistent with their internal account of the good. Motivation is a necessary feature for ethics since normativity only matters insofar as agents follow through on the ethic that’s generated from it

#### 4] Open Question Argument –: Its impossible for goodness to be synonymous with an observable natural property like pleasure, since if we ask “is X good”, either A) X is the exact same thing as good, in which case our answer is the meaningless tautology “good is good” or B) X is not the same as goodness.

#### Thus, rather than individuals acting on objective moral principles, they merely act based on self-interest. Only an account of mutual self-restraint where each agent recognizes the benefit of restraining each other’s right can create a coherent ethical theory out of egoism.

David Gauthier, “Why Contractarianism?,” from Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice JS

I turn then to the third way of resolving morality ’ s foundational crisis. The first step is to embrace deliberative justification, and recognize that morality’s place must be found within, and not outside, its framework. Now this will immediately raise two problems. First of all, it will seem that the attempt to establish any constraint on choice and action, within the framework of a deliberation that aims at the maximal fulfillment of the agent ’ s considered preferences, must prove impossible. But even if this be doubted, it will seem that the attempt to establish a constraint independent of the agent ’ s preferences, within such a framework, verges on lunacy. Nevertheless, this is precisely the task accepted by my third way. And, unlike its predecessors, I believe that it can be successful; indeed, I believe that my recent book, Morals by Agreement , shows how it can succeed. 13 I shall not rehearse at length an argument that is now familiar to at least some readers, and, in any event, can be found in that book. But let me sketch briefly those features of deliberative rationality that enable it to constrain maximizing choice. The key idea is that in many situations, if each person chooses what, given the choices of the others, would maximize her expected utility, then the outcome will be mutually disadvantageous in comparison with some alternative – everyone could do better. 14 Equilibrium, which obtains when each person ’ s action is a best response to the others ’ actions, is incompatible with (Pareto-) optimality, which obtains when no one could do better without someone else doing worse. Given the ubiquity of such situations, each person can see the benefit, to herself, of participating with her fellows in practices requiring each to refrain from the direct endeavor to maximize her own utility, when such mutual restraint is mutually advantageous. No one, of course, can have reason to accept any unilateral constraint on her maximizing behavior; each benefits from, and only from, the constraint accepted by her fellows. But if one benefits more from a constraint on others than one loses by being constrained oneself, one may have reason to accept a practice requiring everyone, including oneself, to exhibit such a constraint. We may represent such a practice as capable of gaining unanimous agreement among rational persons who were choosing the terms on which they would interact with each other. And this agreement is the basis of morality. Consider a simple example of a moral practice that would command rational agreement. Suppose each of us were to assist her fellows only when either she could expect to benefit herself from giving assistance, or she took a direct interest in their well-being. Then, in many situations, persons would not give assistance to others, even though the benefit to the recipient would greatly exceed the cost to the giver, because there would be no provision for the giver to share in the benefit. Everyone would then expect to do better were each to give assistance to her fellows, regardless of her own benefit or interest, whenever the cost of assisting was low and the benefit of receiving assistance considerable. Each would thereby accept a constraint on the direct pursuit of her own concerns, not unilaterally, but given a like acceptance by others. Reflection leads us to recognize that those who belong to groups whose members adhere to such a practice of mutual assistance enjoy benefits in interaction that are denied to others. We may then represent such a practice as rationally acceptable to everyone. This rationale for agreed constraint makes no reference to the content of anyone’s preferences. The argument depends simply on the structure of interaction, on the way in which each person’s endeavor to fulfill her own preferences affects the fulfillment of everyone else. Thus, each person ’ s reason to accept a mutually constraining practice is independent of her particular desires, aims and interests, although not, of course, of the fact that she has such concerns. The idea of a purely rational agent, moved to act by reason alone, is not, I think, an intelligible one. Morality is not to be understood as a constraint arising from reason alone on the fulfillment of nonrational preferences. Rather, a rational agent is one who acts to achieve the maximal fulfillment of her preferences, and morality is a constraint on the manner in which she acts, arising from the effects of interaction with other agents.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with mutual self-restraint. Impact calc – the only moral principles that matter are those that rational and self-interested agents would choose in order to mutually restrain themselves.

#### Negate:

#### 1] Intellectual Property creates a prisoner’s dilemma game that justifies its protection from the perspective of a self-interested agent.

