### T

#### Interpretation:

#### The aff must defend reducing IP protections for more than 1 medicine

Hurbles, 17

(1-14, https://hinative.com/en-US/questions/1594102)

You say "take some medicine" medicine is a hard word because medicine is singular and plural. "Medicines" means many types of medicines, but you use "medicine" as singular and plural for a single type of medicine

#### The plural means different kinds of medicines

WordHippo

https://www.wordhippo.com/what-is/the-plural-of/medicine.html

The noun medicine can be countable or uncountable. In more general, commonly used, contexts, the plural form will also be [medicine](https://www.wordhippo.com/what-is/the-meaning-of-the-word/medicine.html). However, in more specific contexts, the plural form can also be [medicines](https://www.wordhippo.com/what-is/the-meaning-of-the-word/medicines.html) e.g. in reference to various types of medicines or a collection of medicines.

#### B. Violation – the aff specifies only one type of medicine, or anti-malarial drugs.

#### C. Reasons to prefer

#### 1. The affirmative interpretation is unreasonable - it creates a race to the bottom of smallest possible changes and obscure singular medicines to dodge links. Plural solves since there isn’t unified solvency advocates for random combinations of medicines so it forces debates to groups of medicines that are easier to link disads into.

#### 2. Precision is good – T is about the model of debate that you endorse – their model of debate lets them arbitrarily jettison words from the resolution and shift out of neg prep which is on-net worse for debate

#### D. Topicality is a voting issue for predictable limits- it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for. It should be evaluated through competing interpretations – reasonability is arbitrary and causes a race to the bottom based on questionable argumentation and you can’t be reasonably topical.

#### No RVIs -- forcing the 1NC to go all in kills substance education and discourages checking abuse

### NC

#### Morality must begin from practical reason—it’s impossible to deny reason’s authority.

Velleman (David, “Self To Self”, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pg 18-19)

As we have seen, requirements that depend for their force on some external source of authority turn out to be escapable because the authority behind them can be questioned. We can ask, “Why should I act on this desire?” or “Why should I obey the U.S. Government?” or even “Why should I obey God?” And as we observed in the **case** of the desire to punch someone in the nose, this question demands a reason for acting. The authority we are questioning would be vindicated, in each case, by the production of a sufficient reason. What this observation suggests is that any purported source of practical authority depends on reasons for obeying it—and hence on the authority of reasons. Suppose, then, that we attempted to question the authority of reasons themselves, as we earlier questioned other authorities. Where we previously asked “Why should I act on my desire?” let us now ask “Why should I act for reasons?” Shouldn’t this question open up a route of escape from all requirements? As soon as we ask why we should act for reasons, however, we can hear something odd in our question. To ask “Why should I?” is to demand a reason; and so to ask “Why should I act for reasons?” is to demand a reason for acting for reasons. This demand implicitly concedes the very authority that it purports to question—namely, the authority of reasons. Why would we demand a reason if we didn’t envision acting for it? If we really didn’t feel required to act for reasons, then a reason for doing so certainly wouldn’t help. So there is something self-defeating about asking for a reason to act for reasons.

#### Practical reason means we must be able to universally will maxims—our judgements are authoritative and can’t only apply to ourselves anymore than 2+2=4 can be true only for me.

#### That entails that freedom is an intrinsic good – if we universally willed coercion then I would be extending my freedom to coerce others while simultaneously endorsing that other people violate my freedom, a contradiction. Thus the standard is respecting freedom. Now prefer the standard:

#### 1] Culpability – if we didn’t regard agents as free, then we can’t hold them culpable for immoral actions since there would be no possibility of them doing otherwise and being moral.

