### NC – Property Rights

#### I negate and value freedom.

#### There exists no universal good –

#### 1] Open Question argument – it’s impossible to equate any property X with the good since if it was, the coherent question of “is X good” would be the meaningless tautology “is good good.” Means no universal good exists.

#### 2] Regress – it’s always possible to challenge conceptions of goodness by merely asking “why?” infinitely

#### 3] Widespread moral disagreement in ethics is best explained by relativism since it’s improbable that the majority of agent who have equal access to logical reasoning are incorrect.

#### Thus, ethical theories cannot appeal to objective values but instead to internal goods that each creates. Mutual restraint on property is internally motivating as it is a prerequisite to successful action itself.

Narveson, Jan (2010). Property and rights. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (1):101-134. JS

How, then, do we get to property? In brief, the answer is that many of our actions involve the use of various bits of the world outside of ourselves. We want to be able to engage in those actions successfully, and to do this requires, generally, that others not intervene to upset those trains of actions, given the plans governing them. Successful actions “require” this in the straightforward sense that noninterference is a logically necessary condition of their success: if you stop me from doing x, then I don’t do x, by definition; but x here is, by hypothesis, the very thing I wanted to do. This can generate misunderstanding, in one important respect. Obviously, many of our actions involve others, and many involve the joint use, by ourselves with others, of assorted material objects, spaces, and processes. A few actions might involve many others. But in virtually all of these cases, it is possible to distinguish between those in the group of persons acting together and those not in that group, with the latter, usually, vastly exceeding the former in size. In those cases, persons outside the group can often act to prevent or greatly increase the difficulty of successful performance by those inside, including oneself. Here, too, property rules will often be necessary, or at least useful. A group of condominium owners (for example) needs freedom from a lot of external intervention, and each of its members has an interest in that freedom. The point generalizes: just as every individual is to have a right of liberty as against every other individual, so too every group, however small, has such a right against every other, however large. The question from my individual point of view is: How do I induce you to refrain from such interferences? The proposed answer is that I make a very general deal, or arrangement, or agreement, with you: You refrain from interfering with me, in regard to certain bits of the world, and I refrain from interfering with you in your use of certain other bits of it. This is the proposed answer because, given that we are both capable of such interferences, mutual refraining is of mutual benefit for us. We both do better in the absence of such interference: with rights, we do as well as our own powers and our relation to our environment and to each other will enable us to do. This result is far superior to what we would be able to achieve under a regime where interference, by all and sundry, is common and expected (because it is not prohibited). XI. Property-Respecting as a Moral Duty The moral dimension of all this is that, for full effect, we want this tendency to refrain from interference to become a strong internal commitment: we want everyone to have an internally monitored aversion to such interfering activity, a disposition to ask before we encroach, and not to proceed without assurance of (or reason to expect) an affirmative answer. The general possession of such a disposition is, I propose, to our maximum mutual advantage. I say “maximum” mutual advantage because this arrangement permits the widest range of potentially useful action on the part of each individual: if we ask for more, it will, by definition, be at the expense of someone else. Moreover, that expense is uncompensated, since if it were compensated to the satisfaction of the affected persons, an imposed restriction on those persons’ powers would be unnecessary. For we suppose that we will do what benefits ourselves, and a deal from you leaving me better off does benefit me—but it also benefits you, since you need not have made it, but did so. Hence, we would voluntarily accept such a deal if it were offered, and so, mutual benefit ensues.

#### Impacts:

#### 1] Liberal conceptions of property are inevitable – since resources are scarce and often incompatible among different people, the only way to effectively use resources is to distribute particular objects to particular individuals through a system of property.

#### 2] The aff’s taking of action presupposes non-interference else no action could happen, which concedes the moral authority of freedom.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with libertarianism, or a system of respecting the property rights and freedom of others. Prefer this:

#### 1] Performativity – discourse presupposes self-ownership since its intrinsic purpose is to compel belief through persuasion rather than coercion– this means contestations of my framework in debate presuppose it.

#### 2] The seperateness of persons justifies a right to self-ownership and property that cannot be aggregated with the interests of others.