Moore, Adam and Himma, Ken "Intellectual Property", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/intellectual-property/>. JS

Consider the following case. Imagine that we have two intellectual property creators, Beren and Lúthien, and two possible outcomes for each. In a single-play prisoner’s dilemma game, each player can copy an intellectual creation of the other, or not. Assume as well that the intellectual works created by Beren and Lúthien are valuable, interesting, or desired. The best case for either player is one where their own intellectual creation is not copied and yet they get to copy the work of the other player. This is ‘best’ for the player who copies and ‘worst’ for the player who doesn’t because, (1) the player who copies gets to enjoy or consume more content compared to the other player, (2) the player who copies still has the option or possibility of obtaining benefit by selling, trading, or bartering with the other player, while the non-copier does not enjoy these possibilities — this provides a way to recoup research and development costs, and (3) via selling, trading, or bartering the copier may obtain a positional advantage and more capital for future exchanges compared to the non-copier. Simply put, the copier obtains more content and retains more opportunities to sell, barter, or exchange compared to the non-copier. If Beren and Lúthien both refrain from copying each other, then each will avoid the worst outcome in terms of recouping investment costs and being at a positional disadvantage. Both will also retain the option of buying or bartering for the non-copied content the other enjoys. This payoff is ‘okay,’ better than ‘worst’ but not as good as ‘best.’ If both Beren and Lúthien copy each other, then both will get extra content to enjoy and will not be put at a positional disadvantage, but each will be denied the possibility of recouping research and development costs. The other player will not buy or barter for content he already possesses. These payoffs mirror a prisoner’s dilemma game. In modeling content creation, access, and copying as an iterated prisoner’s dilemma between numerous individuals, the problem becomes even more salient. It will be individually rational to copy the intellectual efforts and creations of others. This will suppress innovation and lead to a sub-optimal result. Based solely on rational self-interest and prudence, Moore argues we should adopt institutions that promote innovation and allow inventors the capacity to recoup research and development costs. If copying becomes too widespread or if enforcement mechanisms fail, then we will likely spiral toward the collectively sub-optimal result of suppressing innovation. We see similar results of an intellectual property prisoner’s dilemma played out between nations. Through the use of sanctions against copying the intellectual efforts of others, we give ourselves compelling reasons to pursue a collectively superior outcome.

#### 2] Companies have made contracts and agreements with governments mandating that their medicines be patented – the aff is a reduction in this mutual agreement and thus violates contracts – creating a contract to break a contract is immoral since it would mean people can’t be assured that the contracts they set will be respected, which leads to non-compliance.

### 2

#### Interpretation: the affirmative may not specify a particular state in the WTO that ought to reduce intellectual property rights for medicines.

Nebel 19 [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs] “Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution.” Vbriefly. August 12, 2019. https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the- standardized-tests-resolution/?fbclid=IwAR0hUkKdDzHWrNeqEVI7m59pwsnmqLl490n4uRLQTe7bWmWDO\_avWCNzi14

“Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural . I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons. First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “ Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them , but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “ colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural. Second, “ colleges and universities” fails the upward-entailment test for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “ Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals

#### This applies to the resolution – proving “Korea ought to reduce IP rights” doesn’t entail that “the member states of the WTO ought to reduce IP rights” so it’s a generic bare plual incapable of being proven through specific instances.

#### Violation:

#### Standards:

#### Semantics is a voting issue – prefer the topicality rule – if we prove that being topical’s good and that the resolution means x, then logically this means that following x is good, which means any justification for being topical is offense – the resolution’s good – key to set a limited stasis point for clash and allows for predictable neg ground. They’ll say they’re close enough, but there’s no brightline for that which justifies straying from the rez always which decks neg contestation.

#### Limits – there’s 159 countries in the WTO and a limitless number of different medicines like opioids, vaccines, inhalers, insulin, and more which explodes limits – overspecific affs decks engagement since it allows them to moot core neg generics and the neg can’t prep every single permutation – TVA solves – read the aff as an advantage to a whole rez plan – we don’t prevent new frameworks, advantages, or mechanisms.

#### Fairness is a voter—the judge must vote for the better debater which is impossible if the round is skewed.

#### Drop the debater since drop the arg is severance – restarts the debate so the aff gets 7-6 time skew and too late for new neg offense.

#### Use competing interps—[a] leads to a race to the top where we find the best norms [b] reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention [c] reasonability collapses—you use offense/defense on the paradigm debate.

#### No RVIs—[a] logic – you don’t win for being fair, [b] means you bait theory and go for the RVI

### Util

#### There’s an act omission distinction: A. Ethics cannot hold agents accountable for an infinite number of untaken decisions, otherwise that would impair action because agents would simultaneously have an infinite number of obligations. B. Omissions aren’t intrinsic to the will because agents don’t proactively choose not to take certain actions, e.g. you don’t wake up and say, “Today is my day to not donate to charity!” – so we shouldn’t hold agents morally accountable for these omissions.