#### 2] Argumentation Ethics – Any attempt to justify a violation of rights commits performative contradiction.

Marian Eabrasu, Research fellow at the GRANEM (Angers University), A Reply to the Current Critiques Formulated Against Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics, 03/13/2009, <https://mises.org/library/reply-current-critiques-formulated-against-hoppe%E2%80%99s-argumentation-ethics> ///AHS PB

Hoppe observes that “the right to self-ownership” is very similar with the statement “I am alive.” One has to be not only a living person but she has to be also a non-coerced self-owner in order to deny the right to self-ownership. Hence, Hoppe purports to show that denying the right to self-ownership is self-contradictory: Such property right in one’s own body must be said to be justified a priori. For anyone who would try to justify any norm whatsoever would already have to presuppose an exclusive right to control over his [their] body as a valid norm simply in order to say “I propose such and such.” And anyone disputing such right, then, would become caught up in a practical contradiction, since arguing so would already implicitly have to accept the very norm which he was [they where] disputing. [Hoppe 2006, 342] Were this argument valid, libertarianism would be the only theory of justice that can be justified. By libertarianism it is intended the normative set of propositions derived from the self-ownership axiom. “In effect, this argument supports the natural rights position of libertarianism as espoused by the other master thinker of the modern libertarian movement, Murray N. Rothbard—above all in his Ethics of Liberty” (Hoppe 2006, 340–41). Showing that only the self-ownership axiom can pass the test of performative contradiction, justifies the preference for it. Libertarianism should be preferred to any other theory of justice, because only libertarianism is non-contradictory. To be sure, this fact does not impede conflicts to arise or non-libertarian solutions to be provided. Hoppe’s argument shows only that it would be absurd (i.e., self-contradictory) to adopt a non-libertarian ethics: I demonstrate that only the libertarian private property ethic can be justified argumentatively, because it is the praxeological presupposition of argumentation as such; and that any deviating, non-libertarian ethical proposal can be shown to be in violation of this demonstrated preference. Such a proposal can be made, of course, but its propositional content would contradict the ethic for which one demonstrated a preference by virtue of one’s own act of proposition-making, i.e., by the act of engaging in argumentation as such. […] Likewise, non-libertarian ethical proposals are falsified by the reality of actually proposing them. [Hoppe 2006, 341] If libertarianism is the correct ethical theory, the foremost political implication which follows from this idea is anarchy. As simple as the solution to the problem of social order is and as much as people in their daily lives intuitively recognize and act according to the ethics of private property just explained, this simple and undemanding solution implies some surprisingly radical conclusions. Apart from ruling out as unjustified all activities such as murder, homicide, rape, trespass, robbery, burglary, theft, and fraud, the ethics of private property is also incompatible with the existence of a state defined as an agency that possesses a compulsory territorial monopoly of ultimate decision-making (jurisdiction) and/or the right to tax. [Hoppe 2006, 388]

#### 3] Other Frameworks Collapse – viewing others as ends in themselves is a prerequisite for moral value.

Korsgaard ’83 (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action, he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, "for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity" or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action." By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### I contend that taking away IP violates the categorical imperative:

#### 1] Self ownership entails a right to all products of your body and mind, which includes intellectual property.

Attas D. (2008) Lockean Justifications of Intellectual Property. In: Gosseries A., Marciano A., Strowel A. (eds) Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice. Palgrave Macmillan, London. <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-0-230-58239-2_2> JS

On a very simple notion of intellectual creativity, ideas are simply extensions of the self. That is to say, mental products such as ideas, inventions, works of art, and so on, come into being as parts of the mind, in the same way as body products, such as hair or blood, come into being as parts of the body. Since we own our body, we also own its products; if we similarly own our mind, we also own our mind’s products. Were Locke to have given any thought to the idea of intellectual property when he was writing Of Civil Government, he might have said not only that ‘The labour of his body, and the work of his hands’, but also that the ideas of his mind, ‘we may say are properly his’. There is no real need to ‘appropriate’ anything in the genuine sense, since these things come into the world already attached to persons having foundational rights of self-ownership with respect to them.

#### 2] When one labors to create a product, using the product without their consent uses them as a mere means to an end since you’re using their labor for your own benefit – any piece of IP, especially medicines, requires labor to produce making it property.

#### 3] Taking away intellectual property is a contradiction in conception, since if every agent was able to take the intellectual property then no one would make IP since there’s no incentive to so there’d be no IP to steal.