Narveson, Jan (2010). Property and rights. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (1):101-134. JS

The idea of self ownership—that is, of a general right to liberty—is rooted in our particularity and our individuality. Persons are separate: one person’s purposes are not another’s; there is no necessary normative output from A’s interests to B’s. Consequently, when the pursuit of interests is to be curtailed by consideration of the interests of others, this will have to be due to aspects of interaction, specifically the impinging of some persons on others in such a way as to create a potential for cooperatively derived mutual benefit—or the reverse. This provides genuine reason, seen from each agent’s internal point of view, for restricting one’s own pursuit of benefit: the reason is simply that we stand to do better with such restrictions than without them, provided, of course, that others accept such restrictions as well. This abstract result seems to be viewed with alarm by many theorists, who apparently suppose that morals must require self-abnegatory altruism. The trouble with that, however, is that selves are the only beings with interests; they are, normatively speaking, all we have, and therefore, negating them means, on the face of it, abandoning the whole point of being someone in particular—as we all are, after all. If the point is generalized, then it raises the problem that if my self means nothing, why should anybody else’s mean something? If the satisfaction of some self doesn’t count, independently of who provided the sources of that satisfaction, then the point of altruism is as completely defeated as the initial selfinterest to be abnegated. Our individual persons and pursuits are what we have, and the general principle of liberty protects us in being the persons we are, doing what we want to do, and thus acquiring what we can and want to acquire, compatibly with the similar right of others.

#### 3] Viewing others as ends in themselves is a prerequisite for moral value – coercion treats others as a mere means for one’s own purposes.

Korsgaard ’83 (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action, he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, "for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity" or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action." By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### Impact Calc—

#### 1] The only moral wrongs are those that intentionally infringe upon their rights, not those that make property less available for others. For example, I don’t *wrong* *you* by buying the last carton of milk at the grocery store when you want milk, but it’s mere happening

#### 2] Moral responsibility is only possible via the standard – if we didn’t regard agents as free, then we can’t hold them culpable for immoral actions since there would be no possibility of them doing otherwise and being moral.

#### I defend the squo – now negate:

#### Liberal conception of property rights are awesome and egalitarian – space exploration only changes the location and not the nature of property claims, which makes private appropriation just.

Baca, Kurt Anderson Property Rights in Outer Space, 58 J. Air L. & Com. 1041 (1993) https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol58/iss4/4 JS

The powers necessary to constitute an efficient system of property rights on Earth have been found, by deduction from first principles by political philosophers influential in the development of the Western institutions and from history and practice in the courts, to be the power to exclude, to use, and to dispose. 98 The resulting system is also inherently equitable as it benefits society as a whole and as it protects investments and expectations. This system would remain equitable so long as the initial allocation of any new resource was, and is, not based on mere usurpation of unclaimed property, but is based on investment in the property that adds to its value. 99 This system of property rights relies on the provision of powers to the holder of the property. The source of the power is ultimately in the state that enforces the liabilities of parties corresponding to the powers of owners: the liability to exclusion, the liability for interference with use, and the liability to respect contracts and to refrain from hindering disposition. °0 This implies that sovereign power is essential to any functioning system of property rights, and in the absence of a general sovereign body, sovereignty is to be found in the nation-state. How does the extension of man's activities into space and onto the celestial bodies change the basic necessities of an efficient and equitable property rights system? The movement of activities into space affects only the place of activities. The nature of those activities and of the actor remain unchanged. The nature of efficiency and equity are likewise unchanged, and the need for certain securities and guarantees to foster productive activity by man is unchanged. The same property rights system that is most beneficial on Earth will be most beneficial on the celestial bodies.

#### There is no such thing as unjust initial acquisition – an injustice requires one whose right has been violated, which cannot be the case if a resource is unclaimed.

Feser, E. (2005). THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION. Social Philosophy and Policy, 22(1), 56–80. doi:10.1017/s0265052505041038 JS

The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of justice, that is to say, simply does not apply to initial acquisition. It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that external resources are initially unowned. Consider the following example. Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisition of R, B would have to have had a rightful claim over R, a right to R. By hypothesis, however, B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after someone has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.

#### That negates – space is not under ownership by any state now, which proves that acquisition cannot be unjust