### Case

#### Can’t make enough vaccines vital components are too scarce

Tepper 4-10 James Tepper, 4/10 [James Tepper, (James M. Tepper is an American neuroscientist currently a Board of Governors Professor of Molecular and Behavioral Neuroscience and Distinguished Professor at Rutgers University and an Elected Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.)]. "Global Covid vaccine rollout threatened by shortage of vital components." Guardian, 4-1-2021, Accessed 8-8-2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/10/global-covid-vaccine-rollout-threatened-by-shortage-of-vital-components // duongie

Vaccine-makers around the world face shortages of vital components including large plastic growbags, according to the head of the firm that is manufacturing a quarter of the UK’s jab supply. Stan Erck, the chief executive of Novavax – which makes the second vaccine to be grown and bottled entirely in Britain – told the Observer that the shortage of 2,000-litre bags in which the vaccine cells were grown was a significant hurdle for global supply. His warning came as bag manufacturers revealed that some pharmaceutical firms were waiting up to 12 months for the sterile single-use disposable plastic containers, which are used to make medicines of all kinds, including the Pfizer, Moderna and Novavax Covid-19 vaccines. But Erck and his British partners said they were confident they had enough suppliers to avoid disruption to the supply of Novavax. The vaccine is waiting for approval from the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) but the first of 60 million doses ordered by the government are already in production in Teesside. The Fujifilm Diosynth Biotechnologies factory began growing the first cells for the Novavax vaccine in Billingham, County Durham this month and in a few weeks they will fill the bioreactor bag, ready to be transported to GlaxoSmithKline’s plant at Barnard Castle to be put into vials for distribution. “The first hurdle is showing it works and we don’t have that hurdle any more,” Erck said. But he added there were others still to overcome. “There’s the media that the cells have to grow in,” Erck said. “You grow them in these 2,000-litre bags, which are in short supply. Then you pour it out and you have to filter it, and the filters are in short supply. The little things count.” Novavax almost ran out of bags at one of its 20 factories earlier this year, but there had been no delays for the UK operation, according to Martin Meeson, global chief executive of Fujifilm Diosynth. “We started working on our part of the supply chain in summer last year,” he said. “We had to accelerate some of the investment here, but the commitment we made last summer to start manufacturing in February has been fulfilled.” Production of coronavirus vaccines is being ramped up. Production of coronavirus vaccines is being ramped up. Photograph: Christophe Archambault/AP Both Meeson and Erck said the UK’s vaccine taskforce had been helpful in sorting out supply issues so far, but other countries and other medical supplies might be affected. ABEC makes bioreactor bags at two plants in the US and two in Fermoy and Kells in Ireland, and delivered six 4,000-litre bags to the Serum Institute in India last year for its Covid vaccines. Brady Cole, vice-president of equipment solutions at ABEC, said: “We are hearing from our customer base of lead times that are pushing out to nine, 10, even 12 months to get bioreactor bags. We typically run out at 16 weeks to get a custom bioreactor bag out to a customer.” He said ABEC was still managing to fulfil orders at roughly that rate. “The bag manufacturing capacity can’t meet demand right now,” he added. “And on the component side, the tubes and the instruments and so forth that also go into the bag assembly – those lead times are also starting to get stretched as well. But the biggest problem we see is it really is just the ability to get bags in a reasonable amount of time.” ABEC expanded its factories last year and has now started making 6,000-litre bags, which are roughly the size of a minibus. Other firms including MilliporeSigma, part of German company Merck, have also been expanding their manufacturing facilities. American firm Thermo Fisher Scientific expects it will finish doubling its capacity this year. The US government has also blocked exports of bags, filters and other components so it can supply more Pfizer vaccines for Americans. Adar Poonawalla, the chief executive of the Serum Institute of India, said the restrictions were likely to cause serious bottlenecks. Novavax is hoping to avoid delays and “vaccine nationalism” by operating on four continents, with 20 facilities in nine countries. “One year ago, we had exactly zero manufacturing capacity,” Erck said. “We’re self-sufficient. The two main things we need to do are done in the UK. And in the EU we have plants in Spain and the Czech Republic and fill-and-finish in Germany and the Netherlands.” There was no need for vaccines to cross borders to fulfil contracts, he said. The Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine was hit by a delay to a delivery of 5 million doses from India and a problem with a batch made in Britain, and the company has been dragged into a lengthy row between the UK and the EU over vaccine exports.

#### Squo solves and the plan increases price of scarce materials and results in costly, ineffective facilities – postdates Stone.

Mcmurry-Heath 8/18 (Michelle Mcmurry-Heath, [physician-scientist and president and CEO of the Biotechnology Innovation Organization.], 8-18-2021, “Waiving intellectual property rights would harm global vaccination“, STAT, https://www.statnews.com/2021/08/18/waiving-intellectual-property-rights-compromise-global-vaccination-efforts/) ajs

Covid-19 vaccines are already remarkably cheap, and companies are offering them at low or no cost to low-income countries. Poor access to clinics and transportation are barriers in some countries, but the expense of the shot itself is not. In fact, if the World Trade Organization grants the IP waiver, it could make these vaccines more expensive.

Here’s why. Before Covid-19 emerged, the world produced at most [5.5 billion doses](https://www.barrons.com/articles/a-plan-to-break-the-vaccine-manufacturing-bottleneck-51621952245) of various vaccines every year. Now the world needs an additional [11 billion doses](https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-g7-summit---12-june-2021) — including billions of doses of mRNA vaccines that no one had ever mass-manufactured before — to fully vaccinate every eligible person on the planet against the new disease.

Even as Covid-19 vaccines were still being developed, pharmaceutical companies began retrofitting and upgrading existing facilities to produce Covid-19 vaccines, at a cost of $40 to $100 million each. Vaccine developers also licensed their technologies to well-established manufacturers, like the Serum Institute of India, to further increase production. As a result, almost every facility in the world that can quickly and safely make Covid-19 vaccines is already doing so, or will be in the next few months.

The cutting-edge mRNA vaccines from Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech face an even bigger capacity issue. Since the underlying technology is new, there are no mRNA manufacturing facilities sitting idle with operators just waiting for licensing agreements to turn on the machines. Nor are there trained personnel to run them or ensure safety and quality control. Embedding delicate mRNA vaccine molecules inside lipid nanoparticle shells at temperatures colder than Antarctica isn’t as easy as following a recipe from Bon Appetit.

Another big barrier to producing more shots is a shortage of raw materials. Suspending intellectual property protections and allowing any manufacturer to try to produce these vaccines, regardless of preparedness or experience, would increase the demand for scarce raw materials, driving up prices and impeding production.

Nor could all companies that suddenly get a green light due to suspended intellectual property rights produce vaccines as cheaply or quickly as existing manufacturers. Building a new vaccine manufacturing facility costs about $700 million, takes many months — if not years — to build and, once opened, requires another [four to six months](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/reports/2020/07/28/488196/comprehensive-covid-19-vaccine-plan/) to start producing vaccine doses. And because negotiations surrounding the WTO waiver, which began this summer, could take until December before they are completed, it wouldn’t be until well into 2023 or later that any additional doses would become available.

That’s slower than our current production rate. According to a report from Duke University’s [Global Health Innovation Center](https://launchandscalefaster.org/covid-19/vaccinemanufacturing), companies are on track to manufacture enough shots in 2021 to fully vaccinate at least 70% of the global population against Covid-19 — the level required to achieve herd immunity.

Covid-19 vaccines are saving millions of lives and protecting trillions of dollars of economic activity for an exceptionally low cost. Israel, for example, which has one of the world’s highest vaccination rates, paid [$23.50 per dose](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-said-to-be-paying-average-of-47-per-person-for-pfizer-moderna-vaccines/) for early shipments, for a total of about $315 million. That’s approximately equal to the gross domestic productivity losses incurred during [just two days of shutdowns](https://www.bmj.com/content/372/bmj.n281) in the country.

Many countries are buying shots for under $10 per dose. India and South Africa — the two countries leading the petition to gut IP rights — are paying just $8 and $5.25 per dose, respectively. For reference, a regular flu shot costs about $14 in the United States, and pediatric vaccines average about $55 per dose.

Meanwhile, low-income countries that can’t afford even modest prices are getting their vaccines at no charge. [COVAX](https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/covax), the international nonprofit vaccine distributor, aims to deliver 2 billion doses to developing nations by the end of the year.

President Biden vowed to make America the world’s [“arsenal of vaccines.”](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/05/17/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-covid-19-response-and-the-vaccination-program-4/) The U.S. has already committed $4 billion to COVAX, has donated more than 100 million vaccine doses abroad, and is on track to donate [500 million more](https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2021/08/03/1023822839/biden-is-sending-110-million-vaccines-to-nations-in-need-thats-just-a-first-step) by the end of summer. Other countries are following the administration’s leadership and ramping up their donations.

#### Turn – direct Support worse to solve pandemics – costs, corruption, and inaccuracy prove.

Philip Stevens and Stephen Ezell , 2-3-2020, "Delinkage Debunked: Why Replacing Patents With Prizes for Drug Development Won’t Work," No Publication, <https://itif.org/publications/2020/02/03/delinkage-debunked-why-replacing-patents-prizes-drug-development-wont-work> JS

Drug development prize committees would need to decide what kinds of discoveries should be eligible for prizes—and their market value—before any actual R&D begins. This kind of centralized planning would inefficiently require prize agencies to avail themselves of technological expertise and market foresight equal to that of the global pharmaceutical industry. The assumption made by advocates of government-run prizes that they would have minor deadweight costs compared with the (temporary) “monopolies” created by the IP system has been called into question by many. For instance, as Daniel Spulber, Professor of International Business at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, and an award-winning expert on innovation policy, notes, “Prize advocates tend to assume that the government would expend no resources in administering the prize system, including managing contests, selecting winners, and allocating inventions.” However, as he continues, “The government could not replace the entire patent system with contests and awards in every area of science and technology covered by the patent system without incurring astronomical administrative costs.”51 There would be other costs as well. As noted, it’s expected the global pharmaceutical industry will invest $181 billion annually in R&D by 2022.52 This is privately raised capital which governments moving toward a delinkage drug development system would have to replace through taxation. Replacing the money raised through prices with money raised through taxes would likely lead to some distortions and reduced economic growth. As Spulber observes, “Most prize advocates assume free money. In fact, the government raises money for the prizes through taxation, which causes economic distortions that involve significant deadweight losses. The deadweight welfare losses resulting from a government prize system are likely to substantially exceed any such losses from competitive markets—replacing prices with prizes would lower social welfare.”53 Evaluating How Much a Drug Is Worth A major—and as yet unresolved—problem with delinkage in general, and prizes in particular, is governments find it very hard to determine accurately the true economic and social value of an invention. In the past, this failure has resulted in government prize committees undervaluing inventions. “There is an inherent conservative bias in the prizes granted by administrative and quasi-judicial bodies. Munificence is a rare committee virtue,” wrote Harvard economist FM Scherer.54 For instance, under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, military uses of atomic energy were made ineligible for patent protection. Instead, monetary awards were disbursed to inventors by a specialist government committee. Professor Scherer has observed that atomic-energy innovators—including inventors of early methods of producing plutonium and basic liquid rocket engines—were awarded sums far below what they could have earned had their inventions been patented. Undervaluing a new medicine in a prize system matters for future innovation. In a situation wherein innovators know their inventions are unlikely to be properly rewarded, they are less likely to invest in R&D and compete for the prize. With the cost of drug development approaching $3 billion, innovators—and the venture capitalists on which many biopharmaceutical start-ups rely—need to be certain the potential rewards are worth the risk of this capital.55 If there is a real prospect of under-reward, innovators could direct their capital away from medicines and toward sectors in which the expected rate of return would be higher. Some prize advocates have suggested the problems of under-valuation and expropriation could be avoided by allocating a fixed amount to prize agencies and legally requiring them to disburse all their monies according to pre-set rules and criteria.56 But this would not prevent governments from underfunding the prize committee in the first place. Another challenge is that even for a prize winner, there would still be no guarantee the prize amount would sufficiently cover costs of development. Moreover, the prize would have to be large enough to account for the expected value of winning, which would be low given not only the technical challenges of successfully developing a drug that could be approved by governments, but that is ahead of all other competitors globally that would also hope to win the prize. The problem of under-rewarding invention is likely to be a fatal flaw in a prize system that could seriously disrupt innovation. In turn, that would harm society, as fewer new medicines would be developed. In her study of the history of prizes, economic historian Khan reiterates these last two mechanical challenges discussed. As she writes, “A systematic assessment of the role of incentives for innovation in the nineteenth century highlights the advantages of market-oriented policies which economize on information, especially in the decentralized determination of prize, value, and ‘winners.’ Market mechanisms also bypassed many of the high transactions costs attendant on negotiating, monitoring, and contracting with applicants and winners.”57 Vulnerability to Political Influence Opponents of the market-based system of drug development decry funds spent by the pharmaceutical industry on lobbying governments to ensure a favorable policy regime, such as a reasonably strong patent system and a global trading system that respects IP rights. But a prize system would hand significant new discretionary powers to government officials, who would be the ultimate arbiters of whether a new medicine wins a prize. This would create major new incentives for rent seeking and crony capitalism, and potentially result in the wholesale politicization of drug development.